



THE HISTORIANS.
HISTORY
OF THE WORLD




BUILDING THE PARTHENON; PHIDIAS AT WORK ON THE SCULPTURES
Painted especially for "The Historians' History of the World" by A. Raynolt

THE HISTORIANS' HISTORY OF THE WORLD

A Comprehensive Narrative
of the Rise and Development
of Nations from the Earliest
Times as recorded by over
Two Thousand of the Great
Writers of All Ages. Edited
with the Assistance of a Dis-
tinguished Board of Advisers
and Contributors

BY

HENRY SMITH WILLIAMS, LL.D.



IN TWENTY-SEVEN VOLUMES

VOLUME III—GREECE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

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TOGETHER WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ON

THE SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK HISTORY

BY

EDUARD MEYER

A STUDY OF

THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

BY

HERMANN DIELS

AND A CHARACTERISATION OF


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THE SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK HISTORY

WRITTEN SPECIALLY FOR THE PRESENT WORK

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THE history of Greek civilisation forms the centre of the history of antiquity. In the East, advanced civilisations with settled states had existed for thousands of years ; and as the populations of Western Asia and of Egypt gradually came into closer political relations, these civilisations, in spite of all local differences in customs, religion, and habits of thought, gradually grew together into a uniform sphere of culture. This development reached its culmination in the rise of the great Persian universal monarchy, the "kingdom of the lands," i.e. "of the world." But from the very beginning these oriental civilisations are so completely dominated by the effort to maintain what has been won that all progress beyond this point is prevented. And although we can distinguish an individual, active, and progressive intellectual movement among many nations, — as in Egypt, among the Iranians and Indians, while among the Babylonians and Phœnicians nothing of the sort is thus far known, — nevertheless the forces that represent tradition are in the end everywhere victorious over it and force it to bow to their yoke. Hence, all oriental civilisations culminate in the creation of a theological system which governs all the relations and the whole field of thought of man, and is everywhere recognised as having existed from all eternity and as being inviolable to all future time.

With the cessation of political life and the establishment of the universal monarchy, the nationality and the distinctive civilisation of the separate districts are restricted to religion, which has become theology. The development of oriental civilisation then subsides in the competition of these religions and the unavoidable coalescence consequent thereupon. This is true even of that nation which experienced the richest intellectual development, and did the most important work of all oriental peoples — the Israelites. When the great political storms from which the universal monarchy arose have spent their rage, Israel, the nation, has developed into Judaism ; and under the Persian rule and with the help of the kingdom it organises itself as a church which seeks to put an end to all free individual movement, upon which the greatness of ancient Israel rests.

It was just the same with the ruling nation, the Persians, however vigorous their entrance into history under Cyrus. The Persian kingdom is, indeed, a civilised state, but the civilisations that it includes lack the highest that a civilisation can offer: an energetic, independent life, a combination of the firm institutions and permanent attainments of the past with the free, progressive, and creative movement of individuality. So the East, after the Persian period, was unable of its own force to create anything new. It stagnated, and, had it not received new elements from without, had it been left permanently to itself, would perhaps in the course of centuries have altered its external form again and again, but would hardly have produced anything new or have progressed a step beyond what had already been attained.

But when Cyrus and Darius founded the Persian kingdom, the East no longer stood alone. The nations and kingdoms of the East came into communication with the coast of the Mediterranean very early — not later than the beginning of the second millennium B.C.; and under their influence, about 1500 B.C., a civilisation arose among the Greeks bordering the Ægean. We call it the Mycenæan, and in spite of its formal dependence upon the East it could, in the field of art (where alone we have an exact knowledge of it), take an independent and equal place beside the great civilisations of the East.

How Greek civilisation continued to advance from step to step for many centuries in the field of politics and society as well as in that of the intellect; how it spread simultaneously over all the islands and coasts of the Mediterranean, from Massalia on the coast of the Ligurians and Cumæ in the land of the Oscans to the Crimea and the eastern coast of the Black Sea, and in the south as far as Cyprus and Cilicia; how Greek culture at the same time took root in much more remote districts, especially in Asia Minor; and how under its influence an energetic civilisation arose among the tribes of Italy, cannot be depicted here.

When the Persian kingdom was founded the Hellenes had developed from a group of linguistically related tribes into a nation possessing a completely independent culture whose equal the world had never yet seen, a culture whose mainspring was that very political and intellectual freedom of the individual which was completely lacking in the East.

Hence its character was purely human, its aim the complete and harmonious development of man; and if for that very reason it always strove to be moderate and to adapt itself to the moral and cosmical forces that govern human life, nevertheless it could accomplish this only in free subordination, by absorbing the moral commandment into its own will. Therefore it did not permit the opposing theological tendencies to gain control, strong as was their development in considerable districts of Greece in the sixth century. At that very period, on the other hand, it was stretching out to grasp the apples on the tree of knowledge; in the most advanced regions of Hellas science and philosophy were opposing theology. National as it was, this culture lacked but one thing: the political unity of the nation, the co-ordination of all its powers in the vigorous organism of a great state.

The instinct of freedom itself, upon which the greatness of this civilisation rested, favoured by the geographical conformation of the Greek soil, had caused a constantly increasing political disunion, which saw in the complete and unlimited autonomy of every individual community, even of the tiniest of the hundreds of city states into which Hellas was divided, the highest ideal of liberty, the only fit existence for a Hellene. And, inter-

nally, every one of these dwarf states was eaten by the canker of political and social contrasts which could not be permanently suppressed by any attempt to introduce a just political order founded upon a codified law and a written constitution — whether the ideal were the rule of the “best,” the rule of the whole, *i.e.* of the actual masses, or that of a mixed constitution. The smaller the city and its territory, the more apt were these attempts to become bloody revolutions. Lively as was the public spirit, clearly as the justice of the demand for subordination to law was recognised, every individual and every party interpreted it according to its own conception and its own judgment, and at all times there were not a few who were ready to seize for themselves all that the moment offered.

To be sure, manifold and successful attempts to found a greater political power were brought about by the advancing growth of industry and culture, as well as by the development of the citizen army of hoplites, which had a firm tactical structure and was well schooled in the art of war. In the Peloponnesus Sparta brought the whole south under the rule of its citizens and not only effected the union of almost the whole peninsula into a league, but established its right, as the first military power of Hellas, to leadership in all common affairs.

In middle Greece, Thebes succeeded in uniting Bœotia into a federal state, while its neighbour Athens, which had maintained the unity of the Attic district since the beginning of history, began to annex the neighbouring districts of Megara, Bœotia, and Eubœa, and laid the foundation of a colonial power, as Corinth had formerly done. In the north the Thessalians acquired leadership over all surrounding tribes. In the west, in Sicily, usurpers had founded larger monarchical unified states, especially in Syracuse and Agrigentum.

But all these combinations were after all only of very limited extent and by no means firmly united; on the contrary, the weaker communities felt even the loosest kind of federation, to say nothing of dependence, as an oppressive fetter which impaired the ideal of the individual destiny of the autonomous state, and which at least one party, — generally the one that happened to be out of power, — felt justified in bursting at the first opportunity.

However, as things lay, the nation found itself forced, with this sort of constitution, to take up the struggle for its political independence. The Greeks of Asia Minor, formerly subjects of the kings of Sardis, had become subjects of the Persian kingdom under Cyrus; the free Hellenes had the most varied relations with the latter, and more than once gave him occasion to intervene in their affairs. The Persian kingdom, which under Darius no longer attempted conquests that were not necessary for the maintenance of its own existence, took no advantage of these provocations until the revolt of the Greeks of Asia Minor, supported by Athens, made war inevitable.

After the first attempt had failed Xerxes repeated it on the greatest scale. Against the Hellenic nation, whose alien character was everywhere a hindrance in its path, the Orient arose in the east and the west for a decisive struggle; the Phœnician city of Carthage, the great sea power of the west, was in alliance with the Persian kingdom. Only the minority of the Hellenes joined in the defence; in the west the princes of Syracuse and Agrigentum, in the east Sparta and the Peloponnesian league, Athens, the cities of Eubœa and a few smaller powers. But in both fields of operation the Hellenes won a complete victory; the Carthaginians were defeated on the Himera, in the east Themistocles broke the base of the Persian position by destroying their sea power with the Athenian fleet that he had created, and

on the battle-field of Plataea the Persian land forces were defeated by the superiority of the Greek armies of hoplites.

Thus the Hellenes had won the leading position in the world. For the moment there was no other power that could oppose them by land or sea; the Asiatic king never again ventured an attack on Greece. Her absolute military superiority was founded upon the national character, the energetic public spirit, the voluntary subordination to law and discipline and the capacity for conceiving and realising great political ideas. The Hellenes could gain and assert permanently the ascendancy over the entire Mediterranean world, and impress upon it for all time the stamp of their nationality, provided only that they were united and saw the way to gather together all their resources into a single firmly knit great power.

But the Greeks were not able to meet this first and most urgent demand; though the days of particularism were irrevocably past, the idea which was so inseparably bound up with the very nature of Hellenism still exerted a powerful influence. As the individual communities were no longer able to maintain an independent existence, they gathered about the two powers that had gained the leadership, and each of which was striving for supremacy: the patriarchal military state of Sparta and the new progressive great power of Athens.

With the victory over the East it had been decided that the individuality of Hellenic culture, the intellectual liberty which gives free play to all vigorous powers in both material and intellectual life, had asserted itself; the future lay only along this way. Mighty was the advance that in all fields carried Greece along with gigantic strides; after only a few decades the time before the Persian wars seemed like a remote and long past antiquity.

But mighty as were the advancing strides of the nation in trade and industry, in wealth and all the luxury of civilisation, in art and science, all these attainments finally became factors of political disintegration. They furthered the unlimited development of individualism, which in custom and law and political life recognises no other rule than its own ego and its claims. The ideal world of the time of the sophists and the politics of an Alcibiades and a Lysander are the results of this development.

Athens perceived the political tasks that were set for the Hellenic people and ventured an attempt to perform them. They could be accomplished only by admitting the new ideas into the programme of democracy, by the foundation and extension of sea power, by an aggressive policy which aimed more and more at the subjection of the Greek world under the hegemony of one city. In consequence all opposing elements were forced under the banner of Sparta, which adopted the programme of conservatism and particularism, in order to strengthen its resistance, and restrict and, if possible, overcome its rival.

The conflict was inevitable, though both sides were reluctant to enter upon it; twenty years after the battle of Salamis it broke out. The fact that Athens was trying at the same time to continue the war against Persia and wrest Cyprus and Egypt from it gave her opponents the advantage; she had far overestimated her strength. After a struggle of eleven years (460-449 B.C.) Athens found herself compelled to make peace with Persia and free the Greek mainland, only retaining absolute control over the sea.

Under the rule of Pericles she consolidated her power, and the ideals that lived in her were embodied in splendid creations. She proved herself equal,

in spite of all internal instability and crises, to a second attack of her Greek opponents (431–421 B.C.). But it again became evident that the radical democracy, which was now at the helm, had no grasp of the realities of the political situation; for the second time it stretched out its hand for the hegemony over all Hellas, in unnatural alliance with Alcibiades, the conscienceless, ambitious man who was aiming at the crown of Athens and Hellas.

Mighty indeed was the plan to subdue the Western world, Sicily first of all; then with doubled power first to crush the opponents at home and then gain the supremacy over the whole Mediterranean world. But what a united Hellas might have accomplished was far beyond the resources of Athens, even if the democrats had not overthrown their dangerous ally at the first opportunity, and thus lamed the undertaking at the outset.

The catastrophe of the Athenians before Syracuse (413 B.C.) is the turning-point of Greek history. All the opponents of Athens united, and the Persian king, who saw that the hour had come to regain his former power without a struggle, made an alliance with them. Only through his subsidies was it possible for Sparta and her allies to reduce Athens—until she lay prostrate. And the gain fell to Persia alone, however feeble the kingdom had meanwhile become internally. Sparta, after overthrowing the despotism of Lysander, made an honest attempt to reorganise the Greek world after the conservative programme, and to fulfil the task laid upon the nation in the contest with Persia. But she only furnished her opponents at home, and particularism, which now immediately turned against its former ally, an occasion for a fresh uprising, which Sparta could master only by forming a new alliance with Persia. After the peace of 386 the king of Asia utters the decisive word even in the affairs of the Greek mother-country.

Here dissolution is going rapidly forward. Every power that has once more for a short time possessed some importance in Greece succumbs to it in turn; first Sparta, then Thebes and Athens. The attempts to establish permanent and assured conditions by local unions in small districts, as in Chalcidice under Olynthus, in Bœotia and Arcadia, were never able to hold out more than a short time. It was useless to look longer for the fulfilment of the national destiny. Feeble as the Persian kingdom was internally, every revolt against it, to say nothing of an attempt to make conquests and acquire a new field of colonisation in Asia,—the programme that Isocrates repeatedly urged upon the nation,—was made impossible by internal strife. Prosperity was ruined, the energy of the nation was exhausted in the wild feuds of brigands, the most desolate conditions prevailed in all communities. Greek history ends in chaos, in a hopeless struggle of all against all.

In this same period, to be sure, the positive, constructive criticism of Socrates and his school rose in opposition to the negative tendencies of sophistry; and made the attempt to put an end to the political misery, to create by a proper education the true citizen who looks only to the common welfare in place of the ignorant citizen of the existing states, who was governed only by self-interest. These efforts resulted in the development of science and the preservation for all future time of the highest achievements of the intellectual life of Hellas, but they could not produce an internal transformation of men and states, whose earthly life does not lie within the sphere of the problems of theoretical perception, but in that of the problems of will and power. So at the same time that Greek culture has reached the highest point of its development, prepared to become the culture of the world, the Greek nation is condemned to complete impotence.

For the development in the West, different as was its course, led to no other result. In the fifth century Greece controlled almost all Sicily except the western point, the whole south of Italy up to Tarentum, Elea and Posidonia and the coast of Campania. Nowhere was an enemy to be seen that might have become dangerous. The Carthaginians were repulsed, and the power of the Etruscans, who in the sixth century had striven for the hegemony in Italy, decayed, partly from internal weakness, partly in consequence of the revolt of their subjects, especially the Romans and the Sabines. The Cumæans under Aristodemus with the Sabines as their allies defeated Aruns, the son of Porsena of Clusium, at Aricia about 500 B.C., and in the year 474 the Etruscan sea power suffered defeat at Cumæ from the fleet of Hiero of Syracuse.

The cities of western Greece stood then as if founded for all eternity; they were adorned with splendid buildings, the gayest and most luxurious life developed in their streets; and they had leisure enough, after the Greek manner, to dissipate their energies, which were not claimed by external enemies, in internal strife and in struggles for the hegemony. Only the bold attempts which Phocæa made in the sixth century to turn the western basin of the Mediterranean likewise into a Greek sea, to get a firm footing in Corsica and southern Spain, had succumbed to the resistance of the Carthaginians, who were in alliance with the Etruscans. Only in the north, on the coast of Liguria from the Alps to the Pyrenees, Massalia maintained its independence. Southern Spain, Gades, and the coast of the land of Tarshish (Tartessus) were occupied by the Carthaginians about the middle of the fifth century; and the Greeks and all foreign mariners in general were cut off from the navigation of the ocean, as well as from the coasts of North Africa and Sardinia.

In the fourth century the political situation is totally changed in both east and west. The Greeks are reduced to the defensive and lose one position after the other. A few years after the destruction of the Athenian expedition the Carthaginians stretched out their hands for Sicily; in the years 409 and 406 they take and destroy Selinus, Himera, and Agrigentum; in the wars of the following years every other Greek city of the island except Syracuse was temporarily occupied and plundered by them.

In Italy after the middle of the fifth century a new people made their entrance into history, the Sabellian (Oscan) mountain tribes. From the valleys of the Abruzzi and the Samnitic Apennines they pressed forward towards the rich plains of the coast, and the land of civilisation with its inhabitants succumbed to them almost everywhere. To be sure, the Sabines under Rome defended themselves against the Æquians and Volscians, and so did the Apulians in the east against the Frentanians and Pentrians of Samnium. But the Etruscans of Capua and Nola and the Greeks of Cumæ were overcome (438 and 421 B.C.) by the Sabellian Campanians, and Naples alone in this district was able to preserve its independence. In the south the Lucanians advanced farther and farther, took Posidonia (Paestum) in 400 B.C., Pyxus, Laos, and harassed the Greek cities of the east coast and the south.

From between these hostile powers, the Carthaginians and the Sabellians, an energetic ruler, Dionysius of Syracuse (405–367 B.C.), once more rescued Hellenism. In great battles, with heavy losses to be sure, and only by the employment of the military power of the Oscans, of Campanian mercenary troops and of the Lucanians, he succeeded in setting up once more a powerful Greek kingdom, including two-thirds of Sicily, the south of Italy as far as

Crotona and Terina; he held Carthage in restraint, scourged the Etruscans in the western sea, and at the same time occupied a number of important points on the Adriatic, Lissus and Pharos in Illyria, several Apulian towns, Ancona, and Hadria at the mouth of the Po in Italy. Dionysius had covered his rear by a close alliance with Sparta, which not only insured him against any republican uprising, but made possible an uninterrupted recruiting of mercenaries from the Peloponnesus. In return Dionysius supported the Spartans in carrying through the Kings' Peace and against their enemies elsewhere.

The kingdom of Dionysius seemed to rest on a firm and permanent foundation. Had it continued to exist the whole course of the world's history would have been different; Hellenism could have maintained its position in the West, which might even have received again a Greek impress instead of becoming Italic and Roman.

But the kingdom of Dionysius was in the most direct opposition to all that Greek political theory demanded; it was a despotic state which made the free self-government of communities an empty form in the capital Syracuse, and in the subject territories, for the most part, simply abolished the city-state, the *polis*. The necessity of a strong government that would protect Hellenism in the West against its external enemies was indeed recognised by the discerning, but internally it seemed possible to relax and to effect a more ideal political formation.

Under the successor of the old despot, Dionysius II, Plato's pupil, Dion, and Plato himself, made an attempt at reform, first with the ruler's support, and then in opposition to him. The result was, that the west Grecian kingdom was shattered (357-353 B.C.), while the establishment of the ideal state was not successful; instead anarchy appeared again, and the struggle of all against all. Only the enemies of the nation gained. In Sicily, to be sure, Timoleon (345-337) was able to establish a certain degree of order; he overthrew the tyrants, repulsed the Carthaginians, restored the cities and gave them a modified democratic constitution. But the federation of these republics had no permanence. On the death of Timoleon the internal and external strife began anew, and the final verdict was uttered by the governor of the Carthaginian province.

In Italy, on the other hand, the majority of the Greek cities were conquered by the Lucanians or the newly risen Bruttians. On the west coast only Naples and Elea were left, in the south Rhegium; in the east Locri, Crotona, and Thurii had great difficulty in defending themselves against the Bruttians. Tarentum alone (upon which Heraclea and Metapontum were dependent) possessed a considerable power, owing to its incomparable situation on a sea-girt peninsula and to the trade and wealth which furnished it the means again and again to enlist Greek chieftains and mercenaries in its service for the struggle against its enemies.

It was as Plato wrote to the Syracusans in the year 352 B.C. If matters go on in this way, no end can be foreseen "until the whole population, supporters of tyrants and democrats, alike, has been destroyed, the Greek language has disappeared from Sicily and the island fallen under the power and rule of the Phœnicians or Oscans" (*Epist.* 8, 353 e). In a century the prophecy was fulfilled. But its range extends a great deal farther than Plato dreamed; it is the fate not only of the western Greeks, but of the whole Hellenic nation, that he foretells here.

The Greek states were not equal to the task of maintaining the position of their nation as a world-power and gaining control of the world for their

civilisation. When they had completely failed, a half-Greek neighbouring people, the Macedonians, attempted to carry out this mission. The impotence of the Greek world gave King Philip (359–336) the opportunity, which he seized with the greatest skill and energy, of establishing a strong Macedonian kingdom, including all Thrace as far as the Danube, extending on the west to the Ionian Sea, and finally, on the basis of a general peace, of uniting the Hellenic world of the mother-country in a firm league under Macedonian hegemony (337 B.C.).

Philip adopted the national programme of the Hellenes proposed by Isocrates and began war in Asia against the Persians (336 B.C.). His youthful son Alexander then carried it out on a far greater scale than his father had ever intended. His aim was to subdue the whole known world, the *οικουμένη*, simultaneously to Macedonian rule and Hellenic civilisation. Moreover, as the descendant of Hercules and Achilles, as king of Macedonia and leader of the Hellenic league, imbued by education with Hellenic culture, the triumphs of which he had enthusiastically absorbed, he felt himself called as none other to this work. Darius III, after the victory of Issus (November 333 B.C.), offered him the surrender of Western Asia as far as the Euphrates; and the interests of his native state and also, — we must not fail to note, — the true interests of Hellenic culture would have been far better served by such self-restraint than by the ways that Alexander followed.

But he would go farther, out into the immeasurable; the attraction to the infinite, to the comprehension and mastery of the universe, both intellectual and material, that lies in the nature of the yet inchoate uniform world-culture, finds its most vivid expression in its champion. When, indeed, he would advance farther and farther, from the Punjab to the Ganges and to the ends of the world, his instrument, his army, failed him; he had to turn back. But the Persian kingdom, Asia as far as the Indus, he conquered, brought permanently under Macedonian rule, and laid the foundation for its Hellenisation. With this, however, only the smaller portion of his mission was fulfilled. The East everywhere offered further tasks which had in part been undertaken by the Persian kingdom at the height of its power under Darius I — the exploration of Arabia, of the Indian Ocean, and of the Caspian Sea, the subjugation of the predatory nomads of the great steppe that extends from the Danube through southern Russia and Turania as far as the Jaxartes.

It was of far more importance that Hellenism had a task in the West like that in the East; to save the Greeks of Italy and Sicily, to overcome the Carthaginians and the tribes of Italy, to turn the whole Mediterranean into a Greek sea, was just as urgently necessary as the conquest of Western Asia. It was the aim that Alcibiades had set himself and on which Athens had gone to wreck.

In the same years in which the Macedonian king was conquering the Persians, his brother-in-law, Alexander of Epirus, at the request of Tarentum, had devoted himself to this task. After some success at the beginning he had been overcome by the Lucanians and Bruttians and the opposition of Hellenic particularism (334–331 B.C.).

Now the Macedonian king made preparations to take up this work also and thus complete his conquest of the world. That the resources of Macedonia were inadequate for this purpose was perfectly clear to him. Since he had rejected the proposals of Darius he had employed the conquered Asiatics in the government of his empire, and above all had endeavoured to form an auxiliary force to his army out of the people that had previously

ruled Asia. In his naïve overvaluation of education, due to the Socratic belief in the omnipotence of the intellect, he thought he could make Macedonians out of the young Persians. But as ruler of the world he must no longer bear the fetters which the usage of his people and the terms of the Hellenic league put upon him. He must stand above all men and peoples, his will must be law to them, like the commandment of the gods. The march to Ammon (331 B.C.), which at the time enjoyed the highest regard in the Greek world, inaugurated this departure. This elevation of the kingship to divinity was not an outgrowth of oriental views, although it resembles them, but of political necessity and of the loftiest ideas of Greek culture—of the teaching of Greek philosophy, common to all Socratic schools, of the unlimited sovereignty of the true sage, whose judgment no commandment can fetter; he is no other than the true king.

Henceforth this view is inseparable from the idea of kingship among all occidental nations down to our own times. It returns in the absolute monarchy that Cæsar wished to found at Rome and which then gradually develops out of the principate of Augustus, until Diocletian and Constantine bring it to perfection; it returns, only apparently modified by Christian views, in the absolute monarchy of modern times, in kingship by the grace of God as well as in the universal monarchy of Napoleon, and in the divine foundation of the autocracy of the Czar.

But Alexander was not able to bring his state to completion. In the midst of his plans, in the full vigour of youth, just as a boundless future seemed to lie before him, he was carried off by death at Babylon, on the thirteenth of June, 323 B.C., in the thirty-third year of his age.

With the death of Alexander his plans were buried. He left no heir who could have held the empire together; his generals fought for the spoils. The result of the mighty struggles of the period of the Diadochi, which covers almost fifty years (323-277 B.C.), is, that the Macedonian empire is divided into three great powers; the kingdom of the Lagidæ, who from the seaport of Alexandria on the extreme western border of Egypt control the eastern Mediterranean with all its coasts, and the valley of the Nile; the kingdom of the Seleucidæ, who strive in continual wars to hold Asia together; and the kingdom of the Antigonidæ, who obtained possession of Macedonia, depopulated by the conquest of the world and again by the fearful Celtic invasion (280), and who, when they wish to assert themselves as a great power, must attempt to acquire an ascendancy in some form or other over Greece and the Ægean Sea.

Of these three powers the kingdom of the Lagidæ is most firmly welded together, being in full possession of all the resources that trade and sea power, money and politics, afford. To re-establish the universal monarchy was never its aim, even when circumstances seemed to tempt to it. But as long as strong rulers wear the crown it always stands on the offensive against the other two; it harasses them continually, hinders them at every step from consolidating, wrests from the Seleucidæ almost all the coast towns of Palestine and Phœnicia as far as Thrace, temporarily gains control of the islands of the Ægean, and supports every hostile movement that is made in Greece against Macedonia. The Greek mother-country is thus continually forced anew into the struggle, the play of intrigue between the court of Alexandria and the Macedonian state never gives it an opportunity to become settled. All revolts of the Greek world received the support of Alexandria; the uprising of Athens and Sparta in the war of Chremonides (264), the attempt of Aratus to give the Peloponnesus an independent

organisation by means of the Achæan league (beginning in 252), and finally the uprising of Sparta under Cleomenes. The aim of giving the Greek world an independent form was never attained; finally, when at the end of the reign of Ptolemy III Euergetes (221) the kingdom of the Lagidæ withdraws and lets Cleomenes fall, the peninsula comes anew under the supremacy of the Macedonians, whom Aratus the "liberator" had himself brought back to the citadel of Corinth. But neither can the Macedonian king attain the full power that Philip and Alexander had possessed a century earlier; in particular, its resources are insufficient, even in alliance with the Achæans, to overthrow the warlike, piratical Ætolian state, which is constantly increasing in power. So Greece never gets out of these hopeless conditions; on the contrary, indeed, through the emigration of the population to the Asiatic colonies, through the decay of a vigorous peasant population which began as early as in the fourth century, through the economic decline of commerce and industry caused by the shifting of the centre of gravity to the east, its situation becomes more and more wretched and the population constantly diminishes. It can never attain peace of itself, but only through an energetic and ruthlessly despotic foreign rule.

In the East, on the contrary, an active and hopeful life developed. The great kings of the Lagidæan kingdom, the first three Ptolemies, fully appreciated the importance of intellectual life to the position of their kingdom in the world. All that Greek culture offered they tried to attract to Alexandria, and they managed to win for their capital the leading position in literature and science. But in other respects the kingdom of the Lagidæ is by no means the state in which the life of the new time reaches its full development. However much, in opposition to the Greek world, in conflict with Macedonia, they coquette with the Hellenic idea of liberty, within their own jurisdiction they cannot endure the independence and the free constitution of the Greek *polis*, and their subjects are by no means initiated into the new world-culture, but are kept in complete subjugation, sharply distinguished from the ruling classes, the Macedonians and Greeks, to whom also no freedom of political movement whatever is granted.¹

The development in Asia follows a very different course. Here, through the activity of the great founders of cities, Antigonos, Lysimachus, Seleucus I, and Antiochos I, one Greek city arises after another, from the Hellespont through Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Media, as far as Bactria and India; and from them grow the great centres of culture, full of independent life, by which the Asiatic population is introduced to the modern world-civilisation and becomes Hellenised. Antigonos deliberately supported the independence of the cities within the great organic body of the kingdom, thus following on the lines of the Hellenic league under Philip and Alexander. By the pressure of political necessity and the fact that they could maintain their power only by winning the attachment and fidelity of their subjects, the Seleucidæ were forced into the same ways. And side by

¹ It is altogether wrong to regard the kingdom of the Lagidæ as the typical state of Hellenism. Through the mass of material that the Egyptian papyri afford a further shifting in its favour is threatened, which must certainly lead to a very incorrect conception of the whole of antiquity. It is frequently quite overlooked that we have to do here only with documents from a province of the kingdom of the Lagidæ (later of Rome) which had a quite peculiar constitution, and that these documents therefore show by no means typical, but in every respect exceptional, conditions. The investigators who have made this material accessible deserve great gratitude, but it must never be overlooked that even a small fragment of similar documents from Asia would have infinitely greater value for the interpretation of the whole history of antiquity and specially that of Hellenism.

side with the great kingdom the political struggle creates a great number of powers of the second rank, in part pure Greek communities, like Rhodes, Chios, Cyzicus, Byzantium, Heraclea, in part newly formed states of Greek origin, like the kingdom of Pergamus and later the Bactrian kingdom, in part fragments of the old Persian kingdom, like Bithynia, Pontus, Cappadocia, Armenia, Atropatene, and not much later the Parthian kingdom. Among these states the eastern retain their oriental character, while the western are forced to pass more and more into the culture of Hellenism.


Destructive as were the effects of the continual wars, and especially of the raids of the Celtic hordes in Asia Minor, nevertheless there pulsates here a fresh, progressive life, to which the future seems to belong. To be sure, there is no lack of counter disturbance; beneath the surface of Hellenism, the native population that is absorbed into the Greek life everywhere preserves its own character, not through active resistance, but through the passivity of its nature. When the orientals become Hellenised, Hellenism itself begins at the same time to take on an oriental impress.

But in this there lies no danger as yet. Hellenism everywhere retains the upper hand and seems to come nearer and nearer to the goal of its mission for the world. In all fields of intellectual life the cultured classes have undisputed control and can look down with absolute contempt on the currents that move the masses far beneath them; the exponents of philosophical enlightenment may imagine they have completely dominated them. When the great ideas upon which Hellenism is based have been created by the classical period and new ones can no longer be placed beside them, the new time sets to work to perfect what it has inherited. The third century is the culmination of ancient science.

However, this whole civilisation lacks one thing, and that is a state of natural growth. Of all the states that developed out of Alexander's empire, the kingdom of the Antigonidæ in Macedonia was the only one that had a national basis; and therefore, in spite of the scantiness of its resources, it was also the most capable of resistance of them all. All others, on the contrary, were purely artificial political combinations, lacking that innate necessity vital to the full power of a state. They might have been altogether different, or they might not have been at all. The separation of state and nationality, which is the result of the development of the ancient East, exists in them also; they are not supported by the population, which, by the contingencies of political development, is for the moment included in them, and their subjects, so far as the individual man or community is not bound to them by personal advantage, have no further interest in their existence. To be sure, had they maintained their existence for centuries, the power of custom might have sufficed to give them a firmer constitution, such as many later similar political formations have acquired and such as the Austrian monarchy possesses to-day; and as a matter of fact we find the loyalty of subjects to the reigning dynasty already quite strongly developed in the kingdom of the Seleucidæ. But a national state can never arise on the basis of a universal, denationalised civilisation, and the unity is consequently only political, based only upon the dynasty and its political successes. Therefore, except in Macedonia, none of these states can, even in the struggle for existence, set in motion the full national force supplied by internal unity.

The resources at the command of the Macedonio-Hellenic states were consumed in the struggle with one another; nothing was left for the great task that was set them in the West. The remains of Greek nationality, still

maintaining their existence here, looked in vain for a deliverer to come from the East. An attempt made by the Spartan prince Cleonymus, in response to the appeal of Tarentum, to take up the struggle in Italy against the Lucanians and Romans, failed miserably through the incapacity of its leader (303-302 B.C.). In Sicily, to be sure, the gifted general and statesman Agathocles (317-289) had once more established, amid streams of blood, and by mighty and ruthless battles against both internal enemies and rivals and against Carthage, a strong Greek kingdom that reached even to Italy and the Ionian Sea. But he was never able to attain the position taken by Dionysius, and at his death his kingdom goes to pieces. At this point also the rôle of the Sicilian Greeks in the history of the world is played out; they disappear from the number of independent powers capable of maintaining themselves by their own resources.



GREEK MASK USED AT THE FESTIVALS OF BACCHUS



GREEK CITY SEALS

GREEK HISTORY IN OUTLINE

A PRELIMINARY SURVEY, COMPRISING A CURSORY VIEW OF THE SWEEP OF EVENTS AND A TABLE OF CHRONOLOGY

It is unnecessary in the summary of a country whose chief events are so accurately dated and so fully understood as in the case of Greece, to amplify the chronology. A synoptical view of these events will, however, prove useful. Questions of origins and of earliest history are obscure here as elsewhere. As to the earliest dates, it may be well to quote the dictum of Prof. Flinders Petrie, who, after commenting on the discovery in Greece, of pottery marked with the names of early Egyptian kings, states that "the grand age of prehistoric Greece, which can well compare with the art of classical Greece, began about 1600 B.C., was at its highest point about 1400 B.C. and became decadent about 1200 B.C., before its overthrow by the Dorian invasion." The earlier phase of civilisation in the Ægean may therefore date from the third millennium B.C.

2000-1000. Later phase of civilisation in the Ægean (the Mycenaean Age). The Achæans and other Greeks spread themselves over Greece. Ionians settle in Asia Minor. The Pelopidæ reign at Mycenæ. Agamemnon, king of Mycenæ, commands the Greek forces at Troy. 1184. Fall of Troy (traditional date). 1124. First migration. Northern warriors drive out the population of Thessaly and occupy the country, causing many Achæans to migrate to the Peloponnesus. 1104. Dorian invasion. The Peloponnesus gradually brought under the Dorian sway. Dorian colonies sent out to Crete, Rhodes, and Asia Minor. Argos head of a Dorian hexapolis. 885. **Lycurgus** said to have given laws to Sparta. About this time (perhaps much earlier) Phœnician alphabet imported into Greece. 776. The first Olympic year. 750. First Messenian war.

PERIOD OF GREEK COLONISATION (750-550 B.C.)

683. Athens ruled by nine archons. 632. Attempt of Cylon to make himself supreme at Athens. 621. Draconian code drawn up. 611. Anaximander of Miletus, the constructor of the first map, born. End of seventh century. Second Messenian war. Spartans conquer the country. The Ephors win almost all the kingly power. **Cypselus** and his son **Periander** tyrants of Corinth. 600. The poets Alcæus and Sappho flourish at Lesbos. 594-593. **Solon** archon at Athens. 590-589. Sacred war of the Amphictyonic league against Crissa. **Clisthenes** tyrant of Sicyon. 585. Pythian games reorganised. Date of first Pythiad. 570. **Pisistratus** polemarch at Athens. Athenians conquer Salamis and Nisæa. 561. **Pisistratus** makes himself

supreme in Athens. He is twice exiled. 559-556. **Miltiades** tyrant of the Thracian Chersonesus. 556. Chilon's reforms in Sparta. 549-548. Mycenæ and Tiryns go over to Sparta.

ATHENS UNDER THE TYRANTS (540-510 B.C.)

540. Pisistratus tyrant of Athens. 530. Pythagoras goes to Croton. 527. Pisistratus dies and is succeeded by his sons, **Hippias** and **Hipparchus**. Homeric poems collected. 514. Hipparchus slain by Harmodius and Aristogiton. 510. A Spartan army under Cleomenes blockades Hippias and forces him to quit Athens.

THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY

Cleisthenes and Isagoras contend for the chief power in Athens. 507. Isagoras calls in **Cleomenes** who invades Attica. The Athenians overcome the Spartans, and Cleisthenes, who had left Athens, returns. **Cleisthenes** reforms the Athenian democracy. 506. Spartans, Bœotians, and Chalcidians allied against Athens. The Athenians allied with Plataea. Chalcidian territory annexed by Athens. Nearly the whole Peloponnesus forms a league under the hegemony of Sparta. Rivalry between Athens and Ægina. 504. The Athenians refuse to restore Hippias on the Persian demand. 498. Athens and Eretria send ships to aid the Milesians against the Persians. 496. Sophocles born at Athens. 494. Naval battle off Lade, the decisive struggle of the Ionian war, won by the Persians. Battle of Sepeia. The Spartans defeat the Argives. 493. **Themistocles**, archon at Athens, fortifies the Piræus.

PERIOD OF THE PERSIAN WARS (492-479 B.C.)

492. Quarrel between the Spartan kings. King **Demaratus** flees to the Persian court, and King **Cleomenes** seizes hostages from Ægina. Thrace and Macedonia subdued by the Persians. 490. The Persians subdue Naxos and other islands, and destroy Eretria before landing in Attica. Battle of Marathon; the Greeks under **Miltiades** defeat the Persians, the latter losing six thousand men; the Persian fleet sets sail for Asia. 489. **Miltiades'** expedition against Paros. **Miltiades** tried, and fined. His death. 487. War between Athens and Ægina. **Themistocles** begins to equip an Athenian fleet. 483. **Aristides** ostracised. 481. **Xerxes** musters an army to invade Greece. Greek congress at Corinth. 480. **Xerxes** at the Hellespont. The northern Greeks submit to **Xerxes**. The Greek army is defeated at the pass of Thermopylae and **Leonidas**, the Spartan king, is slain. Battle of Artemisium. The Greek fleet retreats. Athens being evacuated, **Xerxes** occupies it. Battle of Salamis and complete victory of the Greeks. Retreat of **Xerxes**. The Greeks fail to follow up their victory. 479. **Mardonius** invades Bœotia; occupies Athens. Retreat of **Mardonius**. Battle of Plataea. **Mardonius** defeated and slain. Retreat of the Persian army. Battle of Mycale and defeat of the Persian fleet.

POST-BELLUM RECONSTRUCTION (479-463 B.C.)

478. Athenians under **Xanthippus** capture **Sestus** in the Chersonesus. Confederacy of Delos. 477. Athenian walls rebuilt. Piræus fortified. **Themistocles'** law providing for the annual increase of the navy. **Pausanias**

conquers Byzantium. He enters into treacherous relations with the Persians. 476. The Spartans endeavour to reorganise the Amphictyonic league. Their attempts defeated by Themistocles. 474. The poet Pindar flourishes. 473. Scyros conquered by the Athenian, Cimon. Argos defeated by the Spartans at the battle of Tegea. 472. Themistocles ostracised. *Persæ* of Æschylus performed. 471. The Arcadian league against Sparta crushed at the battle of Diprea. 470-469. Naxos secedes from the confederacy of Delos, and is compelled to return. 470. Socrates born. 468. Cimon defeats the Persians at the Eurymedon. Argos recovers Tiryns. 465-463. Thasos revolts and is reduced by the fleet under Cimon. 464. Sparta stirred by terrible earthquake and a revolt of the helots. The Third Messenian war. 463-462. Cimon persuades Athens to send help to the Spartans, but the latter refuse the assistance. They are afraid of Athens' revolutionary spirit. This incident puts an end to Cimon's Laconian policy. It is the triumph of Ephialtes and his party.

THE AGE OF PERICLES (463-431 B.C.)

463-461. Triumph of democracy at Athens under Ephialtes and Pericles. The Areopagus deprived of its powers. Cimon protests against the changes effected in his absence. He is ostracised, and Athens forms a connection with Argos, which captures and destroys Mycenæ. 460-459. Megara secedes from the Peloponnesian league to Athens. A fleet, sent by Athens to aid the Egyptian revolt against Persia, captures Memphis. 459. Ithome captured by the Spartans. 459-458. Athens at war with the northern states of the Peloponnesus. Athenian victories of Halieis, Cœryphalea, and Ægina. 458. Long walls of Athens completed. 457. Spartan expedition to Bœotia. Victory of Tanagra over the Athenians. Truce between Athens and Sparta. Battle of Cœnophyta and conquest of Bœotia by the Athenians. The Phocians and Locrians make alliance with Athens. 456. Ægina surrenders to the Athenians. 454. Greek contingent in Egypt capitulates to the Persians; the Athenian fleet destroyed at the mouth of the Nile. 454-453. Treasury of the confederacy of Delos transferred from the island to Athens. 453. Pericles besieges Sicyon and Cœniadæ without success. Achaia passes under the Athenian dominion. 452-451. Five years' truce between Athens and the Peloponnesus. 450-449. Cimon leads an expedition against Cyprus. Death of Cimon. The fleet on its way home wins the battle of Salamis in Cyprus. 448. Peace of Callias concluded with Persia. Sacred war. The Phocians withdraw from the Athenian alliance. 447. Bœotia lost to Athens by the battle of Coronea. 447-446. Revolt of Eubœa and Megara from the Delian confederacy. Eubœa is subdued and annexed. Pericles plants colonies in the Thracian Chersonesus, Eubœa, Naxos, etc. 446-445. Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta. 444. Aristophanes born. 442. Thucydides opposes Pericles; is ostracised, leaving Pericles without a rival in Athens, where he governs for fifteen years with absolute power. Sophocles' *Antigone* produced. 440-439. Pericles subdues Samos. Corecyraeans defeat Corinthians in a sea-fight. 433. Corecyra concludes alliance with Athens. Battle of Sybota between Corecyra and Corinth. King **Perdiccas** of Macedonia incites the revolt of Chalcidice against Athens. 432. "Megarian decree," passed at Athens, excludes Megarians from all Athenian markets. Battle of Potidæa. Athenians defeat the Corinthians.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (431-404 B.C.)

431. Sparta decides on war with Athens on the grounds of her having broken the Thirty Years' Peace. Peloponnesian War. First period called the "Attic War." Plataea surprised by Thebans. Thebans taken and executed in spite of a promise for their release. King Archidamus of Sparta invades Attica. The population crowd into Athens. Athens annexes Ægina. The fleet takes several important places. 430. The plague in Athens. Trial of Pericles for misappropriation of public money. Potidæa taken by the Athenians and the inhabitants expelled. 429. Archidamus besieges Plataea. Phormion, the Athenian, wins the victory of Naupactus. Death of Pericles. Rivalry between contending parties under Nicias and Cleon. 428. Archidamus invades Attica. Mytilene revolts and is blockaded by the Athenians. 427. Fourth invasion of Attica by the Spartans. Surrender of Mytilene. The Mytilenæan ringleaders executed. Surrender of Plataea to the Peloponnesians. Oligarchs in Corcyra conspire to overthrow the democrats. Civil war and naval engagement. Terrible slaughter. Athenian expedition to Sicily under Laches. Birth of Plato. 426. Athenians under Demosthenes defeated in Ætolia. Battle of Olpæ. Peloponnesians and Ambracians defeated by Demosthenes. Purification of Delos by the Athenians. The Delian festival revived under Athenian superintendence. 425. Athens increases the amount of tribute to be paid by the confederacy. The episode of Pylos, leading, after a long struggle, to the capture of Lacedæmonian forces in Sphacteria. 424. Defeat of Hippocrates at Delium. Thucydides, the historian, banished for not succouring Amphipolis in time. Brasidas takes towns of Chalcidice. 423. Truce between Athens and Sparta. Scione in Chalcidice revolts to Sparta and an Athenian expedition under Cleon is sent against it, notwithstanding the truce. 422. Battle of Amphipolis won by Brasidas, but both he and Cleon are slain. 421. Peace of Nicias ends the first period of the Peloponnesian War. Mutual restoration of conquests. Scione is taken and all the male inhabitants put to death. 420. Second period of the Peloponnesian War. Alcibiades becomes the chief opponent of Nicias. Expedition against Epidaurus. 418. Nicias recovers his power in Athens. The Spartans invade Argolis. Athenians take Orchomenus, but are defeated by the Spartans. Battle of Mantinea. Hyperbolus attempts to obtain the ostracism of Nicias. The decree is passed against himself, being the last instance of ostracism. Argive oligarchy overthrows the democratic government. A counter revolution restores the democrats. Athens concludes alliance with Argos. 416. Melos conquered by the Athenians. The Sicilian city of Segesta appeals to Athens for help against Selinus. Nicias opposes the sending of assistance, but is overruled and sent with Alcibiades in command of a Sicilian expedition. 415. Mysterious mutilation of the Herminæ statues regarded as an evil omen. Alcibiades accused of a plot. His trial postponed. The expedition sails. Fall of Alcibiades; his escape. 414. Siege of Syracuse. The Spartan Gylippus arrives with ships. 413. Nicias appeals for help to Athens and a second expedition is voted. Syracusans worsted in a sea battle. Syracusans capture an Athenian treasure fleet, and win a battle in the harbour of Syracuse. Arrival of the second Athenian expedition and its total defeat. The Athenians retreat by land. The rear guard is forced to surrender and the relics of the main body are captured after the defeat of the Asinarus. Tribute of the confederacy abolished and replaced by an import and export duty. 412. Third period of the Peloponnesian War, called the Decelean or Ionian War. The

allies of Athens take advantage of her misfortunes to revolt. Sparta makes a treaty with Persia. Athens wins several naval successes. 411. "Revolution of the Four Hundred." The fleet and army at Samos place themselves under the leadership of Alcibiades. Spartans defeat the Athenian fleet at Eretria. Fall of the Four Hundred and partial restoration of Athenian democracy. Battle of Cynossema won by the Athenians. Alcibiades defeats the Peloponnesians at Abydos. 410. Battle of Cyzicus won by Alcibiades. Complete restoration of Athenian democracy. 408. Alcibiades conquers Byzantium. 407. Cyrus, viceroy of Sardis, furnishes the Spartan Lysander with money to raise the pay of the Spartan navy. Lysander begins to set up the oligarchical government of the decarchies in the cities conquered by him. Battle of Notium. Athenians defeated. Alcibiades' downfall. 406. Battle of Arginusæ. Peloponnesians defeated by the Athenians. The victorious generals are blamed for not rescuing their wounded, and are illegally condemned and executed. The Spartans make overtures for peace, which are rejected. 405. Battle of Ægospotami. Most of the Athenian ships are taken and all the prisoners are put to death. The Athenian empire passes to Sparta. Lysander subdues the Hellespont and Thrace, and lays siege to Athens. 404. Surrender of Athens.

SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND PERSIAN INFLUENCE

Return to Athens of exiles of the oligarchical party. Athens under the Thirty. Thrasybulus and other exiles gain Phyle. Theramenes opposes the violent rule of the Thirty and is put to death. 403. Battle of Munychia. Thrasybulus defeats the army of the Thirty. Death of Critias. The Thirty are deposed and replaced by the Ten. The Spartans under Lysander come to the aid of the Ten, but the intervention of the Spartan king, Pausanias, brings about the restoration of the Attic democracy. 401. Cyrus' campaign and the battle of Cunaxa. Retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon. 400. Spartan invasion of the Persian dominions. 399. Spartans under Dercyllidas occupy the Troad. Elis conquered and dismembered by the Spartans. Socrates put to death for denying the Athenian gods. 398. Agesilaus becomes king of Sparta. 397. Cinadon's conspiracy. 396. Agesilaus invades Phrygia. 395. Agesilaus wins the victory of Sardis. Revolt of Rhodes. The Spartans invade Boeotia and are repelled with the assistance of the Athenians. Thebes, Athens, Argos, and Corinth allied against Sparta. 394. Agesilaus returns from Asia Minor. Battle of Nemea won by the Spartans. Battle of Cnidus. The Persian fleet under Conon destroys the Spartan fleet. Agesilaus wins the battle of Coronea and retreats from Boeotia. 393. Pharnabazus destroys the Spartan dominion in the eastern Ægean, and supplies Conon with funds to restore the long walls of Athens. Beginning of the "Corinthian War." 392. Federation of Corinth and Argos. Fighting between the Spartans and the allies on the Isthmus of Corinth. Both sides send embassies to the Persians. 391. The Spartans begin fresh wars in Asia. 389. Successes of Thrasybulus in the northern Ægean. 388. Spartans dispute the supremacy of Athens on the Hellespont and are defeated at Cremaste. 387. Peace of Antalcidas between Persia and Sparta. Athens is compelled to accede. 386. Dissolution of the union of Corinth and Argos. Sparta compels the Mantineans to break down their city walls and separate into small villages. 384-382. The city of Olynthus, having united the Chalcidian towns under her hegemony

and increased her territory at the expense of Macedonia, makes alliance with Athens and Thebes. Sparta sends help to the towns which refuse to join. 384. Aristotle born. 382. Spartans seize the citadel of Thebes. 380. *Panegyric* of Isocrates, a plea for Greek unity. 381–379. Sparta forces Phlius to submit to her dictation. 379. Chalcidian league compelled by Sparta to dissolve. The power of Sparta at its height. Rising of Thebes under Pelopidas against Sparta. Sphodrias, the Spartan, invades Athenian territory. The Spartans decline to punish the aggression.

RISE OF THEBES (378–359 B.C.)

378. Athens makes alliance with Thebes. 378–377. Formation by the Athenians of a new maritime confederacy. 378–376. Three unsuccessful Spartan expeditions into Bœotia. 376. Great maritime victory of the Athenian Chabrias at Naxos. Successes of Timotheus of Athens in the Ionian Sea. 374. Brief peace between Sparta and Athens. 374–373. Coreyra unsuccessfully invested by the Spartans. 371. Peace of Callias, guaranteeing the independence of each individual Greek city. Thebes not included in the Peace. Jason of Pheræ, despot of Thessaly. Battle of Leuctra. Epaminondas of Thebes defeats the Spartans. Revolutionary outbreaks in Peloponnesus. 370. Arcadian union and restoration of Mantinea. Foundation of Megalopolis. Epaminondas and Pelopidas invade Laconia. 369. Messene restored by the Thebans as a menace to Sparta. Alliance between Sparta and Athens. The Thebans conquer Sicyon. Pelopidas sent to deliver the Thessalian cities from the rivals, Alexander of Macedon and Alexander of Pheræ. 368. The Spartans win the “tearless victory” of Midea over the Arcadians. Death of **Alexander II** of Macedon. Succession of his brother **Perdiccas** secured by Athenian intervention. Pelopidas captured by Alexander of Pheræ. 367. Epaminondas rescues him. Pelopidas obtains a Persian decree settling disputed questions in Peloponnesus. The decree disregarded in Greece. 366. The Thebans conquer Achaia, but fail to keep it. Athens makes alliance with Arcadia. 365. Athenians conquer and colonise Samos, and acquire Sestus and Crithote. **Perdiccas III** of Macedon assassinates the regent. Timotheus takes Potidæa and Torone for Athens. Elis invaded by the Arcadians. 364. Creation of a Bœotian navy encourages the allies of Athens to revolt. Battle of Cynoscephalæ. Alexander of Pheræ, defeated by the Bœotians and their Thessalian allies. Pelopidas falls in the battle. Orchomenus destroyed by the Thebans. Elis invaded by the Arcadians. Spartan operations fail. Battle in the Altis during the Olympic games. The Arcadians appropriate the sacred Olympian treasure. Praxiteles, the sculptor, flourished. 362. Unsuccessful attack on Sparta by Epaminondas. Battle of Mantinea and death of Epaminondas. 361. Agesilaus of Sparta goes to Egypt as a leader of mercenaries. Battle of Peparethus. Alexander of Pheræ defeats the Athenian fleet. He attacks the Piræus. 360. The Thracian Chersonesus lost to Athens.

PHILIP OF MACEDONIA (359–336 B.C.)

359. Death of **Perdiccas III** of Macedon. **Philip** seizes the government as guardian for his nephew, **Amyntas**. 358. Brilliant victories of Philip over the Pæonians and Illyrians. 357. Thracian Chersonesus and Eubœa

recovered by Athens. Philip takes Amphipolis. Revolt of Athenian allies, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes. 356. Battle of Embata lost by the Athenians. Philip founds Philippi, takes Pydna and Potidæa, defeats the Illyrians and sets to work to organise his kingdom on a military basis. Birth of Alexander the Great. 355. Peace between Athens and her revolted allies. The Athenians abandon their schemes of a naval empire. Outbreak of the "Sacred war" against the Phocians who had seized the Delphic temple. 354. Battle of Neon. The Phocians defeated. Demosthenes begins his political activity. Phocian successes under Onomarchus. 353. Methone taken by Philip of Macedon. Philip and the Thessalian league opposed to Onomarchus and the tyrants of Pheræ. Onomarchus drives Philip from Thessaly. Philip crushes the Phocians in Magnesia and makes himself master of Thessaly. Phocis saved from him by help from Athens. 352. War in the Peloponnesus. Spartan schemes of aggression frustrated. Thrace subdued by Philip. 351. Demosthenes delivers his *First Philippic*. 349. Philip begins war against Olynthus which makes alliance with Athens. Athenian attempt to recover Eubœa fails. 348. Philip destroys Olynthus and the Chalcidian towns. 347. Death of Plato. 346. Peace of Philocrates between Philip and Athens. Phocis subdued by Philip. Philip presides at the Pythian games. Philip becomes archon of Thessaly. Demosthenes accuses Æschines of accepting bribes from Philip. 344. Demosthenes delivers *The Second Philippic*. 343. Megara, Chalcis, Ambracia, Acarnania, Achaia, and Coreyra ally themselves with Athens. 342-341. Philip annexes Thrace. He founds Philippopolis. 341. Demosthenes' *Third Philippic*. 340. Diplomatic breach between Athens and Philip. 339. Perinthus and Byzantium unsuccessfully besieged by Philip. Philip's campaign on the Danube. 338. The Amphictyonic league declares a "holy war" against Amphissa, and requests the aid of Philip. Philip destroys Amphissa and conquers Naupactus. Philip occupies Elatea. Athens makes alliance with Thebes. Battle of Chæronea. Philip defeats the Athenians and Thebans. The hegemony of Greece passes to Macedon. Philip invades the Peloponnesus which, with the exception of Sparta, acknowledges his supremacy. Philip establishes a Greek confederacy under the Macedonian hegemony. Lycurgus appointed to control the public revenues in Athens. 336. Attalus and Parmenion open the Macedonian war in Æolis.

THE AGE OF ALEXANDER (336-323 B.C.)

Murder of Philip and succession of **Alexander the Great**. Alexander compels the Hellenes to recognise his hegemony. 335. Alexander conducts a successful campaign on the Danube and defeats the Illyrians at Pelium. Thebes revolts against him and is destroyed. 334. Alexander sets out for Asia. Battle of the Granicus. Alexander defeats the Persians. Lydia, Miletus, Caria, Halicarnassus, Lycia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia subdued. 333. Alexander goes to Gordium and cuts the Gordian knot. Death of his chief opponent, the Persian general, Memnon. Submission of Paphlagonia and Cilicia. Battle of Issus. Alexander puts the army of Darius to flight. Sidon and Byblos submit. 332. Tyre besieged and taken. He slaughters the inhabitants and marches southward, storming Gaza. Egypt conquered. He founds Alexandria. 331. Battle of Arbela and defeat of the Great King. Babylon opens its gates to Alexander. He enters Susa. The Spartans rise and are defeated at Megalopolis. 330. Alexander occupies

Persepolis. Alexander in Ecbatana, in Parthia, and on the Caspian. Philotas is accused of conspiring against Alexander's life and is executed. His father, the general Parmenion, put to death on suspicion. Judicial contest between Demosthenes and Æschines ends in the latter's quitting Athens. Part of Gedrosia (Beluchistan) submits to Alexander. 329. Arachosia conquered. 328. Alexander conquers Bactria and Sogdiana. 327. Alexander quells the rebellion of Sogdiana and Bactria. Clitus killed by Alexander at a banquet. Alexander marries the Sogdian Roxane. Callisthenes, the historian, is put to death under pretext of complicity in the conspiracy of the pages to assassinate Alexander. Beginning of the Indian war. 326. Alexander in the Punjab; he crosses the Indus, and is victorious at the Hydaspes. At the Hyphasis the army refuses to advance further. Alexander builds a fleet and sails to the mouth of the Indus. 325. Conquest of the Lower Punjab. March through Gedrosia (Mekran in Beluchistan) and Carmania. Nearchus makes a voyage of discovery in the Indian Ocean. 324. Alexander in Susa. He punishes treasonable conduct of officials during his absence. Alexander's veterans discharged at Opis. Harpalus deposits at Athens the money stolen from Alexander. The trial respecting misappropriation of this money ends in Demosthenes being forced to quit Athens. Alexander's last campaign against the Kossæans. 323. Alexander returns to Babylon and reorganises his army for the conquest of Arabia. Death of Alexander.

THE POST-ALEXANDRIAN EPOCH

323. At Alexander's death his young half-brother, **Philip Arrhidæus**, succeeded to his empire, while there are expectations of a posthumous heir by Roxane. The young Alexander is born. **Perdiccas** is made regent over the Asiatic dominions, while **Antipater** and **Craterus** take the joint regency of the West. The Greeks, with Athens at their head, attempt to throw off the Macedonian yoke as soon as Alexander is dead, and the Lamian war breaks out (323-322). But one by one the states yield to Antipater and Craterus. The direct government of the dominions in Europe, Africa, and Western Asia is divided among Alexander's generals. Thirty-four shared in the allotment; the most important are: **Ptolemy Lagus**, in Egypt and Cyrenaica; **Antigonus**, in Phrygia, Pamphylia, and Lycia; **Eumenes**, the secretary of Alexander, in Paphlagonia and Cappadocia; **Cassander**, in Caria; **Leonnatus**, in Hellespontine Phrygia; **Menander**, in Lydia; and **Lysimachus**, in Thrace and the Euxine districts. **Perdiccas** aims to marry Alexander's sister, **Cleopatra**, as a means of becoming absolute master of the empire. The other generals league themselves against him, and (321) **Perdiccas** is murdered by his soldiers while proceeding against **Ptolemy**. **Antipater** replaces him as regent, and redivides the empire; **Seleucus** is given **Babylonia** to rule over. **Antipater** dies 319, and the son **Cassander** and **Polysperchon** become regents. In 317 and 316, **Cassander** conquers Greece and Macedonia. **Antigonus**, with the help of **Cassander**, attacks and defeats **Eumenes**, who is betrayed by his own forces in 316. **Antigonus** now has ambitions to control the whole empire, and in 315 the terrible war of the Diadochi, between him and the other generals, begins. **Antigonus** and his son, **Demetrius Poliorcetes**, call themselves kings. **Seleucus**, **Lysimachus**, **Cassander**, and others do the same. **Demetrius** seizes Athens in 307. At the end of the struggle every member of Alexander's family is dead, the majority put to death. In 301, at the battle of Ipsus, **Antigonus** falls, and **Demetrius** takes to flight. **Cassander** dies 296, and the succession is

contested by his two sons, **Philip IV** and **Antipater**. Demetrius takes the opportunity of this quarrel to seize the European dominions. He prepares to invade Asia, and the other successors of the empire, together with King **Pyrrhus** of Epirus, league against him. In 287 Pyrrhus invades Macedonia, and Demetrius' army deserts him. Pyrrhus is welcomed as king, and he gives Lysimachus the eastern part of Macedonia to rule over. Demetrius renews the struggle with Pyrrhus, and at his death, in 283, his son, **Antigonus Gonatas**, carries it on. In 282 Lysimachus is attacked by Seleucus Nicator, and is defeated and killed on the plain of Corus in 281. **Ptolemy Ceraunus** murders Seleucus, and seizes the European kingdom of Lysimachus. In 280 Pyrrhus goes to Tarentum to make war on the Romans.

THE ACHÆAN AND ÆTOLIAN LEAGUES

The Achæan towns of Patræ, Dyme, Tritæa, and Phære expel their Macedonian garrisons and join in a confederacy. 279. The Celts descend on the Balkan countries and on Macedonia. Death of Ptolemy Ceraunus. 278. Celts under Brennus approach Greece. Struggle between Celts and Hellenes round Thermopylæ. Brennus defeated at Delphi. Celts driven back. Ætolian Confederacy becomes the most important representative of Greek independence. 277. **Antigonus** king of Macedonia. He founds the dynasty of the Antigonids. Pyrrhus conquers Sicily. 276. The Achæan town Ægium expels its garrison and joins Patræ, etc., in the Achæan Confederacy. 274. Pyrrhus returns to Epirus. 273. Pyrrhus expels Antigonus from Macedon. 272. Pyrrhus besieges Sparta, which successfully resists him. He turns against Argos, where he is killed. Antigonus recovers his supremacy in Greece. The Greek cities fight for their independence. 265. The Macedonians defeat the Egyptian fleet at Cos. Antigonus recovers his position in the Peloponnesus. 263. Chremonidean war. 263-262. Antigonus takes Athens. End of the independent political importance of Athens. 255. The Long Walls of Athens broken down. 249. Aratus frees Sicyon from its tyrant Nicocles, and brings the town over to the Achæan League. 245. Aratus becomes president of the Achæan League. **Agis IV** becomes king of Sparta and attempts to introduce reforms. 242. Aratus conquers Corinth. Megara, Trœzen, and Epidaurus join the Achæans. 241. Agis IV executed. 239. **Demetrius**, king of Macedon. Alliance between the Achæans and Ætolians. 238-5. Extinction of the Epirote Æacids; federative republic in Epirus. 235. **Cleomenes III**, king of Sparta. 234. Lydiades abdicates from his tyranny and brings Megalopolis over to the Achæan League. 231. Illyrian corsairs ravage the western coasts of Greece and defy the Achæan and Ætolian fleets. 229. The greater part of Argolis included in the Achæan League. **Antigonus Doson**, regent of Macedon. Athens frees herself from the Macedonian dominion. The Romans defeat the Illyrian corsairs. 228. Athens makes alliance with Rome. The Achæan League at the height of its power. 227. Beginning of the Spartan war against the Achæan League. 226. Cleomenes III effects fundamental reforms in Sparta. 224. Battle at Dyme. Cleomenes defeats the Achæan League. 223. Aratus calls in the aid of Macedon. Egypt deserts the Achæans and becomes the ally of Sparta. Achæans, Bœotians, Phocians, Thessalians, Epirotes, and Acarnanians form, under the leadership of Macedon, an alliance against Sparta. 222. Battle of Sellasia. Defeat of the Spartans. Antigonus Doson restores the Spartan oligarchy. 220. **Philip V**

king of Macedon. War of Philip and his Greek allies, including the Achæan League, against the Ætolians supported by Sparta. 219. **Lycurgus** (last king of Sparta). 217. Peace of Naupactus. The destructive war against the Ætolians ended in dread of a Carthaginian invasion. Philip V becomes protector of all the Hellenes.

THE ROMAN CONQUEST (216-146 B.C.)

216. Philip concludes an alliance with Hannibal and provokes the first Macedonian war with Rome. 214. Battle near the mouth of the Aous. The Romans surprise Philip and defeat him. Ætolians, Eleans, Messenians, and Illyrians accept Roman protection. 213. Aratus poisoned at Philip's instigation. 211. Sparta goes over to Rome. Savage wars of the Grecian cities against one another. 208. Philopœmen becomes general of the Achæan League, and revives its military power. 205. Philip makes peace with Rome, ceding the country of the Parthenians and several Illyrian districts to Rome. Philip carries on war in Rhodes, Thrace, and Mysia, and sends auxiliaries to Carthage. 200. Second Macedonian war declared by Rome. Romans under Sulpicius invade Macedonia. 199. Romans kept inactive by mutiny in the army. 198. Defeat of Philip by Flamininus. Achæans and Spartans join the Romans. 197. Battle of Cynoscephalæ and destruction of the Macedonian phalanx. Philip accepts humiliating terms and renounces his supremacy over the Greeks. 194. Flamininus returns to Rome. The Ætolians, dissatisfied, pillage Sparta, which joins the Achæan League. **Antiochus III** of Syria comes to the aid of the Ætolians. 191. Battle of Thermopylæ. Antiochus defeated by the Romans. 190. Battle of Magnesia. Romans defeat Antiochus. Submission of the Ætolians. 183. Messene revolts from the Achæan League. 179. Callicrates succeeds Philopœmen as general of the Achæan League. Death of Philip V and accession of **Perseus**, who conciliates the Greeks, and makes alliances with Syria, Rhodes, etc. 169. Attempted assassination of Eumenes of Pergamum on his return from Rome. 168. Third Macedonian war declared by the Romans. Romans are unsuccessful at first, but the battle of Pydna is won by Paulus Æmilius, the Macedonians losing twenty thousand men. Flight and subsequent surrender of Perseus. 150. Death of Callicrates. 152. Andriscus lays claim to the throne of Macedon. 148. Andriscus defeated at Pydna and taken to Rome. 146. Macedon made a Roman province. Romans support Sparta in her attempt to withdraw from the Achæan League. Corinthians take up arms, and are joined by the Bœotians and by Chalcis. Battle of Scarphe and victory of the Romans under Metellus. Corinth is taken by Mummius; its art treasures are sent to Rome, and the city delivered up to pillage. Achæan and Bœotian leagues dissolved.

THE EGYPTIAN KINGDOM OF THE PTOLEMIES OR LAGIDÆ (323-30 B.C.)

In 323 **Ptolemy I**, son of Lagus, receives the government of Egypt and Cyrenaica in the division of Alexander's Empire. He rules at Alexandria. In 321 he allies himself with Antipater against the ambitious Perdikkas. He joins the alliance against Antigonos in 315. 306. He assumes the title of king. 304. He assists the Rhodians to repel Demetrius, and wins the surname of Soter (Saviour). 285. He abdicates in favour of his son, **Ptolemy**

(II) **Philadelphus**, and dies two years later. Ptolemy II reigns almost in undisturbed peace. About 266 he annexes Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria. He is famous as a great patron of commerce, science, literature, and art, and raises the Alexandrian Museum and Library to importance. On his death in 247, his son, **Ptolemy (III) Euergetes**, reunites Cyrenaica, of which his father's half-brother, Magas, had declared himself king on the death of Ptolemy I. In 245 he invades Syria, to avenge his sister Berenice, the wife of Antiochus II, slain by Laodice. He also marches to and captures Babylon, but is recalled to Egypt by a revolt in 243. In 222 he is succeeded by his son, **Ptolemy (IV) Philopator**. In 217 this king defeats Antiochus the Great at Raphia, recovering Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria, which has been wrested from him. **Ptolemy (V) Epiphanes** began his reign in 205 or 204. Antiochus the Great invades Egypt, and the Romans intervene. Ptolemy marries Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus. He dies by poison in 181. His son, **Ptolemy (VI) Philometor**, succeeds, with **Cleopatra** as regent until her death in 174. Then the ministers make war on Antiochus Epiphanes, who captures Ptolemy in 170. The king's brother, **Ptolemy (VII) Euergetes** or **Physcon**, then proclaims himself king, and reigns jointly with his brother after the latter's release. In 164 Ptolemy VII expels Ptolemy VI, but is compelled to recall him at the demand of Rome. Ptolemy VII returns to Cyrenaica, which he holds as a separate kingdom until his brother's death, 146, when he returns to Egypt, slays the legitimate heir, and rules as sole king. The people of Alexandria expel him in 130, but he manages to get back in 127. Dies 117. His son, **Ptolemy (VIII) Philometor** or **Lathyrus**, shares the throne with his mother, **Cleopatra III**. In 107 his mother expels him, and puts her favourite son, **Ptolemy (IX) Alexander**, on the throne. Ptolemy VIII keeps his power in Cyprus, and on his mother's death the Egyptians recall him and banish his brother. The wars with the Seleucid princes are kept up. **Berenice III**, the daughter of Ptolemy VIII, succeeds him in 81. Her stepson, **Ptolemy X** or **Alexander II**, son of Ptolemy Alexander, comes from Rome as Sulla's candidate, and marries her. The queen is at once murdered, by her husband's order, and the people put him to death, 80. The legitimate line is now extinct. An illegitimate son of Ptolemy Lathyrus, **Ptolemy (XI) Neus Dionysus** or **Auletes**, takes Egypt; and a younger brother, Cyprus. Weary of taxation, the Alexandrians expel Auletes in 58, but the Romans restore him in 55. His son, **Ptolemy XII**, and his daughter, **Cleopatra**, succeed him in joint reign in 51. In 48 Ptolemy expels his sister, who flees to Syria, and attempts to recover Egypt by force of arms. Cæsar effects her restoration in 48, and the civil war with Pompey results. Ptolemy is defeated on the Nile, and drowned. Cleopatra's career after this belongs to Roman history, *q.v.* Unwilling to appear in Octavian's triumph after Actium, she kills herself in some unknown way, 30 B.C.

THE SELEUCID KINGDOM OF SYRIA (312-65 B.C.)


Seleucus (I) Nicator receives the satrapy of Babylon from Antipater. He founds his kingdom in 312. He extends his conquests into Central Asia and India, assuming the title of king about 306. He takes part against Antigonus in the battle of Ipsus, 301. After this a part of Asia Minor is added to his dominions, and the Syrian kingdom is formed. He defeats Lysimachus on the plain of Corus in 281 and is assassinated by Ptolemy Ceraunus in 280. He is the builder of the capital cities of Seleucia and

Antioch. His son **Antiochus (I) Soter** succeeds. He gives up all claim to Macedonia on the marriage of Seleucus' daughter, Phila, to Antigonus Gonatas. Dies 261, his son **Antiochus (II) Theos** succeeding. In this reign the kingdom is greatly weakened by the revolt of Parthia and Bactria, leading to the establishment of the Parthian empire by Arsaces about 250. He also involves himself in a ruinous war with Ptolemy Philadelphus, concluding with the peace of 250. He is killed, 246, and succeeded by his son **Seleucus (II) Callinicus** who wars with the Parthians and Egyptians until his death in 226. **Seleucus (III) Ceraunus** after a short reign of three years is succeeded by his brother **Antiochus (III) the Great**, the most famous of the Seleucidæ. 223. Alexander and Molon the rebellious brothers of the king are subdued. Antiochus goes to war with Ptolemy Philopator and is beaten at Raphia, 217, losing Cœle-Syria and Phœnicia. 214. Achæus the governor of Asia Minor rebels, and is defeated and killed. 212. Antiochus begins an attempt to regain Parthia and Bactria, but in 205 is compelled to acknowledge their independence. Continued warfare with Egypt. Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria regained by battle of Paneas in 198, but these territories are given back to Egypt when Ptolemy Epiphanes marries Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus. 196. The Thracian Chersonesus taken from Macedonia. 192-189. War with the Romans, who demand restoration of the Thracian and Egyptian provinces. 190. Battle of Magnesia; great defeat of Antiochus by the Romans. 187. Antiochus killed by his subjects as he attempts to rob the temple of Elymais to pay the Romans. His son **Seleucus (IV) Philopator** succeeds. Before his death, in 175, Seleucus satisfies the Roman claims. His successor is his brother **Antiochus (IV) Epiphanes**. Armenia, lost by Antiochus III, is reconquered, also Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria, 171-168. Antiochus attempts to stamp out the Jewish religion, giving rise to the Maccabæan rebellion in 167. **Antiochus (V) Eupator** succeeds his father in 164. Lysias is regent, as the king is only nine years old. A peace with the Jews is concluded and then Antiochus is killed, 162, by **Demetrius (I) Soter**, son of Seleucus Philopator, who seizes the throne. The Maccabæans hold their own against this king. Alexander Balas, a pretended son of Antiochus Epiphanes, organises an insurrection. He invades Syria, and Demetrius is killed, 150, in battle. **Alexander Balas** usurps the throne. **Demetrius (II) Nicator**, son of Demetrius I, contests the throne but not with much success. Balas wars with Ptolemy Philopator and is killed, 145. A war of succession begins between Demetrius Nicator and Balas' young son **Antiochus VI**. The latter is supported by the Jews. Antiochus VI is slain by **Tryphon**, the general of Alexander Balas, in 142. Tryphon rules until 139, when he is put to death by **Antiochus (VII) Sidetes**. Meanwhile one faction recognises Demetrius Nicator as king. He marries Cleopatra, an Egyptian princess, goes to war with the Parthians, is captured, and Antiochus Sidetes takes his place for ten years. Sidetes wages war with the Parthians, and is killed in battle, 128. Demetrius Nicator now resumes his rule, but owing to his misgovernment is assassinated at the instigation of Cleopatra, in 125. The eldest son, **Seleucus V**, is put to death the same year by Cleopatra, and the second son, **Antiochus (VIII) Grypus**, takes the throne. He expels Alexander Zabina, a usurper. Civil war breaks out between **Antiochus** and his half-brother, **Antiochus (IX) Cyzicenus**, who in 112 compels a division of the kingdom, taking Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria as his share. Antiochus VIII is assassinated, 96. Antiochus IX is killed in 95 by **Seleucus (VI) Epiphanes**, son of Grypus, who rules only one year. **Antiochus (X) Eusebes**, son of Antiochus IX, follows. His claims are contested by the sons of Grypus,

Philip, Demetrius (III) Eucærus, and **Antiochus (XI) Epiphanes**. The latter is drowned fleeing from Eusebès and the other two rule over the whole of Syria. In 88 Demetrius is captured by the Parthians and another brother **Antiochus (XII) Dionysius**, shares the rule with Philip. He is killed in a war with the Arabians. Civil strife has now reached such a state that the Syrians invite **Tigranes** of Armenia to put an end to it. He conquers Syria in 83, and rules it until 69, when, after his defeat by Lucullus, **Antiochus (XIII) Asiaticus**, son of Antiochus Eusebes, regains the throne. He is deposed, 65, by Pompey, and Syria becomes a Roman province.

THE SICILIAN TYRANTS (570-210 B.C.)

The government of the Greek colonies in Sicily is originally oligarchical, but the rule soon gets into the hands of despots or tyrants, who hold uncontrolled power. 570-554. **Phalaris**, tyrant of Agrigentum or Acrægas, brings that city to be the most powerful in the island. About 500, **Cleander** obtains possession of Gela. His brother **Hippocrates** succeeds, and is followed by **Gelo**, who makes himself master of Syracuse. 488. **Theron** is tyrant of Agrigentum, and, 481, expels **Terillus** from Himera. Terillus appeals to the Carthaginians who besiege Himera, 480. Gelo aids Theron and defeats Hamilear. 478. Gelo succeeded by his brother **Hiero I**, an oppressive ruler. 472. **Thrasydæus** succeeds Theron in Agrigentum, but is expelled by Hiero. 467. **Thrasybulus** succeeds Hiero, but is driven from Sicily by the people, 466. The fall of Thrasybulus is the signal for great internal dissensions, settled, 461, by a congress, which restores peace and prosperity for half a century, interrupted only by a quickly suppressed revolt of the Sicels in 451. 409. Hannibal, grandson of Hamilear, attempts the conquest of Sicily. 405. **Dionysius** attains to despotic power in Syracuse. 383. After constant war the limits of Greek and Carthaginian power in Sicily are fixed. 367. **Dion** succeeds Dionysius; after an oppressive rule he is murdered, 353. A period of confusion follows. The younger **Dionysius** and **Hicetas** hold power against each other. The latter calls in the Carthaginians, and Timoleon comes from Corinth, defeats Hicetas, and restores Greek liberty in 343. Democratic government is also reinstated in other parts of Sicily. 340. Defeat of Hasdrubal and Hamilear at the Crimissus puts an end to all fear from Carthage. 317. **Agathocles** establishes a despotism in Syracuse. His reign is oppressive and disastrous for Sicily. 310. Defeat of Agathocles by Hamilear at Ecnomus. Agathocles goes to Africa to carry on the war; meanwhile Hamilear gets possession of a large part of Sicily. Agathocles makes peace with Carthage, and perpetrates a fearful massacre of his opponents. 289. Death of Agathocles. **Hicetas** becomes tyrant of Syracuse. Agrigentum, under **Phintias**, attains to great power. The Carthaginians now begin to be predominant in the island. 278. Pyrrhus lands in Sicily to aid the Greeks, but returns to Italy, 276. **Hiero II** is chosen general by the Syracusans. He fights the Mamertines. 270. Hiero assumes title of king. He allies with Carthage to expel the Mamertines. The Romans espouse the latter's cause, and the First Punic War is begun, 264. 263. Hiero makes peace with Rome. 242. Battle off the Ægetan Islands. The whole island, except the territory of Hiero, becomes a Roman province. 215. **Hieronimus**, grandson and successor of Hiero, breaks the treaty with Rome in the Second Punic War, and is assassinated. Marcellus is sent to Syracuse. 212. Syracuse falls into his hands. 210. Agrigentum captured. Roman conquest completed.



CHAPTER I. LAND AND PEOPLE

THE character of every people is more or less closely connected with that of its land. The station which the Greeks filled among nations, the part which they acted, and the works which they accomplished, depended in a great measure on the position which they occupied on the face of the globe. The manner and degree in which the nature of the country affected the bodily and mental frame, and the social institutions of its inhabitants, may not be so easily determined; but its physical aspect is certainly not less important in a historical point of view, than it is striking and interesting in itself. An attentive survey of the geographical site of Greece, of its general divisions, and of the most prominent points on its surface, is an indispensable preparation for the study of its history. In the following sketch nothing more will be attempted, than to guide the reader's eye over an accurate map of the country, and to direct his attention to some of those indelible features, which have survived all the revolutions by which it has been desolated.

THE LAND

The land which its sons called *Hellas*, and for which we have adopted the Roman name *Greece*,¹ lies on the southeast verge of Europe, and in length extends no further than from the thirty-sixth to the fortieth degree of latitude. It is distinguished among European countries by the same character which distinguishes Europe itself from the other continents—the great range of its coast compared with the extent of its surface; so that while in the latter respect it is considerably less than Portugal, in the former it exceeds the whole Pyrenean peninsula. The great eastern limb which projects from the main trunk of the continent of Europe grows more and more finely articulated as it advances towards the south, and terminates in the peninsula of Peloponnesus, the smaller half of Greece, which bears some resemblance to an outspread palm. Its southern extremity is at a nearly equal distance from the two neighbouring continents: it fronts one of the most beautiful and fertile regions of Africa, and is separated from the nearest point of Asia by the southern outlet of the *Ægean Sea*—the sea, by the Greeks familiarly called their own, which, after being contracted into a narrow stream by the approach of the opposite shores at the *Hellespont*,

[¹ The Latin *Græcus* was, however, derived from the old Greek name *Γραικός*.]

suddenly finds its liberty in an ample basin as they recede towards the east and the west, and at length, escaping between Cape Malea and Crete, confounds its waters with the broader main of the Mediterranean. Over that part of this sea which washes the coast of Greece, a chain of islands, beginning from the southern headland of Attica, Cape Sunium, first girds Delos with an irregular belt, the Cyclades, and then, in a waving line, links itself to a scattered group (the Sporades) which borders the Asiatic coast. Southward of these the interval between the two continents is broken by the larger islands Crete and Rhodes. The sea which divides Greece from Italy is contracted, between the Iapygian peninsula and the coast of Epirus, into a channel only thirty geographical miles in breadth; and the Italian coast may be seen not only from the mountains of Coreyra, but from the low headland of the Ceraunian hills.

Thus on two sides Greece is bounded by a narrow sea; but towards the north its limits were never precisely defined. The word *Hellas* did not convey to the Greeks the notion of a certain geographical surface, determined by natural or conventional boundaries: it denoted the country of the Hellenes, and was variously applied according to the different views entertained of the people which was entitled to that name. The original *Hellas* was included in the territory of a little tribe in the south of Thessaly. When these Hellenes had imparted their name to other tribes, with which they were allied by a community of language and manners, *Hellas* might properly be said to extend as far as these national features prevailed. On the east, Greece was commonly held to terminate with Mount Homole at the mouth of the Peneus; the more scrupulous, however, excluded even Thessaly from the honour of the Hellenic name, while Strabo, with consistent laxity, admitted Macedonia. But from Ambracia to the mouth of the Peneus, when these were taken as the extreme northern points, it was still impossible to draw a precise line of demarcation; for the same reason which justified the exclusion of Epirus applied, perhaps much more forcibly, to the mountaineers in the interior of Ætolia, whose barbarous origin, or utter degeneracy, was proved by their savage manners, and a language which Thucydides describes as unintelligible. When the Ætolians bade the last Philip withdraw from *Hellas*, the Macedonian king could justly retort, by asking where they would fix its boundaries, and by reminding them that of their own body a very small part was within the pale from which they wished to exclude him.

The northern part of Greece is traversed in its whole length by a range of mountains, the Greek Apennines. This ridge first takes the name of Pindus, where it intersects the northern boundary of Greece, at a point where an ancient route still affords the least difficult passage from Epirus into Thessaly. From Pindus two huge arms stretch towards the eastern sea, and enclose the vale of Thessaly, the largest and richest plain in Greece: on the north the Cambunian hills, after making a bend towards the south, terminate in the loftier heights of Olympus, which are scarcely ever entirely free from snow; the opposite and lower chain of Othrys parting, with its eastern extremity, the Malian from the Pagasæan Gulf, sinks gently towards the coast. A fourth rampart, which runs parallel to Pindus, is formed by the range which includes the celebrated heights of Pelion and Ossa; the first a broad and nearly even ridge, the other towering into a steep conical peak, the neighbour and rival of Olympus, with which, in the songs of the country, it is said to dispute the pre-eminence in the depth and duration of its snows. The mountain barrier with which Thessaly is thus encompassed is broken only at the northeast corner, by a deep and narrow cleft, which

parts Ossa from Olympus : the defile so renowned in poetry as the vale, in history as the pass, of Tempe. The imagination of the ancient poets and declaimers delighted to dwell on the natural beauties of this romantic glen, and on the sanctity of the site, from which Apollo had transplanted his laurel to Delphi.

From other points of view, the same spot no less forcibly claims the attention of the historian. It is the only pass through which an army can invade Thessaly from the north, without scaling the high and rugged ridges of its northern frontier. The whole glen is something less than five miles long, and opens gradually to the east into a spacious plain, stretching to the shore of the Thermaic Gulf. On each side the rocks rise precipitously from the bed of the Peneus, and in some places only leave room between them for the stream ; and the road, which at the narrowest point is cut in the rock, might in the opinion of the ancients be defended by ten men against a host.

On the eastern side of the ridge which stretches from Tempe to the Gulf of Pagasæ, a narrow strip of land, called Magnesia, is intercepted between the mountains and the sea, broken by lofty headlands and the beds of torrents, and exposed without a harbour to the fury of the northeast gales.

South of this gulf the coast is again deeply indented by that of Malis, into which the Sperchius, rising from Mount Tymphrestus, a continuation of Pindus, winds through a long narrow vale, which, though considered as a part of Thessaly, forms a separate region, widely distinguished from the rest by its physical features. It is intercepted between Othrys and Œta, a huge rugged pile, which, stretching from Pindus to the sea at Thermopylæ, forms the inner barrier of Greece, as the Cambunian range is the outer, to which it corresponds in direction, and is nearly equal in height. To the south of Thessaly and between it and Bœotia lie the countries of Doris and Phocis. Doris is small and obscure, but interesting as the foster-mother of a race of conquerors who became the masters of Greece. Phocis is somewhat larger than Doris, and separates it from Bœotia.

The peculiar conformation of the principal Bœotian valleys, the barriers opposed to the escape of the streams, and the consequent accumulation of the rich deposits brought down from the surrounding mountains, may be considered as a main cause of the extraordinary fertility of the land. The vale of the Cephissus especially, with its periodical inundations, exhibits a resemblance, on a small scale, to the banks of the Nile — a resemblance which some of the ancients observed in the peculiar character of its vegetation. The profusion in which the ordinary gifts of nature were spread over the face of Bœotia, the abundant returns of its grain, the richness of its pastures, the materials of luxury furnished by its woods and waters, are chiefly remarkable, in a historical point of view, from the unfavourable effect they produced on the character of the race, which finally established itself in this envied territory. It was this cause, more than the dampness and thickness of their atmosphere, that depressed the intellectual and moral energies of the Bœotians, and justified the ridicule which their temperate and witty neighbours so freely poured on their proverbial failing.

Eubœa, that large and important island, which at a very early period attracted the Phœnicians by its copper mines, and in later times became almost indispensable to the subsistence of Athens, though it covers the whole eastern coast of Locris and Bœotia, is more closely connected with the latter of these countries. The channel of the Euripus which parts it from the mainland, between Aulis and Chalcis, is but a few paces in width, and is broken by a rocky islet, which now forms the middle pier of a bridge.

A wild and rugged, though not a lofty, range of mountains, bearing the name of Cithæron on the west, of Parnes towards the east, divides Boeotia from Attica. Lower ridges, branching off to the south, and sending out arms towards the east, mark the limits of the principal districts which compose this little country, the least proportioned in extent of any on the face of the earth to its fame and its importance in the history of mankind. The most extensive of the Attic plains, though it is by no means a uniform level, but is broken by a number of low hills, is that in which Athens itself lies at the foot of a precipitous rock, and in which, according to the Attic legend, the olive, still its most valuable production, first sprang up.

Attica is, on the whole, a meagre land, wanting the fatness of the Boeotian plains, and the freshness of the Boeotian streams. The waters of its principal river, the Cephissus, are expended in irrigating a part of the plain of Athens, and the Ilissus, though no less renowned, is a mere brook, which is sometimes swollen into a torrent. It could scarcely boast of more than two or three fertile tracts, and its principal riches lay in the heart of its mountains, in the silver of Laurium, and the marble of Pentelicus. It might also reckon among its peculiar advantages the purity of its air, the fragrance of its shrubs, and the fineness of its fruits. But in its most flourishing period its produce was never sufficient to supply the wants of its inhabitants, and their industry was constantly urged to improve their ground to the utmost. Traces are still visible of the laborious cultivation which was carried by means of artificial terraces, up the sides of their barest mountains. After all, they were compelled to look to the sea even for subsistence. Attica would have been little but for the position which it occupied, as the south-east foreland of Greece, with valleys opening on the coast, and ports inviting the commerce of Asia. From the top of its hills the eye surveys the whole circle of the islands, which form its maritime suburbs, and seem to point out its historical destination.

The isthmus connecting Attica with the Peloponnesus is not level. The roots of the Onean Mountains are continued along the eastern coast in a line of low cliffs, till they meet another range, which seems to have borne the same name, at the opposite extremity of the isthmus. This is an important feature in the face of the country: the isthmus at its narrowest part, between the inlets of Schœnus and Lechæum, is only between three and four miles broad; and along this line, hence called the Diolcus, or Draughtway, vessels were often transported from sea to sea, to avoid the delay and danger which attended the circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus. Yet it seems not to have been before the Macedonian period, that the narrowness of the intervening space suggested the project of uniting the two seas by means of a canal. It was entertained for a time by Demetrius Poliorcetes; but he is said to have been deterred by the reports of his engineers, who were persuaded that the surface of the Corinthian Gulf was so much higher than the Saronic, that a channel cut between them would be useless from the rapidity of the current, and might even endanger the safety of Ægina and the neighbouring isles. Three centuries later, the dictator Cæsar formed the same plan, and was perhaps only prevented from accomplishing it by his untimely death. The above-mentioned inequality of the ground would always render this undertaking very laborious and expensive. But the work was of a nature rather to shock than to interest genuine Greek feelings: it seems to have been viewed as an audacious Titanian effort of barbarian power; and when Nero actually began it, having opened the trench with his own hands, the belief of the country people may probably have concurred with the aversion of the

Prætorian workmen, to raise the rumour of howling spectres, and springs of blood, by which they are said to have been interrupted.

The face of the Peloponnesus presents outlines somewhat more intricate than those of northern Greece. At first sight the whole land appears one pile of mountains, which, toward the northwest, where it reaches its greatest height, forms a compact mass, pressing close upon the Gulf of Corinth. On the western coast it recedes farther from the sea; towards the centre is pierced more and more by little hollows; and on the south and east is broken by three great gulfs, and the valleys opening into them, which suggested to the ancients the form of a plane leaf, to illustrate that of the peninsula. On closer inspection, the highest summits of this pile, with their connecting ridges, may be observed to form an irregular ring, which separates the central region, Arcadia, from the rest.

The other great divisions of the Peloponnesus are Argolis, Laconia, Messenia, Elis, and Achaia. Argolis, when the name is taken in its largest sense, as the part of the Peloponnesus which is bounded on the land side by Arcadia, Achaia, and Laconia, comprehends several districts, which, during the period of the independence of Greece, were never united under one government, but were considered, for the purpose of description, as one region by the later geographers. It begins on the western side with the little territory of Sicyon, which, beside some inland valleys, shared with Corinth a small maritime plain, which was proverbial among the ancients for its luxuriant fertility. The dominions of Corinth, which also extended beyond the isthmus, meeting those of Megara a little south of the Scironian rocks, occupied a considerable portion of Argolis. The two cities, Sicyon and Corinth, were similarly situated — both commanding important passes into the interior of the peninsula. The lofty and precipitous rock, called the Acrocorinthus, on which stood the citadel of Corinth, though, being commanded by a neighbouring height, it is of no great value for the purposes of modern warfare, was in ancient times an impregnable fortress, and a point of the highest importance.

The plain of Argos, which is bounded on three sides by lofty mountains, but open to the sea, is, for Greece, and especially for the Peloponnesus, of considerable extent, being ten or twelve miles in length, and four or five in width. But the western side is lower than the eastern, and is watered by a number of streams, in which the upper side is singularly deficient. In very ancient times the lower level was injured by excess of moisture, as it is at this day: and hence, perhaps, Argos, which lay on the western side, notwithstanding its advantageous position, and the strength of its citadel, flourished less, for a time, than Mycenæ and Tiryns, which were situate to the east, where the plain is now barren through drought.

A long valley, running southward to the sea, and the mountains which border it on three sides, composed the territory of Laconia. It is to the middle region, the heart of Laconia, that most of the ancient epithets and descriptions relating to the general character of the country properly apply. The vale of Sparta is Homer's "hollow Lacedæmon," which Euripides further described as girt with mountains, rugged, and difficult of entrance for a hostile power. The epithet "hollow" fitly represents the aspect of a valley enclosed by the lofty cliffs in which the mountains here abruptly terminate on each side of the Eurotas. The character which the poet ascribes to Laconia, — that it is a country difficult of access to an enemy, — is one which most properly belongs to it, and is of great historical importance. On the northern and the eastern sides there are only two natural passes by which the plain of Sparta can be invaded.

At the northern foot of the Taygetus Mountains begins the Messenian plain, which, like the basin of the Eurotas below Sparta, is divided into two distinct districts, by a ridge which crosses nearly its whole width from the eastern side. The upper of these districts, which is separated from Arcadia by a part of the Lycæan chain, and is bounded towards the west by the ridge of Ithome, the scene of ever memorable struggles, was the plain of Stenyclarus, a tract not peculiarly rich, but very important for the protection and command of the country, as the principal passes, not only from the north, but from the east and west fall into it. The lower part of the Messenian plain, which spreads round the head of the gulf, was a region celebrated in poetry and history for its exuberant fertility; sometimes designated by the title of Macaria, or the Blessed, watered by many streams, among the rest by the clear and full Panisus. It was, no doubt, of this delightful vale, that Euripides meant to be understood, when, contrasting Messenia with Laconia, he described the excellence of the Messenian soil as too great for words to reach.

The rich pastures on the banks of the Elean Peneus were celebrated in the earliest legends; and an ancient channel, which is still seen stretching across them to the sea, may be the same into which Hercules was believed to have turned the river, to cleanse the stable of Augeas.

When the necessary deduction has been made for the inequalities of its surface, Greece may perhaps be properly considered as a land, on the whole, not less rich than beautiful. And it probably had a better claim to this character in the days of its youthful freshness and vigour. Its productions were various as its aspect: and if other regions were more fertile in grain, and more favourable to the cultivation of the vine, few surpassed it in the growth of the olive, and of other valuable fruits. Its hills afforded abundant pastures: its waters and forests teemed with life. In the precious metals it was perhaps fortunately poor; the silver mines of Laurium were a singular exception; but the Peloponnesian Mountains, especially in Laconia and Argolis, as well as those of Eubœa, contained rich veins of iron and copper, as well as precious quarries. The marble of Pentelicus was nearly equalled in fineness by that of the isle of Paros, and that of Carystus in Eubœa. The Grecian woods still excite the admiration of travellers, as they did in the days of Pausanias,^h by trees of extraordinary size. Even the hills of Attica are said to have been once clothed with forests; and the present scantiness of its streams may be owed in a great measure to the loss of the shade which once sheltered them. Herodotusⁱ observes, that, of all countries in the world, Greece enjoyed the most happily tempered seasons. But it seems difficult to speak generally of the climate of a country, in which each district has its own, determined by an infinite variety of local circumstances. Both in northern Greece and the Peloponnesus the snow remains long on the higher ridges; and even in Attica the winters are often severe. On the other hand, the heat of the summer is tempered, in exposed situations, by the strong breezes from the northwest (the etesian winds), which prevail during that season in the Grecian seas; and it is possible that Herodotus may have had their refreshing influence chiefly in view.

Though no traces of volcanic eruptions appear to have been discovered in Greece, history is full of the effects produced there by volcanic agency; and permanent indications of its physical character were scattered over its surface, in the hot springs of Thermopylæ, Trœzen, Ædepsus, and other places. The sea between the Peloponnesus and Crete has been, down to modern times, the scene of surprising changes wrought by the same forces; and not long

before the Christian era, a new hill was thrown up on the coast near Trœzen, no less suddenly than the islands near Thera were raised out of the sea. Earthquakes, accompanied by the rending of mountains, the sinking of land into the sea, by temporary inundations, and other disasters, have in all ages been familiar to Greece, more especially to the Peloponnesus. And hence some attention seems to be due to the numerous legends and traditions which describe convulsions of the same kind as occurring still more frequently, and with still more important consequences, in a period preceding connected history; and which may be thought to point to a state of elemental warfare, which must have subsided before the region which was its theatre could have been fitted for the habitation of man. Such an origin we might be inclined to assign to that class of legends which related to struggles between Poseidon and other deities for the possession of several districts as his contests with Athene (Minerva) for Athens and Trœzen; with the same goddess, or with Hera (Juno) for Argos — where he was said, according to one account, to have dried up the springs, and according to another, to have laid the plain under water; with Apollo for the isthmus of Corinth.^b

THE NAME

It is a singular anomaly that a people who habitually called themselves Hellenes should be known to all the world beside as Greeks. This name was derived from the Graians, a small and obscure group. The Romans, chancing to come first in contact with this tribe, gave the name Greek to the whole people. In the course of time it became so fixed in the usage of other nations that it could never be shaken off. Such a change of a proper name was very unusual in antiquity. The almost invariable custom was, when it became necessary to use a proper name from a foreign language, to transcribe it as literally as might be with only such minor changes as a difference in the genius of the language made necessary. Thus the Greeks in speaking of their Persian enemies pronounced and wrote such words as "Cyrus" and "Darius" in as close imitation as possible of the native pronunciation of those names, and the Egyptians in turn, in accepting the domination of the Macedonian Ptolemies, spelled and no doubt pronounced the names of their conquerors with as little alteration as was possible in a language which made scant use of vowels. It was indeed this fact of transliteration rather than translation of foreign proper names which, as we have seen, furnished the clew to the nineteenth century scholars in their investigations of the hieroglyphics of Egypt and the cuneiform writing of Asia. Had not the engraver of the Rosetta stone spelled the word Ptolemy closely as the Greeks spelled it, Dr. Young, perhaps, never would have found the key to the interpretation of the hieroglyphics. And had not the eighty or ninety proper names of the great inscription at Behistun been interpreted by the same signs in the three different forms of writing that make up that inscription, it may well be doubted whether we should even now have any clear knowledge of the cuneiform character of the Babylonians and Assyrians. Indeed, so universal was this custom of retaining proper names in their original form that the failure of the Romans to apply to the Greeks the name which they themselves employed seems very extraordinary indeed. The custom which they thus inaugurated, however, has not been without imitators in modern times, as witness the translation "Angleterre" by which the French designate England, and the even stranger use by the same nation of the word "Allemagne"

to designate the land which its residents term "Deutschland" and which in English is spoken of as Germany.

Had the classical writings of Greece been more extensively read throughout Europe in the Middle Ages it is probable that the Roman name Greece would have been discarded in modern usage, and the name Hellas restored to its proper position. An effort to effect this change has indeed been made more recently by many classical scholars, and it is by no means unusual to meet the terms "Hellas" and "Hellenes" in modern books of almost every European language; but to make the substitution in the popular mind after the word Greece has been so closely linked with so wide a chain of associate ideas for so many generations would be utterly impossible, at least in our generation.

THE ORIGIN OF THE GREEKS

But whether known as Hellas or as Greece, the tiny peninsula designated by these names was inhabited by a people which by common consent was by far the most interesting of antiquity. It has been said that they constituted a race rather than a nation, for the most patent fact about them, to any one who gives even casual attention to their history, was that they lacked the political unity which lies at the foundation of true national existence. Yet the pride of race to a certain extent made up for this deficiency, and if the Greeks recognised no single ruler and were never bound together into a single state, they felt more keenly perhaps than any other nation that has lived at any other period of the world's history—unless perhaps an exception be made of the modern Frenchman—the binding force of racial affinities and the full meaning of the old adage that blood is thicker than water.

All this of course implies that the Greeks were one race in the narrow sense of the term, sprung in relatively recent time from a single stock. Such was undoubtedly the fact, and the division into Ionians, Dorians, and various lesser branches, on which the historian naturally lays much stress, must be understood always as implying only a minor and later differentiation. One will hear much of the various dialects of the different Greek states, but one must not forget that these dialects represent only minor variations of speech which as compared with the fundamental unity of the language as a whole might almost be disregarded. To be a Greek was to be born of Greek parents, to the use of the Greek language as a mother tongue; for the most part, following the national custom, it was to eschew every other language and to look out upon all peoples who spoke another tongue as "barbarians"—people of an alien birth and an alien genius.

But whence came this people of the parent stock whose descendants made up the historic Greek race? No one knows. The Greeks themselves hardly dared to ask the question, and we are utterly without data for answering it if asked. Their traditions implied a migration from some unknown land to Greece, since those traditions told of a non-Hellenic people who inhabited the land before them. Yet in contradiction of this idea the Greek mind clung always to autochthony. Like most other nations, and in far greater measure than perhaps any other, the Hellenes loved their home—almost worshipped it. To be a Greek and yet to have no association with the mountains and valleys and estuaries and islands of Greece seems a contradiction of terms. True, a major part of the population at a later day lived in distant colonies as widely separated as Asia Minor and

Italy, but even here they thought of themselves only as more or less temporary invaders from the parent seat, and even kept up their association with it by considering all lands which Greeks colonised as a part of "Greater Greece."

That the Greeks are of Aryan stock is of course made perfectly clear by their language. Some interesting conclusions as to the time when they branched from the parent stock are gained by philologists through observation of words which manifestly have the same root and meaning in the different Aryan languages. Thus, for example, the fact that such words as Father, Mother, Sister, Brother, Son, Daughter, and the like, are clearly of the same root in Sanskrit and Greek as well as in Latin and the Germanic speech, shows that a certain relatively advanced stage of family life had been attained while the primitive Aryans still formed but a single race. Again the resemblance between the Greek and the Latin languages goes to show that the people whose descendants became Greeks and Romans clung together till a relatively late period, after the splitting up of the primitive race had begun. Yet on the other hand the differences between the Greek and the Latin prove that the two races using these languages had been separated long before either of them is ushered into history.

From which direction the parent stock of the Greeks came into the land that was to be their future abiding place has long been a moot point with scholars, and is yet undetermined. So long as the original cradle of the Aryans was held to be central Asia, it was the unavoidable conclusion that the Aryans of Europe, including the Greeks, had come originally from the East. But when the theory was introduced that the real cradle of the primitive Aryan was not Asia but northwestern Europe all certainty from *a priori* considerations vanished, for it seemed at least as plausible that the parent Greeks might have dropped aside from the main swarm on its eastern journey to invade Asia as that they should have oscillated back to Greece after that invasion had been established. And more recently the question is still further complicated by the "Mediterranean Race" theory, which includes the Greeks as descendants of a hypothetical stock whose cradle was neither Asia nor Europe, but equatorial Africa.^a

Some of the latest accounts of Greek origin are stated by Professor Bury who says :

"It is in the lands of Thessaly and Epirus that we first dimly descry the Greeks busy at the task for which destiny had chosen them, of creating and shaping the thought and civilisation of Europe. The oak wood of Dodona in Epirus is the earliest sanctuary, whereof we have any knowledge, of their supreme god, Zeus, the dweller of the sky. Thessaly has associations which still appeal intimately to men of European birth. The first Greek settlers in Thessaly were the Achæans; and in the plain of Argos, and in the mountains which gird it about, they fashioned legends which were to sink deeply into the imagination of Europe. We know that when the Greek conquerors came down to the coast of the Ægean they found a material civilisation more advanced than their own; and it was so chanced that we know more of this civilisation than we know of the conquerors before they came under its influence.

"In Greece as in the other two great peninsulas of the Mediterranean, we find, before the invader of Aryan speech entered in and took possession, a white folk not speaking an Aryan tongue. Corresponding to the Iberians in Spain and Gaul, to the Ligurians in Italy, we find in Greece a race which was also spread over the islands of the Ægean and along the coast of Asia

Minor. The men of this primeval race gave to many a hill and rock the name which was to abide with it forever. Corinth and Tiryns, Parnassus and Olympus, Arne and Larissa, are names which the Greeks received from the peoples whom they dispossessed. But this Ægean race, as we may call it for want of a common name, had developed, before the coming of the Greek, a civilisation of which we have only very lately come to know. This civilisation went hand in hand with an active trade, which in the third millennium spread its influence far beyond the borders of the Ægean, as far at least as the Danube and the Nile, and received in return gifts from all quarters of the world. The Ægean peoples therefore plied a busy trade by sea, and their maritime intercourse with the African continent can be traced back to even earlier times, since at the very beginning of Egyptian history we find in Egypt obsidian, which can have come only from the Ægean isles. The most notable remains of this civilisation have been found at Troy, in the little island of Amorgos, and in the great island of Crete.

"The conquest of the Greek peninsula by the Greeks lies a long way behind recorded history, and the Greeks themselves, when they began to reflect on their own past, had completely forgotten what their remote ancestors had done ages and ages before.

"The invaders spoke an Aryan speech, but it does not follow that they all came of Aryan stock. There was, indeed, an Aryan element among them, and some of them were descendants of men of Aryan race who had originally taught them their language and brought them some Aryan institutions and Aryan deities. But the infusion of the Aryan blood was probably small; and in describing the Greeks, as well as any other of the races who speak sister tongues, we must be careful to call them men of Aryan speech, and not men of Aryan stock."^c

Perhaps the very latest view of sterling authority is that of Professor William Ridgeway,^d who, after marshalling a vast amount of argument and induction based upon the extant and newly discovered relics of early Grecian civilisations, sums up his theories briefly and definitely. He accepts the existence of a "Pelasgian" race, which many have scouted, and credits it with the art-work and commerce revealed at Mycenæ and elsewhere and called "Mycenæan." This was a dark-skinned (or melanochroös) race which "had dwelt in Greece from a remote antiquity and had at all times, in spite of conquests, remained a chief element in the population of all Greece, whilst in Arcadia and Attica it had never been subjugated." The Mycenæan civilisation had its origin, he believes, in the mainland of Greece and spread thence outwards to the isles of the Ægean, Crete, Egypt, and north to the Euxine. This Mycenæan era differs widely from the Homeric,—as in the treatment of the dead, and in the use of metals,—and preceded the Homeric by a great distance, the Mycenæan period belonging to the Bronze Age, the Homeric to the Iron Age.

The Homeric people were not melanochroös, but xanthochroös (fair and blond), and were evidently a conquering race—the Achæans. These Achæans, according to Greek tradition, came from Epirus, and indeed a study of the relics and "the culture of the early Iron Age of Bosnia, Carniola, Styria, Salzburg, and upper Italy revealed armour, weapons, and ornaments exactly corresponding to those described in Homer. Moreover we found that a fair-haired race greater in stature than the melanochroös Ægean people had there been domiciled for long ages, and that fresh bodies of tall, fair-haired people from the shores of the northern ocean continually through the ages had kept pressing down into the southern peninsulas. From this

it followed that the Achæans of Homer were one of these bodies of Celts, who had made their way down into Greece and had become masters of the indigenous race."

The history of the round shield, the use of buckles and brooches, the custom of cremating the dead, and the distribution of iron in Europe, Asia, and Africa, seem to Professor Ridgeway to point still more sharply to a theory that these features of Greek civilisation previously existed in central Europe and were brought thence into Greece. A study of the dialect in which the Homeric poems are written indicates that the language and metre belonged to the earlier race, the Pelasgians, whom the Achæans conquered. The earliest Greeks spoke an Aryan or Indo-Germanic language of which the Arcadian dialect was the purest remnant, since the Achæans and Dorians never conquered Arcadia. The introduction of labialism into the Greek, Ridgeway believes to be a proof of the Celtic origin of the invaders who accepted, as conquerors usually do, the language of the conquered and yet modified it. "Labialism" is the changing of a hard consonant as "k" into a lip-consonant as "p" — as the older Greek word for horse was "hikkos," which became "hippos." The result, then, of Ridgeway's erudite research is his belief that "the Achæans were a Celtic tribe who made their way into Greece," and for this theory he asserts that "archæology, tradition, and language are all in harmony."

The original source of this migration, — for it was rather migration than an invasion, — seems to have been in the northwest of the Balkan peninsula. Some extraordinary pressure must have been brought to bear on the Greeks by the Illyrians who may themselves have been forced out of their own homes by some unrecorded power. At the same time the people then living in Macedonia and Thrace were dispossessed and shoved into Phrygia and the regions of Troy in Asia Minor. The possession of Greece by the Greeks was doubtless very gradual and the Peloponnesus was the last to be visited, possibly by boat across the Corinthian Gulf. In some places the new-comers were doubtless compelled to fight, elsewhere they drifted in almost unnoticed and gradually asserted a sway. The new-comers imposed their speech eventually on the older people, but as usual they must have been themselves largely influenced by the older civilisation in the matter of customs and conditions.^a

EARLY CONDITIONS AND MOVEMENTS

In the Pelasgic period we find the ancient Greeks in a primitive, but not really barbaric condition. There are settled peoples engaged in agriculture, as well as half nomadic pastoral tribes. The latter form, for a long time, a very unstable element of the population, ever ready under pressure of circumstances to leave their old homes and fight for new ones, bearing disturbance and anarchy into the civilised districts.

The life of these peasants and shepherds was very simple and patriarchal. The ox and the horse were known to them, and drew their wagons and their ploughs; the principal source of their wealth consisted in great herds of swine, sheep, and cattle. Fishermen already navigated the numerous arms of the seas that indented the land. Public life had perfectly patriarchal forms. "Kings" were to be found everywhere as ruling heads of the numerous small tribes. Religion appeared essentially as a cult of the mighty forces of nature. The deities were worshipped without temples and images, and were appealed to with prayers, with both bloody and bloodless sacrifices,

— at the head Zeus, the god of the sky; at his side Dione, the goddess of earth, who, however, was early replaced by the figure of Hera; Demeter, the earth mother, the patron of agriculture and of settled life; Hestia, the patron of the hearth fire and the altar fire; Hermes, the swift messenger of heaven, driver of the clouds and guardian of the herds; Poseidon, the god of the waters; and the chthonic [*i.e.* subterranean] divinity Aidoneus or Hades. The art of prophecy was developed early; the oracle of Dodona in Epirus was universally known.

We know not how long the ancient Greeks remained in the quiet Pelasgic conditions. But we can distinguish the causes that produced the internal movement and mighty ferment, from which the chivalrous nation of the Achæans finally came. Most important were the influences of the highly developed civilisation of the Orient upon the youthful, gifted Greek nation. The Phœnicians were the principal bearers of this influence. They had occupied many of the islands of the Ægean, and had planted colonies even on the mainland, as at Thebes and Acrocorinthus. The merchants exchanged the products of Phœnician and Babylonian industry for wool, hides, and slaves. They worked the copper mines of Cyprus and Argolis and the gold mines of Thasos and Thrace, but obtained even greater wealth from the purple shellfish of the Grecian waters.

For about a century the Phœnicians exerted a strong pressure on the coasts of Greece, and they left considerable traces in Grecian mythology and civilisation. The gifted Greeks, who in all periods of their history were quick to profit by foreign example, were deeply impressed by the superior civilisation of the Phœnicians. The activity and skill of the men of Sidon in navigation and fortification had a very permanent effect. For a long time the Greeks made the Phœnicians their masters in architecture, mining, and engineering; later they received from them the alphabet and the Babylonian system of weights and measures. The industry and the artistic skill of the Greeks also began to practice on the models brought into the land by the Sidonians.

Internal dissensions, raids of the rude pastoral tribes upon the settled peoples of the lowlands and the coast, and feuds between the nomads themselves, were, doubtless, also a powerful factor in the transition from the peaceful patriarchy of Pelasgic times to the more stirring and warlike period that followed. The necessity of protecting person and property from bold raiders by sea and land led to the erection of fortresses, massive walls of rough stones piled upon one another and held together only by the law of gravity. The best example of such "Cyclopean" remains is the well-preserved citadel of Tiryns in Argolis. Here on a hill only fifty feet high, the top of which is nine hundred feet long and three hundred feet wide, a wall without towers follows the edge of the rock. With an apparent thickness of twenty-five feet the real wall, as it appears to-day, cannot be estimated at more than fifteen feet. On each side of this run covered passages or galleries. By degrees the Greeks learned from Phœnician models to construct these fortresses better and finally to make real citadels of them. Little city communities were gradually formed at the foot of the hill, but until far into the Hellenic period the upper city, the "acropolis" remained the more important. Here were the sanctuaries and the council chamber, the residence of the king and often also the houses of the nobility.

The military nobility, the ancient Greek chivalry, also originated in pre-historic times. In the storms of the new time the patriarchal chieftains developed into powerful military princes who everywhere forced the

"Pelagian" peasant to keep his sling or his sword, his lance or his javelin, always at hand. A class of lords also arose, consisting of families that supported themselves rather by the trade of arms than by the pursuit of agriculture. This new nobility, which gradually grew to great numerical strength, held a very important position down to the days of democracy.

This transition period was subsequently called by the Hellenes the Heroic Age. The myths and legends which the memory of the Greek tribes and their poets preserved of this period have a varied character. On the one hand, heroic figures are repeatedly developed from the local names or the surnames of divinities, or the mythical history of a god is transferred to a human being. On the other hand, this imaginative people loved to concentrate its historical recollections and to load the deeds and experiences of whole tribes and epochs upon one or another heroic personality, whose cycle of legends in the course of further development underwent new colourings and extensions through the mixture of fresh elements. This is the way in which the legends of Hercules and Theseus, of the Argonauts and the "Seven against Thebes" grew up. The most glorious poetical illumination is cast upon the alleged greatest deed of pre-Hellenic times, the ten years' war waged by nearly the whole body of Achæan heroes against the Teucrian Troy or Ilion.

The warlike, chivalrous-romantic nation of poetry and legendary history at the close of the pre-Hellenic period we are accustomed to call the Achæans. It seems to us safe to accept the theory that the name Achæans means "the noble, excellent," and belongs to the entire "hero-nation," not to a single tribe after which the Greeks as a whole were afterwards called.

At least a few important remains of the tribal and state relations of this age passed over into the Hellenic period. The Dorians were at this time an insignificant mountain race in the mountains on the northern edge of the beautiful basin of northeastern Greece, which had not yet received the name of Thessaly, while the principal part was played there by the Lapithæ on Mount Ossa and the lower Peneus, the Bœotians in the southwest of the Peneus district, and especially the Minyæ, with one branch at Iolcus on the gulf of Pagasæ and another in the western part of the basin of the Copais, where they were in constant rivalry with the Cadmeans of Thebes. The Ionic race was spread over the northern coast of the Peloponnesus on the Gulf of Corinth, over a portion of the eastern coast of this peninsula on the Gulf of Saron, and over Megaris and Attica. Among the Ionic cantons Attica had already attained considerable importance. Here the so-called Theseus, or rather a family of warlike chieftains descended from the Ionic tribal hero Theseus, had succeeded in uniting the four different portions of this district.

Of greater importance than any of these in the pre-Doric period were the feudal states of the Peloponnesus. The strongest among these was the royal house of the Atridæ, upon whose glory terrible legends cast a dark and bloody shadow. From their capital at Mycenæ they ruled over the whole of Argolis; chieftains in Tiryns, in Argos and on the coast of the peninsula of Paros acknowledged their authority. The remains of the citadel of this royal family are still preserved. The hill on which this citadel stood is surmounted by a small circular wall, and lower down is surrounded by a mighty wall which everywhere follows the edge of the cliff, and which in some places is built of rough layers of massive stones, elsewhere of carefully fitted polygonal blocks, but also for considerable stretches of rectangular blocks, in horizontal courses.


On the southwestern side is the principal gate, the famous Gate of the Lions, which takes its name from the oldest extant remains of sculpture in Greece. In the triangular gap in the wall above the lintel an enormous slab of yellow limestone is fitted; it is divided in the middle by a perpendicular column, on either side of which stands a lioness. In this acropolis Schliemann found graves with human remains, with vessels of clay, alabaster, and gold, ornaments of rock-crystal, copper, silver, gold, and ivory.

Near the Gate of the Lions begin the walls of the lower city, which stood on the ridge extending from the western declivity of the citadel to the south. In this lower city are a number of remarkable subterranean buildings, sepulchres and treasure houses of the ancient monarchs. The best preserved and largest of these is the noteworthy round building known as the "treasure house of Atreus" (also as the "grave of Agamemnon"), which is especially interesting on account of its *tholos*, or interior circular vault.

So in a large part of the Greek world a not inconsiderable degree of civilisation had already begun to flourish. War, to be sure, was governed, even down to the period of the highest culture, by a "martial law" that recognised no right of the vanquished, delivered conquered cities to the flames, and gave the person and the family of the captured enemy to the victor as booty. The battle itself however, was conducted according to certain mutually recognised chivalrous forms. The Greek knights, rushing into battle in their chariots, hurled their terrible javelins at the enemy, but made less use of the sword, and still less of the bow, sought single combat with a foe of equal birth, and as a rule avoided slaughtering the common soldier. The development of a class of slaves in consequence of the incessant feuds was of great influence in determining the whole future character of the later Hellenic states. On the other hand, it is worthy of note that the ancient cruelty and bloodthirsty savagery disappeared more and more, although breaking out frightfully on occasion when the heat of Greek passion burst through all restraint. But murder and even simple homicide, as they are recorded with traces of blood in the older legendary history, ceased to be daily occurrences.

Tradition shows traces of a beautiful moral idealism. The tenderest friendship, respect of the Greek youth for age, conjugal loyalty of the women, ardent love of family, and the highest degree of receptivity for the good and the noble shine forth from the traditions of the Achæans with a charm that warms the heart.

The beginnings of common religious assemblages, or Amphictyons, also appear to belong to this time. So Greek life had already a quite complex structure when a last echo of the ancient movement of peoples on the Illyrian-Greek peninsula once more produced a general upheaval in all the lands between Olympus and Malea, between the Ionian Sea and the mountains of the coast of Asia Minor, after which Greece on either side of the Ægean Sea had acquired the ethnographic physiognomy that it retained until the invasion of the Slavs and Bulgarians.^e



CHAPTER II. THE MYCENÆAN AGE

At Mycenæ in 1876 Dr. Schliemann lifted the corner of the veil which had so long enshrouded the elder age of Hellas. Year by year ever since that veil has been further withdrawn, and now we are privileged to gaze on more than the shadowy outline of a far-back age. The picture is still incomplete, but it is already possible to trace the salient features. . . . The name "Mycenæan" is now applied to a whole class of monuments — buildings, sepulchres, ornaments, weapons, pottery, engraved stones — which resemble more or less closely those found at Mycenæ. I think I am right when I say that archæologists are unanimous in considering them the outcome of one and the same civilisation, and the product of one and the same race. — WILLIAM RIDGEWAY.

MYCENÆAN CIVILISATION ¹



THE GATE OF THE LIONS, MYCENÆ

"MYCENÆAN" is a convenient epithet for a certain phase of a prehistoric civilisation, which, as a whole, is often called "Ægean." It owes its vogue to the fame of Henry Schliemann's discovery at Mycenæ in 1876, but is not intended to beg the open question as to the origin or principal seat of the Bronze Age culture of the Greek lands.

The site of Mycenæ itself was notorious for the singular and massive character of its ruins, long before Schliemann's time. The great curtain wall and towers of the citadel, of mixed Cyclopean, polygonal, and ashlar construction, and unbroken except on the south cliff, and the main gate, crowned with a heraldic relief of lionesses, have

never been hidden; and though much blocked with their own ruin, the larger dome-tombs outside the citadel have always been visible, and remarked by travellers. But since these remains were always referred vaguely to a "Heroic" or "proto-Hellenic" period, even Schliemann's preliminary clearing of the gateway and two dome-tombs in 1876, which exposed the engaged columns of the façades, and suggested certain inferences as to external revetment and internal decoration, would not by itself have led any one to associate Mycenæ with an individual civilisation. It was his simultaneous attack on the unsearched area which was enclosed by the citadel walls, and in 1876 showed no remains above ground, that led to the recognition of a "Mycenæan civilisation." Schliemann had published in 1868 his belief that the Heroic graves mentioned by Pausanias lay within the citadel of Mycenæ, and now he chose the deeply silted space just within the gate for his first sounding. About 10

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[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

feet below the surface his diggers exposed a double ring of upright slabs, once capped with cross slabs, and nearly 90 feet in diameter. Continuing downwards through earth full of sherds and other débris, whose singularity was not then recognised, the men found several sculptured limestone slabs showing subjects of war or the chase, and scroll and spiral ornament rudely treated in relief. When, after some delay, the work was resumed, some skeletons were uncovered lying loose, and at last, 30 feet from the original surface, an oblong pit-grave was found, paved with pebbles, and once roofed, which contained three female skeletons, according to Schliemann, "smothered in jewels." A few feet to the west were presently revealed a circular altar, and beneath it another grave with five corpses, two probably female, and an even richer treasure of gold. Three more pits came to light to the northward, each adding its quota to the hoard, and then Schliemann, proclaiming that he had found Atreus and all his house, departed for Athens. But his Greek ephor, clearing out the rest of the precinct, came on yet another grave and some gold objects lying loose. Altogether there were nineteen corpses in six pits, buried, as the grave furniture showed, at different times, but all eventually included in a holy ring.

These sepulchres were richer in gold than any found elsewhere in the world, a fact which led to an absurd attempt to establish their kinship with the later and only less golden burials of Scythians or Celts. The metal was worked up into heavy death-masks and lighter breastplates, diadems, baldries, pendants, and armlets, often made of mere foil, and also into goblets, hair-pins, rings engraved with combats of men and beasts, miniature balances, and an immense number of thin circular plaques and buttons with bone, clay, or wooden cores. Special mention is due to the inlays of gold and *niello* on bronze dagger-blades, showing spiral ornament or scenes of the chase, Egyptian in motive, but non-Egyptian in style; and to little flat models of shrine-façades analogous to those devoted to Semitic pillar-worship. The ornament on these objects displayed a highly developed spiraliform system, and advanced adaptation of organic forms, especially octopods and butterflies, to decorative uses. The shrines, certain silhouette figurines, and one cup bear moulded doves, and plant forms appear inlaid in a silver vessel. The last-named metal was much rarer than gold, and used only in a few conspicuous objects, notably a great hollow ox-head with gilded horns and frontal rosette, a roughly modelled stag, and a cup, of which only small part remains, chased with a scene of nude warriors attacking a fort. Bronze swords and daggers and many great cauldrons were found, with arrow-heads of obsidian, and also a few stone vases, beads of amber, intaglio gems, sceptre heads of crystal, certain fittings and other fragments made of porcelain and paste, and remains of carved wood. Along with this went much pottery, mostly broken by the collapse of the roofs. It begins with a dull painted ware, which we now know as late "proto-Mycenæan"; and it develops into a highly glazed fabric, decorated with spiraliform and marine schemes in lustrous paint, and showing the typical forms, false-mouthed *amphoræ* and long-footed vases, now known as essentially Mycenæan. The loose objects found outside the circle include the best intaglio ring from this site, admirably engraved with a cult scene, in which women clad in flounced skirts are chiefly concerned, and the worship seems to be of a sacred tree.

This treasure as a whole was admitted at once to be far too highly developed in technique and ornament, and too individual in character, to belong, as the lionesses over the gate used to be said to belong, merely to a first stage in Hellenic art. It preceded in time the classical culture of the

same area; but, whether foreign or native, it was allowed to represent a civilisation that was at its acme and practically incapable of further development. So the bare fact of a great prehistoric art-production, not strictly Greek, in Greece came to be accepted without much difficulty. But before describing how its true relations were unfolded thereafter, it may be mentioned that the site of Mycenæ had yet much to reveal after Schliemann left it. Ten years later the Greek Archæological Society resumed exploration there, and M. Tsountas, probing the summit of the citadel, hit upon and opened out a fragment of a palace with hearth of stucco, painted with geometric design, and walls adorned with frescoes of figure subjects, armed men, and horses. An early Doric temple was found to have been built over this palace, a circumstance which disposed forever of the later dates proposed for Mycenæan objects. Subsequently many lesser structures were cleared in the east and southwest of the citadel area, which yielded commoner vessels of domestic use, in pottery, stone, and bronze, and some more painted objects, including a remarkable fragment of stucco, which shows human ass-headed figures in procession, a tattooed head, and a plaque apparently showing the worship of an aniconic deity. From the immense variety of these domestic objects more perhaps has been learned as to the affinities of Mycenæan civilisation than from the citadel graves. Lastly, a most important discovery was made of a cemetery west of the citadel. Its tombs are mostly rock-cut chambers, approached by sloping *dromoi*; but there are also pits, from one of which came a remarkable ivory mirror handle of oriental design. The chamber graves were found to be rich in trinkets of gold, engraved stones, usually opaque, vases in pottery and stone, bronze mirrors and weapons, terra-cottas and carved ivory; but neither they nor the houses have yielded iron except in very small quantity, and that not fashioned into articles of utility. The presence of fibulæ and razors supplied fresh evidence as to Mycenæan fashions of dress and wearing of the hair, and a silver bowl, with male profiles inlaid in gold, proved that the upper lip was sometimes shaved. All the great dome-tombs known have been cleared, but the process has added only to our architectural knowledge. The tomb furniture had been rifled long ago. Part of the circuit of a lower town has been traced, and narrow embanked roadways conducted over streams on Cyclopean bridges lead to it from various quarters.

The abundance and magnificence of the circle treasure had been needed to rivet the attention and convince the judgment of scholars, slow to reconstruct *ex pede Herculem*. But there had been a good deal of evidence available previous to 1876, which, had it been collated and seriously studied, might have greatly discounted the sensation that the Citadel graves eventually made. Although it was recognised that certain tributaries, represented, *e.g.*, in the XVIIIth Dynasty tomb of Rekh-ma-Ra at Egyptian Thebes, as bearing vases of peculiar form, were of Mediterranean race, neither their precise habitat nor the degree of their civilisation could be determined while so few actual prehistoric remains were known in the Mediterranean lands. Nor did the Mycenæan objects which were lying obscurely in museums in 1870 or thereabouts provide a sufficient test of the real basis underlying the Hellenic myths of the Argolid, the Troad, and Crete, to cause these to be taken seriously.

Even Schliemann's first excavations at Hissarlik in the Troad did not surprise those familiar equally with Neolithic settlements and Hellenistic remains. But the "Burnt City" of the second stratum, revealed in 1873, with its fortifications and vases, and the hoard of gold, silver, and bronze

[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

objects, which the discoverer connected with it (though its relation to the stratification is doubtful still), made a stir, which was destined to spread far outside the narrow circle of scholars when in 1876 Schliemann lighted on the Mycenæ graves.


Like the "letting in of water," light at once poured in from all sides on the prehistoric period of Greece. It was established that the character of both the fabric and the decoration of the Mycenæan objects was not that of any well-known art. A wide range in space was proved by the identification of the *inselsteine* and the Ialysos vases with the new style, and a wide range in time by collation of the earlier Theraean and Hissarlik discoveries. A relation between objects of art described by Homer and the Mycenæan treasure was generally recognised, and a correct opinion prevailed that, while certainly posterior, the civilisation of the *Ilial* was reminiscent of the great Mycenæan period. Schliemann got to work again at Hissarlik in 1878, and greatly increased knowledge of the lower strata, but did not recognise the Mycenæan remains in his "Lydian" city of the sixth stratum; but by laying bare in 1884 the upper remains on the rock of Tiryns, he made a contribution to the science of domestic life in the Mycenæan period, which was amplified two years later by Tsountas' discovery of the Mycenæ palace. From 1886 dates the finding of Mycenæan sepulchres outside the Argolid, from which, and from the continuation of Tsountas' exploration of the buildings and lesser graves at Mycenæ, a large treasure, independent of Schliemann's princely gift, has been gathered into the National Museum at Athens. In that year were excavated dome-tombs, most already rifled, in Attica, in Thessaly, in Cephalonia, and Laconia. In 1890 and 1893 Stæs cleared out more homely dome-tombs at Thoricus in Attica; and other graves, either rock-cut "beehives" or chambers, were found at Spata and Aphidnæ in Attica, in Ægina and Salamis, at the Heraeum and Nauplia in the Argolid, near Thebes and Delphi, and lastly not far from the Thessalian Larissa.

But discovery was far from being confined to the Greek mainland and its immediate dependencies. The limits of the prehistoric area were pushed out to the central Ægean islands, all of which are singularly rich in evidence of the pre-Mycenæan period. The series of Syran built graves, containing crouching corpses, is the best and most representative that is known in the Ægean. Melos, long marked as containing early objects, but not systematically excavated until taken in hand by the British School at Athens in 1896, shows remains of all the Ægean periods.

Crete has been proved by the tombs of Anoja and Egarnos, by the excavations on the site of Knossos begun in 1878 by M. Minos Kalokairinos and resumed with startling success in 1900 by Messrs. Evans and Hogarth, and by those in the Dictean cave and at Phaestos, Gournia, Zakro, and Palæokastro, to be prolific of remains of the prehistoric periods out of all proportion to remains of classical Hellenic culture. A map of Cyprus in the later Bronze Age now shows more than five-and-twenty settlements in and about the Mesaorea district alone, of which one, that at Enkomi, near the site of later Salamis, has yielded the richest gold treasure found outside Mycenæ. Half round the outermost circle to which Greek influence attained in the classical period remains of the same prehistoric civilisation have been happened on. M. Chantre, in 1894, picked up lustreless ware, like that of Hissarlik, in central Phrygia, and the English archæological expeditions sent subsequently into northwestern Anatolia have never failed to bring back "Ægean" specimens from the valleys of the Rhyndacus and Sangarius, and even of the Halys.

[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

In Egypt, Mr. Petrie found painted sherds of Cretan style at Kahun in the Fayum in 1887, and farther up the Nile, at Tel-el-Amarna, chanced on bits of not less than eight hundred Ægean vases in 1889. There have now been recognised in the collections at Gizeh, Florence, London, Paris, and Bologna several Egyptian or Phœnician imitations of the Mycenæan style to set off against the many debts which the centres of Mycenæan culture owed to Egypt. Two Mycenæan vases were found at Sidon in 1885, and many fragments of Ægean, and especially Cypriote, pottery have been turned up during the recent excavation of sites in Philistia by the Palestine Fund. Southeastern Sicily has proved, ever since Orsi excavated the Sicel cemetery near Lentini in 1877, a mine of early remains, among which appear in regular succession Ægean fabrics and motives of decoration from the period of the second stratum at Hissarlik down to the latest Mycenæan. Sardinia has Mycenæan sites, *e.g.*, at Abini near Teti, and Spain has yielded objects recognised as Mycenæan from tombs near Cadiz, and from Saragossa.



ARCHED PASSAGE WAY, MYCENÆ

found in the earliest cist-graves. The second and third cities rise one out of the other without evidence of long interval. A third and more important site than either, Knossos in Crete, awaits fuller publication. Here are ruins of a great palace, mainly of two periods. Originally constructed about 2000 B.C., it was almost entirely rebuilt at the acme of the Mycenæan Age, but substructures and other remains of the earlier palace underlie the later.

Since recent researches, some of whose results are not yet published, have demonstrated that in certain localities, for instance, Cyprus, Crete, and most of the Ægean islands where Mycenæan remains were not long ago supposed to be merely sporadic, they form in fact a stratum to be expected on the site

terry near Lentini in 1877, a mine of early remains, among which appear in regular succession Ægean fabrics and motives of decoration from the period of the second stratum at Hissarlik down to the latest Mycenæan. Sardinia has Mycenæan sites, *e.g.*, at Abini near Teti, and Spain has yielded objects recognised as Mycenæan from tombs near Cadiz, and from Saragossa.

The results of three excavations will especially serve as rallying points and supply a standard of comparison. After Schliemann's death, Dörpfeld returned to Hissarlik, and recognised in the huge remains of the sixth stratum, on the southern skirts of the citadel mound, a city of the same period as

Mycenæ at its acme. Thus we can study there remains of a later stage, in one process of development superposed on earlier remains, after an intervening period. The links there missing are, however, apparent at Phylakopi in Melos, excavated systematically from 1896 to 1899. Here buildings of three main periods appear one on another. The earliest overlies in one spot a deposit of sherds of the most primitive type known in the Ægean and

[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

of almost every ancient Ægean settlement, we may safely assume that Mycenæan civilisation was a phase in the history of all the insular and peninsular territories of the east Mediterranean basin. Into the continents on the east and south we have no reason to suppose that its influence penetrated either very widely or very strongly.

The remains that especially concern us here belong to the later period illustrated by these discoveries, and have everywhere a certain uniformity. Some common influence spread at a certain era over the Ægean area and reduced almost to identity a number of local civilisations of similar origin but diverse development. Surviving influences of these, however, combined with the constant geographical conditions to reintroduce some local differentiation into the Mycenæan products.

The Neolithic Age in the Ægean has now been abundantly illustrated from the yellow bottom clay at Knossos, and its products do not differ materially from those implements and vessels with which man has everywhere sought to satisfy his first needs. The mass of the stone tools and weapons, and the coarse hand-made and burnished pottery, might well proceed from the spontaneous invention of each locality that possessed suitable stone and clay; but the common presence of flaked blades, arrow-heads, and blunt choppers of an obsidian, native, so far as is known, to Melos only, speaks of inter-communication even at this early period between many distant localities and the city whose remains have been unearthed at Phylakopi. The wide range of the peculiar cist-grave strengthens the belief that late Stone Age culture in the Ægean was not of sporadic development, and prepares us for the universality of a certain fiddle-shaped type of stone idol. Local divergence is, however, already apparent in the relative prevalence of certain forms: for example, a shallow bowl is common in Crete, but not in the Cyclades, while the *pyxis*, so common in the graves of Amorgos and Melos, has left little sign of itself in Crete; and from this point the further development of civilisation in the Ægean area results in increasing differentiation. The Greek mainland has produced as yet very little of the earlier periods (the excavators of the Heraeum promise additions); but the primitive remains in the rest of the area may be divided into four classes of strong family likeness, but distinct development.

The pottery supplies the best criterion, and will suffice for our end. We have no such comprehensive and certain evidence from other classes of remains. Except for the Great Treasure of Hissarlik, and the weapons in Cycladic graves, there have been found as yet hardly any metal products of the period. Of the few stone products, one class, the "island idols," already referred to, was obviously exported widely, and supplies an ill test either of place or date. There have not been discovered sufficiently numerous structures or graves to afford a basis of classification. Fortified towns have been explored in Melos, Siphnos, and the Troad, and a few houses in Ægina and Thera; but neither unaltered houses nor tombs of undoubted primitive character have appeared in Crete as yet, nor elsewhere than in the Cyclad isles.

Above the strata, however, which contain these remains of local divergent development, there lies in all districts of the Ægean area a rich layer of deposit, whose contents show a rapid and marked advance in civilisation, are essentially uniform, and have only subsidiary characteristics due to local influence or tradition. The civilisation there represented is not of an origin foreign to the area. The germs of all its characteristic fabrics, forms, and motives of decoration exist in the underlying strata, though not equally in all districts, and the change which Mycenæan art occasions is not always equally

abrupt. It is most reasonable to see in these remains the result of the action of some accidental influence which greatly increased the wealth and capacity of one locality in the area, and caused it to impose its rapidly developing culture on all the rest. The measure of the reaction that took place in divers localities thereafter depended naturally on the point to which local civilisations had respectively advanced in the pre-Mycenæan period.

As to the decorative motives in vogue, there is less uniformity. The earlier Mycenæan vessels have curvilinear and generally spiraliform geometric schemes. These pass into naturalistic vegetable forms, and finally become in the finest typical vases almost exclusively marine—*algæ*, octopods, molluscs, shells, in many combinations. Everywhere animal, bird, and human forms are but seldom found. Man certainly appears very late, and in company with the oriental motives which characterise the Spata objects. Insects, especially butterflies, become common, and when their antennæ terminate in exquisite spirals, decorative art is at the end of its progress.



SILVER OX-HEAD FROM MYCENÆ

Not only in the continuous and universal commentary of painted earthenware, but in many other media, we have evidence of "Mycenæan" art, but varying in character according to the local abundance or variety of particular materials. We have reached an age when the artist had at his disposal not only terra-cotta, hard and soft stone, and wood, but much metal, gold, silver, lead, copper, bronze containing about twelve per cent. of tin alloy, as well as bone and ivory, and various compositions from soft lime plaster up to opaque glass. If it were not for the magnificent stone utensils, in the guise of lioness heads, triton shells,

palm and lotus capitals, with spirals in relief, miniature shields for handles, which have come to light at Knossos, we should have supposed stone to be a material used (except architecturally) only for such rude metallic-seeming reliefs as stood over the Mycenæ gate and circle graves, or for heavy commonplace vases and lamps.

We have discovered no large free statuary in the round in any material as yet, though part of a hand at Knossos speaks to its existence; but figurines in metal, painted terra-cotta, and ivory, replacing the earlier stone idols, are fairly abundant. For these bronze is by far the commonest medium, and two types prevail; a female with bell-like or flounced divided skirt, and hair coiled or hanging in tails, and a male, nude but for a loin-cloth. The position of the hands and legs varies with the skill of the artist, as in all archaic statuary. Knossos has revealed for the first time the Mycenæan artist's skill in painted plaster-relief (*gesso duro*). The life-size bull's head from the northern entrance of the palace and fragments of human busts challenge comparison triumphantly with the finest Egyptian work. And from the same site comes the fullest assurance of a high development of fresco-painting.

Tiryns had already shown us a galloping bull on its palace wall, Mycenæ smaller figures and patterns, and Phylakopi its panel of 'flying-fish'; but Knossos is in advance of all with its processions of richly dressed vase-

[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

carriers, stiff in general pose and incorrect in outline, but admirably painted in detail and noble in type; and its yet more novel scenes of small figures, in animated act of dance or ritual or war, irresistibly suggestive of early Attic vase-painting. Precious fragments of painted transparencies in rock-crystal have also survived, and both Mycenæ and Knossos have yielded stone with traces of painted design. Moulded glass of a cloudy blue-green texture seems to belong to the later period, at which carved ivory, previously rare, though found even in pre-Mycenæan strata, becomes common. The Spata tomb in Attica alone yielded 730 pieces of the latter material, helmeted heads in profile, mirror handles and sides of coffers of orientalising design, plaques with outlines of heraldic animals, and so forth. Articles in paste and porcelain of native manufacture, though often of exotic design, have been found most commonly where Eastern influence is to be expected; for instance, at Enkomi in Cyprus. But the glassy blue composition, known to Homer as *κύανος*, an imitation of lapis-lazuli, was used in architectural ornament at Tiryns.

But it is in precious metals, and in the kindred technique of gem-cutting, that Mycenæan art effects its most distinctive achievements. This is, as we have said, an age of metal. That stone implements had not entirely passed out of use is attested by the obsidian arrow-heads found in the circle graves, and the flint knives and basalt axes which lay beside vases of the full "Mycenæan" style at Cozzo del Pantano in Sicily. But they are survivals, unimportant beside the objects in copper, bronze, and precious metals. Iron has been found with remains of the period only as a great rarity. Some five rings, a shield boss, and formless lumps alone represent it at Mycenæ. In the fourth circle grave occurred thirty-four vessels of nearly pure copper. Silver makes its appearance before gold, and is found moulded into bracelets and bowls, and very rarely into figurines. Gold is more plentiful. Beaten, it makes face-masks, armlets, pendants, diadems, and all kinds of small votive objects; drawn, it makes rings whose bezels are engraved with the burin; riveted, it makes cups; and overlaid as leaf on bone, clay, wood, or bronze cores, it adorns hundreds of discs, buttons, and blades.

Next to Mycenæ in wealth of this metal ranks Enkomi in Cyprus, and pretty nearly all the tombs of the later period have yielded gold, conspicuously that of Vaphio. From the town sites, *e.g.*, Phylakopi in Melos, and Knossos, it has disappeared almost entirely. Detached from the mass of golden objects which show primitive or tentative technique, are a few of such elaborate finish and fineness of handiwork, that it is hard to credit them to the same period and the same craftsmen. The Mycenæ inlaid dagger-blades are famous examples, and the technical skill, which beat out each of the Vaphio goblets in a single unriveted plate, has never been excelled.

We are fortunate in possessing very considerable remains of all kinds of construction and structural ornament of the Mycenæan period. The great walls of Mycenæ, of Tiryns (though perhaps due to an earlier epoch), and of the sixth layer at Hissarlik, show us the simple scheme of fortification—massive walls with short returns and corner towers, but no flank defences, approached by ramps or stairs from within and furnished with one great gate and a few small sally-ports. Chambers in the thickness of the wall seem to have served for the protection of stores rather than of men. The great palaces at Knossos and Phæstos, however, are of much more complicated plan. Remains of much architectural decoration have been found in these palaces—at Mycenæ, frescoes of men and animals; at Knossos, frescoes of men, fish, and sphinxes, vegetable designs, painted reliefs, and rich

conventional ornament, such as an admirably carved frieze in hard limestone; at Tiryns, traces of a frieze inlaid with lapis-lazuli glass, and also frescoes. The rough inner walls, that appear now on these sites, must once have looked very different.

Certain chambers at Knossos, paved and lined with gypsum, and two in Melos, have square central piers. These seem to have had a religious significance, and are possibly shrines devoted to pillar-worship. The houses of the great dead were hardly less elaborate. The "Treasury of Atreus" had a moulded façade with engaged columns in a sort of proto-Doric order and marble facing; and there is good reason to suppose that its magnificent vault was lined within with metal ornament or hanging draperies. The construction itself of this and the other masonry domes bespeaks skill of a high order. For lesser folk beehive excavations were made in the rock, and at the latest period a return was made apparently to the tetragonal chamber; but now it has a pitched or vaulted roof, and generally a short passage of approach whose walls converge overhead towards a pointed arch but do not actually meet. The corpses are laid on the floor, neither mummified nor cremated; but in certain cases they were possibly mutilated and "scarified," and the limbs were then enclosed in chest urns. There is evidence for this both in Crete and Sicily. But the order of burial, which first made Mycenaean civilisation known to the modern world, continues singular. Similar shaft graves, whether contained within a circle of slabs or not, have never been found again.

The latest excavation has at last established beyond all cavil that the civilisation which was capable of such splendid artistic achievement was not without a system of written communication. Thousands of clay tablets (many being evidently labels) and a few inscriptions on pottery from the palace at Knossos have confirmed Mr. A. J. Evans' previous deduction, based on gems, masons' and potters' marks, and one short inscription on stone found in the Dictæan cave, that more than one script was in use in the period. Most of the Knossos tablets are written in an upright linear alphabetic or syllabic character, often with the addition of ideographs, and showing an intelligible system of decimal numeration. Since many of the same characters have been found in use as potters' marks on sherds in Melos, which are of earlier date than the Mycenaean period, the later civilisation cannot be credited with their invention. Other clay objects found at Knossos, as well as gems from the east of Crete, show a different system more strictly pictographic. This seems native to the island, and to have survived almost to historic times; but the origin of the linear system is more doubtful. No such tablets or sealings have yet been found outside Crete, and their writing remains undeciphered. The affinities of the linear script seem to be with the Asianic systems, Cypriote and Hittite, and perhaps with later Greek. The characters are obviously not derived from the Phœnician.

This Mycenaean civilisation, as we know it from its remains, belongs to the Ægean area (*i.e.*, roughly the Greek), and to no other area with which we are at present acquainted. It is apparently not the product of any of the elder races which developed culture in the civilised areas to the east or southeast, much as it owed to those races. It would be easy to add to the singular vase-forms, script, lustrous paint, idols, gems, types of house and tomb, and so forth, already mentioned, a long list of Mycenaean decorative schemes which, even if their remote source lies in Egypt, Babylonia, or inner Anatolia, are absolutely peculiar in their treatment. But style is conclusive. From first to last the persistent influence of a true artistic ideal differen-

[ca. 1600-1000 B.C.]

tiates Mycenæan objects from the hieratic or stylised products of Egypt or Phœnicia. A constant effort to attain symmetry and decorative effect for its own sake inspires the geometric designs. Those taken from organic life show continual reference to the model and a "naturalistic grasp of the whole situation," which resists convention and often ignores decorative propriety. The human form is fearlessly subjected to experiment, the better to attain lightness, life, and movement in its portrayal. A foreign motive is handled with a breadth and vitality which renders its new expression practically independent. The conventional bull of an Assyrian relief was referred to the image of a living bull by the Knossian artist, and made to express his emotions of fear or wrath by the Vaphio goldsmith, the Cypriote worker in ivory mirror handles, or the "island-gem" cutter.

Since we have a continuous series of links by which the development of the characteristic Mycenæan products can be traced within the area back to very primitive forms, we can fearlessly assert that not only did the full flower of the Mycenæan civilisation proper belong to the Ægean area, but also its essential origin. That it came to have intimate relations with other contemporary civilisations, Egyptian, Mesopotamian, perhaps "Hittite," and early began to contract a huge debt, especially to Egypt, is equally certain. Not to mention the certainly imported Nilotic objects found on Mycenæan sites, and bearing hieroglyphic inscriptions and cartouches of Pharaonic personages, the later Ægean culture is deeply indebted to the Nile for forms and decorative motives.

At what epoch did Ægean civilisation reach its full development? It is little use to ask when it arose. A *terminus a quo* in the Neolithic Age can

be dated only less vaguely than a geological stratum. But it is known within fairly definite limits when it ceased to be a dominant civilisation. Nothing but derived products of sub-Mycenæan style falls within the full Iron Age in the Ægean. Bronze, among useful metals, accompanies almost alone the genuine Mycenæan objects, at Enkomi in Cyprus, as at Mycenæ. This fact supplies a *terminus ad quem*, to which a date may be assigned at least as precise as scholars assign to the Homeric lays. For these represent a civilisation spread over the same area and in process of transition from bronze to iron, and if they fall in the ninth century B.C., then the Mycenæan period proper ends a little earlier, at any rate in the West. It is possible, indeed probable, that in Asia Minor and Cyprus, where the descent of northern tribes about 1000 B.C., remembered by the Greeks as the "Dorian Invasion," did not have any direct effect, the Mycenæan culture survived longer in something like purity, and passed by an uninterrupted process of development into the



EXTERIOR VIEW OF THE TREASURY OF ATREUS

Hellenic; and even in Crete, where there was certainly a cataclysm, and in the Argolid, where art was temporarily eclipsed about the tenth century, earlier influence survived and came once more to the surface when peace was restored. Persistence of artistic influence under a new order, and differences in the artistic history of different districts widely sundered, have to be taken into account. The appearance, *e.g.*, of late Mycenaean objects in Cyprus, does not necessarily falsify the received Mycenaean dates in mainland Greece.

For the main fact, however, *viz.*, the age of greatest florescence all over the area, a singular coincidence of testimony points to the period of the XVIIIth Pharaonic Dynasty in Egypt. To this dynasty refer all the scarabs or other objects inscribed with royal cartouches (except an alabaster lid from Knossos, bearing the name of the earlier "Shepherd King," Khyu), as yet actually found with true Mycenaean objects, even in Cyprus. In a tomb of this period at Thebes was found a bronze patera of fine Mycenaean style. At Tel-el-Amarna, the site of a capital city which existed only in the reign of Amenhotep IV., have been unearthed by far the most numerous fragments of true "Ægean" pottery found in Egypt; and of that singular style which characterises Tel-el-Amarna art, the art of the Knossian frescoes is irresistibly suggestive. To the XVIIIth and two succeeding dynasties belong the tomb-paintings which represent vases of Ægean form; and to these same dynasties Mr. Petrie's latest comparisons between the fabrics, forms, and decorative motives of Egypt and Mycenæ have led him. The lapse of time between the eighteenth and the tenth centuries is by no means too long, in the opinion of most competent authorities, to account for the changes which take place in Mycenaean art.

The question of race, which derives a special interest from the possibility of a family relation between the Mycenaean and the subsequent Hellenic stocks, is a controversial matter as yet. The light recently thrown on Mycenaean cult does not go far to settle the racial problem. The aniconic ritual, involving tree and pillar symbols of divinity, which prevailed at one period, also prevailed widely elsewhere than in the Ægean, and we are not sure of the divinity symbolised. Even if sure that it was the Father God, whose symbol alike in Crete and Caria is the *labrys* or double axe, we could not say if Caria or Crete were prior, and whether the Father be Aryan or Semitic or neither.

When it is remembered that, firstly, knowing not a word of the Mycenaean language, we are quite ignorant of its affinities; secondly, not enough Mycenaean skulls have yet been recovered to establish more than the bare fact that the race was mixed and not wholly Asiatic; and thirdly, since identity of civilisation in no sense necessarily entails identity of race, we may have to do not with one or two, but with many races—it will be conceded that it is more useful at present to attempt to narrow the issue by excluding certain claimants than to pronounce in favour of any one. The facial types represented not only on the Knossian frescoes, but by statuettes and gems, are distinctly non-Asiatic, and recall strongly the high-crowned brachycephalic type of the modern northern Albanians and Cretan hillmen. Of the elder civilised races about the Levantine area the Egyptians, Assyrians, and Babylonians may be dismissed at once. We know their art from beginning to end, and its character is not at any period the same as that of Ægean art. As for the Phœnicians, for whom on the strength of Homeric tradition a strong claim has been put forward, it cannot be said to be impossible that some objects thought to be Mycenaean are of Sidonian origin, since we know little or nothing of Sidonian art. But the presumption against this

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Semitic people having had any serious share in Mycenaean development is strong, since racial types apart, the only scripts known to have been used in the Mycenaean area and period are in no way affiliated to the Phœnician alphabet, and neither the characteristic forms nor the characteristic style of Phœnician art, as we know it, appear in Mycenaean products. The one thing, of which recent research has assured us in this matter, is this, that the Keftiu, represented in XVIIIth Dynasty tombs at Thebes, were a "Mycenaean" folk, an island people of the northern sea. They came into intimate contact, both peaceful and warlike, with Egypt, and to them no doubt are owed the Ægean styles and products found on Nile sites. Exact parallels to their dress and products, as represented by Egyptian artists, appear in the work of Cretan artists; and it is now generally accepted that the Keftiu were "Mycenaean" of Crete at any rate, whatever other habitat they may have possessed.

As to place of origin, Central Europe or any western or northern part of the continent is out of the question. Mycenaean art is shown by various remains to have moved westwards and northwards, not *vice versa*. It arose within the Ægean area, in the Argolid as some, e.g., the Herakum excavators, seem to propose, or the Cyclades, or Rhodes; or, if our idea, then the issue is narrowed for practical purposes to a region about which we know next to nothing as yet, northern Libya, and to Asia Minor. So far as the Mycenaean objects themselves testify, they point to a progress not from south or west, but from east. In the western localities, notably Crete and Mycenae, we have more remains of highly developed Mycenaean civilisation, but less of its early stages than elsewhere. Nothing in the Argolid, but much in the Troad, prepares us for the Mycenaean metallurgy. The appearance of Mycenaean forms and patterns is abrupt in Crete, but graduated in other islands, especially Thera and Melos. The Cretan linear script seems to be of "Asiatic" family, and to be inscribed in Melos on sherds of earlier date than its appearance at Knossos. Following Mycenaean development backwards in this manner, we seem to tend towards the Anatolian coast of the Ægean, and especially the rich and little-known areas of Rhodes and Caria.

It does not advance seriously the solution of the racial problem to turn to Greek literary tradition. Now that we are assured of the wide range and the long continuance of the influence of Mycenaean civilisation, overlapping the rise of Hellenic art, we can hardly question that the early peoples, whom the Greeks knew as Pelasgi, Minyæ, Leleges, Danaï, Carians, and so forth, shared in it. But were they its authors? and who, after all, were they themselves? The Greeks believed them their own kin, but what value are we to attach to the belief of an age to which scientific ethnology and archaeology were unknown? Nor is it useful to select traditions, e.g., to accept those about the Pelasgi, and to override those which connect the Achæans equally closely with Mycenaean centres. We are gradually learning that the classical Hellene was of no pure race, but the result of a blend of several racial stocks, into which those pre-existing in his land can hardly fail to have entered; and if we have been able to determine that Mycenaean art was distinguished by just that singular quality of idealism which is of the essence of the art which succeeded it in the same area (whatever be the racial connection), it can scarcely be doubted in reason that Mycenaean civilisation was in some sense the parent of the later civilisation of Hellas. In fact, now that the Mycenaean remains are no longer to be regarded as isolated phenomena on Greek soil, but are seen to be intimately connected on

the one hand with a large class of objects which carry the evolution of civilisation in the Ægean area itself back to the Stone Age, and on the other with the earlier products of Hellenic development, the problem is no longer purely one of antiquarian ethnology. We ask less what race was so greatly gifted, than what geographical or other circumstances will account for the persistence of a certain peculiar quality of civilisation in the Ægean area.

An eloquent summary of our Mycenæan knowledge and a lively description of life such as it may have been in Mycenæ has been drawn by Chrestos Tsountas and J. Irving Manatt in their work, *The Mycenæan Age*, from which we quote at length.



SEPULCHRAL ENCLOSURE, MYCENÆ

THE PROBLEM OF MYCENÆAN CHRONOLOGY

Whether or not the authors of this distinct and stately civilisation included among their achievements a knowledge of letters, their monuments thus far address us only in the universal language of form and action. Of their speech we have yet to read the first syllable. The vase handles of Mycenæ may have some message for us, if no more than a pair of heroic names: and the nine consecutive characters from the cave of Cretan Zeus must have still more to say when we find the key. We may hope, at least if this ancient culture ever recovers its voice, to find it not altogether unfamiliar: we need not be startled if we catch the first lisping accent of what has grown full and strong in the Achæan epic.

But for the present we have to do with a dumb age, with a race whose artistic expression amazes us all the more in the dead silence of their history. So far as we yet know from their monuments, they have recorded no one fixed point in their career, they have never even written down their name as a people.

Now, a dateless era and a nameless race — particularly in the immediate background of the stage on which we see the forces of the world's golden age deploying — are facts to be accepted only in the last resort. The student of human culture cannot look upon the massive walls, the solemn domes, the exquisite creations of what we call Mycenæan art, without ask-

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ing — When? By whom? In default of direct and positive evidence, he will make the most of the indirect and probable.

We have taken a provisional and approximate date for the meridian age of Mycenæan culture — namely, from the sixteenth to the twelfth century B.C. We have also assumed that the Island culture was already somewhat advanced as far back as the earlier centuries of the second millennium before our era. This latter datum is based immediately on geological calculations: M. Fouqué, namely, has computed a date *circa* 2000 B.C. for the upheaval which buried Thera, and thus preserved for us the primitive monuments of Ægean civilisation. Whatever be the value of Fouqué's combinations — and they have been vigorously, if not victoriously, assailed — we may reach a like result by another way round. The Island culture is demonstrably older than the Mycenæan — it must have attained the stage upon which we find it at Thera a century or two at least before the bloom-time came in Argolis. If, then, we can date that bloom-time, we can control within limits the geologists' results.

Here we call in the aid of Egyptology. In Greece we find datable Egyptian products in Mycenæan deposits, and conversely in datable Egyptian deposits we find Mycenæan products.

To take the first Mycenæan finds in Egypt. In a tomb of 1100 B.C., or within fifty years of that either way, at Kahun, Flinders Petrie found along with some dozens of bodies, "a great quantity of pottery, Egyptian, Phœnician, Cypriote, and Ægean" — notably an Ægean vase with an ivy leaf and stalk on each side, which he regards as the beginning of natural design. Further, at Gurob and elsewhere, the same untiring explorer has traced the Mycenæan false-necked vase or *Bügelkanne* through a series of dated stages, "a chain of examples in sequence showing that the earliest geometrical pottery of Mycenæ begins about 1400 B.C., and is succeeded by the beginning of natural designs about 1100 B.C."

But long before these actual Mycenæan products came to light in Egypt, Egyptian art had told its story of relations with the Ægean folk. On the tomb-frescoes of Thebes we see pictured in four groups the tributaries of Tehutimes III (about 1500 B.C.), bringing their gifts to that great conqueror; among them, as we are told by the hieroglyphic text that runs with the painting, are "the princes of the land of Keftu [or Kefa] (Phœnicia) and of the islands in the great sea." And the tribute in their hands includes vases of distinct Mycenæan style.

On the other hand, we find datable Egyptian products in Mycenæan deposits in Greece. From Mycenæ itself and from Ialysos in Rhodes we have scarabs bearing the cartouches of Amenhotep III and of his queen Thi; and fragments of Egyptian porcelain, also from Mycenæ, bear the cartouches of the same king, whose reign is dated to the latter half of the fifteenth century.

We have already noted the recurrence at Gurob, Kahun, and Tel-el-Amarna of the characters which were first found on the vase handles of Mycenæ; and this seemed at one time to have an important bearing on Mycenæan chronology. But in the wider view of the subject which has been opened up by Evans' researches, this can no longer be insisted upon as an independent datum. However, the occurrence of these signs in a town demonstrably occupied by Ægean peoples at a given date has corroborative value.

While it can hardly be claimed that any or all of these facts amount to final proof, they certainly establish a strong probability that at least from the fifteenth century B.C. there was traffic between Egypt and the Mycenæan

world. Whatever be said for the tomb-frescoes of Tehutimes' foreign tribute-bearers and the scarabs from Mycenæ and Rhodes, we cannot explain away Mr. Petrie's finds in the Fayum. The revelations of Tel-Gurob can leave no doubt that the brief career of the ancient city on that spot — say from 1450 to 1200 B.C. — was contemporaneous with the bloom-time of Mycenæan civilisation.

Now most, if not all, of the "Ægean" pottery from Gurob, like that pictured in the tomb-frescoes, belongs to the later Mycenæan styles as we find them in the chamber-tombs and ruined houses — in the same deposits, in fact, with the scarabs and broken porcelain which carry the cartouches of Amenhotep and Queen Thi. The earlier period of Mycenæan art is thus shown to be anterior to the reign of Tehutimes III; and as that period cannot conceivably be limited to a few short generations, the sixteenth century is none too early for the upper limit of the Mycenæan Age. We should, perhaps, date it at least a century farther back. Thus we approximate the chronology to which M. Fouqué has been led by geological considerations; while, on the other hand, more recent inquirers are inclined to reduce by a century or two the antiquity of the convulsion in which Thera perished, and thus approximate our own datum.

For the lower limit of the Mycenæan Age we have taken the twelfth century, though certain archæologists and historians are inclined to a much more recent date — some even bringing it three or four centuries further down.

This is not only improbable on its face, but at variance with the facts. To take but one test, the Mycenæan Age hardly knew the use of iron; at Mycenæ itself it was so rare that we find it only in an occasional ornament such as a ring. No iron was found in the prehistoric settlements at Hissarlik until 1890, when Dr. Schliemann came across two lumps of the metal, one of which had possibly served as the handle of a staff. "It is therefore certain," he says, "that iron was already known in the second or 'burnt city'; but it was probably at that time rarer and more precious than gold." In Egypt, on the other hand, iron was known as early as the middle of the second millennium B.C., and if the beehive and chamber-tombs at Mycenæ are to be assigned to a period as late as the ninth century, the rare occurrence of iron in them becomes quite inexplicable.

The Testimony of Art

From the seventeenth or sixteenth to the twelfth century B.C., then, we may regard as the bloom-time of Mycenæan culture, and of the race or races who wrought it out. But we need not assume that their arts perished with their political decline. Even when that gifted people succumbed to or blended with another conquering race, their art, especially in its minor phases, lived on, though under less favouring conditions. There were no more patrons like the rich and munificent princes of Tiryns and Mycenæ; and domed tombs with their wealth of decoration were no longer built. Still, certain types of architecture, definitively wrought out by the Mycenæans, became an enduring possession of Hellenic art, and so of the art of the civilised world; while from other Mycenæan types were derived new forms of equally far-reaching significance.


The correspondence of the gateways at Tiryns with the later Greek propylæa, and that of the Homeric with the prehistoric palaces, is noteworthy; so, too, is the obvious derivation of the typical form of the Greek

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temple, consisting of vestibule and cella, from the Mycenæan *magaron*. That the Doric column is of the same lineage is a fact long ago recognised by the ablest authorities. In fact, the Mycenæan pillars known to us, whether in actual examples as embedded in the façades of the two beehive tombs or in art representations, as in the lion relief and certain ivory models, while varying in important details, exhibit now one, now another of the features of the Doric column. Thus, all have in common abacus, echinus, and cymatium — the last member adorned with ascending leaves just as in the earliest capitals of the Doric order. Again, the Doric fluting is anticipated in the actual pilasters of "Clytemnestra's tomb," and in an ivory model. And as the Doric column has no base, but rests directly on the stylobate, so the wooden pillars in the Mycenæan halls appear to rise directly from the ground in which their stone bases are almost entirely embedded.

That Mycenæan art outlasted the social régime under which it had attained its splendid bloom is sufficiently attested by the Homeric poems. Doubtless, the Achæan system, when it fell before the aggressive Dorian, must have left many an heirloom above ground, as well as those which its tombs and ruins had hidden down to our own day. And, again, the poems in their primitive strata undoubtedly reflect the older order, and offer us many a picture at first hand of a contemporary age. Thus the dove-cup of Mycenæ, or another from the same hand, may have been actually known to the poet who described old Nestor's goblet in our eleventh *Iliad*; and the cyanos frieze of Tiryns may well have inspired the singer of the Phæacian tale, or at least helped out his fancy in decorating Alcinous' palace. Still, it is in the more recent strata of the poems that we find the great transcripts of art-creations and the clearest indications of the very processes met with in the monuments. To take but one instance, there is the shield of Achilles forged at Thetis' intercession by Hephestus and embazoned with a series of scenes from actual mundane life. (*Iliad*, XVIII. 468-613.) The subjects are at once Mycenæan and Homeric. On the central boss, for example, the Olympian smith "wrought the earth and the heavens and the sea and the unwearying sun," very much as the Mycenæan artist sets sun, moon, and sky in the upper field of his great signet. Again, the city under siege, while "on the walls to guard it, stand their dear wives and infant children, and with these the old men," appears to be almost a transcript of the scene which still stirs our blood as we gaze upon the beleaguered town on the silver cup. But it is less the subject than the technique that reveals artistic heredity, and when we find Homer's Olympian craftsman employing the selfsame process in the forging of the shield which we can now see for ourselves in the inlaid swords of Mycenæ, we can hardly doubt that that process was still employed in the poet's time.

In this sense of an aftermath of art, Mycenæan influence outlasted by centuries the overthrow of Mycenæan power; and the fact is one to be considered in establishing a chronology. We have taken as our lower limit the catastrophe in which the old order at Mycenæ and elsewhere obviously came to an end. But the old stock survived, — "scattered and peeled" though it must have been, — and carried on, if it did not teach the conqueror, their old arts. If we are to comprehend within the Mycenæan Age all the centuries through which we can trace this Mycenæan influence, then we shall bring that age down to the very dawn of historical Greece. In this view it is no misnomer to speak of the Æginetan gold find recently acquired by the British Museum as a Mycenæan treasure.



ACROPOLIS OF MYCENÆ

THE PROBLEM OF THE MYCENÆAN RACE

We have seen that Mycenaean art was no exotic, transplanted full grown into Greece, but rather a native growth — influenced though it was by the earlier civilisations of the Cyclades and the East. This indigenous art, distinct and homogeneous in character, no matter whence came its germs and rudiments, must have been wrought out by a strong and gifted race. That it was of Hellenic stock we have assumed to be self-evident. But, as this premise is still in controversy, we have to inquire whether (aside from art) there are other considerations which make against the Hellenic origin of the Mycenaean peoples, and compel us to regard them as immigrants from the islands or the Orient.

In the first place, recalling the results of our discussion of domestic and sepulchral architecture, we observe that neither in the Ægean nor in Syria do we find the gable-roof which prevails at Mycenæ. Nor would the people of these warm and dry climates have occasion to winter their herds in their own huts — an ancestral custom to which we have traced the origin of the avenues to the beehive tombs.

Again, we have seen reason to refer the shaft-graves to a race or tribe other than that whose original dwelling we have recognised in the sunken hut. To this pit-burying stock we have assigned the upper-story habitations at Mycenæ. If we are right, now, in explaining this type of dwelling as a reminiscence of the pile-hut, it would follow that this stock, too, was of northern origin. The lake-dwelling habit, we know, prevailed throughout Northern Europe, an instance occurring, as we have seen, even in the Illyrian peninsula; while we have no reason to look for its origin to the Orient or the Ægean. It is indeed true that the island-folk were no strangers to the pile-dwelling, but this rather goes to show that they were colonists from the mainland.

But, apart from the evidence of the upper-story abodes, are there other indications of an element among the Mycenaean people which had once actually dwelt in lakes or marshes?

Monuments like the stone models from Melos and Amorgos have not indeed been found in the Peloponnesus, or on the mainland, but in default of such indirect testimony we have the immediate witness of actual settlements. Of the four most famous cities of the age, Mycenæ, Tiryns, Orchomenos, and Amyclæ, it is a singular fact that but one has a mountain-site, while the other three were once surrounded by marshes. The rock on which Tiryns is built, though it rises to a maximum elevation of some sixty feet above the plain, yet sinks so low on the north that the lower citadel is only a few feet

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above the level of the sea. Now this plain, as Aristotle asserts, and as the nature of the ground still bears witness, was originally an extensive morass. The founders, therefore, must have chosen this rock for their settlement, not because it was a stronghold in itself, but because it was protected by the swamp out of which it rose.

What is true of Tiryns holds for Orchomenos as well. The original site was down in the plain until the periodic inundations of the lake forced the inhabitants to rebuild on the slopes of Mount Acontion; and Orchomenos was not the only primitive settlement in this great marsh. Tradition tells us also of Athenæ, Eleusis, Arne, Midea—cities which had long perished, and were but dimly remembered in historic times. To one of these, or to some other whose name has not come down to us, belong the remarkable remains on the Island of Goulas or Gha, which is connected with the shore by an ancient mole. During the Greek Revolution this island-fort was the refuge of the neighbouring population who found greater security there than in the mountains.

It is usually held that, when these Copaic cities were founded, the region was in the main drained and arable, whereas afterwards, the natural outlets being choked up, the imprisoned waters flooded the plain, turned it into a lake and so overwhelmed the towns. But, obviously, this is reversing the order of events. To have transformed the lake into a plain and kept it such would have demanded the co-operation of populous communities in the construction of costly embankments and perpetual vigilance in keeping them intact. Where were such organised forces to be found at a time anterior to the foundation of the cities themselves? Is it not more reasonable to believe that the builders of these cities—instead of finding Copais an arable plain, and failing to provide against its inundation—were induced by the very fact of its being a lake to establish themselves in it upon natural islands like the rock of Goulas, on artificial elevations, or even in pile-settlements? It is possible, indeed, that on some unusual rise of the waters, towns were submerged, but it is quite as probable that without any such catastrophe the inhabitants finally abandoned these of their own accord to settle in higher, healthier, and more convenient regions.

The case of Amyclæ is no exception. The prehistoric as well as the historic site is probably to be identified with that of the present village of Mahmud Bey, some five miles south of Sparta. The ground is low and wet, and in early times was undoubtedly a marsh.

In the plain of Thessaly, again, we may trace the same early order. There, where tradition (backed by the conclusions of modern science) tells us that the inflowing waters used to form stagnant lakes, we find low artificial mounds strewn with primitive potsherds. On these mounds, Lolling holds, the people pitched their settlements to secure them against overflow.

The choice of these marshy or insulated sites is all the more singular from the environment. Around Lake Copais, about Tiryns and Amyclæ, as well as in Thessaly, rise mountains which are nature's own fastnesses and which would seem to invite primitive man to their shelter. The preference for these lowland or island settlements then, can only be explained in the first instance by immemorial custom, and, secondly, by consequent inexperience in military architecture. Naturally, a lake-dwelling people will be backward in learning to build stone walls strong enough to keep off a hostile force. And in default of such skill, instead of settling on the mountain slopes, they would in their migrations choose sites affording the best natural fortifications akin to their ancient environment of marsh or lake—reinforcing this on occasion by a moat, an embankment, or a pile-platform.

That the people in question once actually followed this way of living is beyond a doubt. Amyclæ shows no trace of wall, and probably never had any beyond a mere earthwork. The Cyclopean wall of Tiryns, as it now stands, does not belong to the earliest settlement, nor is it of uniform date. Adler holds that the first fortress must have been built of wood and sundried bricks. This construction may possibly account for those remarkable galleries whose origin and function are not yet altogether clear. The mere utility of the chambers for storage—a purpose they did unquestionably serve—hardly answers to the enormous outlay involved in contriving them. May we not, then, recognise in them a reminiscence of the primitive palisade-earthwork? In the so-called Lower Citadel of Tiryns we find no such passages, possibly because its Cyclopean wall was built at a later date. Likewise no proper galleries have yet been found at Mycenæ, and it is highly improbable that any such ever existed there. What had long been taken for a gallery in the north wall proves to be nothing but a little chamber measuring less than seven by twelve feet. Obviously, then, the gallery was not an established thing in fortress-architecture, and this fact shows that it did not originate with the builders of stone walls, but came to them as a heritage from earlier times and a more primitive art.

In fact, we find in the *terramare* of Italy palisade and earthwork fortifications so constructed that they may be regarded as a first stage in the development which culminates in the Tiryns galleries. The construction of the wall at Casione near Parma is thus described: ¹ “Piles arranged in two parallel rows are driven in the ground with an inward slant so as to meet at the top, and this Δ -shaped gallery is then covered with earth. Along the inside of this embankment is carried a continuous series of square pens, built of beams laid one upon another, filled with earth and brushwood, and finally covered with a close-packed layer of sand and pebbles. This arrangement not only strengthens the wall but provides a level platform for its defenders.” Thus the space between these palisades would closely resemble the “arched” corridors of Tiryns, while the square pens (if covered over without being filled up) would correspond to the chambers.

These facts strengthen the inferences to which we have been led by our study of the stone models and the upper-story dwellings. And they point to the region beyond Mount Olympus as the earlier seat of this lake-dwelling contingent of the Mycenæan people as well as of their kinsmen of the earth-huts. And we have other evidence that the Mycenæan cities, at least the four of chief importance, were founded by a people who were not dependent on the sea and in whose life the pursuits of the sea were originally of little moment. Mycenæ and Orchomenos are at a considerable remove from the coast, while Amyclæ is a whole day's journey from the nearest salt-water. Tiryns alone lies close to the sea-board; and, indeed, the waves of the Argolic Gulf must have washed yet nearer when its walls were reared. But, obviously, it was not the nearness of the sea that drew the founders to this low rock. For it is a harbourless shore that neighbours it, while a little farther down lies the secure haven of Nauplia guarded by the impregnable height of Palamedes; and it is yet to be explained why the Tirynthians, if they were a sea-faring people, did not build their city there. Again, the principal entrance to Tiryns is not on the side towards the sea, but on the east or landward side. This goes to show that even when the Cyclopean wall was built, certainly long after the first settlement, the people must have

¹ Helbig, *f. Die Italiker in der Po-Ebene*, p. 11; cf. Pigorini in *Atti dell' Accad. dei Lincei*, viii. 265 ff.

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been still devoted mainly to tilling the soil and tending flocks, occupations to which the fertile plain and marshy feeding grounds would invite them. So in historic times, also, the town appears to have lain to the east of the citadel, not between it and the sea.

Even if it be granted that these Mycenæan cities were settled by immigrants who came by sea, it does not follow that they were originally a sea-faring folk. The primitive Dorians were hardly a maritime people, yet Grote has shown that their conquest of the Peloponnesus was in part effected by means of a fleet which launched from the Malian Gulf; and their kinsmen, who settled in Melos, Thera, and Crete, in all probability, sailed straight from the same northern port.

The Minyæ, who founded Orchomenos, Curtius regards as pre-eminently a seafaring race; and he seeks to account for their inland settlement by assuming that they were quick to realise the wealth to be won by draining and tilling the swamp. But this is hardly tenable. Whatever our estimate of Minyan shrewdness, they must have had their experience in reclaiming swamp land yet to acquire and on this ground. It was the outcome of age-long effort in winning new fields from the waters and guarding them when won. The region invited settlement because it offered the kind of security to which they were wonted; the winning of wealth was not the motive but the fortunate result.

Again, if the Mycenæans had been from the outset a maritime race we should expect to find the ship figuring freely in their art-representations. But this is far from being the case. We have, at last, one apparent instance of the kind on a terra-cotta fragment found in the acropolis at Mycenæ in 1892. On this we seem to have a boat, with oars and rudder, and curved fore and aft like the Homeric *νῆες ἀμφιέλισσαι*. Below appear what we may take to be dolphins. But this unique example can hardly establish the maritime character of the Mycenæans.

Along with this unfamiliarity with ships, we have to remark also their abstinence from fish. In the remains of Tiryns and Mycenæ we have found neither a fish-hook nor a fish-bone, though we do find oysters and other shellfish such as no doubt could be had in abundance along the adjacent shores. In the primitive remains of the Italian *terramare* there is the same absence of anything that would suggest fishing or fish-eating; and, indeed, linguistic evidence confirms these observations. Greek and Latin have no common term for fish; and we may fairly conclude that the Græco-Italic stock before the separation were neither fishermen or fish-eaters. That they were slow to acquire a taste for fish, even after the separation, is attested not only by the negative evidence of their remains in the Argolid and on the Po but by the curious reticence of Homer. His heroes never go fishing but once and then only in the last pinch of famine—"when the bread was all spent from out the ship and hunger gnawed at their belly."

Now that we find in Greece, five or six centuries earlier than the poems, a people in all probability hailing from the same region whence came the ancestors of the Homeric Greeks, with the same ignorance of, or contempt for, a fish diet, and building their huts on piles like the primitive Italians whose earthworks further appear to have set the copy for the Tirynthian galleries—can we doubt that this people sprung from the same root with the historic Greeks and their kinsmen of Italy? The conclusion appears so natural and so logical, that it must require very serious and solid objections to shake it. But, instead of that, our study of Mycenæan manners and institutions—both civil and religious—affords strong confirmation. In the

matter of dress we find the historical Greeks the heirs of the Mycenæans, and the armour of the Homeric heroes—when we get behind the epic glamour of it—differs little from what we know in the Mycenæan monuments.

While our knowledge of Mycenæan religion is vague at the best, and we must recognise in the dove-idols and dove-temples the insignia of an imported Aphrodite-cult, we have beyond a reasonable doubt also to recognise a genuine Hellenic divinity with her historical attributes clearly foreshadowed in Artemis. Again, while the Homeric Greeks themselves are not presented to us as worshippers of the dead after the custom avouched by the altar-pits of Mycenæ and Tiryns, we do find in the poems an echo at least of this cult, and among the later Hellenes it resumes the power of a living belief. So, though Homer seems to know cremation only, and this has been taken for full proof that the Mycenæans were not Greeks, the traces of embalming in the poems clearly point to an earlier custom of simple burial as we find it uniformly attested by the Mycenæan tombs. And, here, again, historical Greece reverts to the earlier way. In Greece proper, at least in Attica, the dead were not burned,—not even in the age of the Dipylon vases,—and yet the Athenians of that day were Greeks. So, among the earlier Italians, burial was the only mode of dealing with the dead, and the usage was so rooted in their habits that even after cremation was introduced some member of the body (*e.g.*, a finger) was always cut off and buried intact. We need not repeat what we have elsewhere said of the funeral banquet, the immolation of victims, the burning of raiment—all bearing on the same conclusion and cumulating the evidence that the Greeks of Homer, and so of the historic age, are the lineal heirs of Mycenæan culture.

If the proof of descent on these lines is strong, it is strengthened yet more by all we can make out regarding the political and social organisation. That monarchy was the Mycenæan form of government is sufficiently attested by the strong castles, each taken up in large part by a single princely mansion. But “the rule of one man” is too universal in early times to be a criterion of race. Far more significant is the evidence we have for a clan-system such as we afterwards find in full bloom among the Hellenes.

The clan, as we know it in historic times, and especially in Attica, was a factor of prime importance in civil, social, and religious life. It was composed of families which claim to be, and for the most part actually were, descended from a common ancestor. These originally lived together in clan-villages—of which we have clear reminiscences in the clan-names of certain Attic demes, as Boutadai, Perithoidai, Skanbonidai. Not only did the clan form a village by itself, but it held and cultivated its land in common. It built the clan-village on the clan-estate; and as the clansmen dwelt together in life, so in death they were not divided. Each clan had its burial-place in its own little territory, and there at the tomb it kept up the worship of its dead, and especially of its hero-founder.

That the Mycenæans lived under a like clan-system, the excavation of the tombs of the lower town has shown conclusively. The town was composed of villages more or less removed from one another, each the seat of a clan. We have no means of determining whether the land was held and tilled in common, but we do know that by each village lay the common clan-cemetery—a group of eight, ten, or more tombs, obviously answering to the number of families or branches of the clan. In the construction of the tombs, and in the offerings contained, we note at once differences between different cemeteries and uniformity in the tombs of the same group. The richest cemeteries lie nearer the acropolis, as the stronger clans would natu-

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rally dwell nearer the king. Thus, for its population, Mycenæ covered a large area, but its limits were not sharply defined, and the transition from the citadel centre to the open country was not abrupt. The villages were linked together by graveyards, gardens and fields, highways and squares; thus the open settlement was indeed a *πόλις εὐράγυια* — a town of broad ways.

Somewhat such must have been the aspect in primitive days of Sparta and Athens, not to mention many other famous cities. Indeed, even in historic times, as we know from the ruins, Sparta was still made up of detached villages spread over a large territory for so small a population. So, primitive Athens was composed of the central settlement on the Acropolis, with the villages encircling it from Phnyx to Lycabettus and back again. When the city was subsequently walled in, some of these villages were included in the circuit, others were left outside, while still others (as the Ceramicus) were cut in two by the wall. The same thing happened at Mycenæ; the town wall was built simply because the fortress was an insufficient shelter for the populace as times grew threatening; but it could not, and did not, take in all the villages.

Such, briefly, is the objective evidence — the palpable facts — pointing to a race connection between the Mycenæans and the Greeks of history. We have, finally, to consider the testimony of the Homeric poems. Homer avowedly sings of heroes and peoples who had flourished in Greece long before his own day. Now it may be denied that these represent the civilisation known to us as Mycenæan; but it is certainly a marvellous coincidence (as Schuchhardt^h observes) that “excavations invariably confirm the former power and splendour of every city which is mentioned by Homer as conspicuous for its wealth or sovereignty.”

Of all the cities of Hellas, it is the now established centres of Mycenæan culture which the poet knows best and characterises with the surest hand. Mycenæ “rich in gold” is Agamemnon’s seat, and Agamemnon is lord of all Argos and many isles, and leader of the host at Troy. In Laconia, in the immediate neighbourhood of the tomb which has given us the famous Vaphio cups, is the royal seat of Menelaus, which is likened to the court of Olympian Zeus. Bœotian Orchomenos, whose wealth still speaks for itself in the Treasury of Minyas, is taken by the poet as a twin type of affluence with Egyptian Thebes, “where the treasure-houses are stored fullest.” Assuredly, no one can regard all this and many another true touch as mere coincidence. The poet knows whereof he affirms. He has exact knowledge of the greatness and bloom of certain peoples and cities at an epoch long anterior to his own, with which the poems have to do. And there is not one hint in either poem that these races and heroes were not of the poet’s own kin.

It might be assumed that there had once ruled in those cities an alien people, and that the monuments of Mycenæan culture were their legacy to us, but that the Achæans who came after them have entered into the inheritance of their fame. Such usurpations there have been in history; but the hypothesis is out of the question here. At Mycenæ, where exploration has been unusually thorough, the genuine Mycenæan Age is seen to have come to a sharp and sudden end — a catastrophe so overwhelming that we cannot conceive of any lingering bloom. Had the place passed to a people worthy to succeed to the glory of the race who reared its mighty walls and vaulted tombs, then we should look for remains of a different but not a contemptible civilisation. But, in fact, we find built directly on the ruins of

the Mycenæan palace mean and shabby huts which tell us how the once golden city was succeeded by a paltry village. Centuries were to pass before the Doric temple rose on the accumulated ruins of palace and hovels, and generations more before the brave little remnant returned with the laurels of Plataea and enough of the spoil (we may conjecture) to put the walls of the Atreidæ in repair.

If the structures peculiar to the Mycenæan age are the work of foreigners, what have we left for Agamemnon and his Achæans? Simply the hovels. Of the Dipylon pottery, with which it is proposed to endow them, there is none worth mentioning at Mycenæ, very little at Tiryns, hardly a trace at Amyclæ, or Orchomenos. In the Mycenæan acropolis, particularly, very few fragments of this pottery have been found, and that mainly in the huts already mentioned. Can these be the sole traces of the power and pride of the Atreidæ?

For us at least the larger problem of nationality is solved; but there is a further question. Can we determine the race or races among the Greeks known to history to whom the achievements of Mycenæan civilisation are to be ascribed? In this inquiry we may set aside the Dorians, although many scholars (especially among the Germans) still claim for them the marvellous remains of the Argolid. The Homeric poems, they say, describe a state of things subsequent to the Dorian migration into the Peloponnesus and consequent upon the revolution thereby effected. As the Dorians themselves hold sway at Mycenæ and Sparta, they must be the subjects of the poet's song—the stately fabric of Mycenæan culture must be the work of their hands.

On the other hand, Beloch,ⁱ while accepting the Dorian theory of this civilisation, dismisses the traditional Dorian migration as a myth, and maintains that Dorian settlement in the Peloponnesus was as immemorial as the Arcadian. Just as the original advent of the Arcadians in the district which bears their name had faded out of memory and left no trace of a tradition, so the actual migration of the Dorians belonged to an immemorial past.

The first of these views which attributes the Mycenæan culture to the Dorians of the traditional migration, cannot stand the test of chronology. For tradition refers that migration to the end of the twelfth century B.C., whereas the Mycenæan people were established in the Argolid before the sixteenth, probably even before the twentieth century. While Beloch's hypothesis is not beset with this chronological difficulty, it is otherwise quite untenable. For, as the excavations at Tiryns and Mycenæ abundantly prove, the Mycenæan civilisation perished in a great catastrophe. The palaces of both were destroyed by fire after being so thoroughly pillaged that scarcely a single bit of metal was left in the ruins. Further, they were never rebuilt; and the sumptuous halls of Mycenæ were succeeded by the shabby hovels of which we have spoken. The larger domes at Mycenæ, whose sites were known, were likewise plundered—in all probability by the same hands that fired the palace. This is evidenced by the pottery found in the hovels and before the doorways of two of the beehive tombs. A similar catastrophe appears to have cut short the career of this civilisation in the other centres where it had flourished.

How are we to account for this sudden and final overthrow otherwise than by assuming a great historic crisis, which left these mighty cities with their magnificent palaces only heaps of smoking ruins? And what other crisis can this have been than the irruption of the Dorians? And their descent into the Peloponnesus is traditionally dated at the very time which

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other considerations have led us to fix as the lower limit of the Mycenaean Age. Had that migration never been recorded by the ancients nor attested by the state of the Peloponnesus in historic times, we should still be led to infer it from the facts now put in evidence by the archaeologist's spade.

Setting aside the Dorian claim as preposterous, we have nothing to do but follow the epic tradition. The Homeric poems consistently assume that prior to any Dorian occupation Argolis was inhabited by other peoples, and notably by Achæans whose position is so commanding that the whole body of Greeks before Troy usually go by their name. Their capital is Mycenæ, and their monarch Agamemnon, King of Men; although we find them also in Laconia under the rule of Menelaus. But the poet has other names, hardly less famous, applied now to the people of Argolis and now to the Greeks at large. One of these names (*Ἀργεῖοι*) is purely geographical, whether it be restricted to the narrow Argolid district or extended to the wider Argos, and has no special ethnological significance. But the other (*Δαναοί*) belonged to a people distinct from and, according to uniform tradition, more ancient than the Achæans. We find, then, two races in Argolis before the Dorian migration, each famous in song and story, and each so powerful that its name may stand for all the inhabitants of Greece. The Achæans occupy Mycenæ, that is to say, the northern mountain region of the district, while legend represents the Danaans as inseparably connected with Argos and the sea-board, and ascribes to them certain works of irrigation.

Whatever interpretation be put upon the myth, it seems clear that Argos could not feed its great cities without artificial irrigation, and this it owed to Danaus and his fifty daughters, "who were condemned perpetually to pour water in a tub full of holes,"—that is to say, into irrigation ditches which the thirsty soil kept draining dry.

Now our study of the Mycenaean remains has already constrained us to distinguish in the Argolid two strata of Mycenaean peoples, one of them originally dwelling on dry land in sunken huts, the other occupying pile settlements in lakes and swamps. And since tradition squares so remarkably with the facts in evidence, may we not venture to identify the marsh-folk with the Danaans and the landmen with the Achæans?

But Achæans and Dorians were not alone in shaping and sharing Mycenaean culture; they had their congeners in other regions. Foremost among



GALLERY IN THE WALL AROUND THE CITADEL OF TIRYNS

these were the Minyan founders of Orchomenos. As lake-dwellers and hydraulic engineers they are assimilated to the Danaans, whose near kinsmen they may have been, as the primitive islanders, whose abode we have found copied in the stone vases, must have been related to them both. Tradition has, in fact, preserved an account of the colonisation of Thera by a people coming from Bœotia, although it is uncertain whether it refers to the original occupation or to a settlement subsequent to the great catastrophe.

From the Danao-Minyan stock, it would appear that the Achæans parted company at an early date and continuing for a time in a different — most probably a mountainous — country, there took on ways of living proper to such environment. Later than the Danaans, according to the consistent testimony of tradition, they came down into the Peloponnesus and by their superior vigour and prowess prevailed over the older stock.

To these two branches of the race we may refer the two classes of tombs. The beehive and chamber tombs, as we have seen, have their prototype in the sunken huts: they belong to the Achæans coming down from the colder north. The shaft-graves are proper to the Danaan marsh-men. At Tiryns we find a shaft-grave, but no beehive or chamber tomb. At Orchomenos the Treasury of Minyas stands alone in its kind against at least eight *tholoi* and sixty chamber-tombs at Mycenæ. Hence, wherever this type of tombs abounds we may infer that an Achæan stock had its seat, as at Pronoia, in Attica, Thessaly, and Crete. Against this it may be urged that precisely at the Achæan capital, and within its acropolis at that, we find the famous group of shaft-graves with their precious offerings, as well as humbler graves of the same type outside the circle. But this, in fact, confirms our view when we remember it was the Danaid Perseus who founded Mycenæ and that his posterity bore rule there until the sceptre passed to Achæan hands in the persons of the Pelopidæ.¹ We have noted the close correspondence of the original fortress at Mycenæ with that of Tiryns, and its subsequent enlargement. Coincident with this extension of the citadel, the new type of tomb makes its appearance in the great domes, — some of them certainly royal sepulchres, — although the grave-circle of the acropolis is but half occupied. That circle, however, ceases thenceforth to be used as a place of burial, while the humbler graves adjacent to it are abandoned and built over with dwellings. With the new type of tomb we note changes of burial customs, not to be accounted for on chronological grounds: in the beehive tombs the dead are never embalmed, nor do they wear masks, nor are they laid on pebble beds — a practice which may have owed its origin to the wet ground about Tiryns.

There is but one theory on which these facts can be fully explained. It is that of a change in the ruling race and dynasty, and it clears up the whole history of Mycenæ and the Argive Plain. The first Greek settlers occupied the marshy sea board, where they established themselves at Tiryns and other points; later on, when they had learned to rear impregnable walls, many of them migrated to the mountains which dominated the plain and thus were founded the strongholds of Larissa, Midea, and Mycenæ.

But while the Danaans were thus making their slow march to the north the Achæans were advancing southward from Corinth — a base of great importance to them then and always, as we may infer from the network of Cyclopean highways between it and their new centre. At Mycenæ, already

¹ This is not gainsaying the Phrygian extraction of the Pelopid line. "The true Phrygians were closely akin to the Greeks, quite as closely akin as the later Macedonians. We may fairly class the Pelopidæ as Achæan." (Percy Gardner, *New Chapters of Greek History*, p. 84.)

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a strong Perseid outpost, the two columns meet—when, we cannot say. But about 1500 B.C., or a little later, the Achæans had made themselves masters of the place and imposed upon it their own kings.

We have no tradition of any struggle in connection with this dynastic revolution, and it appears probable that the Achæans did not expel the older stock. On the contrary, they scrupulously respected the tombs of the Danaid dynasty—it may be, because they felt the claim of kindred blood. In manners and culture there could have been but little difference between them, for the Achæans had already entered the strong current of Mycenæan civilisation.

Indeed, we discern a reciprocal influence of the two peoples. Within certain of the Achæan tombs (as we may now term the beehives and rock chambers) we find separate shaft-graves, obviously recalling the Danaid mode of burial. On the other hand, it would appear that the typical Achæan tomb was adopted by the ruling classes among other Mycenæan peoples. Otherwise we cannot explain the existence of isolated tombs of this kind as at Amyclæ (Vaphio), Orchomenos, and Menidi—obviously the sepulchres of regal or opulent families; while the common people of these places—of non-Achæan stock—buried their dead in the ordinary oblong pits.

Achæan ascendancy is so marked that the Achæan name prevails even where that stock forms but an inconsiderable element of the population. Notably this is true of Laconia, where the rare occurrence of the beehive tomb goes to show that the pre-Dorian inhabitants were mostly descended from the older stock, which we have encountered at Tiryns and at Orchomenos.^d



RESTORATION OF A MYCENÆAN PALACE



CHAPTER III. THE HEROIC AGE

IN thinking of the mythical period with its citations of fables about gods and goddesses galore and heroes unnumbered, one is apt to become the victim of a mental mirage. One can hardly escape imagining the period in question thus veiled in mystery and peopled with half mythical and altogether mystical figures as really having been a time when men and women lived an idyllic life. As one contemplates the period he intuitively falls into a day-dream in which there dance before him light-robed artistic figures moving in arcadian bowers, tenanted by nymphs and satyrs and centaurs. But when one awakes to a practical view he recognises of course that all this is an illusion. Reason tells him that this was a mythical age, simply because the people were not sufficiently civilised to make permanent historical records. They were half barbarians, living as pastoral peoples everywhere live, striving for food against wild beasts, protecting their herds, cultivating the soil, fighting their enemies. And yet, in a sense, their life was idyllic. Heroic elements were not altogether lacking; the men were trained athletes, whose developed muscles were a joy to look upon, and no doubt the women, despite a certain coarseness, shared something of that figure. Then the people themselves believed in the gods and nymphs and satyrs and centaurs of which we dream, and so in a sense their world was peopled with them: in a sense they did dwell in Arcady. Still one cannot disguise the fact that it was an Arcady which no modern, placed under similar restrictions, would care to enter.

In that early day writing was an unknown art in Hellas, and so the people as they emerged from their time of semi-civilisation brought with them no specific tangible records of the life of that period, but only fables and traditions to take the place of sober historical records. To the people themselves these fables and traditions bore, for a long time at any rate, a stamp of veritable truth. Even the most extravagant of their narratives of gods and godlike heroes were believed as implicitly, no doubt, by the major part of the people even at a comparatively late historical period, as we to-day believe the stories of an Alexander, a Cæsar, or a Napoleon. As time went on these fables became even more intimately fixed in the minds of the people through becoming embalmed in the verses of the poet and the lines of the tragedian. Here and there, to be sure, there was a man who questioned the authenticity of these tales as recitals of fact, but we may well believe that the generality of people, even of the most cultured class, preferred throughout the entire period of antiquity to accept the myths at their face value. Not only so, but for many generations later, throughout the period sometimes spoken of as the "Age of Faith" of the western world, a somewhat similar estimate

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was put upon the Greek myths as recited by the classical authors. Even after the growth of scepticism and the development of the scientific spirit rendered the acceptance of the myths as recitals of fact impossible, for a long time it seemed little less than a sacrilege to think of severing them altogether from the realm of fact.

THE VALUE OF THE MYTHS

That, considered as historical narratives, they had been elaborated and their bald facts distorted by the creative imagination of a marvellous people, was clearly evident. No one, for example, in recent days would be expected to believe that the hero Achilles had been plunged into the river Styx by his mother and rendered thereby invulnerable except as to the heel by which he was held. But to doubt that the hero Achilles lived and accomplished such feats as were narrated in the *Iliad* would seem almost a blow at the existence of the most fascinating people of antiquity. There came a time, however, in comparatively recent generations when scepticism no longer hesitated to invade the ranks of the most time-honoured and best-beloved traditions, and when a warfare of words began between a set of critics, who would wipe the whole mass of Greek myths from the pages of history, and the champions of those myths who were but little disposed to give them up. Thus scepticism found an obvious measure of support in the clear fact that the mythical narratives could not possibly be received as authentic in their entirety. Further support was given to the sceptical party a little later by the study of comparative mythology, which showed to the surprise of many scholars that the Greek myths were by no means so unique in their character as had been supposed. It was shown that in the main they are closely paralleled by myths of other nations, and a theory was developed and advocated with much plausibility that they had been developed out of a superstitious regard of the sun and moon and elements, that most of them were, in short, what came to be called solar myths, and that they had no association whatever with the deeds of human historic personages.

Looking at the subject in the broadest way it, perhaps, does not greatly matter which view, as to the status of myths, is the true one. After all, the main purport of history in all its phases has value, not for what it tells us of the deeds of individual men or the conflicts of individual nations, but for what it can reveal of the process of the evolution of civilisation. Weighed by this standard, the beautiful myths of the Greeks are of value chiefly as revealing to us the essential status of the Greek mind in the early historical period, and the stage of evolution of that mind.

The beautiful myths of Greece cannot and must not be given up, and fortunately they need not. The view which Grote and the host of his followers maintained, practically solves the problem for the historian. He may retain the legend and gain from it the fullest measure of imaginative satisfaction; he may draw from it inferences of the greatest value as to the mental status of the Greek people at the time when the legends were crystallised into their final form; he may even believe that, in the main, the legends have been built upon a substructure of historical fact, and he may leave to specialists the controversy as to the exact relations which this substructure bears to the finished whole, content to accept the decision of the greatest critical historians of Greece that this question is insoluble.

From the period of myth pure and simple when the gods and goddesses themselves roved the earth achieving miracles, taking various shapes, slaying

pythons, titans, and other monsters, and exercising their amorous fancies among the men and women of earth—from this period we come to the semi-historical time of the activity of the demi-gods and the men who, superior to the ordinary clay, were called Heroes.

The term "Heroic Age" has passed into general use with the historian as applying to the period of Grecian history immediately preceding and including the Trojan wars. As there are very few reliable documents at hand relating to this period — there were none at all until recently — it is clear that this age is in reality only the latter part of that mythical period to which we have just referred. Recent historians tend to treat it much more sceptically than did the historians of an earlier epoch; some are even disposed practically to ignore it. But the term has passed far too generally into use to be altogether abandoned; and, indeed, it is not desirable that it should be quite given up, for, however vague the details of the history it connotes, it is after all the shadowy record of a real epoch of history. We shall, perhaps, do best, therefore, to view it through the eyes of a distinguished historian of an earlier generation, remembering only that what is here narrated is still only half history — that is to say, history only half emerged from the realm of legend.^a

The real limits of this period cannot be exactly defined; but still, so far as its traditions admit of anything like a chronological connection, its duration may be estimated at six generations, or about two hundred years.¹ The history of the heroic age is the history of the most celebrated persons belonging to this class, who, in the language of poetry, are called heroes. The term "hero" is of doubtful origin, though it was clearly a title of honour; but in the poems of Homer, it is applied not only to the chiefs, but also to their followers. In later times its use was narrowed, and in some degree altered; it was restricted to persons, whether of the Heroic or of after ages, who were believed to be endowed with a superhuman, though not a divine, nature, and who were honoured with sacred rites, and were imagined to have the power of dispensing good or evil to their worshippers; and it was gradually combined with the notion of prodigious strength and gigantic stature. Here however we have only to do with the heroes as men. The history of their age is filled with their wars, expeditions, and adventures; and this is the great mine from which the materials of the Greek poetry were almost entirely drawn. But the richer a period is in poetical materials, the more difficult it usually is to extract from it any that are fit for the use of the historian; and this is especially true in the present instance. We must content ourselves with touching on some which appear most worthy of notice, either from their celebrity, or for the light they throw on the general character of the period, or their connection, real or supposed, with subsequent historical events.

THE EXPLOITS OF PERSEUS

We must pass very hastily over the exploits of Bellerophon and Perseus, and we mention them only for the sake of one remark. The scene of their principal adventures is laid out of Greece, in the East. The former, whose father Glaucus is the son of Sisyphus, having chanced to stain his hands with the blood of a kinsman, flies to Argos, where he excites the jealousy of Præ-tus, and is sent by him to Lycia, the country where Prætus himself had been

[¹ This estimate must not be taken too literally. The "Heroic Age" is more a racial memory than a chronological epoch.]

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hospitably entertained in his exile. It is in the adjacent regions of Asia that the Corinthian hero proves his valour by vanquishing ferocious tribes and terrible monsters. Perseus too has been sent over the sea by his grandfather Acrisius, and his achievements follow the same direction, but take a wider range; he is carried along the coasts of Syria to Egypt, where Herodotus heard of him from the priests, and into the unknown lands of the South. There can be no doubt that these fables owed many of their leading features to the Argive colonies which were planted at a later period in Rhodes, and on the southwest coast of Asia. But still it is not improbable that the connection implied by them between Argolis and the nearest parts of Asia may not be wholly without foundation. We proceed however to a much more celebrated name, on which we must dwell a little longer — that of Hercules.

THE LABOURS OF HERCULES

It has been a subject of long dispute, whether Hercules was a real or a purely fictitious personage; but it seems clear that the question, according to the sense in which it is understood, may admit of two contrary answers, both equally true. When we survey the whole mass of the actions ascribed to him, we find that they fall under two classes. The one carries us back into the infancy of society, when it is engaged in its first struggles with nature for existence and security: we see him cleaving rocks, turning the course of rivers, opening or stopping the subterraneous outlets of lakes, clearing the earth of noxious animals, and, in a word, by his single arm effecting works which properly belong to the united labours of a young community. The other class exhibits a state of things comparatively settled and mature, when the first victory has been gained, and the contest is now between one tribe and another, for possession or dominion; we see him maintaining the cause of the weak against the strong, of the innocent against the oppressor, punishing wrong, and robbery, and sacrilege, subduing tyrants, exterminating his enemies, and bestowing kingdoms on his friends. It would be futile to inquire, who the person was to whom deeds of the former kind were attributed; but it is an interesting question, whether the first conception of such a being was formed in the mind of the Greeks by their own unassisted imagination, or was suggested to them by a different people.

It is sufficient to throw a single glance at the fabulous adventures called the "labours" of Hercules, to be convinced that a part of them at least belongs to the Phœnicians, and their wandering god, in whose honour they built temples in all their principal settlements along the coast of the Mediterranean. To him must be attributed all the journeys of Hercules round the shores of western Europe, which did not become known to the Greeks for many centuries after they had been explored by the Phœnician navigators. The number to which those labours are confined by the legend, is evidently an astronomical period, and thus itself points to the course of the sun which the Phœnician god represented. The event which closes the career of the Greek hero, who rises to immortality from the flames of the pile on which he lays himself, is a prominent feature in the same Eastern mythology, and may therefore be safely considered as borrowed from it. All these tales may indeed be regarded as additions made at a late period to the Greek legend, after it had sprung up independently at home. But it is at least a remarkable coincidence, that the birth of Hercules is assigned to the city of Cadmus; and the great works ascribed to him, so far as they were really

accomplished by human labour, may seem to correspond better with the art and industry of the Phœnicians, than with the skill and power of a less civilised race. But in whatever way the origin of the name and idea of Hercules may be explained, he appears, without any ambiguity, as a Greek hero; and here it may reasonably be asked, whether all or any part of the adventures they describe, really happened to a single person, who either properly bore the name of Hercules, or received it as a title of honour.

We must briefly mention the manner in which these adventures are linked together in the common story. Amphitryon, the reputed father of Hercules, was the son of Alcæus, who is named first among the children born to Perseus at Mycenæ. The hero's mother, Alcmene, was the daughter of Electryon, another son of Perseus, who had succeeded to the kingdom. In his reign, the Taphians, a piratical people who inhabited the island called Echinades, near the mouth of the Achelous, landed in Argolis, and carried off the king's herds. While Electryon was preparing to avenge himself by invading their land, after he had committed his kingdom and his daughter to the charge of Amphitryon, a chance like that which caused the death of Acrisius stained the hands of the nephew with his uncle's blood. Sthenelus, a third son of Perseus, laid hold of this pretext to force Amphitryon and Alcmene to quit the country, and they took refuge in Thebes; thus it happened that Hercules, though an Argive by descent, and, by his mortal parentage, legitimate heir to the throne of Mycenæ, was, as to his birthplace, a Theban. Hence Bœotia is the scene of his youthful exploits: bred up among the herdsmen of Cithæron, like Cyrus and Romulus, he delivers Thespia from the lion which made havoc among its cattle. He then frees Thebes from the yoke of its more powerful neighbour, Orchomenos: and here we find something which has more the look of a historical tradition, though it is no less poetical in its form. The king of Orchomenos had been killed, in the sanctuary of Poseidon at Onchestus, by a Theban. His successor, Erginus, imposes a tribute on Thebes; but Hercules mutilates his heralds when they come to exact it, and then marching against Orchomenos, slays Erginus, and forces the Minyans to pay twice the tribute which they had hitherto received. According to a Theban legend, it was on this occasion that he stopped the subterranean outlet of the Cephissus, and thus formed the lake which covered the greater part of the plain of Orchomenos. In the meanwhile Sthenelus had been succeeded by his son Eurystheus, the destined enemy of Hercules and his race, at whose command the hero undertakes his labours. This voluntary subjection of the rightful prince to the weak and timid usurper is represented as an expiation, ordained by the Delphic oracle, for a fit of frenzy, in which Hercules had destroyed his wife and children.

This, as a poetical or religious fiction, is very happily conceived; but when we are seeking for a historical thread to connect the Bœotian legends of Hercules with those of the Peloponnesus, it must be set entirely aside; and yet it is not only the oldest form of the story, but no other has hitherto been found or devised to fill its place with a greater appearance of probability. The supposed right of Hercules to the throne of Mycenæ was, as we shall see, the ground on which the Dorians, some generations later, claimed the dominion of Peloponnesus. Yet, in any other than a poetical view, his enmity to Eurystheus is utterly inconsistent with the exploits ascribed to him in the peninsula. It is also remarkable, that while the adventures which he undertakes at the bidding of his rival are prodigious and supernatural, belonging to the first of the two classes above distinguished, he is described as during the same period engaged in expeditions which are only accidentally connected with

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these marvellous labours, and which, if they stood alone, might be taken for traditional facts. In these he appears in the light of an independent prince, and a powerful conqueror. He leads an army against Augeas, king of Elis, and having slain him, bestows his kingdom on one of his sons, who had condemned his father's injustice. So he invades Pylus to avenge an insult which he had received from Neleus, and puts him to death, with all his children, except Nestor, who was absent, or had escaped to Gerenia. Again he carries his conquering arms into Laconia, where he exterminates the family of the king Hippocoön, and places Tyndareus on the throne. Here, if anywhere in the legend of Hercules, we might seem to be reading an account of real events. Yet who can believe, that while he was overthrowing these hostile dynasties, and giving away sceptres, he suffered himself to be excluded from his own kingdom?

It was the fate of Hercules to be incessantly forced into dangerous and arduous enterprises; and hence every part of Greece is in its turn the scene of his achievements. Thus we have already seen him, in Thessaly, the ally of the Dorians, laying the foundation of a perpetual union between the people and his own descendants, as if he had either abandoned all hope of recovering the crown of Mycenæ, or had foreseen that his posterity would require the aid of the Dorians for that purpose. In Ætolia too he appears as a friend and a protector of the royal house, and fights its battles against the Thesprotians of Epirus. These perpetual wanderings, these successive alliances with so many different races, excite no surprise, so long as we view them in a poetical light, as issuing out of one source, the implacable hate with which Juno persecutes the son of Jove. They may also be understood as real events, if they are supposed to have been perfectly independent of each other, and connected only by being referred to one fabulous name. But when the poetical motive is rejected, it seems impossible to frame any rational scheme according to which they may be regarded as incidents in the life of one man, unless we imagine Hercules, in the purest spirit of knight-errantry, sallying forth in quest of adventures, without any definite object, or any impulse but that of disinterested benevolence. It will be safer, after rejecting those features in the legend which manifestly belong to Eastern religions, to distinguish the Theban Hercules from the Dorian, and the Peloponnesian hero. In the story of each some historical fragments have most probably been preserved, and perhaps least disfigured in the Theban and Dorian legends. In those of Peloponnesus it is difficult to say to what extent their original form may not have been distorted from political motives. If we might place any reliance on them, we should be inclined to conjecture that they contain traces of the struggles by which the kingdom of Mycenæ attained to that influence over the rest of the peninsula, which is attributed to it by Homer, and which we shall have occasion to notice when we come to speak of the Trojan war.

THE FEATS OF THESEUS

The name of Hercules immediately suggests that of Theseus, according to the mythical chronology his younger contemporary, and only second to him in renown. It was not without reason that Theseus was said to have given rise to the proverb, *another Hercules*; for not only is there a strong resemblance between them in many particular features, but it also seems clear that Theseus was to Attica what Hercules was to the rest of Greece, and that his career likewise represents the events of a period which cannot

have been exactly measured by any human life, and probably includes many centuries. His legend is chiefly interesting to us, so far as it may be regarded as a poetical outline of the early history of Attica [where it will be recounted in detail].

The legend of his Cretan expedition most probably preserves some genuine historical recollections. But the only fact which appears to be plainly indicated by it, is a temporary connection between Crete and Attica. Whether this intercourse was grounded solely on religion, or was the result of a partial dominion exercised by Crete over Athens, it would be useless to inquire; and still less can we pretend to determine the nature of the Athenian tribute, or that of the Cretan worship to which it related. That part of the legend which belongs to Naxos and Delos was probably introduced after these islands were occupied by the Ionians. A part is assigned in these traditions to Minos, who is represented by the general voice of antiquity as having raised Crete to a higher degree of prosperity and power than it ever reached at any subsequent period [and whom we shall also discuss later in connection with Cretan history].



TEMPLE OF THESEUS, ATHENS

THE SEVEN AGAINST THEBES

Our plan obliges us to pass over a great number of wars, expeditions, and achievements of these ages, which were highly celebrated in heroic song, not because we deem them to contain less of historical reality than others which we mention, but because they appear not to have been attended with any important or lasting consequences. We might otherwise have been induced to notice the quarrel which divided the royal house of Thebes, and led to a series of wars between Thebes and Argos, which terminated in the destruction of the former city, and the temporary expulsion of the Cadmeans, its ancient inhabitants. Hercules and Theseus undertook their adventures either alone, or with the aid of a single comrade; but in these Theban wars we find a union of seven chiefs; and such confederacies appear to have become frequent in the latter part of the heroic age. So a numerous band of heroes was combined in the enterprise, which, whatever may have been its real nature, became renowned as the chase of the Calydonian boar. Plassman^f suspects that this was in reality a military expedition against some of the savage Ætolian tribes, and that the name of one of them (the Aperantii) suggested the legend. We proceed to speak of two expeditions

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much more celebrated, conducted like these by a league of independent chieftains, but directed, not to any part of Greece, but against distant lands; we mean the voyage of the Argonauts, and the siege of Troy, which will conclude our review of the mythical period of Grecian history.

THE ARGONAUTS

The Argonautic expedition, when viewed in the light in which it has usually been considered, is an event which a critical historian, if he feels himself compelled to believe it, may think it his duty to notice, but which he is glad to pass rapidly over as a perplexing and unprofitable riddle. For even when the ancient legend has been pared down into a historical form, and its marvellous and poetical features have been all effaced, so that nothing is left but what may appear to belong to its pith and substance, it becomes indeed dry and meagre enough, but not much more intelligible than before. It relates an adventure, incomprehensible in its design, astonishing in its execution, connected with no conceivable cause, and with no sensible effect. The narrative, reduced to the shape in which it has often been thought worthy of a place in history, runs as follows:

In the generation before the Trojan war, Jason, a young Thessalian prince, had incurred the jealousy of his kinsman Pelias, who reigned at Iolcus. The crafty king encouraged the adventurous youth to embark in a maritime expedition full of difficulty and danger. It was to be directed to a point far beyond the most remote which Greek navigation had hitherto reached in the same quarter; to the eastern corner of the sea, so celebrated in ancient times for the ferocity of the barbarians inhabiting its coasts, that it was commonly supposed to have derived from them the name of "Axenus," the inhospitable, before it acquired the opposite name of the "Euxine," from the civilisation which was at length introduced by Greek settlers. Here, in the land of the Colchians, lay the goal, because this contained the prize, from which the voyage has been frequently called the adventure of the golden fleece. Jason having built a vessel of uncommon size,—in more precise terms, the first 50-oared galley his countrymen had ever launched,—and having manned it with a band of heroes, who assembled from various parts of Greece to share the glory of the enterprise, sailed to Colchis, where he not only succeeded in the principal object of his expedition, whatever this may have been, but carried off Medea, the daughter of the Colchian king, Æetes.

Though this is an artificial statement, framed to reconcile the main incidents of a wonderful story with nature and probability, it still contains many points which can scarcely be explained or believed. It carries us back to a period when navigation was in its infancy among the Greeks; yet their first essay at maritime discovery is supposed at once to have reached the extreme limit, which was long after attained by the adventurers who gradually explored the same formidable sea, and gained a footing on its coasts. The success of the undertaking however is not so surprising as the project itself; for this implies a previous knowledge of the country to be explored, which it is very difficult to account for. But the end proposed is still more mysterious; and indeed can only be explained with the aid of a conjecture. Such an explanation was attempted by some of the later writers among the ancients, who perceived that the whole story turned on the Golden Fleece, the supposed motive of the voyage, and that this feature had not a

sufficiently historical appearance. But the mountain torrents of Colchis were said to sweep down particles of gold, which the natives used to detain by fleeces dipped in the streams.

This report suggested a mode of translating the fable into historical language. It was conjectured that the Argonauts had been attracted by the metallic treasures of the country, and that the Golden Fleece was a poetical description of the process which they had observed, or perhaps had practised: an interpretation certainly more ingenious, or at least less absurd, than those by which Diodorus transforms the fire-breathing bulls which Jason was said to have yoked at the bidding of Æetes, into a band of Taurians, who guarded the fleece, and the sleepless dragon which watched over it, into their commander Draco; but yet not more satisfactory; for it explains a casual, immaterial circumstance, while it leaves the essential point in the legend wholly untouched. The epithet "golden," to which it relates, is merely poetical and ornamental, and signified nothing more as to the nature of the fleece than the epithets white or purple, which were also applied to it by early poets. According to the original and genuine tradition, the fleece was a sacred relic, and its importance arose entirely out of its connection with the tragical story of Phrixus, the main feature of which is the human sacrifice which the gods had required from the house of Athamas. His son Phrixus either offered himself, or was selected through the artifices of his stepmother Ino, as the victim; but at the critical moment, as he stood before the altar, the marvellous ram was sent for his deliverance, and transported him over the sea, according to the received account, to Colchis, where Phrixus, on his arrival, sacrificed the ram to Jupiter, as the god who had favoured his escape; the fleece was nailed to an oak in the grove of Mars, where it was kept by Æetes as a sacred treasure, or palladium.

But the tradition must have had a historical foundation in some real voyages and adventures, without which it could scarcely have arisen at all, and could never have become so generally current as to be little inferior in celebrity to the tale of Troy itself. If however the fleece had no existence but in popular belief, the land where it was to be sought was a circumstance of no moment. In the earlier form of the legend, it might not have been named at all, but only have been described as the distant, the unknown, land; and after it had been named, it might have been made to vary with the gradual enlargement of geographical information. But in this case the voyage of the Argonauts can no longer be considered as an isolated adventure, for which no adequate motive is left; but must be regarded, like the expedition of the Tyrian Hercules, as representing a succession of enterprises, which may have been the employment of several generations. And this is perfectly consistent with the manner in which the adventurers are most properly described. They are Minyans; a branch of the Greek nation, whose attention was very early drawn by their situation, not perhaps without some influence from the example and intercourse of the Phœnicians, to maritime pursuits. The form which the legend assumed was probably determined by the course of their earliest naval expeditions. They were naturally attracted towards the northeast, first by the islands that lay before the entrance of the Hellespont, and then by the shores of the Propontis and its two straits. Their successive colonies, or spots signalised either by hostilities or peaceful transactions with the natives, would become the landing-places of the Argonauts. That such a colony existed at Lemnos, seems unquestionable; though it does not follow that Euneus, the son of Jason, who is described in the *Iliad* as reigning there during the siege of Troy, was a historical personage.

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If however it should be asked, in what light the hero and heroine of the legend are to be viewed on this hypothesis, it must be answered that both are most probably purely ideal personages, connected with the religion of the people to whose poetry they belong. Jason was perhaps no other than the Samothracian god or hero Jasion, whose name was sometimes written in the same manner, the favourite of Demeter, as his namesake was of Hera, and the protector of mariners as the Thessalian hero was the chief of the Argonauts. Medea seems to have been originally another form of Hera herself, and to have descended, by a common transition, from the rank of a goddess into that of a heroine, when an epithet had been mistaken for a distinct name. We have already seen that the Corinthian tradition claimed her as belonging properly to Corinth, one of the principal seats of the Minyan race. The tragical scenes which rendered her stay there so celebrated were commemorated by religious rites, which continued to be observed until the city was destroyed by the Romans. According to the local legend, she had not murdered her children; they had been killed by the Corinthians; and the public guilt was expiated by annual sacrifices offered to Hera, in whose temple fourteen boys, chosen every twelve-month from noble families, were appointed to spend a year in all the ceremonies of solemn mourning. But we cannot here pursue this part of the subject any further. The historical side of the legend seems to exhibit an opening intercourse between the opposite shores of the *Ægean*. If however it was begun by the northern Greeks, it was probably not long confined to them, but was early shared by those of the Peloponnesus. It would be inconsistent with the piratical habits of the early navigators, to suppose that this intercourse was always of a friendly nature; and it may therefore not have been without a real ground, that the Argonautic expedition was sometimes represented as the occasion of the first conflict between the Greeks and Trojans. We therefore pass by a natural transition out of the mythical circle we have just been tracing, into that of the Trojan war, and the light in which we have viewed the one may serve to guide us in forming a judgment on the historical import of the other.

We have already seen in what manner Eurystheus, the son of Sthenelus, had usurped the inheritance which belonged of right to Hercules, as the legitimate representative of Perseus. Sthenelus had reserved Mycenæ and Tiryns for himself; but he had bestowed the neighbouring town of Midea on Atreus and Thyestes, the sons of Pelops, and uncles of Eurystheus. On the death of Hercules, Eurystheus pursued his orphan children from one place of refuge to another, until they found an asylum in Attica. Theseus refused to surrender them, and Eurystheus then invaded Attica in person; but his army was routed, and he himself slain by Hyllus, the eldest son of Hercules, in his flight through the isthmus. Atreus succeeded to the throne of his nephew, whose children had been all cut off in this disastrous expedition; and thus, when his sceptre descended to his son Agamemnon, it conveyed the sovereignty of an ample realm. While the house of Pelops was here enriched with the spoils of Hercules, it enjoyed the fruits of his triumphant valour in another quarter. He had bestowed Laconia on Tyndareus, the father of Helen; and when Agamemnon's brother, Menelaus, had been preferred to all the other suitors of this beautiful princess, Tyndareus resigned his dominions to his son-in-law. In the meanwhile a flourishing state had risen up on the eastern side of the Hellespont. Its capital, Troy, had been taken by Hercules, with the assistance of Telamon, son of *Æacus*, but had been restored to Priam, the son of its conquered king, Laomedon,

who reigned there in peace and prosperity over a number of little tribes, until his son Paris, attracted to Laconia by the fame of Helen's beauty, abused the hospitality of Menelaus by carrying off his queen in his absence. All the chiefs of Greece combined their forces, under the command of Agamemnon, to avenge this outrage, and sailed with a great armament to Troy.^c Their enterprise, famous for all time as the Trojan War, stands quite by itself in interest and importance among the traditions of the Heroic Age, and demands exceptional treatment here.


THE TROJAN WAR

Historic criticism is almost a pendulum in its motion. Nowhere has this been more vividly seen than in the attitude of prominent historians toward the Trojan War and the poetical chronicle of it known as Homer's *Iliad*. Scholarly belief has passed through all imaginable grades of opinion ranging between a flat denial that there was ever such a place as Troy, such a war as the Trojan, or such a man as Homer, to an acceptance of them all with an unquestioning credulity matching that of the early Greeks.

It was textual criticism, the deadly work of the critical scalpel in the verbal form of the poems that first destroyed the good standing of the Homeric legend. It is the revivifying work of the pickaxe and shovel in the actual ground as wielded by the excavator and archæologist that have brought back the repute of Homer. A few years ago and a Gladstone arguing for the reality of a Homer and of an Homeric epic was dismissed by the professor as an old-fashioned ignoramus. To-day almost the same terms are applied to those who cling to the fashion of yesterday and claim that the Trojan War and Homer himself are myths. In the new swing of the pendulum, however, the cautious will still avoid extremes.

What has already been said about the status of Greek myth applies in the main to the Homeric poems. They are legends doubtless with some measure of historical foundation, but they cannot be accepted by the critical student of to-day as historical narratives in the narrow sense. But the Homeric poems have an interest of quite another kind which gives them a place apart among the legends of antiquity. This interest centres about the personality of the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. From the earliest historic periods of Grecian life the authorship of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* was unquestionably ascribed to a poet named Homer. If doubts ever arose in the mind of any sceptical or critical person as to the reality of Homer, such doubts were quite submerged by the popular verdict. It was not generally claimed that Homer himself had written the works ascribed to him, — it was long held, indeed, that he must have lived at a period prior to the introduction of writing into Greece, — but that the person whom tradition loved to speak of as the blind bard had invented and recited his narratives *in toto*, and that these, memorised by others, had been brought down through succeeding generations until they were finally given permanence in writing, were accepted as the most unequivocal of historical facts.

But in the latter half of the 18th century, these supposed historical facts began to be called in question, Wolf^h leading the van and holding all scholarship in terror of his name for nearly a century. Critical students of Homer were struck with numerous anomalies in his writings that seemed to them inconsistent with the idea that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* had been composed at one time and by one person. To cite but a single illustration, it



(Courtesy of The Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)

HOMER, FROM THE ANTIQUE BUST

[ca. 1400-1200 B.C.]

was noted that the various parts of these poems were not all written in the same dialect, and it seemed highly improbable that any one person should have employed different dialects in a single composition. Such a suggestion as this naturally led to bitter controversies — controversies which have by no means altogether subsided after the lapse of a century.^a Later scholarship denies the “stratification of language” in the poems.^b But the controversy did not confine itself to the mere question whether such a person as Homer had lived and written, it came presently to involve also the subject of the Homeric poems, in particular, of the *Iliad*.

Certain details aside, the Trojan War had been looked upon as an historical event, quite as fully credited by the modern historian as it had been by Alexander when he stopped to offer sacrifices at the site of Troy. But now the iconoclastic movement being under way there was a school of students who openly maintained that the whole recital, by whomsoever written, was nothing but a fable which the historian must utterly discard. It was even questioned whether such a place as Troy had ever existed. Such a scepticism as this seemed, naturally enough, a clear sacrilege to a large body of scholars, but for several generations no successful efforts were made to meet it with any weapons more tangible than words. Then came a champion of the historical verity of the Homeric narrative who set to work to prove his case in the most practical way. Curiously enough the man who thus championed the cause of the closet scholars and poets and visionaries was himself a practical man of affairs, no less experienced and no less successful in dealing with the affairs of an everyday business than had been the man from whom the iconoclastic movement had gained its chief support. This man was also a German, Heinrich Schliemann.⁽¹⁾

Having amassed a fortune, the income from which was more than sufficient for all his needs, he retired from active business and devoted the remainder of his life to a self-imposed task, which had been an ambition with him all his life, the search, namely, for the site of Ancient Troy. How well he succeeded all the world knows. But in opposition to the opinions of many scholars he selected the hill of Hissarlik as the site of ancient Ilium, and his excavations there soon demonstrated that at least it had been the site not of one alone but of at least seven different cities in antiquity — one being built above the ruins of another at long intervals of time. One of these cities, the sixth from the top, — or to put it otherwise, the most ancient but one, — was, he became firmly convinced, Ilium itself.

The story of his achievements cannot be told here in detail, and it is necessary to point the warning that Dr. Schliemann's excavations — wonderful as are their results — do not, perhaps, when critically viewed, demonstrate quite so much as might at first sight appear. There is, indeed, a high degree of probability that the city which he excavated was really the one intended in the Homeric descriptions, but it must be clear to any one who scrutinises the matter somewhat closely, that this fact goes but a little way towards substantiating the Homeric narrative as a whole. The city of Ilium may have existed without giving rise to any such series of events as that narrated in the *Iliad*. Dr. Schliemann himself was led to realise this fact, and to modify somewhat in later years the exact tenor of some of his more enthusiastic earlier views, yet the fact remains that the excavations at Hissarlik must be reckoned with by whoever in future discusses the status of the Homeric story.

This is not the place to enter into a statement of the multitudinous phases scepticism has taken in dealing with the Trojan legend. The story,

whether pure fancy, as some have thought it, or a dramatised and romantic version of actual history, is indispensable to any chronicle of Greece or of Grecian influence.^a Taking Homer as a basis, it may be outlined as follows:

The Town of Troy

The origin of Dardanus, founder of the Trojan state, has been very variously related; but the testimony of Homer to the utter uncertainty of his birth and native country, delivered in the terms that he was the son of Jupiter, may seem best entitled to belief. Thus however it appears that the Greeks not unwillingly acknowledged consanguinity with the Trojans; for many, indeed most, of the Grecian heroes also claimed their descent from Jupiter. It is moreover remarkable that, among the many genealogies which Homer has transmitted, none is traced so far into antiquity as that of the royal family of Troy. Dardanus was ancestor in the sixth degree to Hector, and may thus have lived from a hundred and fifty to two hundred years before that hero. On one of the many ridges projecting from the foot of the lofty mountain of Ida in the northwestern part of Asia Minor, he founded a town, or perhaps rather a castle, which from his own name was called Dardania.

The situation commanded the narrow but highly fruitful plain, watered by the streams of Simois and Scamander, and stretching from the roots of Ida to the Hellespont northward, and the Ægean Sea westward. His son Erichthonius, who succeeded him in the sovereignty of this territory, had the reputation of being the richest man of his age. Much of his wealth seems to have been derived from a large stock of brood mares, to the number, according to the poet, of three thousand, which the fertility of his soil enabled him to maintain, and which by his care and judgment in the choice of stallions produced a breed of horses superior to any of the surrounding countries. Tros, son of Erichthonius, probably extended, or in some other way improved, the territory of Dardania; since the appellation by which it was known to posterity was derived from his name. With the riches the population of the state of course increased. Ilus, son of Tros, therefore, venturing to move his residence from the mountain, founded, on a rising ground beneath, that celebrated city called from his name Ilion [or Ilium], but more familiarly known in modern languages by the name of Troy, derived from his father.

Twice before that war which Homer has made so famous Troy is said to have been taken and plundered: and for its second capture by Hercules, in the reign of Laomedon, son of Ilus, we have Homer's authority. The government however revived, and still advanced in power and splendour. Laomedon after his misfortune fortified the city in a manner so superior to what was common in his age that the walls of Troy were said to be a work of the gods. Under his son Priam, the Trojan state was very flourishing and of considerable extent; containing, under the name of Phrygia, the country afterwards called Troas, together with both shores of the Hellespont and the large and fertile island of Lesbos.

A frequent communication, sometimes friendly, but oftener hostile, was maintained between the eastern and western coasts of the Ægean Sea; each being an object of piracy more than of commerce to the inhabitants of the opposite country. Cattle and slaves constituting the principal riches of the times, men, women, and children, together with swine, sheep, goats, oxen, and horses, were principal objects of plunder. But scarcely was any crime

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more common than rapes; and it seems to have been a kind of fashion, in consequence of which the leaders of piratical expeditions gratified their vanity in the highest degree when they could carry off a lady of superior rank. How usual these outrages were among the Greeks, may be gathered from the condition said to have been exacted by Tyndareus, king of Sparta, father of the celebrated Helen, from the chieftains who came to ask his daughter in marriage; he required of all, as a preliminary, to bind themselves by solemn oaths that, should she be stolen, they would assist with their utmost power to recover her. This tradition, with many other stories of Grecian rapes, on whatsoever founded, indicates with certainty the opinion of the later Greeks, among whom they were popular, concerning the manners of their ancestors. But it does not follow that the Greeks were more vicious than other people equally unhabituated to constant, vigorous, and well-regulated exertions of law and government. Equal licentiousness but a few centuries ago prevailed throughout western Europe. Hence those gloomy habitations of the ancient nobility, which excite the wonder of the traveller, particularly in the southern parts, where, in the midst of the finest countries, he often finds them in situations so very inconvenient and uncomfortable, except for what was then the one great object, security, that now the houseless peasant will scarcely go to them for shelter. From the licentiousness were derived the manners, and even the virtues, of the times; and hence knight-errantry with its whimsical consequences.

Paris and Helen

The expedition of Paris, son of Priam king of Troy, into Greece, appears to have been a marauding adventure, such as was then usual. It is said indeed that he was received very hospitably, and entertained very kindly, by Menelaus king of Sparta. But this also was consonant to the spirit of the times; for hospitality has always been the virtue of barbarous ages: it is at this day no less characteristical of the wild Arabs than their spirit of robbery; and in the Scottish highlands we know robbery and hospitality flourished togethertill very lately. Hospitality indeed will be generally found in different ages and countries very nearly in proportion to the need of it; that is, in proportion to the deficiency of jurisprudence, and the weakness of government. Paris concluded his visit at Sparta with carrying off Helen, wife of Menelaus, together with a considerable treasure: and whether this was effected by fraud, or as some have supposed, by open violence, it is probable enough that as Herodotus relates, it was first concerted, and afterward supported, in revenge for some similar injury done by the Greeks to the Trojans.

An outrage however so grossly injurious to one of the greatest princes of Greece, especially if attended with a breach of the rights of hospitality, might not unreasonably be urged as a cause requiring the united revenge of all the Grecian chieftains. But there were other motives to engage them in the quarrel. The hope of returning laden with the spoil of the richer provinces of Asia was a strong incentive to leaders poor at home, and bred to rapine. The authority and influence of Agamemnon, king of Argos, brother of Menelaus, were also weighty. The spirit of the age, his own temper, the extent of his power, the natural desire of exerting it on a splendid occasion, would all incite this prince eagerly to adopt his brother's quarrel. He is besides represented by character qualified to create and command a powerful league; ambitious, active, brave, generous, humane; vain indeed and haughty, sometimes to his own injury; yet commonly repress

ing those hurtful qualities, and watchful to cultivate popularity. Under this leader all the Grecian chieftains from the end of Peloponnesus to the end of Thessaly, together with Idomeneus from Crete, and other commanders from some of the smaller islands, assembled at Aulis, a seaport of Bœotia. The Acarnanians alone, separated from the rest of Greece by lofty mountains and a sea at that time little navigated, had no share in the expedition.

The Siege of Troy

A story acquired celebrity in aftertimes, that, the fleet being long detained at Aulis by contrary winds, Agamemnon sacrificed his daughter Iphigenia as a propitiatory offering to obtain from the gods a safe and speedy passage to the Trojan coast. To the credit of his character however it is added that he submitted to this abominable cruelty with extreme reluctance, compelled by the clamours of the army, who were persuaded that the gods required the victim; nor were there wanting those who asserted that by a humane fraud the princess was at last saved, under favour of a report that a fawn was miraculously sent by the goddess Diana to be sacrificed in her stead. Indeed the story, though of such fame, and so warranted by early authorities, that some notice of it seemed requisite, wants, it must be confessed, wholly the best authentication for matters of that very early age; for neither Homer, though he enumerates Agamemnon's daughters, nor Hesiod, who not only mentions the assembling of the Grecian forces under his command at Aulis, but specifies their detentions by bad weather, has left one word about so remarkable an event as this sacrifice.

The fleet at length had a prosperous voyage. It consisted of about twelve hundred open vessels, each carrying from fifty to a hundred and twenty men. The number of men in the whole armament, computed from the mean of those two numbers mentioned by Homer as the complement of different ships, would be something more than a hundred thousand; and Thucydides, whose opinion is of the highest authority, has reckoned this within the bounds of probability; though a poet, he adds, would go to the utmost of current reports. The army, landing on the Trojan coast, was immediately so superior to the enemy as to oblige them to seek shelter within the city walls: but here the operations were at a stand. The hazards to which unfortified and solitary dwellings were exposed from pirates and freebooters had driven the more peaceable of mankind to assemble in towns for mutual security. To erect lofty walls around those towns for defence was then an obvious resource, requiring little more than labour for the execution. More thought, more art, more experience were necessary for forcing the rudest fortification, if defended with vigilance and courage. But the Trojan walls were singularly strong: Agamemnon's army could make no impression upon them. He was therefore reduced to the method most common for ages after, of turning the siege into a blockade, and patiently waiting till want of necessaries should force the enemy to quit their shelter. But neither did the policy of the times amount by many degrees to the art of subsisting so numerous an army for any length of time, nor would the revenues of Greece have been equal to it with more knowledge, nor indeed would the state of things have admitted it, scarcely with any wealth, or by any means. For in countries without commerce, the people providing for their own wants only, supplies cannot be found equal to the maintenance of a superadded army. No sooner therefore did the Trojans shut themselves within their walls than the Greeks were obliged to give their principal attention to the means of

[cæ. 1400-1200 B.C.]

subsisting their numerous forces. The common method of the times was to ravage the adjacent countries; and this was immediately put in practice. But such a resource soon destroys itself. To have therefore a more permanent and certain supply, a part of their army was sent to cultivate the vales of the Thracian Chersonesus, then abandoned by the inhabitants on account of the frequent and destructive incursions of the wild people who occupied the interior of that continent.

Large bodies being thus detached from the army, the remainder scarcely sufficed to deter the Trojans from taking the field again, and could not prevent succour and supplies from being carried into the town. Thus the siege was protracted to the enormous length of ten years. It was probably their success in marauding marches and pirating voyages that induced the Greeks to persevere so long. Achilles is said to have plundered no less than twelve maritime and eleven inland towns. Lesbos, then under the dominion of the monarch of Troy, was among his conquests; and the women of that island were apportioned to the victorious army as a part of the booty. But these circumstances alarming all neighbouring people contributed to procure numerous and powerful allies to the Trojans. Not only the Asiatic states, to a great extent eastward and southward, sent auxiliary troops, but also the European, westward, as far as the Pæonians of that country about the river Axius, which afterwards became Macedonia.

At length, in the tenth year of the war, after great exertions of valour and the slaughter of numbers on both sides, among whom were many of the highest rank, Troy yielded to its fate. Yet was it not then overcome by open force; stratagem is reported by Homer; fraud and treachery have been supposed by later writers. It was, however, taken and plundered: the venerable monarch was slain: the queen and her daughters, together with only one son remaining of a very numerous male progeny, were led into captivity. According to some, the city was totally destroyed, and the survivors of the people so dispersed that their very name was from that time lost. But the tradition supported by better authority, and in no small degree by that of Homer himself, whose words upon the occasion seem indeed scarcely doubtful, is, that Æneas and his posterity reigned over the Trojan country and people for some generations; the seat of government however being removed from Troy to Scepsis: and Xenophon has marked his respect for this tradition, ascribing the final ruin of the Trojan state and name to that following inundation of Greeks called the Æolic emigration.

Agamemnon's Sad Home-coming

Agamemnon, we are told, triumphed over Troy; and the historical evidence to the fact is large. But the Grecian poets themselves universally acknowledge that it was a dear-bought, a mournful triumph. Few of the princes, who survived to partake of it, had any enjoyment of their hard-earned glory in their native country. None expecting that the war would detain them so long from home, had made due provision for the regular administration of their affairs during such an absence. It is indeed probable that the utmost wisdom and forethought would have been unequal to the purpose. For, in the half-formed governments of those days, the constant presence of the prince as supreme regulator was necessary towards keeping the whole from running presently into utter confusion. Seditions and revolutions accordingly remain recorded almost as numerous as the cities of Greece. Many of the princes on their return were compelled to embark

again with their adherents, to seek settlements in distant countries. A more tragical fate awaited Agamemnon. His queen, Clytemnestra, having given her affection to his kinsman Ægisthus, concurred in a plot against her husband, and the unfortunate monarch on his return to Argos was assassinated; those of his friends who escaped the massacre were compelled to fly with his son Orestes; and, so strong was the party which their long possession of the government had enabled the conspirators to form, the usurper obtained complete possession of the throne. Orestes found refuge at Athens; where alone among the Grecian states there seems to have been then a constitution capable of bearing both the absence and the return of the army and its commander without any essential derangement.

Such were the Trojan war and its consequences, according to the best of the unconnected and defective accounts remaining, among which those of Homer have always held the first rank. In modern times, as we have seen, the authority of the great poet as an historian has been more questioned. It is of highest importance to the history of the early ages that it should have its due weight; and it may therefore be proper to mention here some of the circumstances which principally establish its authority; others will occur hereafter. It should be observed then that in Homer's age poets were the only historians; whence, though it does not at all follow that poets would so adhere to certain truth as not to introduce ornament, yet it necessarily follows that veracity in historical narration would make a large share of a poet's merit in public opinion, a circumstance which the common use of written records and prose histories instantly and totally altered. The probability and the very remarkable consistency of Homer's historical anecdotes, variously dispersed as they are among his poetical details and embellishments, form a second and powerful testimony. Indeed, the connection and the clearness of Grecian history, through the very early times of which Homer has treated, appear very extraordinary when compared with the darkness and uncertainty that begin in the instant of our losing his guidance, and continue through ages.^h

CHARACTER AND SPIRIT OF THE HEROIC AGE

In the tales of Grecian mythology a great difference is apparent between the earlier and later centuries of the heroic age. They show us a considerable progress in culture during the course of the period. The legends of Perseus, Hercules, and Theseus, or of the battle of the Lapithæ and Centauri, depict the early Greeks as a half wild race tormented by fierce animals, robbers, and tyrants. Giants, fearful snakes, and other monsters, also adventures in the nether world, often appear in these legends, and the Grecians seem to be engaged in a battle with the wildness of nature and with their own crudity. The same land appears utterly different in the legends and poems of the Trojan war and the other events of the later heroic age. In these legends the manners of the Greeks are represented as friendlier and more peaceful, and, with a few exceptions, we find no more real miracles, but everything points to a quieter time and a more orderly state of affairs.

We have a poetical, yet essentially faithful, description of these last centuries in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the two oldest extant Grecian literary works. Both poems are, besides the recital of a part of the heroic legends, a true picture of the customs, the conquering spirit, and the domestic as

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well as public life of the Greeks at the time of the Trojan war and immediately after it. The Grecians at that time do not seem to have been a very numerous people. They lived in small states, with central cities in active intercourse with one another, not differing much in their ways of life, customs, and language. They were a rustic, warlike race, who rejoiced in simple customs and led a happy existence under a friendly sky. The similarity of religion, language, and customs made the Greeks of that time, as it were, members of a great organism, holding together although divided into many tribes and states. At the end of the heroic age some of the tribes were brought even closer together by near relationship and by means of temples and feasts in common. But the link that held them all together had not as yet become a clear conviction; therefore, so far there was no joint name for the Greek nation.

Agriculture and cattle raising were the principal occupations of the people. Besides this they had few industries. Other sources of wealth were the chase, fishing, and war. The agriculture consisted of corn and wine-growing and horticulture. The ox was the draught animal, donkeys and mules were used for transport, horses were but seldom used for riding, but they drew the chariots in time of war. The herds consisted principally of cattle, sheep, goats, and pigs. Slaves were used for the lower work. These were purchased from sea-robbers, obtained in victorious wars, or born in the house. They had a knowledge of navigation, although their ships generally had no decks, and were worked more by means of oars than sails. There was no commerce on a large scale; war and piracy served instead as a means of obtaining riches. Many metals were known; they used iron, the working of which was still difficult. Coinage was not used at all, or, at all events, very little. Weaving was the work of women; the best woven stuffs, however, were obtained from the Phœnicians, who were the reigning commercial people of the Grecian seas. They made various kinds of arms, which were in part of artistic workmanship, ornaments and vessels of metal, ivory, clay, and wood. The descriptions of these objects show that the taste for plastic art, that is, the representation of beautiful forms, was already awakened among them. They possessed further a knowledge of architecture; towns and villages are mentioned, also walls with towers and gates. The houses of princes were built of stone; they contained large and lofty rooms, as well as gardens and halls.

Caste was unknown to the Grecians. The people in the heroic age, to be sure, consisted of nobles and commons, but the latter took part in all public affairs of importance, and the privileges of the former did not rest upon their birth alone; an acquisition of great strength, bravery, and adroitness was also necessary — virtues which are accessible to all. The difference between the two classes was, therefore, not grounded, like the oriental establishment of caste, on superstition and deception, but on the belief that certain families possessed bodily strength and warlike abilities, and were therefore appointed by the gods as protectors of the country; that their only right to superiority over others lay in their actual greater capacity for ruling and fighting.

The system of government was aristocratic monarchy, supported by the personal feelings and co-operative opinions of all free men. The state was thus merely a warlike assembly of vigorous men, consisting of nobles and freemen, having a leader at their head. The latter was bound to follow the decisions of the nobility, and in important affairs had to ask the consent of the people.

The king was only the first of the nobility, and the only rights he possessed which were not shared by them was that of commander in battle and high priest. Therefore, if he wished to excel others as real ruler, everything depended on his personality; he had to surpass others in riches, bodily strength, bravery, discernment, and experience. The king brought the sacrifice to the gods for the totality and directed the religious ceremonies. He also sat in judgment, but mostly in company with experienced old men from the nobility, being really arbitrator and protector of the weak against the strong; for if no plaintiff appeared there was no trial at the public judgment-seat. It was the king's duty to offer hospitality to the ambassadors of other states and to be hospitable to strangers generally. His revenues consisted only of the voluntary donations of his subjects, of a larger share in the spoils of war, and of the produce of certain lands assigned to him. The only signs of his royalty were the sceptre and the herald that went before him. He took the first place at all assemblies and feasts, and at the sacrificial repasts he received a double helping of food and drink. He was addressed in terms of veneration, but otherwise one associated with him as with any other noble, and there was no trace of the oriental forms of homage towards kings among the ancient Greeks.

The nobility was composed of men of certain families to whom especial strength and dexterity were attributed as hereditary prerogatives; they sought to keep these up by means of knightly practices and to prove them on the battle-field. As has already been said, they took part in the government of the country. The common people or free citizens of the second class were assembled on all important occasions, to give their votes for peace or war, or any other matter of importance. The assemblies of the people described in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* show the same general participation in public affairs and that lively activity which later reached such a high development in the Grecian republics. Beside this, at that time bravery and strength showed what every man was worth, and still more than mere bodily strength, experience, eloquence, and a judicious insight into life and its circumstances brought to any one honour and importance.

In time of war the decision depended more upon the bravery of the kings and nobles than upon the fighting of the people, who arranged themselves in close masses on the battle-field. The chiefs were not trained to be generals or leaders, but rather brave and skilled fighters. Swiftmess in running, strength and certainty in throw, and skill in wrestling as in the use of arms, of the lance and the sword, were the most important items. Every leader had his own chariot, with a young companion by his side to hold the reins, while he himself fought with a javelin. The fortifications of the towns consisted of a trench and a wall with towers. As yet they had no knowledge of how to conduct a siege. They knew of no implement which would serve in the taking of a town.

Music and poetry played an important part in the lives of these warlike people. These were inseparable from their meals, their feasts, and military expeditions. The lyre, the flute, and the pipe were the musical instruments in the heroic age; the trumpet was not used until the end of that time. Flute and pipe were the instruments of shepherds and peasants. The lyre, on the other hand, was played by poets and singers and even by many of the kings and nobles, and always served as the accompaniment of songs. The subjects of their songs were the deeds of living or past heroes. There were singers or bards who composed these songs and sang them while men stood round to listen and these bards were held in great esteem.


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Religion and politics were closely connected; but there was no trace of a priesthood with predominant influence. The king was the director of sacrifices, the presence of a priest not being required. There already existed, to be sure, besides the ancient oracle of Dodona, the oracle of Delphi in Phocis, which became so celebrated at a later period; but neither had any great influence in the heroic age. On the other hand, there were so-called soothsayers, who were supposed to possess much wisdom and at the same time a kind of association with the gods. For this reason they were consulted, so as to foretell the results of important undertakings, and to discover the cause of general misfortunes as well as a means of removing them.

The most renowned of these men were Orpheus, who played the part of prophet in the expedition of the Argonauts; Amphiaræus, who joined the expedition of the Seven against Thebes in the same character; Tiresias, who was the prophet of the Thebans both at that time and in the war of the Epigoni; and lastly Calchas, the soothsayer of the Greeks in the Trojan war. Even these men had no influence to be compared with the oriental priesthood. They were really only looked upon as pacifiers of the outraged god-head and as advisers; their soothsayings were not always respected, and when their prophecies were unsatisfactory they had to face the anger of those in power.

The religious belief of the heroic age was the origin of the later national religion. It sprang probably from various sources. Therefore it cannot be distinguished by any special belief like that of the Indians and Egyptians. The religion of the Greeks was never a perfected system and therefore not free from contradictions, especially as oriental conceptions were introduced into it from ancient times. The Grecians of this time believed heaven,

or rather the summit of the towering Mount Olympus, to be inhabited by beings, like the earth; they imagined that these beings resembled human beings in appearance and inner nature, but with the difference that they ascribed to them invisibility, greater strength, freedom from the barriers of mortality, and a powerful influence over earthly things. The life of the gods, according to the representation of the heroic age, only differed from that of men in the fact that it had a more beautiful colouring and higher pleasures. They therefore looked upon the gods as personal beings and had that form of religion known as anthropomorphism, the essential characteristic of which is the belief that the gods resemble men. But joined in an inexplicable manner with this view, was the idea that the gods were at the same time natural phenomena and powers of nature. For instance Zeus, the king and ruler in the kingdom of the gods, was also regarded as the god of the



ZEUS

(From a Greek Statue)

[ca. 1400-1200 B.C.]

atmosphere; Apollo of the sun; Poseidon the god of the sea; and the woods, wells, valleys, and hills were believed to be inhabited by divine beings called nymphs.

The king offered sacrifice for the people and every father for his house and family. The religious ceremonies consisted chiefly of sacrifices and prayers. There were but few temples, but on the other hand every town had a piece of land set apart, on which there was an altar. They did not feel bound to these holy places for the worship of the gods, but often built an altar on some spot in the open field for prayer and sacrifice. The sacrifice consisted in burning some pieces of flesh to the gods and the pouring of wine into the fire; while the rest was consumed at a general and merry feast. Even the appointed religious feast days had quite a festive colouring: they feasted, drank, joked, held tournaments, and listened while bards sang of the deeds of heroes. There was no trace to be found among the religious ceremonies of the heroic Greeks of that wild, intoxicating character which generally existed at the feasts of the oriental people.

This was how the character of the later Grecian heroic age was formed. They were a vigorous people, with warlike tastes and simple customs, living under a mild heaven. All took part in public affairs, all were free, and, in spite of a certain inequality among them, they were all connected; and divided by no great contrasts in education, the community felt no kind of oppression. The limited population of the country and the possession of slaves permitted a careless and merry way of life. Rough work was unknown to the greater part of the populace. They exercised their bodies and steeled their strength with warlike undertakings, hunting, practice with arms, and wrestling. Their mental intelligence was directed to higher things through religious customs and soothsayers, and developed rapidly by means of the merry association of the nobility, frequent consultations about public affairs, and mutual military expeditions; and, above all, by means of the poetical stories related by the bards, who put into pleasant form what all felt, and were the real teachers of a higher mental culture; and lastly by means of the elevating power of music.

The Greek, under his bright heaven, looked upon life in the kind sunlight of the upper world as a real life; but that of the lower regions seemed to him, even if he obtained the greatest honours, and reigned like Achilles "over the entire dead as king," only a sombre picture as compared with the upper world: he loved life and did not throw it ostentatiously away, where there was no necessity. He did not look upon flying from a stronger foe as disgrace; swiftness of foot was regarded by him as a heroic merit, like cunning and a mighty arm.^d

GEOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE

If we endeavour to ascertain the extent of Homer's geographical knowledge, we find ourselves almost confined to Greece and the *Ægean*. Beyond this circle all is foreign and obscure: and the looseness with which he describes the more distant regions, especially when contrasted with his accurate delineation of those which were familiar to him, indicates that as to the others he was mostly left to depend on vague rumours, which he might mould at his pleasure. In the catalogue indeed of the Trojan auxiliaries, which probably comprises all the information which the Greeks had acquired concerning that part of the world at the time it was composed, the names of several nations in the interior of Asia Minor are enumerated. The remotest are probably

the Halizonians of Alyba, whose country may, as Strabo supposes, be that of the Chaldeans on the Euxine. On the southern side of the peninsula the Lycians appear as a very distant race, whose land is therefore a fit scene for fabulous adventures: on its confines are the haunts of the monstrous Chimæra, and the territory of the Amazons: farther eastward the mountains of the fierce Solymi, from which Poseidon, on his return from the Ethiopians, describes the bark of Ulysses sailing on the western sea. These Ethiopians are placed by the poet at the extremity of the earth; but as they are visited by Menelaus in the course of his wanderings, they must be supposed to reach across to the shores of the inner sea, and to border on the Phœnicians. Ulysses describes a voyage which he performed in five days, from Crete to Egypt: and the Taphians, though they inhabit the western side of Greece, are represented as engaged in piratical adventures on the coast of Phœnicia. But as to Egypt, it seems clear that the poet's information was confined to what he had heard of a river *Ægyptus*, and a great city called Thebes.

On the western side of Europe, the compass of his knowledge seems to be bounded by a few points not very far distant from the coast of Greece. The northern part of the Adriatic he appears to have considered as a vast open sea. Farther westward, Sicily and the southern extremity of Italy are represented as the limits of all ordinary navigation. Beyond lies a vast sea, which spreads to the very confines of nature and space. Sicily itself, at least its more remote parts, is inhabited by various races of gigantic cannibals: whether, at the same time, any of the tribes who really preceded the Greeks in the occupation of the island were known to be settled on the eastern side, is not certain, though the Sicels and Sicania are mentioned in the *Odyssey*. Italy, as well as Greece, appears, according to the poet's notions, to be bounded on the north by a formidable waste of waters.

When we proceed to inquire how the imagination of the people filled up the void of its experience, and determined the form of the unknown world, we find that the rudeness of its conceptions corresponds to the scantiness of its information. The part of the earth exposed to the beams of the sun was undoubtedly considered, not as a spherical, but as a plane surface, only varied by its heights and hollows; and, as little can it be doubted, that the form of this surface was determined by that of the visible horizon. The whole orb is girt by the ocean, not a larger sea, but a deep river, which, circulating with constant but gentle flux, separates the world of light and life from the realms of darkness, dreams, and death. No feature in the Homeric chart is more distinctly prominent than this: hence the divine artist terminates the shield of Achilles with a circular stripe, representing "the mighty strength of the river *Ocean*," and all the epithets which the poet applies to it are such as belong exclusively to a river. Homer describes all the other rivers, all springs and wells, and the salt main itself, as issuing from the ocean stream, which might be supposed to feed them by subterraneous channels. Still it is very difficult to form a clear conception of this river, or to say how the poet supposed it to be bounded. Ulysses passes into it from the western sea; but whether the point at which he enters is a mouth or opening, or the two waters are only separated by an invisible line, admits of much doubt. On the farther side however is land: but a land of darkness, which the sun cannot pierce, a land of Cimmerians, the realm of Hades, inhabited by the shades of the departed, and by the family of dreams. As to the other dimensions of the earth, the poet affords us no information, and it would be difficult to decide whether a cylinder or a cone approaches nearest to the figure which he may have assigned to it: and as little does he intimate in what manner

he conceives it to be supported. But within it was hollowed another vast receptacle for departed spirits, perhaps the proper abode of Hades. Beneath this, and as far below the earth as heaven was above it, lay the still more murky pit of Tartarus, secured by its iron gates and brazen floor, the dungeon reserved by Jupiter for his implacable enemies.

Some of the epithets which Homer applies to the heaven, seem to imply that he considered it as a solid vault of metal. But it is not necessary to construe these epithets so literally, nor to draw any such inference from his description of Atlas, who "holds the lofty pillars which keep earth and heaven asunder." Yet it would seem, from the manner in which the height of heaven is compared with the depth of Tartarus, that the region of light was thought to have certain bounds. The summit of the Thessalian Olympus was regarded as the highest point on the earth, and it is not always carefully distinguished from the acrian regions above. The idea of a seat of the gods, — perhaps derived from a more ancient tradition, in which it was not attached to any geographical site, — seems to be indistinctly blended in the poet's mind with that of a real mountain. Hence Hephæstus, when hurled from the threshold of Jupiter's palace, falls "from morn to noon, from noon to dewy eve," before he drops on Lemnos; and Jupiter speaks of suspending the earth by a chain from the top of Olympus.

NAVIGATION AND ASTRONOMY

A wider compass of geographical knowledge, and more enlarged views of nature, would scarcely have been consistent with the state of navigation and commerce which the Homeric poems represent. The poet expresses the common feelings of an age when the voyages of the Greeks were mostly confined to the *Ægean*. The vessels of the heroes, and probably of the poet's contemporaries, were slender half-decked boats: according to the calculation of Thucydides, who seems to suspect exaggeration, the largest contained one hundred and twenty men, the greatest number of rowers mentioned in the catalogue: but we find twenty rowers spoken of as a usual complement of a good ship. The mast was movable, and was only hoisted to take advantage of a fair wind, and at the end of a day's voyage was again deposited in its appropriate receptacle. In the day-time, the Greek mariner commonly followed the windings of the coasts, or shot across from headland to headland, or from isle to isle: at night his vessel was usually put into port, or hauled up on the beach; for though on clear nights he might prosecute his voyage as well as by day, yet should the sky be overcast his course was inevitably lost. Engagements at sea are never mentioned by Homer, though he so frequently alludes to piratical excursions. They were probably of rare occurrence: but as they must sometimes have been inevitable, the galleys were provided with long poles for such occasions. The approach of winter put a stop to all ordinary navigation. Hesiod fixes the time for laying up the merchant ship, covering it with stones, taking out the rigging, and hanging the rudder up by the fire. According to him, the fair season lasts only fifty days: some indeed venture earlier to sea, but a prudent man will not then trust his substance to the waves.

The practical astronomy of the early Greeks consisted of a few observations on the heavenly bodies, the appearances of which were most conspicuously connected with the common occupations of life. The succession of light and darkness, the recurring phases of the moon, and the vicissitude of the

seasons, presented three regular periods of time, which, though all equally forced on the attention, were not all marked with equal distinctness by sensible limits. From the first, and down to the age of Solon, the Greeks seem to have measured their months in the natural way, by the interval between one appearance of the new moon and the next. Hence, their months were of unequal duration; yet they might be described in round numbers as consisting of thirty days. It was soon observed that the revolutions of the moon were far from affording an exact measure of the apparent annual revolution of the sun, and that if this were taken to be equal to twelve of the former, the seasons would pass in succession through all the months of the year. This in itself would have been no evil, and would have occasioned no disturbance in the business of life. Seen under the Greek sky, the stars were scarcely less conspicuous objects than the moon itself: some of the most striking groups were early observed and named, and served, by their risings and settings, to regulate the labours of the husbandman and the adventures of the seaman.

COMMERCE AND THE ARTS

Commerce appears in Homer's descriptions to be familiar enough to the Greeks of the heroic age, but not to be held in great esteem. Yet in the *Odyssey* we find the goddess, who assumes the person of a Taphian chief, professing that she is on her way to Temesa with a cargo of iron to be exchanged for copper: and in the *Iliad*, Jason's son, the prince of Lemnos, appears to carry on an active traffic with the Greeks before Troy. He sends a number of ships freighted with wine, for which the purchasers pay, some in copper, some in iron, some in hides, some in cattle, some in slaves. Of the use of money the poet gives no hint, either in this description or elsewhere. He speaks of the precious metals only as commodities, the value of which was in all cases determined by weight. The *Odyssey* represents Phœnician traders as regularly frequenting the Greek ports; but as Phœnician slaves are sometimes brought to Greece, so the Phœnicians do not scruple, even where they are received as friendly merchants, to carry away Greek children into slavery.

The general impression which the Homeric pictures of society leave on the reader is, that many of the useful arts,—that is, those subservient to the animal wants or enjoyments of life,—had already reached such a stage of refinement as enabled the affluent to live, not merely in rude plenty, but in a considerable degree of luxury and splendour. The dwellings, furniture, clothing, armour, and other such property of the chiefs, are commonly described as magnificent, costly, and elegant, both as to the materials and workmanship. We are struck, not only by the apparent profusion of the precious metals and other rare and dazzling objects in the houses of the great, but by the skill and ingenuity which seem to be exerted in working them up into convenient and graceful forms. Great caution, however, is evidently necessary in drawing inferences from these descriptions as to the state of the arts in the heroic ages. The poet has treasures at his disposal which, as they cost him nothing, he may scatter with an unsparing hand. The shield made by Hephæstus for Achilles cannot be considered as a specimen of the progress of art, since it is not only the work of a god, but is fabricated on an extraordinary occasion, to excite the admiration of men. It is clear that the poet attributes a superiority to several Eastern nations, more

especially to the Phœnicians, not only in wealth, but in knowledge and skill, that, compared with their progress, the arts of Greece seem to be in their infancy. The description of a Phœnician vessel, which comes to a Greek island freighted with trinkets, and of the manner in which a lady of the highest rank, and her servants, handle and gaze on one of the foreign ornaments, present the image of such a commerce as Europeans carry on with the islanders of the South Sea. It looks as if articles of this kind, at least, were eagerly coveted, and that there were no means of procuring them at home.

It is possible that Homer's pictures of the heroic style of living may be too highly coloured, but there is reason to believe that they were drawn from the life. He may have been somewhat too lavish of the precious metals; but some of the others, particularly copper, were perhaps more abundant than in later times; beside copper and iron, we find steel and tin, which the Phœnicians appear already to have brought from the west of Europe, frequently mentioned. There can be no doubt that the industry of the Greeks had long been employed on these materials. We may therefore readily believe that, even in the heroic times, the works of Greek artisans already bore the stamp of the national genius. In some important points, the truth of Homer's descriptions has been confirmed by monuments, brought to light within our own memory, of an architecture which was most probably contemporary with the events which he celebrated. The remains of Mycenæ and other ancient cities seem sufficiently to attest the fidelity with which he has represented the general character of that magnificence which the heroic chieftains loved to display. On the other hand, the same poems afford several strong indications that, though in the age which they describe such arts were, perhaps, rapidly advancing, they cannot then have been so long familiar to the Greeks as to be very commonly practised; and that a skilful artificer was rarely found, and was consequently viewed with great admiration, and occupied a high rank in society. Thus, the craft of the carpenter appears to be exceedingly honourable. He is classed with the soothsayer, the physician, and the bard, and like them is frequently sent for from a distance. The son of a person eminent in this craft is not mixed with the crowd on the field of battle, but comes forward among the most distinguished warriors. And as in itself it seems to confer a sort of nobility, so it is practised by the most illustrious chiefs. Ulysses is represented as a very skilful carpenter. He not only builds the boat in which he leaves the island of Calypso, but in his own palace carves a singular bedstead out of the trunk of a tree, which he inlays with gold, silver, and ivory. Another chief, Epeus, was celebrated as the builder of the wooden horse in which the heroes were concealed at the taking of Troy. The goddess Athene was held to preside over this, as over all manual arts, and to favour those who excelled in it with her inspiring counsels.

The chances of war give occasion, as might be expected, for frequent allusions to the healing art. The Greek army contains two chiefs who have inherited consummate skill in this art from their father Æsculapius; and Achilles has been so well instructed in it by Chiron, that Patroclus, to whom he has imparted his knowledge, is able to supply their place. But the processes described in this and other cases show that these might often be the least danger from the treatment of the most unpractised hands. The operation of extracting a weapon from the wound, with a knife, seems not to have been considered as one which demanded peculiar skill; the science of the physician was chiefly displayed in the application of medicinal herbs, by

which he stanchd the blood, and eased the pain. When Ulysses has been gored by a wild boar, his friends first bind up the hurt, and then use a charm for stopping the flow of blood. The healing art, such as it was, was frequently and successfully practised by the women.


We have already seen that several of the arts which originally ministered only to physical wants, had been so far refined before the time of Homer, that their productions gratified the sense of beauty, and served for ornament as well as for use. Hence our curiosity is awakened to inquire to what extent those arts, which became in later times the highest glory of Greece, in which she yet stands unrivalled, were cultivated in the same period. Unfortunately, the information which the poet affords on this subject is so scanty and obscure, as to leave room on many points for a wide difference of opinion. If we begin with his own art, of which his own poetry is the most ancient specimen extant, we find several hints of its earlier condition. It was held in the highest honour among the heroes. The bard is one of those persons whom men send for to very distant parts; his presence is welcome at every feast; it seems as if one was attached to the service of every great family, and treated with an almost religious respect; Agamemnon, when he sets out on the expedition to Troy, reposes the most important of all trusts in the bard whom he leaves at home. It would even seem as if poetry and music were thought fit to form part of a princely education; for Achilles is found amusing himself with singing, while he touches the same instrument with which the bards constantly accompany their strains. The general character of this heroic poetry is also distinctly marked; it is of the narrative kind, and its subjects are drawn from the exploits or adventures of renowned men. Each song is described as a short extemporaneous effusion, but yet seems to have been rounded into a little whole, such as to satisfy the hearer's immediate curiosity.

The Graphic Arts

An interesting and difficult question presents itself, as to the degree in which Homer and his contemporaries were conversant with the imitative arts, and particularly with representations of the human form. We find such representations, on a small scale, frequently described. The garment woven by Helen contained a number of battle scenes; as one presented by Penelope to Ulysses was embroidered with a picture of a chase, wrought with gold threads. The shield of Achilles was divided into compartments exhibiting many complicated groups of figures: and though this was a masterpiece of Hephæstus, it would lead us to believe that the poet must have seen many less elaborate and difficult works of a like nature. But throughout the Homeric poems there occurs only one distinct allusion to a statue, as a work of human art. The robe which the Trojan queen offers to Athene in her temple, is placed by the priestess on the knees of the goddess, who was therefore represented in a sitting posture. Even this, it may be said, proves nothing as to the Greeks. They can only be admitted as additional indications that the poet was not a stranger to such objects.

To pictures, or the art of painting, properly so called, the poet makes no allusion, though he speaks of the colouring of ivory, as an art in which the Carian and Mæonian women excelled. It must, however, be considered that there is only one passage in which he expressly mentions any kind of delineation, and there in a very obscure manner, though he has described so many works which imply a previous design.^c

THE ART OF WAR



PAVEMENT OF SOUTHWEST RAMPARTS OF
THE WALLS OF TROY

The art of war is among the arts of necessity, which all people, the rudest equally and the most polished, must cultivate, or ruin will follow the neglect. The circumstances of Greece were in some respects peculiarly favourable to the improvement of this art. Divided into little states, the capital of each, with the greater part of the territory, generally within a day's march of several neighbouring states which might be enemies and seldom were thoroughly to be trusted as friends, while from the establishment of slavery arose everywhere perpetual danger of a domestic foe, it was of peculiar necessity both for every individual to be a soldier, and for the community to pay unremitting attention to military affairs. Accordingly we find that so early as Homer's time the Greeks had improved considerably upon that tumultuary warfare alone known to many barbarous nations, who yet have prided themselves in the practice of war for successive centuries. Several terms used by the poet, together with his descriptions of marches, indicate that orders of battle were in his time regularly formed in rank and file. Steadiness in the soldier, that foundation of all those powers which distinguish an army from a mob, and which to this day forms the high-

est praise of the best troops, we find in great perfection in the *Iliad*. "The Grecian phalanges," says the poet, "marched in close order, the leaders directing each his own band. The rest were mute: insomuch that you would say in so great a multitude there was no voice. Such was the silence with which they respectfully watched for the word of command from their officers."

Considering the deficiency of iron, the Grecian troops appear to have been very well armed both for offence and defence. Their defensive armour consisted of a helmet, a breastplate, and greaves, all of brass, and a shield, commonly of bull's hide, but often strengthened with brass. The breastplate appears to have met the belt, which was a considerable defence to the belly and groin, and with an appendant skirt guarded also the thighs. All together covered the forepart of the soldier from the throat to the ankle; and the shield was a superadded protection for every part. The bulk of the Grecian troops were infantry thus heavily armed, and formed in close order many ranks deep. Any body formed in ranks and files, close and deep, without regard to a specific number of either ranks or files, was generally termed a phalanx. But the Locrians, under Oilean Ajax, were all light-armed: bows were their principal weapons; and they never engaged in close fight.

Riding on horseback was yet little practised, though it appears to have been not unknown. Some centuries, however, passed before it was generally applied in Greece to military purposes; the mountainous ruggedness of the

country preventing any extensive use of cavalry, except among the Thesalians, whose territory was a large plain. But in the Homeric armies no chief was without his chariot, drawn generally by two, sometimes by three horses; and these chariots of war make a principal figure in Homer's battles. Nestor, forming the army for action, composes the first line of chariots only. In the second he places that part of the infantry in which he has least confidence; and then forms a third line, or reserve, of the most approved troops. It seems extraordinary that chariots should have been so extensively used in war as we find they were in the early ages. In the wide plains of Asia, indeed, we may account for their introduction, as we may give them credit for utility: but how they should become so general among the inhabitants of rocky, mountainous Greece, how the distant Britons should arrive at that surprising perfection in the use of them which they possessed when the Roman legions first invaded this island, especially as the same mode of fighting was little if at all practised among the Gauls and Germans, is less obvious to conjecture.

The combat of the chiefs, so repeatedly described by Homer, advancing to engage singly in front of their line of battle, is apt to strike a modern reader with an appearance of absurdity perhaps much beyond the reality. Before the use of fire-arms, that practice was not uncommon when the art of war was at its greatest perfection. In Caesar's *Commentaries* we have a very particular account of an advanced combat, in which, not generals indeed, but two centurions of his army engaged. The Grecian chiefs of the heroic age, like the knights of the times of chivalry, had armour apparently very superior to that of the common soldiers; which, with the skill acquired by assiduous practice amid unbounded leisure, might enable them to obviate much of the seeming danger of such skirmishes. Nor might the effect be unimportant. Like the sharp-shooters of modern days, a few men of superior strength, activity, and skill, superior also by the excellence of their defensive armour, might prepare a victory by creating disorder in the close array of the enemy's phalanx. They threw their weighty javelins from a distance, while none dared advance to meet them but chiefs equally well-armed with themselves: and from the soldiers in the ranks they had little to fear; because, in that close order, the dart could not be thrown with any advantage. Occasionally, indeed, we find some person of inferior name advancing to throw his javelin at a chief occupied against some other, but retreating again immediately into the ranks: a resource not disdained by the greatest heroes when danger pressed. Hector himself, having thrown his javelin ineffectually at Ajax, retires toward his phalanx, but is overtaken by a stone of enormous weight, which brings him to the ground. If from the death or wounds of chiefs, or slaughter in the foremost rank of soldiers, any confusion arose in the phalanx, the shock of the enemy's phalanx, advancing in perfect order, must be irresistible.

Another practice common in Homer's time is by no means equally defensible, but on the contrary marks great barbarism; that of stopping in the heat of action to strip the slain. Often this paltry passion for possessing the spoil of the enemy superseded all other, even the most important and most deeply interesting objects of battle. The poet himself was not unaware of the danger and inconveniency of the practice, and seems even to have aimed at a reformation of it. We find indeed in Homer's warfare a remarkable mixture of barbarism with regularity. Though the art of forming an army in phalanx was known and commonly practised, yet the business of a general, in directing its operations, was lost in the passion, or we may call it fashion,

of the great men to signalise themselves by acts of personal courage and skill in arms. Achilles and Hector, the first heroes of the *Iliad*, excel only in the character of fighting soldiers: as generals and directors of the war, they are inferior to many. Excepting indeed in the single circumstance of forming the army in order of battle, so far from the general, we scarcely ever discover even the officer among Homer's heroes. It is not till most of the principal Grecian leaders are disabled for the duty of soldiers that at length they so far take upon themselves that of officers as to endeavour to restore order among their broken phalanges.

We might, however, yet more wonder at another deficiency in Homer's art of war, were it not still universal throughout those rich and populous countries where mankind was first civilised. Even among the Turks, who, far as they have spread over the finest part of Europe, retain pertinaciously every defect of their ancient Asiatic customs, the easy and apparently obvious precaution of posting and relieving sentries, so essential to the safety of armies, has never obtained. When, in the ill turn of the Grecian affairs, constant readiness for defence became more especially necessary, it is mentioned as an instance of soldiership in the active Diomedes, that he slept on his arms without his tent: but no kind of watch was kept; all his men were at the same time asleep around him: and the other leaders were yet less prepared against surprise. A guard indeed selected from the army was set, in the manner of a modern grand-guard or out-post; but though commanded by two officers high both in rank and reputation, yet the commander-in-chief expresses his fear that, overcome with fatigue, the whole might fall asleep and totally forget their duty. The Trojans, who at the same time, after their success, slept on the field of battle, had no guard appointed by authority, but depended wholly upon the interest which every one had in preventing a surprise; "They exhorted one another to be watchful," says the poet. But the allies all slept; and he subjoins the reason, "For they had no children or wives at hand." However, though Homer does not expressly blame the defect, or propose a remedy, yet he gives, in the surprise of Rhesus, an instance of the disasters to which armies are exposed by intermission of watching, that might admonish his fellow-countrymen to improve their practice.

The Greeks, and equally the Trojans and their allies, encamped with great regularity; and fortified, if in danger of an attack from a superior enemy. Indeed Homer ascribes no superiority in the art of war, or even in personal courage, to his fellow-countrymen. Even those inland Asiatics, afterwards so unwarlike, are put by him upon a level with the bravest people. Tents, like those now in use, seem to have been a late invention. The ancients, on desultory expeditions, and in marching through a country, slept with no shelter but their cloaks; as our light troops often carry none but a blanket — a practice which Bonaparte extended to his whole army, thereby providing a speedy and miserable death for thousands in his retreat from Russia. When the ancients remained long on a spot they huddled. Achilles' tent or hut was built of fir, and thatched with reeds; and it seems to have had several apartments.^b

TREATMENT OF ORPHANS, CRIMINALS, AND SLAVES

There are two special veins of estimable sentiment, on which it may be interesting to contrast heroic and historical Greece, and which exhibit the latter as an improvement on the former, not less in the affections than in the intellect.

The law of Athens was peculiarly watchful and provident with respect both to the persons and the property of orphan minors; but the description given in the *Iliad* of the utter and hopeless destitution of the orphan boy, despoiled of his paternal inheritance and abandoned by all the friends of his father, whom he urgently supplicates, and who all harshly cast him off, is one of the most pathetic morsels in the whole poem. In reference again to the treatment of the dead body of an enemy, we find all the Greek chiefs who come near (not to mention the conduct of Achilles himself) piercing with their spears the corpse of the slain Hector, while some of them even pass disgusting taunts upon it. We may add, from the lost epics, the mutilation of the dead bodies of Paris and Deiphobus by the hand of Menekaus. But at the time of the Persian invasion, it was regarded as unworthy of a right-minded Greek to maltreat in any way the dead body of an enemy, even where such a deed might seem to be justified on the plea of retaliation.

The different manner of dealing with homicide presents a third test, perhaps more striking yet, of the change in Grecian feelings and manners during the three centuries preceding the Persian invasion. That which the murderer in the Homeric times had to dread, was, not public prosecution and punishment, but the personal vengeance of the kinsmen and friends of the deceased, who were stimulated by the keenest impulses of honour and obligation to avenge the deed, and were considered by the public as specially privileged to do so. To escape from this danger, he is obliged to flee the country, unless he can prevail upon the incensed kinsmen to accept of a valuable payment (we must not speak of coined money, in the days of Homer) as satisfaction for their slain comrade. They may, if they please, decline the offer, and persist in their right of revenge; but if they accept, they are bound to leave the offender unmolested, and he accordingly remains at home without further consequences. The chiefs in agora do not seem to interfere, except to insure payment of the stipulated sum.

In historical Athens, this right of private revenge was discountenanced and put out of sight, even so early as the Draconian legislation, and at last restricted to a few extreme and special cases; while the murderer came to be considered, first as having sinned against the gods, next as having deeply injured the society, and thus at once as requiring absolution and deserving punishment. On the first of these two grounds, he is interdicted from the agora and from all holy places, as well as from public functions, even while yet untried and simply a suspected person; for if this were not done, the wrath of the gods would manifest itself in bad crops and other national calamities. On the second ground, he is tried before the council of Areopagus, and if found guilty, is condemned to death, or perhaps to disfranchisement and banishment. The idea of a propitiatory payment to the relatives of the deceased has ceased altogether to be admitted: it is the protection of society which dictates, and the force of society which inflicts, a measure of punishment calculated to deter for the future.

The society of legendary Greece includes, besides the chiefs, the general mass of freemen (*λαοί*), among whom stand out by special names certain professional men, such as the carpenter, the smith, the leather-dresser, the leech, the prophet, the bard, and the fisherman. We have no means of appreciating their condition. Though lots of arable land were assigned in special property to individuals, with boundaries both carefully marked and jealously watched, yet the larger proportion of surface was devoted to pasture. Cattle formed both the chief item in the substance of a wealthy man, the chief means of making payments, and the common ground of quarrels — bread and meat, in

large quantities, being the constant food of every one. The estates of the owners were tilled, and their cattle tended, mostly by bought slaves, but to a certain degree also by poor freemen called *thetes*, working for hire and for stated periods. The principal slaves, who were entrusted with the care of large herds of oxen, swine, or goats, were of necessity men worthy of confidence, their duties placing them away from their master's immediate eye. They had other slaves subordinate to them, and appear to have been well-treated : the deep and unshaken attachment of Eumæus the swineherd and Philætius the neatherd to the family and affairs of the absent Ulysses, is among the most interesting points in the ancient epic. Slavery was a calamity, which in that period of insecurity might befall any one : the chief who conducted a freebooting expedition, if he succeeded, brought back with him a numerous troop of slaves, as many as he could seize — if he failed, became very likely a slave himself : so that the slave was often by birth of equal dignity with his master — Eumæus was himself the son of a chief, conveyed away when a child by his nurse, and sold by Phœnician kidnappers to Laertes. A slave of this character, if he conducted himself well, might often expect to be enfranchised by his master and placed in an independent holding.

On the whole, the slavery of legendary Greece does not present itself as existing under a peculiarly harsh form, especially if we consider that all the classes of society were then very much upon a level in point of taste, sentiment, and instruction. In the absence of legal security or an effective social sanction, it is probable that the condition of a slave under an average master, may have been as good as that of the free Thete. The class of slaves whose lot appears to have been the most pitiable were the females — more numerous than the males, and performing the principal work in the interior of the house. Not only do they seem to have been more harshly treated than the males, but they were charged with the hardest and most exhausting labour which the establishment of a Greek chief required ; they brought in water from the spring, and turned by hand the house-mills, which ground the large quantity of flour consumed in his family. This oppressive task was performed generally by female slaves, in historical as well as in legendary Greece. Spinning and weaving was the constant occupation of women, whether free or slave, of every rank and station ; all the garments worn both by men and women were fashioned at home, and Helen as well as Penelope is expert and assiduous at the occupation. The daughters of Celeus at Eleusis go to the well with their basins for water, and Nausicaa, daughter of Alcinous, joins her female slaves in the business of washing her garments in the river. If we are obliged to point out the fierceness and insecurity of an early society, we may at the same time note with pleasure its characteristic simplicity of manners : Rebecca, Rachel, and the daughters of Jethro, in the early Mosaic narrative, as well as the wife of the native Macedonian chief (with whom the Temenid Perdiccas, ancestor of Philip and Alexander, first took service on retiring from Argos), baking her own cakes on the hearth, exhibit a parallel in this respect to the Homeric pictures.

We obtain no particulars respecting either the common freemen generally, or the particular class of them called *thetes*. These latter, engaged for special jobs, or at the harvest and other busy seasons of field labour, seem to have given their labour in exchange for board and clothing : they are mentioned in the same line with the slaves, and were (as has been just observed) probably on the whole little better off. The condition of a poor free-man in those days, without a lot of land of his own, going about from one temporary job to another, and having no powerful family and no social

authority to look up to for protection, must have been sufficiently miserable. When Eumæus indulged his expectation of being manumitted by his masters, he thought at the same time that they would give him a wife, a house, and a lot of land near to themselves; without which collateral advantages simple manumission might perhaps have been no improvement in his condition. To be *thete* in the service of a very poor farmer is selected by Achilles as the maximum of human hardship.^b

MANNERS AND CUSTOMS

The Trojan war gives a great shock to Greece and hurls it for the first time against Asia. Herodotus saw very well in this war, still mixed with fables, but certain in its principal events and in its issue, the first act of this long struggle between Greece and Asia, which will have for end the expedition of Alexander.


The Eastern armies are richer, the habits more slack, the spirit less active and less enterprising. Greece already lived its own life, it was conscious of itself and practised in its own centre that military and intellectual activity of which the Trojan War was the first development.


Marriage is no longer, as in the East, a sale, where the woman is considered as a thing; an exchange of presents between the two families seems to indicate a certain equality between the husband and wife. The legitimate wife, in this society where the scourge of polygamy has not passed, has a dignity and influence unknown in Greece. Penelope is the companion of Ulysses. The nobleness of her sorrow, her authority, are signs of the new destiny of women. The wife of Alcinoüs rules the domestic affairs. Helen herself, after her return to family life, will come and sit down, free and respected by the hearth of her spouse. Lastly, Andromache is the true companion of Hector, and seems worthy of sharing in all his fortune. But the woman is still far from being the equal of man. Favourite slaves frequently take from her her influence, and slavery, which the chances of war can bring down on the noblest, vilifies her at every instant. That tripod, given to a victor in a contest, is worth twelve oxen. We see the princes Iphitus and Ulysses, labourers and shepherds, Anclises, who is shepherd and hunter. The shield of Achilles shows us a king harvesting. Neleus gives his daughter in marriage for a flock; Andromache herself takes care of Hector's horses; and Nausicaa, at a later and more civilised period than the *Odyssey*, is depicted to us washing the linen of the royal family.

The guest almost makes part of the family; it is the gods who send him, a touching and wholesome belief in that time of brigandage and of difficult communications. You are going to spurn this guest; take care! perhaps it is Jupiter himself. How many times have the gods not come thus to try mortals? Also hospitality formed a sacred link which united, in the most distant tribes, those who had received it to those who had given it. This gave rise to duties of gratitude and friendship that nothing could efface, and which kept their sway even to the encounters on the battle-field. Glaucus and Diomedes met in the midst of the conflict and exchanged weapons, which they would have a horror of staining with the blood of a guest. It is not in vain that Hercules and Theseus travelled over Greece, punishing the violators of hospitality. There were no castes in the Grecian society, but slavery from the most ancient times, with the right of life and death for sanction. War was the most ordinary cause of servitude. The enemy spared became

the slave of the victor ; it is thus that Briseis fell to the power of Achilles. There was no town taken without slaves, and the inhabitants formed part of the booty. Hector predicted slavery for his wife and his sons, and depicts Andromache as fetching water from the fountain, and spinning wool in the house of a Greek. The carrying off of children by pirates, who made a regular trade of them, already maintained slavery ; it is thus that Eumæus was sold at Ithaca. This custom of taking away children from the inhabitants of the coasts, lasted as long as the ancient world. The Greek comedy, and after it Roman comedy, made of this carrying off the most ordinary source of their intrigues. But if servitude was already rooted in Greek civilisation, it was at least then singularly softened by the simplicity of the customs, and above all by the rural and agricultural life, which brought together in common works master and slave.

Poetry was already a fashion in these rising societies, and in the middle of these hard wars the pleasures of the mind had their place. The warriors, seated in circles, listened with an eagerness, full of patience, to the interminable recitals of the *ædes* or singers. Competitions of music and religious poetry are already instituted in the small towns, which call the rising art to their ceremonies. These poetries were sung with the accompaniment of the lyre, and there was no king who had not his singer. Agamemnon treated his with honour, and in leaving, entrusted to him his wife and his treasures. This religious and heroic poetry preceded Homer, who found established rules and fixed types. As to the beauty of this primitive poetry, it must be judged by the immortal creations of its most illustrious representative. Certainly there were not many Homers, but he was not the only poet, and the imposing simplicity of his poetry could not be a unique fact in this age of chanted legends. Art and sciences were in infancy, but the curiosity and admiration that the poets testify for the still imperfect work of the artists, and for the fabulous tales of travellers, remind us that we see at its beginning the most industrious and the most inventive race of antiquity.ⁱ





CHAPTER IV. THE TRANSITION TO SECURE HISTORY

BELOCH'S VIEW OF THE CONVENTIONAL PRIMITIVE HISTORY¹

THE singers of the epic poems as well as their hearers were as yet wholly unconscious of the gap separating mythology from history. To them the Trojan War, the march of the Seven against Thebes, the wanderings of Ulysses and Menelaus, were historical realities and they believed just as firmly that Achilles, Diomedes, Agamemnon, and all the other heroes once really lived, as the Swiss until recently believed in the reality of their Tell and Winkelried. Indeed until the fourth century hardly any one in Greece dared to question the truth of these things. Even so critical a person as Thucydides is still wholly under the influence of epic tradition, so much so that he gives a statistical report of the strength of Agamemnon's army and tries to answer the question as to how such masses of people could have been supported during the ten years' siege of Troy.

But the world which the epic described belonged to an immeasurably distant past. The people of that time were much stronger than those "who live to-day"; the gods still used to descend upon the earth and did not consider it beneath them to generate sons with mortal women. In comparison with that great by-gone age, the present and that which oral tradition told of the immediate past seemed wholly without interest; and if the epic did occasionally seize upon historical recollections, the events were put back into the heroic age and became inseparably mingled with mythical occurrences. As to how the present had grown out of this heroic past, the poets and their contemporaries had not yet begun to ask.

The time came, however, when this question was put. People wanted to know why the Greece of historical times looked so different from Homer's Greece; why for example Homer knows of no Thessaly; why he has Achæans instead of Dorians living in Argolis; why, according to him, descendants of Pelops instead of those of Hercules sit upon the thrones of Argos and Sparta.

[¹ Reproduced by permission from his *Griechische Geschichte*. The subject here treated is one on which the authorities are by no means agreed. Other views are presented in a subsequent chapter.]

It is the first awakening of the historical sense which finds expression in such questions. The answer, however, was already given with the question. It was clear that the Grecian tribes must have changed their abodes to a great extent after the Trojan War; Hellas must have been shaken by a real migration of peoples. But this single fact was not sufficient. People wanted to know the impelling cause of the migrations, and the particular circumstances under which they took place. The answer was not difficult for a people endowed with such a facility for speculation.

The very lack of colour in such accounts would be a sufficient proof for the fact that we are not dealing here with pure speculation, not with real tradition. Thus hardly anything more is told of the immigration of the Thessalians into the river basin of the Peneus beyond the bald fact, and that was sufficient to explain why Homer's "Pelasgian Argos" was called Thessaly in historic times. Of course the incomers must have had a leader, consequently Thessalus, the eponymic hero of the people, was placed at their head, a point in the story which of itself is sufficient to stamp the whole narrative as a late invention. The Thessalians also must have come from somewhere; but since Homer already places the races south of Thermopylæ in the homes they actually occupied in history, and since they could not make a Grecian tribe immigrate from Thrace or Illyria, there was nothing else to do but to place the original home of the conquerors in Epirus. This was all the more plausible as the name Thessaly is really closely connected with Thessalotis, the region about Pharsalia and Cierium on the borders of Epirus, and first spread from here to other parts of the country.

Even more characteristic perhaps is the account of the migration of the Bœotians. According to Homer, Cadmeans lived in Thebes, Minyæ in Orchomenos. Hence it followed that the Bœotians must have immigrated after the Trojan War, like the Thessalians. But a great many Thessalian names of places and religious practices occur in Bœotia. Hence nothing was more simple than to make the Bœotians immigrate from Thessaly, thus at the same time explaining what had become of the original inhabitants of Thessaly after the influx of Thessalians. To be sure this original population, as represented by the serfs (*penestai*) of the Thessalian nobles, presented a very different appearance; still these two views could very well be combined: one needed only to suppose that one part of the former population of the region had fallen into bondage, and that the other had emigrated. Moreover, Homer already mentions Bœotians in the region which they occupied in historic times. That made the further supposition necessary that a part of the people had already settled in Bœotia before the Trojan War; or else the opposite hypothesis was made, that the Bœotians had been driven out of Bœotia after the Trojan War by the Pelasgians and Thracians, and had returned thither after several generations. We see plainly from this example how all such suppositions were dependent on the epic poems.

The migration of the Eleans is a similar case. Elis is an old district name, consequently no Eleans can ever have existed outside of Elis. But Homer mentions the Epeans as being inhabitants of the country; consequently it was stated that the Eleans did not enter the Peloponnesus until after the Trojan War, and that they came from Ætolia, where Oxylus, the mythical ancestor of the Elean royal house, was also worshipped as a hero. According to an opposite version Ætolia was settled by emigrants from Elis; and these two views were then combined, and the Eleans were made first to move to Ætolia and then, after ten generations, to move back again. As a matter of fact the Homeric Epeans are nothing else than the inhabitants of Epea in Triphylia,

[ca. 1200-800 B.C.]

whose name was extended to include the inhabitants of the surrounding districts, like the name of the neighbouring Pylians, since the knowledge of the Ionic rhapsodists concerning the western part of the Peloponnesus is very scanty.

Further, since Homer knows of no Dorians in the Peloponnesus, it was clear that the peoples inhabiting Argolis and Laconia in historic times could have come in only after the Trojan War; it remained only to discover from whence. This was not difficult; there was in the middle part of Greece, between Ceta and Parnassus, a small mountainous district whose inhabitants were called Dorians, quite like the Grecian colonists on the Carian coast. This is not at all remarkable, since in a widely extended linguistic territory the same local names must necessarily recur in different places, as may be seen from any topographical dictionary. Such homonyms by no means prove an especially close relationship between the inhabitants of such localities; in the formation of Greek racial tradition, however, they have played an important part.

The home of the Dorians was in this way established. People now wanted to know the reason which had led them to seek new abodes so far away. In close connection with this was the question as to how the descendants of Hercules had come to reign over Argos, Sparta, and Messene. The answer was given by the tradition of the return of the Heraclidæ. Hercules, it was related, had belonged to the royal family of Argos, but had been robbed of his rights to the throne and had died in exile; his sons, or grandsons as was stated later for chronological reasons, had made good their rights with the aid of the Dorians and had also established the claims which Hercules had to dominion over Laconia and Messenia. The regained lands were divided under the three brothers Temenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus, or between the twin sons of the latter, Procles and Eurysthenes. This was a tradition which could be put to admirable political use. Supported by this title, Argos could claim the hegemony over the whole of Argolis; Sparta could justify the subjection of the small cities of Laconia and Messenia. That was why this tradition, once come into existence, was quickly circulated and officially recognised.

But the mention of Messenia shows that we are here dealing with a comparatively recent stage in the growth of tradition, since this region could not be claimed as a heritage by the Heraclidæ until after the Spartan conquest between the eighth and seventh centuries.

Also the eponymi of the Spartan royal dynasties of Agis and Eurypon have no place in the tradition of the Doric migrations; a sure sign that they were first connected with Hercules artificially. And Temenus, from whom the Argive kings traced their descent, was, according to the Arcadian myth, —no doubt taken from Argos, —the son of Pelasgus, of Phegeus, or of the Argolian hero Phoroneus. It was also related that Temenus had been brought up by Hera — the goddess of the Argolian land. He was thus an old Argive hero who originally had nothing whatever to do with Hercules. Just as little was known about the Doric migration on the island of Cos at the time when the genealogy of its ruling dynasty was written, since the latter is not traced back to Temenus, but directly to Hercules through his son Thessalus. And anyway Hercules, as we have seen, is not a "Doric" divinity at all, but a Bœotian, whose cult was extended to the neighbouring countries of Bœotia, only after the colonisation of Asia Minor. The tradition concerning the return of the Heraclidæ is thus seen to have come into existence long after the immigration of the Dorians into the Peloponnesus,

with which it is inseparably connected. This tradition is first mentioned by Tyrtæus towards the end of the seventh century and in the epic poem *Ægimios*, ascribed to Hesiod, which may have been written at the same time, or a little later. That was the period when the Homeric poems became popular in European Greece; both Tyrtæus and Hesiod are wholly under their influence. Moreover it is clear that an immigration of Dorians from middle Greece into the Peloponnesus could be talked of only after the Doric name had been carried from the colonies of Asia Minor to the west coast of the Ægean Sea, which did not happen until post-Homeric times. In the same way the legend of the Thessalian migration could have grown up only after the inhabitants of the Peneus river basin had become conscious of their racial unity and had begun to designate themselves by the common name of Thessalians. This must have taken place early in the eighth or seventh centuries, since, as has already been stated, Homer is not as yet acquainted with this name, whereas the latest part of the *Iliad*, the catalogue of ships, mentions the eponymic hero of the people. Finally, the dependence of all these legendary migrations upon the epic poems is shown by the fact that they are connected only with regions which in Homer had a different population than in historic times. The Arcadians and Athenians, on the other hand, who already in Homer are found in the same districts they occupied in later times, considered themselves autochthonous. Thus we see that Homer had not only given the Greeks their gods, as Herodotus says, but their ancient history also. We, however, do not need to be told that traditions which did not grow up until the eighth or seventh century are entirely worthless as helping to an understanding of conditions in Greece at a time preceding the colonisation of Asia Minor.

After all this the question as to the internal evidence of the truth of these traditions is really superfluous. Even a well-invented myth is yet by no means history. Here, however, we are asked to believe the most improbable things. The Doris on the Ceta is a wild mountain valley, measuring scarcely two hundred square kilometers in area, which could not have contained more than a few thousand inhabitants, since farming and grazing formed their sole means of support. In Homer's time the eastern Locrians were still so lightly armed that they were wholly unfitted for fighting with the hoplites at close range; the Dorians who lived farther inland than these Locrians cannot have been much further advanced several centuries earlier. And a few hundreds or even thousands of such poorly armed soldiers are to have conquered the old highly civilised districts of the Peloponnesus with their numerous strongholds, and the superior armour of their inhabitants? The very idea is an absurdity. No more can we understand why the Dorians should have migrated precisely to Argolis, and Laconia, and even to Messenia — places situated so far from their home. The legend does indeed give a satisfactory answer to this question, but anyone who cannot recognise Hercules, with his sons and grandsons, as historical characters, is obliged to find some other motive for the migration of the Dorians.

In other respects, also, there is absolutely no proof to support the supposition of a migration of peoples upon the Grecian peninsula. The "Mycenæan" civilisation was not, as has been supposed, suddenly destroyed by an incursion of uncivilised tribes, but was gradually merged into the civilisation of the classic period. Even Attica, in connection with which there is no tradition of a migration, had its period of Mycenæan culture. The so-called "Doric" institutions are limited to Crete and Laconia, and in the latter country they are not older than the Spartan conquest in the eighth century;

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hence they have nothing whatever to do with the Doric migration. In the same way the serfdom of the Thessalian peasants may very well have been the result of an economic development, like the colonia during the Roman empire or serfdom in Germany after the end of the Middle Ages. Also the differentiation of the Grecian dialects came about, as we saw, after the colonisation of Asia Minor, and hence should not be traced back to the migrations which took place within the Grecian peninsula at some time preceding this period. And, in any case, after the Dorians settled in the Peloponnesus they must have adopted the dialect of the original inhabitants of the country, who were so far superior to them in numbers and civilisation; just as no one doubts that the Thessalians did the same after their immigration into the Peneus river basin. A "religion of the Doric race," however, exists only in the imagination of modern scholars; Hercules himself, the ancestral god of the Dorians, is of Bæotian origin. Finally, it is extremely doubtful if the Argives and Laconians were any more closely related to each other than to the other Grecian tribes—the so-called Doric Phyleans, at least, have until now been traced only in Argolis and in the Argolian colonies. But even if a closer relationship did exist between the two neighbouring tribes, it would by no means necessarily follow that the Argo-Laonian people first immigrated into the Peloponnesus at a time when the eastern part of the peninsula had already reached a comparatively high grade of civilisation. There is indeed no question but that the Peloponnesus got its Hellenic population from the north, that is directly from middle Greece; and it is very probable that, even after the Peloponnesus was already in the possession of the Greeks, tribal displacements still took place in Greece. But they occurred in so remote a period that they have left no distinguishable trace, even in tradition. If the Greeks of Asia Minor remembered only the bare fact of their immigration, how could a tradition have been maintained of tribal wanderings which took place long before this colonisation? It is an idle task to try to discover the direction of these migrations or the more particular circumstances under which they took place.

Hence it is a picture of the imagination which, since Herodotus,^c has been accepted as primitive Grecian history. But the problem which gave rise to the traditions of mythical migrations still remains for us to solve—the question as to why the epics present us with a different picture of the distribution of Grecian tribes, from that found in historic times. The answer to-day will naturally be different from the one given two thousand years ago.

The epic poem designates Agamemnon's followers, and indeed all the Greeks before Troy, as Argives, Achæans, or Danaans—terms which are used wholly synonymously even in the oldest parts of the *Iliad*. Now we know that not only in Homeric times, but already centuries earlier, before the colonisation of Crete and Asia Minor, Argolis was inhabited by the same people that we find there in historic times. It would not of itself be impossible to suppose that this people, who afterwards had no common tribal name, should have called themselves Achæans or Danaans, in prehistoric times, although it would be difficult to understand how this tribal name could have been lost. But as a matter of fact a tribe called Danaan never did exist. Danaus is an old Argive hero who is said to have transformed the waterless Argos into a well-watered country; his daughters, the Danaïdes, are water nymphs; Danaë also, the mother of the solar hero Perseus, and herself a goddess, cannot be separated from Danaus. The Danaans, accordingly, are the "people of Danaus"; they belong like him to tradition, and have been transposed from heaven to earth like the Cadmeans and Minyæ to

whom we shall return later on. The name Achæan, however, was applied in historic times to the inhabitants of the northern coast of the Peloponnesus and of the south of Thessaly, and it is hardly probable that it should have been more widely spread in historic times. Agamemnon seems rather, according to the oldest tradition, to have been a Thessalian prince, like Achilles, who continued to be regarded as such. At the time, however, when the epic was being formed in Ionia, the Peloponnesian Argos outshone all other parts of the Grecian peninsula, and the poets in consequence were obliged to transpose the governmental seat of the powerful ruler from Thessaly to the Peloponnesus. His Achæans of course migrated with him.

Since, now, in Homer the name Achæan includes all the Grecian tribes under Agamemnon's command, it could no longer be used to designate the inhabitants of one single region. Consequently in the epic the name Achaia is not used for the northern coast of the Peloponnesus, but this region is simply called "coast-land," or Ægialea. This then gave rise to the tradition—if we still call such combinations tradition—that the Achæans who were driven out of Laconia by the Dorians had settled in Ægialea and given their name to the country. Ionians were said to have lived there previously, a theory which was supported by the existence of a sanctuary of the Heli-conian Poseidon on the promontory of Mycale.

Furthermore Homer mentions various peoples upon the Grecian peninsula and the surrounding islands, which in historic times no longer existed there; for example, the Abantes, who appear in the catalogue of ships as inhabitants of Eubœa, whereas in the rest of the *Iliad* they are not localised. It is possible that there has here been a preservation of the old tribal name of the Eubœans, which later must have been lost; but it is also just as possible, and more probable, that the Abantes had originally nothing whatever to do with Eubœa, but that they were the inhabitants of Abæ in Phocis, whose name then, for the sake of some theory, was transferred to the neighbouring island. The Caucones according to the *Telemachus* must have dwelt in the western part of the Peloponnesus, not far from Pylus, whereas the *Iliad* calls them allies of the Trojans; and in reality even in historic times Caucones are said to have been found on the Paphlagonian coast. The name was thus evidently transferred from Asia Minor to the Peloponnesus, for which the river Caucon near Dyme in Achaia may have given a reason. A comparatively late part of the *Iliad* tells of a war between the Curetes and the inhabitants of Calydon in Ætolia. In Hesiod, on the other hand, the Curetes are divine beings, related to the nymphs and satyrs. They appear also as beneficent dæmons in the Cretan folk-lore; they are said to have taught mankind all sorts of useful arts and also to have brought up the infant Zeus. They belong thus to mythology, not to history. They were probably located in Ætolia only because there was a mountain there called Curion; and as a matter of course it was said that they had immigrated from Crete. Since on the Ætolian coast at the foot of the Curion there was a city called Chalcis, they were further transferred to the Eubœan Chalcis.

There are also other cases in pre-Homeric times of mythical people having been transposed from heaven to earth—thus the Danaans of whom we have already spoken; furthermore, the Lapithæ, who are said to have lived in the northern part of Thessaly at the foot of Olympus and Ossa. Their close association with the centaurs leaves no doubt that they, like the latter, belong to the realm of mythology. Closely related to them are the Phlegyæ. The *Iliad* gives us a picture of Ares, as he advances to battle in their ranks, but leaves their dwelling-place indefinite; later authorities placed it in Thessaly

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or in the valley of the Bœotian Cephissus. Coronis, the mother of Æsculapius, belonged to this tribe; also Ixion, who laid violent hands on Hera. Finally, the Phlegyæ are said to have burned the Delphic temple and in punishment therefor were destroyed by Apollo by lightning and an earthquake. The Minyæ also belong to this circle. They compose the crew of the ship *Argo*, which goes into the distant sun-land of the east to bring back from thence the Golden Fleece; the daughter of their tribal hero, Minyas, is Persephone, and no further proof is necessary to show that he himself is a god and his people mythical. Afterwards when the starting-point of the Argonauts was localised in the Pagasæan Gulf, the Minyæ also became a Thessalian race; from there, like their relatives the Phlegyæ, they were brought over to Bœotia, where Orchomenos in Homer is called "Minyean." And since the *Iliad* furthermore mentions a river Minyos in the later Triphylia, the Minyæ were placed there also.

The Pelasgians play a much more important part in the conventional primitive history of Greece than the last-mentioned peoples. Throughout antiquity their name is connected with the western part of the great Thessalian plain, the "Pelasgic Argos" of Homer, the Pelasgiotis of historic times. The *Iliad* speaks of the Pelasgians, famed for their spears, who lived far from Troy in broad-furrowed Larissa, and probably intends thereby the Thessalian capital. Thessalian Achilles prays to the Pelasgian Zeus of Dodona before the departure of his friend Patroclus. But the *Iliad* as yet knows nothing of Pelasgian inhabitants of Dodona; on the contrary the catalogue of ships reckons this sacred city as belonging to the territory of the Ænians and Perrhæbi, and it is Hesiod who first makes the temple to have been founded by Pelasgians. Elsewhere Pelasgians are mentioned by Homer only in Crete.

Otherwise the later accounts. Wherever within the circle of the Ægean Sea the name of Larissa occurs, there Pelasgians are said to have lived — in the Peloponnesian Argos, in Æolis of Asia Minor, on the island of Lesbos, on the Cayster near Ephesus. It is possibly for this reason that the *Odyssey* places Pelasgians in Crete, since there, also, there was a Larissæan field near Hierapytna, and Gortyn is said to have been called Larissa in ancient times. From Argos the Pelasgians also became woven into the myths of the neighbouring Arcadia, the ancestral hero of which, Lycaon, is called by Hesiod a son of Pelasgus.

Pelasgians were said to have lived once in Attica also. The wall which defended the approach to the citadel of Athens bore the name Pelargicon, and as no one knew what that meant, it was said that it had been corrupted out of Pelasgicon and that the citadel had been built by Pelasgians. These Pelasgians were then said to have been driven out by the Athenians and to have migrated to Lemnos. Why they went precisely to this place we do not know, nor why these Lemnian Pelasgians were called Tyrrhenians. Homer places the Sinties, that is a Thracian tribe, in Lemnos. Remnants of the original inhabitants of the island, who were driven out by the Athenians in about the year 500 B.C., were, a hundred years later, still living on the peninsula of Athos and on the Propontis near Placia and Scylace; they had preserved their old language, which was different from the Greek.

In consequence of this and similar traditions, the theory was brought forward in the sixth century that the Hellenes had been preceded in Greece by a Pelasgic race. Since, however, some of the Grecian tribes, as the Arcadians and Athenians, considered themselves to be autochthonous, there was nothing for it but to call the Pelasgians the ancestors of the later Hellenes,

and so the whole change was reduced to one of name only. This to be sure was in contradiction of the statements of Homer, who names the Pelasgians among the allies of Troy, and hence evidently considered them to be racially antagonistic to the Greeks. The genealogists and historians of antiquity never got around this contradiction, which was indeed inexplicable with the means at their command.

Moreover, even if a Pelasgian people ever had existed in the wide extent attributed to them by tradition, the Greeks of antiquity would no more have conceived of them as being a single nation, than they themselves became conscious of their national unity before the eighth century; they would have designated the several Pelasgian tribes by different names. This alone shows that we are not dealing here with real historical tradition, quite apart from the fact that there is no historical tradition from the time preceding the colonisation of Asia Minor. Here also it is a question of mere theorising, and the theories already presuppose the existence of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, even to their later songs, so that they cannot be older than the seventh or sixth century. Historically the Pelasgians can be traced only in Thessaly. Pelasgiotis is thus equivalent to Pelasgia, just as Thessaliotis is equivalent to Thessalia and Elimiotis to Elimeia. The Pelasgiots, however, of historic times were of Grecian origin and we have not the slightest reason to suppose that the same was not true of prehistoric times. Indeed the Thessalian plain in all probability is the place in which the Hellenes first made permanent settlements.

A similar position to that of the Pelasgians is occupied by the Leleges in tradition. Homer speaks of them as inhabiting Pedasus in southern Troy and even Alcæus calls Antandrus, situated in this region, a Lelegean town. Later comers regarded the Leleges as the original inhabitants of Caria, where there was also a Pedasus; even in the Hellenistic period they were said to have formed a clan of serfs in this region, like the Heliots in Sparta. Old fortresses and tombstones, concerning the origin of which nothing was known, were ascribed to the Leleges, just as we speak of "Pelasgian" walls. It was also supposed that the whole Ionian coast and the islands near it were once inhabited by these people. It was natural to suppose a similar relationship for European Greece and here also to let a Lelegean population precede the Hellenic. Supports for this theory were found in a number of local names, such as Phycus and Larymna in Locris, Abæ in Phocis, Pedasus in Messenia, which occur in an identical or similar form in Caria. One of the two citadels of Megara was called Caria; and Zeus Carios was worshipped in various parts of Greece. Accordingly, Leleges or Carians were said to have lived in all these places. The supposition that the southern part of the Hellenic peninsula was occupied by a Carian population in a pre-Grecian period has, as we have seen, a great deal in its favour; only we should avoid trying to discover historical tradition in late suppositions, since Homer still knows nothing of all these myths and Hesiod is the first to make Locrus rule over the Leleges.

Nor does Homer know anything of Thracians outside of their historic abodes to the north of the Ægean Sea. Later tradition places them in Phocian Daulis and in Bœotia on the Helicon. The most direct cause for this was probably furnished by the race of Thracidæ, which attained a prominent position in Delphi and which had probably spread into other Phocian cities as well; another reason was the name of the Daulian king, Tereus, which had a Thracian sound, and lastly, the cult of the Muses which had a home on the Helicon, as also on Olympus in Thracian Pieria. Mysteries were

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connected with this cult even at a comparatively early period, as is shown by the legends of Orpheus and Musæus. Hence Eumolpus, the mythical founder of the Eleusinian mysteries, was held to be a Thracian; his very name shows that he is connected with the worship of the Muses, even if he were not expressly said to be the son of Musæus. The historic value of this tradition is thus sufficiently demonstrated.

There were also traditions of immigrations from the Orient into Greece. These were based in part upon solar myths, which have given rise to similar legends among the most widely separated peoples; they also reflect the consciousness that the rudiments of a higher civilisation were brought to the Greeks from the East. In the form in which we have them, these myths are without exception late formations, which presuppose close relations between Greece and the old civilisations of Asia and Egypt. In Homer, accordingly, there is no trace of them.

Thus Pelops is said to have come from Lydia or Phrygia to the peninsula which has since borne his name. One might be tempted to regard him as the eponymic hero of the Peloponnesus; but Pelopia was also the name of a daughter of Pelias or of Niobe, and of the mother of Cyrenus, a son of Ares. Pelops' mother also is Euryanassa, a daughter of Dione; his paternal grandfather is Xanthus (the "shining one"); two of his sons are called Chrysippus and Alcathous. These names leave no doubt as to the fact that Pelops was originally a solar hero; hence also the story of his contest with Ctenomachus for the possession of Hippodamia. The name Peloponnesus, which is also unknown to Homer, means accordingly "Island of the sun-god"; Helios, as is well known, had a celebrated temple at the most extreme southern point of the peninsula, on the promontory of Tænaron. Thus Pelops, originally, was not materially different from Hercules, who for the most part has crowded him out of cult and tradition; just as the genealogy of the Peloponnesian dynasties was traced back to Pelops in ancient times and to Hercules at a later period. Nevertheless Pelops has at least kept the first place in Olympia.

The tradition of the immigration of Danaus from Egypt is closely connected with the legend of the wanderings of Io, which could not have taken on its present form until after Egypt was opened up to the Hellenes, that is not before the end of the seventh century. The legend concerning the Egyptian origin of the old Attic national hero Cecrops grew up much later in the fourth or third century, and never attained general recognition.

We have already seen how Phœnix and his brother Cadmus became Phœnicians. Accordingly Phœnix's daughter, or according to a later myth his sister, Europa, was carried off by Zeus from Phœnicia to Crete, where she gave birth to Minos. This alone makes it clear that Minos had nothing whatever to do with the Phœnicians, but is a good Grecian god, as are also Phœnix, Cadmus, Europa, his wife Pasiphaë (the "all enlightening"), his daughter Phædra (the "beaming"), and Ariadne the wife of Dionysus. Minos, also, afterwards fell to the rank of a hero; already in Homer he appears as the king of Knossos, and later the Cretans trace their laws back to him. The name Minoa occurs frequently in the islands and on the coast of the Ægean Sea; also in Crete itself, and in Amorgos, Siphnos, and on the coast of Megaris. Hence the conclusion was drawn that Minos had ruled in all these places and must therefore have been a great sea-king, whose dominion extended over the whole of the Cyclades and in fact over the whole Ægean Sea. But in Sicily there was also a Minoa, a daughter city of the Megarian colony of Selinus, and doubtless named after the small island of Minoa near the

Nisæan Megara. Thus the tradition arose that Minos had proceeded to Sicily and there found his death. Since Selinus was founded in the year 650 B.C., this myth cannot have come into existence before the sixth century.

At the beginning of the fifth century all these traditions were combined, and connected; on the one hand, with the myths which formed the substance of the epic poems; on the other, with the oldest historic recollections. The genealogies of the heroes as given in part by Homer and more completely by Hesiod served as a chronological basis. At the beginning were placed the Pelasgians, then the immigrations from the east, of Danaus, Pelops, Cadmus, and others. Then followed the expedition of the Argonauts, the march of the Seven against Thebes, the Trojan War, and whatever else of similar nature was related in the epics. Next came the age of the great migrations; first the incursion of the Thessalians into the plains of the Peneus, and the Bœotian migration caused thereby, then the march of the Dorians and their allies, the Eleans, into the Peloponnesus, which was followed by the colonisation of the islands and of the western coast of Asia Minor.

Thus was gained the misleading appearance of a pragmatic history of Grecian antiquity; and although even in ancient times occasional critical doubts were not wanting, this system as a whole was accepted by the Greeks as historical truth.^c



CHAPTER V. THE DORIANS

Land of the lordly mien and iron frame !
Where wealth was held dishonour, Luxury's smile
Worse than a demon's soul-destroying wile !
Where every youth that hailed the Day-God's beam,
Wielded the sword, and dreamt the patriot's dream ;
Where childhood lisped of war with eager soul,
And woman's hand waved on to glory's goal.

—NICHOLAS MICHELL.

FROM the earliest period there were two peoples of Greece who seem, at least in the eye of later generations, to have been pre-eminent—the Dorians and the Ionians. Of the former the leaders are the Spartans; of the latter, the Athenians. In the main, so preponderant are these two cities that, viewed retrospectively, Greek history comes to seem the history of Athens and Sparta. This appears a curious anomaly when one considers that these cities were not great world emporiums like Babylon and Nineveh and Rome, but at best only moderate-sized towns. Yet they influenced humanity for all time to come; and our study of Greek history perforce resolves itself largely into the doings of the citizens of these two little communities. We shall first consider the history of the Dorians, who, though in the long run the less important of the two, were the earlier to appear prominently on the stage of history.^a

The Dorians derived their origin from those districts in which the Grecian nation bordered towards the north upon numerous and dissimilar races of barbarians. As to the tribes which dwelt beyond these boundaries we are indeed wholly destitute of information; nor is there the slightest trace of any memorial or tradition that the Greeks originally came from those quarters. On these frontiers, however, the events took place which effected an entire alteration in the internal condition of the whole Grecian nation, and here were given many of those impulses, of which the effects were so long and generally experienced. The prevailing character of the events alluded to, was a perpetual pressing forward of the barbarous races, particularly of the Illyrians, into more southern districts.

To begin then by laying down a boundary line, which may be afterwards modified for the sake of greater accuracy, we shall suppose this to be the mountain ridge, which stretches from Mount Olympus to the west as far as the Aroceraunian Mountains (comprehending the Cambunian ridge and Mount Laemon), and in the middle comes in contact with the Pindus chain, which stretches in a direction from north to south. The western part of this chain separates the farthest Grecian tribes from the great Illyrian nation, which extended back as far as the Celts in the south of Germany.

In the fashion of wearing the mantle and dressing the hair, and also in their dialect, the Macedonians bore a great resemblance to the Illyrians, whence it is evident that the Macedonians belonged to the Illyrian nation. Notwithstanding which, there can be no doubt that the Greeks were aboriginal inhabitants of this district. The plains of Emathia, the most beautiful district of the country, were occupied by the Pelasgi, who, according to Herodotus, also possessed Creston above Chalcidice, to which place they had come from Thessalotis. Hence the Macedonian dialect was full of primitive Greek words. And that these had not been introduced by the royal family (which was Hellenic by descent or adoption of manners) is evident from the fact, that many signs of the most simple ideas (which no language ever borrows from another) were the same in both, as well as from the circumstance that these words do not appear in their Greek form, but have been modified according to a native dialect. In the Macedonian dialect there occur grammatical forms which are commonly called *Æolic*, together with many Arcadian and Thessalian words: and what perhaps is still more decisive, several words, which, though not to be found in the Greek, have been preserved in the Latin language. There does not appear to be any peculiar connection with the Doric dialect: hence we do not give much credit to the otherwise unsupported assertion of Herodotus, of an original identity of the Dorian and Macedonian (Macedonian) nations. In other authors Macednus is called the son of Lycaon, from whom the Arcadians were descended, or Macedon is the brother of Magnes, or a son of *Æolus*, according to Hesiod and Hellanicus, which are merely various attempts to form a genealogical connection between this semi-barbarian race and the rest of the Greek nation.

The Thessalians as well as the Macedonians were, as it appears, an Illyrian race, who subdued a native Greek population; but in this case the body of the interlopers was smaller, while the numbers and civilisation of the aboriginal inhabitants were considerable. Hence the Thessalians resembled the Greeks more than any of the northern races with which they were connected: hence their language in particular was almost purely Grecian, and indeed bore perhaps a greater affinity to the language of the ancient epic poets than any other dialect. But the chief peculiarities of this nation with which we are acquainted were not of a Grecian character. Of this their national dress, which consisted in part of the flat and broad-brimmed hat (*καυσία*) and the mantle (which last was common to both nations, but was unknown to the Greeks of Homer's time, and indeed long afterwards, until adopted as the costume of the equestrian order at Athens), is a sufficient example. The Thessalians moreover were beyond a doubt the first to introduce into Greece the use of cavalry. More important distinctions however than that first alleged are perhaps to be found in their impetuous and passionate character, and the low and degraded state of their mental faculties. The taste for the arts shown by the rich family of the Scopadæ proves no more than that such was the disposition of the whole people, than the existence of the same qualities in Archelaus argues their prevalence in Macedonia. This is sufficient to distinguish them from the race of the Greeks, so highly endowed by nature. We are therefore induced to conjecture that this nation, which a short time before the expedition of the Heraclidæ, migrated from Thesprotia, and indeed from the territory of Ephyra (Cichyrus) into the plain of the Peneus, had originally come from Illyria. On the other hand indeed, many points of similarity in the customs of the Thessalians and Dorians might be brought forward. Thus, for example, the love for the

male sex (that usage peculiar to the Dorians) was also common among the Illyrians, and the objects of affection were, as at Sparta, called *ἀῖται*; the women also, as amongst the Dorians, were addressed by the title of ladies (*δέσποιναι*), a title uncommon in Greece, and expressive of the estimation in which they were held. A great freedom in the manners of the female sex was nevertheless customary among the Illyrians, who in this respect bore a nearer resemblance to the northern nations. Upon the whole, however, these migrations from the north had the effect of disseminating among the Greeks manners and institutions which were entirely unknown to their ancestors, as represented by Homer.

We will now proceed to inquire what was the extent of territory gained by the Illyrians in the west of Greece. A great part of Epirus had in early times been inhabited by Pelasgi, to which race the inhabitants of Dodona are likewise affirmed by the best authorities to have belonged, as well as the whole nation of Thesprotians; also the Chaonians at the foot of the Acroceraunian Mountains, and the Chones, Cenotri, and Peucetii on the opposite coast of Italy, are said to have been of this race. The ancient buildings, institutions, and religious worship of the Epirotes are also manifestly of Pelasgic origin. We suppose always that the Pelasgi were Greeks, and spoke the Grecian language, an opinion however in support of which we will on this occasion only adduce a few arguments. It must then be borne in mind, that all the races whose migrations took place at a late period, such as the Achæans, Ionians, Dorians, were not (the last in particular) sufficiently powerful or numerous to effect a complete change in the customs of a barbarous population; that many districts, Arcadia and Perrhæbia for instance, remained entirely Pelasgic, without being inhabited by any nation not of Grecian origin; that the most ancient names, either of Grecian places or mentioned in their traditions, belonged indeed to a different era of the dialect, but not to another language; that finally, the great similarity between the Latin and Greek can only be explained by supposing the Pelasgic language to have formed the connecting link. Now the nations of Epirus were almost reduced to a complete state of barbarism by the operation of causes, which could only have had their origin in Illyria; and in the historic age, the Ambracian Bay was the boundary of Greece. In later times more than half of Ætolia ceased to be Grecian, and without doubt adopted the manners and language of the Illyrians, from which point the Athamanes, an Epirote and Illyrian nation, pressed into the south of Thessaly. Migrations and predatory expeditions, such as the Encheleans had undertaken in the fabulous times, continued without intermission to repress and keep down the genuine population of Greece.

The Illyrians were in these ancient times also bounded on the east by the Phrygians and Thracians, as well as by the Pelasgi. The Phrygians were at this time the immediate neighbours of the Macedonians in Lebæa, by whom they were called Brygians (*Βρύγες*, *Βρύγοι*, *Βρίγες*); they dwelt at the foot of the snowy Bermius, where the fabulous rose-gardens of King Midas were situated, while walking in which the wise Silenus was fabled to have been taken prisoner. They also fought from this place (as the *Telegonia* of Eugamon related) with the Thesprotians of Epirus. At no great distance from hence were the Mygdonians, the people nearest related to the Phrygians. According to Xanthus, this nation did not migrate to Asia until after the Trojan War. But, in the first place, the Cretan traditions begin with religious ceremonies and fables, which appear from the most ancient testimonies to have been derived from Phrygians of Asia; and secondly the

Armenians, who were beyond a doubt of a kindred race to the Phrygians, were considered as an aboriginal nation in their own territory. It will therefore be sufficient to recognise the same race of men in Armenia, Asia Minor, and at the foot of Mount Bermius, without supposing that all the Armenians and Phrygians emigrated from the latter settlement on the Macedonian coast. The intermediate space between Illyria and Asia, a district across which numerous nations migrated in ancient times, was peopled irregularly from so many sides, that the national uniformity which seems to have once existed in those parts was speedily deranged. The most important documents respecting the connection between the Phrygian and other nations are the traces that remain of its dialect. It was well known in Plato's time that many primitive words of the Grecian language were to be recognised with a slight alteration in the Phrygian, such as *πῦρ*, *ῥῑν*, *κύν*; and the great similarity of grammatical structure which the Armenian now displays with the Greek, must be referred to this original connection. The Phrygians in Asia have, however, been without doubt intermixed with Syrians, who not only established themselves on the right bank of the Halys, but on the left also in Lycaonia, and as far as Lycia, and accordingly adopted much of the Syrian language and religion. Their enthusiastic and frantic ceremonies, however, had doubtless always formed part of their religion; these they had in common with their immediate neighbours, the Thracians: but the ancient Greeks appear to have been almost entirely unacquainted with such rites.

The Thracians, who settled in Pieria at the foot of Mount Olympus, and from thence came down to Mount Helicon, as being the originators of the worship of Bacchus and the Muses, and the fathers of Grecian poetry, are a nation of the highest importance in the history of civilisation. We cannot but suppose that they spoke a dialect very similar to the Greek, since otherwise they could not have had any considerable influence upon the latter people. They were in all probability derived originally from the country called Thrace in later times, where the Bessi, a tribe of the nation of the Satræ, at the foot of Mount Pangæum, presided over the oracle of Bacchus. Whether the whole of the populous races of Edones, Odomantes, Odrysi, Treres, etc., are to be considered as identical with the Thracians in Pieria, or whether it is not more probable that these barbarous nations received from the Greeks their general name of Thracians, with which they had been familiar from early times, are questions which we shall not attempt to determine. Into these nations, however, a large number of Pæonians subsequently penetrated, who had passed over at the time of a very ancient migration of the Teucrians together with the Mysians. To this Pæonian race the Pelagonians, on the banks of the Axius, belonged; who also advanced into Thessaly, as will be shown hereafter. Of the Teucrians, however, we know nothing excepting that, in concert with (Pelagic) Dardanians, they founded the city of Troy—where the language in use was probably allied to the Grecian, and distinct from the Phrygian.

Now it is within the mountainous barriers above described that we must look for the origin of the nations which in the heroic mythology are always represented as possessing dominion and power, and are always contrasted with an aboriginal population. These, in our opinion, were northern branches of the Grecian nation, which had overrun and subdued the Greeks who dwelt farther south. The most ancient abode of the Hellenes proper (who in mythology are merely a small nation in Phthia) was situated, according to Aristotle, in Epirus, near Dodona, to whose god Achilles prays,

as being the ancient protector of his family. In all probability the Achæans, the ruling nation both of Thessaly and of the Peloponnesus in fabulous times, were of the same race and origin as the Hellenes. The Minyans, Phlegyans, Lapithæ, and Æolians of Corinth and Salmone, came originally from the districts above Pieria, on the frontiers of Macedonia, where the very ancient Orchomenus, Minya, and Salmonia or Halmopia were situated. Nor is there less obscurity with regard to the northern settlements of the Ionians; they appear, as it were, to have fallen from heaven into Attica and Ægialea; they were not, however, by any means identical with the aboriginal inhabitants of these districts, and had perhaps detached themselves from some northern, probably Achæan, race. Lastly, the Dorians are mentioned in ancient legends and poems as established in one extremity of the great mountain chain of Upper Greece, viz. at the foot of Mount Olympus: there are, however, reasons for supposing that at an earlier period they had dwelt at its other northern extremity, at the farthest limit of the Grecian nation.

We now turn our attention to the singular nation of the Hylleans (Ἰλλεῖς, Ἰλλοί), which is supposed to have dwelt in Illyria, but is in many respects connected in a remarkable manner with the Dorians. The real place of its abode can hardly be laid down; as the Hylleans are never mentioned in any historical narrative, but always in mythological legends; and they appear to have been known to the geographers only from mythological writers. Yet they are generally placed in the islands of Melita and Black-Coreyra, to the south of Liburnia. Now the name of the Hylleans agrees strikingly with that of the first and most noble tribe of the Dorians. Besides which, it is stated, that though dwelling among Illyrian races, these Hylleans were nevertheless genuine *Greeks*. Moreover they, as well as the Doric Hylleans, were supposed to have sprung from Hyllus, a son of Hercules, whom that hero begot upon Melite, the daughter of Ægæus: here the name Ægæus refers to a river in Coreyra, Melite to the island just mentioned. Apollo was the chief god of the Dorians; and so likewise these Hylleans were said to have concealed under the earth, as the sign of inviolable sanctity, that instrument of such importance in the religion of Apollo, a tripod. The country of the Hylleans is described as a large peninsula, and compared to the Peloponnesus: it is said to have contained fifteen cities; which however had not a more real existence, than the peninsula as large as the Peloponnesus on the Illyrian coast. How all these statements are to be understood is hard to say. It appears however that they can only be reconciled as follows: the Doric Hylleans had a tradition, that they came originally from these northern districts, which then bordered on the Illyrians, and were afterwards occupied by that people; and there still remained in those parts some members of their tribe, some other Hylleans. This notion of Greek Hylleans in the very north of Greece, who also were descended from Hercules, and also worshipped Apollo, was taken up and embellished by the poets: although it is not likely that any one had really ever seen these Hylleans and visited their country. Like the Hyperboreans, they existed merely in tradition and imagination. It is possible also that the Coreyræans, in whose island there was an "*Hyllæan*" harbour, may have contributed to the formation of these legends, as is shown by some circumstances pointed out above; but it cannot be supposed that the whole tradition arose from Coreyræan colonies.

Here we might conclude our remarks on this subject, did not the following question (one indeed of great importance) deserve some consideration. What relation can we suppose to have existed between the races

which migrated into those northern districts, and the native tribes, and what between the different races of Greece itself? All inquiries on this subject lead us back to the Pelasgi, who although not found in every part of ancient Greece (for tradition makes so wide a distinction between them and many other nations, that no confusion ever takes place), yet occur almost universally wherever early civilisation, ancient settlements, and worships of peculiar sanctity and importance existed. And in fact there is no doubt that most of the ancient religions of Greece owed their origin to this race. The Jupiter and Dione of Dodona; Jupiter and Juno of Argos; Vulcan and Minerva of Athens; Ceres and Proserpine of Eleusis; Mercury and Diana of Arcadia, together with Cadmus and the Cabiri of Thebes, cannot, if properly examined, be referred to any other origin. We must therefore attribute to that nation an excessive readiness in creating and metamorphosing objects of religious worship, so that the same fundamental conceptions were variously developed in different places, a variety which was chiefly caused by the arbitrary neglect of, or adherence to, particular parts of the same legend. In many places also we may recognise the sameness of character which pervaded the different worships of the above gods; everywhere we see manifested in symbols, names, rites, and legends, an uniform character of ideas and feelings. The religions introduced from Phrygia and Thrace, such as that of the Cretan Jupiter and Dionysus or Bacchus, may be easily distinguished by their more enthusiastic character from the native Pelasgic worship. The Phœnician and Egyptian religions lay at a great distance from the early Greeks, were almost unknown even where they existed in the immediate neighbourhood, were almost unintelligible when the Greeks attempted to learn them, and repugnant to their nature when understood. On the whole, the Pelasgic worship appears to form part of a simple elementary religion, which easily represented the various forms produced by the changes of nature in different climates and seasons, and which abounded in expressive signs for all the shades of feeling which these phenomena awakened.

On the other hand, the religion of the northern races (who as being of Hellenic descent are put in contrast with the Pelasgi) had in early times taken a more moral turn, to which their political relations had doubtless contributed. The heroic life (which is no fable of the poets), the fondness for vigorous and active exertion, the disinclination to the harmless occupations of husbandry, which is so remarkably seen in the conquering race of the Hellenes, necessarily awakened and cherished an entirely different train of religious feeling. Hence the Jupiter Hellanius of Æacus, the Jupiter Laphystius of Athamas, and, finally, the Doric Jupiter, whose son is Apollo, the prophet and warrior, are rather representations of the moral order and harmony of the universe, after the ancient method, than of the creative powers of nature. We do not however deny, that there was a time when these different views had not as yet taken a separate direction. Thus it may be shown, that the Apollo Lyceus of the Dorians conveyed nearly the same notions as the Jupiter Lycæus of the Arcadians, although the worship of either deity was developed independently of that of the other. Thus also certain ancient Arcadian and Doric usages had, in their main features, a considerable affinity. The points of resemblance in these different worships can be only perceived by comparison: tradition presents, at the very first outset, an innumerable collection of discordant forms of worship belonging to the several races, but without explaining to us how they came to be thus separated. For these different rites were not united into a whole until they

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had been first divided ; and both by the connection of worships and by the influence of poetry new combinations were introduced, which differed essentially from those of an earlier date.

The language of the ancient Grecian race (which, together with its religion, forms the most ancient record of its history) must, if we may judge from the varieties of dialect and from a comparison with the Latin language, have been very perfect in its structure, and rich and expressive in its flexions and formations ; though much of this was polished off by the Greeks of later ages : in early times, distinctness and precision in marking the primitive words and the inflections being more attended to than facility of utterance. Wherever the ancient forms had been preserved, they sounded foreign and uncouth to more modern ears ; and the language of later times was greatly softened, in comparison with the Latin. But the peculiarities of the pure Doric dialect are (wherever they were not owing to a faithful preservation of archaic forms) actual deviations from the original dialect, and consequently they do not occur in Latin ; they bear a northern character. The use of the article, which did not exist in the Latin language or in that of epic poetry, can be ascribed to no other cause than to immigrations of new tribes, and especially to that of the Dorians. Its introduction must, nearly as in the Roman languages, be considered as the sign of a great revolution. The peculiarities of the Doric dialect must have existed before the period of the migrations ; since thus only can it be explained how peculiar forms of the Doric dialect were common to Crete, Argos, and Sparta : the same is also true of the dialects which are generally considered as subdivisions of the Æolic ; the only reason for the resemblance of the language of Lesbos to that of Bœotia being, that Bœotians migrated at that period to Lesbos. The peculiarities of the Ionic dialect may, on the other hand, be viewed in great part as deviations caused by the genial climate of Asia ; for the language of the Attic race, to which the latter were most nearly related, could hardly have differed so widely from that of the colonies of Athens, if the latter had not been greatly changed.^b

THE MIGRATION—THE VIEW OF CURTIUS

It is with the advance of the Dorians that the power of the mountain peoples makes its appearance from the north to take its share in the history of nations. For centuries they had lagged behind the coast and maritime races, but now they stepped in with all the greater impress of sheer natural force, and all that was transformed and reformed as a consequence of their conquering march, had a durability which lasted throughout the whole period of Greek history. This is the reason that in contradistinction to the "Heroic Age" ancient historians begin the historical period with the first deeds of the Dorians.

But, for all that, the information concerning these deeds is none the less scanty. On the contrary : as this epoch approaches, the old sources dry up, and new ones are not opened. Homer knows nothing of the march of the Heraclidæ [*i.e.*, descendants of Heracles or Hercules]. The Achæan emigrants lived entirely in the memory of past days, and cherished it beyond the sea in the faithful memorials of song. For those who remained behind, who had to submit themselves to a strange and powerful rule, it was no time for poetry. The Dorians themselves have always been sparing in the matter of tradition ; it was not their way to use many words about what they had done ;

they had not the soaring enthusiasm of the Achæan race, and still less were they capable of spinning out their experiences at a pleasing length, in the fashion of the Ionians. Their inclination and ability were directed to practical existence, to the fulfilment of definite tasks, to earnest occupations.

Thus, then, the great incidents of the Dorian emigration were left to chance tradition, of which all but a few faint traces have been lost, and this is why our whole information on the conquest of the peninsula is as poor in names as in facts. For it was only at a later date, when the national epos itself had long died out, that an attempt was made to recover the beginnings of Peloponnesian history.

But these later poets could no longer find any fresh and living fountain of tradition; nor is theirs that pure and unrestrained delight in the images of the olden time, which constitutes the very breath of life in the Homeric poem; but there is a conscious effort to fill out the gaps in tradition, and to join the torn threads connecting the Achæan and the Dorian period. They sought to unify the legends of various places, to restore the missing links, to reconcile contradictions; and thus arose a history of the march of the Heraclidæ, in which things that had come about gradually and in the course of centuries, were related together with dogmatic brevity.

The Dorians crossed over from the mainland in successive troops, accompanied by their wives and children; they spread slowly over the country; but wherever they gained a footing the result was a complete transformation of the conditions of life by their agency. They brought with them their household and tribal institutions; they clung with tenacious obstinacy to their peculiarities of speech and custom; proud and shy, they held aloof from the other Greeks, and instead of becoming absorbed, as the Ionians did, into the older population, they impressed on the new home the character of their own race. The peninsula became Dorian.

But this transmutation came about in a very varied fashion; it did not start from one point, but had three chief centres. The legend of the Peloponnesus has expressed it in this wise: three brothers, Temenus, Aristodemus, and Cresphontes, who were of the race of Heracles [Hercules], the old rightful heir to the dominion of Argos, asserted the claims of their ancestor. They offered common sacrifices on the three altars of Zeus Patrous and cast lots among themselves for the various lordships in the country. Argos was the principal lot, and it fell to Temenus; Lacedæmon, the second, came to the children of Aristodemus, who were minors, whilst the beautiful Messenia passed, by craft, into the third brother's possession.

This tale of the drawing of lots by the Heraclidæ, arose in the Peloponnesus after the states had assumed their peculiar constitution. It contains the reasons, derived from the old heroic past, for the erection of the three metropolitan towns; the mythical authority for the Peloponnesian claims of the Heraclidæ, and for the new state organisation. The historical kernel of the legend is that, from the very beginning, the Dorians represented, not the interests of their own race, but the interests of their leaders, who were not Dorians, but Achæans; this is why the god, under whose authority the division of the land was made, was none other than the ancient god of the race of Æacidæ. Further, the foundation of the legend lies in the fact that the Dorians, in order to gain possession of the three chief plains of the peninsula, divided, soon after their arrival into three hosts.

Each had its Heraclid as leader of the people. Each was composed of three races, the Hylleans, Dymanes, and Pamphylians. Each host was an image of the entire race. Thus the whole subsequent development of Pello-

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ponnesian history depended on the manner in which the different hosts now established themselves in the new regions; on the extent to which, in the midst of the ancient people of the country and in spite of the subservience of their forces to foreign leadership, they remained faithful to themselves and their native customs; and on the method by which mutual relations were established.

MESSENIA

The new states were in part, also new territories, as was, for instance, Messenia. For in the Homeric Peloponnesus there is no country of this name: its eastern portion where the waters of the Pamisus connect a higher and lower plain with one another, belongs to the lordship of Menelaus, and the western half to the kingdom of the Neleïdes which has its centre on the coast. The Dorians came from the north into the upper plain, and there obtained a footing in Stenyclarus. Thence they spread farther and drove the Thessalian Neleïdes towards the sea. The high, island-like ocean citadel of old Navarino, seems to have been the last spot on the coast where the latter maintained themselves, till finally, being more and more closely pressed, they forsook the land for the sea. The island-plain of Stenyclarus now became the kernel of the newly-formed district, and could thence be called Messene—that is, the middle or inner country.

With the exception of this great supplanting of one nation by another the change was effected more peacefully than in most other quarters. At least the native legend knows nothing of forcible conquest. A certain portion of arable land and pasture was to be given up to the Dorians; the remainder was to be left to the inhabitants in undisturbed possession. The victorious visitors laid claim to no special and favoured position; the new princes were by no means regarded as foreign conquerors, but were received with friendliness by the nation as relatives of the ancient Æolian kings, and on account of the dislike to the house of the Pelopidæ. With full confidence they and their following settled among the Messenians, and evidently with the idea that under their protection the old and new inhabitants might peacefully amalgamate into one community.

But after this their relations did not develop in the same harmless manner. The Dorians believed themselves betrayed by their leaders, and in consequence of a Dorian reaction Cresphontes found himself compelled to overthrow the old order of things; to abolish equality before the law; to unite the Dorians in one close society in Stenyclarus, and to make this place the capital of the country, while the rest of Messenia was reduced to the position of a conquered district. The disturbances went on. Cresphontes himself became the victim of a bloody insurrection; his family were overthrown and no Cresphontidæ followed. Æpytus succeeded. He is by name and race an Arcadian, brought up in Arcadia whence he penetrated into Messenia, then on the verge of dissolution. He gave order and direction to the development of the country, and hence its subsequent kings are called Æpytidæ. But the whole direction henceforth taken by the history of the country is different, non-Dorian, unwarlike. The Æpytidæ are no soldier-princes, but creators of order, and founders of forms of religious worship. And these forms are not those of the Dorians, but decidedly non-Dorian, old Peloponnesian, like those of Demeter, Æsculapius, the Æsculapidæ. The high festival of the country was a mystery-service of the so-called “great deities” and unknown to the Dorian race, while at Ithome,

the lofty citadel of the country, which raises its commanding height between the two plains of the district, ruled the Pelasgic Zeus, whose worship was considered the distinctive mark of the Messenian people.

Scanty as are the relics preserved of the history of the Messenian country, some very important facts undoubtedly underlie them. From the first a remarkable insecurity reigned in this Dorian foundation; a deep gulf between the commander of the army and the people, which had its origin in the king's connection with the ancient pre-Achæan population. He did not succeed in founding a dynasty, for it is only in subsequent legend, which here, as in the case of all Greek pedigrees, seeks to disguise a violent break, that Æpytus is made to be the son of Cresphontes. But the warlike Dorian nation must have become so weakened by internal conflicts, that it was not in a position to assert itself; the transformation of Messenia into a Dorian country was not carried into effect, and thus the main lines of its history were determined. For rich though the district was in natural resources, uniting as it did two of the finest watersheds with a coast stretching between two seas and well provided with harbours; yet the development of the State was from the first unfortunate. There was here no complete renewal, no powerful Hellenic revival in the district.

It was with far different success that a second host of Dorian warriors pressed down the long valley of the Eurotas, which from a narrow gorge gradually widens to the smiling plain of cornfields at the foot of Taygetus, the "Hollow Lacedæmon." There is no Greek territory in which one plain is so decidedly the very kernel of the whole as it is here. Sunk deep between rugged mountains and severed from the surrounding country by high passes, it holds in its lap all the means of comfort and well-being. Here on the hillocks on the Eurotas above Amyclæ the Dorians pitched their camp, from which grew up the town of Sparta, the youngest city of the plain.

If the Dorian Sparta and the Achæan Amyclæ existed for centuries side by side, it is manifest that no uninterrupted state of war continued during this period. Here, no more than in Messenia, can a thorough occupation of the whole district have taken place, but the relations between the old and new inhabitants must have been arranged by agreement. Here, too, the Dorians dispersed through different places and mingled with the foreign nation.

ARGOS

The third state has its kernel in the plain of the Inachus, which was regarded as the portion of the first-born of the Heraclidæ. For the fame of Atreides' might, though it was chiefly fixed at Mycenæ, also extended over the state which was founded on the ruins of the Mycenaean kingdom. The nucleus of the Dorian Argos was on the coast, where between the sandy estuary of the Inachus, and that of the copious stream of the Erasinus, a tract of firm land rises in the swampy soil. Here the Dorians had their camp and their sanctuaries; here their commander Temenus had died and had been buried before he had seen his people in secure possession of the upper plain; and after him this coast town preserved the name of Temenium. Its situation shows that the citadels and passes farther inland were maintained by the Achæans with a more steadfast resistance, so that the Dorians were for a long time compelled to content themselves with a thoroughly disadvantageous situation. For it was only by degrees that the whole strip of shore was rendered habitable, and the swampy character of the soil was, according to

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Aristotle, the main reason why the sovereign town of the Pelopidæ was placed so far back in the upper plain. Now by the advance of the Dorian might, the high rock citadel of Larissa also became the political centre of the district, and the Pelasgian Argos at its foot, which had been the oldest place of assembly for the population, was once more the capital. It came to be the seat of the reigning family of the line of Temenus, and the starting-point for the further extension of their power.

This extension did not result from the uniform conquest of the district and the annihilation of the earlier settlements, but from the despatch of Dorian bands which established themselves at the chief points between the Ionian and Achaean populations. This was also effected in different ways, more or less violent, and radiating in two directions, on the one side towards the Corinthian, on the other towards the Saronic Sea.

Low passes lead from Argos into the Asopus Valley. Rhegnidas the Temenid led Dorian armies into the upper valley, where, under the blessing of Dionysus, flourished the old Ionian Phlius, while Phalces chose the lower vale at whose entrance, Sicyon, the ancient capital of the coast district of Ægialea, spread itself over a stately plateau. At both places a peaceful division of the soil appears to have taken place; and the same was the case in the neighbourhood of the Phliasians, at Cleonæ.

It must be confessed that it is incredible that, in this narrow and thickly populated territory, lordless acres were to be found with which to satisfy the strangers' desire for territory, and even more so that the former land-owners willingly vacated their hereditary possessions; but the sense of the tradition is that only certain wealthy families were compelled to give place in consequence of the Dorian immigration, whilst the rest of the population continued in their former situation and were exempted from political change. The passion for emigration which had taken possession of the Ionian families throughout the north of the peninsula softened the effects of the transfer. The hope of finding fairer homes and a wider future beyond the sea, drove them to a distance. Thus Hippasus the ancestor of Pythagoras, left the narrow valley of Phlius to find in Samos a new home for him and his.

In this way it came about that good arable lands were left unoccupied in all the coast districts, so that the governments of the small states, which either retained their power or entered upon it in the place of the emigrants, were able to portion out fields and hand them over to the members of the warrior race of Dorians. For the latter were not anxious to overthrow the ancient order and to assert new principles of government, but only required a sufficiency of landed property for themselves and their belongings, together with the civil rights that belonged to it. Therefore the similarities between their worship of gods and heroes were utilised as a means of forming peaceful bonds of union. Thus it is expressly declared of Sicyon that from ancient times the Heraclidæ had ruled in this very place: therefore Phalces, when he penetrated thither with his Dorians, had allowed the ruling family to retain its offices and titles and had come to an understanding with it by peaceful agreement.

Towards the coast of the Saronic Gulf marched two hosts from Argos, under Deiphontes and Agaios, who transformed the old Ionian Epidaurus and Trœzen into Dorian towns; but from Epidaurus the march was continued to the isthmus, where, in the strong and important city of Corinth, whose citadel was the key of the whole peninsula, the series of Temenid settlements found its limit.

These settlements unquestionably form the most brilliant part of the warlike march of the Dorians through the Peloponnesus. By the energy of these Dorians and their leaders of the race of Hercules, who must have joined in these undertakings in specially large numbers, all parts of the many sections into which the country was split up were successfully occupied, and the new Argos, stretching from the island of Cythera as far as the Attic frontiers, far exceeded the bounds of the modest settlements on the Pamisus and Eurotas. For even if the leaders of the armies had not everywhere founded new states, still those existing had all become homogeneous by the acceptance of a Dorian element, which formed the military and preponderating section of the population.

This transformation had started from Argos, and consequently all these settlements stood in a filial relation to the mother city, so that we may regard Argos, Phlius, Sicyon, Trœzen, Epidaurus, and Corinth as a Dorian hexapolis forming a confederation like that in Caria.

Moreover this organisation was not an entirely new one. In Achæan times Mycenæ had formed with Heræum the centre of the country; in the Heræum Agamemnon had received the oath of fealty from his vassals. This was why the goddess Hera [Juno] is said to have preceded the Temenidæ to Sicyon, when they sought to revive the union between the towns which had become estranged from one another. Thus here also the remodeling was connected with the ancient tradition.

But now a central point for the confederacy was found in the worship of Apollo, which the Dorians had found established in Argos and had merely reconstituted, in the guise of the Delphic or Pythian god, through whose influence they had become an active people and under whose auspices they had hitherto been led. The towns sent their yearly offerings to the temple of Apollo Pythæus, which stood in Argos at the foot of the Larissa, but the mother city possessed the rights of a chief town as well as the government of the sanctuary.

In the meantime the size of Argos and the splendour of her new foundations, constituted a dangerous superiority. For the extension of power implied its division, and this was in the highest degree increased by the natural peculiarities of the Argive territory, which is more broken than any other Peloponnesian country.

In regard to the internal relations of the different states, great complications prevailed from the time that the older and younger population had mutually arranged themselves. For where the victory of the Dorians had been decided by force of arms, the old occupants had been driven from rights and possessions; an Achæo-Dorian town was formed and none were citizens save those belonging to the three tribes.

But in most cases it was otherwise. For example where, as in Phlius and Sicyon, a prosperity founded on agriculture, industrial activity, and commerce already existed; there the population did not, at least for any length of time, submit to be oppressed and thrust on one side. They remained no nameless and insignificant mass, but were recognised as forming one or several tribes, side by side with the three Dorian divisions, though not with the same rights. Where, therefore, more than three *phylæ* or tribes are met with; where, besides the Hylleans, Dymæans and Pamphylians, there are also mentioned "Hynethians" as in Argos, or "Ægi-alæans" (shore people) as in Sicyon, or a "*Chthonophyle*" (which was perhaps the tribal name of the natives in Phlius), it may be concluded that the immigrants had not left the older people entirely outside the newly-

[*c.* 1100-1000 B.C.]

founded commonwealth, but had sooner or later given them a certain recognised standing. However insignificant the latter might be, it was still the germ of important developments, and the existence of such co-tribes suffices to indicate a peculiar history for those states in which they occur.

Originally the various tribes also occupied different localities. As the diverse sections of the army had been separated in the camp, so the Pamphylians, the Dymanes and the Hylleans had their special quarters in Argos, and these long subsisted as such; when the Hyrnethians were admitted into the municipal commonwealth, they formed a fourth quarter. How long a period generally elapsed before the various elements of the population became amalgamated, is most clearly shown by the fact that places like Mycenæ continued their quiet existence as Achaean communities. Here the ancient traditions of the age of the Pelopidae lived on undisturbed on the very spot where they had been enacted; here the anniversary of Agamemnon's death was celebrated year after year at the place of his burial, and even during the Persian War, we see the men of Mycenæ and Tiryns, mindful of their old hero kings, as they take their part in the national quarrel against Asia.

Thus under the Dorian influence three new states were founded in the south and east of the peninsula, namely Messenia, Laconia, and Argos, which differed greatly even at the outset, and early diverged upon separate lines.

ARCADIA

At the same time great changes were taking place on the remote west coast. The states north and south of the Alpheus with which Homer is acquainted, were overthrown and Ætolian families, who honoured Oxylyus as their ancestor, founded new lordships on the territory of the Epeans and Pylæans. These foundations had no apparent connection with the marches of the Dorian armies, and it is only a legendary poem of later date which speaks of Oxylyus as having stipulated for the western land as his share in reward for services rendered to the Dorians. This betrays that it was a subsequent invention, by the fact that the new settlements on the peninsula are represented in this and similar fables as a result of a great and carefully planned undertaking; a representation which stands in complete contradiction to the facts of history. And when it is further related that the Dorians were conducted by their crafty leader, not along the flat coast road but across country through Arcadia, so that they might not be roused to envy or tempted to break their compact altogether, by the sight of the tracts of land conceded to Oxylyus; this is but a tale invented with the object of explaining the erection of a state in Elis independently of the Dorian immigration, and the grounds for it are to be sought in the circumstance that the whole west coast, from the straits by Rhium down to Navarino, is distinguished by easy tracts of level country, such as are scarcely found elsewhere in Greek territory.

The best cornland lies at the foot of the Erymanthus Mountains, a broad plain through which the Peneus flows and which is surrounded by vine-clad hills stretching towards the neighbouring groups of islands. At the spot where the Peneus issues from the Arcadian mountains and flows into the coast-plain there rises on the left bank a stately height which looks clear over land and island sea and on this account was called in the Middle Ages, Calascope, or Belvidere. This height was selected by the Ætolian immi-

grants as their chief citadel; it became the royal fortress of the Oxyliadæ and their following, into whose hands fell the best estates.

From here the Ætolian state, under the territorial name of Elis spread southward over the whole low country, where on the banks of the Alpheus the Epeans and Pylæans had once fought out those petty feuds of which Nestor was so fond of telling. On the decay of that maritime kingdom of the Neleidæ which was attacked on the south by the Messenian Dorians and on the north by the Epeans, Ætolian tribes pressed forward from the interior of the island; these were the Minyans who being expelled from Taygetus took possession of the mountains which run farthest in the direction of the Sicilian Sea from Arcadia. Here they settled themselves in six fortified towns, united by a common worship of Poseidon; Macistus and Lapreus, were the most distinguished. Thus between the Alpheus and the Neda, in what was afterwards the so-called Triphylia, or "country of three tribes," a new Minyan state was formed.

Finally the nucleus of a new state was also planted in the valley of the Alpheus, where scattered families of Achæans under Agorius of Helice allied themselves with Ætolian houses, and founded the state of Pisa.

Thus on the western coast, partly through conquest by the northern tribes and partly by arrivals from other parts of the peninsula, three new states arose, namely Elis, Pisa, and Triphylia; and in this way the whole coast district of the Peloponnesus was gradually newly populated and partitioned out afresh. Only in the district in the heart of the peninsula, did the country remain undisturbed in its existing state.

Arcadia was regarded by the ancients as a pre-eminently Pelasgian country, and here it was thought the autochthonic condition of the aboriginal inhabitants had been longest preserved and had suffered the least disturbance. Nevertheless the native legends themselves distinctly indicate that here also immigrations took place, interrupting the uniform condition of Pelasgian life, and occasioning a fusion of races, of different character and origin. Here too there is no mistaking the epoch at which, as in all other Greek states, the historical movement began.

After Pelasgus and his sons, Arcas, as ancestor of the Arcadians, stands at the beginning of a new era in the prehistoric life of the country. But Arcadians were to be found in Phrygia and Bithynia as well as in Crete and Cyprus, and the fact that colonists from the islands and shores of the eastern sea ascended into the highlands of the Peloponnesus that they might settle there in the beautiful valleys, is manifested by many tokens. The Cretan myths about Zeus are repeated in the closest manner of the Arcadian Lycæum; Tegea and Gortys are Cretan as well as Arcadian towns, with identical forms of worship, ancient legends connect Tegea and Paphos and the Cyprian dialect, which has only very recently been learnt from the native monuments, shows a great likeness to the Arcadian. Arcadians were known as navigators both in the western and in the eastern sea, and Nauplius, the hero of the oldest Peloponnesian seaport town appears as the servant of the Tegeatic kings, to whose house Argonauts like Anceus also belong.

There are remains of old traditions, which show that even the interior of the Peloponnesus was not so remote or isolated as is commonly supposed; that here too there were immigrations and that in consequence in the rural districts, and particularly in the fruitful ravines of the eastern side, a series of towns grew up, which, on account of the natural barriers of their frontiers, early formed isolated city domains; such as those of Pheneus, Stynphalus, Orchomenus, Cleitor and afterwards the towns of Mantinea, Alea, Caphyæ,

[ca. 1000 B.C.]

and Gortys. In the southwest portion of Arcadia, in the forest range of Lycæum, and in the valley of the Alpheus were also to be found ancient fortress towns, such as Lycosura; but these fortresses never became political centres of the districts. The mass of the people remained scattered and were only connected with the community by very slight bonds.

Thus the whole of Arcadia consisted of a numerous group of municipal and rural cantons. It was only the former which could attain historical importance, and among them especially Tegea, which lying as it did in the most fertile part of the great Arcadian plateau, must from the earliest times have assumed something of the position of a capital city. Thus it was a Tegeatic king, Echemus, the "steadfast," who is said to have prevented the Dorians from entering the peninsula. Yet the Tegeatæ never succeeded in giving a unity to the whole island. Its natural conformation was too multi-form, too diversified, and too much cut up by high mountain ridges into numerous and sharply defined portions for it to be able to attain to a common territorial history. It was only certain forms of worship, with which customs and institutions were bound up, that were universal among the whole Arcadian people. These were, in the north country the worship of Artemis Hymnia and in the south that of Zeus Lycæus, on the Lycæum, whose summit had been honoured as the holy mountain of Arcadia from primeval Pelasgian times.

The country was in this condition when the Pelopidæ founded their states; and so it still remained when the Dorians invaded the peninsula. A wild, impracticable mountain country, thickly populated by a sturdy people, Arcadia offered little prospect of easy success to races in search of territory, and could not detain them from their attempts on the river plains of the southern and western districts. According to the legend they were granted a free passage through the Arcadian fields. Nothing was changed except that the Arcadians were pushed farther and farther back from the sea, and therefore driven farther and farther from the advance Hellenic civilisation.

If we take a glance at the peninsula as a whole, and the political government which, in consequence of the immigration, it acquired for all time, we shall find, first, the interior persisting in its former condition unshaken, secondly, three districts, Lacedæmon, Messenia, and Argos, which had undergone a thorough metamorphosis directly due to the immigrating races; and finally the two strips of land along the north and west coasts, which had been left untouched by the Dorians, but in part were resettled by the ancient tribes whom the Dorians displaced, as was the case with Triphylia and Achæa, and in part transformed by arrivals of another kind, as happened at Elis.

Thus complicated were the results which followed the Dorian migration. They show sufficiently how little we have here to do with a transformation effected at one blow, like the result of a fortunate campaign. After the races had long wandered up and down in a varying series of territorial disputes and mutual agreements, the fate of the peninsula was gradually decided. Only when men had forgotten the tedious period of unrest and ferment, which memory can adorn with no incidents, could the reconstitution of the peninsula be regarded as a sudden turn of events by which the Peloponnesus had become Dorian.

Even in those districts which the invaders especially contended for and occupied, the transformation of the people into a Dorian population was only effected very gradually and in a very imperfect fashion. How could it

have been otherwise? Even the conquering hosts themselves were not of purely Dorian blood, but intermixed with people of all sorts of races. Nor was it as Dorians but as relatives of the Achæan princes that the leaders of their armies laid claim to power and rule. Thus Plato saw in the march of the Heraclids a union between Dorians and Achæans, dating from the times of the movement of the Greek peoples, and how little unity originally existed between the commander and his men is shown by a series of undoubted facts. For no sooner had the force of the warriors won a firm footing in the districts, than the interests of Heraclids and Dorians diverged and such dissensions broke out as either endangered or nullified the whole success of the colony.

The leaders sought to effect amalgamation of the old and new populations, that they might thus attain a broader foundation for their power and place themselves in a position independent of the influence of the Dorian warriors. Everywhere do we find the same phenomena, and most distinctly in Messenia. But in Laconia also, the Heraclids made themselves detested by their warriors, by trying to assimilate the non-Dorian to the Dorian people, and in Argolis we see the Heraclid Deiphontes, whose name is thoroughly Ionic, allied with Hyrnetho, who is the representative of the original population of the coast district. It is this same Deiphontes who helps to establish the throne of the Temenids in Argos, to the indignation of the other Heraclids and of the Dorians: here, therefore, their new kingdom undoubtedly rests on the support of the pre-Dorian population.

Thus the bonds between the Heraclids and the Dorians were loosened in all three countries, soon after their occupation. The political institutions were established in spite of the Dorians, and if the newly imported popular force was to have a fruitful and beneficial effect on the soil of the country, it required the art of a wise legislation to conciliate opposition and regulate the forces which threatened to destroy it. The first example of such legislation was given, as far as we know, on the island of Crete.

DORIANS IN CRETE

Dorians in considerable numbers had passed over into Crete from Argos and Laconia, and if in other cases islands and seacoast were not a soil on which the Dorian races felt at home, here it was otherwise.

Crete is rather a continent than an island. With the wealth of resources of every kind which distinguishes the country, the Cretan towns were able to preserve themselves from the restlessness belonging to the life of a seaport, and quietly to unfold the new germs of life which the Dorians brought to the island. Here, too, they came as invaders: massed in great hosts they overpowered the island people, whom no bonds of union held together. We find Dorian tribes in Cydonia, the first place in which the new arrivals from Cythera established themselves. Then Knossos, and especially Lyctus, whose Dorian people hailed from Laconia, became the chief towns of the new settlement.

The Dorians had here reached the land of an ancient civilisation, whose fertility was not yet exhausted. They found towns with definite constitutions and families well versed in the art of rule. State government and religious worship had here, under quieter conditions, retained their original connection and in especial the religion of Apollo, administered by the old priestly families, displayed its organising, civilising, and intellectual influ-

[ca. 1000 B.C.]

ence in entirety. The Dorians brought nothing but their tempestuous courage and the strength of their spears; compared with the Cretan nobility they were the merest children in all that concerns the art of government and legislation. They demanded land and left it to others to find out the ways and means of satisfying their requirements, for the overthrow of the ancient government signified nothing to them. But that the Dorians nevertheless did not behave as reckless conquerors; that they did not overturn the ancient state and found new ones, is manifest from the mere fact that the organisation of Dorian Crete is nowhere referred to a Dorian originator.

On the contrary, Aristotle testifies that the inhabitants of the Cretan town of Lyctus, where the Dorian institutions were most completely developed, preserved the existing institutions of the country; according to unanimous tradition, there was no break, no gap between the Dorian and the pre-Dorian period; so that the name of Minos, the representative of Cretan civilisation, could be associated both with the old and the new.

Patrician houses whose rights had come down to them from the royal period, remained in possession of the government. Now as formerly it was from them that the ten chief rulers of the state, "the Kosmoi," were taken in the different towns; from them that the senate was chosen, whose members retained their dignity for life and were answerable to none. These families held rule in the towns when the Dorians invaded them. They concluded treaties with them, which took account of the interests of both sides, they made themselves subservient to the foreign power, by assigning the immigrants a sufficient share of the land which the state had to dispose of, not without the accompanying obligation of military service and the right, as the fighting portion of the community, to a voice in all important decisions but especially when it was a question of war and peace.

The Dorians took their place as the fighting element in the state. For this reason, the boys as they grew up, were placed under state discipline; united in troops; trained according to regulation, in the public gymnasia, and schooled in the use of weapons; they were inured to hard living and prepared by warlike games for real combats. Thus, remote from all effeminate influences, the military qualities peculiar to the Dorian race were to be imparted; there was also, however, some intermixture of Cretan customs, as for instance, the use of the bow, which was previously unknown to the Dorian. The grown youths and men, even if they possessed households of their own, were expected to be sensible first of all of the fact that they were comrades in arms, and prepared to march at any moment as though in a camp. Accordingly at the men's daily meal they sat together by troops, as they served in the army, and in the same way they slept in common dormitories. The costs were met through the state from a common chest, but this chest was supplied by each delivering the tenth part of the fruit of his possession to the fraternity to which he belonged, and this tithe was then handed over to the state chest. In return, the state undertook to support the warriors, as well as the women who had charge of the house with the children and servants, in times both of peace and war. I believe it is plain that we have here an arrangement agreed on by treaty between the older and newer members of the state.

In order, however, that the Dorian fighting element might be able to devote itself wholly to its calling, its members had to be entirely exempt from the necessity of personally cultivating their share of the soil; otherwise they would not only have been impoverished by its neglect in war-time, but in peace they would have been detained from military exercises, and the

equally valuable hunting excursions after the plentiful game of the Ida Mountains. Consequently the work of agriculture was imposed on a special class of men, who, by the chance of war, had fallen into the condition of servitude and were deprived of civil rights. When and how this element of serfdom was formed, is not indicated; but there were two classes of them. The one tilled those fields which had been preserved by the state as public property; these were the so-called *Mnoetæ*; the others, the *Clarotæ* dwelt on the lands which had passed by donation into the hereditary possession of the immigrants. The Dorian landowners were their masters and had the right to demand of them the fruit of the field at a fixed date, while it was their duty to see that the soil was properly improved, so that nothing might be lost to the state. Otherwise the military class lived without care, unconcerned for the maintenance of existence, and could say, as the proverbial lines of the Cretan *Hybrias* have it, "Here are my sword, spear and shield; my whole treasure; herewith I plough and gather the harvest."

What they learned was the use of weapons and self-command; their art, discipline, and obedience, obedience of the younger to the older, of the soldier to his superior, of all to the state. Higher and more liberal culture appeared unnecessary and even dangerous, and we may suppose that the ruling families of Crete had intentionally laid down a one-sided and narrow education for the Dorian community, in order that they might not feel tempted to outstep their soldierly calling, and contest the guidance of the state with the native races.

Beside these however there remained on the peninsula a considerable part of the older population, whose position was entirely unaffected by the Dorian immigration; the people on the mountains and in the rural towns, who were dependent on the larger cities of the island and paid according to an ancient usage a yearly tax to their governments; and rural peasants and cattle-breeders, tradesmen, fishers, and sailors who had nothing to do with the State except willingly to submit to its ordinances, and to pursue their occupations in a peaceful fashion.

It is on the whole, an unmistakable fact that a Greek state organisation of a very remarkable character was here called into being, and formed a combination in which old and new, foreign and native, were amalgamated; an organization which Plato judged worthy to form the groundwork for the plan of his ideal state. For here we actually have the latter's three classes: the class equipped with the wise foresight becoming the rulers of the state; the class of "guards," in which the virtue of courage, with exclusion from a more liberal development by means of art and science, was the object to be attained; and, finally, the industrial class, the element which provided the necessities of life, and to which a disproportionately larger amount of arbitrary freedom was permitted; it had but to provide for the physical support of itself and the community generally. The first and third classes might have formed the state by themselves, inasmuch as they sufficiently represented the mutual relations of governing and governed. Between the two the guards, or armed element, had thrust itself in, to the increase of stability and durability. On this wise it came to pass that Crete was the first country to succeed in assigning to the Dorian race a share in the ancient community, and thus for the second time the island of Minos became a typical starting-point for the Hellenic state organisation.


The later Crete is also better known to us by the effects which proceeded from it, than in its internal condition like a heavenly body the abundance of whose light is measured by its reflection on other objects. Crete became for

[ca. 1000 B.C.]

the Hellenes the cradle of a complicated civilisation. Thence sprang a series of men who founded the art of sculpture in the peculiar Hellenic form, and strewed its seeds in all Greek countries—for Diponus and Scyllis, the earliest masters in marble sculptures, derived their origin from Crete, the home of Dædalus. Other Cretans distinguished themselves as masters in the art of divination, and as singers and musicians who, educated in the service of Apollo, obtained such power over the human soul, that they were summoned by foreign states to interpose their aid in a disordered condition of the community and lay the foundations of a sound system of government. These Cretan masters, such as Thaletas and Epimenides, are not, however, sprung from the Dorian race any more than are the sculptors; the new shoots had sprouted from the old root of native culture, even if the admixture of various Greek races had essentially contributed to the impulse of new vital activity.

In spite of the fact that the population of Crete received such a reinforcement and that she had so well understood how to employ it to strengthen her states, none the less, after the time of Minos, she never again attained to a political influence extending over all her shores. The chief cause lies in the condition of the island which made the formation of a great state an impossibility. The territories of the various towns among which the Dorians were divided, Cydonia in the west, Knossos and Lyctus in the north and Gortys in the south of the island, held suspiciously aloof from one another, or were at open feud; thus the Dorian strength was squandered in the interests of petty towns. Added to this that the Dorians, when they immigrated across the sea, of course came only in small bands, and for the most part, unaccompanied by women, so that for this reason alone they could not retain their racial characteristics to the same extent as on the mainland. Finally, even in the seats of Dorian habitation across the sea, we sometimes find, that not all three races, but only one of them had settled in the same town; thus in Halicarnassus there were only Dymanes; in Cydonia, as it seems, only Hylleans. Thus a fresh dispersal and weakening of the Dorian strength must have supervened, and it is easy to understand why the continental settlements of the Dorians, especially those of the Peloponnesus, still remained the most important and the ones fraught with most consequence for history.

In the Peloponnesus, however, it was, once again, at a single point that a Dorian history of independent and far-reaching importance developed itself. And that point was Sparta.^c



GREEK COIN



CHAPTER VI. SPARTA AND LYCURGUS

What! are these stones, yon column's broken shaft,
Where moss-crowned Ruin long hath sat and laughed,
These shattered steps, these walls that earthward bow,
All Sparta's Royal Square can boast of now?

—NICHOLAS MICHELL.

THE characteristic development of Sparta depends partly on the nature of the land and partly on the relations formed there by strange conquerors.

Sparta is a peninsular land, enclosed by an almost uninterrupted line of mountains, a hundred miles square in area, which opens itself out southwards towards the sea between two necks of land. On the west side are the steep walls of Taygetus, which before entering into the Tænarian promontory are penetrated by a pass which leads into Messenia; to the east on the coast is the chain of Parnon. Between these mountains, which enclose many cultivable valleys, the valley of the Eurotas runs from north to south and is narrow in its upper part to below the defile in which Sparta lies; south of this it extends itself in the shape of a trough into a fertile plain which again narrows itself towards the sea; there are no good ports. Therefore on all sides Sparta was not easily accessible to the enemy, or even to friends; and had produce enough for its inhabitants.

Sparta had three classes of inhabitants. They were:

(1) the Helots, those old inhabitants of the land who in consequence of their obstinate resistance were made slaves; and were not so much oppressed as hated and despised; they had to pay a "fixed and moderate rent" for the land on which they (bound to the soil) dwelt, nevertheless they were partly public and partly private slaves and could only go about in a special slave costume; the so-called *crypteia*¹ was a yearly campaign against them when they showed themselves refractory; it served as military exercise or manœuvres to the youthful conquerors.

(2) The Laconians stood under far more favourable relations; they were the populations of the hundred towns of the province; a portion of them were strangers who had joined the Dorians at the conquest, but, for the greater part, they were old inhabitants who early enough subjected themselves to the conquerors. They stood in the relation of subjects, and had no political rights, but were in no way oppressed; they had landed property for which they paid rent to the state; and they carried on trade and art.

(3) The Dorian conquerors, the real Spartans, dwelt in the capital, which remained an "open camp," all the more so as they formed only a small part of the whole population and could keep the land in subjection only by arms. They were the ruling citizens, possessed the best lands

[¹ J. B. Bury translates it as "a secret police."]

[ca. 835 B.C.]

which were in the vicinity of the capital, and had these cultivated by slaves (helots) whilst they dedicated themselves to war and the affairs of state.

These relations certainly existed in the beginnings of the Dorian conquest, but they were only brought about by circumstances, without being regulated by law. Many errors must have arisen through this, and they seem to have given rise to the "Legislation of Lycurgus."^b

While modern criticism makes few inroads upon the accepted stories of the Spartan régime it assails the very existence of Lycurgus, the so-called creator of it. The earliest accounts of his legislation are three centuries later than the time of his alleged career. The old Spartan poet Tyrteus does not seem to have mentioned him. Pindar credits his edicts to Ægimius the mythical ancestor of the Dorians. Hellanicus and Thucydides do not credit them to Lycurgus, and the "argument from silence" is strong against him. His name means "wolf-repeller," and it is thought that from being originally a god of protection worshipped by the predecessors of the Dorians, he came to be accepted finally as a man and a lawgiver. But historical cities have denied the existence of other heroes of tradition only to restore them later to their old glory, and it is necessary to present here the Lycurgus of venerable story, as all the traditions of early Spartan communal life centre about his name; and their alleged ancient lawgiver becomes, therefore, one of the most important personages in Grecian history. As to his personality—accepting him for the nonce as a reality—opinions differ according to the bias of the individual historian. We shall perhaps be in best position to gain a judicious idea of the subject by first following the biography of Lycurgus by Plutarch, and afterward turning to modern investigators for an estimate of the man and his laws. Whatever our individual opinion as to the personality of the hero himself, we shall at least gain an insight into the actual customs of the Spartans; and it perhaps does not greatly matter if we are left in doubt as to the share which any single man—be his name Lycurgus or what not—had in shaping them.^a



THE VALLEY OF SPARTA

PLUTARCH'S ACCOUNT OF LYCURGUS

Of Lycurgus, the lawgiver, says Plutarch, we have nothing to relate that is certain and uncontroverted. For there are different accounts of his birth, his travels, his death, and especially of the laws and form of government

which he established. But least of all are the times agreed upon in which this great man lived. For some say he flourished at the same time with Iphitus, and joined with him in settling the cessation of arms during the Olympic Games. Among these is Aristotle the philosopher, who alleges for proof an Olympic quoit, on which was preserved the inscription of Lyncurgus' name. But others who, with Eratosthenes and Apollodorus, compute the time by the succession of the Spartan kings, place him much earlier than the first Olympiad. Timæus, however, supposes, that, as there were two Lyncurguses in Sparta at different times, the actions of both are ascribed to one, on account of his particular renown; and that the more ancient of them lived not long after Homer: Nay, some say he had seen him. Xenophon, too, confirms the opinion of his antiquity, when he makes him contemporary with the Heraclidæ. It is true, the latest of the Lacedæmonian kings were of the lineage of the Heraclidæ; but Xenophon there seems to speak of the first and more immediate descendants of Hercules. As the history of those times is thus involved, in relating the circumstances of Lyncurgus' life, we shall endeavour to select such as are least controverted, and follow authors of the greatest credit.

For a long time anarchy and confusion prevailed in Sparta, by which one of its kings, the father of Lyncurgus, lost his life. For while he was endeavouring to part some persons who were concerned in a fray, he received a wound by a kitchen knife, of which he died, leaving the kingdom to his eldest son Polydectes.

But he, too, dying soon after, the general voice gave it for Lyncurgus to ascend the throne; and he actually did so, till it appeared that his brother's widow was pregnant. As soon as he perceived this, he declared that the kingdom belonged to her issue, provided it were male, and he kept the administration in his hands only as his guardian. This he did with the title of Prodicos, which the Lacedæmonians give to the guardians of infant kings. Soon after, the queen made him a private overture, that she would destroy her child, upon condition that he would marry her when king of Sparta. Though he detested her wickedness, he said nothing against the proposal, but pretending to approve it, charged her not to take any drugs to procure an abortion, lest she should endanger her own health or life; for he would take care that the child, as soon as born, should be destroyed. Thus he artfully drew on the woman to her full time, and, when he heard she was in labour, he sent persons to attend and watch her delivery, with orders, if it were a girl, to give it to the women, but if a boy, to bring it to him, in whatever business he might be engaged. It happened that he was at supper with the magistrates when she was delivered of a boy, and his servants, who were present, carried the child to him. When he received it, he is reported to have said to the company, "Spartans, see here your new-born king." He then laid him down upon the chair of state, and named him Charilaus, because of the joy and admiration of his magnanimity and justice testified by all present. Thus the reign of Lyncurgus lasted only eight months. But the citizens had a great veneration for him on other accounts, and there were more that paid him their attentions, and were ready to execute his commands, out of regard to his virtues, than those that obeyed him as a guardian to the King, and director of the administration. There were not, however, wanting those that envied him, and opposed his advancement, as too high for so young a man; particularly the relations and friends of the queen-mother, who seemed to have been treated with contempt. Her brother Leonidas one day boldly attacked him with virulent language, and scrupled

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not to tell him, that he was well assured he would soon be king. Insinuations of the same kind were likewise spread by the queen-mother. Moved with this ill treatment, and fearing some dark design, he determined to get clear of all suspicion, by travelling into other countries, till his nephew should be grown up, and have a son to succeed him in the kingdom.

He set sail, therefore, and landed in Crete. There having observed the forms of government, and conversed with the most illustrious personages, he was struck with admiration of some of their laws, and resolved at his return to make use of them in Sparta. Some others he rejected. From Crete Lycurgus passed to Asia, desirous, as is said, to compare the Ionian expense and luxury with the Cretan frugality and hard diet, so as to judge what effect each had on their several manners and governments. The Egyptians likewise suppose that he visited them; and as of all their institutions he was most pleased with their distinguishing the military men from the rest of the people, he took the same method at Sparta, and, by separating from these the mechanics and artificers, he rendered the constitution more noble and more of a piece.

Returning, he immediately applied himself to alter the whole frame of the constitution; sensible that a partial change, and the introducing of some new laws, would be of no sort of advantage, he applied to the nobility, and desired them to put their hands to the work; addressing himself privately at first to his friends, and afterwards, by degrees, trying the disposition of others, and preparing them to concur in the business. When matters were ripe, he ordered thirty of the principal citizens to appear armed in the market-place by break of day, to strike terror into such as might desire to oppose him. Upon the first alarm, King Charilaus, apprehending it to be a design against his person, took refuge in the *Chalcioicos* [brazen temple]. But he was soon satisfied, and accepted their oath, and joined in the undertaking.

The Institutions of Lycurgus

Among the many new institutions of Lycurgus, the first and most important was that of a senate; which sharing, as Plato says, in the power of the kings, too imperious and unrestrained before, and having equal authority with them, was the means of keeping them within the bounds of moderation, and highly contributed to the preservation of the state. For before, it had been veering and unsettled, sometimes inclining to arbitrary power, and sometimes towards a pure democracy; but this establishment of a senate, an intermediate body, like ballast, kept in it a just equilibrium, and put it in a safe posture: the twenty-eight senators adhering to the kings, whenever they saw the people too encroaching, and, on the other hand, supporting the people, when the kings attempted to make themselves absolute. This, according to Aristotle, was the number of senators fixed upon, because two of the thirty associates of Lycurgus deserted the business through fear.

He had this institution so much at heart, that he obtained from Delphi an oracle in its behalf called *rhetra*, or *the decree*.

Though the government was thus tempered by Lycurgus, yet soon after it degenerated into an oligarchy, whose power was exercised with such wantonness and violence, that it wanted indeed a bridle, as Plato expresses it. This curb they found in the authority of the ephori, about one hundred and thirty years after Lycurgus.

A second and bolder political enterprise of Lycurgus, was a new division of the lands. For he found a prodigious inequality, the city over-charged

with many indigent persons, who had no land, and the wealth centred in the hands of a few. Determined, therefore, to root out the evils of insolence, envy, avarice, and luxury, and those distempers of a state still more inveterate and fatal, I mean poverty and riches, he persuaded them to cancel all former divisions of land, and to make new ones, in such a manner that they might be perfectly equal in their possessions and way of living. Hence, if they were ambitious of distinction they might seek it in virtue, as no other difference was left between them, but that which arises from the dishonour of base actions and the praise of good ones. His proposal was put in practice.

After this, he attempted to divide also the movables, in order to take away all appearance of inequality; but he soon perceived that they could not bear to have their goods directly taken from them, and therefore took another method, counterworking their avarice by a stratagem. First he stopped the currency of the gold and silver coin, and ordered that they should make use of iron money only: then to a great quantity and weight of this he assigned but a small value; so that to lay up ten minæ [£30 or \$150] a whole room was required, and to remove it nothing less than a yoke of oxen. When this became current, many kinds of injustice ceased in Lacedæmon. Who would steal or take a bribe, who would defraud or rob, when he could not conceal the booty? Their iron coin would not pass in the rest of Greece, but was ridiculed and despised; so that the Spartans had no means of purchasing any foreign or curious wares; nor did any merchantship unlade in their harbours. There were not even to be found in all their country either sophists, wandering fortune-tellers, keepers of infamous houses, or dealers in gold and silver trinkets, because there was no money. Thus luxury, losing by degrees the means that cherished and supported it, died away of itself: even they who had great possessions, had no advantage from them, since they could not be displayed in public, but must lie useless, in unregarded repositories.

Desirous to complete the conquest of luxury, and exterminate the love of riches, he introduced a third institution, which was wisely enough and ingeniously contrived. This was the use of public tables, where all were to eat in common of the same meat, and such kinds of it as were appointed by law. At the same time, they were forbidden to eat at home, upon expensive couches and tables, to call in the assistance of butchers and cooks, or to fatten like voracious animals in private. For so not only their manners would be corrupted, but their bodies disordered; abandoned to all manner of sensuality and dissoluteness, they would require long sleep, warm baths, and the same indulgence as in perpetual sickness. To effect this was certainly very great; but it was greater still, to secure riches from rapine and from envy, as Theophrastus expresses it, or rather by their eating in common, and by the frugality of their table, to take from riches their very being. For what use or enjoyment of them, what peculiar display of magnificence could there be, where the poor man went to the same refreshment with the rich?

The rich, therefore (we are told), were more offended with this regulation than with any other, and, rising in a body, they loudly expressed their indignation: nay, they proceeded so far as to assault Lycurgus with stones, so that he was forced to fly from the assembly and take refuge in a temple.

The public repasts were called by the Cretans *andria*; but the Lacedæmonians styled them *phiditia*, either from their tendency to *friendship* and mutual benevolence, *phiditia* being used instead of *philitia*; or else from their teaching frugality and *parsimony*, which the word *pheido* signifies. But it is not at all impossible, that the first letter might by some means or

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other be added, and so *phiditia* take place of *editia*, which barely signifies *eating*. There were fifteen persons to a table, or a few more or less. Each of them was obliged to bring in monthly a bushel of meal, eight gallons of wine, five pounds of cheese, two pounds and a half of figs, and a little money to buy flesh and fish. If any of them happened to offer a sacrifice of first fruits, or to kill venison, he sent a part of it to the public table: for after a sacrifice or hunting, he was at liberty to sup at home: but the rest were to appear at the usual place. For a long time this eating in common was observed with great exactness: so that when King Agis returned from a successful expedition against the Athenians, and from a desire to sup with his wife, requested to have his portion at home, the polemarchs refused to send it: nay, when, through resentment, he neglected the day following to offer the sacrifice usual on occasion of victory, they set a fine upon him. Children were also introduced at these public tables, as so many schools of sobriety. There they heard discourses concerning government, and were instructed in the most liberal breeding. There they were allowed to jest without scurrility, and were not to take it ill when the raillery was returned. For it was reckoned worthy of a Lacedæmonian to bear a jest: but if any one's patience failed, he had only to desire them to be quiet, and they left off immediately. After they had drunk moderately, they went home without lights. Indeed, they were forbidden to walk with a light either on this or any other occasion, that they might accustom themselves to march in the darkest night boldly and resolutely. Such was the order of their public repasts.

Lycurgus left none of his laws in writing; it was ordered in one of the *rhêtræ* that none should be written. For what he thought most conducive to the virtue and happiness of a city, was principles interwoven with the manners and breeding of the people. As for smaller matters, it was better not to reduce these to a written form and unalterable method, but to suffer them to change with the times, and to admit of additions or retrenchments at the pleasure of persons so well educated. For he resolved the whole business of legislation into the bringing up of youth. And this, as we have observed, was the reason why one of his ordinances forbade them to have any written laws.

Another ordinance levelled against magnificence and expense, directed that the ceilings of houses should be wrought with no tool but the axe, and the doors with nothing but the saw.

Regulations Regarding Marriage and the Conduct of Women

As for the education of youth, which he looked upon as the greatest and most glorious work of a lawgiver, he began with it at the very source, taking into consideration their conception and birth, by regulating the marriages. For he did not (as Aristotle says) desist from his attempt to bring the women under sober rules. They had, indeed, assumed great liberty and power on account of the frequent expeditions of their husbands, during which they were left sole mistresses at home, and so gained an undue deference and improper titles; but notwithstanding this he took all possible care of them. He ordered the virgins to exercise themselves in running, wrestling, and throwing quoits and darts; that their bodies being strong and vigorous, the children afterwards produced from them might be the same; and that, thus fortified by exercise, they might the better support the pangs of childbirth, and be delivered with safety. In order to take away the excessive tenderness and delicacy of the sex, the consequence of a recluse life, he accustomed

the virgins occasionally to be seen naked as well as the young men, and to dance and sing in their presence on certain festivals. There they sometimes indulged in a little raillery upon those that had misbehaved themselves, and sometimes they sung encomiums on such as deserved them, thus exciting in the young men a useful emulation and love of glory. For he who was praised for his bravery and celebrated among the virgins, went away perfectly happy: while their satirical glances thrown out in sport, were no less cutting than serious admonitions; especially as the kings and senate went with the other citizens to see all that passed. As for the virgins appearing naked, there was nothing disgraceful in it, because everything was conducted with modesty, and without one indecent word or action. Nay, it caused a simplicity of manners and an emulation for the best habit of body; their ideas, too, were naturally enlarged, while they were not excluded from their share of bravery and honour. Hence they were furnished with sentiments and language, such as Gorgo the wife of Leonidas is said to have made use of. When a woman of another country said to her, "You of Lacedæmon are the only women in the world that rule the men:" she answered, "We are the only women that bring forth men."

These public dances and other exercises of the young maidens naked, in sight of the young men, were, moreover, incentives to marriage; and, to use Plato's expression, drew them almost as necessarily by the attractions of love, as a geometrical conclusion follows from the premises. To encourage it still more, some marks of infamy were set upon those that continued bachelors. For they were not permitted to see these exercises of the naked virgins; and the magistrates commanded them to march naked round the market-place in the winter, and to sing a song composed against themselves, which expressed how justly they were punished for their disobedience to the laws. They were also deprived of that honour and respect which the younger people paid to the old; so that nobody found fault with what was said to Dercyllidas, though an eminent commander. It seems, when he came one day into company, a young man, instead of rising up and giving place, told him, "You have no child to give place to me, when I am old."

In their marriages the bridegroom carried off the bride by violence; and she was never chosen in a tender age, but when she had arrived at full maturity. Then the woman that had the direction of the wedding, cut the bride's hair close to the skin, dressed her in man's clothes, laid her upon a mattress, and left her in the dark. The bridegroom, neither oppressed with wine nor enervated with luxury, but perfectly sober, as having always supped at the common table, went in privately, untied her girdle, and carried her to another bed. Having stayed there a short time, he modestly retired to his usual apartment, to sleep with the other young men: and observed the same conduct afterwards, spending the day with his companions, and reposing himself with them in the night, nor even visiting his bride but with great caution and apprehensions of being discovered by the rest of the family; the bride at the same time exerted all her art to contrive convenient opportunities for their private meetings. And this they did not for a short time only, but some of them even had children before they had an interview with their wives in the day-time. This kind of commerce not only exercised their temperance and chastity, but kept their bodies fruitful, and the first ardour of their love fresh and unabated; for as they were not satiated like those that are always with their wives, there still was place for unextinguished desire.

When he had thus established a proper regard to modesty and decorum with respect to marriage, he was equally studious to drive from that state

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the vain and womanish passion of jealousy ; by making it quite as reputable to have children in common with persons of merit, as to avoid all offensive freedom in their own behaviour to their wives. He laughed at those who revenge with wars and bloodshed the communication of a married woman's favours ; and allowed, that if a man in years should have a young wife, he might introduce to her some handsome and honest young man, whom he most approved of, and when she had a child of this generous race, bring it up as his own. On the other hand, he allowed, if a man of character should entertain a passion for a married woman on account of her modesty and the beauty of her children, he might treat with her husband for admission to her company, that so planting in a beauty-bearing soil, he might produce excellent children, the congenial offspring of excellent parents.

For in the first place, Lycurgus considered children, not so much the property of their parents, as of the state ; and therefore he would not have them begot by ordinary persons, but by the best men in it. In the next place, he observed the vanity and absurdity of other nations, where people study to have their horses and dogs of the finest breed they can procure, either by interest or money ; and yet keep their wives shut up, that they may have children by none but themselves, though they may happen to be doting, decrepit, or infirm. As if children, when sprung from a bad stock, and consequently good for nothing, were no detriment to those whom they belong to, and who have the trouble of bringing them up, nor any advantage, when well descended and of a generous disposition. These regulations tending to secure a healthy offspring, and consequently beneficial to the state, were so far from encouraging that licentiousness of the women which prevailed afterwards, that adultery was not known amongst them.

The Rearing of Children

It was not left to the father to rear what children he pleased, but he was obliged to carry the child to a place called Leseche, to be examined by the most ancient men of the tribe, who were assembled there. If it was strong and well proportioned, they gave orders for its education, and assigned it one of the nine thousand shares of land ; but if it was weakly and deformed, they ordered it to be thrown into the place called Apothetæ, which is a deep cavern near the mountain Taygetus : concluding that its life could be no advantage either to itself or to the public, since nature had not given it at first any strength or goodness of constitution. For the same reason the women did not wash their new-born infants with water, but with wine, thus making some trial of their habit of body ; imagining that sickly and epileptic children sink and die under the experiment, while healthy became more vigorous and hardy. Great care and art was also exerted by the nurses ; for, as they never swathed the infants, their limbs had a freer turn, and their countenances a more liberal air ; besides, they used them to any sort of meat, to have no terrors in the dark, nor to be afraid of being alone, and to leave all ill humour and unmanly crying. Hence people of other countries purchased Lacedæmonian nurses for their children.

The Spartan children were not in that manner, under tutors purchased or hired with money, nor were the parents at liberty to educate them as they pleased : but as soon as they were seven years old, Lycurgus ordered them to be enrolled in companies, where they were all kept under the same order and discipline, and had their exercises and recreations in common. He who showed the most conduct and courage amongst them, was made

captain of the company. The rest kept their eyes upon him, obeyed his orders, and bore with patience the punishment he inflicted: so that their whole education was an exercise of obedience. The old men were present at their diversions, and often suggested some occasion of dispute or quarrel, that they might observe with exactness the spirit of each, and their firmness in battle.

As for learning, they had just what was absolutely necessary. All the rest of their education was calculated to make them subject to command, to endure labour, to fight and conquer. They added, therefore, to their discipline, as they advanced in age; cutting their hair very close, making them go barefoot, and play, for the most part, quite naked. At twelve years of age, their under garment was taken away, and but one upper one a year allowed them. Hence they were necessarily dirty in their persons, and were not indulged with the great favour of baths and oils, except on some particular days of the year. They slept in companies, on beds made of the tops of reeds, which they gathered with their own hands, without knives, and brought from the banks of the Eurotas. In winter they were permitted to add a little thistle-down, as that seemed to have some warmth in it.

They steal, too, whatever victuals they possibly can, ingeniously contriving to do it when persons are asleep, or keep but indifferent watch. If they are discovered, they are punished not only with whipping, but with hunger. Indeed, their supper is but slender at all times, that, to fence against want, they may be forced to exercise their courage and address. This is the first intention of their spare diet: a subordinate one is, to make them grow tall. For when the animal spirits are not too much oppressed by a great quantity of food, which stretches itself out in breadth and thickness, they mount upwards by their natural lightness, and the body easily and freely shoots up in height. This also contributes to make them handsome: for thin and slender habits yield more freely to nature, which then gives a fine proportion to the limbs; whilst the heavy and gross resist her by their weight.

The boys steal with so much caution, that one of them, having conveyed a young fox under his garment, suffered the creature to tear out his bowels with his teeth and claws, choosing rather to die than to be detected. Nor does this appear incredible, if we consider what their young men can endure to this day; for we have seen many of them expire under the lash at the altar of Diana Orthia.

The Famed Laconic Discourse: Spartan Discipline

The boys were also taught to use sharp repartee, seasoned with humour, and whatever they said was to be concise and pithy. For Lycurgus, as we have observed, fixed but a small value on a considerable quantity of his iron money; but on the contrary, the worth of speech was to consist in its being comprised in a few plain words, pregnant with a great deal of sense: and he contrived that by long silence they might learn to be sententious and acute in their replies. As debauchery often causes weakness and sterility in the body, so the intemperance of the tongue makes conversation empty and insipid. King Agis, therefore, when a certain Athenian laughed at the Lacedæmonian short words and said, "The jugglers would swallow them with ease upon the stage," answered in his laconic way, "And yet we can reach our enemies' hearts with them." Indeed, to me there seems to be something in this concise manner of speaking which immediately reaches the object aimed at, and forcibly strikes the mind of the hearer.

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Lycurgus himself was short and sententious in his discourse, if we may judge by some of his answers which are recorded: that, for instance, concerning the constitution. When one advised him to establish a popular government in Lacedæmon, "Go," said he, "and first make a trial of it in thy own family." That again, concerning sacrifices to the deity, when he was asked why he appointed them so trifling and of so little value, "That we may never be in want," said he, "of something to offer him." Once more, when they inquired of him, what sort of martial exercises he allowed of, he answered, "All, except those in which you stretch out your palms." Several such like replies of his are said to be taken from the letters which he wrote to his countrymen: as to their question, "How shall we best guard against the invasion of an enemy?" "By continuing poor, and not desiring in your possessions to be one above another." And to the question, whether they should enclose Sparta with walls, "That city is well fortified which has a wall of men instead of brick." Whether these and some other letters ascribed to him are genuine or not, is no easy matter to determine.

Even when they indulged a vein of pleasantry, one might perceive, that they would not use one unnecessary word, nor let an expression escape them that had not some sense worth attending to. For one being asked to go and hear a person who imitated the nightingale to perfection, answered, "I have heard the nightingale herself."

Nor were poetry and music less cultivated among them, than a concise dignity of expression. Their songs had a spirit, which could rouse the soul, and impel it in an enthusiastic manner to action. The language was plain and manly, the subject serious and moral. For they consisted chiefly of the praises of heroes that had died for Sparta, or else of expressions of detestation for such wretches as had declined the glorious opportunity, and rather chose to drag on life in misery and contempt. Nor did they forget to express an ambition for glory suitable to their respective ages.

Hippias the sophist tells us, that Lycurgus himself was a man of great personal valour, and an experienced commander. Philostephanus also ascribes to him the first division of cavalry into troops of fifty, who were drawn up in a square body. But Demetrius the Phalerean says, that he never had any military employment, and that there was the profoundest peace imaginable when he established the Constitution of Sparta. His providing for a cessation of arms during the Olympic Games is likewise a mark of the humane and peaceable man.

The discipline of the Lacedæmonians continued after they were arrived at years of maturity. For no man was at liberty to live as he pleased; the city being like one great camp, where all had their stated allowance, and knew their public charge, each man concluding that he was born, not for himself, but for his country. Hence, if they had no particular orders, they employed themselves in inspecting the boys, and teaching them something useful, or in learning of those that were older than themselves. One of the greatest privileges that Lycurgus procured his countrymen, was the enjoyment of leisure, the consequence of his forbidding them to exercise any mechanic trade. It was not worth their while to take great pains to raise a fortune, since riches there were of no account: and the helots, who tilled the ground, were answerable for the produce above-mentioned.

Lawsuits were banished from Lacedæmon with money. The Spartans knew neither riches nor poverty, but possessed an equal competency, and had a cheap and easy way of supplying their few wants. Hence, when they were not engaged in war, their time was taken up with dancing, feasting,

hunting, or meeting to exercise or converse. They went not to market under thirty years of age, all their necessary concerns being managed by their relations and adopters. Nor was it reckoned a credit to the old to be seen sauntering in the market-place; it was deemed more suitable for them to pass great part of the day in the schools of exercise, or places of conversation. Their discourse seldom turned upon money, or business, or trade, but upon the praise of the excellent, or the contempt of the worthless; and the last was expressed with that pleasantry and humour, which conveyed instruction and correction without seeming to intend it. Nor was Lyncurgus himself immoderately severe in his manner; but, as Sosibius tells us, he dedicated a little statue to the god of laughter in each hall. He considered facetiousness as a seasoning of their hard exercise and diet, and therefore ordered it to take place on all proper occasions, in their common entertainments and parties of pleasures. Upon the whole, he taught his citizens to think nothing more disagreeable than to live by (or for) themselves.

The Senate; Burial Customs; Home-Staying; The Ambuscade

The Senate, as said before, consisted at first of those that were assistants to Lyncurgus in his great enterprise. Afterwards, to fill up any vacancy that might happen, he ordered the most worthy men to be selected, of those that were full threescore years old. This was the most respectable dispute in the world, and the contest was truly glorious: for it was not who should be swiftest among the swift, or strongest of the strong, but who was the wisest and best among the good and wise. He who had the preference was to bear this mark of superior excellence through life, this great authority, which put into his hands the lives and honour of the citizens, and every other important affair. The manner of the election was this: When the people were assembled, some persons appointed for the purpose were shut up in a room near the place; where they could neither see nor be seen, and only hear the shouts of the constituents: for by them they decided this and most other affairs. Each candidate walked silently through the assembly, one after another according to lot. Those that were shut up had writing tables, in which they set down in different columns the number and loudness of the shouts, without knowing whom they were for; only they marked them as first, second, third, and so on, according to the number of the competitors. He that had the most and loudest acclamations, was declared duly elected. Then he was crowned with a garland, and went round to give thanks to the gods: a number of young men followed, striving which should extol him most, and the women celebrated his virtues in their songs, and blessed his worthy life and conduct. Each of his relations offered him a repast, and their address on the occasion was, "Sparta honours you with this collation." When he had finished the procession, he went to the common table, and lived as before. Only two portions were set before him, one of which he carried away: and as all the women related to him attended at the gates of the public hall, he called her for whom he had the greatest esteem, and presented her with the portion, saying at the same time, "That which I received as a mark of honour, I give to you." Then she was conducted home with great applause by the rest of the women.

Lyncurgus likewise made good regulations with respect to burials. In the first place, to take away all superstition, he ordered the dead to be buried in the city, and even permitted their monuments to be erected near the temples; accustoming the youth to such sights from their infancy, that they

[ca. 885 B.C.]

might have no uneasiness from them nor any horror for death, as if people were polluted with the touch of a dead body, or with treading upon a grave. In the next place, he suffered nothing to be buried with the corpse, except the red cloth and the olive leaves in which it was wrapped. Nor would he suffer the relations to inscribe any names upon the tombs, except of those men that fell in battle, or those women who died in some sacred office. He fixed eleven days for the time of mourning: on the twelfth they were to put an end to it, after offering sacrifice to Ceres. No part of life was left vacant and unimproved, but even with their necessary actions he interwove the praise of virtue and the contempt of vice: and he so filled the city with living examples, that it was next to impossible for persons who had these from their infancy before their eyes, not to be drawn and formed to honour.

For the same reason he would not permit all that desired to go abroad and see other countries, lest they should contract foreign manners, gain traces of a life of little discipline, and of a different form of government. He forbade strangers, too, to resort to Sparta, who could not assign a good reason for their coming; not, as Thucydides says, out of fear they should imitate the constitution of that city, and make improvements in virtue, but lest they should teach his own people some evil. For along with foreigners come new subjects of discourse: new discourse produces new opinions; and from these there necessarily spring new passions and desires, which, like discords in music, would disturb the established government. He, therefore, thought it more expedient for the city, to keep out of it corrupt customs and manners, than even to prevent the introduction of a pestilence.

Thus far, then, we can perceive no vestiges of a disregard to right and wrong, which is the fault some people find with the laws of Lyeurgus, allowing them well enough calculated to produce valour, but not to promote justice. Perhaps it was the *erypteia*, as they called it, or *ambuscade*, if that was really one of this lawgiver's institutions, as Aristotle says it was, which gave Plato so bad an impression both of Lyeurgus and his laws. The governors of the youth ordered the shrewdest of them from time to time to disperse themselves in the country, provided only with daggers and some necessary provisions. In the day-time they hid themselves, and rested in the most private places they could find, but at night they sallied out into the roads, and killed all the helots they could meet with. Nay, sometimes by day, they fell upon them in the fields, and murdered the ablest and strongest of them. Thucydides relates, in his history of the Peloponnesian War, that the Spartans selected such of them as were distinguished for their courage, to the number of two thousand or more, declared them free, crowned them with garlands, and conducted them to the temples of the gods; but soon after they all disappeared; and no one could, either then or since, give account in what manner they were destroyed. Aristotle particularly says, that the *ephori*, as soon as they were invested in their office, declared war against the helots, that they might be massacred under pretence of law. In other respects they treated them with great inhumanity: sometimes they made them drink till they were intoxicated, and in that condition led them into the public halls, to show the young men what drunkenness was. They ordered them, too, to sing mean songs, and to dance ridiculous dances, but not to meddle with any that were genteel and graceful. Thus they tell us, that when the Thebans afterwards invaded Laconia, and took a great number of the helots prisoners, they ordered them to sing the odes of Terpander, Aleman, or Spondon the Lacedæmonian, but they excused themselves, alleg-

ing that it was forbidden by their masters. Those who say, that a freeman in Sparta was most a freeman, and a slave most a slave, seem well to have considered the difference of states. But in my opinion, it was in aftertimes that these cruelties took place among the Lacedæmonians; chiefly after the great earthquake, when, as history informs us, the helots, joining the Messenians, attacked them, did infinite damage to the country, and brought the city to the greatest extremity. I can never ascribe to Lycurgus so abominable an act as that of the ambushade. I would judge in this case by the mildness and justice which appeared in the rest of his conduct.

Lycurgus' Subterfuge to Perpetuate His Laws

When his principal institutions had taken root in the manners of the people, and the government was come to such maturity as to be able to support and preserve itself, then, as Plato says of the Deity, that he rejoiced when he had created the world, and given it its first motion; so Lycurgus was charmed with the beauty and greatness of his political establishment, when he saw it exemplified in fact, and move on in due order. He was next desirous to make it immortal, so far as human wisdom could effect it, and to deliver it down unchanged to the latest times. For this purpose he assembled all the people, and told them, the provisions he had already made for the state were indeed sufficient for virtue and happiness, but the greatest and most important matter was still behind, which he could not disclose to them till he had consulted the oracle; that they must therefore inviolably observe his laws, without altering anything in them, till he returned from Delphi; and then he would acquaint them with the pleasure of Apollo. When they had promised to do so, he took an oath of the kings and senators, and afterwards of all the citizens, that they would abide by the present establishment till Lycurgus came back. He then took his journey to Delphi.

When he arrived there, he offered sacrifice to the gods, and consulted the oracle, whether his laws were sufficient to promote virtue, and secure the happiness of the state. Apollo answered, that the laws were excellent, and that the city which kept to the constitution he had established, would be the most glorious in the world. This oracle Lycurgus took down in writing, and sent it to Sparta. He then offered another sacrifice, and embraced his friends and his son, determined never to release his citizens from their oath, but voluntarily there to put a period to his life; while he was yet of an age when life was not a burden, when death was not desirable, and while he was not unhappy in any one circumstance. He, therefore, destroyed himself by abstaining from food, persuaded that the very death of lawgivers, should have its use, and their exit, so far from being insignificant, have its share of virtue, and be considered as a great action. To him, indeed, whose performances were so illustrious, the conclusion of life was the crown of happiness, and his death was left guardian of those invaluable blessings he had procured his countrymen through life, as they had taken an oath not to depart from his establishment till his return. Nor was he deceived in his expectations. Sparta continued superior to the rest of Greece, both in its government at home and reputation abroad, so long as it retained the institution of Lycurgus; and this it did during the space of five hundred years, and the reign of fourteen successive kings, down to Agis the son of Archidamus. As for the appointment of the ephors, it was so far from weakening the constitution, that it gave it additional vigour, and though it seemed to be established in favour of the people, it strengthened the aristocracy.^c

[ca. 885 B.C.]

EFFECTS OF LYCURGUS' SYSTEM

Thus far we have followed Plutarch; now let us see what modern authority will say of the influence of Lycurgus.

The best commentary on the laws of Lycurgus is the history of Sparta; let us read it and judge the tree by its fruits.

Lycurgus, if we unite under his name all the laws mentioned, without pausing to make sure that they are rightfully attributed, had operated with rare sagacity to render Sparta immutable and its constitution immortal. But there exists an arch-enemy to the things of this world that call themselves eternal—the old man with the white beard and denuded scalp that antiquity armed with a scythe. Legislators like, no better than poets, to take him into account; they are ready enough to declare that they have erected an edifice more solid than brass. Time advances and the whole structure crumbles to the earth. Sparta braved him through several centuries, by sacrificing the liberty of her citizens whom she kept bowed under the severest discipline. She lasted long, but never truly lived. As soon as her inflexible, and in some respects immoral, constitution, established outside the usual conditions under which society exists, was shaken, her decadence was rapid and irrevocable.

Lycurgus had desired to make fixed, population, lands, and the number and fortune of citizens; as it turned out never was there a city where property changed hands more frequently, where the condition of citizens was more unstable, or their number subject to more steady diminution. He had singularly restricted individual property rights to strengthen the power of the state; and Aristotle says: "In Sparta the state is poor, the individual rich and avaricious." He had failed to recognise the laws of nature in the education and destiny of women; and Aristotle, charging the Spartan women with immorality, with greed, and even calling into question their courage, sees in the license they allowed themselves one of the causes of Lacedæmon's downfall.

He made the helots tremble under his rule, and finally sent them back to their masters. He prohibited long wars; but he had made war attractive by freeing the soldiers from the heavy rules laid upon the citizen, and it was by war and victory that his republic perished. He withdrew from his fellow-citizens all power of initiative, assigning to each moment of their lives its particular duty; in a word, to speak with Rousseau, who was also a master of political paradox, "His laws completely changed the nature of man to make of him a citizen." Yet Sparta, become a revolutionary city, perished for want of men. He proscribed gold and silver that there might be no corruption, and nowhere since the Median wars, was venality so pronounced and shameless.

He banished the arts, except for the adornment of his temple of Apollo at Amyclæ; and in this he succeeded. Pausanias makes note of some fifty temples in Lacedæmonia, but not a stone of them remains. Rustic piety and not art erected them. Save for a certain taste in music, the dance, and a severe style of poetry, Sparta stands alone as a barbarian city in the middle of Greece, a spot of darkness where all else is light; she did not even know thoroughly the only art she practised, that of war; at least she always remained ignorant of certain features of it.


As Aristotle says: "Trained for war, Lacedæmonia, like a sword in its scabbard, rests in peace." All her institutions taught her to fight, not one to live the life of the spirit. Savage and egotistical, she satisfied the pride

of her children, and won the praise of those who admire power and success, but what did she do for the world? A war machine perfectly fitted to destroy but incapable of production, what has she left behind her? Not an artist nor a man of genius, not even a ruin that bears her name; she is dead in every part as Thucydides predicted, while Athens, calumniated by rhetoricians of all ages, still has to show the majestic ruins of her temples, source of inspiration to modern art in two worlds, as her poets and philosophers are the source of eternal beauty.

To sum up, and this is the lesson taught by this history: rigidly as Lycurgus might decree for Sparta equality of possessions, an end contrary to natural as to social conditions, nowhere in Greece was social inequality so marked. Something of her discipline subsisted longer, and it was this strange social ordonnance that won for Lacedæmon her power and renown, striking as it did all other populations with astonishment.

The Spartans have further set a noble example of sobriety, and of contempt for passion, pain, and death. They could obey and they could die. Law was for them, according to the felicitous expression of Pindarus and of Montaigne: "Queen and Empress of the World." Let us accord to them one more virtue which does them honour, respect for those upon whose head Time has placed the crown of whitened locks.

The aristocratic poet of Bœotia who like another Dorian, Theognis of Megara hated the masses, admired the city where reigned under a line of hereditary kings, "The wisdom of old men, and the lances of young, the choirs of the Muse and sweet harmony." Simonides more clearly recognises the true reason of Sparta's greatness; he called Lacedæmon "the city which tames men." Empire over oneself usually gives empire over others, and for a long time the Spartan possessed both.^d





CHAPTER VII. THE MESSENIAN WARS OF SPARTA

THAT there were two long contests between the Lacedaemonians and Messenians, and that in both the former were completely victorious, is a fact sufficiently attested. And if we could trust the statements in Pausanias, — our chief and almost only authority on the subject, — we should be in a situation to recount the history of both these wars in considerable detail. But unfortunately, the incidents narrated in that writer have been gathered from sources which are, even by his own admission, undeserving of credit, from Rhianus, the poet of Bene in Crete, who had composed an epic poem on Aristomenes and the Second Messenian War, about B.C. 220, and from Myron of Priene, a prose author whose date is not exactly known, but belonging to the Alexandrine age, and not earlier than the third century before the Christian era.

The poet Tyrtaeus was himself engaged on the side of the Spartans in the second war, and it is from him that we learn the few indisputable facts respecting both the first and the second. If the Messenians had never been re-established in Peloponnesus, we should probably never have heard any further details respecting these early contests. That re-establishment, and the first foundation of the city called Messene on Mount Ithome, was among the capital wounds inflicted on Sparta by Epaminondas, in the year B.C. 369, — between three hundred and two hundred and fifty years after the conclusion of the Second Messenian War. The descendants of the old Messenians, who had remained for so long a period without any fixed position in Greece, were incorporated in the new city, together with various helots and miscellaneous settlers who had no claim to a similar genealogy. The gods and heroes of the Messenian race were reverentially invoked at this great ceremony, especially the great hero Aristomenes; and the site of Mount Ithome, the ardour of the newly established citizens, the hatred and apprehension of Sparta, operating as a powerful stimulus to the creation and multiplication of what are called *traditions*, sufficed to expand the few facts known respecting the struggles of the old Messenians into a variety of details. In almost all these stories we discover a colouring unfavourable to Sparta, contrasting forcibly with the account given by Isocrates in his discourse called *Archidamus*, wherein we read the view which a Spartan might take of the ancient conquests of his forefathers. But a clear proof that these Messenian stories had no real basis of tradition, is shown in the contradictory statements respecting the prime hero Aristomenes. Wes-seling thinks that there were two persons named Aristomenes, one in the first and one in the second war. This inextricable confusion respecting the greatest name in Messenian antiquity, shows how little any genuine stream of tradition can here be recognised.

Pausanias states the First Messenian War as beginning in B.C. 743 and lasting till B.C. 724, — the Second, as beginning in B.C. 685 and lasting till B.C. 668. Neither of these dates rest upon any assignable positive authority; but the time assigned to the first war seems probable, that of the second is apparently too early. Tyrtæus authenticates both the duration of the first war, twenty years, and the eminent services rendered in it by the Spartan king Theopompus. He says, moreover, speaking during the second war, "the fathers of our fathers conquered Messene;" thus loosely indicating the relative dates of the two.

The Spartans (as we learn from Isocrates, whose words date from a time when the city of Messene was only a recent foundation) professed to have seized the territory, partly in revenge for the impiety of the Messenians in killing their king, the Heraclid Cresphontes, whose relative had appealed to them for aid, — partly by sentence of the Delphian oracle. Such were the causes which had induced them first to invade the country, and they had conquered it after a struggle of twenty years. The Lacedæmonian explanations, as given in Pausanias, seem for the most part to be counter-statements arranged after the time when the Messenian version, evidently the interesting and popular account, had become circulated.^b

Within the limits of Messenia there was a temple of Diana Limnatis, which was alone common to the Messenians among the Dorians, and to the Lacedæmonians. The Lacedæmonians asserted, that the virgins whom they sent to the festival were violated by the Messenians; that their king, Teleclus, was slain through endeavouring to prevent the injury, and that the violated virgins slew themselves through shame.

The Messenians, however, relate this affair differently; that stratagems were raised by Teleclus against those persons of quality that came to the temple in Messene. For when the Lacedæmonians, on account of the goodness of the land desired to possess Messenia, Teleclus adorned the beardless youths after the manner of virgins, and so disposed them, that they might suddenly attack the Lacedæmonians with their daggers as they were sitting. The Messenians, however, running to their assistance, slew both Teleclus and all the beardless youths. But the Lacedæmonians, as they were conscious that this action was perpetrated by public consent, never attempted to revenge the death of their king. And such are the reports of each party, which every one believes, just as he is influenced by his attachment to each. After this event had taken place, and when one generation had passed away, a hatred commenced between the Lacedæmonians and Messenians.^c

FIRST MESSENIAN WAR

In spite of the death of Teleclus, however, the war did not actually break out until some little time after, when Alcamenes and Theopompus were kings at Sparta, and Antiochus and Androcles, sons of Pintas, kings of Messenia. The immediate cause of it was a private altercation between the Messenian Polychares (victor at the fourth Olympiad, B.C. 764) and the Spartan Euæphnus. Polychares having been grossly injured by Euæphnus, and his claim for redress having been rejected at Sparta, took revenge by aggressions upon other Lacedæmonians; the Messenians refused to give him up, though one of the two kings, Androcles, strongly insisted upon doing so, and maintained his opinion so earnestly against the opposite sense of the majority and of his brother, Antiochus, that a tumult arose, and he was slain.

[ca. 750 B.C.]

The Lacedæmonians, now resolving upon war, struck the first blow without any formal declaration, by surprising the border town of Amphæa, and putting its defenders to the sword. They further overran the Messenian territory, and attacked some other towns, but without success. Euphaes, who had now succeeded his father Antiochus as king of Messenia, summoned the forces of the country and carried on the war against them with energy and boldness. For the first four years of the war, the Lacedæmonians made no progress, and even incurred the ridicule of the old men of their nation as faint-hearted warriors: in the fifth year, they made a more vigorous invasion, under their two kings, Theopompus and Polydorus, who were met by Euphaes with the full force of the Messenians. A desperate battle ensued, in which it does not seem that either side gained much advantage: nevertheless the Messenians found themselves so much enfeebled by it, that they were forced to take refuge on the fortified mountain of Ithome, and to abandon the rest of the country.^b

After this battle the affairs of the Messenians were in a calamitous situation. For, in the first place, through the great sums of money which they had expended in fortifying their cities, they had no longer the means of supplying their army. In the next place, their slaves had fled to the Lacedæmonians. And lastly, a disease resembling a pestilence, though it did not infest all their country, greatly embarrassed their affairs. In consequence, therefore, of consulting about their present situation, they thought proper to abandon all those cities which had the most inland situation, and to betake themselves to the mountain Ithome. In this mountain there was a city of no great magnitude, which, they say, is mentioned by Homer in his catalogue :

“And those that in the steep Ithome dwell.”

In this city, therefore, fixing their residence, they enlarged the ancient enclosure, so that it might be sufficient to defend the whole of its inhabitants. This place was in other respects well fortified: for Ithome is not inferior to any of the mountains within the isthmus in magnitude; and besides this, is most difficult of access.

When they were settled in this mountain, they determined to send to Delphos, and consult the oracle concerning the event of the war. Tisis, therefore, the son of Alcis, was employed on this errand; a man who, in nobility of birth, was not inferior to any one, and who was particularly given to divination. This Tisis, on his return from Delphos, was attacked by a band of Lacedæmonians belonging to the guard of Amphæa, but defended himself so valiantly that they were not able to take him. It is certain, however, that they did not desist from wounding him, till a voice was heard, from an invisible cause, “Dismiss the bearer of the oracle.” And Tisis, indeed, as soon as he returned to his own people, repeated the oracle to the king, and not long after died of his wounds. But Euphaes, collecting the Messenians together, recited the oracle, which was as follows: “Sacrifice a pure virgin, who is allotted a descent from the blood of the Æpytidæ, to the infernal demons, by cutting her throat in the night: but if the virgin who is led to the altar descends from any other family, let her voluntarily offer herself to be sacrificed.” Such then being the declaration of the god, immediately all the virgins descended from the Æpytidæ awaited the decision of lots: when the lot fell upon the daughter of Lyciscus, the prophet Epebolus told them that it was not proper that she should be sacrificed, because she was not the genuine daughter of Lyciscus: but that the wife of Lyciscus, in

consequence of her barrenness, had falsely pretended that this was her daughter.

The Futile Sacrifice of the Daughter of Aristodemus

In the meantime, while the prophet was thus dissuading the people, Lyciscus privately took away the virgin and fled to Sparta. But the Messenians being greatly dejected as soon as they perceived that Lyciscus had fled, Aristodemus, a man descended from the Æpytidæ, and who was most illustrious in warlike concerns and other respects, offered his own daughter as a voluntary sacrifice. Destiny, however, no less absorbs the wills of mankind than the mud of a river the pebbles which it contains. For the following circumstance became a hindrance to Aristodemus, who was then desirous of saving Messene by sacrificing his daughter: A Messenian citizen whose name is not transmitted to us happened to be in love with the daughter of Aristodemus, and was just on the point of making her his wife. This man from the first entered into a dispute with Aristodemus, asserting that the virgin was no longer in the power of her father, as she had been promised to him in marriage, but that all authority over her belonged to him as her intended husband. However, finding that this plea was ineffectual, he made use of a shameful lie in order to accomplish his purpose, and affirmed that he had lain with the girl, and that she was now with child by him. But in the end, Aristodemus was so exasperated by this lie, that he slew his daughter, and having cut open her womb, plainly evinced that she was not with child.

Upon this, Epebolus, who was present, exhorted them to sacrifice the daughter of some other person, because the daughter of Aristodemus, in consequence of having been slain by her father in a rage, could not be the sacrifice to those demons which the oracle commanded. In consequence of the prophet thus addressing the people, they immediately rushed forth in order to slay the suitor of the dead virgin, as he had been the means of Aristodemus becoming defiled with the blood of his offspring, and had rendered the hope of their preservation dubious. But this man was a particular friend of Euphaes; and in consequence of this, Euphaes persuaded the Messenians that the oracle was accomplished in the death of the virgin, and that they ought to be satisfied with what Aristodemus had accomplished. All the Æpytidæ, therefore, were of the opinion of Euphaes, because each was anxious to be liberated from the fear of sacrificing his daughter. In consequence of this, the advice of the king was generally received, and the assembly dissolved. And after this they turned their attentions to the sacrifices and festival of the gods.^c

The war still continued, and in the thirteenth year of it another hard-fought battle took place, in which the brave Euphaes was slain, but the result was again indecisive. Aristodemus, being elected king in his place, prosecuted the war strenuously: the fifth year of his reign is signalised by a third general battle, wherein the Corinthians assist the Spartans, and the Arcadians and Sicyonians are on the side of Messenia; the victory is here decisive on the side of Aristodemus, and the Lacedæmonians are driven back into their own territory. It was now their turn to send envoys and ask advice from the Delphian oracle; and the remaining events of the war exhibit a series, partly of stratagems to fulfil the injunctions of the priestess, partly of prodigies in which the divine wrath is manifested against the Messenians. The king Aristodemus, agonised with the thought that he has slain his own daughter without saving his country, puts an end to his

[ca. 750-668 B.C.]

own life. In the twentieth year of the war, the Messenians abandoned Ithome, which the Lacedæmonians razed to the ground: the rest of the country was speedily conquered, and such of the inhabitants as did not flee either to Arcadia or to Eleusis, were reduced to complete submission.

Such is the abridgement of what Pausanias gives as the narrative of the First Messenian War. Most of his details bear the evident stamp of mere late romance: and it will easily be seen that the sequence of events presents no plausible explanation of that which is really indubitable—the result. The twenty years' war, and the final abandonment of Ithome, are attested by Tyrtaeus, and beyond all doubt, as well as the harsh treatment of the conquered. “Like asses worn down by heavy burthens” (says the Spartan poet) “they were compelled to make over to their masters an entire half of the produce of their fields, and to come in the garb of woe to Sparta, themselves and their wives, as mourners at the decease of the kings and principal persons.” The revolt of their descendants, against a yoke so oppressive, goes by the name of the Second Messenian War.

The Hero Aristomenes and the Second Messenian War

Had we possessed the account of the First Messenian War as given by Myron and Diodorus, it would evidently have been very different from the above, because they included Aristomenes in it, and to him the leading parts would be assigned. As the narrative now stands in Pausanias, we are not introduced to that great Messenian hero,—the Achilles of the epic of Rhinanus,—until the second war, in which his gigantic proportions stand prominently forward. He is the great champion of his country in the three battles which are represented as taking place during this war: the first, with indecisive result, at Dera; the second, a signal victory on the part of the Messenians, at the Boar's Grave; the third, an equally signal defeat, in consequence of the traitorous flight of Aristocrates, king of the Arcadian Orcho-menus, who, ostensibly embracing the alliance of the Messenians, had received bribes from Sparta. Thrice did Aristomenes sacrifice to Zeus Ithomates the sacrifice called Hecatomphonia, reserved for those who had slain with their own hands a hundred enemies in battle. At the head of a chosen band he carried his incursions more than once into the heart of the Lacedæmonian territory, surprised Amyclæ and Pharis, and even penetrated by night into the unfortified precinct of Sparta itself, where he suspended his shield, as a token of defiance, in the temple of Athene Chalciceus. Thrice was he taken prisoner, but on two occasions marvellously escaped before he could be conveyed to Sparta.^b Pausanias thus describes one of his escapes:

“Aristomenes continued to plunder the Spartan land, nor did he cease his hostilities till, happening to meet with more than half of the Lacedæmonian forces, together with both the kings, among other wounds which he received in defending himself, he was struck so violently on the head with a stone, that his eyes were covered with darkness, and he fell to the ground. The Lacedæmonians, on seeing this, rushed in a collected body upon him, and took him alive, together with fifty of his men. They likewise determined to throw all of them into the Ceadas, or a deep chasm, into which the most criminal offenders were hurled. Indeed, the other Messenians perished after this manner; but some god who had so often preserved Aristomenes, delivered him at that time from the fury of the Spartans. And some who entertain the most magnificent idea of his character, say, that an eagle flying to him bore him on its wings to the bottom of the chasm, so that he sustained no injury by the fall.

“Indeed, he had not long reached the bottom before a dæmon shewed him a passage, by which he might make his escape; for as he lay in this profound chasm wrapped in a robe, expecting nothing but death, he heard a noise on the third day, and uncovering his face (for he was now able to look through the darkness) he saw a fox touching one of the dead bodies. Considering, therefore, where the passage could be through which the beast had entered, he waited till the fox came nearer to him, and when this happened seized it with one of his hands, and with the other, as often as it turned to him, exposed his robe for the animal to seize. At length, the fox beginning to run away, he suffered himself to be drawn along by her, through places almost impervious, till he saw an opening just sufficient for the fox to pass through, and a light streaming through the hole. And the animal, indeed, as soon as she was freed from Aristomenes, betook herself to her usual place of retreat. But Aristomenes, as the opening was not large enough for him to pass through, enlarged it with his hands, and escaped safe to Ira. The fortune, indeed by which Aristomenes was taken, was wonderful, for his spirit and courage were so great, that no one could hope to take him; but his preservation at Ceadas is far more wonderful, and at the same time it is evident to all men that it did not take place without the interference of a divine power.”^c

The fortified mountain of Ira on the banks of the river Nedon, and near the Ionian Sea, had been occupied by the Messenians, after the battle in which they had been betrayed by Aristocrates the Arcadian; it was there that they had concentrated their whole force, as in the former war at Ithome, abandoning the rest of the country. Under the conduct of Aristomenes, assisted by the prophet Theoclus, they maintained this strong position for eleven years. At length, they were compelled to abandon it; but, as in the case of Ithome, the final determining circumstances are represented to have been, not any superiority of bravery or organisation on the part of the Lacedæmonians, but treacherous betrayal and stratagem, seconding the fatal decree of the gods. Unable to maintain Ira longer, Aristomenes, with his sons, and a body of his countrymen, forced his way through the assailants, and quitted the country — some of them retiring to Arcadia and Elis, and finally migrating to Rhegium. He himself passed the remainder of his days in Rhodes, where he dwelt along with his son-in-law, Damagetus, the ancestor of the noble Rhodian family, called the Diagorids, celebrated for its numerous Olympic victories.

Such are the main features of what Pausanias calls the Second Messenian War, or of what ought rather to be called the Aristomeneis of the poet Rhianus. That after the foundation of Messene, and the recall of the exiles by Epaminondas, favour and credence was found for many tales respecting the prowess of the ancient hero whom they invoked in their libations, — tales well-calculated to interest the fancy, to vivify the patriotism, and to inflame the anti-Spartan antipathies, of the new inhabitants, — there can be little doubt. And the Messenian maidens of that day may well have sung, in their public processional sacrifices, how “Aristomenes pursued the flying Lacedæmonians down to the mid-plain of Stenyclarus, and up to the very summit of the mountain.” From such stories, *traditions* they ought not to be denominated, Rhianus may doubtless have borrowed; but if proof were wanting to show how completely he looked at his materials from the point of view of the poet, and not from that of the historian, we should find it in the remarkable fact noticed by Pausanias: Rhianus represented Leotychides as having been king of Sparta during the Second Messenian War; now Leotychides, as Pausanias observes, did not reign until near a century and a half afterwards, during the Persian invasion.

[ca. 668-648 B.C.]

THE POET TYRTÆUS

To the great champion of Messenia, during this war, we may oppose, on the side of Sparta, another remarkable person, less striking as a character of romance, but more interesting, in many ways, to the historian—the poet Tyrtaeus, a native of Aphidnæ in Attica, an inestimable ally of the Lacedæmonians during most part of this second struggle. According to a story—which however has the air partly of a boast of the later Attic orators—the Spartans, disheartened at the first successes of the Messenians, consulted the Delphian oracle, and were directed to ask for a leader from Athens.^b “At the same time,” Pausanias writes, “the Lacedæmonians received an oracle from Delphos, which commanded them to make use of an Athenian for their counsellor. Hence, when by ambassadors they had informed the Athenians of the oracle, and at the same time required an



VIEW OF DELPHI, SEAT OF THE DELPHIAN ORACLE

Athenian as their adviser, the Athenians were by no means willing to comply: for they considered, that the Lacedæmonians could not without great danger to the Athenians take possession of the best part of Peloponnesus; and at the same time, they were unwilling to disobey the commands of the god.

“At last they adopted the following expedient: There was at Athens a certain teacher of grammar, whose name was Tyrtaeus, who appeared to possess the smallest degree of intellect, and who was lame in one of his feet. This man they sent to Sparta, who at one time instructed the principal persons in what was necessary for them to do, and at another time instructed the common people by singing elegies to them, in which the praise of valour was contained, and verses called *anapæsti*.”^c

This seems to be a colouring put upon the story by later writers, and the intervention of the Athenians in the matter in any way deserves little credit. It seems more probable that the legendary connection of the Dioscuri with Aphidnæ, celebrated at or near that time by the poet Aleman, brought about, through the Delphian oracle, the presence of the Aphidnæan poet at

Sparta. Respecting the lameness of Tyrtæus, we can say nothing: but that he was a schoolmaster (if we are constrained to employ an unsuitable term) is highly probable, for in that day, minstrels, who composed and sung poems, were the only persons from whom the youth received any mental training. Moreover, his sway over the youthful mind is particularly noted in the compliment paid to him, in after-days, by king Leonidas: "Tyrtæus was an adept in tickling the souls of youth." We see enough to satisfy us that he was by birth a stranger, though he became a Spartan by the subsequent recompense of citizenship conferred upon him; that he was sent through the Delphian oracle; that he was an impressive and efficacious minstrel, and that he had, moreover, sagacity enough to employ his talents for present purposes and diverse needs; being able, not merely to reanimate the languishing courage of the baffled warrior, but also to soothe the discontents of the mutinous. That his strains, which long maintained undiminished popularity among the Spartans, contributed much to determine the ultimate issue of this war, there is no reason to doubt; nor is his name the only one to attest the susceptibility of the Spartan mind in that day towards music and poetry. The first establishment of the Carneian festival, with its musical competition, at Sparta, falls during the period assigned by Pausanias to the Second Messenian War: the Lesbian harper, Terpander, who gained the first recorded prize at this solemnity, is affirmed to have been sent for by the Spartans pursuant to a mandate from the Delphian oracle, and to have been the means of appeasing a sedition. In like manner, the Cretan Thaletas was invited thither during a pestilence, which his art, as it is pretended, contributed to heal (about 620 B.C.); and Alcman, Xenocritus, Polymnastus, and Sacadas, all foreigners by birth, found favourable reception, and acquired popularity, by their music and poetry. With the exception of Sacadas, who is a little later, all these names fall in the same century as Tyrtæus, between 660 B.C.—610 B.C. The fashion which the Spartan music continued for a long time to maintain, is ascribed chiefly to the genius of Terpander.

That the impression produced by Tyrtæus at Sparta, therefore, with his martial music, and emphatic exhortations to bravery in the field, as well as union at home, should have been very considerable, is perfectly consistent with the character both of the age and of the people; especially as he is represented to have appeared pursuant to the injunction of the Delphian oracle. From the scanty fragments remaining to us of his elegies and anapæsts, however, we can satisfy ourselves only of two facts: first, that the war was long, obstinately contested, and dangerous to Sparta as well as to the Messenians; next, that other parties in Peloponnesus took part on both sides, especially on the side of the Messenians. So frequent and harassing were the aggressions of the latter upon the Spartan territory, that a large portion of the border-land was left uncultivated: scarcity ensued, and the proprietors of the deserted farms, driven to despair, pressed for a redivision of the landed property in the state. It was in appeasing these discontents that the poem of Tyrtæus, called *Eunomia*, "Legal Order," was found signally beneficial. It seems certain that a considerable portion of the Arcadians, together with the Pisatæ and the Triphylians, took part with the Messenians; there are also some statements numbering the Eleans among their allies, but this appears not probable. The state of the case rather seems to have been, that the old quarrel between the Eleans and the Pisatæ, respecting the right to preside at the Olympic games, which had already burst forth during the preceding century, in the reign of the Ar-

[ca. 660-580 B.C.]


geian Pheidon, still continued. The Second Messenian War will thus stand as beginning somewhere about the 33rd Olympiad, or 648 B.C., between seventy and eighty years after the close of the first, and lasting, according to Pausanias, seventeen years; according to Plutarch, more than twenty years.

Many of the Messenians who abandoned their country after this second conquest are said to have found shelter and sympathy among the Arcadians, who admitted them to a new home and gave them their daughters in marriage; and who, moreover, punished severely the treason of Aristocrates, king of Orchomenos, in abandoning the Messenians at the battle of the Trench.

The Second Messenian War was thus terminated by the complete subjugation of the Messenians. Such of them as remained in the country were reduced to a servitude probably not less hard than that which Tyrtæus described them as having endured between the first war and the second. In after-times, the whole territory which figures on the map as Messenia, — south of the river Nedon, and westward of the summit of Taygetus, — appears as subject to Sparta, and as forming the western portion of Laconia. Nor do we hear of any serious revolt from Sparta in this territory until a hundred and fifty years afterwards, subsequent to the Persian invasion—a revolt which Sparta, after serious efforts, succeeded in crushing. So that the territory remained in her power until her defeat at Leuctra, which led to the foundation of Messene by Epaminondas.

Imperfectly as these two Messenian wars are known to us, we may see enough to warrant us in saying that both were tedious, protracted, and painful, showing how slowly the results of war were then gathered, and adding one additional illustration to prove how much the rapid and instantaneous conquest of Laconia and Messenia by the Dorians, which the Heraclid legend sets forth, is contradicted by historical analogy.

The relations of Pisa and Elis form a suitable counterpart and sequel to those of Messenia and Sparta. Unwilling subjects themselves, the Pisatæ had lent their aid to the Messenians, and their king Pantaleon, one of the leaders of this combined force, had gained so great a temporary success, as to dispossess the Eleans of the *agonothesia* or administration of the games for one Olympic ceremony, in the 34th Olympiad. Though again reduced to their condition of subjects, they manifested dispositions to renew their revolt. These incidents seem to have occurred about the 50th Olympiad, or B.C. 580; and the dominion of Elis over her Periœcid territory was thus as well assured as that of Sparta. The Lacedæmonians, after the close of the Peloponnesian War had left them undisputed heads of Greece, formally upheld the independence of the Triphylian towns against Elis, and seem to have countenanced their endeavours to attach themselves to the Arcadian aggregate, which, however, was never fully accomplished. Their dependence on Elis became loose and uncertain, but was never wholly shaken off.⁶



CHAPTER VIII. THE IONIANS

Athens, the eye of Greece, mother of arts and eloquence.

—MILTON.

THE complete change in the map of Greece at the close of the Achæan period and the origin of the ethnographic system with which the history of Hellenic times begins, were always referred by Greek tradition to a last wandering of north Grecian tribes. The customary chronology places the beginning of this shifting at 1133 or 1124 B.C., *i.e.*, less than three generations after the so-called conquest of Troy. Recent chronological investigations, however, have made it seem probable that a period at least a hundred years later should be chosen.

The first impulse was probably given by new movements of tribes in the north. The advance of the Illyrians caused the Thessalians, a part of the Epirot tribe of the Thesproti, to withdraw across Pindus into the valley of the Peneus, which was afterwards called Thessaly. While the preservation of the Greek character in Epirus was henceforth left to the brave Molossi, the Thessalians east of Pindus fell upon the settled Greeks of the lowlands and destroyed their states. The proudest and most vigorous elements of the old population that survived the war, determined to emigrate and found a new home. Thus, the Arnæ migrated to middle Greece, destroyed the old states of Thebes and Orchomenus in the basin of the Copais and united this whole district, which henceforth appears in history as Bœotia, under their rule.

While the Thessalians were making preparations to subjugate the warlike tribes of the highlands about the valley of the Peneus, one of these mountain races, the Dorians, carried the mighty movement on to the extreme south of the Peloponnesus. Within twenty years, according to tradition, they had crossed the narrow strait of Rhium and begun the conquest of the Peloponnesus. They ascended the valley of the Alpheus into southern Arcadia. From here one body of them descended into the Messenian valley of the Pamisus and overwhelmed the old kingdom of the Melidæ of Pylos. The other branch invaded the principal districts of the Achæans in the east and southeast of the Peloponnesus. In open battle the rude Dorian foot-soldiers easily defeated the Achæan knights. But they could not destroy the colossal walls of the Achæan fortresses or cities, and were themselves finally forced to build fortifications from which they could watch or invest the Achæan strongholds until the opportunity was presented of storming them or forcing their capitulation. It was in such a fortified camp that the Dorian capital Sparta had its origin.

It was probably the tenacious resistance of the Achæans in Laconia that determined a large body of the Dorians to leave that district and turn to the east, where they completely subjugated Argolis and made Argos the centre of Dorian power in the eastern part of the Peloponnesus.

At the close of the Achæan period Attica was the canton which appeared to have the most settled and uniform structure. It now became a favourite refuge of migrant Greeks of many different tribes. This movement seems to have strengthened little Attica in a considerable degree, for tradition ascribes to these immigrants the successful resistance that Attica was able to make when the hordes of the conquerors finally approached her borders. But Attica was far too small and unproductive to retain the mass of fugitives as permanent settlers. So the movement was finally turned towards the islands of the Ægean and the coast of Asia Minor. According to tradition there had already been an Archæan (or Æolian) migration to Lesbos and Tenedos.

The most important Ionian colonies in the east were in the Cyclades, at Miletus, and at Ephesus. As their power continued to grow, the Ionians gradually Hellenised a broad strip of coast and in the river valleys pushed out a considerable distance to the eastward.

The Dorians also followed the movement of the other Greeks to the islands and to Asia. Their most important occupations were Crete, Rhodes, and a small portion of the southern coast of Caria, including the cities of Cnidus and Halicarnassus.

By the first half of the eighth century B.C., the Greek world had acquired the aspect which it retained for several centuries. The nation had greatly increased its territory by colonisation. But the district now called Thessaly was in possession of a race that showed little capacity to develop beyond a vigorous and pleasure-loving feudalism; and the Greeks of Epirus and the valley of the Achelous had been for several centuries shut out from the evolution into Hellenism. So apart from the newly risen power of the Boeotians, the future of Greece rested upon the two races that had been but little named in the Achæan period. The Dorians had become a great people. Argos had at first been the leading power of the Peloponnesus, both in religion and in politics. The Doric canton in the valley of the Upper Eurotas had made but slow and difficult progress, until, at the close of the ninth and beginning of the eighth century, that remarkable military and political consolidation was completed which is connected with the name of Lysurgus. This was the starting-point of a growth of Spartan power in consequence of which before the end of the eighth century the balance of Doric power was to pass from Argos to the south of the Peloponnesus.

Among the Ionians the Asiatic branch long remained the more important. The Ionian Greeks of the Ægean and of the Lydio-Carian coast, through their direct contact with the Orient, introduced to the Greek world new elements of culture of a varied character. Of a friendly and adaptable nature, they were specially fitted to be the traders and mariners of Greek nationality. Politically they became pre-eminently the democratic element of the nation, although there were powerful aristocratic groups among them. But with them the tendency appears stronger than among the other Greeks to allow full scope to personality, individual right, individual liberty, and individual activity beside, and even in opposition to the common interest.

The Asiatic Achæans appear in the historical period only under the name of Æolians. This name also came to be applied to those members of the Greek nation in Europe that could not be counted among either Dorians or Ionians.

The common name borne by the Greeks after the completion of the migrations is that of Hellenes. All the members of the various branches exhibit the Hellenic character, though only a few communities developed it in so ideal a form as the Athenians at the height of their historical greatness. A beautiful heritage of all Hellenes was their appreciation and enjoyment of art — of poetry and music as well as the plastic arts. A warm feeling not only for the beautiful, but for the ideal and the noble, — among the best elements also for right and harmoniously developed life, — and a fine taste in art and in ethical perception have never been denied the Greeks.

They were, moreover, at all periods characterised by a quick intellectual receptivity and an incomparable union of glowing fancy, brilliant intelligence, and sharp understanding. But mighty passion was coupled with all this. Party spirit and furious party hatred ran through all Greek history. The proud Greek self-assertion often degenerates into boundless presumption. Cruelty in war, even towards Greeks themselves, cunning and treachery, harsh self-interest and reckless greed are traits that mar the brilliant figure of Hellenism long before the Roman and Byzantine times.^b

ORIGIN AND EARLY HISTORY OF ATHENS

In that part of earth termed by the Greeks *Hellas*, and by the Romans *Græcia*, a small tract of land known by the name of *Attica* extends into the *Ægean Sea* — the southeast peninsula of Greece. In its greatest length it is about sixty, in its greatest breadth about twenty-four, geographical miles. In shape it is a rude triangle, — on two sides flows the sea — on the third, the mountain range of *Parnes* and *Cithæron*, divides the *Attic* from the *Bœotian* territory. It is intersected by frequent but not lofty hills, and compared with the rest of Greece, its soil, though propitious to the growth of the olive, is not fertile or abundant. In spite of painful and elaborate culture, the traces of which are yet visible, it never produced a sufficiency of corn to supply its population; and this, the comparative sterility of the land, may be ranked among the causes which conduced to the greatness of the people. The principal mountains of *Attica* are, the *Cape of Sunium*, *Hymettus* renowned for its honey, and *Pentelicus* for its marble; the principal streams which water the valleys are the capricious and uncertain rivulets of *Cephisus* and *Ilissus* — streams breaking into lesser brooks, deliciously pure and clear. The air is serene, the climate healthful, the seasons temperate. Along the hills yet breathe the wild thyme and the odorous plants which, everywhere prodigal in Greece, are more especially fragrant in that lucid sky — and still the atmosphere colours with peculiar and various tints the marble of the existent temples and the face of the mountain landscapes.

Even so early as the traditional appearance of *Cecrops* amongst the savages of *Attica*, the *Pelasgians* in *Arcadia* had probably advanced from the pastoral to the civil life; and this, indeed, is the date assigned by *Pausanias* to the foundation of that ancestral *Lycosura*, in whose rude remains (by the living fountain and the waving oaks of the modern *Diaphorte*) the antiquary yet traces the fortifications of “the first city which the sun beheld.” It is in their buildings that the *Pelasgi* have left the most indisputable record of their name. Their handwriting is yet upon their walls! A restless and various people — overrunning the whole of Greece, found northward in *Dacia*, *Illyria*, and the country of the *Getæ*, colonising the coasts of *Ionis*, and long the master-race of the fairest lands of *Italy* — they have passed

away amidst the revolutions of the elder earth, their ancestry and their descendants alike unknown.

The proofs upon which rest the reputed arrival of Egyptian colonisers, under Cæcrops, in Attica, have been shown to be slender, the authorities for the assertion to be comparatively modern, the arguments against the probability of such an immigration in such an age, to be at least plausible and important. The traditions speak of them with gratitude as civilisers, not with hatred as conquerors. Assisting to civilise the Greeks, they then became Greeks; their posterity merged and lost amidst the native population.

Perhaps in all countries, the first step to social improvement is in the institution of marriage, and the second is the formation of cities. As Menes in Egypt, as Fohi in China, so Cæcrops at Athens is said first to have reduced into sacred limits the irregular intercourse of the sexes, and reclaimed his barbarous subjects from a wandering and unprovidential life, subsisting on the spontaneous produce of no abundant soil. High above the plain, and fronting the sea, which, about three miles distant on that side, sweeps into a bay peculiarly adapted for the maritime enterprises of an earlier age, we still behold a cragged and nearly perpendicular rock. In length its superficies is about eight hundred, in breadth about four hundred, feet. Below, on either side, flow the immortal streams of the Ilissus and Cephissus. From its summit you may survey here the mountains of Hymettus, Pentelicus, and, far away, "the silver bearing Laurium"; below, the wide plain of Attica, broken by rocky hills—there, the islands of Salamis and Egina, with the opposite shores of Argolis, rising above the waters of the Saronic Bay. On this rock the supposed Egyptian is said to have built a fortress, and founded a city; the fortress was in later times styled the Acropolis, and the place itself, when the buildings of Athens spread far and wide beneath its base, was still designated *πόλις*, or the City. By degrees we are told that he extended, from this impregnable castle and its adjacent plain, the limit of his realm, until it included the whole of Attica, and perhaps Bœotia. It is also related that he established eleven other towns or hamlets, and divided his people into twelve tribes, to each of which one of the towns was apportioned—a fortress against foreign invasion, and a court of justice in civil disputes.

If we may trust to the glimmering light which, resting for a moment, uncertain and confused, upon the reign of Cæcrops, is swallowed up in all the darkness of fable during those of his reputed successors, it is to this apocryphal personage that we must refer the elements both of agriculture and law. He is said to have instructed the Athenians to till the land, and to watch the produce of the seasons; to have imported from Egypt the olive tree, for which the Attic soil was afterwards so celebrated, and even to have navigated to Sicily and to Africa for supplies of corn. That such advances, from a primitive and savage state, were not made in a single generation, is sufficiently clear. With more probability, Cæcrops is reputed to have imposed upon the ignorance of his subjects and the license of his followers, the curb of impartial law, and to have founded a tribunal of justice (doubtless the sole one for all disputes), in which after-times imagined to trace the origin of the solemn Areopagus.^c

KING ÆGEUS

The fortress, which Cæcrops made his residence, was from his own name called Cæcropia, and was peculiarly recommended to the patronage of the Egyptian goddess whom the Greeks worshipped by the name of Athene, and

the Latins of Minerva. Many, induced by the neighbourhood of the port, and expecting security both from the fortress and from its tutelary deity, erected their habitations around the foot of the rock; and thus arose early a considerable town, which, from the name of the goddess, was called Athenai, or, as we after the French have corrupted it, Athens.

This account of the rise of Athens, and of the origin of its government, though possibly a village and even a fortress may have existed there before Cecrops, is supported by a more general concurrence of traditional testimony, and more complete consonancy to the rest of history, than is often found for that remote age. The subsequent Attic annals are far less satisfactory. Strabo declines the endeavour to reconcile their inconsistencies; and Plutarch gives a strong picture of the uncertainties and voids which occurred to him in attempting to form a history from them. "As geographers," he says, "in the outer parts of their maps distinguish those countries which lie beyond their knowledge with such remarks as these, *All here is dry and desert sand, or marsh darkened with perpetual fog, or Scythian cold, or frozen sea*; so of the earliest history we may say, *All here is monstrous and tragical land, occupied only by poets and fabulists*." If such apology was reckoned necessary by Plutarch for such an account as could in his time be collected of the life of Theseus, none can now be wanting for omitting all disquisition concerning the four or seven kings, for even their number is not ascertained, who are said to have governed Attica from Cecrops to Ægeus, father of that hero. The name of Amphictyon, indeed, whose name is in the list, excites a reasonable curiosity: but as it is not in his government of Athens that he is particularly an object of history, farther mention of him may best be reserved for future opportunity.

Various, uncertain, and imperfect, then, as the accounts were which passed to posterity concerning the early Attic princes, yet the assurance of Thucydides may deserve respect, that Attica was the province of Greece in which population first became settled, and where the earliest progress was made toward civilisation. Being nearly peninsular, it lay out of the road of emigrants and wandering freebooters by land; and its rocky soil, supporting few cattle, afforded small temptation to either. The produce of tillage was of less easy removal; and the gains of commerce were secured within fortifications. Attica therefore grew populous, not only through the safety which the natives thus enjoyed, but by a confluence of strangers from other parts of Greece; for when either foreign invasion or intestine broil occasioned anywhere the necessity of emigration, Athens was the resort in highest estimation not only as a place of the most permanent security, but also as strangers of character, able by their wealth or their ingenuity to support themselves and benefit the community, were easily admitted to the privilege of citizens.

But, as population increased, the simple forms of government and jurisprudence established by Cecrops were no longer equal to their purpose. Civil wars arose; the country was invaded by sea: Erechtheus, called by later authors Erichthonius, and by the poets Son of the Earth, acquired the sovereignty, bringing, according to some not improbable reports, a second colony from Egypt.¹ Eumolpus, with a body of Thracians, about the same time established himself in Eleusis. When, a generation or two later,

[¹ According to some, the name Erechtheus was imported into "history" from the legend of the contest between Minerva (Athena) and Neptune (Poseidon Erechtheus) for the Acropolis. Erechtheus, though defeated, was permitted to remain; later he was thought of as a hero, and finally given a place along with Cecrops (the imaginary ancestor of the Cecropes) in the list of kings.]

Ægeus, contemporary with Minos, succeeded his father Pandion in the throne, the country seems to have been well peopled, but the government ill constituted and weak. Concerning this prince, however, and his immediate successor, tradition is more ample; and though abundantly mixed with fable, yet in many instances apparently more authentic than concerning any other persons of their remote age. Plutarch has thought a history of Theseus, son of Ægeus, not unfit to hold a place among his parallel lives of the great men of Greece and Rome; and his account appears warranted in many points by strong corresponding testimony from other ancient authors of various ages. The period also is so important in the annals of Attica, and the reports remaining altogether go so far to illustrate the manners and circumstances of the times, that it may be proper to allow them some scope in narration.

Ægeus, king of Athens, though an able and spirited prince, yet, in the divided and disorderly state of his country, with difficulty maintained his situation. When past the prime of life he had the misfortune to remain childless, though twice married; and a faction headed by his presumptive heirs, the numerous sons of Pallas his younger brother, gave him unceasing disturbance. Thus urged, he went to Delphi to implore information from the oracle how the blessing of children might be obtained. Receiving an answer which, like most of the oracular responses, was unintelligible, his next concern was to find some person capable of explaining to him the will of the deity thus mysteriously declared. Among the many establishments which Pelops had procured for his family throughout Peloponnesus was the small town and territory of Trœzen on the coast opposite to Athens, which he placed under the government of his son Pittheus. Ægeus applied to that prince; who was not only in his own age eminent for wisdom, but of reputation remaining even in the most flourishing period of Grecian philosophy; yet so little was he superior to the ridiculous, and often detestable superstition of his time that, in consequence of some fancied meaning in the oracle, which even the superstitious Plutarch confesses himself unable to comprehend, he introduced his own daughter Æthra to an illicit commerce with Ægeus. Perhaps it may be allowed to conjecture that the commerce was unknown to the Trœzenian prince till the consequence became evident, and that the interpretation of the oracle was an ensuing resource to obviate disgrace.

The affairs of Attica being in great confusion required the return of Ægeus. His departure from Trœzen is marked by an action which, to persons accustomed to consider modern manners only, may appear unfit to be related but in a fable, yet is so consonant to the manners of the times, and so characteristic of them, as to demand the notice of the historian. He led Æthra to a sequestered spot where was a small cavity in a rock. Depositing there a hunting-knife and a pair of sandals, he covered them with a marble fragment of enormous weight; and then addressing Æthra, "If," said he, "the child you now bear should prove a boy, let the removal of this stone be one day the proof of his strength; when he can effect it, send him with the tokens underneath to Athens."

Pittheus, well knowing the genius and the degree of information of his subjects and fellow-countrymen, thought it not too gross an imposition to report that his daughter was pregnant by the god Poseidon, or, as we usually call him with the Latins, Neptune, esteemed the tutelary deity of the Trœzenians. A similar expedient seems indeed to have been often successfully used to cover the disgrace which, even in those days, would otherwise attend such irregular amours in a lady of high rank, though women of

lower degree appear to have derived no dishonour from concubinage with their superiors. Theseus was the produce of the singular connection of Æthra with Ægeus. He is said to have been carefully educated under the inspection of his grandfather, and to have given early proofs of uncommon vigour both of body and mind. On his attaining manhood, his mother, in pursuance of the injunction of Ægeus, unfolded to him the reality of his parentage, and conducted him to the rock where his father's tokens were deposited. He removed the stone which covered them, with a facility indicating that superior bodily strength so necessary in those days to support the pretensions of high birth; and thus encouraged she recommended to him to carry them to Ægeus at Athens. This proposal perfectly suited the temper and inclination of Theseus; but when he was farther advised to go by sea on account of the shortness and safety of the passage, piracy being about this time suppressed by the naval power of Minos, king of Crete, he positively refused.

THESEUS

The age of Theseus was the great era of those heroes, to whom the knights errant of the Gothic kingdoms afterwards bore a close resemblance. Hercules was his near kinsman. The actions of that extraordinary personage are reported to have been for some years the subject of universal conversation, and both an incentive and a direction to young Theseus in the road to fame. After having destroyed the most powerful and atrocious freebooters throughout Greece, Hercules, according to Plutarch, was gone into Asia; and those disturbers of civil order, whom his irresistible might and severe justice had driven to conceal themselves, took advantage of his absence to renew their violences. Being not obscure and vagabond thieves, but powerful chieftains, who openly defied law and government, the dangers to be expected from them were well known at Trezen. Theseus however persevered in his resolution to go by land; alleging that it would be shameful, if, while Hercules was traversing earth and sea to repress the common disturbers of mankind, he should avoid those at his door, disgracing his reputed father by an ignominious flight over his own element, and carrying to his real father, for tokens, a bloodless weapon and sandals untrodden, instead of giving proofs of his high birth by actions worthy of it.

Proceeding in his journey he found every fastness occupied by men who, like many of the old barons of the Western European kingdoms, gave protection to their dependants, and disturbance to all beside within their reach, making booty of whatever they could master. His valour, however, and his good fortune procuring him the advantage in every contest carried him safe through all dangers; though he found nothing friendly till he arrived on the bank of the river Cephissus in the middle of Attica. Some people of the country meeting him there saluted him in the usual terms of friendship to strangers. Judging himself then past the perils of his journey, he requested to have the accustomed ceremony of purification from blood performed, that he might properly join in sacrifices and other religious rites. The courteous Atticans readily complied, and then entertained him at their houses. An ancient altar, said to have been erected in commemoration of this meeting, dedicated to Jupiter with the epithet of Meilichius, the friendly or kind, remained to the time of Pausanias.

When Theseus arrived at Athens, Ægeus, already approaching dotage, was governed by the Colchian princess Medea, so famous in poetry, who fly-

ing from Corinth had prevailed on him to afford her protection. Theseus, as an illustrious stranger invited to a feast, on drawing his hunting-knife, as it seems was usual, to carve the meat before him, was recognised by Ægeus. The old king immediately rising embraced him, acknowledged him before the company for his son, and afterward summoning an assembly of the people presented Theseus as their prince. The fame of exploits suited, as those of Theseus, to acquire popularity in that age had already prepossessed the people in his favour; strong marks of general satisfaction followed. But the party of the sons of Pallas was powerful: their disappointment was equally great and unexpected; and no hope remaining to accomplish their wishes by other means, they withdrew from the city, collected their adherents, and returned in arms. The tide of popular inclination, however, now ran so strongly in favour of Theseus that some even of their confidants gave way to it. A design to surprise the city was discovered; part of their troops were in consequence cut off, the rest dispersed; and the faction was completely quelled.

Quiet being thus restored to Athens, Theseus was diligent to increase the popularity he had acquired. Military fame was the means to which his active spirit chiefly inclined him; but, as the state had now no enemies, he exercised his valour in the destruction of wild beasts, and, it is said, added not a little to his reputation by delivering the country from a savage bull, which had done great mischief in the neighbourhood of Marathon.

An opportunity however soon offered for Theseus to do his country more essential service, and to acquire more illustrious fame. The Athenians, in a war with Minos, king of Crete, had been reduced to purchase peace of that powerful monarch by a yearly tribute of seven youths and as many virgins. Coined money was not common till some centuries after his age; and slaves and cattle were not only the principal riches, but the most commodious and usual standards by which the value of other things was determined. A tribute of slaves therefore was perhaps the most convenient that Minos could impose; Attica maintaining few cattle, and those being less easily transported. The burden however could not but cause much uneasiness among the Athenians; so that the return of the Cretan ship at the usual time to demand the tribute excited fresh and loud murmurs against the government of Ægeus. Theseus took an extraordinary step, but perfectly suited to the heroic character which he affected, for appeasing the popular discontent. The tributary youths and virgins had been hitherto drawn by lot from the body of the people; who might however apparently send slaves, if they had or could procure them, instead of persons of their own family. But Theseus offered himself. Report went that those unfortunate victims were thrown into the famous Labyrinth built by Dædalus, and there devoured by the Minotaur, a monster, half-man and half-bull. This fable was probably no invention of the poets who embellished it in more polished ages: it may have been devised at the time, and even have found credit among a people of an imagination so lively, and a judgment so uninformed, as were then the Athenians. The offer of Theseus therefore, really magnanimous, appeared an unparalleled effort of patriotic heroism.

Ancient writers, who have endeavoured to investigate truth among the intricacies of fabulous tradition, tell us that the labyrinth was a fortress where prisoners were usually kept, and that a Cretan general, its governor, named Taurus, which in Greek signifies a bull, gave rise to the fiction of the Minotaur. The better testimony from antiquity however asserts that Theseus was received by Minos more agreeably to the character of a great and generous prince than of a tyrant who gave his captives to be devoured

by monsters. But during this, the flourishing age of Crete, letters were, if at all known, little used in Greece. In after-times, when the Athenians bore the sway in literature, their tragedians, flattering vulgar prejudices, exhibited Minos in odious colours; and through the popularity of their ingenious works their calumnious misrepresentations, as Plutarch has observed, overbore the eulogies of the elder poets, even of Hesiod and Homer. Thus the particulars of the adventures of Theseus in Crete, and of his return to Athens, have been so disguised that even to guess at the truth is difficult. For these early ages Homer is our best guide; but he has mixed mythology with his short notice of the adventure of Theseus in Crete.

A rational interpretation nevertheless is obvious. Minos, surprised probably at the arrival of the Athenian prince among the tributary slaves, received him honourably, became partial to his merit, and after some experience of it gave him his daughter Ariadne in marriage. In the voyage toward Athens the princess being taken with sudden sickness was landed in the island of Naxos, where Bacchus was esteemed the tutelary deity; and she died there. If we add the supposition that Theseus, eager to communicate the news of his extraordinary success, or urged by public duty, proceeded on his voyage while the princess was yet living, no further foundation would be wanting for the fables which have made these names so familiar. Theseus however, according to what with most certainty may be gathered from Athenian tradition, freed his country from further payment of the ignominious and cruel tribute.

This achievement, by whatsoever means effected, was so bold in the undertaking, so complete in the success, so important and so interesting in the consequences, that it deservedly raised Theseus to the highest popularity among the Athenians. Sacrifices and processions were instituted in honour of it, and were continued while the Pagan religion had existence in Athens. The vessel in which he made his voyage was yearly sent in solemn pomp to the sacred island of Delos, where rites of thanksgiving were performed to Apollo. Through the extreme veneration in which it was held, it was so anxiously preserved that in Plato's time it was said to be still the same vessel; though at length its frequent repairs gave occasion to the dispute, which became famous among the sophists, whether it was or was not still the same. On his father's death the common voice supported his claim to the succession, and he showed himself not less capable of improving the state by his wisdom than of defending it by his valour.

The twelve districts into which Cecrops had divided Attica were become so many nearly independent commonwealths, with scarcely any bond of union but their acknowledgment of one chief, whose authority was not always sufficient to keep them from mutual hostilities. The inconveniences of such a constitution were great and obvious, but the remedy full of difficulty. Theseus, however, undertook it; and effected that change which laid the foundation of the following glory of Athens, while it ranks him among the most illustrious patriots that adorn the annals of mankind. Going through every district, with that judicial authority which in the early state of all monarchical governments has been attached to the kingly office, and with those powers of persuasion which he is said largely to have possessed, he put an end to civil contest. He proposed then the abolition of all the independent magistracies, councils, and courts of justice, and the substitution of one common council of legislation, and one common system of judicature. The lower people readily acceded to his measures. The rich and powerful, who shared among them the independent magistracies, were more inclined

to opposition. To satisfy these, therefore, he offered, with a disinterestedness of which history affords few examples, to give up much of his own power; and, appropriating to himself only the cares and dangers of royalty, to share with his people authority, honour, wealth, all that is commonly most valued in it. Few were inclined to resist so equitable and generous a proposal: the most selfish and most obstinate dared not. Theseus therefore proceeded quietly to new-model the commonwealth.¹

The dissolution of all the independent councils and jurisdictions in the several towns and districts, and the removal of all the more important civil business to Athens, was his first measure. He wisely judged that the civil union, so happily effected, would be incomplete, or at least unstable, if he did not cement it by union in religion. He avoided however to shock rooted prejudices by any abolition of established religious ceremonies. Leaving those peculiar to each district as they stood, he instituted, or improved and laid open for all in common, one feast and sacrifice, in honour of the goddess Athene, or Minerva, for all inhabitants of Attica. This feast he called *Panathenæa*, the feast of all the Athenians or people of Minerva; and thenceforward apparently all the inhabitants of Attica, esteeming themselves unitedly under the particular protection of that goddess, uniformly distinguished themselves by a name formed from hers; for they were before variously called from their race, Ionians; from their country, Atticans; or from their princes, Cranaans, Cecropians, or Erechtidæ. To this scheme of union, conceived with a depth of judgment, and executed with a moderation of temper, rarely found in that age, the Athenians may well be said to owe all their after greatness. Otherwise Attica, like Boeotia and other provinces, whose circumstances will come hereafter under notice, would probably have contained several little republics, united only in name; each too weak to preserve dignity, or even to secure independency to its separate government; and possessing nothing so much in common as occasions for perpetual disagreement.

A share in the legislature, extended to all, insured civil freedom to all; and no distinction prevailed, as in other Grecian provinces, between the people of the capital and those of the inferior towns; but all were united under the Athenian name in the enjoyment of every privilege of Athenian citizens. When his improvements were completed, Theseus, according to the policy which became usual for giving authority to great innovations and all uncommon undertakings, is said to have procured a declaration of divine approbation from the prophetic shrine of Delphi.

Thus the province of Attica, containing a triangular tract of land with two sides about fifty miles long, and the third forty, was moulded into a well-united and well-regulated commonwealth, whose chief magistrate was yet hereditary, and retained the title of king. In consequence of so improved a state of things, the Athenians began the first of all the Greeks to acquire more civilised manners. Thucydides remarks that they were the first who dropped the practice, formerly general among the Greeks, of going constantly armed; and who introduced a civil dress in contradistinction to the military. This particularity, if not introduced by Theseus, appears to have been not less early, since it struck Homer, who marks the Athenians by the appellation of long-robed Ionians. If we may credit Plutarch, Theseus coined money; which was certainly rare in Greece two centuries after.

¹Payne Knight has supposed Theseus a merely fabulous personage, because he is not mentioned in any passage of Homer's poems, excepting one which he has reckoned not genuine. It seems bold to oppose such negative testimony to the positive of Thucydides and Cicero.

The rest of the history of Theseus affords little worthy of notice. It is composed of a number of the wildest adventures, many of them consistent enough with the character of the times, but very little so with what is related of the former part of his life. It seems indeed as if historians had inverted the order of things; giving to his riper years the extravagance of youth, after having attributed to his earliest manhood what the maturest age seldom has equalled. Whether this should be attributed altogether, or in any part, to the fancy which afterward prevailed among philosophical writers to mix mythology with history, will be rather for the dissertator than the historian to inquire. Theseus however, it may be proper to observe, is said to have lost in the end all favour and all authority among the Athenians; and though his institutions remained in vigour, to have died in exile. After him, Menestheus, a person of the royal family, acquired the sovereignty, and commanded the Athenian troops in the Trojan War.^d

According to some historians, Theseus, however explained, deserves no credit for the Athenian union, since at the time this union took place, Theseus was not even a national hero but only a local and minor god worshipped about Marathon.

RISE OF POPULAR LIBERTY

We may perhaps safely conclude from analogy, that, even while the power of the nobles was most absolute, a popular assembly was not unknown at Athens; and the example of Sparta may suggest a notion of the limitations which might prevent it from endangering the privileges of the ruling body. So long as the latter reserved to itself the office of making, or declaring, of interpreting, and administering the laws, as well as the ordinary functions of government, it might securely entrust many subjects to the decision of the popular voice. Its first contests were waged, not with the people, but with the kings.

Even in the reign of Theseus himself the legend exhibits the royal power as on the decline. Menestheus, a descendant of the ancient kings, is said to have engaged his brother nobles in a conspiracy against Theseus, which finally compelled him and his family to go into exile, and placed Menestheus on the throne. After the death of this usurper indeed the crown is restored to the line of Theseus for some generations. But his descendant Thymœtes is compelled to abdicate in favour of Melanthus, a stranger, who has no claim but his superior merit. After the death of Codrus, the nobles, taking advantage perhaps of the opportunity afforded by the dispute between his sons, are said to have abolished the title of king, and to have substituted for it that of archon. This change however seems to have been important, rather as it indicated the new, precarious tenure by which the royal power was held, than as it immediately affected the nature of the office. It was indeed still held for life; and Medon, the son of Codrus, transmitted it to his posterity, though it would appear that, within the house of the Medontids, the succession was determined by the choice of the nobles. It is added however, that the archon was deemed a responsible magistrate, which implies that those who elected had the power of deposing him; and consequently, though the range of his functions may not have been narrower than that of the king's, he was more subject to control in the exercise of them. This indirect kind of sway, however, did not satisfy the more ambitious spirits; and we find them steadily, though gradually, advancing towards the accomplishment of their final object — a complete and equal participation of the sovereignty.

After twelve reigns, ending with that of Alemæon,¹ the duration of the office was limited to ten years; and through the guilt or calamity of Hippomenes, the fourth decennial archon,² the house of Medon was deprived of its privilege, and the supreme magistracy was thrown open to the whole body of the nobles. This change was speedily followed by one much more important. When Tlesias, the successor of Eryxias, had completed the term which his predecessor had left unfinished, the duration of the archonship was again reduced to a single year; and at the same time its branches were severed, and distributed among nine new magistrates.

Among these, the first in rank retained the distinguishing title of The Archon, and the year was marked by his name. He represented the majesty of the state, and exercised a peculiar jurisdiction—that which had belonged to the king as the common parent of his people, the protector of families, the guardian of orphans and heiresses, and of the general rights of inheritance. For the second archon the title of king, if it had been laid aside, was revived, as the functions assigned to him were those most associated with ancient recollections. He represented the king as the high priest of his people; he regulated the celebration of the mysteries and the most solemn festivals; decided all causes which affected the interests of religion, and was charged with the care of protecting the state from the pollution it might incur through the heedlessness or impiety of individuals. The third archon bore the title of polemarch, and filled the place of the king, as the leader of his people in war, and the guardian who watched over its security in time of peace. Connected with this character of his office was the jurisdiction he possessed over strangers who had settled in Attica under the protection of the state, and over freedmen. The remaining six archons received the common title of *thesmothetes*, which literally signifies legislators, and was probably applied to them, as the judges who determined the great variety of causes which did not fall under the cognisance of their colleagues; because, in the absence of a written code, those who declare and interpret the laws may be properly said to make them.

These successive encroachments on the royal prerogatives, and the final triumph of the nobles, are almost the only events that fill the meagre annals of Attica for several centuries. Here, as elsewhere, a wonderful stillness suddenly follows the varied stir of enterprise and adventure, and the throng of interesting characters, that present themselves to our view in the heroic age. Life seems no longer to offer anything for poetry to celebrate, or for history to record. Are we to consider this long period of apparent tranquillity, as one of public happiness, of pure and simple manners, of general harmony and content, which has only been rendered obscure by the absence of the crimes and the calamities which usually leave the deepest traces in the page of history? We should willingly believe this, if it were not that, so far as the veil is withdrawn which conceals the occurrences of this period from our sight, it affords us glimpses of a very different state of things. In the list of the magistrates who held the undivided sovereignty of the state, the only name with which any events are connected is that of Hippomenes, the last archon of the line of Codrus. It was made memorable by the shame of his daughter, and by the extraordinary punishment which he inflicted on her and her paramour. Tradition long continued to point out as accursed

¹ The successors of Medon were Acastus, Archippus, Thersippus, Phorbas, Megacles, Diogenetus, Pherecles, Ariphron, Thespieus, Agamestor, Æschylus, Alemæon (*Ol.* VII, 1. B.C. 752).

² His predecessors were Charops, Æsimedes, Clidius; he was succeeded by Leocrates, Ap-sander, and Eryxias. Creon, the first annual archon, enters upon his office B.C. 684.

ground the place where she was shut up to perish from hunger, or from the fury of a wild horse, the companion of her confinement. The nobles, glad perhaps to seize an opportunity so favourable to their views, deposed Hippomenes, and razed his house to the ground.

This story would seem indeed to indicate the austerity, as well as the hardness, of the ancient manners: but on the other hand we are informed, that the father had been urged to this excess of rigour by the reproach that had fallen upon his family from the effeminacy and dissoluteness of its members. Without however drawing any inference from this isolated story, we may proceed to observe, that the accounts transmitted to us of the legislation of Draco, the next epoch when a gleam of light breaks through the obscurity of the Attic history, do not lead us to suppose that the people had enjoyed any extraordinary measure of happiness under the aristocratical government, or that their manners were peculiarly innocent and mild.

DRACO, THE LAWGIVER

The immediate occasion which led to Draco's legislation is not recorded, and even the motives which induced him to impress it with that character of severity to which it owes its chief celebrity, are not clearly ascertained. We know however that he was the author of the first written laws of Athens: and as this measure tended to limit the authority of the nobles, to which a customary law, of which they were the sole expounders, opposed a much feebler check, we may reasonably conclude that the innovation did not proceed from their wish, but was extorted from them by the growing discontent of the people. On the other hand, Draco undoubtedly framed his code as much as possible in conformity to the spirit and the interests of the ruling class, to which he himself belonged; and hence we may fairly infer that the extreme rigour of its penal enactments was designed to overawe and repress the popular movement which had produced it.

Aristotle observes that Draco made no change in the constitution; and that there was nothing remarkable in his laws, except the severity of the penalties by which they were enforced. It must however be remembered that the substitution of law for custom, of a written code for a fluctuating and flexible tradition, was itself a step of great importance; and we also learn that he introduced some changes in the administration of criminal justice, by transferring causes of murder, or of accidental homicide, from the cognisance of the archons to the magistrates called *ephetes*; though it was not clear whether he instituted, or only modified or enlarged, their jurisdiction. Demades was thought to have described the character of his laws very happily, when he said that they were written not in ink, but in blood. He himself is reported to have justified their severity, by observing that the least offences deserved death, and that he could devise no greater punishment for the worst. This sounds like the language of a man who proceeded on higher grounds than those of expediency, and who felt himself bound by his own convictions to disregard the opinions of his contemporaries. Yet it is difficult to believe, that Draco can have been led by any principles of abstract justice, to confound all gradations of guilt, or, as has been conjectured with somewhat greater probability, that, viewing them under a religious rather than a political aspect, he conceived that in every case alike they drew down the anger of the gods, which could only be appeased by the blood of the criminal.

[ca. 630 B.C.]

It seems much easier to understand how the ruling class, which adopted his enactments, might imagine that such a code was likely to be a convenient instrument in their hands, for striking terror into their subjects, and stifling the rising spirit of discontent, which their cupidity and oppression had provoked. We are however unable to form a well-grounded judgment on the degree in which equity may have been violated by his indiscriminate vigour; for though we read that he enacted the same capital punishment for petty thefts as for sacrilege and murder, still as there were some offences for which he provided a milder sentence, he must have framed a kind of scale, the wisdom and justice of which we have no means of estimating.


The danger which threatened the nobles at length showed itself from a side on which they probably deemed themselves most secure. Twelve years after Draco's legislation, a conspiracy was formed by one of their own number for overthrowing the government. Cylon, the author of this plot, was eminent both in birth and riches. His reputation, and still more his confidence in his own fortune, had been greatly raised by a victory at the Olympic games; and he had further increased the lustre and influence of his family by an alliance with Theagenes, the tyrant of Megara, whose daughter he married. This extraordinary prosperity elated his presumption, and inflamed his ambition with hopes of a greatness, which could only be attained by a dangerous enterprise. He conceived the design of becoming master of Athens. He could reckon on the cordial assistance of his father-in-law, who, independently of their affinity, was deeply interested in establishing at Athens a form of government similar to that which he himself had founded at Megara; and he had also, by his personal influence, insured the support of numerous friends and adherents. Yet it is probable that he would not have relied on these resources, and that his scheme would never have suggested itself to his mind, if the general disaffection of the people toward their rulers, the impatience produced by the evils for which Draco had provided so inadequate a remedy, and by the irritating nature of the remedy itself, and the ordinary signs of an approaching change, the need of which began to be universally felt, had not appeared to favour his aims.

At this period scarcely any great enterprise was undertaken in Greece without the sanction of an oracle; yet we cannot but feel some surprise, when we are informed by Thucydides, that Cylon consulted the Delphic god on the means by which he might overthrow the government of his country, and still more at the answer he is said to have received: that he must seize the citadel of Athens during the principal festival of Zeus. Cylon naturally interpreted the oracle to mean the Olympic games, the scene of his glory; and Thucydides thinks it worth observing, that the great Attic festival in honour of the same god occurred at a different season. At the time however which appeared to be prescribed by his infallible counsellor, Cylon proceeded to carry his plan into effect. With the aid of a body of troops furnished by Theagenes, and of his partisans, he made himself master of the citadel. Cylon and his friends soon found themselves besieged by the forces which the government called in from all parts of the country. When the provisions were all spent, and some had died of hunger, the remainder abandoned the defence of the walls, and took refuge in the temple of Athene.

The archon Megacles and his colleagues, seeing them reduced to the last extremity of weakness, began to be alarmed lest the sanctuary should be profaned by their death. To avoid this danger, they induced them to surrender on condition that their lives should be spared. Thucydides simply

relates that the archons broke their promise, and put their prisoners to death when they had quitted their asylum, and that some were even killed at the altars of the "dread goddesses," as the Eumenides, or Furies, were called, to which they had fled in the tumult. Plutarch adds a feature to the story, which seems too characteristic of the age to be considered as a later invention. More effectually to insure their safety, the suppliants, before they descended from the citadel, fastened a line to the statue of Minerva, and held it in their hands, as they passed through the midst of their enemies. But the line chancing to break as they were passing by the sanctuary of the Eumenides, Megacles, with the approbation of his colleagues, declared that they were no longer under the safeguard of the goddess, who had thus visibly rejected their supplication, and immediately proceeded to arrest them. His words were the signal of a general massacre, from which even the awful sanctity of the neighbouring altars did not screen the fugitives: none escaped but those who found means of imploring female compassion.

If the conduct of the principal actors in this bloody scene had been marked only by treachery and cruelty, it would never have exposed them to punishment, perhaps not even to reproach. But they had been guilty of a flagrant violation of religion; and Megacles and his whole house were viewed with horror, as men polluted with the stain of sacrilege. All public disasters and calamities were henceforth construed into signs of the divine displeasure: and the surviving partisans of Cylon did not fail to urge that the gods would never be appeased until vengeance should have been taken on the offenders. Yet if this had been the only question which agitated the public mind, it might have been hushed without producing any important consequences. But it was only one ingredient in the ferment which the conflict of parties, the grievances of the many, and the ambition of the few, now carried to a height that called for some extraordinary remedy. Hence Cylon's conspiracy and its issue exercised an influence on the history of Athens, which has rendered it forever memorable, as the event which led the way to the legislation of Solon.^e



GREEK SEALS



GREEK SEALS

CHAPTER IX. SOME CHARACTERISTIC INSTITUTIONS

PERPETUAL warfare, pushed to the last extremity of hostile rage, would in no long time have consumed or ruined the little tribes whose territories occupied only a few adjacent valleys, always open to invasion: the necessity of mutual forbearance for general safety would naturally suggest the prudence of entering into friendly associations, without any ulterior views, either of aggrandisement, or of protection against a common enemy. Such an association, formed among independent neighbouring tribes for the regulation of their mutual intercourse, and thus distinguished on the one hand from confederations for purposes offensive or defensive, and on the other, from the continued friendly relations subsisting among independent members of the same race, is the one properly described by the Greek term *amphictyony*.

This Greek word, which we shall be obliged to borrow, has been supposed by some ancient and modern writers to have been derived from the name of Amphictyon, the son of Deucalion, who is said to have founded the most celebrated of the Amphictyonic associations, that which is always to be understood under the title of the Amphictyonic Confederacy. There can, however, be scarcely any reasonable doubt that this Amphictyon is a merely fictitious person, invented to account for the institution attributed to him, the author of which, if it was the work of any individual, was probably no better known than those of the other amphictyonies, which did not happen to become so famous.

The term “amphictyony,” which has probably been adapted to the legend, and would be more properly written “amphictiony,” denotes a body referred to a local centre of union, and in itself does not imply any national affinity: and, in fact, the associations bearing this name include several tribes, which were but very remotely connected together by descent. But the local centre of union appears to have been always a religious one—a common sanctuary, the scene of periodical meetings for the celebration of a common worship. It is probable that many amphictyonies once existed in Greece, all trace of which has been lost: and even with regard to those which happen to have been rescued from total oblivion, our information is for the most part extremely defective.

Of all such institutions the most celebrated and important was the one known, without any other local distinction, as the Amphictyonic League or council. This last appellation refers to the fact that the affairs of the whole Amphictyonic body were transacted by a congress, composed of deputies sent by the several states according to rules established from time immemorial. One peculiar feature of this congress was, that its meetings were held at two different places. There were two regularly convened

every year ; one in the spring, at Delphi, the other in the autumn, near the little town of Anthela, within the pass of Thermopylæ, at a temple of Demeter.

The confederate tribes are variously enumerated by different authors. A comparison of their lists enables us to ascertain the greater part of the names, and to form a probable conjecture as to the rest ; but it also leads us to conclude that some changes took place at a remote period in the constitution of the council, as to which tradition is silent. The most authentic list of the Amphictyonic tribes contains the following names : Thessalians, Bœotians, Dorians, Ionians, Perrhæbians, Magnetes, Locrians, Cætæans or Enianians, Phthiots or Achæans of Phthia, Malians or Melians, and Phocians. The orator Æschines, who furnishes this list, shows, by mentioning the number twelve, that one name is wanting. The other lists supply two names to fill up the vacant place ; the Dolopes, and the Delphians. It seems not improbable that the former were finally supplanted by the Delphians, who appear to have been a distinct race from the Phocians.

The mere inspection of this list is sufficient to prove at once the high antiquity of the institution and the imperfection of our knowledge with regard to its early history. It is clear that the Dorians must have become members of the Amphictyonic body before the conquest, which divided them into several states, each incomparably more powerful than most of the petty northern tribes, which possessed an equal number of votes in the council. It may however be doubted, whether they were among the original members, and did not rather take the place of one of the tribes which they had dislodged from their seats in the neighbourhood of Delphi, perhaps the Dryopes.

On the other hand the Thessalians were probably not received into the league, before they made their appearance in Thessaly, which is commonly believed to have taken place only twenty years before the Dorian invasion of the Peloponnesus. It is therefore highly probable that they were admitted in the room of some other tribe, which had lost its independence through the convulsions of this eventful period.

The constitution of the council rested on the supposition, once perhaps not very inconsistent with the fact, of a perfect equality among the tribes represented by it. Each tribe, however feeble, had two votes in the deliberation of the congress : none, however powerful, had more. The order in which the right of sending representatives to the council was exercised by the various states included in one Amphictyonic tribe was perhaps regulated by private agreement ; but, unless one state usurped the whole right of its tribe, it is manifest that a petty tribe, which formed but one community, had greatly the advantage over Sparta, or Argos, which could only be represented in their turn, the more rarely in proportion to the magnitude of the tribe to which they belonged. Besides the council which held its sessions either in the temple, or in some adjacent building, there was an Amphictyonic assembly, which met in the open air, and was composed of persons residing in the place where the congress was held, and of the numerous strangers who were drawn to it by curiosity, business, or devotion.

It is evident that a constitution such as we have described could not have been suffered to last, if it had been supposed that any important political interests depended on the decision of the council. But, in fact, it was not commonly viewed as a national congress for such purposes ; its ordinary functions were chiefly, if not altogether, connected with religion, and it was only by accident that it was ever made subservient to political ends. The original objects, or at least the essential character, of the institution, seem to



A GREEK WARRIOR

[590 B.C.]

be faithfully expressed in the terms of the oath, preserved by Æschines, which bound the members of the league to refrain from utterly destroying any Amphictyonic city, and from cutting off its supply of water, even in war, and to defend the sanctuary and the treasures of the Delphic god from sacrilege. In this ancient and half-symbolical form we perceive two main functions assigned to the council; to guard the temple, and to restrain the violence of hostility among Amphictyonic states. There is no intimation of any confederacy against foreign enemies, except for the protection of the temple; nor of any right of interposing between members of the league, unless where one threatens the existence of another.

A review of the history of the council shows that it was almost powerless for good, except perhaps as a passive instrument, and that it was only active for purposes which were either unimportant or pernicious. In the great national struggles it lent no strength to the common cause; but it now and then threw a shade of sanctity over plans of ambition or revenge. It sometimes assumed a jurisdiction uncertain in its limits, over its members; but it seldom had the power of executing its sentences, and commonly committed them to the party most interested in exacting the penalty. Thus it punished the Dolopes of Scyros for piracy, by the hands of the Athenians, who coveted their island. But its most legitimate sphere of action lay in cases where the honour and safety of the Delphic sanctuary were concerned; and in these it might safely reckon on general co-operation from all the Greeks. Thus it could act with dignity and energy in a case where a procession, passing through the territory of Megara towards Delphi, was insulted by some Megarians, and could not obtain redress from the government; the Amphictyonic tribunal punished the offenders with death or banishment.

A much more celebrated and important instance of a similar intervention, was that which gave occasion to the war above alluded to, which is commonly called the Crissæan, or the First Sacred War. Crissa appears to be the same town which is sometimes named Cirrha. Situate on that part of the Corinthian Gulf which was called from it the Gulf of Crissa, it commanded a harbour, much frequented by pilgrims from the West, who came to Delphi by sea, and was also mistress of a fruitful tract, called the Cirrhæan Plain. It is possible that there may have been real ground for the charge which was brought against the Crissæans, of extortion and violence used towards the strangers who landed at their port, or passed through their territory: one ancient author, who however wrote nearly three centuries later, assigned as the immediate occasion of the war an outrage committed on some female pilgrims as they were returning from the oracle. It is however at least equally probable, that their neighbours of Delphi had long cast a jealous and a wishful eye on the customs by which Crissa was enriched, and considered all that was there exacted from the pilgrims as taken from the Delphic god, who might otherwise have received it as an offering.

A complaint, however founded, was in the end preferred against Crissa before the Amphictyons, who decreed a war against the refractory city. They called in the aid of the Thessalians, who sent a body of forces under Eurylochus; and their cause was also actively espoused by Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon: and, according to the Athenian tradition, Solon assisted them with important advice. They consulted the offended god, who enjoined, as the condition of success in the war, that they should cause the sea to beat upon his domain. In compliance with this oracle, at the suggestion of Solon, they vowed to dedicate the Crissæans and their territory to the god, by enslaving them, and making their land a waste forever. If the prospect of

such signal vengeance animated the assailants, the besieged were no doubt goaded to a more obstinate defence by the threat of extermination. The war is said to have lasted ten years, and at length to have been brought to a close by a stratagem, which we could wish not to have found imputed to Solon. He is reported to have poisoned the waters of the Plistus, from which the city was supplied, and thus to have reduced the garrison to a state in which they were easily overpowered. When the town had fallen, the vow of the conquerors was literally fulfilled. Crissa was razed to the ground, its harbour choked up, its fruitful plain turned into a wilderness. This triumph was commemorated by the institution of gymnastic games, called the Pythian, in the room of a more ancient and simple festival. The Amphictyons, who celebrated the new games with the spoils of Crissa, were appointed perpetual presidents.

THE ORACLE AT DELPHI

As the Delphic oracle was the object to which the principal duties of the Amphictyons related, it might have been imagined to have been under their control, and thus to have afforded them an engine by which they might, at least secretly, exert a very powerful influence over the affairs of Greece. But though this engine was not unfrequently wielded for political purposes, it appears not to have been under the management of the council, but of the leading citizens of Delphi, who had opportunity of constant and more efficacious access to the persons employed in revealing the supposed will of the god. In early times the oracle was often consulted, not merely for the sake of learning the unknown future, but for advice and direction, which, as it was implicitly followed, really determined the destiny of those who received it. The power conferred by such an instrument was unbounded; and it appears, on the whole, not to have been ill applied: but the honour of its beneficial effects must be ascribed almost entirely to the wisdom and patriotism of the ruling Delphians or of the foreigners who concerted with them in the use of the sacred machinery. But the authority of the oracle itself was gradually weakened, partly by the progress of new opinions, and partly by the abuse which was too frequently made of it. The organ of the prophetic god was a woman, of an age more open to bribery than to any other kind of seduction;¹ and, even before the Persian wars, several instances occurred in which she had notoriously sold her answers. The credulity of individuals might notwithstanding be little shaken: but a few such disclosures would be sufficient to deprive the oracle of the greater part of its political influence.

NATIONAL FESTIVALS

The character of a national institution, which the Amphictyonic council affected, but never really acquired, more truly belonged to the public festivals, which, though celebrated within certain districts, were not peculiar to any tribe, but were open to all who could prove their Hellenic blood.^b

From very early times, it had been customary among the Greeks to hold numerous meetings for purposes of festivity and social amusement. A foot-race, a wrestling match, or some other rude trial of bodily strength and

¹ The Pythia had once been a maiden, chosen in the flower of youth; but this practice having been attended with inconvenient consequences, women were appointed who had passed the age of fifty, but still wore the dress of virgins. Diodorus, xvi, 26.

activity, formed originally the principal entertainment, which seems to have been very similar in character to our country wakes. The almost ceaseless warfare among the little Grecian states gave especial value to military exercises, which were accordingly ordinary in those games. The connection of these games with the warlike character may have occasioned their introduction at funerals in honour of the dead; a custom which, we learn from Homer, was in his time ancient. But all the violence of the early ages was unable to repress that elegance of imagination which seems congenial to Greece. Very anciently a contention for a prize in poetry and music was a favourite entertainment of the Grecian people; and when connected, as it often was, with some ceremony of religion, drew together large assemblies of both sexes. A festival of this kind in the little island of Delos, at which Homer assisted, brought a numerous concourse from different parts by sea: and Hesiod informs us of a splendid meeting for the celebration of various games at Chalcis in Eubœa, where himself obtained the prize for poetry and song. The contest in music and poetry seems early to have been particularly connected with the worship of Apollo. When this was carried from the islands of the Ægean to Delphi, a prize for poetry was instituted; and thence appear to have arisen the Pythian games. But Homer shows that games, in which athletic exercises and music and dancing were alternately introduced, made a common amusement of the courts of princes; and before his time the manner of conducting them was so far reduced to a system that public judges of the games were of the established magistracy. Thus improved, the games greatly resembled the tilts and tournaments of the ages of chivalry. Only men of high rank presumed to engage in them; but a large concourse of all orders attended as spectators; and to keep regularity among these was perhaps the most necessary office of the judges. But the most solemn meetings, drawing together people of distinguished rank and character, often from distant parts, were at the funerals of eminent men. The paramount sovereigns of the Peloponnesus did not disdain to attend these, which were celebrated with every circumstance of magnificence and splendour that the age could afford. The funeral of Patroclus, described in the *Iliad*, may be considered as an example of what the poet could imagine in its kind most complete. The games, in which prizes were there contended for, were the chariot-race, the foot-race, boxing, wrestling, throwing the quoit and the javelin, shooting with the bow, and fencing with the spear. And in times when none could be rich or powerful but the strong and active, the expert at martial exercises, all those trials of skill appear to have been esteemed equally becoming men of the highest rank; though it may seem, from the prizes offered and the persons contending at the funeral of Patroclus, the poet himself saw, in the game of the cestus, some incongruity with exalted characters.



GREEK DANCING GIRL
(After Hope)

Traditions are preserved of games celebrated in Elis, upon several great occasions, in very early times, with more than ordinary pomp, by assemblies of chiefs from different parts of Greece. Homer mentions such at Elis under King Augeas, contemporary with Hercules, and grandfather of one of the chiefs who commanded the Elean troops in the Trojan War; and again at Buprasium in Elis, for the funeral of Amarynceus, while Nestor was yet in the vigour of youth. But it does not at all appear from Homer that in his time, or ever before him, any periodical festival was established like that which afterward became so famous under the title of the Olympiad or the Olympian contest, or, as our writers, translating the Latin phrase, have commonly termed it, the Olympian Games. On the contrary, every mention of such games, in his extant works, shows them to have been only occasional solemnities; and Strabo has remarked that they were distinguished by a characteristic difference from the Olympian. In these the honour derived from receiving publicly a crown or chaplet, formed of a branch of oleaster, was the only reward of the victor; but in Homer's games the prizes, not merely honorary, were intrinsically valuable, and the value was often very considerable.

After Homer's age, through the long troubles ensuing from the Dorian conquest, and the great change made in the population of the country, the customs and institutions of the Peloponnesians were so altered that even memory of the ancient games was nearly lost.

THE OLYMPIAN GAMES

In this season of turbulence and returning barbarism, Iphitus, a descendant, probably grandson, of Oxylus (though so deficient were the means of transmitting information to posterity that we have no assurance even of his father's name), succeeded to the throne of Elis. This prince was of a genius that might have produced a more brilliant character in a more enlightened age, but which was perhaps more beneficial to mankind in the rough times in which he lived. Active and enterprising, but not by inclination a warrior, he was anxious to find a remedy for the disorderly situation of his country. He sent a solemn embassy to Delphi to supplicate information from the deity of the place, "How the anger of the gods, which threatened total destruction to the Peloponnesus through endless hostilities among its people, might be averted." He received for answer, what himself, as a judicious critic has observed, had probably suggested, "That the Olympic festival must be restored; for the neglect of that solemnity had brought on the Greeks the indignation of the god Jupiter, to whom it was dedicated, and of the hero Hercules, by whom it had been instituted: and that a cessation of arms must therefore immediately be proclaimed for all cities desirous of partaking in it." This response of the god was promulgated throughout Greece; and Iphitus, in obedience to it, caused the armistice to be proclaimed. But the other Peloponnesians, full of respect for the authority of the oracle, yet uneasy at the ascendancy thus assumed by the Eleans, sent a common deputation to Delphi, to inquire concerning the authenticity of the divine mandate reported to them. The Pythoress however, seldom averse to authorise the schemes of kings and legislators, adhered to her former answer and commanded the Peloponnesians "to submit to the direction and authority of the Eleans, in ordering and establishing the ancient laws and customs of their forefathers."

[ca. 884 B.C.]

Supported thus by the oracle, and encouraged by the ready acquiescence of all the Peloponnesians, Iphitus proceeded to model his institution. Jupiter, the chief of the gods, being now the acknowledged patron of the plan, and the prince himself, under Apollo, the promulgator of his will, it was ordained that a festival should be held at the temple of Jupiter at Olympia, near the town of Pisa in Elis, open to the whole Greek nation; and that it should be repeated at the termination of every fourth year: that this festival should consist in solemn sacrifices to Jupiter and Hercules, and in games celebrated to their honour; and as wars might often prevent not only individuals, but whole states, from partaking in the benefits with which the gods would reward those who properly shared in the solemnity, it was ordained under the same authority, that an armistice should take place throughout Greece for some time before the commencement of the festival, and continue for some time after its conclusion. For his own people, the Eleans, Iphitus procured an advantage never perhaps enjoyed in equal extent by any other people. A tradition was current that the Heraclidæ, on appointing Oxyllus at the same time to the throne of Elis and to the guardianship of the temple of Olympian Jupiter, had consecrated all Elis to the god under sanction of an oath, and denounced the severest curses, not only on any who should invade it, but also on all who should not defend it against invaders. Iphitus procured universal acquiescence to the authority of this tradition; and the deference of the Grecian people towards it, during many ages, is not among the least remarkable circumstances of Grecian history. A reputation of sacredness became attached to the whole Elean people as the hereditary priesthood of Jupiter, and a pointed difference in character and pursuits arose between them and the other Greeks. Little disposed to ambition, and regardless even of the pleasures of a town-life, their general turn was to rural business and rural amusements. Elsewhere the country was left to hinds and herdsmen, who were mostly slaves; men of property, for security as well as for pursuits of ambition and pleasure, resided in fortified towns. But the towns of Elis, Elis itself the capital, remained unfortified. In republican governments however civil contention would arise. Within a narrow territory the implication of domestic party-politics with foreign interests could not be entirely obviated; and thus foreign wars would ensue. But to the time of Polybius, who saw the liberty of Greece expire, the Eleans maintained their general character, and in a great degree their ancient privileges; whence they were then the wealthiest people of the Peloponnesus, and yet the richest of them mostly resided upon their estates, and many, as that historian avers, without ever visiting Elis.

Character of the Games

At the Olympian festival, as established by Iphitus, the foot-race, distinguished by the name of *stadion*, is said to have been the only game exhibited; whether the various other exercises familiar in Homer's age had fallen into oblivion, or the barbarism and poverty, superinduced by the violent and lasting troubles which followed the return of the Heraclidæ, forbade those of greater splendour.

Afterwards, as the growing importance of the meeting occasioned inquiry concerning what had been practised of old, or excited invention concerning what might be advantageously added new, the games were multiplied. The *diaulos*, a more complicated foot-race, was added at the fourteenth Olympiad; wrestling, and the *pentathlon* or game of five exercises, at the eighteenth, boxing at the twenty-third; the chariot-race was not restored till the twenty-

fifth, of course not till a hundred years after the institution of the festival; the *pancratation* and the horse-race were added in the thirty-third.

So much Pausanias has asserted; apparently from the Olympian register, which on other occasions he has quoted. Originally the sacrifices, processions, and various religious ceremonies apparently formed the principal pageantry of the meeting. Afterwards perhaps the games became the greater inducement for the extraordinary resort of company to Olympia; though the religious ceremonies continued still to increase in magnificence as the festival gained importance. The temple, like that of Delphi, became an advantageous repository for treasure. A mart or fair was a natural consequence of a periodical assembly of multitudes in one place; and whatever required extensive publicity, whatever was important for all the scattered members of the Greek nation to know, would be most readily communicated, and most solemnly, by proclamation at the Olympian festival. Hence treaties by mutual agreement were often proclaimed at Olympia; and sometimes columns were erected there at the joint expense of the contracting parties, with the treaties engraved.

Thus the Olympian meeting to a not inconsiderable degree supplied the want of a common capital for the Greek nation; and, with a success far beyond what the worthy founder's imagination, urged by his warmest wishes, could reach, contributed to the advancement of arts, particularly of the fine arts, of commerce, of science, of civilised manners, of liberal sentiments, and of friendly communication among all the Grecian people. Such was the common feeling of these various advantages, it became established as a divine law that, whatever wars were going forward among the republics, there should be a truce, not only during the festival, but also for some days before and after; so that persons from all parts of Greece might safely attend it.

The advantages and gratifications in which the whole nation thus became interested, and the particular benefits accruing to the Eleans, excited attempts to establish or improve other similar meetings in different parts of Greece. Three of these, the Delphian, Isthmian, and Nemean, though they never equalled the celebrity and splendour of the Olympian, acquired considerable fame and importance. Each was consecrated to a different deity. In the Delphic, next in consideration to the Olympic, Apollo was honoured; the Delphian people were esteemed his ministers; the Amphictyonic council were the allowed protectors and regulators of the institution. The Isthmian had its name from the Corinthian Isthmus, near the middle of which, overlooking the scene of the solemnity, stood a temple of the god Neptune, venerated by the Corinthian people, administrators of the ceremonies, as their patron.

At the Nemean, sacred to Juno, the Argives (who esteemed her the tutelary deity of their state) presided. All these meetings, like the Olympian, were, in war as in peace, open to all Grecian people; the faith of gods as well as of men being considered as plighted for protection of all, under certain rules, going to, staying at, and returning from them. All were also, like the Olympian, held at intervals of four years; so that, taking their years in turn, it was provided that in every summer, in the midst of the military season, there should be a respite of those hostilities among the republics which were otherwise so continually desolating Greece; and though this beneficial regulation was under some pretences occasionally overborne by powerful states, yet the sequel of history shows it to have been of very advantageous efficacy.^c

MONARCHIES AND OLIGARCHIES

The enterprises of the heroic age, as we see from the example of the Trojan War itself, often led to the extinction, or expulsion, of a royal family, or of its principal members; and no principle appears to have been generally recognised which rendered it necessary, in such cases, to fill a vacant throne or to establish a new dynasty, while every such calamity inevitably weakened the authority of the kings, and made them more dependent on the nobles, who, as an order, were not affected by any disasters to individuals. But the great convulsions which attended the Thessalian, Bœotian, and Dorian migrations, contributed still more effectually to the same end. In most parts of Greece they destroyed or dislodged the line of the ancient kings, who, when they were able to seek new seats, left behind them the treasures and the strongholds which formed the main supports of their power: and, though the conquerors were generally accustomed to a kingly government, it must commonly have lost something of its vigour when transplanted to a new country, where it was subject to new conditions, and where the prince was constantly reminded, by new dangers, of the obligations which he owed to his companions in arms. Yet, even this must be considered rather as the occasion which led to the abolition of the heroic monarchy, than as the cause: that undoubtedly lay much deeper, and is to be sought in the character of the people—in that same energy and versatility which prevented it from ever stiffening, even in its infancy, in the mould of oriental institutions, and from stopping short, in any career which it had once opened, before it had passed through every stage.

It seems to have been seldom, if ever, that royalty was abolished by a sudden and violent revolution; the title often long survived the substance, and this was extinguished only by slow successive steps. These consisted in dividing it among several persons, in destroying its inheritable quality, and making it elective, first in one family, then in more; first for life, then for a certain term; in separating its functions, and distributing them into several hands. In the course of these changes it became more and more responsible to the nobles, and frequently, at a very early stage, the name itself was exchanged for one simply equivalent to ruler, or chief magistrate. The form of government which thus ensued might, with equal propriety, be termed either aristocracy or oligarchy, but, in the use of the terms to which these correspond, the Greek political writers made a distinction, which may at first sight appear more arbitrary than it really is. They taught—not a very recondite truth—that the three forms of government, that of one, that of a few, and that of the many, are all alike right and good, so long as they are rightly administered, with a view, that is, to the welfare of the state, and not to the interest of an individual or of a particular class. But, when any of the three loses sight of its legitimate object, it degenerates into a vicious species, which requires to be marked by a peculiar name. Thus a monarchy, in which selfish aims predominate, becomes a tyranny. The government of a few, conducted on like principles, is properly called an oligarchy. But to constitute an aristocracy, it is not sufficient that the ruling few should be animated by a desire to promote the public good: they must also be distinguished by a certain character; for aristocracy signifies the rule of the best men.

More distinctly to understand the peculiar nature of the Greek oligarchies, it is necessary to consider the variety of circumstances under which they arose. By the migrations which took place in the century following the

Trojan War, most parts of Greece were occupied by a new race of conquerors. Everywhere their first object was to secure a large portion of the conquered land; but the footing on which they placed themselves, with regard to the ancient inhabitants, was not everywhere the same; it varied according to the temper of the invaders, or of their chiefs, to their relative strength, means, and opportunities. In Sparta, and in most of the Dorian states, the invaders shunned all intermixture with the conquered, and deprived them if not of personal freedom, of all political rights. But elsewhere, as in Elis and probably in Bœotia, no such distinction appears to have been made between the old and the new people gradually melted into one.

An oligarchy, in the sense which we have assigned to the word, could only exist where there was an inferior body which felt itself aggrieved by being excluded from the political rights which were reserved to the privileged few. Such a feeling of discontent might be roused by the rapacity or insolence of the dominant order, as we shall find to have happened at Athens and as was the case at Mytilene, where some members of the ruling house of the Pentilids went about with clubs, committing outrages like those which Nero practised for a short time in the streets of Rome. But, without any such provocation, disaffection might arise from the cause which we shall see producing a revolution at Corinth, where the aristocracy was originally established on a basis too narrow to be durable: as Aristotle relates of the Basilids at Erythræ, that, though they exercised their power well, they could not retain it, because the people would no longer endure that it should be lodged in so few hands. In general however it was a gradual, inevitable change in the relative position of the higher and lower orders, which converted the aristocracy into an oligarchical faction, and awakened an opposition which usually ended in its overthrow.

The precautions which were used by the ruling class, when it began to perceive its danger, were of various kinds, and it was more frequently found necessary to widen the oligarchy itself, by the admission of new families, and to change the principle of its constitution by substituting wealth for birth as the qualification of its members. The form of government in which the possession of a certain amount of property was the condition of all, or at least of the highest, political privileges, was sometimes called a timocracy and its character varied according to the standard adopted. When this was high, and especially if it was fixed in the produce of land, the constitution differed little in effect from the aristocratical oligarchy, except as it opened a prospect to those who were excluded of raising themselves to a higher rank. But, when the standard was placed within reach of the middling class, the form of government was commonly termed a polity, and was considered as one of the best tempered and most durable modifications of democracy. The first stage however often afforded the means of an easy transition to the second, or might be reduced to it by a change in the value of the standard.

Another expedient, which seems to have been tried not unfrequently in early times for preserving or restoring tranquillity, was to invest an individual with absolute power, under a peculiar title, which soon became obsolete and that of *æsymnete*. At Cumæ indeed, and in other cities, this was the title of an ordinary magistracy, probably of that which succeeded the hereditary monarchy; but, when applied to an extraordinary office, it was equivalent to the title of protector or dictator. It did not indicate any disposition to revive the heroic royalty, but only the need which was felt, either by the commonalty of protection against the nobles, or by all parties of a temporary compromise, which induced the adverse factions to acquiesce in a neutral gov-

ernment. The office was conferred sometimes for life, sometimes only for a limited term, or for the accomplishment of a specific object, as the sage Pittacus was chosen by universal consent at Mytilene, when the city was threatened by a band of exiles, headed by the poet Alcæus and his brother Antimenidas [about 612 B.C.].

TYRANNIES

The fall of an oligarchy was sometimes accelerated by accidental and inevitable disasters, as by a protracted war, which at once exhausted its wealth and reduced its numbers, or by the loss of a battle, in which the flower of its youth might sometimes be cut off at one blow, and leave it to the mercy of its subjects; a case of which we shall find a signal instance in the history of Argos. But much more frequently the revolutions which overthrew the oligarchical governments arose out of the imprudence or misconduct, or the internal dissensions, of the ruling body, or out of the ambition of some of its members. The commonalty, even when really superior in strength, could not, all at once, shake off the awe with which it was impressed by ages of subjection. It needed a leader to animate, unite, and direct it.

Such was the origin of most of the governments which the Greeks described by the term "tyranny" — a term to which a notion has been attached, in modern languages, which did not enter into its original definition. A tyranny, in the Greek sense of the word, was the irresponsible dominion of a single person, not founded on hereditary right, like the monarchies of the heroic ages and of many barbarian nations; nor on a free election, like that of a dictator or *æsymnete*; but on force. It did not change its character when transmitted through several generations, nor was any other name invented to describe it when power which had been acquired by violence was used for the public good; though Aristotle makes it an element in the definition of tyranny, that it is exercised for selfish ends. But, according to the ordinary Greek notions, and the usage of the Greek historians, a mild and beneficent tyranny is an expression which involves no contradiction. On the other hand, a government, legitimate in its origin, might be converted into a tyranny, by an illegal forcible extension of its powers, or of its duration; and we are informed by Aristotle that this was frequently the case in early times, before the regal title was abolished, or while the chief magistrate, who succeeded under a different name to the functions of royalty, was still invested with prerogatives dangerous to liberty. Such was the basis on which one of the ancient tyrants, most infamous for his cruelty, Phalaris of Agrigentum [or Acragas], established his despotism.

But most of the tyrannies which sprang up before the Persian wars owed their existence to the cause above described, and derived their peculiar character from the occasion which gave them birth. It was usually by a mixture of violence and artifice that the demagogue accomplished his ends. A hackneyed stratagem, which however seems always to have been successful, was, to feign that his life was threatened, or had even been attacked by the fury of the nobles, and on this pretext to procure a guard for his person from the people. This band, though composed of citizens, he found it easy to attach to his interests, and with its aid made the first step towards absolute power by seizing the citadel: an act which might be considered as a formal assumption of the tyranny, and as declaring a resolution to maintain it by force. But in other respects the more politic tyrants set an example which Augustus might have studied with advantage. Like him, they as

carefully avoided the ostentation of power as they guarded its substance. They suffered the ancient forms of the government to remain in apparent vigour, and even in real operation, so far as they did not come into conflict with their own authority. They assumed no title, and were not distinguished from private citizens by any ensigns of superior rank. But they did not the less keep a jealous eye on all whom wealth, or character, or influence might render dangerous rivals; and commonly either forced them into exile or removed them by the stroke of an assassin. They exerted still greater vigilance in suppressing every kind of combination which might cover the germ of a conspiracy. The lowest class of the commonalty they restrained from license, and provided with employment. For this purpose, no less than to gratify their taste or display their magnificence, they frequently adorned their cities with costly buildings, which required years of labour from numerous hands: and, where this expedient did not suffice, they scrupled not to force a part of the population to quit the capital, and seek subsistence in rural occupations. On the same ground they were not reluctant to engage in wars, which afforded them opportunities of relieving themselves, in a less invidious manner, both from troublesome friends and from dangerous foes, as well as of strengthening and extending their dominion by conquest.

Such was the ordinary policy of the best tyrants; and by these arts they were frequently able to reign in peace, and to transmit their power to their children. But the maxims and character of the tyranny generally underwent a change under their successors, and scarcely an instance was known of a tyrannical dynasty that lasted beyond the third generation. But, even where the tyrant did not make himself universally odious, or provoke the vengeance of individuals by his wantonness or cruelty, he was constantly threatened by dangers, both from within and from without, which it required the utmost vigour and prudence to avert. The party which his usurpation had supplanted, though depressed, was still powerful, more exasperated than humbled by its defeat, and ever ready to take advantage of any opportunity of overthrowing him, either by private conspiracy, or by affecting to make common cause with the lower classes, or by calling in foreign aid. And in Greece itself such aid was always at hand: the tyrants indeed were partially leagued together for mutual support. But Sparta threw all her might into the opposite scale. She not only dreaded the contagion of an example which might endanger her own institutions, but was glad to extend her influence by taking an active part in revolutions, which would cause the states restored, by her intervention, to their old government to look up to her with gratitude and dependence as their natural protectress. And accordingly Thucydides ascribes the overthrow of most of the tyrannies which flourished in Greece before the Persian War to the exertions of Sparta.

The immediate effect produced by the fall of the tyrants depended on the hands by which it was accomplished. Where it was the work of Sparta, she would aim at introducing a constitution most in conformity to her own. But the example of Athens will show, that she was sometimes instrumental in promoting the triumph of principles more adverse to her views than those of the tyranny itself. When, however, the struggle which had been interrupted by the temporary usurpation was revived, the parties were no longer in exactly the same posture as at its outset. In general the commonalty was found to have gained, in strength and spirit, even more than the oligarchy had lost; and the prevalent leaning of the ensuing period was on the side of democracy. Indeed the decisive step was that by which the oligarchy

of wealth was substituted for the oligarchy of birth. This opened the door for all the subsequent innovations, by which the scale of the timocracy was gradually lowered, until it was wholly abolished.

DEMOCRACIES

The term "democracy" is used by Aristotle sometimes in a larger sense, so as to include several forms of government, which, notwithstanding their common character, were distinguished from each other by peculiar features; at other times in a narrower, to denote a form essentially vicious, which stands in the same relation to the happy temperament to which he gives the name of polity, as oligarchy to aristocracy, or tyranny to royalty. We shall not confine ourselves to the technical language of his system, but will endeavour to define the notion of democracy, as the word was commonly understood by the Greeks, so as to separate the essence of the thing from the various accidents which have sometimes been confounded with it by writers who have treated Greek history as a vehicle for conveying their views on questions of modern politics, which never arose in the Greek republics.

It must not be forgotten, that the body to which the terms oligarchy and democracy refer formed a comparatively small part of the population in most Greek states, since it did not include either slaves or resident free foreigners. The sovereign power resided wholly in the native freemen; and whether it was exercised by a part or by all of them, was the question which determined the nature of the government. When the barrier had been thrown down, by which all political rights were made the inheritance of certain families,—since every freeman, even when actually excluded from them by the want of sufficient property, was by law capable of acquiring them,—democracy might be said to have begun. It was advancing, as the legal condition of their enjoyment was brought within the reach of a more numerous class; but it could not be considered as complete, so long as any freeman was debarred from them by poverty. Since, however, the sovereignty included several attributes which might be separated, the character of the constitution depended on the way in which these were distributed. It was considered as partaking more of democracy than of oligarchy, when the most important of them were shared by all freemen without distinction, though a part was still appropriated to a number limited either by birth or fortune. Thus where the legislative, or, as it was anciently termed, the deliberative, branch of the sovereignty was lodged in an assembly open to every freeman, and where no other qualification than free birth was required for judicial functions, and for the election of magistrates, there the government was called democratical, though the highest offices of the state might be reserved to a privileged class. But a finished democracy, that which fully satisfied the Greek notion, was one in which every attribute of sovereignty might be shared, without respect to rank or property, by every freeman.

More than this was not implied in democracy; and little less than this was required, according to the views of the philosophers, to constitute the character of a citizen, which, in the opinion of Aristotle, could not exist without a voice in the legislative assembly, and such a share in the administration of justice as was necessary to secure the responsibility of the magistrates. But this equality of rights left room for a great diversity in the modes of exercising them, which determined the real nature of a democratical constitution. There were, indeed, certain rights, those which Aristotle

considers as essential to a citizen, which, according to the received Greek notions, could, in a democracy, only be exercised in person. The thought of delegating them to accountable representatives seems never to have occurred either to practical or speculative statesmen, except in the formation of confederacies, which rendered such an expedient necessary.

But the principle of legal equality, which was the basis of democracy was gradually construed in a manner which inverted the wholesome order of nature, and led to a long train of pernicious consequences. The administration of the commonwealth came to be regarded, not as a service, in which all were interested, but for which some might be qualified better than others, but as a property, in which each was entitled to an equal share. The practical application of this view was the introduction of an expedient for leveling, as far as possible, the inequality of nature, by enabling the poorest to devote his time, without loss, or even with profit, to public affairs. This was done by giving him wages for his attendance on all occasions of exercising his franchise; and, as the sum which could be afforded for this purpose was necessarily small, it attracted precisely the persons whose presence was least desirable.

A further application of the same principle was, as much as possible, to increase the number, and abridge the duration and authority of public offices, and to transfer their power to the people in a mass. On the same ground, chance was substituted for election in the creation of all magistrates, whose duties did not actually demand either the security of a large fortune or peculiar abilities and experience. In proportion as the popular assembly, or large portions detached from it for the exercise of judicial functions, drew all the branches of the sovereignty more and more into their sphere, the character of their proceedings became more and more subject to the influence of the lower class of the citizens, which constituted a permanent majority. And thus the democracy, instead of the equality which was its supposed basis, in fact established the ascendancy of a faction, which, although greatly preponderant in numbers, no more represented the whole state than the oligarchy itself; and which, though not equally liable to fall into the mechanism of a vicious system, was more prone to yield to the impulse of the moment, more easily misled by blind or treacherous guides, and might thus, as frequently, though not so deliberately and methodically, trample, not only on law and custom, but on justice and humanity. This disease of a democracy was sometimes designated by the term "ochlocracy," or the dominion of the rabble.

A democracy thus corrupted exhibited many features of a tyranny. It was jealous of all who were eminently distinguished by birth, fortune, or reputation; it encouraged flatterers and sycophants; was insatiable in its demands on the property of the rich, and readily listened to charges which exposed them to death or confiscation. The class which suffered such oppression, commonly ill satisfied with the principle of the constitution itself, was inflamed with the most furious animosity by the mode in which it was applied, and regarded the great mass of its fellow-citizens as its mortal enemies.^b



RUINS OF THE TEMPLE OF APOLLO EPICURIUS, ARCADIA

CHAPTER X. THE SMALLER CITIES AND STATES

ARISTOTLE'S survey of the Greek forms of government was founded on a vast store of information which he had collected on the history and constitution of more than a hundred and fifty states, in the mother country and the colonies, and which he had consigned to a great work now unfortunately lost. Our knowledge of the internal conditions and vicissitudes of almost all these states is very scanty and fragmentary: but some of the main facts concerning them, which have been saved from oblivion, will serve to throw light on several parts of the ensuing history.

ARCADIA, ELIS, AND ACHAIA

We have scarcely anything to say, during this period, of the state of parties, or even the forms of government, in Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia. If Arcadia was ever subject to a single king, which seems to be intimated by some accounts of its early history, it was probably only, as in Thessaly, by an occasional election, or a temporary usurpation. The title of king however appears not to have been everywhere abolished down to a much later time, as we find a hint that it was retained at Orchomenos even in the fifth century before our era. That the republican constitutions were long aristocratical can scarcely be doubted, as the two principal Arcadian cities, Tegea and Mantinea, were at first only the chief among several small hamlets, which were at length united in one capital. This, whenever it happened, was a step towards the subversion of aristocratical privileges; and it was no doubt with this view that the five Mantinean villages were incorporated by the Argives, as Strabo mentions without assigning the date of the event. But it is not probable that Argos thus interfered before her own institutions had undergone a like change, which, as we shall see, did not take place before a later period than our history has yet reached. Whether the union of the nine villages, which included Tegea as their chief, was effected earlier or later, does not appear. But, after she had once acknowledged the supremacy of Sparta, Tegea was sheltered by Spartan influence from popular innovations, and was always the less inclined to adopt them when they prevailed at

Mantineia: for as the position of the two Arcadian neighbours tended to connect the one with Sparta, and the other with Argos, so it supplied occasion for interminable feuds between them. But, in general, the history of the western states of Arcadia is wrapt in deep obscurity, which was only broken, in the fourth century B.C., by the foundation of a new Arcadian capital.

In Elis the monarchical form of government continued for some generations in the line of Oxylus, but appears to have ceased there earlier than at Pisa, which, at the time when it was conquered and destroyed by the Eleans, was ruled by chiefs, who were probably legitimate kings. Immediately after the conquest, in the fiftieth Olympiad, the dignity of *hellanodiceæ*, which had been held by the kings of Elis, or shared by them with those of Pisa, was assigned to two Elean officers by lot, a proof that royalty was then extinct. The constitution by which it was replaced seems to have been rigidly aristocratical, perhaps no other than the narrow oligarchy described by Aristotle, — who observes that the whole number of citizens exercising any political functions was small — confined, perhaps to the six hundred mentioned by Thucydides; and that the senate, originally composed of ninety members, who held their office for life, and filled up vacancies at their pleasure, had been gradually reduced to a very few. Elis, the capital, remained in a condition like that of the above-mentioned Arcadian towns until the Persian War, when the inhabitants of many villages were collected in its precincts. This was probably attended by other changes of a democratical nature — perhaps by the limitation which one Phormis is said to have effected in the power of the senate — and henceforth the number of the *hellanodiceæ* corresponded to that of the tribes or regions into which the Elean territory was divided; so that, whenever any of these regions was lost by the chance of war, the number of the *hellanodiceæ* was proportionately reduced. So too the matrons who presided at the games in honour of Hera, in which the Elean virgins contended at Olympia, were chosen in equal number from each of the tribes.

In Achaia, the royal dignity was transmitted in the line of Tisamenus down to Ogyges, whose sons, affecting despotic power, were deposed, and the government was changed to a democracy, which is said to have possessed a high reputation. From Pausanias it would rather seem as if the title of king had been held by a number of petty chiefs at once. If so, the revolution must have had its origin in causes more general than those assigned to it by Polybius. It was probably accelerated by the number of Achaean emigrants who sought refuge in Achaia from other parts of the Peloponnesus, and who soon crowded the country, till it was relieved by its Italian colonies. What Polybius and Strabo term a democracy may however have been a polity, or a very liberal and well-tempered form of oligarchy. Of its details we know nothing; nor are we informed in what relation the twelve principal Achaian towns — a division adopted from the Ionians — stood to the hamlets, of which each had seven or eight in its territory, like those of Tegea and Mantineia. As little are we able to describe the constitution of the confederacy in which the twelve states were now united.

ARGOS, ÆGINA, AND EPIDAUROS

More light has been thrown by ancient authors on the history of the states in the northeast quarter of Peloponnesus, those of Argolis in the largest sense of the word. At Argos itself, regal government subsisted

down to the Persian wars, although the line of the Heraclid princes appears to have become extinct toward the middle of the preceding century. Pausanias remarks, that, from a very early period, the Argives were led by their peculiarly independent spirit to limit the prerogatives of their kings so narrowly as to leave them little more than the name. We cannot however place much reliance on such a general reflection of a late writer. But we have seen that Phidon, who, about the year 750 B.C., extended the power of Argos farther than any of his predecessors, also stretched the royal authority so much beyond its legitimate bounds, that he is sometimes called a tyrant, though he was rightful heir of Temenus. After his death, as his conquests appear to have been speedily lost, so it is probable that his successors were unable to maintain the ascendancy which he had gained over his Dorian subjects, and the royal dignity may henceforth have been, as Pausanias describes it, little more than a title. Hence, too, on the failure of the ancient line, about B.C. 560, Ægon, though of a different family, may have met with the less opposition in mounting the throne. The substance of power rested with the Dorian freemen: in what manner it was distributed among them we can only conjecture from analogy. Their lands were cultivated by a class of serfs, corresponding to the Spartan helots, who served in war as light-armed troops, whence they derived their peculiar name, "gymnesii." They were also sovereigns of a few towns, the inhabitants of which, like the Laconians subject to Sparta, though personally free, were excluded from all share in their political privileges. The events which put an end to this state of things, and produced an entire change in the form of government at Argos, will be hereafter related.

Among the states of the Argolic *actæ*, Epidaurus deserves notice, not so much for the few facts which are known of its internal history, as on account of its relation to Ægina. This island, destined to take no inconsiderable part in the affairs of Greece, was long subject to Epidaurus, which was so jealous of her sovereignty as to compel the Æginetans to resort to her tribunals for the trial of their causes. It seems to have been as a dependency of Epidaurus that Ægina fell under the dominion of the Argive Phidon. After recovering her own independence, Epidaurus still continued mistress of the island. Whether she had any subjects on the main land standing on the same footing, we are not expressly informed. But here likewise the ruling class was supported by the services of a population of bondsmen, distinguished by a peculiar name (*conipodes*, the dusty-footed), designating indeed their rural occupations, but certainly expressive of contempt. Towards the end of the seventh century B.C., and the beginning of the next, Epidaurus was subject to a ruler named Procles, who is styled a tyrant, and was allied with Periander the tyrant of Corinth. But nothing is known as to the origin and nature of his usurpation. He incurred the resentment of his son-in-law Periander, who made himself master of Procles and of Epidaurus. It was perhaps this event which afforded Ægina an opportunity of shaking off the Epidaurian yoke. But, had it been otherwise, the old relation between the two states could not have subsisted much longer. Ægina was rapidly outgrowing the mother country, was engaged in a flourishing commerce, strong in an enterprising and industrious population, enriched and adorned by the arts of peace, and skilled in those of war. The separation which soon after took place was embittered by mutual resentment; and the Æginetans, whose navy soon became the most powerful in Greece, retaliated on Epidaurus for the degradation they had suffered by a series of insults. But the same causes to which they owed their national

independence seem to have deprived the class which had been hitherto predominant in Ægina of its political privileges. The island was torn by the opposite claims and interests arising out of the old and the new order of things, and became the scene of a bloody struggle.

SICYON AND MEGARA

The history of Sicyon presents a series of revolutions, in many points resembling those of Corinth. At what time, or in whose person, royalty was there extinguished, and what form of government succeeded it, we are not expressly informed; but, as we know that there was a class of bondsmen at Sicyon, answering to the helots, and distinguished by peculiar names, derived from their rustic dress or occupation, there can be little doubt that other parts of the Dorian system were also introduced there, and subsisted until a fortunate adventurer, named Orthagoras, or Andreas, overthrew the old aristocracy, and founded a dynasty, which lasted a century: the longest period, Aristotle observes, of a Greek tyranny. Orthagoras is said to have risen from a very low station—that of a cook—and was, therefore, probably indebted for his elevation to the commonalty. The long duration of his dynasty is ascribed by Aristotle to the mildness and moderation with which he and his descendants exercised their power, submitting to the laws and taking pains to secure the good will of the people.

His successor, Myron, having gained a victory in the Olympic chariot-race in the thirty-third Olympiad, erected a treasury at Olympia, which was remarkable for its material, brass of Tartessus, which had not long been introduced into Greece; for its architecture, in which the Doric and Ionic orders were combined; and for its inscription, in which the name of Myron was coupled with that of the people of Sicyon. It may be collected, from an expression of Aristotle's, that, though Myron was succeeded, either immediately or after a short interval, by his grandson Clisthenes, son of Aristonymus, this transmission of the tyranny did not take place without interruption or impediment; and, if this arose from the Dorian nobles, it would explain some points in which the government of Clisthenes differed from that of his predecessors.

He seems to have been the most able and enterprising prince of his house and to have conducted many wars, beside that in which we have seen him engaged on the side of the Amphictyons, with skill and success: he was of a munificent temper, and displayed his love of splendour and of the arts both in the national games and in his native city, where, out of the spoils of Crissa, he built a colonnade, which long retained the name of the Clisthenean. The magnificence with which he entertained the suitors who came from all parts of Greece, and even from foreign lands, to vie with one another, after the ancient fashion, in manly exercises, for his daughter's hand, was long so celebrated, that Herodotus gives a list of the competitors. It proves how much his alliance was coveted by the most distinguished families; and it is particularly remarkable, that one of the suitors was a son of Phidon, king of Argos, whom Herodotus seems to have confounded with the more ancient tyrant of the same name. Still Clisthenes appears not to have departed from the maxims by which his predecessors had regulated their government with regard to the commonalty, but, in the midst of his royal state, to have carefully preserved the appearance, at least, of equity and respect for the laws. On the other hand, towards his Dorian subjects he displayed a spirit

of hostility which seems to have been peculiar to himself, and to have been excited by some personal provocation. It was probably connected with a war in which he was engaged with Argos, and it impelled him to various political and religious innovations, the real nature of which can now be but very imperfectly understood.

One of the most celebrated was the change which he made in the names of the Dorian tribes, for which he substituted others, derived from the lowest kinds of domestic animals; while a fourth tribe, to which he himself belonged, was distinguished by the majestic title of the *archelai* (the princely). Herodotus supposes that he only meant to insult the Dorians; and we could sooner adopt this opinion than believe, with a modern author, that he took so strange a method of directing their attention to rural pursuits. But Herodotus adds, that the new names were retained for sixty years after the death of Clisthenes and the fall of his dynasty, when those of the Dorian tribes were restored, and, in the room of the fourth, a new one was created, called from a son of the Argive hero, Adrastus, the *Ægialeans*. When the Dorians resumed their old division, the commonalty was thrown into the single tribe (called not from the hero, but from the land), the *Ægialeans*.

We do not know how this dynasty ended, and can only pronounce it probable that it was overthrown at about the same time with that of the Cypselids (B.C. 580), by the intervention of Sparta, which must have been more alarmed and provoked by the innovations of Clisthenes than by the tyranny of Periander. It would seem, from the history of the tribes, that the Dorians recovered their predominance; but gradually, and not so completely as to deprive the commonalty of all share in political rights.

On the other side of the isthmus, the little state of Megara passed through vicissitudes similar to those of Corinth and Sicyon, but attended with more violent struggles. Before the Dorian conquest royalty is said to have been abolished there after the last king, Hyperion, son of Agamemnon, had fallen by the hand of an enemy, whom he had provoked by insolence and wrong: and a Megarian legend seems to indicate that the elective magistrates, who took the place of the kings, bore the title of *æsymnetes*. The Dorians of Corinth kept those of Megara, for a time, in the same kind of subjection to which *Ægina* was reduced by Epidaurus; and the Megarian peasantry were compelled to solemnise the obsequies of every Bacchiad with marks of respect, such as were exacted from the subjects of Sparta on the death of the king. This yoke however was cast off at an early period; and Argos assisted the Megarians in recovering their independence. Henceforth it is probable Megara assumed a more decided superiority over the hamlets of her territory, which had once been her rivals; and she must have made rapid progress in population and in power, as is proved by her flourishing colonies in the east and west, and by the wars which she carried on in defence of them. One of her most illustrious citizens, Orsippus, who, in the fifteenth Olympiad, set the example of dropping all incumbrances of dress in the Olympic foot-race, also conducted her arms with brilliant success against her neighbours—probably the Corinthians—and enlarged her territory to the utmost extent of her claims. But the government still remained in the hands of the great Dorian land-owners, who, when freed from the dominion of Corinth, became sovereigns at home; and they appear not to have administered it mildly or wisely. For they were not only deprived of their power by an insurrection of the commonalty, as at Corinth and Sicyon, but were evidently the objects of a bitter enmity, which cannot have been wholly unprovoked.

Theagenes, a bold and ambitious man, who put himself at the head of the popular cause, is said to have won the confidence of the people by an attack on the property of the wealthy citizens, whose cattle he destroyed in their pastures. The animosity provoked by such an outrage, which was probably not a solitary one, rendered it necessary to invest the demagogue with supreme authority. Theagenes, who assumed the tyranny about 620 B.C., followed the example of the other usurpers of his time. He adorned his city with splendid and useful buildings, and no doubt in other ways cherished industry and the arts, while he made them contribute to the lustre of his reign. He allied himself to one of the most eminent families of Athens, and aided his son-in-law, Cylon, in his enterprise, which, if it had succeeded, would have lent increased stability to his own power.

The victories which deprived the Athenians of Salamis, and made them at last despair of recovering it, were probably gained by Theagenes. Yet he was at length expelled from Megara; whether through the discontent of the commonalty, or by the efforts of the aristocratical party, which may have been encouraged by the failure of Cylon's plot, we are not distinctly informed. Only it is said that, after his overthrow, a more moderate and peaceful spirit prevailed for a short time, until some turbulent leaders, who apparently wished to tread in his steps, but wanted his ability or his fortune, instigated the populace to new outrages against the wealthy, who were forced to throw open their houses, and to set luxurious entertainments before the rabble, or were exposed to personal insult and violence. But a much harder blow was aimed at their property by a measure called the *palintocia*, — which carried the principles of Solon's *seisachtheia* to an iniquitous excess, — by which creditors were required to refund the interest which they had received from their debtors.

This transaction at the same time discloses one, at least, of the causes which had exasperated the commonalty against the nobles, who probably had exacted their debts no less harshly than the Athenian Eupatrids. But, in this period of anarchy, neither justice nor religion was held sacred: even temples were plundered; and a company of pilgrims, passing through the territory of Megara, on their way to Delphi, was grossly insulted; many lives even were lost, and the Amphictyonic council was compelled to interpose, to procure the punishment of the ringleaders. It is unquestionably of this period that Aristotle speaks, when he says that the Megarian demagogues procured the banishment of many of the notable citizens for the sake of confiscating their estates; and he adds, that these outrages and disorders ruined the democracy, for the exiles became so strong a body, that they were able to reinstate themselves by force, and to establish a very narrow oligarchy, including those only who had taken an active part in the revolution. Unfortunately we have no means of ascertaining the dates of these events, though the last-mentioned reaction cannot have taken place very long after 600 B.C.

During the following century, our information on the state of Megara is chiefly collected from the writings of the Megarian poet, Theognis, which however are interesting not so much for the historical facts contained in them, as for the light they throw on the character and feelings of the parties which divided his native city and so many others. Theognis appears to have been born about the fifty-fifth Olympiad, not long before the death of Solon; and to have lived down to the beginning of the Persian wars. He left some poems, of which considerable fragments remain, filled with moral and political maxims and reflections. We gather from them, that the oligarchy,

which followed the period of anarchy, had been unable to keep its ground; and that a new revolution had taken place, by which the poet, with others of the aristocratical party, had been stripped of his fortune and driven into exile. But his complaints betray a fact which throws some doubt on the purity of his patriotism, and abates our sympathy for his misfortunes.

BEOTIA, LOCRI, PHOCIS, AND EUBÆA

The peculiar circumstances under which Bœotia was conquered, by a people who had quitted their native land to avoid slavery or subjection, would be sufficient to account for the fact that royalty was very early abolished there. It may indeed be doubted whether the chief named Xanthus, who is called king, sometimes of the Bœotians, sometimes of the Thebans, and who was slain by the Attic king Melanthus, was anything more than a temporary leader. The most sacred functions of the Theban kings seem to have been transferred to a magistrate, who bore the title of archon, and, like the archon-king at Athens, was invested rather with a priestly than a civil character.

From the death of Xanthus, down to about 500 B.C., the constitution of Thebes continued rigidly aristocratical, having probably been guarded from innovation as well by the inland position of the city as by the jealousy of the rulers; and the first change, of which we have any account, was one which threw the government into still fewer hands. But, about the thirteenth Olympiad, it seems as if discontent had arisen, among the members of the ruling caste itself, from the inequality in the division of property, which had perhaps been increased by lapse of time, until some of them were reduced to indigence. Not long after that Olympiad, Philolaus, one of the Corinthian Bacchiads, having been led by a private occurrence to take up his residence at Thebes, was invited to frame a new code of laws; and one of the main objects of his institutions was to prevent the accumulation of estates, and to fix forever the number of those into which the Theban territory, or at least the part of it occupied by the nobles, was divided. He too was perhaps the author of the law which excluded every Theban from public offices who had exercised any trade within the space of ten years. It is probable enough that his code also embraced regulations for the education of the higher class of citizens; and it may have been he who, with the view, as Plutarch supposes, of softening the harshness of the Bœotian character, or to counterbalance an excessive fondness for gymnastic exercises, to which the Thebans were prone, made music an essential part of the instruction of youth.

Our information on the other Bœotian towns is still scantier as to their internal condition; but we may safely presume that it did not differ very widely from that of Thebes, especially as we happen to know that at Thespizæ every kind of industrious occupation was deemed degrading to a freeman: an indication of aristocratical rigour which undoubtedly belongs to this period, and may be taken as a sample of the spirit prevailing in Bœotia. The Bœotian states were united in a confederacy which was represented by a congress of deputies, who met at the festival of the *Pambœotia*, in the temple of the Itonian Athene, near Coronea, more perhaps for religious than for political purposes. There were also other national councils, which deliberated on peace and war, and were perhaps of nearly equal antiquity, though they were first mentioned at a later period, when there were four of them.

It does not appear how they were constituted, or whether with reference to as many divisions of the country, of which we have no other trace. The chief magistrates of the league, called *Bæotarchs*, presided in these councils, and commanded the national forces. They were, in later times at least, elected annually, and rigidly restricted to their term of office.

As to the institutions of the Locrian tribes in Greece, very little is known, and they never took a prominent part in Greek history. Down to a late period the use of slaves was almost wholly unknown among them, as well as among the Phocians. This fact, which indicates a people of simple habits, strangers to luxury and commerce, and attached to ancient usages, may lead us to the further conclusion that their institutions were mostly aristocratical; and this conclusion is confirmed by all that we hear of them. Opus is celebrated, in the fifth century B.C., as a seat of law and order by Pindar.



MT. PARNASSUS, IN PHOCIS

Equally scanty is our information as to the general condition of the Phocians. Their land, though neither extensive nor fertile, was divided among between twenty and thirty little commonwealths, which were united like the Achæans and the Bæotians, and sent deputies at stated times to a congress which was held in a large building, called the Phocicum, on the road between Daulis and Delphi. But Delphi, though lying in Phocis, disclaimed all connection with the rest of the nation. Its government, as was to be expected under its peculiar circumstances, was strictly aristocratical, and was in the hands of the same families which had the management of the temple, on which the prosperity of the city and the subsistence of a great part of the inhabitants depended. In early times the chief magistrate bore the title of king, afterwards that of *prytanis*. But a council of five, who were dignified with a title marking their sanctity, and were chosen from families which traced their origin — possibly through Dorus — to Deucalion, and held their offices for life, conducted the affairs of the oracle.

In Eubœa an aristocracy or oligarchy of wealthy land-owners, who, from the cavalry which they maintained, were called *hippobotæ*, long prevailed in the two principal cities, Chalcis and Eretria. The great number of colonies which Chalcis sent out, and which attests its early importance, was probably the result of an oligarchical policy. Its constitution appears to have been, in proper terms, a timocracy: a certain amount of property was requisite for a share in the government. Eretria, once similarly governed, seems not to have been at all inferior in strength. She was

mistress of several islands, among the rest of Andros, Tenos, and Ceos; and, in the days of her prosperity, could exhibit 600 horsemen, 3000 heavy-armed infantry, and 60 chariots in a sacred procession. Chalcis and Eretria were long rivals, and a tract called the Lelantian plain, which contained valuable copper mines, afforded constant occasion for hostilities. These hostilities were distinguished from the ordinary wars between neighbouring cities by two peculiar features—the singular mode in which they were conducted, and the general interest which they excited throughout Greece. They were regulated, at least in early times, by a compact between the belligerents, which was recorded by a monument in a temple, to abstain from the use of missile weapons. But, while this agreement suggests the idea of a feud like those which we have seen carried on, in an equally mild spirit, between the Megarian townships, we learn with surprise from Thucydides that the war between Eretria and Chalcis divided the whole nation, and that all the Greek states took part with one or the other of the rivals.

It has been suspected that the cause which drew this universal attention to an object apparently of very slight moment was, that the quarrel turned upon political principles; that the oligarchy at Eretria had very early given way to democracy, while that of Chalcis, threatened by this new danger, engaged many states to espouse its cause. We are informed indeed that the Eretrian oligarchy was overthrown by a person named Diagoras, of whom we also hear that he died at Corinth while on his way to Sparta, and that he was honoured with a statue by his countrymen. It is also certain that the oligarchy at Chalcis, though more than once interrupted by a tyranny, was standing till within a few years of the Persian wars. But we do not know when Diagoras lived, and, without stronger evidence, it is difficult to believe that the revolution which he effected took place before the fall of the Athenian aristocracy, an epoch which appears to be too late for the war mentioned by Thucydides.

THESSALY

Thessaly seems, for some time after the conquest, to have been governed by kings of the race of Hercules, who however may have been only chiefs invested with a permanent military command, which ceased when it was no longer required by the state of the country. Under one of these princes, named Aleuas, it was divided into the four districts, Thessaliotis, Pelasgiotis, Pthiotis, and Hestiaeotis. And, as this division was retained to the latest period of its political existence, we may conclude that it was not a merely nominal one, but that each district was united in itself, as well as distinct from the rest. As the four Bæotian councils seem to imply that a like division existed in Bæotia, so we may reasonably conjecture that each of the Thessalian districts regulated its internal affairs by some kind of provincial council. But all that we know with certainty is, that the principal cities exercised a dominion over several smaller towns, and that they were themselves the seat of noble families, sprung from the line of the ancient kings, which were generally able to draw the government of the whole nation into their hands. Thus Larissa was subject to the great house of the Aleuadæ, who were considered as descendants of the ancient Aleuas; Crannon and Pharsalus to the Scopadæ and the Creondæ, who were branches of the same stock. The vast estates of these nobles were

cultivated, and their countless flocks and herds fed, by their serfs, the Penests, who at their call were ready to follow them into the field on foot or on horseback. They maintained a princely state, drew poets and artists to their courts, and shone in the public games of Greece by their wealth and liberality.

We are not anywhere informed whether there were any institutions which provided for the union of the four districts, and afforded regular opportunities for consultation on their common interests. But, as often as an occasion appeared to require it, the great families were able to bring about the election of a chief magistrate, always of course taken from their own body, whose proper title was that of *tagus*, but who is sometimes called a king. We know little of the nature of his authority, except that it was probably rather military than civil; nor of its constitutional extent, which perhaps was never precisely ascertained, and depended on the personal character and the circumstances of the individual.

The population of Thessaly, beside the penests, whose condition was nearly that of the Laconian helots, included a large class of free subjects, in the districts not immediately occupied by the Thessalian invaders, who paid a certain tribute for their lands, but, though not admitted to the rights of citizens, preserved their personal liberty unmolested. But above this class stood a third, of the common Thessalians, who, though they could not boast, like the Aleuadæ and the Scopadæ, of a heroic descent, and had therefore received a much smaller portion of the conquered land, still, as the partners of their conquest, might think themselves entitled to some share in the administration of public affairs. Contests seem early to have arisen between this commonalty and the ruling families, and at Larissa the aristocracy of the Aleuadæ was tempered by some institutions of a popular tendency. We do not know indeed to what period Aristotle refers, when he speaks of certain magistrates at Larissa who bore the title of guardians of the freemen, and exercised a superintendence over the admission of citizens, but were themselves elected by the whole body of the people, out of the privileged order, and hence were led to pay their court to the multitude in a manner which proved dangerous to the interests of the oligarchy. It seems not improbable that the election of a *tagus*, like that of a dictator at Rome, was sometimes used as an expedient for keeping the commonalty under. But the power of the oligarchs was also shaken by intestine feuds; and, under the government of the Aleuadæ, such was the state of parties at Larissa, that, by common agreement, the city was committed to the care of an officer, who was chosen, perhaps from the commonalty, to mediate between the opposite factions; but, being entrusted with a body of troops, made himself master of both. This event took place two generations before the Persian War; but the usurpation appears to have been transitory, and not to have left any durable traces, while the factions of Larissa continue to appear from time to time throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

The western states of Greece are, during this period, shrouded in so complete obscurity, that we cannot pretend to give any account of their condition. With respect to the Ætolians indeed it is uncertain how far they are entitled to the name of Greeks. The Acarnanians, as soon as they begin to take a part in the affairs of Greece, distinguish themselves as a finer and more civilised people; and it is probable that the Corinthian colonies on the Ambracian Gulf may have exerted a beneficial influence on their social progress.^b

CORINTH UNDER PERIANDER

In the Isthmus of Corinth there is a pillar with a double inscription. On the side facing Peloponnesus is written "Here is Peloponnesus and not Ionia." On the opposite side, which faced the territory of Megaris, was written, "This is not Peloponnesus but Ionia." Between the hostile worlds of the Dorians and Ionians, Corinth was as between two stools. Originally, however, the Corinthians favoured the Dorians because they had been conquered by them when Peloponnesus was subjugated under the Heraclids. Corinth took the side of Lacedæmon in the internal quarrels of Greece.

The aristocratic genius of the Dorians without abolishing the ancient royalty, subordinated Corinth. One of the Heraclids was called king. He commanded the army and presided over the debates of this military aristocracy. Later, the oligarchy made this not very powerful king disappear, and kept for itself all the rights of sovereignty. This was at the time of the descendants of Bacchis, the Heraclid.

The Bacchiadæ numbered over two hundred, amongst them being other families with whom they were connected and who governed Corinth together. Each year, one of them, elected by his fellows, exercised under the name Prytanis, a power very much resembling royalty. One day this annual authority fell into the hands of an ambitious man Cypselus, who was not satisfied with his power, and became master, not only of the people but of his equals. This tyranny was followed by that of Periander, son of Cypselus. Periander's first acts were popular, but a sad occurrence weighed upon his brain and made him cruel. This was found out in Corinth, and from that time Periander, thinking he had nothing more to hope for, gave way to all the bad traits of his character. He banished the most powerful citizens. He killed his wife, Melissa, by a kick in the stomach and then wishing by way of atonement to give her a splendid funeral, he assembled all the women of Corinth in Juno's Temple, where his guards stripped them of their jewels and clothes which were burnt in honour of Melissa.

However, Periander kept down luxury. He forbade the citizens to keep many slaves, he ordered land-owners to live on their estates in order to cultivate them, he allowed no one to spend more than his income, and he established no new taxes. Last of all, he increased the Corinthian navy and he conceived the idea of piercing the isthmus. These acts were worthy of a statesman. He wrote and composed over two thousand verses with morals. He praised democratic government and said that he himself was a tyrant because he thought it too dangerous to give up being so. He recommended moderation in happiness and that friendship should not change with fortune.

Man's heart is large enough to have good as well as bad qualities. Besides, to have supreme power over equals was a double spur exciting good as well as bad actions. If the intoxication of power inflamed the senses and passions of the usurper, and defiance had to be met by cruelty, it was in Periander's interest to give his town all the advantages of good government. Also, as he was clever, he knew how to conciliate the people. Force is always admired and worshipped when it comes from the highest, and protects and spares the weak.

After Periander, who died in his bed, Corinth had an aristocratic government and knew no more the tyranny of a single ruler. The people had an assembly but the direction of the important affairs of state was in the hands of a senate. The aristocracy of Corinth which was rich and prudent in governing, watched with jealous care over maintaining its power and it is

due to the energy of one of its number that Corinth escaped from a new tyranny.

Of an illustrious family, Timophanes had become the idol of the people. His audacity, his prowess in warfare, his familiarity with the humblest citizens delighted the multitude and seemed to invite him to take the reins of government into his hands. But Timophanes had near him a severe judge in his brother. This brother, though loving him very much and having for a long time screened or excused his faults, ended by killing him in order that Corinth should not be reduced to servitude. The verses Virgil dedicated to the first of the Brutuses might be applied to Timoleon.

This republican fratricide had the misfortune of being cursed by his mother. He lived twenty years, not in repentance but in solitude, and we shall find him again at Syracuse. Corinth had not only founded that celebrated city in Sicily, she had founded other colonies besides, amongst them Coreyra, with which she was a long time at war, accusing the inhabitants of not paying the respect due to a capital. "Our other colonies love and respect us whilst the Coreyreans are arrogant and unjust, to such a point that they have seized Epidamnus, which belongs to us and which they intend to keep." These were the complaints Corinth made through her deputies, at Athens, against her colonies. However, in spite of the complaints, the Athenians received the alliance of Epidamnus, which had a powerful navy, and which, in their eyes, had the great advantage of being situated on the way to Italy and Sicily.

This determination not to help Corinth, irritated the Corinthians, whose Dorian origin already made them Athens' natural enemy, and was one of the decisive causes of the Peloponnesian War. It was at the instigation of Corinth that the Peloponnesians held a kind of congress at Sparta, in which they denounced the ambition and audacity of the Athenians who were born, they said, never to have rest and never to allow anybody else to have any.

Before Athens shone by her eloquence, poetry, and art, Corinth was the centre of Hellenic trade and was the sojourn of pleasure. All the merchandise of Europe and of Asia was imported on payment of duty, and all foreigners flocked there more than they did to any other town of Greece. People came from everywhere, from Egypt as well as from Sicily; but Corinth was a town essentially for rich men—it was the town of Venus. The courtesans were honoured. They had the privilege of offering the public vows to Venus, when the goddess was appealed to in a case of great danger. They it was who asked her to grant the salvation of Greece when that country was invaded by Xerxes. When private people had their prayers granted by the goddess they showed their gratitude by offering her a number of courtesans for her temple. All the countries which traded with Corinth provided these charming priestesses.

At Sparta the glory of women was their patriotism, at Athens their intellect, and at Corinth their beauty. Laïs was the queen of the courtesans and received homage from the most important and serious personages of Greece, from philosophers as well as from politicians. She was in reality a Sicilian, captured when a child by the Athenians and sold to Corinth. But the Corinthians idolised her, and always swore she was born amongst them.

Riches and pleasure! It was to the interest of the Corinthians not to get rid of these women, in order to enjoy life, and this was in itself a guarantee against the rule of a demagogue in the city of Periander and of Timoleon. Pindar can say with great truth in one of his *Olympics*, "Harmony and good legislation are found in Corinth, also justice and peace.

The daughters of the prudent Themis dispense happiness to mankind and watch over their cities."

This prosperity had a tragic ending. When the Romans triumphed over the Achæan League, Corinth perished miserably. Such lamentable ruin was like the last day of Ilium. Everything condemned the town before the Roman tribunals: its admirable position, the key to the whole of Greece; its riches and works of art, which were placed in the Capitol at Rome.^c



RUINS OF A TOWER OF TITHOREA, IN PHOCIS
(Near Mt. Parnassus)



CHAPTER XI. CRETE AND THE COLONIES

CRETE was an island, which, from its position, should have dominated over the whole of Greece, as it had for its neighbours the coasts of the Peloponnesus and of Asia. The Cretans were remarkable amongst the Hellenic nations for their institutions, which bore a singular physiognomy. Diodorus describes all the legends relating to the Greek divinities of whom Crete boasted to be the cradle; he then adds that during the generations succeeding the birth of the gods, many heroes lived in the island, the most illustrious of whom were Minos, Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon. These heroes are not truly historic, and an exact place cannot be given to their genius and passions, but at any rate they indicate deeds and customs which have left strong impressions on the lives of men. Antiquity believed that Crete, even from the most ancient period, had good laws which were imitated by many of the peoples of Greece, and above all by the Lacedæmonians.

Before teaching Greece, Crete, for a short time, dominated over her. The Cretans, who were an insular and warlike nation made up chiefly of Pelasgians and Dorians, at an epoch made great by the name of Minos, had a navy with which they were able to take possession of the greater number of the islands belonging to Greece. They also reigned over part of the coast of Asia Minor. They were the guardians of the sea, suppressed the Athenian pirates and made them pay tribute. These pirates had their revenge according to the fable of the Minotaur. The Cretans pushed on as far as Sicily, and it was there, so goes the legend, that Minos was killed by the daughters of King Cocalus, who suffocated their father's guest in a bath. A few generations later, Crete sent a fleet of eighty vessels against Priam, a new proof of maritime greatness. About the time when the *Odyssey* was written, this is how Greece imagined the island of Minos: "In the middle of the vast ocean is glorious Crete, a fertile island, where countless men live; there are eighty-six towns,¹ which have each a different language; they are inhabited by the Achæans, the autochthonous Cretans, high-minded heroes, the Cydonians, the Dorians, who are divided into three tribes, and the divine Pelasgi. In the midst of all these people is the beautiful town of Knossos, where Minos reigned, and every nine years had an audience with Jupiter." Thus is the divine or religious type of legislator formed in the mind of the

[¹ Recent excavations have tended to confirm the existence of Crete's boasted hundred cities.]

Greeks and with the double help of time and poetry the name of Minos becomes great.

Crete was as little spared from the revolutions which Thucydides foretold would be one of the results of the Trojan War, as the peculiar state of her soil and customs warranted. The inhabitants, living in a mountainous and divided country, were separated into many cantons, jealous of one another's independence. In Crete, as in Switzerland, nature prepared republics. For a long time royal power succeeded in preventing the germs of discord from bursting forth; this was in the time of Minos, of Rhadamanthus, and of Sarpedon, when the Cretans were conquerors and masters of the sea and possessed of a legislation inspired by the first of all the gods. Later, everything which had helped to make a sovereign authority gave way, the towns of Crete quarrelled internally and with one another for individual government. This spirit of independence was doubtless encouraged by the presence of the Greeks, who, on their return from Troy, founded colonies on the island. Little by little, royal power, weakened by the absence of the chiefs, who had joined the princes of the Peloponnesus in order to attack Asia, disappeared.

Through what shocks, compromises or transitions, Crete passed from government by kings, to an aristocratic federation, with Knossos, Gortyna, Cydonia, and Lyctus at the head, we know not. All we know is that several generations after the Trojan War the new government had entirely taken the place of the old, though still invoked in the sacred name of Minos. The Cretans thus began the great practice we so often find in ancient days, that of placing the young generations under the protection and genius of the ancients. Man, even with a long line of centuries behind him, is a weak creature, and when he separates from the ancients he adds to his nothingness.

In representing Crete with a federal and aristocratic government, these words must not be taken in their full meaning. It was not the entire establishment of a nation, but attempts at peace and order frequently interrupted by revolutions. This point has often escaped modern writers, especially Montesquieu.

Crete was a fertile chaos, from which Sparta took various principles. But Crete itself could not benefit from them. The reason for the outbreaks was the rivalry between the different towns. When one of them conquered the other, the result was despotism; when they strove one against the other without either getting a decisive advantage, the result was anarchy.

At the head of each town were ten magistrates called *cosmes* (or *cosmoi*), taking their name from order itself, and from the necessity of seeing it carried out, for in every town there was always an incorrigible inclination for plotting. The *cosmes*, who were the forerunners of the Spartan *ephori*, were chosen, not from all the citizens, but from a small number of families. As they succeeded royal authority they had its powers, they commanded the troops, concluded treaties, and ruled over people and things alike, with an arbitrary power. The Cretan customs were a strange contrast to this despotism, which was the unmistakable remains of sovereignty. When by their conduct the *cosmes* offended some of their colleagues, they were driven away. When they chose they could also abdicate. Law did not rule, but the will of man, which is not a sure rule. The Cretans had the habit, when they reached the highest point in their quarrels, of returning to a provisional monarchy, in order to facilitate war between them. They lived in the midst of periodical disputes which prevented them from ever forming a great nation.

When the cosmes came to the end of their term of office, which lasted a year, they took a place in the assembly or senate formed of the old men of the city. This was always the custom in antiquity, as in all youthful nations. Thus, experience in life is called in to help govern. The old men who had been cosmes, or had been destined to be so, exercised an irresponsible and life-long authority, deciding all things, not according to written laws but according to their opinions. The decisions of the cosmes and senators were presented to a general assembly where all the citizens met; the assembly only confirmed by vote what was proposed. There were no discussions, a mute acquiescence was alone allowed. The senators and cosmes were the chiefs of that army which had warriors and labourers as body and force. This division into soldiers and labourers was common to the Egyptians and Cretans, according to Aristotle, who traces it back, for the former, to Sesostris and for the latter to Minos, and the ancient discipline, adds Alexander's tutor, remained especially strong amongst the peasants. Like all ancient nations, the Cretans had slaves, those serving in the country were called *chrysonetes* and those in the towns *amphamiotes*. Their usual name was *clarotes*, because they were divided equally by lot, as they were prisoners of war. At Cydonia, one of the towns of Crete, the slaves had festivals during which they were free and powerful, and could even fight the citizens. Servitude has always provoked orgies.

All the instincts of civilisation began to develop in Crete with great energy. The Cretans did not like inaction, they liked hunting, wrestling, and every kind of exercise. They lived in common and divided the fruits of the earth. These customs and habits were at the bottom of Cretan institutions. The legislators confirmed these customs in certain cases and in others trained or suppressed them. The laws, called the laws of Minos, were never written down, and changed in the course of years.

Let us enter into Lyctus, a town of Crete, and see the everyday life of the people. Each person gave up the tenth of his productions or possessions to help support the society of which he was a member. These contributions were divided amongst all the families of the city by the magistrates. The citizens were divided into little societies; the care of the meals being in the hands of one of the women who directed the work of three or four of the public slaves, each of whom had a water-carrier. In each city there were two public edifices; one devoted to the serving of meals, the other to the shelter of foreigners and strangers. In the building for the meals were two tables, called hospitable tables, where strangers sat. The other tables were for the use of the citizens. An equal portion was given to each, except to the young people, who had only half a portion of meat and touched no other food. A pitcher of wine and water was on each table, from which everybody drank; after the meal another pitcher was placed on the table. The children had one pitcher in which the wine was measured, the old people and men had unlimited wine. The women who presided at the meals chose the choicest pieces for those who had distinguished themselves by their valour or their prudence. After the repast, public affairs were discussed, then great actions were related and those who had been courageous were praised and set up as models to the young.

Warfare was the object of all the institutions. On this point Plato and Aristotle agree. Clinias the Cretan, one of Plato's interrogators, wished everything to be arranged for warfare; he took trouble to have it understood that without supremacy in battle, riches and culture in art will be of no use, since all the treasures of the defeated pass into the hands of the

conqueror. Aristotle remarked that in Crete as in Sparta, and among the Scythians, Persians, Thracians, and Celts, everything led up to warfare—education, laws, customs. In Crete, the men were soldiers living under the same discipline, eating the same food, sharing perils and pleasure, and always ready to march or to fight. They were respected only when they were hardy, vigorous, agile, and quick. Prudence and repose were for old age.

As soon as the children could read, they were taught poems in which the laws were explained, and the elements of music. They were very strictly treated, with a severity which was never changed, no matter what the season. Clothed in rough clothes, they ate on the ground, helping one another and waiting upon the men. When they became older, they formed part of different companies, each one being presided over by a youth chosen from the highest or most powerful families. These young chiefs led the companies out hunting and racing; they had an almost parental authority over their companions and punished the disobedient. On certain days the companies fought against each other; to the sound of the flute and lyre, they attacked each other with their hands or weapons. This drilled them in the art of warfare. The Cretan towns, like other Grecian cities, had public buildings and gymnasiums for corporal exercises, gymnasiums for the mind were added later.

There was a time when the disputes between the different towns were judged by a kind of federal arbitration, but it is doubtful whether the decisions of this tribunal were respected. However, after some civil wars between the towns, arrangements were made, and we find some curious remains in the principal clauses of a treaty between two towns, Hierapolis and Priansus. Each had rights of isopolity and of marriage, of acquiring possessions in each other's territory, and of having an equal share in all things, divine and human. Those who wanted to reside in the other town could do so and could buy and sell there, lend or borrow money and make any kind of contract according to the laws of both.

Thus without unity and always at war with one another, the Cretans never left their island and took no part in the general affairs of Greece. They refused to enter into the league formed against Darius, giving the excuse that their assisting Menelaus had cost them misfortune, and recalling the conduct of the Greeks who had not hastened to avenge the death of Minos. These were pretexts, but the real cause was the feebleness of the Cretans, too weak and too few to take part in any great enterprise, a weakness which kept Crete always isolated, obscure and selfish. Polybius was indignant at Crete being compared to Lacedæmonia; he compared the equality of wealth and contempt of riches which reigned at Sparta to the avarice of the Cretans who were quite unscrupulous as to their means of becoming rich.

With the exception of the fact that the cosmes were elected yearly, we believe Polybius is wrong in esteeming Crete a democratic state. Power was in the hands of the senate, which was a regular oligarchy. As for the natural faults of the Cretans, which their government rather encouraged than corrected, time succeeded only in making them increase, and it is not astonishing that, at the time that Polybius wrote, they deserved the severe opinion of the historian. It would be unjust not to state with what disfavour the Greeks looked upon them. This insular race that helped no one and was ready to accept the pay of any nation, was hated by the Greeks. The Cretans were called treacherous liars, and it was proverbial that it was permitted to "cretise" with a Cretan.

Crete was renowned for two causes ; it was looked upon first as the cradle of the gods, then as the nest of sea-robbers and mercenaries. After having shone at the beginning of Greek civilisation, its development was interrupted before its time. Anarchy unnerved it. The bad reputation of the Cretans at Athens was also due to the jealousy of the Athenians who could never forgive Crete a short supremacy on the sea. When the poets wished to please the Athenians they abused Minos and the Cretans. Nothing is more dangerous to good fame with posterity than to have for enemy a witty nation.^b

BELOCH'S ACCOUNT OF GREEK COLONISATION

The scene of Grecian primitive history is practically limited to the countries bordering the *Ægean* Sea. But in the period which gave rise to the great epic poems the geographical horizon had already begun to expand. In one of the later songs of the *Iliad*, Egyptian Thebes is mentioned ; the songs relating the wanderings of Ulysses speak of the Cimmerians, the original inhabitants of the north coast of the Pontus, and the clear summer nights of the north, of which the Greeks could learn only on this coast. The *Telemachus* speaks of Libya, beside Egypt, and the latest songs of the *Odyssey* show an acquaintance with the Siculi and the land of the Sicani. No tradition has preserved the names of the bold explorers who first ventured out into the open sea which phantasy had peopled with all kinds of monsters and fabulous beings, and which, in reality, concealed countless terrors and dangers. Their deeds however lived on in the songs relating the expedition of the Argo and the home-coming of the heroes from Troy.

The settler soon followed the explorer. The need of land had once in a dim antiquity led the Hellenes to the islands of the *Ægean* Sea and to the western coast of Asia Minor ; these regions were now occupied, and whoever found his home too narrow was obliged to seek out more distant lands. Commercial interests played no part in these migrations at first, because there was no industry in Greece to furnish articles for export. People were in search of fertile districts ; whether or not good harbours were close at hand was wholly a question of secondary importance. The division of farm lands was consequently the first business of the new settlers ; at the beginning of the fifth century the ancient citizens of Syracuse already style themselves "land owners" (*γαρόποι*). Herein lies the fundamental difference between Grecian and Phœnician colonisation. Every Phœnician settlement was primarily a commercial establishment, which under favourable circumstances might develop into an agricultural colony ; the Grecian settlements were originally agricultural colonies out of which, however, in the course of time extensive commercial centres were developed.

The oldest colonial foundations of this time were like those unorganised expeditions which once poured out upon the islands and the shores of Asia Minor. Such were the settlements of the Achæans and Locrians in southern Italy. As the Greeks, however, were continually being forced out to more distant coasts, their colonisation had to take on a different character. The navigation of the islandless sea in the west, or even the journey to Libya and the stormy Pontus, necessitated a degree of seamanship greater than that possessed by the inhabitants of the agricultural coast districts of the Grecian peninsula, from among whom the settlers of the lands across the sea had until then gone forth. Hence Africa, Bœotia, and Argolis ceased to take an independent part in the colonisation movement. In their place arose cities,

hardly or not at all mentioned by Homer, which by their advantageous location had come to be centres of navigation; Chalcis and Eretria on the Euripus, the strait which furnishes the most convenient connection between southern Greece and Thessaly; Megara and Corinth on the isthmus, where the two seas which wash the shores of Greece come within a few miles of each other; Rhodes, Lesbos, and other islands of the Ægean Sea; finally the Ionian coast towns, especially Miletus. Not that all the colonists, who went out from here to seek new homes on distant shores were actually at home in these cities. On the contrary, these cities were only gathering places whither streamed the emigrants from the surrounding regions—all those who found no chance to advance in their old homes or who were driven abroad by love of adventure or by dissatisfaction with political conditions. But the cities, from which the colonising expeditions went out, organised the undertaking; they provided leaders and ships and their institutions served as models for the colonies.

Once founded, however, the colonies were, as a rule, wholly independent of the mother-city. The relation between them was like that between a father and his grown son in Grecian law. The citizen of the mother-city was always respected in the colony; and the colony, on the other hand, could always count on finding support with the mother-city in case of a difficult crisis. That the colony, moreover, remained in especially active intercourse with its mother-city lay in the nature of this colonial relationship; and in the course of time the colonies became the surest supports for the commerce of the mother-city and the best markets for the productions of its industrial activity.

In consequence the recollection of this relationship was kept alive for a long time. But the circumstances which gave rise to the foundation of all the colonies earlier than the sixth century, remain veiled in the darkness of tradition. Historical records were as yet far removed from this period, and the dates of foundations which have been handed down to us are based wholly upon calculations according to generations or upon suppositions of even less value. Such accounts can at the most give us only approximate clews and must in each single instance be compared with other traditions. Only so much is certain that in the first half of the seventh century the settlement of the southern coast of Thrace was in full progress and the Hellenes had already established themselves upon the gulf of Tarentum.

No other field offered the Grecian colonists such favourable conditions as the coasts of Italy and Sicily, beyond the Ionic Sea. Situated in the same latitude as the mother-land, these countries have a climate very similar to that of Greece.

Intercourse between the two shores existed at an early date. Fragments of vases in the Mycenæan style have been found in Messapia, and the pre-Hellenic necropolis in eastern Sicily shows traces of a civilisation which is partially under Mycenæan influence. It even appears that in pre-historic times immigrations from the Balkan peninsula into Italy already took place by way of Otranto. At least it is related that the Chones once dwelt on the western coast of the gulf of Tarentum; and the similarity of names between these people and the Epirot Chaones, the inhabitants of the region about the Acroceraunian promontory, can hardly be accidental. Perhaps this is connected with the fact that the Italici designate the Hellenes as *Græci*, since the *Græci* are said to have been an Epirot tribe, which in historic times had wholly disappeared.

Be that as it may, the Hellenes had at all events taken possession of the eastern coast of the present Calabria, during the course of the eighth, or at

latest at the beginning of the seventh century. The new settlers called themselves Achæans and thought they were descended from the Achæans in the Peloponnesus. As a matter of fact their dialect is closely related to the Argolian. The Chones of Italy have since disappeared from history, and have probably been merged into one people with the Achæans.

The new home was called Italia, after a branch of the original population which disappeared at an early date, and this name was gradually extended over the whole peninsula clear to the Alps. The land offered a boundless field for Hellenic activity, and the realisation of that fact found expression in the name Greater Hellas, which arose in the colonial territory across the Ionian Sea in about the sixth century, in contrast to the crowded condition of the too thickly populated mother-land. This may have been hyperbole, but it was in a sense justified by the brilliant development of the Achæan settlements. The coasts of the gulf of Tarentum became covered with a circle of flourishing cities. In the north at the mouth of the Bradanus was Metapontum, which bore on its armour the speaking device of an ear of corn; then came Siris in the fruitful plain at the mouth of the river of the same name, which, to the poet Archilochus appeared an ideal place for a colony; further south where Crathis empties into the sea, was Sybaris, whose wealth and luxury soon became proverbial. In close rivalry with Sybaris stood Croton, situated near the promontory of Lacinium, on the top of which the new settlers founded the temple of Hera, the queen of heaven, which became the chief sanctuary for the Greeks of Italy. One column of the building is still standing, a signal for ships, and can be seen from afar over the blue waters of the Ionian Sea. Finally, far to the south at Cape Stilo was Caulonia, the last of the Achæan settlements.

The Achæans soon penetrated also into the interior and through the narrow peninsula to the shores of the Tyrrhenian Sea. Sybaris founded here the colonies of Scidrus and Laos, and, further north, on the lower Silarus, Posidonia [afterwards Pæstum], whose temple to-day arises in solemn majesty from out its desolate surroundings, the most beautiful monument of Grecian architecture which has been preserved on the western side of the Ionian Sea. Pyxus [afterwards Buxentum], between Posidonia and Laos, is probably a colony from Siris, which was directly opposite it on the Ionian Sea, and was later closely associated with it. Croton founded Pandosia in the upper valley of the Crathis, and Terina and Scylletium (Scylacium) on the isthmus of Catanzaro where the Ionian and Tyrrhenian seas approach to within a few miles of each other. The Achæans now controlled the whole region from the Bradanus and Silarus southward to the gulf of Terina and the gulf of Scylletium, an area of fifteen thousand square kilometres.

The Achæans were soon followed by the Locrians, who lived opposite them on the gulf of Corinth. They founded a new Locri, south of the Achæan settlements not far from the Zephyrian promontory. This city also soon became rich and powerful, so that its territory was extended to the west coast of the peninsula, where it established the colonies Hipponium and Medma.

In the meantime the inhabitants of eastern Greece had begun to direct their gaze to the newly discovered lands in the west—first of all the Chalcidians, the bravest men in Hellas, as they are called in an old proverb. Since the coast of the gulf of Tarentum was already occupied, they sailed further, to Sicily the land famed in fable as the home of the Cyclops and Læstrygones. These were no longer to be found there, but instead a people of Italic race, the Siceli, or the Sicani, as they were called in the western

part of the island, a brave and warlike people, but with no national unity so that they were unable successfully to oppose the invaders. Here, at the foot of the lofty snow pyramid of *Ætna*, the Chalcidians founded *Naxos*, their first settlement and the first Hellenic town on Sicilian soil. In gratitude to the god, *Apollo Archegetes*, who had brought them over the sea in safety, the settlers erected an altar. Later on, when Sicily had become an Hellenic land, all those who were setting sail to attend the festivals in the mother-land used to sacrifice at this place.

From *Naxos* the Chalcidians soon took possession of the surrounding region. In the south they founded *Catane*, *Leontini*, *Callipolis*, *Eubœa*; in the north, on the strait which separates Sicily from Italy, they built *Zancle*, the later *Messana*, or *Messina*, and opposite this on the mainland *Rhegium* was established. Here the wide *Tyrrhenian Sea* was open to the Hellenes. The precipitous western coast of the *Calabria* of to-day and the waterless *Liparæan Islands* were not indeed attractive to settlers, but on the small island *Pithecusa* (*Ischia*), off the coast of the *Osci*, was the most favourable spot a colonist could wish—the soil being luxuriantly fertile and at the same time secure from hostile attacks. Thus the Chalcidians established themselves here at an early date, perhaps in the eighth century. Soon they ventured over to the near-lying continent, and on the steep trachyte cliff, upon the flat, wave-beaten shore of the gulf of *Gæta*, they founded *Cumæ*, so called from a place [*Cyme*] in the old *Eubœan* home-land.

Neapolis, the “new city” was colonised from here in about the year 600, while *Samian* fugitives settled at *Dicaearchia* [afterwards *Puteoli*], in close proximity to *Cumæ* (in 527). The second large island of the *Neapolitan Bay*, *Capræa* must also have been settled by Chalcidians, since we find a Hellenic population there even in the period of the empire.

Cumæ is the most extreme westerly point of Italy which the Chalcidians, and indeed the Hellenes as a whole, ever possessed. It has always remained, as it was first established, the most advanced frontier post, and the continuous territory of Grecian colonisation in Italy ends at the *Silarus*. A similar position was occupied on the southern shore of the *Tyrrhenian Sea* by *Himera*, which was colonised from *Messana* in about the year 650, and was the only Grecian city on the northern coast of Sicily. Chalcidian colonisation in the west came to an end with this settlement.

The example given by *Chalcis* was soon imitated. The *Corinthians* in the eighth century still occupied the rich island of *Coreyra* and likewise turned their steps to Sicily. Since the region around *Ætna* and the strait was already occupied by Chalcidians, they went further south and established the colony of *Syracuse* upon the small island of *Ortygia*, in the most beautiful harbour on the eastern coast of Sicily. This colony was destined to become the metropolis of the Grecian west. The real colonising activity of *Corinth*, however, was directed chiefly towards the northwestern part of the Grecian peninsula. In the course of the eighth century a dense circle of *Corinthian* and *Corintho-Coreyræan* settlements grew up here: among them *Chalcis* and *Molycrium* in *Ætolia* at the entrance to the bay of *Corinth*.

Like *Corinth*, its neighbour city *Megara* began at an early date to take part in the colonisation of Sicily. A new *Megara* arose here, between *Syracuse* and the Chalcidian *Leontini*, professedly in the eighth century, at any rate before *Syracuse* had acquired much importance and had begun to found colonies of its own. Its powerful neighbours made it impossible for the city to expand towards the interior and thus the *Megarians* were obliged to go further west, when their territory became too cramped for them at home.

They founded Selinus, not far from the most western point of the island on the coast of the Libyan Sea, at about the same time that the Chalcidians laid out Himera on the opposite coast (about 650). On account of the fertility of the district the new colony soon reached a high grade of prosperity and established on its own account a number of settlements, such as Minoa, near the mouth of the Halyceus (Platani) so called from the little island of like name in the old Grecian home.

Of the other states of the Grecian mother-land only Sparta took part in the settlement of the west. Inner disturbances which broke out after the conquest of Messenia are said to have caused a portion of the conquered party to leave their home. The emigrants set sail for Iapygia and established there, upon the only good harbour on the southeast coast of Italy, the colony of Tarentum (700 B.C.). Two centuries later, shortly before the Persian wars, the Spartans made an attempt to establish themselves in the west.

Sicily and Italy were too far out of the way for the Asiatic Greeks, and they consequently held almost entirely aloof from any colonising expeditions thither. Rhodes was an exception. At the beginning of the seventh century its citizens, together with the Cretans, established the colony of Gela, on the fertile depression at the mouth of the Gela, which was the first Grecian city on the south coast of Sicily. About a century later (in 580) this city colonised Agrigentum, which is situated farther to the west on a steep height commanding a broad outlook, not far from the sea. This filled the gap which had been left in the row of Grecian cities between Gela and Selinus. At about the same time Rhodians and Cnidians under the leadership of the Heraclid Pentathlus, tried to find a footing on the most extreme west point of Sicily, on the promontory of Lilybæum. But the Hellenes were here successfully opposed by the Elymi, the original inhabitants of this part of the island, and by the citizens of the neighbouring Phœnician colony of Motya. The new settlers and their Selinuntine allies were beaten; Pentathlus himself fell, and the remainder of his people were forced to take refuge on the barren Liparean Islands, which were thus won for the Grecians.

The distant west had been opened up to Grecian commerce even before this. It is said to have been a Samian sailor, Colæus by name, who, on a journey to Egypt, being carried out of his way by a storm off the Libyan coast, was the first to reach Tartessus, the rich silver-land, lying near the Pillars of Hercules (600 B.C.) At about the same time Ionic Phocæans founded the colony of Massalia not far from the mouth of the Rhodanus. This soon became a centre for the commerce of these regions and extended its influence far into the Celtic interior. From here the Phocæans advanced along the Iberian coast to Tartessus, where they entered into friendly relations with the natives and established the colony of Mænaca, which was the most westerly point the Hellenes ever held. The Phocæans settled also on Cynus (Corsica). In 565 they founded Alalia on the east coast of the island. When Ionia was forced to succumb to the Persians after the fall of Sardis (545) a large portion of the citizens of Phocæa left their homes and turned to their tribal kinsmen in Alalia, which thus grew from a mere mercantile settlement into a powerful city.

These results, however, were for the most part of short duration. The Phœnicians reached the western Mediterranean at the same time with the Hellenes, perhaps somewhat earlier even. The northern coast of Libya from Syrtis Major to the Pillars of Hercules was covered with a line of their settlements, among which Carthage attained the first place in the course of time, owing to the advantage of its incomparable location. It was not long

before they crossed over to the islands lying opposite Africa. They occupied Melita (Malta) and Gaulos (Gozzo), and founded Motya, Panormus, and Solus in west Sicily, probably during the seventh century. Here the Greeks formed a barrier preventing their further expansion. The Phœnicians, however, could spread themselves upon Sardinia without hindrance, since the Greeks, although they may have planned to settle there, never went seriously about it. In this way a succession of Phœnician settlements grew up along the south and west coast of the island — Caralis, Nora, Sulci, Tharrus and others. The Pityusæ are said to have been colonised from Carthage in the year 654–653 B.C. The Phœnicians had already reached the silver-land of Tartessus in the eighth century. Their chief point of support in this region was Gades, situated on a small island beyond the Pillars of Hercules on the edge of the ocean.

A hostile encounter with the Hellenes could now no longer be avoided and it seems to have been the danger which threatened the Phœnicians from this side which led their scattered settlements to unite into a single state with Carthage as its centre, or at any rate materially assisted Carthage in her work of unification. Above all it was necessary to drive out the Phœnicians from their newly won position on Corsica. The Phœnicians were aided in their attempt by the Etruscans, who, as bold pirates, had long beforehand made themselves feared by the Greeks, and regarded the Phœcean settlements so near their coasts with no less anxiety than the Phœnicians themselves. The Phœceans could not withstand the attack of the two peoples, who were the most skilful navigators in the western Mediterranean. They were indeed victorious in an open sea fight, but they endured such severe losses that they were obliged to give up Alalia. They next turned to south Italy and established there the colony of Ilyeæ, between Pyxus and Posidonia. Massalia was now isolated and thrown upon its own resources. The distant Menaca could consequently be maintained no longer, and Carthage won undisputed possession of Tartessus. But within its narrow range of power Massalia victoriously resisted all attacks of the Phœnicians, and the final result was that a sort of dividing line was established between the two cities. Massaliot influence was preponderant north of the promontory of Artemisium (cape of Nao); Carthaginian, south of it, on the east coast of Iberia.

Cyrenus came under Etruscan influence after the withdrawal of the Phœceans. The Etruscans, it appears, had already taken possession of the fertile plain on the lower Vulturnus and had established there a number of settlements, whose centre was at Capua. They now proceeded to attack Hellenic Cumæ (presumably in 524). Here, however, the superior military skill of the Greeks won the victory, and the latter were able to defend the Latin cities, which were friendly to them, from being brought into subjection by the Etruscans. The strength of Cumæ, however, was not sufficient to keep up the unequal fight for long and it was due only to the intervention of the Syracusans that Hellenism maintained itself here until the end of the fifth century.

Nearly contemporaneously with the beginnings of colonisation in the west the Hellenes began to spread toward the north and southeast. The Chalcidians again took the first place. Opposite Eubœa a long peninsula projects from the north into the Ægean Sea, which, on account of the numerous indentations of its coast, as well as the fertility of its soil, invited settlement. A long succession of Grecian colonial towns grew up here, the most of which were founded from Chalcis; hence the name Chalcidice, which the peninsula bore in later times. The Corinthians followed the Chalcidians

here, just as they had done in the west. On the narrow isthmus joining the peninsula of Pallene with the main body of Chalcidice they founded the colony of Potidæa (in 600) which remained the most important city of this region until the time of the Peloponnesian War. The original Thracian population maintained itself only on the rugged slopes of Athos.

Further east, in the first half of the seventh century, the Parians took possession of the mountainous island of Thasos, which at that time was still covered with a thick primeval forest. The new settlers soon crossed over to the near-lying mainland, where they established a number of commercial stations, as Œsymba and Galepsus, which had to maintain themselves through long struggles with the warlike Thracian tribes. Opposite Thasos, on the fruitful plain between Nestus and Lake Bistonis, the Clazomenæans founded Abdera in 651, but they could not long maintain themselves against the attacks of the Thracians. Colonists from Teos, who emigrated after the conquest of Ionia by the Persians (545) and took possession of the deserted place, were more successful; Abdera now became the most important city on this whole coast and also took an active part in the intellectual life of the nation.

Lesbos and Tenedos were for a long time the most advanced posts of the Hellenic world toward the northeast. Not until the eighth century do the inhabitants of these islands appear to have succeeded in taking possession of the south of Troas, from the wooded slopes of Ida to the entrance to the Hellespont. None of the numerous settlements founded here, however, became very important. The Lesbians then went further and crossed over to the European shore of the Hellespont, where they built Sestus at the narrowest point of the strait and Alopeconnesus on the northern coast of the Thracian Chersonesus. Œnus, at the mouth of the mighty Hebrus, the principal river of Thrace, was also colonised by Mytilenæans. The further expansion of the Greeks on this coast was arrested by the warlike tribes of Thrace.

The Lesbians were soon followed by the Milesians. In 670 they established Abydos, opposite Sestus, and at about the same time (675) founded Cyzicus on the isthmus connecting the mountainous peninsula of Arcotonnesus with the Asiatic mainland. Other Ionian cities also took part in the colonisation of these regions. Lampsacus was colonised from Phocæa (651); Elæus from Teos; Myrlea from Colophon; Perinthus from Samos (600).

The Milesians also advanced into the Pontus at an early date. It was due to them that this sea, which, with its inhospitable shores peopled by wild barbarians, had been the terror of Grecian mariners, became known as "the hospitable sea" (Pontos Euxinos), with which few other regions could compare in importance for Grecian commerce. Miletus is said to have founded in all no less than ninety colonies on the coasts of the Hellespont and Pontus. In 630 Milesians built Sinope not far from the mouth of the Halys, which soon grew to be the most important emporium in this region, and founded in its turn a number of colonies, as Cotyora, Trapezus, and Cerasus. The Milesians, however, turned their attention especially to the northwest and north coasts of the Pontus, which were to become the principal granaries of Greece. After the middle of the seventh century a large number of Milesian colonies grew up here. The first was Istrus south of the mouth of the Danube, said to have been founded in 656; a few years later (644) Olbia, at the mouth of the Borysthenes near its junction with the Hypanis (Bug); then in the first half of the sixth century on the east coast of Thrace, Apollonia, Odessus, and Tomis; further on Tyras at the

mouth of the river of like name (Dniester) and Theodosia on the south coast of the Crimea. The Hellenic settlements were especially frequent in the Cimmerian Bosphorus, the highway uniting the Pontus with the sea of Mæotis. Nymphæum and the Milesian colony of Panticapæum, the later capital of the Bosphorian kingdom, arose here on the western shore; opposite, on the Asiatic shore, was Phanagorea, founded from Teos. Finally, Tanais was founded at the mouth of the Don, the most northerly point ever occupied by the Greeks.

The Megarians had begun to establish themselves on the Propontis at about the same time with the Milesians. In 675 they founded Chalcedon at the entrance to the Thracian Bosphorus, and seventeen years later, Byzantium, on the opposite European shore. Selymbria, neighbouring Byzantium on the west, and Astacus, at the most easterly point of the Propontis, not far from the site of the later Nicomedia, were Megarian colonies. The Megarians, however, penetrated into the Pontus itself, at a comparatively late date. Their first colony here was Heraclea, founded in association with Boeotian settlers in the year 550, in the land of the Mariandyni, about two hundred kilometres from the outlet of the Bosphorus. From there Mesembria and Callatis were colonised on the east coast of Thrace, and Chersonesus, on the southern point of the Tauric peninsula, near the present Sebastopol.

All of these Grecian towns, however, remained with few exceptions isolated points in the midst of the original population of barbarians. An actual hellenising of the country as in Sicily and lower Italy was never accomplished. This was largely due to the configuration of the Pontine coast, which with the exception of the Crimea has no indentations, so that the Grecian colonies had no way to protect themselves against the attacks of the tribes from the interior. Besides, the winter climate of the regions north of the Pontus was very raw. The Greeks could not feel happy in a land where the vine and olive tree grew only in sheltered places, and only the bitterest necessity or the prospect of great commercial gain could cause them to leave their sunny home-land for such a country. Thus the Grecian cities on the Pontus never became very populous; there was not one among them to compare with Sybaris, Taras, Acragas, to say nothing of Syracuse. Condemned to a continual struggle for existence, the Greeks here had no leisure for the cultivation of higher interests. It is remarkable how poor the Pontine colonies have been in intellectual greatness. Their rôle in history has practically been confined to providing the mother-land with grain, salted fish, and other such raw products. Only once, when the rest of the nation had already fallen under foreign dominion, did they take an active part in great political events. The last battle for Grecian liberty was fought with their forces, but he who led the fight was a hellenised barbarian king.

Although the Hellenes had been able to expand on the Italian, Sicilian, and Pontine coasts with almost no hindrance, Grecian colonisation met an insurmountable obstacle in the old civilised lands on the southeastern shores of the Mediterranean, with their dense populations. In Syria the Hellenes did not attempt a settlement; they were not even able to drive the Phœnicians out of Cyprus. Indeed, when the Assyrian king Sargon conquered Syria at the end of the eighth century, the Greeks on Cyprus thought it advisable to recognise his supremacy, at least nominally, and this relation continued under his successors until Asshurbanapal. Later, after the fall of the Assyrian Empire, the island came under Egyptian rule. Sargon's son Sennacherib (705-681) repulsed an attempt of the Greeks to settle on the

Cilician plain. The warlike tribes of rough Cilicia and Lycia also succeeded in keeping the Greeks at a distance from their coasts, or at least prevented their further expansion. Phaselis, founded by the Rhodians on the western shore of the gulf of Pamphylia in 700, remained the last Grecian colony in the south of Asia Minor.

The rich valley of the Nile attracted Grecian pirates at an early period, the more so as the political divisions of the country in the eighth and first half of the seventh century rendered an effective resistance impossible. The superior military ability of these pirates finally caused Psamthek, the ruler of Saïs, to hire them as mercenaries. With their aid he got the upper hand over the other sectional princes and freed Egypt from the Assyrian yoke (about 660–645). From that time forward, Greeks formed the kernel of the Egyptian army, and although the Nile valley was now closed to piracy, it was, on the other hand, open to Greek commerce. The Milesians founded a colony on the Bolbitinic mouth of the Nile, below Saïs; somewhat later a number of Greek mercantile settlements grew up at Naukratis, not far from the Canopic mouth of the Nile, to which King Aahmes granted rights of corporation. The city soon grew to be the chief commercial emporium of Egypt and in the sixth century occupied, on a small scale, a position like that of the later Alexandria. In the course of time the Greeks would without doubt have become rulers of the country, but the Persian conquest retarded their development for fully a century and put a limit to the further expansion of Hellenism.

The route from Greece to Egypt was usually by way of Crete in a southerly direction to the coast of Libya. This is the narrowest part of the eastern Mediterranean, and the stretch of open sea to be crossed measures hardly three hundred kilometers, about the same as the width of the Ægean Sea. The need soon began to be felt of having a station at the place where land was first touched again. Thus in 630 Greeks from Thera settled upon the small island of Platea, which is situated off the Libyan shore at precisely this point. After a few years the colonists felt strong enough to cross over to the mainland. At a short distance from the coast, where the high tableland of the interior slopes down to the sea, they founded the city of Cyrene. The fertility of the soil and the trade in the aromatic plant *silphion*, which is here indigenous and was highly prized by the Greeks, assured prosperity to the newcomers. The Libyan tribes living in the neighbourhood were subdued and an attack of the Egyptian king Apries [Uah-ab-Ra] was successfully repulsed (570). A short time later Barca was founded (550) on the heights of the plateau west of Cyrene, and Teuchira and Hesperides on the coast. Carthage prevented a further extension toward the west, and Egypt toward the east, and consequently Cernaica remained the only district on the south coast of the Mediterranean, which was colonised by Hellenes.

Thus in the course of two centuries the Ionian Sea, the Propontis, and the Pontus had become Grecian seas, and Grecian colonies had arisen in Egypt as well as in Libya, on the west coast of Italy, and in the land of the Celts as far as distant Iberia. The nation had grown out of the narrow limits in which till then its history had been enacted. Greek influence was henceforth predominant within the entire circumference of the Mediterranean. The reaction of this on Grecian life was manifest in all its phases.^c



CHAPTER XII. SOLON THE LAWGIVER

IT is on the occasion of Solon's legislation that we obtain our first glimpse — only a glimpse, unfortunately — of the actual state of Attica and its inhabitants. It is a sad and repulsive picture, presenting to us political discord and private suffering combined.

Violent dissensions prevailed among the inhabitants of Attica, who were separated into three factions — the *pedieis*, or men of the plain, comprising Athens, Eleusis, and the neighbouring territory, among whom the greatest number of rich families were included; the mountaineers in the east and north of Attica, called *diacrii*, who were on the whole the poorest party; and the *paralii* in the southern portion of Attica from sea to sea, whose means and social position were intermediate between the two. Upon what particular points these intestine disputes turned we are not distinctly informed; they were not however peculiar to the period immediately preceding the archontate of Solon; they had prevailed before, and they reappear afterwards prior to the despotism of Pisistratus, the latter standing forward as the leader of the *diacrii*, and as champion, real or pretended, of the poorer population.

But in the time of Solon these intestine quarrels were aggravated by something much more difficult to deal with — a general mutiny of the poorer population against the rich, resulting from misery combined with oppression. The Thetes, whose condition we have already contemplated in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, are now presented to us as forming the bulk of the population of Attica — the cultivating tenants, metayers, and small proprietors of the country. They are exhibited as weighed down by debts and dependence, and driven in large numbers out of a state of freedom into slavery — the whole mass of them (we are told) being in debt to the rich, who were proprietors of the greater part of the soil. They had either borrowed money for their own necessities, or they tilled the lands of the rich as dependent tenants, paying a stipulated portion of the produce, and in this capacity they were largely in arrear.

All the calamitous effects were here seen of the old harsh law of debtor and creditor, — once prevalent in Greece, Italy, Asia, and a large portion of the world, — combined with the recognition of slavery as a legitimate status, and of the right of one man to sell himself as well as that of another man to buy him. Every debtor unable to fulfil his contract was liable to be adjudged as the slave of his creditor until he could find means either of paying or working it out; and not only he himself, but his minor sons and unmarried daughters and sisters also, whom the law gave him the power of selling. The poor man thus borrowed upon the security of his body, to translate literally the Greek phrase, and upon that of the persons in his family;

and so severely had these oppressive contracts been enforced, that many debtors had been reduced from freedom to slavery in Attica itself, many others had been sold for exportation, and some had only hitherto preserved their own freedom by selling their children. Moreover, a great number of the smaller properties in Attica were under mortgage, signified, according to the formality usual in the Attic law, and continued down throughout the historical times, by a stone pillar erected on the land, inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan. The proprietors of these mortgaged lands, in case of an unfavourable turn of events, had no other prospect except that of irremediable slavery for themselves and their families, either in their own native country, robbed of all its delights, or in some barbarian region where the Attic accent would never meet their ears. Some had fled the country to escape legal adjudication of their persons, and earned a miserable subsistence in foreign parts by degrading occupations. Upon several, too, this deplorable lot had fallen by unjust condemnation and corrupt judges; the conduct of the rich, in regard to money sacred and profane, in regard to matters public as well as private, being thoroughly unprincipled and rapacious.

The manifold and long-continued suffering of the poor under this system, plunged into a state of debasement not more tolerable than that of the Gallic plebs—and the injustices of the rich in whom all political power was then vested—are facts well attested by the poems of Solon himself, even in the short fragments preserved to us, and it appears that immediately preceding the time of his archonship, the evils had ripened to such a point and the determination of the mass of sufferers, to extort for themselves some mode of relief, had become so pronounced that the existing laws could no longer be enforced. According to the profound remark of Aristotle, that seditions are generated by great causes but out of small incidents, we may conceive that some recent events had occurred as immediate stimulants to the outbreak of the debtors—like those which lend so striking an interest to the early Roman annals, as the inflaming sparks of violent popular movements for which the train had long before been laid. Condemnations by the archons of insolvent debtors may have been unusually numerous, or the maltreatment of some particular debtor, once a respected freeman, in his condition of slavery, may have been brought to act vividly upon the public sympathies—like the case of the old plebeian centurion at Rome (first impoverished by the plunder of the enemy, then reduced to borrow, and lastly adjudged to his creditor as an insolvent), who claimed the protection of the people in the forum, rousing their feelings to the highest pitch by the marks of the slave-whip visible on his person. Some such incidents had probably happened, though we have no historians to recount them; moreover it is not unreasonable to imagine, that that public mental affliction which the purifier Epimenides had been invoked to appease, as it sprung in part from pestilence, so it had its cause partly in years of sterility, which must of course have aggravated the distress of the small cultivators. However this may be, such was the condition of things in 594 B.C., through mutiny of the poor freemen and Thetes, and uneasiness of the middling citizens, that the governing oligarchy, unable either to enforce their private debts or to maintain their political power, were obliged to invoke the well-known wisdom and integrity of Solon. Though his vigorous protest (which doubtless rendered him acceptable to the mass of the people) against the iniquity of the existing system, had already been proclaimed in his poems, they still hoped that he would serve as an auxiliary to help them over their difficulties, and

[ca. 638-558 B.C.]

they therefore chose him, nominally as archon along with Philombrotus, but with power in substance dictatorial.^b

For the life of Solon we can do no better than turn to Plutarch, keeping the very translation, by North, that Shakespeare read, but modernising the spelling.

THE LIFE AND LAWS OF SOLON ACCORDING TO PLUTARCH

He was of the noblest and most ancient house of the city of Athens. For of his father's side, he was descended of King Codrus: and for his mother, Heraclides Ponticus writeth, she was cousin-german unto Pisistratus' mother. For this cause even from the beginning there was great friendship between them, partly for their kindred, and partly also for the courtesy and beauty of Pisistratus, with whom it is reported Solon on a time was in love. But Solon's father (as Hermippus writeth) having spent his goods in liberality, and deeds of courtesy, though he might easily have been relieved at divers men's hands with money, he was yet ashamed to take any, because he came of a house which was wont rather to give and relieve others, than to take themselves: so being yet a young man, he devised to trade merchandise. Howbeit others say, that Solon travelled countries, rather to see the world, and to learn, than to traffic, or gain. For sure he was very desirous of knowledge, as appeareth manifestly: for that being now old, he commonly used to say this verse:

"I grow old learning still."

Also he was not covetously bent, nor loved riches too much: for he said in one place:

"Whoso hath goods, and gold enough at call,
Great herds of beasts, and flocks in many a fold;
Both horse and mule, yea, store of corn and all
That may content each man above the mould:
No richer is, for all those heaps and hoards,
Than he which hath sufficiently to feed
And clothe his corpse with such as God affords.
But if his joy and chief delight do breed,
For to behold the fair and heavenly face
Of some sweet wife, which is adorned with grace:
Or else some child, of beauty fair and bright,
Then hath he cause (indeed) of deep delight."

And in another place also he saith:

"Indeed I do desire some wealth to have at will:
But not unless the same be got by faithful dealing still.
For sure who so desires by wickedness to thrive,
Shall find that justice from such goods will justly him deprive."

Solon learned to be lavish in expense, to fare delicately, and to speak wantonly of pleasures in his poems, somewhat more licentiously than became the gravity of a philosopher: only because he was brought up in the trade of merchandise, wherein for that men are marvellous subject to great losses and dangers, they seek other whiles good cheer to drive these cares away, and liberty to make much of themselves. Poetry at the beginning he used but for pleasure, and when he had leisure, writing no matter of importance in his verses. Afterwards he set out many grave matters of

philosophy, and the most part of such things as he had devised before, in the government of a commonweal, which he did not for history or memory's sake, but only of a pleasure to discourse : for he sheweth the reasons of that he did, and in some places he exhorteth, chideth, and reproveth the Athenians. And some affirm also he went about to write his laws and ordinances in verse, and do recite his preface, which was this :

“Vouchsafe, O mighty Jove, of heaven and earth high king :
To grant good fortune to my laws and hests in everything.
And that their glory grow in such triumphant wise,
As may remain in fame for aye, which lives and never dies.”

He chiefly delighted in moral philosophy, which treated of government and commonweals : as the most part of the wise men did of those times. But for natural philosophy, he was very gross and simple. So in effect there was none but Thales alone of all the seven wise men of Greece, who searched further the contemplation of things in common use among men, than he. For setting him apart, all the others got the name of wisdom, only for their understanding in matters of State and government. It is reported that they met on a day all seven together in the city of Delphes, and another time in the city of Corinth, where Periander got them together at a feast that he made to the other six.

Anacharsis being arrived at Athens, went to knock at Solon's gate, saying that he was a stranger which came of purpose to see him, and to desire his acquaintance and friendship. Solon answered him, that it was better to seek friendship in his own country. Anacharsis replied again : “Thou then that art at home, and in thine own country, begin to show me friendship.” Then Solon wondering at his bold ready wit, entertained him very courteously : and kept him a certain time in his house, and made him very good cheer, at the self-same time wherein he was most busy in governing the commonweal, and making laws for the state thereof. Which when Anacharsis understood, he laughed at it, to see that Solon imagined with written laws, to bridle men's covetousness and injustice. “For such laws,” said he, “do rightly resemble the spider's cobwebs : because they take hold of little flies and gnats which fall into them, but the rich and mighty will break and run through them at their will.” Solon answered him, that men do justly keep all covenants and bargains which one makes with another, because it is to the hindrance of either party to break them : and even so, he did so temper his laws, that he made his citizens know, it was more for their profit to obey law and justice, than to break it. Nevertheless afterwards, matters proved rather according to Anacharsis' comparison, than agreeable to the hope that Solon had conceived. Anacharsis being by hap one day in a common assembly of the people at Athens, said that he marvelled much, why in the consultations and meetings of the Grecians, wise men propounded matters, and fools did decide them.

The Athenians, having sustained a long and troublesome war against the Megarians, for the possession of the isle of Salamis, were in the end weary of it, and made proclamation straightly commanding upon pain of death, that no man should presume to prefer any more to the counsel of the city, the title or question of the possession of the isle of Salamis. Solon could not bear this open shame, and seeing the most part of the lustiest youths desirous still of war, though their tongues were tied for fear of the proclamation ; he feigned himself to be out of his wits, and caused it to be given out that Solon was become a fool ; and secretly he had made certain

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lamentable verses, which he had conned without book, to sing abroad the city. So one day he ran suddenly out of his house with a garland on his head, and got him to the market-place, where the people straight swarmed like bees about him : and getting him up upon the stone where all proclamations are usually made out he singeth the elegies he had made.

This elegy is entitled Salamis, and containeth an hundred verses, which are excellently well written. And these being sung openly by Solon at that time, his friends incontinently praised them beyond measure, and especially Pisistratus : and they went about persuading the people that were present, to credit that he spake. Hereupon the matter was so handled amongst them, that by and by the proclamation was revoked, and they began to follow the wars with greater fury than before, appointing Solon to be general in the same.

But the common tale and report is, that he went by sea with Pisistratus unto the temple of Venus, surnamed Colias : where he found all the women at a solemn feast and sacrifice, which they made of custom to the goddess. He taking occasion thereby, sent from thence a trusty man of his own unto the Megarians, which then had Salamis : whom he instructed to feign himself a revolted traitor, and that he came of purpose to tell them, that if they would but go with him, they might take all the chief ladies and gentlewomen of Athens on a sudden. The Megarians easily believed him, and shipped forthwith certain soldiers to go with him. But when Solon perceived the ship under sail coming from Salamis, he commanded the women to depart, and instead of them he put lusty beardless springalls into their apparel, and gave them little short daggers to convey under their clothes, commanding them to play and dance together upon the seaside, until their enemies were landed, and their ship at anchor ; and so it came to pass. For the Megarians being deceived by that they saw afar off, as soon as ever they came to the shore side did land in heaps, one in another's neck, even for greediness, to take these women : but not a man of them escaped, for they were slain every mother's son. This stratagem being finely handled, and to good effect, the Athenians took sea straight, and coasted over to the isle of Salamis : which they took upon the sudden, and won it without much resistance.

Others say that it was not taken after this sort : By order of the oracle, Solon one night passed over to Salamis, and did sacrifice to Periphemus, and to Cychreus, demi-gods of the country. Which done, the Athenians delivered him five hundred men, who willingly offered themselves : and the city made an accord with them : that if they took the isle of Salamis, they should bear greatest authority in the commonweal. Solon embarked his soldiers into divers fisher boats, and appointed a galliot of thirty oars to come after him, and he anchored hard by the city of Salamis, under the point which looketh towards the isle of Negropont. The Megarians which were within Salamis, having by chance heard some inkling of it, but yet knew nothing of certainty : ran presently in hurly-burly to arm them, and manned out a ship to descry what it was. But they fondly coming within danger, were taken by Solon, who clapped the Megarians under hatches fast bound, and in their rooms put aboard in their ship the choicest soldiers he had of the Athenians, commanding them to set their course direct upon the city, and to keep themselves as close out of sight as could be. And he himself with all the rest of his soldiers landed presently, and marched to encounter with the Megarians, which were come out into the field. Now whilst they were fighting together, Solon's men whom he had sent in the Megarians' ship entered the haven and won the town. This is certainly true, and testified

by that which is showed yet at this day. For to keep a memorial hereof, a ship of Athens arriveth quietly at the first, and by and by those that are in the ship make a great shout, and a man armed leaping out of the ship, runneth shouting towards the rock called Sciradion, which is as they come from the firm land: and hard by the same is the temple of Mars, which Solon built there after he had overcome the Megarians in battle, from whence he sent back again those prisoners that he had taken (which were saved from the slaughter of the battle) without any ransom paying. Nevertheless, the Megarians were sharply bent still, to recover Salamis again. Much hurt being done and suffered on both sides: both parties in the end made the Lacedæmonians judges of the quarrel.

Solon undoubtedly won great glory and honour by this exploit, yet was he much more honoured and esteemed, for the oration he made in defence of the temple of Apollo, in the city of Delphes: declaring that it was not meet to be suffered, that the Cyrrhæans should at their pleasure abuse the sanctuary of the oracle, and that they should aid the Delphians in honour and reverence of Apollo. Whereupon the counsel of the Amphictyons, being moved with his words and persuasions, proclaimed wars against the Cyrrhæans.

Now that this sedition was utterly appeased in Athens, for that the excommunicates were banished the country, the city fell again into their old troubles and dissensions about the government of the commonweal: and they were divided into so diverse parties and factions, as there were people of sundry places and territories within the country of Attica. For there were the people of the mountains, the people of the valleys, and the people of the sea-coast. Those of the mountains, took the common people's part for their lives. Those of the valley, would a few of the best citizens should carry the sway. The coastmen would that neither of them should prevail, because they would have had a mean government and mingled of them both. Furthermore, the faction between the poor and rich, proceeding of their inequality, was at that time very great. By reason whereof the city was in great danger, and it seemed there was no way to pacify or take up these controversies, unless some tyrant happened to rise, that would take upon him to rule the whole. For all the common people were so sore indebted to the rich, that either they ploughed their lands, and yielded them the sixth part of their crop (for which cause they were called *hectemorii* and servants), or else they borrowed money of them at usury, upon gauge of their bodies to serve it out. And if they were not able to pay them, then were they by the law delivered to their creditors, who kept them as bondsmen and slaves in their houses, or else they sent them into strange countries to be sold: and many even for very poverty were forced to sell their own children (for there was no law to forbid the contrary) or else to forsake their city and country, for the extreme cruelty and hard dealings of these abominable usurers, their creditors. Inso-much that many of the lustiest and stoutest of them, banded together in companies, and encouraged one another, not to suffer and bear any longer such extremity, but to choose them a stout and trusty captain, that might set them at liberty, and redeem those out of captivity, which were judged to be bondsmen and servants, for lack of paying of their debts at their days appointed: and so to make again a new division of all lands and tenements, and wholly to change and turn up the whole state and government.

Then the wisest men of the city, who saw Solon only neither partner with the rich in their oppression, neither partaker with the poor in their necessity: made suit to him, that it would please him to take the matter in

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hand, and to appease and pacify all these broils and sedition. Yet Phanias Lesbian writeth, that he used a subtilty, whereby he deceived both the one and the other side, concerning the commonweal. For he secretly promised the poor to divide the lands again: and the rich also, to confirm their covenants and bargains. Howsoever it fell out, it is very certain that Solon from the beginning made it a great matter, and was very scrupulous to deal between them, fearing the covetousness of the one, and arrogancy of the other. Howbeit in the end he was chosen governor after Philombrotus, and was made reformer of the rigour of the laws, and the temperer of the state and commonweal, by consent and agreement of both parties.

The rich accepted him, because he was no beggar: the poor did also like him, because he was an honest man. They say, moreover, that one word and sentence which he spake (which at that present was rife in every man's mouth) that equality did breed no strife: did as well please the rich and wealthy, as the poor and needy. For the one sort conceived of this word equality, that he would measure all things according to the quality of the man: and the other took it for their purpose, that he would measure all things by the number, and by the poll only. Thus the captains of both sections persuaded and prayed him, boldly to take upon him that sovereign authority, since he had the whole city now at his commandment. The neuters also of every part, when they saw it very hard to pacify these things with law and reason, were well content that the wisest, and honestest man, should alone have the royal power in his hands. But his familiar friends above all rebuked him, saying he was to be accounted no better than a beast, if for fear of the name of tyrant, he would refuse to take upon him a kingdom: which is the most just and honourable state, if one take it upon him that is an honest man.

Now, notwithstanding he had refused the kingdom, yet he waxed nothing the more remiss or soft therefor in governing, neither would he bow for fear of the great, nor yet would frame his laws to their liking, that had chosen him their reformer. For where the mischief was tolerable, he did not straight pluck it up by the roots: neither did he so change the state, as he might have done, lest if he should have attempted to turn upside down the whole government, he might afterwards have been never able to settle and establish the same again. Therefore he only altered that which he thought by reason he could persuade his citizens unto, or else by force he ought to compel them to accept, mingling as he said, sour with sweet, and force with justice. And herewith agreeth his answer that he made afterwards unto one that asked him, if he had made the best laws he could for the Athenians? "Yea, sure," saith he, "such as they were able to receive." And this that followeth also, they have ever since observed in the Athenian tongue: to make certain things pleasant, that be hateful, finely conveying them under colour of pleasing names. As calling taxes, contributions: garrisons, guards: prisons, houses. And all this came up first by Solon's invention, who called clearing of debts *seisachtheia*: in English, discharge.

The Law Concerning Debts

For the first change and reformation he made in government was this: he ordained that all manner of debts past should be clear, and nobody should ask his debtor anything for the time passed. That no man should thenceforth lend money out to usury upon covenants for the body to be bound, if it were not repaid. Howbeit some write (as Androtion among other) that

the poor were contented that the interest only for usury should be moderated, without taking away the whole debt: and that Solon called this easy and gentle discharge, *seisachtheia*, with crying up the value of money. For he raised the pound of silver, being before but threescore and thirteen drachmas, full up to an hundred: so they which were to pay great sums of money, paid by tale as much as they ought, but with less number of pieces than the debt could have been paid when it was borrowed. And so the debtors gained much, and the creditors lost nothing. Nevertheless the greater part of them which have written the same, say, that this crying up of money, was a general discharge of all debts, conditions, and covenants upon the same: whereto the very poems themselves, which Solon wrote, do seem to agree. For he glorieth, and breaketh forth in his verses, that he had taken away all marks that separated men's lands through the country of Attica, and that now he had set at liberty, that which before was in bondage. And that of the citizens of Athens, which for lack of payment of their debts had been condemned for slaves to their creditors, he had brought many home again out of strange countries, where they had been so long, that they had forgotten to speak their natural tongue, and other which remained at home in captivity, he had now set them all at good liberty.

But while he was in doing this, men say a thing thwarted him, that troubled him marvellously. For having framed an edict for clearing of all debts, and lacking only a little to grace it with words, and to give it some pretty preface, that otherwise was ready to be proclaimed: he opened himself somewhat to certain of his familiars whom he trusted (as Conon, Clinias, and Hipponicus) and told them how he would not meddle with lands and possessions, but would only clear and cut off all manner of debts. These men, before the proclamation came out, went presently to the money-men, and borrowed great sums of money of them, and laid it out straight upon land. So when the proclamation came out, they kept the lands they had purchased, but restored not the money they had borrowed. This foul part of theirs made Solon very ill spoken of, and wrongfully blamed: as if he had not only suffered it, but had been partaker of this wrong and injustice. Notwithstanding he cleared himself of this slanderous report, losing five talents by his own law. For it was well known that so much was due unto him, and he was the first that, following his own proclamation, did clearly release his debtors of the same. Notwithstanding, they ever after called Solon's friends *Chreocopides*, cutters of debts. This law neither liked the one nor the other sort. For it greatly offended the rich, for cancelling their bonds: and it much more disliked the poor, because all lands and possessions they gaped for, were not made again common, and everybody alike rich and wealthy, as Lyeurgus had made the Lacedæmonians.

But Lyeurgus was the eleventh descended of the right line from Hercules, and had many years been king of Lacedæmon, where he had gotten great authority, and made himself many friends: all which things together, did greatly help him to execute that, which he wisely had imagined for the order of his commonweal. Yet also, he used more persuasion than force, a good witness thereof the loss of his eye: preferring a law before his private injury, which hath power to preserve a city long in union and concord, and to make citizens to be neither poor nor rich.

Solon could not attain to this. Howbeit he did what he could possible, with the power he had, as one seeking to win no credit with his citizens, but only by his counsel. To begin withal, he first took away all Draco's bloody laws, saving for murder and manslaughter.

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Class Legislation

Then Solon being desirous to have the chief offices of the city to remain in rich men's hands, as already they did, and yet to mingle the authority of government in such sort, as the meaner people might bear a little sway, which they never could before: he made an estimate of the goods of every private citizen. And those which he found yearly worth five hundred bushels of corn, and other liquid fruits and upwards, he called *pentacosio-medimni*: as to say, five-hundred-bushel-men of revenue. And those that had three hundred bushels a year, and were able to keep a horse of service, he put in the second degree, and called them knights. They that might dispend but two hundred bushels a year, were put in the third place, and called *zeugitæ*. All other under those, were called *thetes*, as you would say, hirelings, or craftsmen living of their labour: whom he did not admit to bear any office in the city, neither were they taken as free citizens, saving they had voices in elections, and assemblies of the city, and in judgments, where the people wholly judged.

Furthermore because his laws were written somewhat obscurely, and might be diversely taken and interpreted, this did give a great deal more authority and power to the judges. For, considering all their controversies could not be ended, and judged by express law: they were driven of necessity always to run to the judges and debated their matters before them. In-somuch as the judges by this means came to be somewhat above the law: for they did even expound it as they would themselves.

Yet considering it was meet to provide for the poverty of the common sort of people: he suffered any man that would, to take upon him the defence of any poor man's case that had the wrong. For if a man were hurt, beaten, forced, or otherwise wronged: any other man that would, might lawfully sue the offender, and prosecute law against him. And this was a wise law ordained of him, to accustom his citizens to be sorry for another's hurt, and so to feel it, as if any part of his own body had been injured. And they say he made an answer on a time agreeable to this law. For, being asked what city he thought best governed, he answered: "That city where such as receive no wrong, do as earnestly defend wrong offered to others, as the very wrong and injury had been done unto themselves." He erected also the council of the Areopagites, of those magistrates of the city, out of which they did yearly choose their governor: and he himself had been of that number, for that he had been governor for a year.

Wherefore perceiving now the people were grown to a stomach and haughtiness of mind because they were clear discharged of their debts: he set one up for matters of state, another council of an hundred chosen out of every tribe, whereof four hundred of them were to consult and debate of all matters, before they were propounded to the people: that when the great council of the people at large should be assembled, no matters should be put forth, unless it had been before well considered of, and digested, by the council of the four hundred. Moreover, he ordained the higher court should have the chief authority and power over all things, and chiefly to see the law executed and maintained: supposing that the commonweal being settled, and stayed with these two courts (as with two strong anchor-holds), it should be the less turmoiled and troubled, and the people also better pacified and quieted. The most part of writers hold this opinion, that it was Solon which erected the council of the Areopagites, as we have said, and it is very likely to be true, for that Draco in all his laws and ordinances made no

manner of mention of the Areopagites, but always speaketh to the ephetes (which were judges of life and death) when he spake of murder, or of any man's death.

Notwithstanding, the eighth law of the thirteenth table of Solon saith thus, in these very words: All such as have been banished or detected of naughty life, before Solon made his laws, shall be restored again to their goods and good name, except those which were condemned by order of the council of the Areopagites, or by the ephetes, or by the kings in open court, for murder, and death of any man, or for aspiring to usurp tyranny. These words to the contrary seem to prove and testify, that the council of the Areopagites was, before Solon was chosen reformer of the laws. For how could offenders and wicked men be condemned by order of the council of the Areopagites before Solon, if Solon was the first that gave it authority to judge?

Miscellaneous Laws; the Rights of Women

Furthermore amongst the rest of his laws, one of them indeed was of his own device: for the like was never stablished elsewhere. And it is that law, that pronounceth him defamed, and dishonest, who in a civil uproar among the citizens, sitteth still a looker-on, and a neuter, and taketh part with neither side. Whereby his mind was as it should appear, that private men should not be only careful to put themselves and their causes in safety, nor yet should be careless for other men's matters, or think it a virtue not to meddle with the miseries and misfortunes of their country, but from the beginning of every sedition that they should join with those that take the justest cause in hand, and rather to hazard themselves with such, than to tarry looking (without putting themselves in danger) which of the two should have the victory.

There is another law also, which at the first sight methinketh is very dishonest and fond. That if any man according to the law hath matched with a rich heir and inheritor, and of himself is impotent, and unable to do the office of a husband, she may lawfully lie with any whom she liketh, of her husband's nearest kinsmen. Howbeit some affirm, that it is a wise made law for those, which knowing themselves unmeet to entertain wedlock, will for covetousness of lands, marry with rich heirs and possessioners, and mind to abuse poor gentlemen under the colour of law: and will think to force and restrain nature. This also confirmeth the same, that such a new-married wife should be shut up with her husband, and eat a quince with him: and that he also which marrieth such an inheritor, should of duty see her thrice a month at the least. For although he get no children of her, yet it is an honour the husband doth to his wife, arguing that he taketh her for an honest woman, that he loveth her, and that he esteemeth of her. Besides, it taketh away many mislikings and displeasures which oftentimes happen in such cases, and keepeth love and good will waking, that it die not utterly between them.

Furthermore, he took away all jointures and dowries in other marriages, and willed that the wives should bring their husbands but three gowns only, with some other little movables of small value, and without any other thing as it were: utterly forbidding that they should buy their husbands, or that they should make merchandise of marriages, as of other trades to gain, but would that man and woman should marry together for issue, for pleasure, and for love, but in no case for money.

They greatly commend another law of Solon's, which forbiddeth to speak ill of the dead. For it is a good and godly thing to think, that they ought

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not to touch the dead, no more than to touch holy things; and men should take great heed to offend those that are departed out of this world; besides it is a token of wisdom and civility, to beware of immortal enemies. He commanded also in the self-same law, that no man should speak ill of the living, specially in churches, during divine service, or in council chamber of the city, nor in the theatres whilst games were a-playing: upon pain of three silver drachmæ to be paid to him that was injured, and two to the common treasury.

So he was marvellously well thought of, for the law that he made touching wills and testaments. For before, men might not lawfully make their heirs whom they would, but the goods came to the children or kindred of the testator. But he leaving it at liberty, to dispose their goods where they thought good, so they had no children of their own: did therein prefer friendship before kindred, and good will and favour before necessity and constraint, and so made every one lord and master of his own goods. Yet he did not simply and alike allow all sorts of gifts howsoever they were made: but those only which were made by men of sound memory, or by those whose wits failed them not by extreme sickness, or through drinks, medicines, poisonings, charms, or other such violence and extraordinary means, neither yet through the enticements and persuasions of women. As thinking very wisely, there was no difference at all between those that were evidently forced by constraint, and those that were compassed and wrought by subornation at length to do a thing against their will, taking fraud in this case equal with violence, and pleasure with sorrow, as passions with madness, which commonly have as much force the one as the other, to draw and drive men from reason.

He made another law also, in which he appointed women their times to go abroad into the fields, their mourning, their feasts and sacrifices, plucking from them all disorder and wilful liberty, which they used before. For he did forbid that they should carry out of the city with them above three gowns, and to take victuals with them above the value of a half-penny, neither basket nor pannier above a cubit high: and especially he did forbid them to go in the night other than in their coach, and that a torch should be carried before them. He did forbid them also at the burial of the dead, to tear and spoil themselves with blows, to make lamentations in verses, to weep at the funeral of a stranger not being their kinsman, to sacrifice an ox on the grave of the dead, to bury above three gowns with the corpse, to go to other men's graves, but at the very time of burying the corpse.

Results of Solon's Legislation

And perceiving that the city of Athens began to replenish daily more and more, by men's repairing thither from all parts, and by reason of the great assured safety and liberty that they found there: and also considering how the greatest part of the realm became in manner heathy, and was very barren, and that men trafficking the seas, are not wont to bring any merchandise to those, which can give them nothing again in exchange: he began to practise that his citizens should give themselves unto crafts and occupations, and made a law, that the son should not be bound to relieve his father being old, unless he had set him in his youth to some occupation.

It was a wise part of Lyeurgus (who dwelt in a city where was no resort for strangers, and had so great a territory, as could have furnished twice as many people, as Euripides saith, and moreover on all sides was environed

with a great number of slaves of the helots, whom it was needful to keep still in labour and work continually) to have his citizens always occupied in exercises of feats of arms, without making them to learn any other science, but discharge them of all other miserable occupations and handicrafts.

But Solon framing his laws unto things, and not things unto laws, when he saw the country of Attica so lean and barren, that it could hardly bring forth to sustain those that tilled the ground only, and therefore much more impossible to keep so great a multitude of idle people as were in Athens: thought it very requisite to set up occupations, and to give them countenance and estimation. Therefore he ordered, that the council of the Areopagites, should have full power and authority to inquire how every man lived in the city, and also to punish such as they found idle people, and did not labour. Yet to say truly, in Solon's laws touching women, there are many absurdities, as they fall out ill-favourably. For he maketh it lawful for any man to kill an adulterer taking him with the fact. But he that ravisheth or forcibly taketh away a free woman, is only condemned to pay a hundred silver drachmæ.

Of the fruits of the earth, he was contented they should transport and sell only oil out of the realm to strangers, but no other fruit or grain. He ordained that the governor of the city should yearly proclaim open curses against those that should do to the contrary, or else he himself making default therein, should be fined at a hundred drachmæ. This ordinance is in the first table of Solon's laws, and therefore we may not altogether discredit those which say, they did forbid in the old time that men should carry figs out of the country of Attica, and that from hence it came that these pick-thanks, which bewray and accuse them that transported figs, were called sycophants. He made another law also against the hurt that beasts might do unto men. Wherein he ordained, that if a dog did bite any man, he that owned him should deliver to him that was bitten, his dog tied to a log of timber of four cubits long: and this was a very good device, to make men safe from dogs. But he was very straight in one law he made, that no stranger might be made denizen and free man of the city of Athens, unless he were a banished man forever out of his country, or else that he should come and dwell there with all his family, to exercise some craft or science. Notwithstanding, they say he made not this law so much to put strangers from their freedom there, as to draw them thither, assuring them by this ordinance, they might come and be free of the city: and he thought moreover, that both the one and the other would be more faithful to the commonweal of Athens.

This also was another of Solon's laws, which he ordained for those that should feast certain days at the townhouse of the city, at other men's cost. For he would not allow, that one man should come often to feasts there. And if any man were invited thither to the feast, and did refuse to come: he did set a fine on his head, as reproving the miserable niggardliness of the one and the presumptuous arrogancy of the other, to condemn and despise common order.

After he had made his laws, he did stablish them to continue for the space of one hundred years, and they were written in tables of wood called *axones*. So all the councils and magistrates together did swear, that they would keep Solon's laws themselves, and also cause them to be observed of others thoroughly and particularly. Then every one of the *thesmothetes* (which were certain officers attendant on the council, and had special charge to see the laws observed) did solemnly swear in the open market-place, near the stone

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where the proclamations are proclaimed: and every one of them both promised, and vowed openly to keep the same laws, and that if any of them did in any one point break the said ordinances, then they were content that such offender should pay to the temple of Apollo, at the city of Delphi, an image of fine gold, that should weigh as much as himself.

Now after his laws were proclaimed, there came some daily unto him, which either praised them, or disliked them: and prayed him either to take away, or to add something unto them. Many again came and asked him how he understood some sentence of his laws: and requested him to declare his meaning, and how it should be taken. Wherefore considering how it were to no purpose to refuse to do it, and again how it would get him much envy and ill will to yield thereunto: he determined (happen what would) to wind himself out of these briers, and to fly the groanings, complaints, and quarrels of his citizens. So, to convey himself awhile out of the way, he took upon him to be master of a ship in a certain voyage, and asked license for ten years of the Athenians to go beyond sea, hoping by that time the Athenians would be very well acquainted with his laws.

SOLON'S JOURNEY AND RETURN; PISISTRATUS

So went he to the seas, and the first place of his arrival was in Egypt, where he remained awhile. And as for the meeting and talk betwixt him and King Cræsus, I know there are that by distance of time will prove it but a fable, and devised of pleasure: but for my part I will not reject, nor condemn so famous a history, received and approved by so many grave testimonies. Moreover it is very agreeable to Solon's manners and nature, and also not unlike to his wisdom and magnanimity: although in all points it agreeth not with certain tables (which they call Chronicles) where they have busily noted the order and course of times which even to this day, many have curiously sought to correct.¹

But during the time of his absence, great seditions rose at Athens amongst the inhabitants, who had gotten them several heads amongst them: as those of the valley had made Lycurgus their head. The coast-men Megacles, the son of Alcmaeon. And those of the mountains, Pisistratus; with whom all artificers and craftsmen living of their handy labour were joined, which were the stoutest against the rich. So that notwithstanding the city kept Solon's laws and ordinances, yet was there not a man but gaped for a change, and desired to see things in another state.

The whole commonweal broiling thus with troubles, Solon arrived at Athens, where every man did honour and reverence him: howbeit he was no more able to speak aloud in open assembly to the people, nor to deal in matters as he had done before, because his age would not suffer him: and therefore he spake with every one of the heads of the several factions apart, trying if he could agree and reconcile them together again.

Whereupon Pisistratus seemed to be more willing than any of the rest, for he was courteous, and marvellous fair spoken, and showed himself besides very good and pitiful to the poor, and temperate also to his enemies: further, if any good quality were lacking in him, he did so finely counterfeit it, that men imagined it was more in him, than in those that naturally had it in them indeed. By this art and fine manner of his, he deceived the poor common

[¹ This famous story has already been given in the Appendix to the history of Western Asia, Vol. II.]

people. Howbeit Solon found him straight, and saw the mark he shot at : but yet hated him not at that time, and sought still to win him, and bring him to reason.

Shortly after Pisistratus having wounded himself, and bloodied all his body over, caused his men to carry him in his couch into the market-place, where he put the people in an uproar, and told them that they were his enemies that thus traitorously had handled and arrayed him, for that he stood with them about the governing of the commonweal : insomuch as many of them were marvellously offended, and mutinied by and by, crying out it was shamefully done. Then Solon drawing near said unto him : " O thou son of Hippocrates, thou dost ill-favouredly counterfeit the person of Homer's Ulysses : for thou hast whipped thyself to deceive thy citizens, as he did tear and scratch himself, to deceive his enemies." Notwithstanding this, the common people were still in uproar, being ready to take arms for Pisistratus : and there was a general council assembled, in the which one Ariston spake, that they should grant fifty men, to carry halberds and maces before Pisistratus for guard of his person.

But Solon going up into the pulpit for orations, stoutly inveighed against it. But in the end, seeing the poor people did tumult still, taking Pisistratus' part, and that the rich fled here and there, he went his way also.

Wherefore he hied him home again, and took his weapons out of his house, and laid them before his gate in the midst of the street, saying : " For my part, I have done what I can possible, to help and defend the laws and liberties of my country."

So from that time he betook himself unto his ease, and never after dealt any more in matters of state, or commonweal. His friends did counsel him to fly : but all they could not persuade him to it. For he kept his house, and gave himself to make verses, in which he sore reprov'd the Athenians' faults. His friends hereupon did warn him to beware of such speeches, and to take heed what he said, lest if it came unto the tyrant's ears, he might put him to death for it. And further, they asked him wherein he trusted, that he spake so boldly. He answered them, " In my age."

Howbeit Pisistratus, after he had obtained his purpose, sending for him upon his word and faith, did honour and entertain him so well, that Solon in the end became one of his council, and approved many things which he did.

Solon lived a long time after Pisistratus had usurped the tyranny, as Heraclides Ponticus writeth. Howbeit Phanias Ephesian writeth, that he lived not above two years after.^d

A MODERN VIEW OF SOLONIAN LAWS AND CONSTITUTION

As a recent summing up of Solon, we may quote Professor Bury :

" He was a poet, not because he was poetically inspired, like the Parian Archilochus of an earlier, or the Lesbian Sappho of his own, generation ; but because at that time every man of letters was a poet ; there was no prose literature. A hundred years later Solon would have used prose as the vehicle of his thought. We are fortunate enough to possess portions of poems — political pamphlets — which he published for the purpose of guiding public opinion ; and thus we have his view of the situation in his own words.

" The character of the remedial measures of Solon is imperfectly known. His title to fame as one of the great statesmen of Europe rests upon his

[580-558 B.C.]

reform of the constitution. He discovered a secret of democracy, and he used his discovery to build up the constitution on democratic foundations. The Athenian commonwealth did not actually become a democracy till many years later. The radical measure of Solon, which was the very corner-stone of the Athenian democracy, was his constitution of the courts of justice. He composed the law courts out of all the citizens, including the Thetes; and as the panels of judges were enrolled by lot, the poorest burgher might have his turn. The constitution of the judicial courts out of the whole people was the secret of democracy which Solon discovered.

"It was the fate of Solon to live long enough to see the establishment of the tyranny which he dreaded. We know not what part he had taken in the troubled world of politics since his return to Athens. The story was invented that he called upon the citizens to arm themselves against the tyrant, but called in vain; and that then, laying his arms outside the threshold of his house, he cried, 'I have aided, so far as I could, my country and the constitution, and I appeal to others to do likewise.' Nor has the story that he refused to live under a tyranny and sought refuge with his Cyprian friend the king of Soli, any good foundation. We know only that in his later years he enjoyed the pleasures of wine and love, and that he survived but a short time the seizure of the tyranny by Pisistratus, who at least treated the old man with respect." ^e





CHAPTER XIII. PISISTRATUS THE TYRANT

PISISTRATUS directed with admirable moderation the courses of the revolution he had produced. Many causes of success were combined in his favour. His enemies had been the supposed enemies of the people, and the multitude doubtless beheld the flight of the Alcæonidæ (still odious in their eyes by the massacre of Cylon) as the defeat of a foe, while the triumph of the popular chief was recognised as the victory of the people. In all revolutions the man who has sided with the people is permitted by the people the greatest extent of license. It is easy to perceive, by the general desire which the Athenians had expressed for the elevation of Solon to the supreme authority, that the notion of regal authority was not yet hateful to them, and that they were scarcely prepared for the liberties with which they were entrusted. But although they submitted thus patiently to the ascendancy of Pisistratus, it is evident that a less benevolent, or less artful tyrant would not have been equally successful. Raised above the law, that subtle genius governed only by the law; nay, he affected to consider its authority greater than his own. He assumed no title—no attribute of sovereignty. He was accused of murder, and he humbly appeared before the tribunal of the Areopagus—a proof not more of the moderation of the usurper than of the influence of public opinion. He enforced the laws of Solon, and compelled the unruly tempers of his faction to subscribe to their wholesome rigour. The one revolution did not, therefore, supplant, it confirmed, the other. “By these means,” says Herodotus, “Pisistratus mastered Athens, and yet his situation was far from secure.”

Although the heads of the more moderate party, under Megacles, had been expelled from Athens, yet the faction, equally powerful, and equally hostile, headed by Lycurgus, and embraced by the bulk of the nobles, still remained. For a time, extending perhaps to five or six years, Pisistratus retained his power; but at length, Lycurgus, uniting with the exiled Alcæonidæ, succeeded in expelling him from the city. But the union that had led to his expulsion, ceased with that event. The contests between the lowlanders and the coastmen were only more inflamed by the defeat of the third party which had operated as a balance of power, and the broils of their several leaders were fed by personal ambition as by hereditary animosities. Megacles, therefore, unable to maintain equal ground with Lycurgus, turned his thoughts towards the enemy he had subdued, and sent proposals to Pisistratus, offering to unite their forces, and to support him in his pretensions to the tyranny, upon condition that the exiled chief should marry his daughter Cæsyra. Pisistratus readily acceded to the terms, and it was resolved by a theatrical pageant to reconcile his return to the people.^b

[550-540 B.C.]

This was, according to Herodotus, "the most ridiculous project that was ever imagined." "In the Pæanean tribe was a woman named Phya," he says, "four cubits high, wanting three fingers, and in other respects handsome; having dressed this woman in a complete suit of armour, and placed her on a chariot, and having shown her beforehand how to assume the most becoming demeanour, they drove her to the city, having sent heralds before, who, on their arrival in the city, proclaimed what was ordered in these terms: 'O Athenians, receive with kind wishes Pisistratus, whom Minerva herself, honouring above all men, now conducts back to her own citadel.' They then went about proclaiming this; and a report was presently spread among the people that Minerva was bringing back Pisistratus; and the people in the city, believing this woman to be the goddess, both adored a human being, and received Pisistratus."^c

The sagacity of the Athenians was already so acute, and the artifice appeared to Herodotus so gross, that the simple Halicarnassian could scarcely credit the authenticity of this tale. But it is possible that the people viewed the procession as an ingenious allegory, to the adaptation of which they were already disposed; and that like the populace of a later and yet more civilised people, they hailed the goddess while they recognised the prostitute.¹ Be that as it may, the son of Hippocrates recovered his authority and fulfilled his treaty with Megacles by a marriage with his daughter. Between the commencement of his first tyranny and the date of his second return, there was probably an interval of twelve years. His sons were already adults. Partly from a desire not to increase his family, partly from some superstitious disinclination to the blood of the Alcmaeonidae, which the massacre of Cylon still stigmatised with contamination, Pisistratus conducted himself towards the fair Cœsyra with a chastity either unwelcome to her affection, or afflicting to her pride. The unwedded wife communicated the mortifying secret to her mother, from whose lips it soon travelled to the father. He did not view the purity of Pisistratus with charitable eyes. He thought it an affront to his own person that that of his daughter should be so tranquilly regarded. He entered into a league with his former opponents against the usurper, and so great was the danger, that Pisistratus (despite his habitual courage) betook himself hastily to flight—a strange instance of the caprice of human events, that a man could with a greater impunity subdue the freedom of his country, than affront the vanity of his wife!

Pisistratus, his sons and partisans, retired to Eretria in Eubœa: there they deliberated as to their future proceedings—should they submit to their exile, or attempt to retrieve their power? The counsels of his son Hippias, prevailed with Pisistratus; it was resolved once more to attempt the sovereignty of Athens. The neighbouring tribes assisted the exiles with forage and shelter. Many cities accorded the celebrated noble large sums of money, and the Thebans outdid the rest in pernicious liberality. A troop of Argive adventurers came from the Peloponnesus to tender to the baffled usurper the assistance of their swords, and Lygdamis, an individual of Naxos, himself ambitious of the government of his native state, increased his resources both by money and military force. At length, though after a long and tedious period of no less than eleven years, Pisistratus resolved to hazard the issue of open war. At the head of a foreign force he advanced to Marathon, and pitched his tents upon its immortal plain. Troops of the factious, or discontented, thronged from Athens to his camp, while the bulk

¹ The procession of the goddess of Reason in the first French Revolution solves the difficulty that perplexed Herodotus.

of the citizens, unaffected by such desertions, viewed his preparations with indifference. At length, when they heard that Pisistratus had broken up his encampment, and was on his march to the city, the Athenians awoke from their apathy, and collected their forces to oppose him. He continued to advance his troops, halted at the temple of Minerva, whose earthly representative had once so benignly assisted him, and pitched his tents opposite the fane. He took advantage of that time in which the Athenians, during the heat of the day, were at their entertainments, or indulging the noontide repose, still so grateful to the inhabitants of a warmer climate, to commence his attack. He soon scattered the foe, and ordered his sons to overtake them in their flight, to bid them return peaceably to their employments, and fear nothing from his vengeance. His clemency assisted the effect of his valour, and once more the son of Hippocrates became the master of the Athenian commonwealth.

Pisistratus lost no time in strengthening himself by formidable alliances. He retained many auxiliary troops, and provided large pecuniary resources. He spared the persons of his opponents, but sent their children as hostages to Naxos, which he first reduced and consigned to the tyranny of his auxiliary, Lygdamis. Many of his inveterate enemies had perished on the field — many fled from the fear of his revenge. He was undisturbed in the renewal of his sway, and having no motive for violence, pursued the natural bent of a mild and generous disposition, ruling as one who wishes men to forget the means by which his power has been attained.

It was in harmony with this part of his character that Pisistratus refined the taste and socialised the habits of the citizens, by the erection of buildings dedicated to the public worship, or the public uses, and laid out the stately gardens of the Lyceum — (in after-times the favourite haunt of Philosophy) by the banks of the river dedicated to Song. Pisistratus thus did more than continue the laws of Solon — he inculcated the intellectual habits which the laws were designed to create. And as in the circle of human events the faults of one man often confirm what was begun by the virtues of another, so perhaps the usurpation of Pisistratus was necessary to establish the institutions of Solon. It is clear that the great lawgiver was not appreciated at the close of his life ; as his personal authority had ceased to have influence, so possibly might have soon ceased the authority of his code. The citizens required repose, to examine, to feel, to estimate the blessings of his laws — that repose they possessed under Pisistratus. Amidst the tumult of fierce and equipoised factions it might be fortunate that a single individual was raised above the rest, who, having the wisdom to appreciate the institutions of Solon, had the authority to enforce them. Silently they grew up under his usurped but benignant sway, pervading, penetrating, exalting the people, and fitting them by degrees to the liberty those institutions were intended to confer. If the disorders of the republic led to the ascendancy of Pisistratus so the ascendancy of Pisistratus paved the way for the renewal of the republic. As Cromwell was the representative of the very sentiments he appeared to subvert — as Napoleon in his own person incorporated the principles of the revolution of France, so the tyranny of Pisistratus concentrated and embodied the elements of that democracy he rather wielded than overthrew.

At home, time and tranquillity cemented the new laws ; poetry set before the emulation of the Athenians its noblest monument in the epics of Homer ; and tragedy put forth its first unmeliorated fruits in the rude recitations of Thespis. Pisistratus sought also to counterbalance the growing

[540-527 B.C.]

passion for commerce by peculiar attention to agriculture, in which it is not unlikely that he was considerably influenced by early prepossessions, for his party had been the mountaineers attached to rural pursuits, and his adversaries the coastmen engaged in traffic. We learn from Aristotle that his policy consisted much in subjecting and humbling the Pedieis, or wealthy nobles of the lowlands. But his very affection for agriculture must have tended to strengthen an aristocracy, and his humility to the Areopagus was a proof of his desire to conciliate the least democratic of the Athenian courts. He probably, therefore, acted only against such individual chiefs as had incurred his resentment, or as menaced his power; nor can we perceive in his measures the systematic and deliberate policy, common with other Greek tyrants, to break up an aristocracy and create a middle class.

Abroad, the ambition of Pisistratus, though not extensive, was successful. There was a town on the Hellespont, called Sigeum, which had long been a subject of contest between the Athenians and the Mytileneans. Some years before the legislation of Solon, the Athenian general, Phrynon, had been slain in single combat by Pittacus, one of the Seven Wise Men, who had come into the field armed like the Roman retiarius, with a net, a trident, and a dagger. This feud was terminated by the arbitration of Periander, tyrant of Corinth, who awarded Sigeum to the Athenians, which was then in their possession, by a wise and plausible decree, that each party should keep what it had got. This war was chiefly remarkable for an incident that introduces us somewhat unfavourably to the most animated of the lyric poets. Alceus, an eminent citizen of Mytilene, and, according to ancient scandal, the unsuccessful lover of Sappho, conceived a passion for military fame: in his first engagement he seems to have discovered that his proper vocation was rather to sing of battles than to share them. He fled from the field, leaving his arms behind him, which the Athenians obtained, and suspended at Sigeum in the temple of Minerva. Although this single action, which Alceus himself recorded, cannot be fairly held a sufficient proof of the poet's cowardice, yet his character and patriotism are more equivocal than his genius. Of the last we have ample testimony, — though few remains save in the frigid grace of the imitations of Horace. The subsequent weakness and civil dissensions of Athens, were not favourable to the maintenance of this distant conquest — the Mytileneans regained Sigeum. Against this town Pisistratus now directed his arms — wrested it from the Mytileneans — and instead of annexing it to the republic of Athens, assigned its government to the tyranny of his natural son, Hegesistratus — a stormy dominion, which the valour of the bastard defended against repeated assaults.

But one incident, the full importance of which the reader must wait awhile to perceive, we shall in this place relate. Among the most powerful of the Athenians was a noble named Miltiades, son of Cypselus. By original descent, he was from the neighbouring island of Ægina, and of the heroic race of Æacus; but he dated the establishment of his house in Athens from no less distant a founder than the son of Ajax. Miltiades had added new lustre to his name by a victory at the Olympic Games. It was probably during the first tyranny of Pisistratus that an adventure, attended with vast results to Greece, befell this noble. His family were among the enemies of Pisistratus, and were regarded by that sagacious usurper with a jealous apprehension, which almost appears prophetic. Miltiades was, therefore, uneasy under the government of Pisistratus, and discontented with his position in Athens.

In that narrow territory which, skirting the Hellespont, was called the Chersonesus, or Peninsula, dwelt the Doloncians, a Thracian tribe. Engaged in an obstinate war with the neighbouring Absinthians, the Doloncians had sent to the oracle of Delphi to learn the result of the contest.^b

The Pythian answered them, "that they should take that man with them to their country to found a colony, who after their departure from the temple should first offer them hospitality." Accordingly the Doloncians, going by the sacred way, went through the territories of the Phocians and Bœotians, and when no one invited them, turned out of the road towards Athens. Miltiades, being seated in his own portico, and seeing the Doloncians passing by, wearing a dress not belonging to the country, and carrying javelins, called out to them; and upon their coming to him, he offered them shelter and hospitality. They having accepted his invitation, and having been entertained by him, made known to him the whole oracle, and entreated him to obey his duty. Their words persuaded Miltiades as soon as he heard them, for he was troubled with the government of Pisistratus, and desired to get out of his way. He therefore immediately set out to Delphi to consult the oracle, whether he should do that which the Doloncians requested of him. The Pythian having bid him do so, thereupon Miltiades, taking with him all such Athenians as were willing to join in the expedition, set sail with the Doloncians, and took possession of the country; and they who introduced him appointed him tyrant.^c

Miltiades (probably B.C. 559) first of all fortified a great part of the isthmus, as a barrier to the attacks of the Absinthians; but shortly afterwards, in a feud with the people of Lampsacus, he was taken prisoner by the enemy. Miltiades, however, had already secured the esteem and protection of Crœsus; and the Lydian monarch remonstrated with the Lampsacœnes in so formidable a tone of menace, that the Athenian obtained his release, and regained his new principality. In the meanwhile, his brother Cimon, (who was chiefly remarkable for his success at the Olympic Games,) sharing the political sentiments of his house, had been driven into exile by Pisistratus. By a transfer to the brilliant tyrant of a victory in the Olympic chariot-race, he, however, propitiated Pisistratus, and returned to Athens.

Full of years, and in the serene enjoyment of power, Pisistratus died (B.C. 527). His character may already be gathered from his actions: crafty in the pursuit of power, but magnanimous in its possession, we have only, with some qualification, to repeat the eulogium on him ascribed to his greater kinsman Solon — "That he was the best of tyrants, and without a vice save that of ambition."^d

THE VIRTUES OF PISISTRATUS' RULE

Pisistratus was far from overturning the constitution of Athens; rather did Solon's ordinances remain in full force under him. The reasonable and necessary progress of development in the state which lay at the root of the movement which produced Greek tyrannies, had been in every way provided for by Solon, and consequently wise and temperate tyrants might govern in accordance with the Solonian laws. Pisistratus honoured the memory of his relative, with whose ideas their former intercourse had made him familiar, and he therefore fostered and forwarded his instructions, so far as they were consistent with his own supremacy. He himself submitted to the laws, and is said to have appeared in person before the Areopagus, to justify himself against a complaint, so that on the whole his government greatly contributed

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to accustom the Athenians to the laws. It must be confessed, however, that he raised the money which he required for the maintenance of his troops, as well as for the buildings and public festivals, by the mere right of tyranny, and by levying a tenth on the real estate of the citizens.

His new measures and dispositions also exhibited the character of a wise moderation, and were in harmony with Solon. Thus he insisted on the obligation of the commonwealth to care for those who were wounded in the wars, as well as for the families of such as had fallen in battle. He especially took upon himself the charge of public morality, the fostering of those good manners which consist in the respect of youth for age and in reverence towards sacred things. He promulgated a law against idle loitering about the streets, and, although he had himself risen to greatness in the market through the agency of the people who had come in from the country, still he regarded the increasing mass of the townsfolk with anxiety. For this reason he sought to oppose a barrier to the tendency to constitute the life of a great city, which prevailed amongst the Ionic races, and following the precedent of Periander and the Orthagoridæ, he made entry into the capital more difficult. He endeavoured to raise the peasant class, which Solon had rescued, and to encourage the taste for agriculture.

With these important dispositions, whose spirit was pre-eminently that of Hipparchus to whom the whole civilisation of the country was so much indebted, were also connected the great aqueducts which brought the drinking-water from the mountains to the capital through rocky underground conduits. That these canals might be inspected and cleaned in every part, shafts were cut through the rock at stated intervals, and thus light and air were introduced into the dark channels. On the outskirts of the town the inflowing water was collected in great rock basins, where it clarified before disseminating itself into the town and feeding the public fountains. These wonderful works have continued in a state of efficiency down to our own day.

Pisistratus governed Athens, but he bore no sovereign title, on the strength of which to lay claim to unlimited supremacy. He had, in truth, grounded his rule on force; he retained in his service a standing army, which, dependent on him alone and uncontrolled by the vote of the citizens, could be all the more crushingly opposed to any attempt at a rising, since the greater part of the citizens were unarmed, the townsfolk diminished in number, and the public interest, from political circumstances, directed partly to rural economy, partly to the new town institutions. The order of the officers of state remained unaltered, only that one of them was always in the hands of a member of Pisistratus' family, in which he managed to suppress every sign of disunion with great skill, so that to the people the ruling house appeared united in itself and animated by but one spirit. In this sense men spoke of the government of the Pisistratidæ, and could not refuse recognition to the manifold gifts which distinguished the house.

It was a wise counsel which the old state organisers gave the tyrants, that they should bestow on their rule as much as possible the character of ancient royalty, so that the usurping origin of their power might be forgotten. Thus Pisistratus did not, like the Cypselidæ and Orthagoridæ, desire to break with the past of the state, but rather to connect himself closely with the ancient and glorious history of the country, so that after all the evil which the party government of the nobility had brought on Attica, she might be restored the blessing of a united rule. Standing superior to the parties, as a relative to the ancient royal house, he believed himself especially chosen to accomplish this end. With this view, he lived on the citadel, near

the altar of Zeus Herceios, the family hearth of the ancient princes of the country, watching over the turbulent citizens from the summit of the rock, which, before the building of the Propylæa, was still more inaccessible than afterwards. The very position of his dwelling must have drawn him into a close relation with the goddess of the citadel and her priesthood.

The public life of the Athenians was awakened and transformed in every direction. Athens became a new town within and without. With her new highways and military roads, her town squares, gymnasia, fountains and aqueducts, her new altars, temples and temple festivals, she stood out prominently from the crowd of Greek towns, and the Pisistratidæ neglected nothing which might contribute to lend her new importance by means of numerous alliances with the islands and shores of the Ægean Sea.

To this end, it was not enough that the Athenians ruled in Delos, Naxos, and at the Hellespont, but they must also appropriate to themselves the intellectual treasures of the further coasts where the Hellenic spirit showed itself at its best, and thus enrich their own life. For this purpose Solon had already introduced the Homeric rhapsodies into Athens, and ordained their public recitation at the festivals. Pisistratus joined in these efforts, with a full appreciation of the importance of the matter, though not with the disinterestedness of the Solonian love for art, but designedly, and for his own advantage. For he ministered at once to the fame of his ancestors and the splendour of his house.

These songs had hitherto been passed down by word of mouth, and the noblest abilities of the nation had been dedicated to the preservation of this national treasure in widely disseminated schools of bards. Nevertheless, even with the utmost power of memory, it was unavoidable that all kinds of confusion should be introduced into the tradition, that the original should be disfigured, what was authentic be lost, spurious matter creep in, and the whole, the most important collection possessed by the Hellenic people, fall to pieces. The danger became the more threatening, the higher rose the turbulence of the times, and the more the individual states deviated in special directions and the interests of modern times gained primary importance. It became, therefore, a state obligation to meet this danger, and to take in hand the task which individual ability had not succeeded in accomplishing; and the state was all the more concerned in the matter since the recital of the Homeric poems had been prescribed in the ordinances for the public festivals.

It is to the great merit of Pisistratus to have clearly recognised that nothing could create for the Athenians a greater and more lasting renown than could be achieved by assuming this task. He therefore summoned a number of learned men, and commissioned them to collect and compare the texts of the rhapsodies, to cut out what did not belong, to unite what was scattered, and fix the Homeric epos as a whole, a great record of national life, in a standard form. Thus Onomacritus the Athenian, Zopyras of Hæraclæa, and Orpheus of Croton worked under the superintendence of the regent; they formed a scientific commission, which had an extensive sphere of labour; for not only were the *Odyssey* and *Iliad* revised, but also that later epos, that is to say the poetic writings of the so-called "cyclic poets," which had come into existence as a sequel supplementary to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, together with the whole treasure of the Ionic epos, which was united under the name of Homer, besides Hesiod and the religious poems. Pisistratus took a personal interest in the work, and even here we can trace the character of a tyranny in that alterations, omissions, and interpolations were made according to his taste or policy. Thus, for example, in the catalogue

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of ships the Salaminians were ranged among the Athenian levies, in order to supply a traditional authority for an ancient claim of Athens.

The end and aim of the proceeding was completely attained. The most important branch of the poetic art, which had developed amongst the Hellenes, namely, the epic of the Ionic and Bœotian schools, was transplanted to Athens. Here for the first time a Hellenic philology was founded: for, in the work of collecting, the critical faculty was first awakened, since the collecting involved the distinction of genuine from spurious, ancient from modern, and, though the scientific performance as such could not bear a very close scrutiny, yet still the treasure of the Homeric poems received from the Athenians the first appreciation of its national significance, and it was now that writing was for the first time employed to secure an irreplaceable national possession against the dangers of a merely verbal tradition. The poems were not, however, by any means alienated from ordinary life, but were raised to a higher position in the festivals of the town and the education of the young. The city of Pisistratus acquired an authoritative reputation in the domain of national poetry; through him a Homer and Hesiod came into existence which could be read in the same form to the ends of the Greek world.

The collection and investigation went back beyond Homer to the most ancient sources of Hellenic theology, of which the Thracian Orpheus was regarded as the founder, and which Onomacritus now worked up into a new system of mystic wisdom, while at the same time it was utilised to give enhanced importance to the favourite cult of the dynasty, the worship of Dionysus. With it was joined the collection of oracular sayings, upon which the Pisistratidæ placed a special value, as well as the arrangement of the historical records, especially the genealogies.

Thus Athens became a centre of scientific learning and labour. If any one wished to gain a sight of any poem worthy of remembrance which had been written in the Hellenic tongue, or of anything concerning the knowledge of the gods and of ethics which had been thought out by the ancients and handed down by tradition from former times, he must journey to Athens. Here, on the citadel of Pisistratus, the whole treasure was united; here the works of the nation's poets and wise men were collected together, carefully inscribed in rolls, well arranged, and suitably disposed.

Yet it was not enough to garner what remained from ancient times; there was also a desire to encourage living art and to have its masters in Athens, and specially those in the lyric art, which had succeeded the epic, and during the age of the tyrants was in full vigour. The lyric poets were especially qualified to enhance the brilliance of courts, and to ennoble their feasts, and were consequently summoned from one place to another. Thus the Pisistratidæ sent out their state ships to fetch Anacreon of Teos, the joyous poet and comrade of Polycrates, to Athens, and thus Simonides of Ceos and Lasus of Hermione dwelt at the tyrant's Court of the Muses.

But quite new germs of national poetry were also unfolded under them and by their means. For they were already the fosterers of the worship of Dionysus [or Bacchus], and at the latter's festivals were developed not only the choral dance and choral song of the Dithyrambus, which Arion had invented and Lasus further improved, but mimic representations were added to them, in which masked choruses appeared, and singers who assumed a rôle opposite the choruses, spoke to the latter and conducted conversations with them. Thus an action, a drama, developed itself, and after the thing had been invented it was freed from the bacchanalian material and changed

in contents as in masks; the whole cycle of heroic legends was gradually drawn on for dramatic treatment, and the founder of this Dionysian play was Thespis of Icaria.

Thus the Pisistratidæ collected the after-echoes of the epic, fostered the existing art of song in its full blossom, and called forth by their patronage a new and genuincy Attic branch of national art, that drama which united both lyric and epic. Besides this the best architects, Antistates, Callicrates Antimachidæ, Porinus, and sculptors were busily employed on the Olympieum and Hecatompedon, and the best experts of their time at the great hydraulic constructions. The most eminent men of all faculties learnt to know each other and interchanged their experiences. But there was also no lack of friction and mutual jealousy, and Lasus did not shrink from publicly reproaching Onomacritus, who had attempted to serve his master by means of forged oracles, with abuse of the princely confidence, and thus to bring about his banishment.

Under such conditions, where everything depended on the ambitious whims of a self-seeking ruling family, how could it fail to happen that many underhand transactions should take place? Even in the arrangement of the Orphic teachings, the traces of wilful forgery were brought home to the sycophantic Onomacritus. Nevertheless the reputation of the Pisistratidæ still remains that of extreme integrity. They clearly recognised the vocation of Athens to unite and cultivate everything that was of national importance, and within a short time and by incredible industry they attained results which have never been effaced.

To the regent himself indeed, no more than to other tyrants was granted the peaceful enjoyment of his success; he continually felt that he trod on the brink of a volcano. Every popular commotion, every aspiring family, every unwonted stroke of fortune attained by an Athenian was pain and grief to him.

This is shown by the petty and superstitious means, which this powerful man employed to quiet his mind. He allowed himself to be pleased when Athenians who had conquered at Olympia caused the name of Pisistratus to be called out instead of their own, as was done by Cimon, called Coalemos, the half-brother of Miltiades, on the occasion of his second triumph (Ol. 63; 528 B.C.), when in recognition of this loyalty he was recalled from banishment. With anxious care inquiries were ceaselessly made after sayings of the gods which might give security of a long duration for the dynasty; and since the tyrant, being himself envious and jealous, felt that he was continually beset by the malevolence of strangers, he had the image of a locust fastened to the wall of his princely citadel, to serve as a defence against the evil glance of envy. Yet in advanced years, Pisistratus might confidently expect that his son and grandson, who were both gifted with talent for rule and took part in the government under him, would remain true to his policy to preserve the dynasty to which Athens was so much indebted at home and abroad. In this hope he died at a great age, surrounded by his family. (Ol. 63, 527 B.C.). Hippias succeeded to the power of the tyranny, in accordance with his father's will; and the brothers, as they had promised their father, stood firmly by one another. To the gentle and refined Hipparchus there was no hardship in being second; he employed his position for the exercise of the peaceful side of power.^d



CHAPTER XIV. DEMOCRACY ESTABLISHED AT ATHENS

PISISTRATUS left three legitimate sons—Hippias, Hipparchus, and Thessalus: the general belief at Athens among the contemporaries of Thucydides was, that Hipparchus was the eldest of the three and had succeeded him; but the historian emphatically pronounces this to be a mistake, and certifies, upon his own responsibility, that Hippias was both eldest son and successor. Such an assurance from him, fortified by certain reasons in themselves not very conclusive, is sufficient ground for our belief, the more so as Herodotus countenances the same version. But we are surprised at such a degree of historical carelessness in the Athenian public, and seemingly even in Plato, about a matter both interesting and comparatively recent. In order to abate this surprise, and to explain how the name of Hipparchus came to supplant that of Hippias in the popular talk, Thucydides recounts the memorable story of Harmodius and Aristogiton.

Of these two Athenian citizens, both belonging to the ancient *gens* called Gephyrei, the former was a beautiful youth, attached to the latter by a mutual friendship and devoted intimacy which Grecian manners did not condemn. Hipparchus made repeated propositions to Harmodius, which were repelled, but which, on becoming known to Aristogiton, excited both his jealousy and his fears lest the disappointed suitor should employ force—fears justified by the proceedings not unusual with Grecian despots, and by the absence of all legal protection against outrage from such a quarter. Under these feelings, he began to look about, in the best way that he could, for some means of putting down the despotism. Meanwhile Hipparchus, though not entertaining any designs of violence, was so incensed at the refusal of Harmodius, that he could not be satisfied without doing something to insult or humiliate him. In order to conceal the motive from which the insult really proceeded, he offered it, not directly to Harmodius, but to his sister. He caused this young maiden to be one day summoned to take her station in a religious procession as one of the *canephoræ*, or basket-carriers, according to the practice usual at Athens; but when she arrived at the place where her fellow-maidens were assembled, she was dismissed with scorn as unworthy of so respectable a function, and the summons addressed to her was disavowed. An insult thus publicly offered filled Harmodius with indignation, and still further exasperated the feelings of Aristogiton: both of them, resolving at all hazards to put an end to the despotism, concerted means for aggression with a few select associates. They awaited the festival of the Great Panathenæa, wherein the body of the citizens were accustomed to march up in armed procession, with spear and shield, to the Acropolis; this being the only day on which an armed body could come together without suspicion. The conspirators appeared armed like the rest of the citizens, but carrying concealed daggers besides. Harmodius and

Aristogiton undertook with their own hands to kill the two Pisistratidæ, while the rest promised to stand forward immediately for their protection against the foreign mercenaries ; and though the whole number of persons engaged was small, they counted upon the spontaneous sympathies of the armed bystanders in an effort to regain their liberties, so soon as the blow should once be struck. The day of the festival having arrived, Hippias, with his foreign bodyguard around him, was marshalling the armed citizens for procession, in the Ceramicus without the gates, when Harmodius and Aristogiton approached with concealed daggers to execute their purpose. On coming near, they were thunder-struck to behold one of their own fellow-conspirators talking familiarly with Hippias, who was of easy access to every man ; and they immediately concluded that the plot was betrayed. Expecting to be seized, and wrought up to a state of desperation, they resolved at least not to die without having revenged themselves on Hipparchus, whom they found within the city gates near the chapel called the Leocorion, and immediately slew him. His attendant guards killed Harmodius on the spot ; while Aristogiton, rescued for the moment by the surrounding crowd, was afterwards taken, and perished in the tortures applied to make him disclose his accomplices.

The news flew quickly to Hippias in the Ceramicus, who heard it earlier than the armed citizens near him, awaiting his order for the commencement of the procession. With extraordinary self-command, he took advantage of this precious instant of foreknowledge, and advanced towards them, commanding them to drop their arms for a short time, and assemble on an adjoining ground. They unsuspectingly obeyed, and he immediately directed his guards to take possession of the vacant arms. He was now undisputed master, and enabled to seize the persons of all those citizens whom he mistrusted, especially all those who had daggers about them, which it was not the practice to carry in the Panathenaic procession.

Such is the memorable narrative of Harmodius and Aristogiton, peculiarly valuable inasmuch as it all comes from Thucydides. To possess great power, to be above legal restraint, to inspire extraordinary fear, is a privilege so much coveted by the giants among mankind, that we may well take notice of those cases in which it brings misfortune even upon themselves. The fear inspired by Hipparchus — of designs which he did not really entertain, but was likely to entertain, and competent to execute without hindrance — was here the grand cause of his destruction.

The conspiracy here detailed happened in 514 B.C., during the thirteenth year of the reign of Hippias, which lasted four years longer, until 510 B.C. And these last four years, in the belief of the Athenian public, counted for his whole reign ; nay, many of them made the still greater historical mistake of eliding these last four years altogether, and of supposing that the conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton had deposed the Pisistratid government and liberated Athens. Both poets and philosophers shared this faith, which is distinctly put forth in the beautiful and popular *scolion* or song on the subject: the two friends are there celebrated as the authors of liberty at Athens — “they slew the despot and gave to Athens equal laws.” So inestimable a present was alone sufficient to enshrine in the minds of the subsequent democracy those who had sold their lives to purchase it: and we must further recollect that the intimate connection between the two, so repugnant to the modern reader, was regarded at Athens with sympathy, so that the story took hold of the Athenian mind by the vein of romance conjointly with that of patriotism. Harmodius and

[537-515 B.C.]

Aristogiton were afterwards commemorated both as the winners and as the protomartyrs of Athenian liberty. Statues were erected in their honour shortly after the final expulsion of the Pisistratidæ; immunity from taxes and public burdens was granted to the descendants of their families; and the speaker who proposed the abolition of such immunities, at a time when the number had been abusively multiplied, made his only special exception in favour of this respected lineage. And since the name of Hipparchus was universally notorious as the person slain, we discover how it was that he came to be considered by an uncritical public as the predominant member of the Pisistratid family,—the eldest son and successor of Pisistratus, the reigning despot,—to the comparative neglect of Hippias. The same public probably cherished many other anecdotes, not the less eagerly believed because they could not be authenticated, respecting this eventful period.

Whatever may have been the moderation of Hippias before, indignation at the death of his brother and fear for his own safety, now induced him to drop it altogether. It is attested both by Thucydides and Herodotus, and admits of no doubt, that his power was now employed harshly and cruelly—that he put to death a considerable number of citizens. We find also a statement, noway improbable in itself, and affirmed both in Pausanias and in Plutarch,—inferior authorities, yet still in this case sufficiently credible,—that he caused Leena, the mistress of Aristogiton, to be tortured to death, in order to extort from her a knowledge of the secrets and accomplices of the latter. But as he could not but be sensible that this system of terrorism was full of peril to himself, so he looked out for shelter and support in case of being expelled from Athens; and with this view he sought to connect himself with Darius, king of Persia—a connection full of consequences to be hereafter developed. Aantides, son of Hippoclus the despot of Lampsacus on the Hellespont, stood high at this time in the favour of the Persian monarch, which induced Hippias to give him his daughter Archedice in marriage; no small honour to the Lampsacene, in the estimation of Thucydides. To explain how Hippias came to fix upon this town, however, it is necessary to say a few words on the foreign policy of the Pisistratidæ.

The expedition of Miltiades to the Chersonesus, as described in the previous chapter, must have occurred early after the first usurpation of Pisistratus, since even his imprisonment by the Lampsacenes happened before the ruin of Cræsus (546 B.C.). But it was not till much later,—probably during the third and most powerful period of Pisistratus,—that the latter undertook his expedition against Sigeum in the Troad. This place appears to have fallen into the hands of the Mytileneans: Pisistratus retook it, and placed there his illegitimate son Hegesistratus as despot. The Mytileneans may have been enfeebled at this time (somewhere between 537-527 B.C.), not only by the strides of Persian conquest on the mainland, but also by the ruinous defeat which they suffered from Polycrates and the Samians. Hegesistratus maintained the place against various hostile attempts, throughout all the reign of Hippias, so that the Athenian possessions in those regions comprehended at this period both the Chersonesus and Sigeum. To the former of the two, Hippias sent out Miltiades, nephew of the first *æcist*, as governor, after the death of his brother Stesagoras. The new governor found much discontent in the peninsula, but succeeded in subduing it by entrapping and imprisoning the principal men in each town. He further took into his pay a regiment of five hundred mercenaries, and married Hegesipyle, daughter of the Thracian king Olorus. It appears to have been about 515 B.C. that this second Miltiades went out to the Chersonesus. He seems to have been

obliged to quit it for a time, after the Scythian expedition of Darius, in consequence of having incurred the hostility of the Persians; but he was there from the beginning of the Ionic revolt until about 493 B.C., or two or three years before the battle of Marathon, on which occasion we shall find him acting-commander of the Athenian army.

Both the Chersonesus and Sigeum, though Athenian possessions, were, however, now tributary and dependent on Persia. And it was to this quarter that Hippias, during his last years of alarm, looked for support in the event of being expelled from Athens: he calculated upon Sigeum as a shelter, and upon Æantides, as well as Darius, as an ally. Neither the one nor the other failed him.

The same circumstances which alarmed Hippias, and rendered his dominion in Attica at once more oppressive and more odious, tended of course to raise the hopes of his enemies, the Athenian exiles, with the powerful Alcmeonidæ at their head. Believing the favourable moment to be come, they even ventured upon an invasion of Attica, and occupied a post called Leipsydrium in the mountain range of Parnes, which separates Attica from Bœotia. But their schemes altogether failed: Hippias defeated and drove them out of the country. His dominion now seemed confirmed, for the Lacedæmonians were on terms of intimate friendship with him; and Amyntas, king of Macedon, as well as the Thessalians were his allies. Yet the exiles whom he had beaten in the open field succeeded in an unexpected manœuvre, which, favoured by circumstances, proved his ruin.

By an accident which had occurred in the year 548 B.C., the Delphian Temple was set on fire and burnt. To repair this grave loss was an object of solicitude to all Greece; but the outlay required was exceedingly heavy, and it appears to have been long before the money could be collected. The Amphictyons decreed that one-fourth of the cost should be borne by the Delphians themselves, who found themselves so heavily taxed by this assessment, that they sent envoys throughout all Greece to collect subscriptions in aid, and received, among other donations, from the Greek settlers in Egypt twenty minæ, besides a large present of alum from the Egyptian king Amasis [Aahmes II]: their munificent benefactor Cræsus fell a victim to the Persians in 546 B.C., so that his treasure was no longer open to them. The total sum required was three hundred talents, equal probably to about £115,000 sterling [or \$575,000],—a prodigious amount to be collected from the dispersed Grecian cities, who acknowledged no common sovereign authority, and among whom the proportion reasonable to ask from each was so difficult to determine with satisfaction to all parties. At length, however, the money was collected, and the Amphictyons were in a situation to make a contract for the building of the temple. The Alcmeonidæ, who had been in exile ever since the third and final acquisition of power by Pisistratus, took the contract; and in executing it, they not only performed the work in the best manner, but even went much beyond the terms stipulated; employing Parian marble for the frontage, where the material prescribed to them was coarse stone. As was before remarked in the case of Pisistratus when he was in banishment, we are surprised to find exiles whose property had been confiscated so amply furnished with money—unless we are to suppose that Clisthenes the Alcmeonid, grandson of the Sicyonian Clisthenes, inherited through his mother wealth independent of Attica, and deposited it in the temple of the Samian Hera.

To the Delphians, especially, the rebuilding of their temple on so superior a scale was the most essential of all services, and their gratitude towards the

[514-510 B.C.]

Alcmaeonidæ was proportionally great. Partly through such a feeling, partly through pecuniary presents, Clisthenes was thus enabled to work the oracle for political purposes, and to call forth the powerful arm of Sparta against Hippias. Whenever any Spartan presented himself to consult the oracle, either on private or public business, the answer of the priestess was always in one strain, "Athens must be liberated." The constant repetition of this mandate at length extorted from the piety of the Lacedæmonians a reluctant compliance. Reverence for the god overcame their strong feeling of friendship towards the Pisistratidæ, and Anchimolius son of Aster was despatched by sea to Athens, at the head of a Spartan force, to expel them. On landing at Phalerum, however, he found them already forewarned and prepared, as well as farther strengthened by one thousand horse specially demanded from their allies in Thessaly. Upon the plain of Phalerum, this latter force was found peculiarly effective, so that the division of Anchimolius was driven back to their ships with great loss and he himself slain. The defeated armament had probably been small, and its repulse only provoked the Lacedæmonians to send a larger, under the command of their king Cleomenes in person, who on this occasion marched into Attica by land. On reaching the plain of Athens, he was assailed by the Thessalian horse, but repelled them in so gallant a style, that they at once rode off and returned to their native country; abandoning their allies with a faithlessness not unfrequent in the Thessalian character. Cleomenes marched on to Athens without further resistance, and found himself, together with the Alcmaeonids and the malcontent Athenians generally, in possession of the town. At that time there was no fortification except around the Acropolis, into which Hippias retired with his mercenaries and the citizens most faithful to him; having taken care to provision it well beforehand, so that it was not less secure against famine than against assault. He might have defied the besieging force, which was noway prepared for a long blockade; but, not altogether confiding in his position, he tried to send his children by stealth out of the country; and in this proceeding the children were taken prisoners. To procure their restoration, Hippias consented to all that was demanded of him, and withdrew from Attica to Sigeum in the Troad within the space of five days.

Thus fell the Pisistratid dynasty in 510 B.C., fifty years after the first usurpation of its founder. It was put down through the aid of foreigners, and those foreigners, too, wishing well to it in their hearts, though hostile from a mistaken feeling of divine injunction. Yet both the circumstances of its fall, and the course of events which followed, conspire to show that it possessed few attached friends in the country, and that the expulsion of Hippias was welcomed unanimously by the vast majority of Athenians. His family and chief partisans would accompany him into exile, — probably as a matter of course, without requiring any formal sentence of condemnation; and an altar was erected in the Acropolis, with a column hard by, commemorating both the past iniquity of the dethroned dynasty, and the names of all its members.

With Hippias disappeared the mercenary Thracian garrison, upon which he and his father before him had leaned for defence as well as for enforcement of authority; and Cleomenes with his Lacedæmonian forces retired also, after staying only long enough to establish a personal friendship, productive subsequently of important consequences, between the Spartan king and the Athenian Isagoras. The Athenians were thus left to themselves, without any foreign interference to constrain them in their political arrangements.

It has been mentioned that the Pisistratidæ had for the most part respected the forms of the Solonian Constitution: the nine archons, and the probouleutic or preconsidering Senate of Four Hundred (both annually changed), still continued to subsist, together with occasional meetings of the people — or rather of such portion of the people as was comprised in the gentes, phratries, and four Ionic tribes. The timocratic classification of Solon (or quadruple scale of income and admeasurement of political franchises according to it) also continued to subsist — but all within the tether and subservient to the purposes of the ruling family, who always kept one of their number as real master, among the chief administrators, and always retained possession of the Acropolis as well as of the mercenary force.

That overawing pressure being now removed by the expulsion of Hippias, the enslaved forms became at once endued with freedom and reality. There appeared again what Attica had not known for thirty years, declared political parties, and pronounced opposition between two men as leaders, — on one side, Isagoras, son of Tisander, a person of illustrious descent, — on the other, Clisthenes the Alemæonid, not less illustrious, and possessing at this moment a claim on the gratitude of his countrymen as the most persevering as well as the most effective foe of the dethroned despots. In what manner such opposition was carried on we are not told. It would seem to have been not altogether pacific; but at any rate, Clisthenes had the worst of it, and in consequence of this defeat, says the historian, “he took into partnership the people, who had been before excluded from everything.” His partnership with the people gave birth to the Athenian democracy: it was a real and important revolution.

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF CLISTHENES THE REFORMER

The political franchise, or the character of an Athenian citizen, both before and since Solon, had been confined to the primitive four Ionic tribes, each of which was an aggregate of so many close corporations or quasi-families — the gentes and the phratries. None of the residents in Attica, therefore, except those included in some gens or phratry, had any part in the political franchise. Such non-privileged residents were probably at all times numerous, and became more and more so by means of fresh settlers: moreover, they tended most to multiply in Athens and Piræus, where emigrants would commonly establish themselves. Clisthenes broke down the existing wall of privilege, and imparted the political franchise to the excluded mass. But this could not be done by enrolling them in new gentes or phratries, created in addition to the old; for the gentile tie was founded upon old faith and feeling, which, in the existing state of the Greek mind, could not be suddenly conjured up as a bond of union for comparative strangers: it could only be done by disconnecting the franchise altogether from the Ionic tribes as well as from the gentes which constituted them, and by redistributing the population into new tribes with a character and purpose exclusively political. Accordingly, Clisthenes abolished the four Ionic tribes, and created in their place ten new tribes founded upon a different principle, independent of the gentes and phratries. Each of his new tribes comprised a certain number of demes or cantons, with the enrolled proprietors and residents in each of them. The demes taken altogether included the entire surface of Attica, so that the Clisthenean Constitution admitted to the political franchise all the free native Athenians; and not merely these, but

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also many metics, and even some of the superior order of slaves. Putting out of sight the general body of slaves, and regarding only the free inhabitants, it was in point of fact a scheme approaching to universal suffrage, both political and judicial.

The slight and cursory manner in which Herodotus announces this memorable revolution tends to make us overlook its real importance. He dwells chiefly on the alteration in the number and names of the tribes: Clisthenes, he says, despised the Ionians so much, that he would not tolerate the continuance in Attica of the four tribes which prevailed in the Ionic cities, deriving their names from the four sons of Ion — just as his grandfather, the Sicyonian Clisthenes, hating the Dorians, had degraded and nicknamed the three Dorian tribes at Sicyon. Such is the representation of Herodotus, who seems himself to have entertained some contempt for the Ionians, and therefore to have suspected a similar feeling where it had no real existence. But the scope of Clisthenes was something far more extensive: he abolished the four ancient tribes, not because they were Ionic, but because they had become incommensurate with the existing condition of the Attic people, and because such abolition procured both for himself and for his political scheme new as well as hearty allies.

As soon as Hippias was expelled, the senate and the public assembly regained their efficiency. But had they been continued on the old footing, including none except members of the four tribes, these tribes would have been reinvested with a privilege which in reality they had so long lost, that its revival would have seemed an odious novelty, and the remaining population would probably not have submitted to it. If, in addition, we consider the political excitement of the moment, the restoration of one body of men from exile, and the departure of another body into exile, the outpouring of long-suppressed hatred, partly against these very forms, by the corruption of which the despot had reigned, we shall see that prudence as well as patriotism dictated the adoption of an enlarged scheme of government. Clisthenes had learned some wisdom during his long exile; and as he probably continued, for some time after the introduction of his new constitution, to be the chief adviser of his countrymen, we may consider their extraordinary success as a testimony to his prudence and skill not less than to their courage and unanimity. For, necessary as the change had become, it was not the less a shock to ancient Attic ideas. It radically altered the very idea of a tribe, which now became an aggregation of demes, not of gentes; and it thus broke up those associations, religious, social, and political, between the whole and the parts of the old system, which operated powerfully on the mind of every old-fashioned Athenian. The patricians at Rome, who composed the gentes and curiæ, and the plebs, who had no part in these corporations, formed for a long time two separate and opposing factions in the same city, each with its own separate organisation. It was only by slow degrees that the plebs gained ground.

So too in the Italian and German cities of the Middle Ages, the patrician families refused to part with their own separate political identity, when the guilds grew up by the side of them; even though forced to renounce a portion of their power, they continued to be a separate fraternity, and would not submit to be regimented anew, under an altered category and denomination, along with the traders who had grown into wealth and importance. But the reform of Clisthenes effected this change all at once, both as to the name and as to the reality. In some cases, indeed, that which had been the name of a gens was retained as the name of a deme, but even then the

old gentiles were ranked indiscriminately among the remaining demots; and the Athenian people, politically considered, thus became one homogeneous whole, distributed for convenience into parts, numerically, locally, and politically equal. It is, however, to be remembered, that while the four Ionic tribes were abolished, the gentes and phratries which compose them were left untouched, and continued to subsist as family and religious associations, though carrying with them no political privilege.

The ten newly created tribes, arranged in an established order of precedence, were called: Erechtheis, Ægeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Acamantis, Ceneis, Cecropis, Hippothoontis, Æantis, Antiochis—names borrowed chiefly from the respected heroes of Attic legend. This number remained unaltered until the year 305 B.C., when it was increased to twelve by the addition of two new tribes, Antigonias and Demetrias, afterwards designated anew by the names of Ptolemais and Attalis. The mere names of these last two, borrowed from living kings and not from legendary heroes, betray the change from freedom to subservience at Athens. Each tribe comprised a certain number of demes—cantons, parishes, or townships—in Attica. But the total number of these demes is not distinctly ascertained.

There is another point, however, which is at once more certain, and more important to notice. The demes which Clisthenes assigned to each tribe were in no case all adjacent to each other; and therefore, the tribe, as a whole, did not correspond with any continuous portion of the territory, nor could it have any peculiar local interest, separate from the entire community. Such systematic avoidance of the factions arising out of neighbourhood will appear to have been more especially necessary, when we recollect that the quarrels of the Paralii, the Diacrii, the Pedieis, during the preceding century, had all been generated from local feud, though doubtless artfully fomented by individual ambition. Moreover, it was only by this same precaution that the local predominance of the city, and the formation of a city-interest distinct from that of the country, was obviated; which could hardly have failed to arise had the city by itself constituted either one deme or one tribe. Clisthenes distributed the city (or found it already distributed) into several demes, and those demes among several tribes; while Piræus and Phalerum, each constituting a separate deme, were also assigned to different tribes; so that there were no local advantages either to bestow predominance, or to create a struggle for predominance, of one tribe over the rest. Each deme had its own local interests to watch over; but the tribe was a mere aggregate of demes for political, military, and religious purposes, with no separate hopes or fears apart from the whole state. Each tribe had a chapel, sacred rites and festivals, and a common fund for such meetings, in honour of its eponymous hero, administered by members of its own choice; and the statues of all the ten eponymous heroes, fraternal patrons of the democracy, were planted in the most conspicuous part of the agora of Athens. In the future working of the Athenian government we shall trace no symptom of disquieting local factions—a capital amendment compared with the disputes of the preceding century, and traceable, in part, to the absence of border-relations between demes of the same tribe.

The deme now became the primitive constituent element of the commonwealth, both as to persons and as to property. It had its own demarch, its register of enrolled citizens, its collective property, its public meetings and religious ceremonies, its taxes levied and administered by itself. The register of qualified citizens was kept by the demarch, and the inscription of new citizens took place at the assembly of the demots, whose legitimate

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sons were enrolled on attaining the age of eighteen, and their adopted sons at any time when presented and sworn to by the adopting citizen. The citizenship could only be granted by a public vote of the people, but wealthy non-freemen were enabled sometimes to evade this law and purchase admission upon the register of some poor deme, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. At the meetings of the demots, the register was called over, and it sometimes happened that some names were expunged—in which case the party thus disfranchised had an appeal to the popular judicature. So great was the local administrative power, however, of these demes, that they are described as the substitute, under the Clisthenean system, for the *naucreries* under the Solonian and anti-Solonian. The *trittyes* and *naucreries*, though nominally preserved, and the latter (as some affirm) augmented in number from forty-eight to fifty, appear henceforward as of little public importance.

Clisthenes preserved, but at the same time modified and expanded, all the main features of Solon's political constitution; the public assembly, or *ecclesia*,—the preconsidering senate, composed of members from all the tribes,—and the habit of annual election, as well as annual responsibility of magistrates, by and to the *ecclesia*. The full value must now have been felt of possessing such pre-existing institutions to build upon, at a moment of perplexity and dissension. But the Clisthenean *ecclesia* acquired new strength, and almost a new character, from the great increase of the number of citizens qualified to attend it; while the annually changed senate, instead of being composed of four hundred members taken in equal proportion from each of the old four tribes, was enlarged to five hundred, taken equally from each of the new ten tribes. It now comes before us, under the name of Senate of Five Hundred, as an active and indispensable body throughout the whole Athenian democracy: and the practice now seems to have begun (though the period of commencement cannot be decisively proved), of determining the names of the senators by lot. Both the senate thus constituted, and the public assembly, were far more popular and vigorous than they had been under the original arrangement of Solon.

The new constitution of the tribes, as it led to a change in the annual senate, so it transformed, no less directly, the military arrangements of the state, both as to soldiers and as to officers. The citizens called upon to serve in arms were now marshalled according to tribes—each tribe having its own *taxiarchs* as officers for the *hoplites*, and its own *phylarch* at the head of the horsemen. Moreover, there were now created for the first time ten *strategi*, or generals, one from each tribe; and two *hipparchs*, for the supreme command of the horsemen. Under the prior Athenian constitution it appears that the command of the military force had been vested in the third archon, or *polemarch*, no *strategi* then existing; and even after the latter had been created, under the Clisthenean constitution, the *polemarch* still retained a joint right of command along with them—as we are told at the battle of Marathon, where Callimachus the *polemarch* not only enjoyed an equal vote in the council of war along with the ten *strategi*, but even occupied the post of honour on the right wing. The ten generals, annually changed, are thus (like the ten tribes) a fruit of the Clisthenean constitution, which was at the same time powerfully strengthened and protected by such remodelling of the military force. The functions of the generals becoming more extensive as the democracy advanced, they seem to have acquired gradually not merely the direction of military and naval affairs, but also that of the foreign relations of the city generally,—while the nine archons,

including the polemarch, were by degrees lowered down from that full executive and judicial competence which they had once enjoyed, to the simple ministry of police and preparatory justice. Enroached upon by the strategi on one side, they were also restricted in efficiency by the rise of the popular dicasteries or numerous jury-courts, on the other. We may be very sure that these popular dicasteries had not been permitted to meet or to act under the despotism of the Pisistratidæ, and that the judicial business of the city must then have been conducted partly by the senate of Areopagus, partly by the archons; perhaps with a nominal responsibility of the latter at the end of their year of office to an acquiescent ecclesia. And if we even assume it to be true, as some writers contend, that the habit of direct popular judicature, over and above this annual trial of responsibility, had been partially introduced by Solon, it must have been discontinued during the long coercion exercised by the supervening dynasty. But the outburst of popular spirit, which lent force to Clisthenes, doubtless carried the people into direct action as jurors in the aggregate heliæa, not less than as voters in the ecclesia; and the change was thus begun which contributed to degrade the archons from their primitive character as judges, into the lower function of preliminary examiners and presidents of a jury. Such convocation of numerous juries, beginning first with the aggregate body of sworn citizens above thirty years of age, and subsequently dividing them into separate bodies or panels, for trying particular causes, became gradually more frequent and more systematised: until at length, in the time of Pericles, it was made to carry a small pay, and stood out as one of the most prominent features of Athenian life.

The financial affairs of the city underwent at this epoch as complete a change as the military: in fact, the appointment of magistrates and officers by tens, one from each tribe, seems to have become the ordinary practice. From this time forward, the senate of Five Hundred steps far beyond its original duty of preparing matters for the discussion of the ecclesia: it embraces, besides, a large circle of administrative and general superintendence, which hardly admits of any definition. Its sittings become constant, with the exception of special holidays, and the year is distributed into ten portions called prytanies — the fifty senators of each tribe taking by turns the duty of constant attendance during one prytany, and receiving during that time the title of the Prytanes: the order of precedence among the tribes in these duties was annually determined by lot.

During those later times known to us through the great orators, the ecclesia, or formal assembly of the citizens, was convoked four times regularly during each prytany, or oftener if necessity required — usually by the senate, though the strategi had also the power of convoking it by their own authority. How often the ancient ecclesia had been convoked during the interval between Solon and Pisistratus, we cannot exactly say — probably but seldom during the year. But under the Pisistratidæ, its convocation had dwindled down into an inoperative formality; and the re-establishment of it by Clisthenes, not merely with plenary determining powers, but also under full notice and preparation of matters beforehand, together with the best securities for orderly procedure, was in itself a revolution impressive to the mind of every Athenian citizen. To render the ecclesia efficient, it was indispensable that its meetings should be both frequent and free. Men thus became trained to the duty both of speakers and hearers, and each man, while he felt that he exercised his share of influence on the decision, identified his own safety and happiness with the vote of the majority, and became familiar-

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ised with the notion of a sovereign authority which he neither could nor ought to resist. This is an idea new to the Athenian bosom; and with it came the feelings sanctifying free speech and equal law — words which no Athenian citizen ever afterwards heard unmoved: together with that sentiment of the entire commonwealth as one and indivisible, which always overruled, though it did not supplant, the local and cantonal specialties. It is not too much to say that these patriotic and ennobling impulses were a new product in the Athenian mind, to which nothing analogous occurs even in the time of Solon. They were kindled in part doubtless by the strong reaction against the Pisistratidæ, but still more by the fact that the opposing leader, Clisthenes, turned that transitory feeling to the best possible account, and gave to it a vigorous perpetuity, as well as a well-defined positive object, by the popular elements conspicuous in his constitution. His name makes less figure in history than we should expect, because he passed for the mere renovator of Solon's scheme of government after it had been overthrown by Pisistratus. Probably he himself professed this object, since it would facilitate the success of his propositions: and if we confine ourselves to the letter of the case, the fact is in a great measure true, since the annual senate and the ecclesia are both Solonian — but both of them under his reform were clothed in totally new circumstances, and swelled into gigantic proportions. How vigorous was the burst of Athenian enthusiasm, altering instantaneously the position of Athens among the powers of Greece, we shall hear presently.

But it was not only the people formally installed in their ecclesia, who received from Clisthenes the real attributes of sovereignty; it was by him also that the people were first called into direct action as dicasts, or jurors. This custom may be said, in a certain limited sense, to have begun in the time of Solon, since that lawgiver invested the popular assembly with the power of pronouncing the judgment of accountability upon the archons after their year of office. Here, again, the building, afterwards so spacious and stately, was erected on a Solonian foundation, though it was not itself Solonian. That the popular dicasteries, in the elaborate forms in which they existed from Pericles downward, were introduced all at once by Clisthenes, it is impossible to believe; yet the steps by which they were gradually wrought out are not distinctly discoverable. It would rather seem, that at first only the aggregate body of citizens above thirty years of age exercised judicial functions, being specially convoked and sworn to try persons accused of public crimes, and when so employed bearing the name of the *heliæa*, or *heliasts*; private offences and disputes between man and man being still determined by individual magistrates in the city, and a considerable judicial power still residing in the senate of Areopagus. There is reason to believe that this was the state of things established by Clisthenes, and which afterwards came to be altered by the greater extent of judicial duty gradually accruing to the *heliasts*, so that it was necessary to subdivide the collective *heliæa*. According to the subdivision, as practised in the times best known, six thousand citizens above thirty years of age were annually selected by lot out of the whole number, six hundred from each of the ten tribes: five thousand of these citizens were arranged in ten panels or decuries of five hundred each, the remaining one thousand being reserved to fill up vacancies in case of death or absence among the former. The whole six thousand took a prescribed oath, couched in very striking words, and every man received a ticket inscribed with his own name as well as with a letter designating his decury. When there were causes or crimes ripe for trial, the *thesmothets* or six inferior archons, determined by lot, first, which decuries should sit, according to the number

wanted — next, in which court, or under the presidency of what magistrate, the decury B or E should sit, so that it could not be known beforehand in what cause each would be judge. Each of these decuries sitting in judicature was called the *heliæa*, a name which belongs properly to the collective assembly of the people; this collective assembly having been itself the original judicature. We conceive that the practice of distributing this collective assembly, or *heliæa*, into sections of jurors for judicial duty, may have begun under one form or another soon after the reform of Clisthenes, since the direct interference of the people in public affairs tended more and more to increase. But it could only have been matured by degrees into that constant and systematic service which the pay of Pericles called forth at last in completeness. Under the last mentioned system the judicial competence of the archons was annulled, and the third archon, or polemarch, withdrawn from all military functions. Still, this had not been yet done at the time of the battle of Marathon, in which Callimachus the polemarch not only commanded along with the strategi, but enjoyed a sort of pre-eminence over them: nor had it been done during the year after the battle of Marathon, in which Aristides was archon — for the magisterial decisions of Aristides formed one of the principal foundations of his honourable surname, the Just.

With this question, as to the comparative extent of judicial power vested by Clisthenes in the popular dicastery and the archons, are in reality connected two others in Athenian constitutional law; relating, first, to the admissibility of all citizens for the post of archon — next, to the choosing of archons by lot. It is well known that, in the time of Pericles, the archons, and various other individual functionaries, had come to be chosen by lot — moreover, all citizens were legally admissible, and might give in their names to be drawn for by lot, subject to what was called the *docimasy*, or legal examination into their status of citizen, and into various moral and religious qualifications, before they took office; while at the same time the function of the archon had become nothing higher than preliminary examination of parties and witnesses for the dicastery, and presidency over it when afterwards assembled, together with the power of imposing by authority a fine of small amount upon inferior offenders.

Now all these three political arrangements hang essentially together. The great value of the lot, according to Grecian democratical ideas, was that it equalised the chance of office between rich and poor. But so long as the poor citizens were legally inadmissible, choice by lot could have no recommendation either to the rich or to the poor; in fact, it would be less democratical than election by the general mass of citizens, because the poor citizen would under the latter system enjoy an important right of interference by means of his suffrage, though he could not be elected himself. Again, choice by lot could never under any circumstances be applied to those posts where special competence, and a certain measure of attributes possessed only by a few, could not be dispensed with without obvious péril; nor was it ever applied, throughout the whole history of democratical Athens, to the strategi, or generals, who were always elected by show of hands of the assembled citizens. Accordingly, we may regard it as certain that, at the time when the archons first came to be chosen by lot, the superior and responsible duties once attached to that office had been, or were in course of being, detached from it, and transferred either to the popular dicasts or to the ten elected strategi: so that there remained to these archons only a routine of police and administration, important indeed to the state, yet such as could be executed by any citizen of average probity, diligence, and capacity. At least

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there was no obvious absurdity in thinking so; and the docimasy excluded from the office men of notoriously discreditable life, even after they might have drawn the successful lot. Pericles, though chosen strategus, year after year successively, was never archon; and it may even be doubted whether men of first-rate talents and ambition often gave in their names for the office. To those of smaller aspirations it was doubtless a source of importance, but it imposed troublesome labour, gave no pay, and entailed a certain degree of peril upon any archon who might have given offence to powerful men, when he came to pass through the trial of accountability which followed immediately upon his year of office. There was little to make the office acceptable either to very poor men, or to very rich and ambitious men; and between the middling persons who gave in their names, any one might be taken without great practical mischief, always assuming the two guarantees of the docimasy before, and accountability after, office. This was the conclusion—in our opinion a mistaken conclusion, and such as would find no favour at present—to which the democrats of Athens were conducted by their strenuous desire to equalise the chances of office for rich and poor. But their sentiment seems to have been satisfied by a partial enforcement of the lot to the choice of some offices,—especially the archons, as the primitive chief magistrates of the state,—without applying it to all, or to the most responsible and difficult. Nor would they have applied it to the archons, if it had been indispensably necessary that these magistrates should retain their original very serious duty of judging disputes and condemning offenders.

Now in regard to the eligibility of all Athenians indiscriminately to the office of archon, we find a clear and positive testimony as to the time when it was first introduced. Plutarch tells us that the oligarchical, but high-principled Aristides, was himself the proposer of this constitutional change—shortly after the battle of Plataea, with the consequent expulsion of the Persians from Greece, and the return of the refugee Athenians to their ruined city. Seldom has it happened in the history of mankind, that rich and poor have been so completely equalised as among the population of Athens in that memorable expatriation and heroic struggle. Nor are we at all surprised to hear that the mass of citizens, coming back with freshly kindled patriotism as well as with the consciousness that their country had only been recovered by the equal efforts of all, would no longer submit to be legally disqualified from any office of state. It was on this occasion that the constitution was first made really “common” to all, and that the archons, strategi, and all functionaries, first began to be chosen from all Athenians without any difference of legal eligibility. No mention is made of the lot in this important statement of Plutarch, which appears in every way worthy of credit, and which teaches us that, down to the invasion of Xerxes not only had the exclusive principle of the Solonian law of qualification continued in force (whereby the first three classes on the census were alone admitted to all individual offices, and the fourth or thetic class excluded), but also the archons had hitherto been elected by the citizens—not taken by lot.

Now for financial purposes, the quadruple census of Solon was retained long after this period, even beyond the Peloponnesian War and the oligarchy of Thirty. But we thus learn that Clisthenes in his constitution retained it for political purposes also, in part at least: he recognised the exclusion of the great mass of the citizens from all individual offices—such as the archon, the strategus, etc. In his time, probably, no complaints were raised on the subject. His constitution gave to the collective bodies—senate, ecclesia,

and *heliæa*, or *dicastery*—a degree of power and importance such as they had never before known or imagined: and we may well suppose that the Athenian people of that day had no objection even to the proclaimed system and theory of being exclusively governed by men of wealth and station as individual magistrates—especially since many of the newly enfranchised citizens had been previously metics and slaves. Indeed, it is to be added that, even under the full democracy of later Athens, though the people had then become passionately attached to the theory of equal admissibility of all citizens to office, yet, in practice, poor men seldom obtained offices which were elected by the general vote, as will appear more fully in the course of this history.¹

The choice of the *strategi* remained ever afterwards upon the footing on which *Aristides* thus placed it. But the present is not the time to enter into the modifications which Athens underwent during the generation after the battle of *Platæa*. They have been here briefly noticed for the purpose of reasoning back, in the absence of direct evidence, to Athens as it stood in the generation before that memorable battle, after the reform of *Clisthenes*. His reform, though highly democratical, stopped short of the mature democracy which prevailed from *Pericles* to *Demosthenes*, in three ways especially, among various others; and it is therefore sometimes considered by the later writers as an aristocratical constitution: (1) It still recognised the *archons* as judges to a considerable extent, and the third *archon*, or *polemarch*, as joint military commander along with the *strategi*. (2) It retained them as elected annually by the body of citizens, not as chosen by lot. (3) It still excluded the fourth class of the *Solonian* census from all individual office, the *archonship* among the rest. The *Solonian* law of exclusion, however, though retained in principle, was mitigated in practice thus far—that whereas *Solon* had rendered none but members of the highest class on the census (*the pentakosiomedimni*) eligible to the *archonship*, *Clisthenes* opened that dignity to all the first three classes, shutting out only the fourth. That he did this may be inferred from the fact that *Aristides*, assuredly not a rich man, became *archon*.

We are also inclined to believe that the senate of Five Hundred, as constituted by *Clisthenes*, was taken, not by election, but by lot, from the ten tribes, and that every citizen became eligible to it. Election for this purpose—that is, the privilege of annually electing a batch of fifty senators, all at once, by each tribe—would probably be thought more troublesome than valuable; nor do we hear of separate meetings of each tribe for purposes of election. Moreover, the office of senator was a collective, not an individual office; the shock, therefore, to the feelings of semi-democratised Athens, from the unpleasant idea of a poor man sitting among the fifty *prytanes*, would be less than if they conceived him as *polemarch* at the head of the right wing of the army, or as an *archon* administering justice.

A further difference between the constitution of *Solon* and that of *Clisthenes* is to be found in the position of the senate of *Areopagus*. Under the former, that senate had been the principal body in the state, and he had even enlarged its powers; under the latter, it must have been treated

¹ So in the Italian republics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the nobles long continued to possess the exclusive right of being elected to the consulate and the great offices of state, even after those offices had come to be elected by the people: the habitual misuse and oppression of the nobles gradually put an end to this right, and even created in many towns a resolution positively to exclude them. At Milan, towards the end of the twelfth century, the twelve consuls, with the *Podestat*, possessed all the powers of government: these consuls were nominated by one hundred electors chosen by and among the people.



THE OSTRACISM OF ARISTIDES

Printed specially for "The Ostracism of Aristides" by the artist.

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at first as an enemy, and kept down. For as it was composed only of all the past archons, and as, during the preceding thirty years, every archon had been a creature of the Pisistratidæ, the Areopagites collectively must have been both hostile and odious to Clisthenes and his partisans, perhaps a fraction of its members might even retire into exile with Hippias. Its influence must have been sensibly lessened by the change of party, until it came to be gradually filled by fresh archons springing from the bosom of the Clisthenean constitution. But during this important interval, the new-modelled senate of Five Hundred, and the popular assembly, stepped into that ascendancy which they never afterwards lost. From the time of Clisthenes forward, the Areopagites cease to be the chief and prominent power in the state: yet they are still considerable; and when the second fill of the democratical tide took place, after the battle of Plataea, they became the focus of that which was then considered as the party of oligarchical resistance. We have already remarked that the archons, during the intermediate time (about 509–477 B.C.), were all elected by the ecclesia, not chosen by lot, and that the fourth (or poorest and most numerous) class on the census were by law then ineligible; while election at Athens, even when every citizen without exception was an elector and eligible, had a natural tendency to fall upon men of wealth and station. We thus see how it happened that the past archons, when united in the Senate of Areopagus, infused into that body the sympathies, prejudices, and interests of the richer classes. It was this which brought them into conflict with the more democratical party headed by Pericles and Ephialtes, in times when portions of the Clisthenean constitution had come to be discredited as too much imbued with oligarchy.

One other remarkable institution, distinctly ascribed to Clisthenes, yet remains to be noticed — the Ostracism. It is hardly too much to say that, without this protective process, none of the other institutions would have reached maturity.

OSTRACISM

By the ostracism, a citizen was banished without special accusation, trial, or defence, for a term of ten years — subsequently diminished to five. His property was not taken away, nor his reputation tainted; so that the penalty consisted solely in the banishment from his native city to some other Greek city. As to reputation, the ostracism was a compliment rather than otherwise; and so it was vividly felt to be, when, about ninety years after Clisthenes, the conspiracy between Nicias and Alcibiades fixed it upon Hyperbolus. The two former had both recommended the taking of an ostracising vote, each hoping to cause the banishment of the other; but before the day arrived, they accommodated the difference. To fire off the safety-gun of the republic against a person so little dangerous as Hyperbolus, was denounced as the prostitution of a great political ceremony: "It was not against such men as him," said the comic writer, Plato, "that the oyster-shell (or potsherd) was intended to be used." The process of ostracism was carried into effect by writing upon a shell, or potsherd, the name of the person whom a citizen thought it prudent for a time to banish; which shell, when deposited in the proper vessel, counted for a vote towards the sentence.

We have already observed that all the governments of the Grecian cities, when we compare them with that idea which a modern reader is apt to conceive of the measure of force belonging to a government, were essentially weak, the good as well as the bad — the democratical, the oligarchical, and

the despotic. The force in the hands of any government, to cope with conspirators or mutineers, was extremely small, with the single exception of a despot surrounded by his mercenary troop; so that no tolerably sustained conspiracy or usurper could be put down except by the direct aid of the people in support of the government; which amounted to a dissolution, for the time, of constitutional authority, and was pregnant with reactionary consequences such as no man could foresee. To prevent powerful men from attempting usurpation was, therefore, of the greatest possible moment; and a despot or an oligarchy might exercise preventive means at pleasure, much sharper than the ostracism, such as the assassination of Cimon, as directed by the Pisistratidæ. At the very least, they might send away any one, from whom they apprehended attack or danger, without incurring even so much as the imputation of severity. But in a democracy, where arbitrary action of the magistrate was the thing of all others most dreaded, and where fixed laws, with trial and defence as preliminaries to punishment, were conceived by the ordinary citizen as the guarantees of his personal security and as the pride of his social condition—the creation of such an exceptional power presented serious difficulty. If we transport ourselves to the times of Clisthenes, immediately after the expulsion of the Pisistratidæ, when the working of the democratical machinery was as yet untried, we shall find this difficulty at its maximum; but we shall also find the necessity of vesting such a power somewhere absolutely imperative. For the great Athenian nobles had yet to learn the lesson of respect for any constitution; their past history had exhibited continual struggles between the armed factions of Megacles, Lycurgus, and Pisistratus, put down after a time by the superior force and alliances of the latter. And though Clisthenes, the son of Megacles, might be firmly disposed to renounce the example of his father, and to act as the faithful citizen of a fixed constitution—he would know but too well that the sons of his father's companions and rivals would follow out ambitious purposes without any regard to the limits imposed by law, if ever they acquired sufficient partisans to present a fair prospect of success. Moreover, when any two candidates for power, with such reckless dispositions, came into a bitter personal rivalry, the motives to each of them, arising as well out of fear as out of ambition, to put down his opponent at any cost to the constitution, might well become irresistible, unless some impartial and discerning interference could arrest the strife in time. "If the Athenians were wise (Aristides is reported to have said, in the height and peril of his parliamentary struggle with Themistocles), they would cast both Themistocles and me into the barathrum." And whoever reads the sad narrative of the Coreyrcæan sedition, in the third book of Thucydides, together with the reflections of the historian upon it, will trace the gradual exasperation of these party feuds, beginning even under democratical forms, until at length they break down the barriers of public as well as of private morality.

Against this chance of internal assailants Clisthenes had to protect the democratical constitution—first, by throwing impediments in their way and rendering it difficult for them to procure the requisite support; next, by eliminating them before any violent projects were ripe for execution. To do either the one or the other, it was necessary to provide such a constitution as would not only conciliate the good will, but kindle the passionate attachment of the mass of citizens, insomuch that not even any considerable minority should be deliberately inclined to alter it by force. It was necessary to create in the multitude, and through them to force upon the leading ambitious men, that rare and difficult sentiment which we may term a con-

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stitutional morality; a paramount reverence for the forms of the constitution, enforcing obedience to the authorities acting under and within those forms, yet combined with the habit of open speech, of action subject only to definite legal control, and unrestrained censure of those very authorities as to all their public acts—combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom of every citizen, amidst the bitterness of party contest, that the forms of the constitution will be not less sacred in the eyes of his opponents than in his own. This coexistence of freedom and self-imposed restraint—of obedience to authority with unmeasured censure of the persons exercising it—may be found in the aristocracy of England (since about 1688) as well as in the democracy of the American United States: and because we are familiar with it, we are apt to suppose it a natural sentiment; though there seem to be few sentiments more difficult to establish and diffuse among a community, judging by the experience of history. We may see how imperfectly it exists at this day in the Swiss cantons; and the many violences of the first French Revolution illustrate, among various other lessons, the fatal effects arising from its absence, even among a people high in the scale of intelligence. Yet the diffusion of such constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community, but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of free institutions impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendancy for themselves. Nothing less than unanimity, or so overwhelming a majority as to be tantamount to unanimity, on the cardinal point of respecting constitutional forms, even by those who do not wholly approve of them, can render the excitement of political passion bloodless, and yet expose all the authorities in the state to the full license of pacific criticism.

At the epoch of Clisthenes, which by a remarkable coincidence is the same as that of the *regifugium* at Rome, such constitutional morality, if it existed anywhere else, had certainly no place at Athens; and the first creation of it in any particular society must be esteemed an interesting historical fact. By the spirit of his reforms,—equal, popular, and comprehensive, far beyond the previous experience of Athenians,—he secured the hearty attachment of the body of citizens; but from the first generation of leading men, under the nascent democracy, and with such precedents as they had to look back upon, no self-imposed limits to ambition could be expected: and the problem required was to eliminate beforehand any one about to transgress these limits, so as to escape the necessity of putting him down afterwards, with all that bloodshed and reaction, in the midst of which the free working of the constitution would be suspended at least, if not irrevocably extinguished. To acquire such influence as would render him dangerous under democratical forms, a man must stand in evidence before the public, so as to afford some reasonable means of judging of his character and purposes; and the security which Clisthenes provided was, to call in the positive judgment of the citizens respecting his future promise purely and simply, so that they might not remain too long neutral between two formidable political rivals—pursuant in a certain way to the Solonian proclamation against neutrality in a sedition, as we have already remarked in a former chapter. He incorporated in the constitution itself the principle of *privilegium* (to employ the Roman phrase, which signifies, not a peculiar favour granted to any one, but a peculiar inconvenience imposed), yet only under circumstances solemn and well defined, with full notice and discussion beforehand, and by the positive secret vote of a large proportion of the citizens. “No law shall be made

against any single citizen, without the same being made against all Athenian citizens; unless it shall so seem good to six thousand citizens voting secretly." Such was that general principle of the constitution, under which the ostracism was a particular case. Before the vote of ostracism could be taken, a case was to be made out in the senate and the public assembly to justify it. In the sixth prytany of the year, these two bodies debated and determined whether the state of the republic was menacing enough to call for such an exceptional measure. If they decided in the affirmative, a day was named, the agora was railed round, with ten entrances left for the citizens of each tribe, and ten separate casks or vessels for depositing the suffrages, which consisted of a shell, or a potsherd, with the name of the person written on it whom each citizen designed to banish. At the end of the day, the number of votes was summed up, and if six thousand votes were found to have been given against any one person, that person was ostracised; if not, the ceremony ended in nothing. Ten days were allowed to him for settling his affairs, after which he was required to depart from Attica for ten years, but retained his property, and suffered no other penalty.

It was not the maxim at Athens to escape the errors of the people, by calling in the different errors, and the sinister interest besides, of an extra-popular or privileged few; nor was any third course open, since the principles of representative government were not understood, nor indeed conveniently applicable to very small communities. Beyond the judgment of the people—so the Athenians felt—there was no appeal; and their grand study was to surround the delivery of that judgment with the best securities for rectitude and the best preservatives against haste, passion, or private corruption. Whatever measure of good government could not be obtained in that way, could not, in their opinion, be obtained at all. We shall illustrate the Athenian proceedings on this head more fully when we come to speak of the working of their mature democracy: meanwhile, in respect to this grand protection of the nascent democracy,—the vote of ostracism,—it will be found that the securities devised by Clisthenes, for making the sentence effectual against the really dangerous man, and against no one else, display not less foresight than patriotism. The main object was, to render the voting an expression of deliberate public feeling, as distinguished from mere factious antipathy: the large minimum of votes required, one-fourth of the entire citizen population, went far to insure this effect, the more so, since each vote, taken as it was in a secret manner, counted unequivocally for the expression of a genuine and independent sentiment, and could neither be coerced nor bought. Then again, Clisthenes did not permit the process of ostracising to be opened against any one citizen exclusively. If opened at all, every one without exception was exposed to the sentence; so that the friends of Themistocles could not invoke it against Aristides, nor those of the latter against the former, without exposing their own leader to the same chance of exile. It was not likely to be invoked at all, therefore, until exasperation had proceeded so far as to render both parties insensible to this chance—the precise index of that growing internecine hostility, which the ostracism prevented from coming to a head. Nor could it even then be ratified, unless a case was shown to convince the more neutral portion of the senate and the ecclesia: moreover, after all, the ecclesia did not itself ostracise, but a future day was named, and the whole body of the citizens were solemnly invited to vote. It was in this way that security was taken not only for making the ostracism effectual in protecting the constitution, but to hinder it from being employed for any other purpose. And we

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must recollect that it exercised its tutelary influence, not merely on those occasions when it was actually employed, but by the mere knowledge that it might be employed, and by the restraining effect which that knowledge produced on the conduct of the great men. Again, the ostracism, though essentially of an exceptional nature, was yet an exception sanctified and limited by the constitution itself; so that the citizen, in giving his ostracising vote, did not in any way depart from the constitution or lose his reverence for it. The issue placed before him—"Is there any man whom you think vitally dangerous to the State? if so, whom?"—though vague, was yet raised directly and legally. Had there been no ostracism, it might probably have been raised both indirectly and illegally, on the occasion of some special imputed crime of a suspected political leader, when accused before a court of justice.

Care was taken to divest the ostracism of all painful consequence except what was inseparable from exile; and this is not one of the least proofs of the wisdom with which it was devised. Most certainly, it never deprived the public of candidates for political influence: and when we consider the small amount of individual evil which it inflicted,—evil too diminished, in the cases of Cimon and Aristides, by a reactionary sentiment which augmented their subsequent popularity after return,—two remarks will be quite sufficient to offer in the way of justification. First, it completely produced its intended effect; for the democracy grew up from infancy to manhood without a single attempt to overthrow it by force—a result, upon which no reflecting contemporary of Clisthenes could have ventured to calculate. Next, through such tranquil working of the democratical forms, a constitutional morality quite sufficiently complete was produced among the leading Athenians, to enable the people after a certain time to dispense with that exceptional security which the ostracism offered. To the nascent democracy, it was absolutely indispensable; to the growing yet militant democracy, it was salutary; but the full-grown democracy both could and did stand without it. The ostracism passed upon Hyperbolus, about ninety years after Clisthenes, was the last occasion of its employment. And even this can hardly be considered as a serious instance: it was a trick concerted between two distinguished Athenians (Nicias and Alcibiades), to turn to their own political account a process already coming to be antiquated. Nor would such a manœuvre have been possible, if the contemporary Athenian citizens had been penetrated with the same serious feeling of the value of ostracism as a safeguard of democracy, as had been once entertained by their fathers and grandfathers. Between Clisthenes and Hyperbolus, we hear of about ten different persons as having been banished by ostracism. First of all, Hipparchus of the deme Cholargus, the son of Charmus, a relative of the recently expelled Pisistratid despots; then Aristides, Themistocles, Cimon, and Thucydides son of Melesias, all of them renowned political leaders; also Alcibiades and Megacles (the paternal and maternal grandfathers of the distinguished Alcibiades), and Callias, belonging to another eminent family at Athens; lastly, Damon, the preceptor of Pericles in poetry and music, and eminent for his acquisitions in philosophy. In this last case comes out the vulgar side of humanity, aristocratical as well as democratical; for with both, the process of philosophy and the persons of philosophers are wont to be alike unpopular. Even Clisthenes himself is said to be ostracised under his own law, and Xanthippus; but both upon authority too weak to trust. Miltiades was not ostracised at all, but tried and punished for misconduct in his command.

We should hardly have said so much about this memorable and peculiar institution of Clisthenes, if the erroneous accusations against the Athenian democracy — of envy, injustice, and ill-treatment of their superior men, had not been greatly founded upon it, and if such criticisms had not passed from ancient times to modern with little examination. In monarchical governments, a pretender to the throne, numbering a certain amount of supporters, is, as a matter of course, excluded from the country. No man treats this as any extravagant injustice, yet it is the parallel of the ostracism, with a stronger case in favour of the latter, inasmuch as the change from one regal dynasty to another does not of necessity overthrow all the collateral institutions and securities of the country. Plutarch has affirmed that the ostracism arose from the envy and jealousy inherent in a democracy, and not from justifiable fears — an observation often repeated, yet not the less demonstrably untrue. Not merely because ostracism so worked as often to increase the influence of that political leader whose rival it removed, but still more, because, if the fact had been as Plutarch says, this institution would have continued as long as the democracy; whereas it finished with the banishment of Hyperbolus, at a period when the government was more decisively democratical than it had been in the time of Clisthenes.

It was, in truth, a product altogether of fear and insecurity, on the part both of the democracy and its best friends — fear perfectly well-grounded, and only appearing needless because the precautions taken prevented attack. So soon as the diffusion of a constitutional morality had placed the mass of the citizens above all serious fear of an aggressive usurper the ostracism was discontinued. And doubtless the feeling, that it might safely be dispensed with, must have been strengthened by the long ascendancy of Pericles, by the spectacle of the greatest statesman whom Athens ever produced, acting steadily within the limits of the constitution; as well as by the ill-success of his two opponents, Cimon and Thucydides, — aided by numerous partisans and by the great comic writers, at a period when comedy was a power in the state such as it has never been before or since, — in their attempts to get him ostracised. They succeeded in fanning up the ordinary antipathy of the citizens towards philosophers, so far as to procure the ostracism of his friend and teacher Damon: but Pericles himself, to repeat the complaint of his bitter enemy, the comic poet Cratinus, “was out of the reach of the oyster-shell.” If Pericles was not conceived to be dangerous to the constitution, none of his successors were at all likely to be so regarded. Damon and Hyperbolus were the two last persons ostracised: both of them were cases, and the only cases, of an unequivocal abuse of the institution, because, whatever the grounds of displeasure against them may have been, it is impossible to conceive either of them as menacing to the state — whereas all the other known sufferers were men of such position and power, that the six or eight thousand citizens who inscribed each name on the shell, or at least a large proportion of them, may well have done so under the most conscientious belief that they were guarding the constitution against real danger. Such a change in the character of the persons ostracised plainly evinces that the ostracism had become dis severed from that genuine patriotic prudence which originally rendered it both legitimate and popular. It had served for two generations an inestimable tutelary purpose, — it lived to be twice dishonoured, — and then passed, by universal acquiescence, into matter of history.

A process analogous to the ostracism subsisted at Argos, at Syracuse, and in some other Grecian democracies. Aristotle states that it was abused for

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factions purposes : and at Syracuse, where it was introduced after the expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty, Diodorus affirms that it was so unjustly and profusely applied, as to deter persons of wealth and station from taking any part in public affairs; for which reason it was speedily discontinued. We have no particulars to enable us to appreciate this general statement. But we cannot safely infer that because the ostracism worked on the whole well at Athens, it must necessarily have worked well in other states — the more so, as we do not know whether it was surrounded with the same precautionary formalities, nor whether it even required the same large minimum of votes to make it effective. This latter guarantee, so valuable in regard to an institution essentially easy to abuse, is not noticed by Diodorus in his brief account of the petalism — so the process was denominated at Syracuse.

THE DEMOCRACY ESTABLISHED

Such was the first Athenian democracy, engendered as well by the reaction against Hippias and his dynasty as by the memorable partnership, whether spontaneous or compulsory, between Clisthenes and the enfranchised multitude. It is to be distinguished, both from the mitigated oligarchy established by Solon before, and from the full-grown and symmetrical democracy which prevailed afterwards from the beginning of the Peloponnesian War towards the close of the career of Pericles. It was, indeed, a striking revolution, impressed upon the citizen not less by the sentiments to which it appealed than by the visible change which it made in political and social life. He saw himself marshalled in the ranks of hoplites, alongside of new companions in arms; he was enrolled in a new register, and his property in a new schedule, in his deme and by his demarch, an officer before unknown; he found the year distributed afresh, for all legal purposes, into ten parts bearing the name of prytanies, each marked by a solemn and free-spoken ecclesia, at which he had a right to be present; that ecclesia was convoked and presided by senators called prytanes, members of a senate novel both as to number and distribution; his political duties were now performed as member of a tribe, designated by a name not before pronounced in common Attic life, connected with one of ten heroes whose statues he now for the first time saw in the agora, and associating him with fellow-tribesmen from all parts of Attica. All these and many others were sensible novelties, felt in the daily proceedings of the citizen. But the great novelty of all was the authentic recognition of the ten new tribes as a sovereign demos, or people, apart from all specialties of phratric or gentile origin, with free speech and equal law; retaining no distinction except the four classes of the Solonian property-schedule with their gradations of eligibility. To a considerable proportion of citizens this great novelty was still further endeared by the fact that it had raised them out of the degraded position of metics and slaves; and to the large majority of all the citizens, it furnished a splendid political idea, profoundly impressive to the Greek mind, capable of calling forth the most ardent attachment as well as the most devoted sense of active obligation and obedience. We have now to see how their newly-created patriotism manifested itself.

Clisthenes and his new constitution carried with them so completely the popular favour, that Isagoras had no other way of opposing it except by calling in the interference of Cleomenes and the Lacedæmonians. Cleomenes listened the more readily to this call, as he was reported to have been

on an intimate footing with the wife of Isagoras. He prepared to come to Athens; but his first aim was to deprive the democracy of its great leader Clisthenes, who, as belonging to the Alcæonid family, was supposed to be tainted with the inherited sin of his great-grandfather Megacles, the destroyer of the usurper Cylon. Cleomenes sent a herald to Athens, demanding the expulsion "of the accursed," — so this family were called by their enemies, and so they continued to be called eighty years afterwards, when the same manœuvre was practised by the Lacedæmonians of that day against Pericles. This requisition had been recommended by Isagoras, and was so well-timed that Clisthenes, not venturing to disobey it, retired voluntarily, so that Cleomenes, though arriving at Athens only with a small force, found himself master of the city. At the instigation of Isagoras, he sent into exile seven hundred families, selected from the chief partisans of Clisthenes: his next attempt was to dissolve the new senate of Five Hundred and place the whole government in the hands of three hundred adherents of the chief whose cause he espoused. But now was seen the spirit infused into the people by their new constitution. At the time of the first usurpation of Pisistratus, the senate of that day had not only not resisted, but even lent themselves to the scheme. But the new senate of Clisthenes resolutely refused to submit to dissolution, and the citizens manifested themselves in a way at once so hostile and so determined, that Cleomenes and Isagoras were altogether baffled. They were compelled to retire into the Acropolis and stand upon the defensive; and this symptom of weakness was the signal for a general rising of the Athenians, who besieged the Spartan king on the holy rock. He had evidently come without any expectation of finding, or any means of overpowering, resistance; for at the end of two days his provisions were exhausted, and he was forced to capitulate. He and his Lacedæmonians, as well as Isagoras, were allowed to retire to Sparta; but the Athenians of the party captured along with him were imprisoned, condemned, and executed by the people.

Clisthenes, with the seven hundred exiled families, was immediately recalled, and his new constitution materially strengthened by this first success. Yet the prospect of renewed Spartan attack was sufficiently serious to induce him to send envoys to Artaphernes, the Persian satrap at Sardis, soliciting the admission of Athens into the Persian alliance: he probably feared the intrigues of the expelled Hippias in the same quarter. Artaphernes, having first informed himself who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, replied that, if they chose to send earth and water to the king of Persia, they might be received as allies, but upon no other condition. Such were the feelings of alarm under which the envoys had quitted Athens, that they went the length of promising this unqualified token of submission. But their countrymen, on their return, disavowed them with scorn and indignation.

TROUBLE WITH THEBES

It was at this time that the first connection began between Athens and the little Bœotian town of Plataea, situated on the northern slope of the range of Cithæron, between that mountain and the river Asopus, on the road from Athens to Thebes; and it is upon this first occasion that we become acquainted with the Bœotians and their politics. The Bœotian federation has already been briefly described, as composed of some twelve or thirteen autonomous towns under the headship of Thebes, which was, or professed to have

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been, their mother-city. Plataea had been, so the Thebans affirmed, their latest foundation; it was ill-used by them, and discontented with the alliance. Accordingly, as Cleomenes was on his way back from Athens, the Plataeans took the opportunity of addressing themselves to him, craved the protection of Sparta against Thebes, and surrendered their town and territory without reserve. The Spartan king, having no motive to undertake a trust which promised nothing but trouble, advised them to solicit the protection of Athens, as nearer and more accessible for them in case of need. He foresaw that this would embroil the Athenians with Boeotia; and such anticipation was in fact his chief motive for giving the advice, which the Plataeans followed.

Selecting an occasion of public sacrifice at Athens, they despatched thither envoys, who sat down as suppliants at the altar, surrendered their town to Athens, and implored protection against Thebes. Such an appeal was not to be resisted, and protection was promised; it was soon needed, for the Thebans invaded the Plataean territory, and an Athenian force marched to defend it. Battle was about to be joined, when the Corinthians interposed with their mediation, which was accepted by both parties. They decided altogether in favour of Plataea, pronouncing that the Thebans had no right to employ force against any seceding member of the Boeotian federation. But the Thebans, finding the decision against them, refused to abide by it, and, attacking the Athenians on their return, sustained a complete defeat: the latter avenged this breach of faith by joining to Plataea the portion of Theban territory south of the Asopus, and making that river the limit between the two. By such success, however, the Athenians gained nothing, except the enmity of Boeotia, as Cleomenes had foreseen. Their alliance with Plataea, long continued, and presenting in the course of this history several incidents touching to our sympathies, will be found, if we except one splendid occasion, productive only of burden to the one party, yet insufficient as a protection to the other.

Meanwhile Cleomenes had returned to Sparta full of resentment against the Athenians, and resolved on punishing them, as well as on establishing his friend Isagoras as despot over them. Having been taught, however, by humiliating experience, that this was no easy achievement, he would not make the attempt, without having assembled a considerable force; he summoned allies from all the various states of the Peloponnesus, yet without venturing to inform them what he was about to undertake. He at the same time concerted measures with the Boeotians, and with the Chalcidians of Euboea, for a simultaneous invasion of Attica on all sides. It appears that he had greater confidence in their hostile dispositions towards Athens than in those of the Peloponnesians; he was not afraid to acquaint them with his design, and probably the Boeotians were incensed with the recent interference of Athens in the affair of Plataea. As soon as these preparations were completed, the two kings of Sparta, Cleomenes and Demaratus, put themselves at the head of the united Peloponnesian force, marched into Attica, and advanced as far as Eleusis on the way to Athens. But when the allies came to know the purpose for which they were to be employed, a spirit of dissatisfaction manifested itself among them. They had no unfriendly sentiment towards Athens; and the Corinthians especially, favourably disposed rather than otherwise towards that city, resolved to proceed no further, withdrew their contingent from the camp, and returned home. At the same time, king Demaratus, either sharing in the general dissatisfaction, or moved by some grudge against his colleague which had not before manifested itself,

renounced the undertaking also. And these two examples, operating upon the pre-existing sentiment of the allies generally, caused the whole camp to break up and return home without striking a blow.

We may here remark that this is the first instance known in which Sparta appears in act as recognised head of an obligatory Peloponnesian alliance, summoning contingents from the cities to be placed under the command of her king. Her headship, previously recognised in theory, passes now into act, but in an unsatisfactory manner, so as to prove the necessity of precaution and concert beforehand, which will be found not long wanting.

Pursuant to the scheme concerted, the Bœotians and Chalcidians attacked Attica at the same time that Cleomenes entered it. The former seized Cœnoe and Hysie, the frontier demes of Attica on the side towards Plataea, while the latter assailed the northeastern frontier, which faces Eubœa. Invaded on three sides, the Athenians were in serious danger, and were compelled to concentrate all their forces at Eleusis against Cleomenes, leaving the Bœotians and Chalcidians unopposed. But the unexpected breaking up of the invading army from the Peloponnesus proved their rescue, and enabled them to turn the whole of their attention to the other frontier. They marched into Bœotia to the strait called Euripus, which separates it from Eubœa, intending to prevent the junction of the Bœotians and Chalcidians, and to attack the latter first apart. But the arrival of the Bœotians caused an alteration of their scheme; they attacked the Bœotians first, and gained a victory of the most complete character, killing a large number, and capturing seven hundred prisoners. On the very same day they crossed over to Eubœa, attacked the Chalcidians, and gained another victory so decisive that it at once terminated the war. Many Chalcidians were taken, as well as Bœotians, and conveyed in chains to Athens, where after a certain detention they were at last ransomed for two minæ per man; and the tenth of the sum thus raised was employed in the fabrication of a chariot and four horses in bronze, which was placed in the Acropolis to commemorate the victory. Herodotus saw this trophy when he was at Athens. He saw too, what was a still more speaking trophy, the actual chains in which the prisoners had been fettered, exhibiting in their appearance the damage undergone when the Acropolis was burnt by Xerxes: an inscription of four lines described the offerings and recorded the victory out of which they had sprung.

Another consequence of some moment arose out of this victory. The Athenians planted a body of four thousand of their citizens as cleruchs (lot-holders) or settlers upon the lands of the wealthy Chalcidian oligarchy called the *hippobotæ*—proprieters probably in the fertile plain of Lelantum, between Chalcis and Eretria. This is a system which we shall find hereafter extensively followed out by the Athenians in the days of their power; partly with the view of providing for their poorer citizens, partly to serve as garrison among a population either hostile or of doubtful fidelity. These Attic cleruchs (we can find no other name by which to speak of them) did not lose their birthright as Athenian citizens: they were not colonists in the Grecian sense, and they are known by a totally different name, but they corresponded very nearly to the colonies formally planted out on the conquered lands by Rome. The increase of the poorer population was always more or less painfully felt in every Grecian city. For though the aggregate population never seems to have increased very fast, yet the multiplication of children in poor families caused the subdivision of the smaller lots of land, until at last they became insufficient for a mainten-

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ance; and the persons thus impoverished found it difficult to obtain subsistence in other ways, more especially as the labour for the richer classes was so much performed by imported slaves. The numerous cleruchies sent out by Athens, of which this to Eubœa was the first, arose in a great measure out of the multiplication of the poorer population, which her extended power was employed in providing for. Her subsequent proceedings with a view to the same object will not be always found so justifiable as this now before us, which grew naturally, according to the ideas of the time, out of her success against the Chalcidians.

The war between Athens, however, and Thebes with her Bœotian allies, still continued, to the great and repeated disadvantage of the latter, until at length the Thebans in despair sent to ask advice of the Delphian oracle, and were directed to "solicit aid from those nearest to them." "How (they replied) are we to obey? Our nearest neighbours, of Tanagra, Coronea, and Thespiæ, are now, and have been from the beginning, lending us all the aid in their power." An ingenious Theban, however, coming to the relief of his perplexed fellow-citizens, dived into the depths of legend and brought up a happy meaning. "Those nearest to us (he said) are the inhabitants of Ægina: for Thebe (the eponym of Thebes) and Ægina (the eponym of that island) were both sisters, daughters of Asopus: let us send to crave assistance from the Æginetans." If his subtle interpretation (founded upon their descent from the same legendary progenitors) did not at once convince all who heard it, at least no one had any better to suggest; and envoys were at once sent to the Æginetans, who, in reply to a petition founded on legendary claims, sent to the help of the Thebans a reinforcement of legendary, but venerated, auxiliaries—the Æacid heroes. We are left to suppose that their effigies are here meant. It was in vain, however, that the glory and the supposed presence of the Æacids, Telamon and Peleus, were introduced into the Theban camp. Victory still continued on the side of Athens; and the discouraged Thebans again sent to Ægina, restoring the heroes, and praying for aid of a character more human and positive. Their request was granted, and the Æginetans commenced war against Athens without even the decent preliminary of a herald and declaration.

This remarkable embassy first brings us into acquaintance with the Dorians of Ægina, — oligarchical, wealthy, commercial, and powerful at sea, even in the earliest days; more analogous to Corinth than to any of the other cities called Dorian. The hostility which they now began without provocation against Athens, — repressed by Sparta at the critical moment of the battle of Marathon; and hushed for a while by the common dangers of the Persian invasion under Xerxes; then again breaking out, — was appeased only with the conquest of the island about twenty years after that event, and with the expulsion and destruction of its inhabitants some years later. There had been indeed, according to Herodotus, a feud of great antiquity between Athens and Ægina, of which he gives the account in a singular narrative, blending together religion, politics, exposition of ancient customs, etc.; but at the time when the Thebans solicited aid from Ægina, the latter was at peace with Athens. The Æginetans employed their fleet, powerful for that day, in ravaging Phalerum and the maritime demes of Attica; nor had the Athenians as yet any fleet to resist them. It is probable that the desired effect was produced, of diverting a portion of the Athenian force from the war against Bœotia, and thus partially relieving Thebes. But the war of Athens against both of them continued for a considerable time, though we have no information respecting its details.

Meanwhile the attention of Athens was called off from these combined enemies by a more menacing cloud, which threatened to burst upon her from the side of Sparta. Cleomenes and his countrymen, full of resentment at the late inglorious desertion of Eleusis, were yet more incensed by the discovery, which appears to have been then recently made, that the injunctions of the Delphian priestess for the expulsion of Hippias from Athens had been fraudulently procured. Moreover, Cleomenes, when shut up in the Acropolis of Athens with Isagoras, had found there various prophecies previously treasured up by the Pisistratidæ, many of which foreshadowed events highly disastrous to Sparta. And while the recent brilliant manifestations of courage, and repeated victories, on the part of Athens, seemed to indicate that such prophecies might perhaps be realised, Sparta had to reproach herself, that, from the foolish and mischievous conduct of Cleomenes, she had undone the effect of her previous aid against the Pisistratidæ, and thus lost that return of gratitude which the Athenians would otherwise have testified. Under such impressions, the Spartan authorities took the remarkable step of sending for Hippias from his residence at Sigeum to the Peloponnesus, and of summoning deputies from all their allies to meet him at Sparta.

The convocation thus summoned deserves notice as the commencement of a new era in Grecian politics. The previous expedition of Cleomenes against Attica presents to us the first known example of Spartan headship passing from theory into act: that expedition miscarried because the allies, though willing to follow, would not follow blindly, nor be made the instruments of executing purposes repugnant to their feelings. Sparta had now learned the necessity, in order to insure their hearty concurrence, of letting them know what she contemplated, so as to ascertain at least that she had no decided opposition to apprehend. Here, then, is the third stage in the spontaneous movement of Greece towards a systematic conjunction, however imperfect, of its many autonomous units. First we have Spartan headship suggested in theory, from a concourse of circumstances which attract to her the admiration of all Greece,—power, unrivalled training, undisturbed antiquity, etc.; next, the theory passes into act, yet rude and shapeless; lastly, the act becomes clothed with formalities, and preceded by discussion and determination. The first convocation of the allies at Sparta, for the purpose of having a common object submitted to their consideration, may well be regarded as an important event in Grecian political history. The proceedings at the convocation are no less important, as an indication of the way in which the Greeks of that day felt and acted, and must be borne in mind as a contrast with times hereafter to be described.

Hippias having been presented to the assembled allies, the Spartans expressed their sorrow for having dethroned him, their resentment and alarm at the new born insolence of Athens, already tasted by her immediate neighbours, and menacing to every state represented in the convocation, and their anxiety to restore Hippias, not less as a reparation for past wrong, than as a means, through his rule, of keeping Athens low and dependent. But the proposition, though emanating from Sparta, was listened to by the allies with one common sentiment of repugnance. They had no sympathy for Hippias, no dislike, still less any fear, of Athens, and a profound detestation of the character of a despot. The spirit which had animated the armed contingents at Eleusis now reappeared among the deputies at Sparta, and the Corinthians again took the initiative. Their deputy Sosicles protested against the project in the fiercest and most indignant strain: no language can be stronger than that of the long harangue which Herodotus puts

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into his mouth, wherein the bitter recollections prevalent at Corinth respecting Cypselus and Periander are poured forth. "Surely, heaven and earth are about to change places, — the fish are coming to dwell on dry land, and mankind going to inhabit the sea, — when you, Spartans, propose to subvert the popular governments, and to set up in the cities that wicked and bloody thing called a Despot. First try what it is, for yourselves at Sparta, and then force it upon others if you can: you have not tasted its calamities as we have, and you take very good care to keep it away from yourselves. We adjure you, by the common gods of Hellas, — plant not despots in her cities: if you persist in a scheme so wicked, know that the Corinthians will not second you."

This animated appeal was received with a shout of approbation and sympathy on the part of the allies. All with one accord united with Sosicles in adjuring the Lacedæmonians "not to revolutionise any Hellenic city." No one listened to Hippias when he replied, warning the Corinthians that the time would come, when they, more than any one else, would dread and abhor the Athenian democracy, and wish the Pisistratidæ back again. He knew well, says Herodotus, that this would be, for he was better acquainted with the prophecies than any man. But no one then believed him, and he was forced to take his departure back to Sigeum: the Spartans not venturing to espouse his cause against the determined sentiment of the allies.

That determined sentiment deserves notice, because it marks the present period of the Hellenic mind; fifty years later it will be found materially altered. Aversion to single-headed rule, and bitter recollection of men like Cypselus and Periander are now the chords which thrill in an assembly of Grecian deputies: the idea of a revolution, implying thereby a great and comprehensive change, of which the party using the word disapproves, consists in substituting a permanent One in place of those periodical magistrates and assemblies which were the common attribute of oligarchy and democracy: the antithesis between these last two is as yet in the background, nor does there prevail either fear of Athens or hatred of the Athenian democracy. But when we turn to the period immediately before the Peloponnesian War, we find the order of precedence between these two sentiments reversed. The anti-monarchical feeling has not perished, but has been overlaid by other and more recent political antipathies,—the antithesis between democracy and oligarchy having become, not indeed the only sentiment, but the uppermost sentiment, in the minds of Grecian politicians generally, and the soul of active party movement. Moreover, a hatred of the most deadly character has grown up against Athens and her democracy, especially in the grandsons of those very Corinthians who now stand forward as her sympathising friends. The remarkable change of feeling here mentioned is nowhere so strikingly exhibited as when we contrast the address of the Corinthian Sosicles, just narrated, with the speech of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta, immediately antecedent to the Peloponnesian War, as given to us in Thucydides. It will hereafter be fully explained by the intermediate events, by the growth of Athenian power, and by the still more miraculous development of Athenian energy.

Such development, the fruit of the fresh-planted democracy as well as the seed for its sustentation and aggrandisement, continued progressive during the whole period just adverted to. But the first unexpected burst of it, under the Clisthenean constitution, and after the expulsion of Hippias, is described by Herodotus in terms too emphatic to be omitted. After narrating the successive victories of the Athenians over both Bœotians and

Chalcidians, that historian proceeds: "Thus did the Athenians grow in strength. And we may find proof, not merely in this instance but everywhere else, how valuable a thing freedom is: since even the Athenians, while under a despot, were not superior in war to any of their surrounding neighbours, but, so soon as they got rid of their despots, became by far the first of all. These things show that while kept down by one man, they were slack and timid, like men working for a master; but when they were liberated, every single man became eager in exertions for his own benefit." The same comparison reappears a short time afterwards, where he tells us, that "the Athenians when free, felt themselves a match for Sparta; but while kept down by any man under a despotism, were feeble and apt for submission."

Stronger expressions cannot be found to depict the rapid improvement wrought in the Athenian people by their new democracy. Of course this did not arise merely from suspension of previous cruelties, or better laws, or better administration. These, indeed, were essential conditions, but the active transforming cause here was the principle and system of which such amendments formed the detail: the grand and new idea of the sovereign people, composed of free and equal citizens,—or liberty and equality, to use words which so profoundly moved the French nation half a century ago. It was this comprehensive political idea which acted with electric effect upon the Athenians, creating within them a host of sentiments, motives, sympathies, and capacities to which they had before been strangers. Democracy in Grecian antiquity possessed the privilege, not only of kindling an earnest and unanimous attachment to the constitution in the bosoms of the citizens, but also of creating an energy of public and private action, such as could never be obtained under an oligarchy, where the utmost that could be hoped for was a passive acquiescence and obedience. Mr. Burke has remarked that the mass of the people are generally very indifferent about theories of government; but such indifference—although improvements in the practical working of all governments tend to foster it—is hardly to be expected among any people who exhibit decided mental activity and spirit on other matters; and the reverse was unquestionably true, in the year 500 B.C., among the communities of ancient Greece. Theories of government were there anything but a dead letter; they were connected with emotions of the strongest as well as of the most opposite character. The theory of a permanent ruling One, for example, was universally odious: that of a ruling Few, though acquiesced in, was never positively attractive, unless either where it was associated with the maintenance of peculiar education and habits, as at Sparta, or where it presented itself as the only antithesis to democracy, the latter having by peculiar circumstances become an object of terror. But the theory of democracy was pre-eminently seductive; creating in the mass of the citizens an intense positive attachment, and disposing them to voluntary action and suffering on its behalf, such as no coercion on the part of other governments could extort.

Herodotus, in his comparison of the three sorts of government, puts in the front rank of the advantages of democracy, "its most splendid name and promise,"—its power of enlisting the hearts of the citizens in support of their constitution, and of providing for all a common bond of union and fraternity. This is what even democracy did not always do: but it was what no other government in Greece could do: a reason alone sufficient to stamp it as the best government, and presenting the greatest chance of beneficent results, for a Grecian community. Among the Athenian citizens, certainly, it produced a strength and unanimity of positive political sentiment, such as

[494-490 A.D.]

has rarely been seen in the history of mankind, which excites our surprise and admiration the more when we compare it with the apathy which had preceded,—and which is even applied as the natural state of the public mind in Solon's famous proclamation against neutrality in a sedition. Because democracy happens to be unpalatable to some modern readers, they have been accustomed to look upon the sentiment here described only in its least honourable manifestations,—in the caricatures of Aristophanes, or in the empty commonplaces of rhetorical declaimers. But it is not in this way that the force, the earnestness, or the binding value of democratical sentiment at Athens is to be measured. We must listen to it as it comes from the lips of Pericles, while he is strenuously enforcing upon the people those active duties for which it both implanted the stimulus and supplied the courage; or from the oligarchical Nicias in the harbour of Syracuse, when he is endeavouring to revive the courage of his despairing troops for one last death-struggle, and when he appeals to their democratical patriotism as to the only flame yet alive and burning even in that moment of agony. From the time of Clisthenes downward, the creation of this new mighty impulse makes an entire revolution in the Athenian character. And if the change still stood out in so prominent a manner before the eyes of Herodotus, much more must it have been felt by the contemporaries among whom it occurred.

The attachment of an Athenian citizen to his democratical constitution comprised two distinct veins of sentiment: first, his rights, protection, and advantages derived from it; next, his obligations of exertion and sacrifice towards it and with reference to it. Neither of these two veins of sentiment was ever wholly absent; but according as the one or the other was present at different times in varying proportions, the patriotism of the citizen was a very different feeling. That which Herodotus remarks is, the extraordinary efforts of heart and hand which the Athenians suddenly displayed,—the efficacy of the active sentiment throughout the bulk of the citizens; and we shall observe even more memorable evidences of the same phenomenon in tracing down the history from Clisthenes to the end of the Peloponnesian War: we shall trace a series of events and motives eminently calculated to stimulate that self-imposed labour and discipline which the early democracy had first called forth. But when we advance farther down, from the restoration of the democracy after the Thirty Tyrants to the time of Demosthenes, we venture upon this brief anticipation, in the conviction that one period of Grecian history can be thoroughly understood only by contrasting it with another,—we shall find a sensible change in Athenian patriotism. The active sentiment of obligation is comparatively inoperative, the citizen, it is true, has a keen sense of the value of the democracy as protecting him and insuring to him valuable rights, and he is, moreover, willing to perform his ordinary sphere of legal duties towards it; but he looks upon it as a thing established, and capable of maintaining itself in a due measure of foreign ascendancy, without any such personal efforts as those which his forefathers cheerfully imposed upon themselves. The orations of Demosthenes contain melancholy proofs of such altered tone of patriotism,—of that languor, paralysis, and waiting for others to act, which preceded the catastrophe of Chæronea, notwithstanding an unabated attachment to the democracy as a source of protection and good government. That same preternatural activity which the allies of Sparta, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, both denounced and admired in the Athenians, is noted by the orator as now belonging to their enemy Philip.

Such variations in the scale of national energy pervade history, modern as well as ancient, but in regard to Grecian history, especially, they can never be overlooked. For a certain measure, not only of positive political attachment, but also of active self-devotion, military readiness, and personal effort, was the indispensable condition of maintaining Hellenic autonomy, either in Athens or elsewhere; and became so more than ever when the Macedonians were once organised under an enterprising and semi-Hellenised prince. The democracy was the first creative cause of that astonishing personal and many-sided energy which marked the Athenian character, for a century downwards from Clisthenes.

That the same ultra-Hellenic activity did not longer continue, is referable to other causes, which will be hereafter in part explained. No system of government, even supposing it to be very much better and more faultless than the Athenian democracy, can ever pretend to accomplish its legitimate end apart from the personal character of the people, or to supersede the necessity of individual virtue and vigour.

During the half-century immediately preceding the battle of Chæronea, the Athenians had lost that remarkable energy which distinguished them during the first century of their democracy, and had fallen much more nearly to a level with the other Greeks, in common with whom they were obliged to yield to the pressure of a foreign enemy. We here briefly notice their last period of languor, in contrast with the first burst of democratical fervour under Clisthenes, now opening—a feeling which will be found, as we proceed, to continue for a longer period than could have been reasonably anticipated, but which was too high-strung to become a perpetual and inherent attribute of any community.^b



THEATRE OF PHOCIS



CHAPTER XV. THE FIRST FOREIGN INVASION

Where'er we tread 'tis haunted, holy ground ;
No earth of thine is lost in vulgar mould,
But one vast realm of wonder spreads around,
And all the muse's tales seem truly told,
Till the sense aches with gazing to behold
The scenes our earliest dreams have dwelt upon ;
Each hill and dale, each deepening glen and wold,
Defies the power which crushed thy temples gone :
Age shakes Athena's tower, but spares gray Marathon.

— BYRON.

CURTIVS in the well-known passage which begins his celebrated history asks where is the division between Asia and Europe, pointing out that the islands of the Ægean Sea are practically stepping-stones between Asia Minor and Greece, and that from one point of view the intervening bits of water are rather connecting links than a severing barrier. This claim has much to support it in the view of a maritime people ; yet from another point of view a very tangible barrier does exist between the two continents. The Persians, as is well known, having their native seat far inland had a standing dread of water. For them the Ægean Sea was unquestionably a barrier, not a bridge. It would probably have been long before they attempted to cross this barrier had not the initiative been taken from the other side. But while it was far from Asia to Europe, it was not far, in the point of view of the sea-faring Greek, from Europe to Asia. To him the sea was a bridge.

No one knows how early the Greeks themselves crossed the various "bridges" of the Ægean and began to make settlements in Asia Minor, but it is known that in a very early day these settlements on the eastern shore had come to play a most important part in Grecian life. It is supposed that in the early day the inhabitants of Asia Minor welcomed the Greek colonist who became valuable to them as a manufacturer, and, in particular, as a trader.

It was long before there seemed anything menacing in the growth of these scattered colonies, and, before the powers of Asia Minor had aroused to a right understanding of the political import of the colonisation that had gone on under their eyes, the whole coast had come practically under the control of these peaceful invaders from the West. Then indeed the Lydians, in particular, were aroused to a realisation of what they had permitted, and sought to make amends by subjecting the colonies that had hitherto been their own masters. The attempt was first made on a large scale by Cræsus, but, before he had completed the task, he was himself overthrown by Cyrus, and the standing broil with the Greek colonies of the coast was one of the perquisites of war which Cræsus handed over to the Persians.

Cyrus himself seems to have thought the Greeks of small importance, as he left a subordinate to dispose of them, while he turned his personal attention to the more powerful Babylonians, but the Greeks were supported by the memory of some generations of freedom, and they did not prove the contemptible foe that they seemed. Cities once conquered were prone to revolt, and the indomitable spirit of the Greeks on this western border of the Persian territory proved a standing source of annoyance. At last Darius determined to put an end to the Grecians once for all, and it was his general who for the first time led a Persian host across the Hellespont and into the precincts of Greece itself. The repulse of this host by the Athenians on the field of Marathon was an event which the Greeks of a later time never tired of celebrating, and which has taken its place in later history as one of the half-dozen great decisive battles of the world. Subjected to a critical view this battle of Marathon, as we shall have occasion to see presently, was not quite so decisive an event as the Athenians were disposed to think it. Still it turned the Persian horde back from Greece for a decade. Then under Xerxes came that stupendous half-organised army that has been the wonder of all after-times; and the glorious events of Thermopylæ, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale in rapid succession added to the glory of Greek prowess and saved the life of Greece as a nation — saved it from an outer foe that it might die by its own hand. The events of this memorable epoch are among the most important in all Grecian history, and we must view them in detail, drawing largely for our knowledge of them on the great original source, Herodotus, but noting also the impression which they have made upon many generations of historians of other times and other lands.^a

THE ORIGIN OF ANIMOSITY

Herodotus, born 484, in the midst of the Median wars, wondered at this great conflict between the Greek and barbarian worlds and sought its causes in times more remote than the Trojan war, even in the mythological period.

"The most learned of the Persians," he says, "assert that the Phœnicians were the original excitors of contention. This nation migrated from the borders of the Red Sea to the place of their present settlement, and soon distinguished themselves by their long and enterprising voyages. They exported to Argos, among other places, the produce of Egypt and Assyria. Argos, at that period, was the most famous of all those states which are now comprehended under the general appellation of Greece. On their arrival here, the Phœnicians exposed their merchandise to sale; after remaining about six days, and when they had almost disposed of their different articles of commerce, the king's daughter, whom both nations agree in calling Io, came among a great number of other women, to visit them at their station. Whilst these females, standing near the stern of the vessel, amused themselves with bargaining for such things as attracted their curiosity, the Phœnicians, in conjunction, made an attempt to seize their persons. The greater part of them escaped, but Io, with many others, remained a captive. They carried them on board, and directed their course for Egypt.

"The relation of the Greeks differs essentially; but this, according to the Persians, was the cause of Io's arrival in Egypt, and the first act of violence which was committed. In process of time, certain Grecians, concerning whose country writers disagree, but who were really of Crete, are reported to have touched at Tyre, and to have carried away Europa, the daughter of the

[506 B.C.]

prince. Thus far the Greeks had only retaliated ; but they were certainly guilty of the second provocation. They made a voyage in a vessel of war to *Æa*, a city of Colchis, near the river Phasis ; and, after having accomplished the more immediate object of their expedition, they forcibly carried off the king's daughter, *Medea*. The king of Colchis despatched a herald to demand satisfaction for the affront, and the restitution of the princess ; but the Greeks replied, that they should make no reparation in the present instance, as the violence formerly offered to *Io* still remained unexpiated.

"In the age which followed, *Alexander [Paris]*, the son of *Priam*, encouraged by the memory of these events, determined on obtaining a wife from Greece, by means of similar violence ; fully persuaded that this, like former wrongs, would never be avenged.

"Upon the loss of *Helen*, the Greeks at first employed messengers to demand her person, as well as a compensation for the affront. All the satisfaction they received was reproach for the injury which had been offered to *Medea* ; and they were further asked, how, under circumstances entirely alike, they could reasonably require what they themselves had denied.

"Hitherto the animosity betwixt the two nations extended no farther than to acts of private violence. But at this period, the Greeks certainly laid the foundation of subsequent contention ; who, before the Persians invaded Europe, doubtless made military incursions into Asia. The Persians appear to be of opinion, that they who offer violence to women must be insensible to the impressions of justice, but that such provocations are as much beneath revenge, as the women themselves are undeserving of regard : it being obvious, that all females thus circumstanced must have been more or less accessory to the fact. They asserted also, that although women had been forcibly carried away from Asia, they had never resented the affront. The Greeks, on the contrary, to avenge the rape of a Lacedæmonian woman, had assembled a mighty fleet, entered Asia in a hostile manner, and had totally overthrown the empire of *Priam*. Since which event they had always considered the Greeks as the public enemies of their nation."

Such were the causes of the animosity between Persians and Greeks as *Herodotus* conceived them. But the modern historian gives scant credence to these tales. In reality we do not have to go back to the abduction of *Io* and *Helen* by the Asiatics, and of *Europa* and *Medea* by the Greeks to explain this mutual hate. Equally trivial are such incidents as the flight of the physician *Democedes*, who deceived *Darius* that he might return to his native *Croton* ; and the desire of the queen, *Atossa*, to include Spartan and Athenian women among her slaves. The appeals of *Hippias* to be reinstated in Athens, and of the *Aleuads* of Thessaly to be delivered from the enemies that oppressed them had, to be sure, a somewhat more serious influence. But the real cause was Persia's power. This empire had at that time attained its natural limits. Being nearly surrounded by deserts, the sea, wide rivers, and high mountains, there was but one direction in which she could expand, the northwest ; and on that side lay a famous country, Greece, whose independence affronted the pride of the Great King. *Cyrus* had conquered Asia ; *Cambyes* a part of Africa, so *Darius*, not to be outdone by his predecessors, attacked Europe. The Sardinian satrap, *Artaphernes*, had already replied to the overtures of *Clisthenes* by demanding that Athens should come under the rule of the Great King. *Darius* had reorganised his empire and restored in his provinces the order so rudely shaken by the usurpation of the Magian and the efforts of the conquered nations to regain their freedom ; it was necessary moreover to furnish occupation for

the warlike ardour which still characterised the Persians. With this end in view he planned an important expedition. The Scythians had formerly invaded Asia; it was the recollection of that injury and the desire to subjugate Thrace which adjoined his own empire that pointed out to Darius the route he was to follow. He set out from Susa with a numerous army, crossed the Bosphorus on a bridge of boats constructed by the Samian, Mandrocles, and entered Europe bringing seven or eight hundred thousand men in his train, among whom were some Asiatic Greeks commanded by the tyrants of the various cities. He traversed Thrace, crossed the Danube (Ister) on a bridge of boats which he left the Greeks to guard, then penetrated well into Scythia in pursuit of an enemy whom it was impossible to seize. Darius had told the Greeks not to expect him to return after the expiration of sixty days. This time having passed without news of him, the Athenian, Miltiades, tyrant of the Chersonesus, proposed to destroy the bridge that the way into Thrace might not be left open to the Scythians whom he supposed victorious, also that the Persian army might be destroyed by them should it still exist. Histæus of Miletus opposed this plan, representing to the chiefs, who were all tyrants of Greek cities, that they would surely be overthrown the day they lost the support of their great leader. This reasoning saved Darius, who, returning from his vain pursuit, left with Megabyzus eighty thousand men to complete the subjugation of Thrace, and also to conquer Macedonia.

Megabyzus conquered Perinthus, that part of Thrace which still resisted, Pæonia, and called upon the king of Macedonia to render him homage of earth and water. Amyntas accorded this, and Megabyzus was able to report to his master that the Persian empire at last adjoined Greece in Europe. With this the expedition came to an end. Histæus' services were rewarded by the gift of a vast territory on the banks of the Strymon. The site had been well chosen, near the gold and silver mines of Mount Pangæ, at the foot of hills rich in building woods and near the mouth of a river that offered an excellent port on the Ægean Sea. Myrcinus, founded there by Histæus, would soon have attained the growth and prosperity that were to signalise Amphipolis later on the same spot, had not Megabyzus, in alarm, warned the king of the necessity of preventing this Greek from carrying out the plans he meditated. Histæus was summoned to Sardis on pretext of being needed for an important consultation, and once there, Darius told him simply that he could not do without his friendship and advice. Histæus was obliged to accept these gilded chains.

THE IONIC REVOLT

Several years had passed in unbroken peace when a trivial matter and an obscure man threw all in disorder again. Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades, was powerful at that time, ruling over several islands, possessing a considerable navy and able to place in the field eight thousand hoplites. Unfortunately, like every other Grecian state, Naxos was divided into two factions, the popular and the aristocratic. This latter destroyed itself by an unpardonable crime, similar to that of which Lucretia was victim about the same time in Rome. Sent into exile, they proposed to Aristagoras, Histæus' son-in-law and, in his absence, tyrant of Miletus, to take them back to their island. He acceded readily, beholding in fancy the Cyclades, possibly also Eubœa as already under his dominion. But unable to accomplish such an enterprise without help, he succeeded in interesting the satrap of Sardis,

[499-494 B.C.]

Artaphernes, who placed at his disposal a fleet of two hundred ships commanded by Megabates. This Persian rebelled at being under the orders of a Greek and to avenge a slight received in a quarrel that broke out between them, sent information to the Naxians. The success of the expedition depended on secrecy; this once destroyed, it was bound to fail. Aristagoras held to the project four months, spending his own treasure as well as that given him for the enterprise by the king. He feared being obliged to make good this loss, and decided that revolt offered a preferable alternative, in which choice he was aided by the secret instigations of Histiaeus. The army he had led before Naxos was still united, and forming part of it were all the tyrants of the cities on the Asiatic coast. These he seized and sent back to their respective cities where they were placed under sentence of death or exile, then established democracy everywhere (499 B.C.). After these deeds, finding it necessary to attach some powerful ally to his cause, he visited Lacedæmon. Cleomenes, its king, questioned him as to the distance of the Persian capital from the sea. "A three months' march," replied Aristagoras. "In that case you will leave this place to-morrow," said the king, "it would be folly to propose to Lacedæmonians to put a three months' march between themselves and the sea." Aristagoras tried to bribe him to consent; but for once Spartan virtue was incorruptible and the Ionian went on to Athens. Given permission to speak in the assembly, he described the riches of Persia, and laid stress on the advantage the Greeks would have over a foe to whom the use of spear and shield was unknown, and finally adduced the fact that Miletus was a colony of Athens. The Athenians had more than one grievance against the Persians—the refuge given to Hippias, and the order to recall the tyrant received as a reply to their remonstrances. Aristagoras had little difficulty in persuading them to assure their own safety by carrying the war with which they were menaced over into the enemy's country, they also believing doubtless that the matter was but a private quarrel between the satrap and Aristagoras. They decreed to the envoy twenty vessels to which were added five triremes from Eretria, this state thus repaying the aid it had formerly received from Miletus in its war against Chalcis. The allies proceeded to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, which they took and pillaged. The houses were thatched with reeds, and, a soldier accidentally setting fire to one of the roofs, the entire city, with the exception of the citadel to which Artaphernes had retired, was consumed, together with the temple of Cybele, venerated as deeply by the Persians as by the Lydians (498). Artaphernes meanwhile had recalled the army that was besieging Miletus, and from all sides gathered the provincial troops; the Athenians began to think of retreat. A defeat they suffered near Ephesus, possibly also treason among themselves, completed their dissatisfaction. They boarded their ships and returned to Athens, leaving their allies to extricate themselves from the difficulty in which they were placed as best they could.

The Ionians continued the contest, drawing into their movement all the cities on the Hellespont and the Propontis, together with Chalcedonia and Byzantium, the Carians and the island of Cyprus. The Persians got together several armies; one, directed northward against the cities of the Hellespont, took several towns, then fell back towards the south against the Carians, who, after losing two battles, surrendered. Another attacked Cyprus with the Phœnician fleet that had been defeated by the Ionians, but the treachery of a Cypriote chief delivered the island over to the enemy. Acting jointly in the centre, Artaphernes and Otanes captured Clazomenæ and Cyme, and

then advanced with a considerable force against Miletus, the last bulwark of Ionia. Here Aristagoras was no longer chief; he had basely deserted and escaped to Myrcinus, and was later killed in an attack on a Thracian city. As regards Histiaëus, Darius, deceived by his promises, had recently restored him to liberty, but the Milesians, having no liking for tyrants, refused to receive him. Getting together a small force of Mytilenæans he became a pirate and was killed in a descent on the Asiatic coast. The Ionians assembled at the Panionium, deliberated as to the best means of saving Miletus. It was decided to risk a naval battle; Chios furnished a hundred ships, Lesbos seventy, Samos sixty, and Miletus itself eighty, the fleet numbering in all three hundred and fifty-three ships. The Persians had six hundred.

In the Greek fleet was a very able man who would have saved Ionia had she been willing to be saved. This was Dionysius, a Phocæan, who demonstrated to the allies that strict discipline and constant practice in manœuvres would assure them success. For seven days he drilled the crews in all the movements of naval warfare, but at the end of this time the effeminate Ionians had had enough; they left the ships, pitched their tents on land, and forgot that the enemy existed. As was unavoidable after taking such a course, their moral fibre became relaxed and treachery began to show among them. When the day of battle arrived, the Samians, in the hottest of the action, deserted their post and made for their own island. The Ionians were defeated despite the splendid courage of the Chian sailors and of Dionysius, who himself took three of the enemy's vessels. When he saw that the battle was lost he boldly pushed on to Tyre and sank several merchant ships, retiring to Sicily with the wealth obtained. The rest of his life was passed in pursuing on the open sea Phœnician, Carthaginian, and Tyrrhenian ships.

All hope was lost for Miletus; it was taken and its inhabitants transported to Ampe, at the mouth of the Tigris (494). Chios, Lesbos, Tenedos, shared Miletus' fate, and several cities of the Hellespont were destroyed by fire. The inhabitants of Chalcedon and Byzantium abandoned these cities to seek a home on the northwest coast of the Pontus Euxinus, in Mesambria. Miltiades also deemed it prudent to leave the Chersonesus; he returned to Athens, where he was soon to find himself arrayed against those very Persians from whom he now sought flight. The news of Ionia's downfall echoed sadly throughout Greece, Athens, in particular, being affected. Phrynichus presented a play entitled the *Capture of Miletus* at which the entire audience burst into tears, and the poet was sentenced to pay a fine of a thousand drachmæ "for having revived the memory of a great domestic misfortune." Tears like these expiate many faults.

Meanwhile Darius had not forgotten that after the burning of Sardis he had sworn to be revenged on the Athenians. He gave to his son-in-law, Mardonius, command over a newly raised army that was to enter Europe by way of Thrace while the fleet followed along the coast. Mardonius, to conciliate the Greeks in Asia, restored to them a democratic government, bearing in mind that the authors of the recent revolt had been two of the tyrants that Persia supported.

Megabazus had already subdued all the nations between the Hellespont and Macedonia. Mardonius crossed the Strymon and gave his fleet rendezvous in the Thermaic Gulf. He took Thasos and was passing along the coast of Chalcidice when on doubling the promontory of Mount Athos, which rises nineteen hundred and fifty metres out of the sea, his fleet encountered a terrific gale that wrecked three hundred ships and destroyed twenty

[492 B.C.]

thousand lives. About the same time Mardonius, attacked at night by the Thracians, lost many of his men and was himself wounded. He continued the expedition, but was so enfeebled after the subjugation of the Brygians that he felt himself obliged to return to Asia.

A more formidable armament was at once prepared. Before sending it forth Darius despatched heralds to Greece demanding homage of earth and water, and, in the case of maritime cities, a contingent of galleys. The greater part of the islands and several cities yielded to this demand, Ægina even anticipating the desire of the Great King. The indignation of Athens and Sparta was such that they forgot the respect due to envoys. "You want earth and water?" replied the Spartans, "very well, you shall have both," and the unfortunate men were thrown into a well. The Greeks cast them into the barathrum, and if a not very authentic tale may be believed, condemned to death the interpreter who had defiled the Greek tongue by translating into it the orders of a barbarian.¹

WAR WITH ÆGINA

Athens was constantly at war with the Æginetans, and she now seized an opportunity their conduct offered to accuse them to the Lacedæmonians of treachery to the common cause. This appeal to the Spartans was equivalent to acknowledging their claims to supremacy as the recognised chiefs of Hellas, the exigencies of the situation having silenced pride. Cleomenes shared the resentment of the Athenians, and proceeded to Ægina to seize the offenders. But his colleague Demaratus, who had already betrayed him in an expedition into Attica, informed the islanders and the enterprise fell through.

To put an end to his colleague's vexatious opposition Cleomenes caused it to be declared by the Pythia, whom he had won over, that Demaratus was not of royal blood, thus obtaining his deposition. Leotychides, who had joined with him in this scheme, succeeded the deposed king, to whom he was next of kin, and by outrageous treatment drove him from Sparta. Demaratus sought out Hippas in his exile and, like him, begged hospitality of the great protector of kings.

Cleomenes next proceeded to Ægina and took thence ten hostages whom he delivered over to the Athenians. This was the last public act of the turbulent chief who later became insane and perished miserably by his own hand; Leotychides, convicted of having taken bribes from the enemy he should have stubbornly opposed, died in exile. "Thus," says Herodotus, "did the gods punish the perjury of these two princes." Meanwhile the Æginetans demanded the return of their hostages, and, Athens refusing to surrender them, they attacked and captured the sacred galley that was carrying to Cape Sunium many prominent citizens. War immediately broke out. An Æginetan attempted to overthrow, in his island, the oligarchical government. He got possession of the citadel, but reinforcements not reaching him in time, he left in the hands of the enemy seven hundred of his men, who were massacred without mercy. One of these poor creatures succeeded in escaping and made his way to the temple of Ceres where he expected to find safe refuge. The gates being closed, he clung with both

[¹ It is worthy of mention that since this embassy there were no diplomatic relations between Athens and Persia until, in the last days of 1902, a Persian ambassador was appointed to the Hellenic court—an interval of about twenty-four hundred years.]

hands to the latch-ring, and all efforts to make him let go being unavailing, the butchers cut off his hands, which even in the convulsions of death still preserved their frenzied hold. Herodotus, accustomed as he was to civil war, raises not a word of protest against this slaughter of seven hundred citizens, he remarks only upon the sacrilege committed on account of one of them. "No sacrifice," he says piously, "will be sufficient to appease the wrath of the goddess." The nobles were all ejected from the island before they had expiated their act of sacrilege. This war did not close, in fact, until nine years after the second expedition of the Persians.^d

THE FIRST INVASION



GREEK FOOT SOLDIER

Whilst these two nations were thus engaged in hostilities, the domestic of the Persian monarch continued regularly to bid him "Remember the Athenians," which incident was further enforced by the unremitting endeavours of the Pisistratidæ to criminate that people. The king himself was very glad of this pretext, effectually to reduce such of the Grecian states as had refused him "earth and water." He accordingly removed from his command Mardonius, who had been unsuccessful in his naval undertakings; he appointed two other officers to commence an expedition against Eretria and Athens; these were Datis, a native of Media, and Artaphernes his nephew, who were commanded totally to subdue both the above places, and to bring the inhabitants captive before him.

These commanders, as soon as they had received their appointment, advanced to Aleum in Cilicia, with a large and well-provided body of infantry. Here, as soon as they encamped, they were joined by a numerous reinforcement of marines, agreeably to the orders which had

been given. Not long afterwards, those vessels arrived to take the cavalry on board, which in the preceding year Darius had commanded his tributaries to supply. The horse and foot immediately embarked, and proceeded to Ionia, in a fleet of six hundred triremes. They did not, keeping along the coast, advance in a right line to Thrace and the Hellespont, but loosing from Samos, they passed through the midst of the islands, and the Icarian Sea, fearing, as we should suppose, to double the promontory of Athos, by which they had in a former year severely suffered. They were further induced to this course by the island of Naxos which before they had omitted to take.

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Proceeding therefore from the Icarian Sea to this island, which was the first object of their enterprise, they met with no resistance. The Naxians, remembering their former calamities, fled in alarm to the mountains. Those taken captive were made slaves, the sacred buildings and the city were burned. This done, the Persians sailed to the other islands.

At this juncture the inhabitants of Delos deserted their island and fled to Tenos. The Persian fleet was directing its course to Delos, when Datis, hastening to the van, obliged them to station themselves at Rhenea, which lies beyond it. As soon as he learned to what place the Delians had retired, he sent a herald to them with this message: "Why, oh sacred people, do you fly, thinking so injuriously of me? If I had not received particular directions from the king my master to this effect, I, of my own accord, would never have molested you, nor offered violence to a place in which two deities were born. Return therefore, and inhabit your island as before." Having sent this message, he offered upon one of their altars incense to the amount of three hundred talents [£60,000 or \$300,000].

After this measure, Datis led his whole army against Eretria, taking with him the Ionians and Æolians. The Delians say, that at the moment of his departure the island of Delos was affected by a tremulous motion, a circumstance which, as the Delians affirm, never happened before or since. The deity, as it should seem by this prodigy, forewarned mankind of the evils which were about to happen. Greece certainly suffered more and greater calamities during the reigns of Darius son of Hystaspes, Xerxes son of Darius, and Artaxerxes son of Xerxes, than in all the preceding twenty generations; these calamities arose partly from the Persians, and partly from the contentions for power among its own great men. It was not therefore without reason that Delos, immovable before, should then be shaken, which event indeed had been predicted by the oracle:

"Although Delos be immovable, I will shake it."

It is also worth observation, that, translated into the Greek tongue, Darius signifies one who compels, Xerxes, a warrior, Artaxerxes, a great warrior; and thus they would call them if they used the corresponding terms.

The barbarians, sailing from Delos to the other islands, took on board reinforcements from them all, together with the children of the inhabitants as hostages. Cruising round the different islands, they arrived off Carystus; but the people of this place positively refused either to give hostages, or to serve against their neighbours, Athens and Eretria. They were consequently besieged, and their lands wasted; and they were finally compelled to surrender themselves to the Persians.

The Eretrians, on the approach of the Persian army, applied to the Athenians for assistance; this the Athenians did not think proper to withhold; they accordingly sent them the four thousand men to whom those lands had been assigned which formerly belonged to the Chalcidian cavalry; but the Eretrians, notwithstanding their application to the Athenians, were far from being firm and determined. They were so divided in their resolutions, that whilst some of them advised the city to be deserted, and a retreat made to the rocks of Eubœa, others, expecting a reward from the Persians, prepared to betray their country. Æschines, the son of Nothion, an Eretrian of the highest rank, observing these different sentiments, informed the Athenians of the state of affairs, advising them to return home, lest they should be involved in the common ruin. The Athenians attended to this advice of Æschines, and by passing over to Oropus, escaped the impending danger.

The Persians, arriving at Eretria, came near Tamynæ, Chærea, and Ægilia; making themselves masters of these places, they disembarked the horse, and prepared to attack the enemy. The Eretrians did not think proper to advance and engage them; the opinion for defending the city had prevailed, and their whole attention was occupied in preparing for a siege. The Persians endeavoured to storm the place, and a contest of six days was attended with very considerable loss on both sides. On the seventh, the city was betrayed to the enemy by two of the more eminent citizens, Euphorbus, son of Alcimachus, and Philager, son of Cyneas. As soon as the Persians got possession of the place, they pillaged and burned the temples to avenge the burning of their own temples at Sardis. The people, according to the orders of Darius, were made slaves.

After this victory at Eretria, the Persians stayed a few days, and then sailed to Attica, driving all before them, and thinking to treat the Athenians as they had done the Eretrians. There was a place in Attica called Marathon, not far from Eretria, well adapted for the motions of cavalry: to this place therefore they were conducted by Hippias, son of Pisistratus.

As soon as the Athenians heard this, they advanced to the same spot, under the conduct of ten leaders, with the view of repelling force by force. The last of these was Miltiades. His father Cimon, son of Stesagoras, had been formerly driven from Athens by the influence of Pisistratus, son of Hippocrates. During his exile, he had obtained the prize at the Olympic games, in the chariot-race of four horses. This honour, however, he transferred to Miltiades his uterine brother. At the Olympic games which next followed he was again victorious, and with the same mares. This honour he suffered to be assigned to Pisistratus, on condition of his being recalled; a reconciliation ensued, and he was permitted to return. Being victorious a third time, on the same occasion, and with the same mares, he was put to death by the sons of Pisistratus, Pisistratus himself being then dead. He was assassinated in the night, near the Prytaneum, by some villains sent for the purpose: he was buried in the approach to the city, near the hollow way; and in the same spot were interred the mares which had three times obtained the prize at the Olympic games. If we except the mares of Evagoras of Sparta, no other ever obtained a similar honour. At this period, Stesagoras, the eldest son of Cimon, resided in the Chersonesus with his uncle Miltiades; the youngest was brought up at Athens under Cimon himself, and named Miltiades, from the founder of the Chersonesus.

This Miltiades, the Athenian leader, in advancing from the Chersonesus, escaped from two incidents which alike threatened his life: he was pursued as far as Imbros by the Phœnicians, who were exceedingly desirous to take him alive, and present him to the King; on his return home, where he thought himself secure, his enemies accused, and brought him to a public trial, under pretence of his aiming at the sovereignty of the Chersonesus; from this also he escaped, and was afterwards chosen a general of the Athenians by the suffrages of the people.

The Athenian leaders, before they left the city, despatched Phidippides to Sparta: he was an Athenian by birth, and his daily employment was that of a courier. To this Phidippides, as he himself affirmed, and related to the Athenians, the god Pan appeared on Mount Parthenius, which is beyond Tegea. The deity called him by his name, and commanded him to ask the Athenians why they so entirely neglected him, who not only wished them well, but who had frequently rendered them service, and would do so again. All this the Athenians believed, and as soon as the state of their affairs

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permitted, they erected a temple to Pan near the citadel: ever since the above period, they venerate the god by annual sacrifices, and the race of torches.

Phidippides, who was sent by the Athenian generals, and who related his having met with Pan, arrived at Sparta on the second day of his departure from Athens. He went immediately to the magistrates, and thus addressed them: "Men of Lacedæmon, the Athenians supplicate your assistance, and entreat you not to suffer the most ancient city of Greece to fall into the hands of the barbarians: Eretria is already subdued, and Greece weakened by the loss of that illustrious place." After this speech of Phidippides, the Lacedæmonians resolved to assist the Athenians; but they were prevented from doing this immediately by the prejudice of an inveterate custom. This was the ninth day of the month, and it was a practice with them to undertake no enterprise before the moon was at the full: for this, therefore, they waited.

In the night before Hippias conducted the barbarians to the plains of Marathon, he saw this vision: he thought that he lay with his mother. The inference which he drew from this was, that he should again return to Athens, be restored to his authority, and die in his own house of old age: he was then executing the office of a general. The prisoners taken in Eretria he removed to Ægilia, an island belonging to the Styreans; the vessels which arrived at Marathon, he stationed in the port, and drew up the barbarians in order as they disembarked. Whilst he was thus employed, he was seized with a fit of sneezing, attended with a very unusual cough. The agitation into which he was thrown, being an old man, was so violent, that as his teeth were loose, one of them dropped out of his mouth upon the sand. Much pains were taken to find it, but in vain; upon which Hippias remarked with a sigh to those around him, "This country is not ours, nor shall we ever become masters of it — my lost tooth possesses all that belongs to me."

Hippias conceived that he saw in the above incident, the accomplishment of his vision. In the meantime the Athenians, drawing themselves up in military order near the temple of Hercules, were joined by the whole force of the Plateans. The Athenians had formerly submitted to many difficulties on account of the Plateans, who now, to return the obligation, gave themselves up to their direction. The occasion was this: the Plateans being oppressed by the Thebans, solicited the protection of Cleomenes the son of Anaxandrides, and of such Lacedæmonians as were at hand; they disclaimed, however, any interference, for which they assigned this reason:

"From us," said they, "situated at so great a distance, you can expect but little assistance; for before we can even receive intelligence of your danger, you may be effectually reduced to servitude; we would rather recommend you to apply to the Athenians, who are not only near, but able to protect you."

The Lacedæmonians, in saying this, did not so much consider the interest of the Plateans, as they were desirous of seeing the Athenians harassed by a Bœotian war. The advice was nevertheless accepted, and the Plateans going to Athens, first offered a solemn sacrifice to the twelve deities, and then sitting near the altar, in the attitude of supplicants, they placed themselves formally under the protection of the Athenians. Upon this the Thebans led an army against Platæa, to defend which, the Athenians appeared with a body of forces. As the two armies were about to engage, the Corinthians interfered; their endeavours to reconcile them so far prevailed, that it was

agreed, on the part of both nations, to suffer such of the people of Bœotia as did not choose to be ranked as Bœotians, to follow their own inclinations. Having effected this, the Corinthians retired, and their example was followed by the Athenians; these latter were on their return attacked by the Bœotians, whom they defeated. Passing over the boundaries, which the Corinthians had marked out, they determined that Asopus and Hysia should be the future limits between the Thebans and Plateans. The Plateans having thus given themselves up to the Athenians, came to their assistance at Marathon.

The Athenian leaders were greatly divided in opinion; some thought that a battle was by no means to be hazarded, as they were so inferior to the Medes in point of number; others, among whom was Miltiades, were anxious to engage the enemy. Of these contradictory sentiments, the less politic appeared likely to prevail, when Miltiades addressed himself to the polemarch, whose name was Callimachus of Aphidna. This magistrate, elected into his office by vote, has the privilege of a casting voice: and, according to established customs, is equal in point of dignity and influence to the military leaders. Miltiades addressed him thus:

“Upon you, O Callimachus, it alone depends, whether Athens shall be enslaved, or whether, in the preservation of its liberties, it shall perpetuate your name even beyond the glory of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Our country is now reduced to a more delicate and dangerous predicament than it has ever before experienced; if conquered, we know our fate, and must prepare for the tyranny of Hippias; if we overcome, our city may be made the first in Greece. How this may be accomplished, and in what manner it depends on you, I will explain: the sentiments of our ten leaders are divided, some are desirous of an engagement, others the contrary. If we do not engage, some seditious tumult will probably arise, which may prompt many of our citizens to favour the cause of the Medes; if we come to a battle before any evil of this kind take place, we may, if the gods be not against us, reasonably hope for victory: all these things are submitted to your attention, and are suspended on your will. If you accede to my opinion, our country will be free, our city the first in Greece.”

These arguments of Miltiades produced the desired effect upon Callimachus, from whose interposition it was determined to fight. Those leaders, who from the first had been solicitous to engage the enemy, resigned to Miltiades the days of their respective command. This he accepted, but did not think proper to commence the attack till the day of his own particular command arrived in its course.

THE BATTLE OF MARATHON

When this happened, the Athenians were drawn up for battle in the following order: Callimachus, as polemarch, commanded the right wing, in conformity with the established custom of the Athenians; next followed the tribes, ranged in close order, according to their respective ranks; the Plateans, placed in the rear, formed the left wing. Ever since this battle, in those solemn and public sacrifices, which are celebrated every fifth year, the herald implores happiness for the Plateans, jointly with the Athenians. Thus the Athenians produced a front equal in extent to that of the Medes. The ranks in the centre were not very deep, which of course constituted their weakest part; but the two wings were more numerous and strong.

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The preparations for the attack being thus made, and the appearance of the victims favourable, the Athenians ran toward the barbarians. There was betwixt the two armies an interval of about eight furlongs. The Persians seeing them approach by running, prepared to receive them, and as they observed the Athenians to be few in number, destitute both of cavalry and archers, they considered them as mad, and rushing on certain destruction; but as soon as the Greeks mingled with the enemy, they behaved with the greatest gallantry. They were the first Greeks that we know of, who ran to attack an enemy; they were the first also who beheld without dismay the dress and armour of the Medes; for hitherto in Greece the very name of a Mede excited terror.

After a long and obstinate contest, the barbarians in the centre, composed of the Persians and the Sacæ, obliged the Greeks to give way, and pursued the flying foe into the middle of the country. At the same time the Athenians and Plataeans, in the two wings, drove the barbarians before them; then making an inclination toward each other, by contracting themselves, they formed against that part of the enemy which had penetrated and defeated the Grecian centre, and obtained a complete victory, killing a prodigious number, and pursuing the rest to the sea, where they set fire to their vessels.

Callimachus the polemarch, after the most signal acts of valour, lost his life in this battle. Stesilaus also, the son of Thrasyllas, and one of the Grecian leaders, was slain. Cynægirus, son of Euphorion, after seizing one of the vessels by the poop, had his hand cut off with an axe, and died of his wounds: with these many other eminent Athenians perished.

In addition to their victory, the Athenians obtained possession of seven of the enemy's vessels. The barbarians retired with their fleet, and taking on board the Eretrian plunder, which they had left in the island, they passed the promontory of Sunium, thinking to circumvent the Athenians, and arrive at their city before them. The Athenians impute the prosecution of this measure to one of the Alcmaeonidæ, who they say held up a shield as a signal to the Persians, when they were under sail.

While they were doubling the cape of Sunium, the Athenians lost no time in hastening to the defence of their city, and effectually prevented the designs of the enemy. Retiring from the temple of Hercules, on the plains of Marathon, they fixed their camp near another temple of the same deity, in Cynosarges. The barbarians anchoring off Phalerum, the Athenian harbour, remained there some time, and then retired to Asia.

The Persians lost in the battle of Marathon six thousand four hundred men, the Athenians one hundred and ninety-two. In the heat of the engagement a most remarkable incident occurred: an Athenian, the son of Cuphagoras, whose name was Epizelus, whilst valiantly fighting, was suddenly struck with blindness. He had received no wound, nor any kind of injury, notwithstanding which he continued blind for the remainder of his life. Epizelus, in relating this calamity, always declared, that during the battle he was opposed by a man of gigantic stature, completely armed, whose beard covered the whole of his shield: he added, that the spectre, passing him, killed the man who stood next him.^c

Thus far we have followed the account of Herodotus. His high reputation, for many years scoffed at, has had a sudden and cordial revival. Minute surveys of the Grecian battle-fields have recently been made by George Beardoe Grundy,^f who finds Herodotus remarkably accurate in his topography and in his sifting of evidence and discarding of what he could not definitely substantiate. It is well to read, however, a typical account of the battle of

Marathon, by a German critic Busolt, whose cautious use of Herodotus has made the following account of this battle famous.^a

At the head of the army marched Callimachus the polemarch, who in his capacity of military chief was entitled to important privileges and honours. Not only did he offer sacrifices and vows, and in the order of battle assume the place of honour at the head of the right wing, but he was also entitled to vote with the Strategî in the council of war, and it even appears that as president of the latter he registered his vote last. In spite of this the actual command of the army was in the hands of the leaders of the regiments of the phylæ, amongst whom the chief command alternated in daily rotation. The Strategî at that time included, so far as we know, Aristides, Stesilaus, and Miltiades, who had apparently been elected as the tenth by his phyle, the Ceneis.



THE PLAIN OF MARATHON

The Athenian army is said to have marched out nine or ten thousand strong, but no confidence can be placed in these numbers as they rest on a later and unreliable authority.

Similarly, we have no decided, tangible information, as to what it was that induced the Athenians not to fortify themselves behind the walls of their city, but to venture into the open field to encounter an enemy, far superior in numbers and also, since the victory over the Ionians, evidently dreaded in Hellas. Perhaps the fate of Eretria may have exercised a decisive influence on the resolution of the Athenians. The town walls may not have been in the best condition, and, as in particular there was good cause to distrust the followers of the Pisistratidæ, there must have been some apprehension lest the latter should find occasion, while the Persian army lay before the town, to enter into relations with the enemy, as the Eretrian traitors had done. But if they decided for contest in the open field it was advisable to join battle in as favourable a position as possible; so that the country might be protected from plunder and foraging. It was therefore necessary to renounce the idea of barring the passes of Pentelicus and its outlying slopes,

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since this position might be easily turned by way of the sea. Still less durst they risk a battle in the open plain, where the enemy would have all the advantage belonging to their overwhelming numbers, and the Persian cavalry would have full play.

The most favourable place to take up a position would be in one of the long narrow side valleys, which adjoin the plain of Marathon and in which a small army might safely encamp opposite a large one. In one of these side valleys and indeed in that of Avlon itself, was the temple precinct of the Heracleum, by which the Athenian army took up its position. The flanks were covered by the slopes of Argaliki (right) and of Kotroni (left) and secured against a turning movement. Whilst it was well calculated for an attack the position also afforded protection against an advancing enemy. The limited breadth of the entrance to the valley hindered the Persians from bringing forward the whole strength of their infantry and from using their cavalry effectively.¹ If they elected to make no attack but to slip past the Athenian army, two ways offered themselves for the march against Athens. One of these led by Marathon or Vrana to Cephisia, the other between the outlying slopes of Pentelicius towards Pallene and the Mesogæa. But it was only this last road that was practicable for vehicles and an army with cavalry and baggage. On the march by either of these two routes the Persians must expose their flank to the enemy. If they took ship, that they might make direct for Phalerum, they were liable to be attacked by the Athenian army before they could get away.

When the Athenians had taken up their stand at the Heracleum, the whole fighting force of the Plateans joined them. It appears from this that the armies had been encamped opposite one another for several days, since the Plateans could of course only start for Marathon after they had heard of the decisive resolution of the Athenians to go out to meet the enemy in that place. Since the Persians showed no signs of attacking the Attic position and since doubtful tidings had already arrived from Sparta, Miltiades decided to anticipate the attack himself, in order, as Herodotus says, to leave those who cherished projects of high treason no time to affect a wider circle of citizens and create discord. Yet half of his colleagues held the Athenian army to be too weak and declared against a battle. Under these circumstances the decision lay with the vote of the polemarch Callimachus, and the latter sided with Miltiades. Thereupon, each of the Strategi, who had voted for the battle, surrendered his command for the day on which it was his turn to assume it to Miltiades. The latter did indeed accept it, but it is nevertheless said that he did not advance to the attack until the day arrived on which he held the command-in-chief himself in his own right. This statement is very doubtful, but shows that Herodotus was unacquainted with the tradition that Miltiades advanced to the attack when he received the news that the Persians were embarking and that the cavalry were on the sea-shore. If the battle-day was selected in this way, Miltiades could not certainly have voluntarily waited for his day. Now it is principally Herodotus whom we have to go upon, as the oldest authority and the one on which later writers have generally preferred to draw, and, moreover, the tradition of the embarkation of the cavalry is a completely unreliable one; all hypotheses therefore which are built upon it and on the circumstance of the display of the shield on the height of Pentelicius are to be regarded as of no value.

[¹ "Large trees felled and scattered over the plain obstructed the movements of the cavalry," says Bulwer-Lytton, not naming his authority.]

In the order of battle the Athenians placed themselves according to the official order of the phylæ. At their head as leader of the right wing, stood the polemarch Callimachus, with the phyle *Æantis*, to which he himself, as an *Aphidnæan*, belonged. The *Platæans* received a place on the extreme left. The front of the Athenians was turned to the northeast. The left wing was covered by the slope of *Kotroni* and the trees which fringed it; the right was not very far from the shore. The ground permitted *Miltiades* to make the line of battle the same length as that of the enemy, in order to protect himself from a flank movement. The wings had to be strong enough both to repel an attempt to surround them and to effect a charge; he therefore ranged the centre only a few lines deep, whilst the wings were relatively strong. The attack was not unexpected by the Persians; they had time to form in order of battle with a centre including their picked troops, Persians and *Sacæ*, while the cavalry seem to have been kept in reserve behind the hills. They were, however, astounded by the manner of the attack. According to *Herodotus* the space between the two lines of battle amounted to eight stadia. The serried ranks of the Athenians covered this distance at a run (in some nine minutes) chiefly to avoid the chance that the cavalry might fall upon them by the way, and in order to get as quickly as possible past the hail of Persian arrows and come to a hand-to-hand combat. For the Persians began their battles with a fight at a distance, and their army was essentially a defensive army, to which Hellenic hoplites were superior in a struggle of man against man. Moreover the speed of the forward movement must have added force to the charge of the heavy-armed infantry. The shock of meeting probably took place between the *Charadra* and the *Brexisa*; the Persian foot stood firm and the fight lasted a long time. Finally the Athenians and *Platæans* with great force threw back the enemy, on either wing, although their centre was pierced by the Persians and *Sacæ* and pursued inland. In consequence, the victorious wings left the vanquished to fly, wheeled inwards and turned their united front against the Persians and *Sacæ*. A new fight ensued, which ended in the total defeat of the barbarians. Many of them were driven, in their flight, into the great swamp of *Kato Suli*, and there perished.

In the meantime, the Persian wings which had been vanquished in the onset, had had some time in which to launch a number of ships and get first on board. In especial, the embarkation of the cavalry, which had probably remained behind the wings, must have been effected. This cannot have required very much time, since the horse-transporters were flat-built vessels. When the Athenians wished to follow up the pursuit of the Persians and *Sacæ* by the shore, they attempted to take or set fire to such ships as were still within reach. Thereupon there ensued a hot fight in which fell many men of name, such as polemarch *Callimachus*, the strategus *Stesilaus*, and *Cynægirus*, brother of the poet *Æschylus*. The Athenians succeeded in gaining possession of only seven ships; with the others the Persians got away and then made for the islet of *Ægilia*, to take on board the *Eretrians* they had left there.

The Persians were already in their ships, when it was noticed in the Athenian camps that a signal had been made by a shield, set up apparently upon the height of *Pentelicus*. It was believed that it had been given by the traitors in the town. Apparently on the morning after the battle the Persian fleet left *Ægilia* and steered its course for *Cape Sunium*. As soon as the Athenians observed the direction taken, the strategi could no longer doubt that it was the town which was aimed at. Forthwith they started with the

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army, and, by a rapid forced march, succeeded in reaching Athens before the enemy, and there set up a camp on the Heracleum, at the southern foot of Lycabettus, in Cynosarges. The Persian fleet soon showed itself above the height of Phalerum, yet made no attack, but only anchored for a time and then sailed back to Asia.

Presumably Datis did not venture on a landing in sight of the Athenian army after the experience of Marathon. The defeat was not indeed a crushing one, but had been by no means insignificant, for the Persians had lost 6400 killed, to which a considerable number of wounded is to be added. Of the Athenians, 192 citizens had fallen in the battle. The town bestowed on them the peculiar honour of a common burial on the battle-field itself. Close by, a tropeum of white marble and a monument to Miltiades were erected. With the tithe of the spoil, the Athenians erected, amongst other things, a bronze group at Delphi. Every year, on the sixth of Bedromion, the festival of Artemis Agrotera, a great goat sacrifice was offered to that goddess for the crowd of defeated enemies, in fulfilment of a vow of the polemarch, before the battle.

Pan, who had thrown his terror amongst the barbarians, received a sanctuary in the grotto on the northwest side of the rock-citadel. To him also an annual sacrifice was offered and a torch-race instituted. The memory of the victory which the Athenians, as advance guard of the Hellenes, had achieved always filled them with special pride. Poets and orators could not refer to it often enough.

The day of the battle cannot be determined with precision. Only this much is certain, that the fight took place at the time of the full moon, in one of the last months of the summer of the year 490. For after the full moon two thousand Lacedæmonians marched hastily from Sparta and made every effort to reach Athens in time. On the third day they arrived in Attica, but the battle had already been fought. After having viewed the scene of the Persian overthrow they started on their return march spreading eulogies on the Athenians.^g

In an article in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (1898), J. A. R. Munro^h declares that the reason the Persians chose so disadvantageous a field as Marathon, was purely to lure Miltiades and the troops out of Athens while the plot was maturing by which the supporters of Ippias should open the gates and admit the Persians by way of Phalerum. But as usually happens, something hung fire, the Spartans approached and, before the signal of the shield could be raised, Miltiades had routed the land forces with undreamed success and was hastening back to Athens.

In this light, the strategy of the Persians becomes somewhat less contemptible and the march of the Spartans seems not so useless.^a

ON THE COURAGE OF THE GREEKS

Modern history will never cease to ring with grateful praises of the Athenians and Platæans for their defence of Greece against Persia. They were the bulwark of the Occident against the Orient, of Europe against Asia. The Persian scholar can see many ways in which, to his mind at least, it would have been best if the Asiatic conquest of Greece had not thus been postponed for centuries. We of to-day shall always be glad that events fashioned themselves as they did until Europe was ready to resist any general enforcement of Asiatic ideals and customs.

Granting the importance, then, of the victory to its fullest extent, it cannot but make for truth to realise how little the Greeks knew all they were doing, how selfish and mutually jealous they were, and in what a humble manner they accomplished so much more than they dreamed or desired.^a The realism of this glorious feat could not be more vividly phrased than by Prof. J. P. Mahaffy in his *Rambles and Studies in Greece* :

“Byron may well be excused for raving about the liberty of the Greeks, for truly their old conflict at Marathon where a thousand ill-disciplined men repulsed a larger number of still worse disciplined Orientals, without any recondite tactics,—perhaps even without any very extraordinary heroism,—how is it that this conflict has maintained a celebrity which has not been equalled by all the great battles of the world, from that day down to our own? The courage of the Greeks was not of the first order. Herodotus praises the Athenians in this very battle for being the first Greeks that dared to look the Persians in the face. Their generals all through history seem never to feel sure of victory, and always endeavour to harangue their soldiers into a fury. Instead of advising coolness, they specially incite to rage—*ὀργήν προσμύζωμεν*, says one of them in Thucydides—as if any man not in this state would be sure to estimate the danger fully, and run away.

“It is, indeed, true that the ancient battles were hand to hand, and therefore parallel to our charges of bayonets, which are said to be very seldom carried out by two opposing lines, as one of them almost always gives way before the actual collision takes place. This must often have taken place in Greek battles, for, at Amphipolis, Brasidas in a battle lost seven men; at a battle of Corinth, mentioned by Xenophon—an important battle, too—the slain amounted to eight; and these battles were fought before the days when whole armies were composed of mercenaries, who spared one another, as Ordericus Vitalis says, ‘for the love of God, and out of good feeling for the fraternity of arms.’ So, then, the loss of 192 Athenians, including some distinguished men, was rather a severe one. As to the loss of the Persians, I so totally disbelieve the Greek accounts of such things, that it is better to pass it by in silence.

“Perhaps most readers will be astonished to hear of the Athenian army as undisciplined, and of the science of war as undeveloped, in those times. Yet I firmly believe this was so. The accounts of battles by almost all the historians are so utterly vague, and so childishly conventional, that it is evident these gentlemen were not only quite ignorant of the science of war, but could not easily find any one to explain it to them. We know that the Spartans, the most admired of all Greek warriors, were chiefly so admired because they devised the system of subordinating officers to one another within the same detachment, like our gradation from colonel to corporal. So orders were passed down from officer to officer, instead of being bawled out by a herald to a whole army.

“But this superiority of the Spartans who were really disciplined, and went into battle coolly, like brave men, certainly did not extend to strategy, but was merely a question of better drill. As soon as any real strategist met them, they were helpless. Thus Iphicrates, when he devised Wellington’s plan of meeting their attacking column in line, and using missiles, succeeded against them, even without firearms. Thus Epaminondas, when he devised Napoleon’s plan of massing troops on a single point, while keeping his enemy’s line occupied, defeated them without any considerable struggle. As for that general’s great battle of Mantinea, which seems really to have been introduced by some complicated strategical movements, it is a mere

[490 B.C.]

hopeless jumble in our histories. But these men were in the distant future when the battle of Marathon was being fought.

"Yet what signifies all this criticism? In spite of all scepticism, in spite of all contempt, the battle of Marathon, whether badly or well fought, and the troops at Marathon, whether well or ill trained, will ever be more famous than any other battle or army, however important or gigantic its dimensions. Even in this very war, the battles of Salamis and Platæa were vastly more important and more hotly contested. The losses were greater, the results were more enduring, yet thousands have heard of Marathon to whom the other names are unknown. So much for literary ability — so much for the power of talking well about one's deeds. Marathon was fought by Athenians; the Athenians eclipsed the other Greeks as far as the other Greeks eclipsed the rest of the world in literary power. This battle became the literary property of the city, hymned by poet, cited by orator, told by aged nurse, lisped by stammering infant; and so it has taken its position, above all criticism, as one of the great decisive battles which assured the liberty of the West against oriental despotism."

IF DARIUS HAD INVADED GREECE EARLIER

Had the first aggressive expedition of Darius, with his own personal command and fresh appetite for conquest, been directed against Greece instead of against Scythia (between 516–514 B.C.), Grecian independence would have perished almost infallibly. For Athens was then still governed by the Pisistratidæ. She had then no courage for energetic self-defence, and probably Hippias himself, far from offering resistance, would have found it advantageous to accept Persian dominion as a means of strengthening his own rule, like the Ionian despots: moreover the Grecian habit of co-operation was then only just commencing. But fortunately the Persian invader did not touch the shore of Greece until more than twenty years afterwards, in 490 B.C.; and during that precious interval, the Athenian character had undergone the memorable revolution which has been before described. Their energy and their organisation had been alike improved and their force of resistance had become decupled; moreover, their conduct had so provoked the Persians that resistance was then a matter of necessity with them and submission on tolerable terms an impossibility. When we come to the grand Persian invasion of Greece, we shall see that Athens was the life and soul of all the opposition offered. We shall see further, that with all the efforts of Athens, the success of the defence was more than once doubtful; and would have been converted into a very different result, if Xerxes had listened to the best of his own counsellors. But had Darius, at the head of the very same force which he conducted into Scythia, or even an inferior force, landed at Marathon in 514 B.C., instead of sending Datis in 490 B.C. — he would have found no men like the victors of Marathon to meet him. As far as we can appreciate the probabilities, he would have met with little resistance, except from the Spartans singly, who would have maintained their own very defensible territory against all his effort — like the Mysians and Pisidians in Asia Minor, or like the Mainots of Laconia in later days; but Hellas generally would have become a Persian satrapy.^b



CHAPTER XVI. MILTIADES AND THE ALLEGED FICKLENESS OF REPUBLICS

HAPPY would it have been for Miltiades if he had shared the honourable death of the polemarch Callimachus, in seeking to fire the ships of the defeated Persians at Marathon. The short sequel of his history will be found in melancholy contrast with the Marathonian heroism.

His reputation had been great before the battle, and after it the admiration and confidence of his countrymen knew no bounds: it appears, indeed, to have reached such a pitch that his head was turned, and he lost both his patriotism and his prudence. He proposed to his countrymen to incur the cost of equipping an armament of seventy ships, with an adequate armed force, and to place it altogether at his discretion; giving them no intimation whither he intended to go, but merely assuring them that, if they would follow him, he would conduct them to a land where gold was abundant, and thus enrich them. Such a promise from the lips of the recent victor of Marathon was sufficient, and the armament was granted, no man except Miltiades knowing what was its destination. He sailed immediately to the island of Paros, laid siege to the town, and sent in a herald to require from the inhabitants a contribution of one hundred talents [$\pounds 20,000$ or $\$100,000$], on pain of entire destruction. His pretence for this attack was, that the Parians had furnished a trireme to Datis for the Persian fleet at Marathon; but his real motive, so Herodotus assures us, was vindictive animosity against a Parian citizen named Lysagoras, who had exasperated the Persian general Hydarnes against him. The Parians amused him at first with evasions, until they had procured a little delay to repair the defective portions of their wall, after which they set him at defiance; and Miltiades in vain prosecuted hostilities against them for the space of twenty-six days: he ravaged the island, but his attacks made no impression upon the town. Beginning to despair of success in his military operations, he entered into some negotiation — such at least was the tale of the Parians themselves — with a Parian woman named Timo, priestess or attendant in the temple of Demeter, near the town gates. This woman, promising to reveal to him a secret which would place Paros in his power, induced him to visit by night a temple to which no male person was admissible. He leaped the exterior fence, and approached the sanctuary; but on coming near, was seized with a panic terror and ran away, almost out of his senses: on leaping the same fence to get back, he strained or bruised his thigh badly, and became utterly disabled. In this melancholy state he was placed on shipboard, the siege being raised, and the whole armament returning to Athens.

Vehement was the indignation both of the armament and of the remaining Athenians against Miltiades on his return; and Xanthippus, father of the great Pericles, became the spokesman of this feeling. He impeached Miltiades before the popular judicature as having been guilty of deceiving the people, and as having deserved the penalty of death. The accused himself, disabled by his injured thigh, which even began to show symptoms of gangrene, was unable to stand, or to say a word in his own defence: he lay on his couch before the assembled judges, while his friends made the best case they could in his behalf. Defence, it appears, there was none; all they could do, was to appeal to his previous services: they reminded the people largely and emphatically of the inestimable exploit at Marathon, coming in addition to his previous conquest of Lemnos. The assembled dicasts, or jurors, showed their sense of these powerful appeals by rejecting the proposition of his accuser to condemn him to death: but they imposed on him the penalty of fifty talents [£10,000 or \$50,000] "for his iniquity."

Cornelius Nepos affirms that these fifty talents represented the expenses incurred by the state in fitting out the armament; but we may more probably believe, looking to the practice of the Athenian dicastery in criminal cases, that fifty talents was the minor penalty actually proposed by the defenders of Miltiades themselves, as a substitute for the punishment of death. In those penal cases at Athens, where the punishment was not fixed beforehand by the terms of the law, if the person accused was found guilty, it was customary to submit to the jurors, subsequently and separately, the question as to amount of punishment: first, the accuser named the penalty which he thought suitable; next, the accused person was called upon to name an amount of penalty for himself, and the jurors were constrained to take their choice between these two—no third gradation of penalty being admissible for consideration. Of course, under such circumstances, it was the interest of the accused party to name, even in his own case, some real and serious penalty—something which the jurors might be likely to deem not wholly inadequate to his crime just proved; for if he proposed some penalty only trifling, he drove them to prefer the heavier sentence recommended by his opponent. Accordingly, in the case of Miltiades, his friends, desirous of inducing the jurors to refuse their assent to the punishment of death, proposed a fine of fifty talents as the self-assessed penalty of the defendant; and perhaps they may have stated, as an argument in the case, that such a sum would suffice to defray the costs of the expedition. The fine was imposed, but Miltiades did not live to pay it: his injured limb mortified, and he died, leaving the fine to be paid by his son Cimon.

According to Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus, and Plutarch, he was put in prison, after having been fined, and there died. But Herodotus does not mention this imprisonment, and the fact appears improbable: he would hardly have omitted to notice it, had it come to his knowledge.

Thus closed the life of the conqueror of Marathon. The last act of it produces an impression so mournful, and even shocking—his descent from the pinnacle of glory to defeat, mean tampering with a temple-servant, mortal bodily hurt, undefended ignominy, and death under a sentence of heavy fine, is so abrupt and unprepared—that readers, ancient and modern, have not been satisfied without finding some one to blame for it: we must except Herodotus, our original authority, who recounts the transaction without dropping a single hint of blame against any one. To speak ill of the people, as Machiavelli has long ago observed, is a strain in which every one at all times, even under a democratical government, indulges with impunity

and without provoking any opponent to reply; and in this instance, the hard fate of Miltiades has been imputed to the vices of the Athenians and their democracy—it has been cited in proof, partly of their fickleness, partly of their ingratitude. But however such blame may serve to lighten the mental sadness arising from a series of painful facts, it will not be found justified if we apply to those facts a reasonable criticism.

What is called the fickleness of the Athenians on this occasion is nothing more than a rapid and decisive change in their estimation of Miltiades; unbounded admiration passing at once into extreme wrath. To censure them for fickleness is here an abuse of terms; such a change in their opinion was the unavoidable result of his conduct. His behaviour in the expedition of Paros was as reprehensible as at Marathon it had been meritorious, and the one succeeded immediately after the other: what else could ensue except an entire revolution in the Athenian feelings? He had employed his prodigious ascendancy over their minds to induce them to follow him without knowing whither, in the confidence of an unknown booty; he had exposed their lives and wasted their substance in wreaking a private grudge; in addition to the shame of an unprincipled project, comes the constructive shame of not having succeeded in it. Without doubt, such behaviour, coming from a man whom they admired to excess, must have produced a violent and painful revulsion in the feelings of his countrymen. The idea of having lavished praise and confidence upon a person who forthwith turns it to an unworthy purpose, is one of the greatest torments of the human bosom; and we may well understand that the intensity of the subsequent displeasure would be aggravated by this reactionary sentiment, without accusing the Athenians of fickleness.

In regard to the charge of ingratitude against the Athenians, this last-mentioned point—sufficiency of reason—stands tacitly admitted. It is conceded that Miltiades deserved punishment for his conduct in reference to the Parian expedition, but it is nevertheless maintained that gratitude for his previous services at Marathon ought to have exempted him from punishment. But the sentiment upon which, after all, this exculpation rests, will not bear to be drawn out and stated in the form of a cogent or justifying reason. For will any one really contend, that a man who has rendered great services to the public, is to receive in return a license of unpunished misconduct for the future? Is the general, who has earned applause by eminent skill and important victories, to be recompensed by being allowed the liberty of betraying his trust afterwards, and exposing his country to peril, without censure or penalty? This is what no one intends to vindicate deliberately; yet a man must be prepared to vindicate it, when he blames the Athenians for ingratitude towards Miltiades. It will be recollected that the death of Miltiades arose neither from his trial nor his fine, but from the hurt in his thigh.

The charge of ingratitude against the Athenian popular juries really amounts to this—that, in trying a person accused of present crime or fault, they were apt to confine themselves too strictly and exclusively to the particular matter of charge, either forgetting or making too little account of past services which he might have rendered. Whoever imagines that such was the habit of Athenian dicasts, must have studied the orators to very little purpose. Their real defect was the very opposite: they were too much disposed to wander from the special issue before them, and to be affected by appeals to previous services and conduct.

This defect is one which we should naturally expect from a body of private, non-professional citizens assembled for the occasion, and which belongs

more or less to the system of jury-trial everywhere ; but it is the direct reverse of that ingratitude, or habitual insensibility to prior services, for which they have been so often denounced.

The fate of Miltiades, then, so far from illustrating either the fickleness or the ingratitude of his countrymen, attests their just appreciation of deserts. It also illustrates another moral, of no small importance to the right comprehension of Grecian affairs ; it teaches us the painful lesson, how perfectly maddening were the effects of a copious draught of glory on the temperament of an enterprising and ambitious Greek. There can be no doubt, that the rapid transition, in the course of about one week, from Athenian terror before the battle to Athenian exultation after it, must have produced demonstrations towards Miltiades such as were never paid towards any other man in the whole history of the commonwealth. Such unmeasured admiration unseated his rational judgment, so that his mind became abandoned to the reckless impulses of insolence, and antipathy, and rapacity — that distempered state, for which (according to Grecian morality) the retributive Nemesis was ever on the watch, and which, in his case, she visited with a judgment startling in its rapidity, as well as terrible in its amount. Had Miltiades been the same man before the battle of Marathon as he became after it, the battle might probably have turned out a defeat instead of a victory. We shall presently be called upon to observe the same tendency in the case of the Spartan Pausanias, and even in that of the Athenian Themistocles.


It is, indeed, fortunate that the reckless aspirations of Miltiades did not take a turn more noxious to Athens than the comparatively unimportant enterprise against Paros. For had he sought to acquire dominion and gratify antipathies against enemies at home, instead of directing his blow against a Parian enemy, the peace and security of his country might have been seriously endangered.

Of the despots who gained power in Greece, a considerable proportion began by popular conduct, and by rendering good service to their fellow-citizens : having first earned public gratitude, they abused it for purposes of their own ambition. There was far greater danger, in a Grecian community, of dangerous excess of gratitude towards a victorious soldier, than of deficiency in that sentiment : hence the person thus exalted acquired a position such that the community found it difficult afterwards to shake him off. Now there is a disposition almost universal among writers and readers to side with an individual, especially an eminent individual, against the multitude ; and accordingly those who under such circumstances suspect the probable abuse of an exalted position, are denounced as if they harboured an unworthy jealousy of superior abilities. But the truth is, that the largest analogies of the Grecian character justified that suspicion, and required the community to take precautions against the corrupting effects of their own enthusiasm. There is no feature which more largely pervades the impressive Grecian character, than a liability to be intoxicated and demoralised by success : there was no fault from which so few eminent Greeks were free : there was hardly any danger, against which it was at once so necessary and so difficult for the Grecian governments to take security — especially the democracies, where the manifestations of enthusiasm were always the loudest. Such is the real explanation of those charges which have been urged against the Grecian democracies, that they came to hate and ill-treat previous benefactors ; and the history of Miltiades illustrates it in a manner no less pointed than painful.

If we are to predicate any attribute of the multitude, it will rather be that of undue tenacity than undue fickleness; and there will occur nothing in the course of this history to prove that the Athenian people changed their opinions on insufficient grounds more frequently than an irresponsible one or few would have changed.

But there were two circumstances in the working of the Athenian democracy which imparted to it an appearance of greater fickleness, without the reality: First, that the manifestations and changes of opinion were all open, undisguised, and noisy: the people gave utterance to their present impression, whatever it was, with perfect frankness; if their opinions were really changed, they had no shame or scruple in avowing it. Secondly, — and this is a point of capital importance in the working of democracy generally, — the present impression, whatever it might be, was not merely undisguised in its manifestations, but also had a tendency to be exaggerated in its intensity. This arose from their habit of treating public affairs in multitudinous assemblages, the well-known effect of which is, to inflame sentiment in every man's bosom by mere contact with a sympathising circle of neighbours. Whatever the sentiment might be, — fear, ambition, cupidity, wrath, compassion, piety, patriotic devotion, etc., — and whether well-founded or ill-founded, it was constantly influenced more or less by such intensifying cause. This is a defect which of course belongs in a certain degree to all exercise of power by numerous bodies, even though they be representative bodies, especially when the character of the people, instead of being comparatively sedate and slow to move, like the English, is quick, impressible, and fiery, like Greeks or Italians; but it operated far more powerfully on the self-acting Demos assembled in the Pnyx. It was in fact the constitutional malady of the democracy, of which the people were themselves perfectly sensible, — as we shall show hereafter from the securities which they tried to provide against it, — but which no securities could ever wholly eradicate. Frequency of public assemblies, far from aggravating the evil, had a tendency to lighten it. The people thus became accustomed to hear and balance many different views as a preliminary to ultimate judgment; they contracted personal interest and esteem for a numerous class of dissentient speakers; and they even acquired a certain practical consciousness of their own liability to error.

These two attributes, then, belonged to the Athenian democracy; first, their sentiments of every kind were manifested loudly and openly; next, their sentiments tended to a pitch of great present intensity. Of course, therefore, when they changed, the change of sentiment stood prominent, and forced itself upon every one's notice — being a transition from one strong sentiment past to another strong sentiment present. And it was because such alterations, when they did take place, stood out so palpably to remark, that the Athenian people have drawn upon themselves the imputation of fickleness: for it is not at all true that changes of sentiment were more frequently produced in them by frivolous or insufficient causes, than changes of sentiment in other governments.^b





CHAPTER XVII. THE PLANS OF XERXES

WHAT follows is one of the most interesting parts of Herodotus. It exhibits the most circumstantial detail of the expedition of Xerxes against Greece, by a writer almost contemporary. It is also impressed with the character of authenticity, for it was recited to a multitude of Greeks assembled at Olympia, among whom doubtless there were many who had fought both at Salamis and Platæa.^f

When the news of the battle of Marathon was communicated to Darius, he, who was before incensed against the Athenians, on account of their invasion of Sardis, became still more exasperated, and more inclined to invade Greece. He instantly therefore sent emissaries to the different cities under his power, to provide a still greater number of transports, horses, corn, and provisions. In the interval which this business employed, Asia experienced three years of confusion ; her most able men being enrolled for the Greek expedition, and making preparation for it. In the fourth, the Egyptians, who had been reduced by Cambyses, revolted from the Persians : but this only induced Darius to accelerate his preparations against both nations. At this juncture there arose a violent dispute among the sons of Darius, concerning the succession to the throne, the Persian customs forbidding the sovereign to undertake any expedition without naming his heir. Darius had three sons before he ascended the throne, by the daughter of Gobryas ; he had four afterwards by Atossa, daughter of Cyrus : Artabazanes was the eldest of the former, Xerxes of the latter. Not being of the same mother, a dispute arose between them ; Artabazanes asserted his pretensions from being the eldest of all his father's sons, a claim which mankind in general consent to acknowledge. Xerxes claimed the throne because he was the grandson of Cyrus, to whom the Persians were indebted for their liberties.

Darius having declared Xerxes his heir, prepared to march ; but in the year which succeeded the Egyptian revolt, he died ; having reigned thirty-six years, without being able to gratify his resentment against the Egyptians and Athenians who had opposed his power. On his death, Xerxes immediately succeeded to the throne, and from the first, seemed wholly inclined to the Egyptian rather than the Athenian War. But Mardonius, who was his cousin, being the son of Gobryas, by a sister of Darius, thus addressed him :

"I should think, Sir, that the Athenians, who have so grievously injured the Persians, ought not to escape with impunity. I would nevertheless have you execute what you immediately propose ; but when you shall have chastised the insolence of Egypt, resume the expedition against Athens. Thus will your reputation be established, and others in future be deterred from molesting your dominions." What he said was further enforced by

representing the beauties of Europe, that it was exceedingly fertile, abounded with all kinds of trees, and deserved to be possessed by the king alone.

Mardonius said this, being desirous of new enterprises, and ambitious of the government of Greece. Xerxes at length acceded to his counsel, to which he was also urged by other considerations. Some messengers came from Thessaly on the part of the Aleuadæ, imploring the king to invade Greece; to accomplish which, they used the most earnest endeavours. These Aleuadæ were the princes of Thessaly: their solicitations were strengthened by the Pisistratidæ, who had taken refuge at Susa, and who to the arguments before adduced, added others. They had among them Onomacritus, an Athenian, a famous priest, who sold the oracles of Musæus; with him they had been reconciled previous to their arrival at Susa. This man had been formerly banished from Athens by the son of Pisistratus; for Lasus of Hermione had detected him in the fact of introducing a pretended oracle, among the verses of Musæus, intimating that the islands contiguous to Lemnos should be overwhelmed in the ocean. Hipparchus for this expelled him, though he had been very intimate with him before. He accompanied the Pisistratidæ to Susa, who always spoke of him in terms highly honourable; upon which account, whenever he appeared in the royal presence, he recited certain oracular verses. He omitted whatever predicted anything unfortunate to the barbarians, selecting only what promised them auspiciously; among other things he said the fates decreed that a Persian should throw a bridge over the Hellespont.

Thus was the mind of Xerxes assailed by the predictions of the priest, and the opinions of the Pisistratidæ. In the year which followed the death of Darius, he determined on an expedition against Greece, but commenced hostilities with those who had revolted from the Persians. These being subdued, and the whole of Egypt more effectually reduced than it had been by Darius, he confided the government of it to Achæmenes, his own brother, son of Darius. Achæmenes was afterwards slain by Inarus, a Lybian, the son of Psammetichus. After the subjection of Egypt, Xerxes prepared to lead an army against Athens, but first of all he called an assembly of the principal Persians, to hear their sentiments, and to deliver, without reserve, his own. He addressed them to the following purport:

"You will remember, O Persians, that I am not about to execute any new project of my own; I only pursue the path which has been previously marked out for me. I have learned from my ancestors, that ever since we recovered this empire from the Medes, after the depression of Astyages by Cyrus, we have never been in a state of inactivity. A deity is our guide, and auspiciously conducts us to prosperity. It must be unnecessary for me to relate the exploits of Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius, and the nations they added to our empire. For my own part, ever since my accession to the throne, it has been my careful endeavour not to reflect any disgrace upon my forefathers, by suffering the Persian power to diminish. My deliberations on this matter have presented me with a prospect full of glory; they have pointed out to me a region not inferior to our own in extent, and far exceeding it in fertility, which incitements are further promoted by the expectation of honourable revenge; I have therefore assembled you to explain what I intend:

"I have resolved, by throwing a bridge over the Hellespont, to lead my forces through Europe into Greece, and to inflict vengeance on the Athenians for the injuries offered to my father and Persia. You well know that this war was intended by Darius, though death deprived him of the means of vengeance. Considering what is due to him and to Persia, it is my deter-

[484 B.C.]

mination not to remit my exertions, till Athens shall be taken and burned. The Athenians, unprovoked, first insulted me and my father; under the conduct of Aristagoras of Miletus, our dependent and slave, they attacked Sardis, and consumed with fire our groves and temples. What they perpetrated against you, when, led by Datis and Artaphernes, you penetrated into their country, you know by fatal experience. Such are my inducements to proceed against them: but I have also additional motives.

"If we reduce these and their neighbours who inhabit the country of Pelops the Phrygian, to our power, the Persian empire will be limited by the heavens alone; the sun will illuminate no country contiguous to ours: I shall overrun all Europe, and with your assistance possess unlimited dominion. For if I am properly informed, there exists no race of men, nor can any city or nation be found, which if these be reduced, can possibly resist our arms: we shall thus subject, as well those who have, as those who have not, injured us. I call therefore for your assistance, which I shall thankfully accept and acknowledge; I trust that with cheerfulness and activity you will all assemble at the place I shall appoint. To him who shall appear with the greatest number of well-provided troops, I will present those gifts which in our country are thought to confer the highest honour. That I may not appear to dictate my own wishes in an arbitrary manner, I commit the matter to your reflection, permitting every one to deliver his sentiments with freedom."

When Xerxes had finished, Mardonius made the following reply:

"Sir, you are not only the most illustrious of all the Persians who have hitherto appeared, but you may securely defy the competition of posterity. Among other things which you have advanced, alike excellent and just, you are entitled to our particular admiration for not suffering the people of Ionia, contemptible as they are, to insult us with impunity. It would indeed be preposterous, if after reducing to our power the Sææ, the Indians, the Ethiopians, and the Assyrians, with many other great and illustrious nations, not in revenge of injuries received, but solely from the honourable desire of dominion, we should not inflict vengeance on these Greeks who, without provocation, have molested us.

"There can be nothing to excite our alarm; no multitude of troops, no extraordinary wealth; we have tried their mode of fighting, and know their weakness. Their descendants, who under the names of Ioniæ, Æolians, and Dorians, reside within our dominions, we first subdued, and now govern. Their prowess I myself have known, when at the command of your father I prosecuted a war against them. I penetrated Macedonia, advanced almost to Athens, and found no enemy to encounter.

"Beside this, I am informed that in all their military undertakings, the Greeks betray the extremest ignorance and folly. As soon as they commence hostilities among themselves, their first care is to find a large and beautiful plain,¹ where they appear and give battle: the consequence is, that even the victors suffer severe loss; of the vanquished I say nothing, for they are totally destroyed. As they use one common language, they ought in policy to terminate all disputes by the mediation of ambassadors, and above all things to avoid a war among themselves: or, if this should prove unavoidable, they should mutually endeavour to find a place of great natural strength, and

[¹ The Romans, in attacking an enemy, so disposed their army, as to be able to rally three different times. This has been thought by many as the great secret of the Roman discipline; because fortune never has failed their efforts three different times before they could be possibly defeated. The Greeks drew up their forces in one extended line, and therefore depended upon the effect of the first charge. *f*]

then try the issue of a battle. By pursuing as absurd a conduct as I have described, the Greeks suffered me to advance as far as Macedonia without resistance. But who, Sir, shall oppose you, at the head of the forces and the fleet of Asia? The Greeks, I think, never can be so audacious. If however I should be deceived, and they shall be so mad as to engage us, they will soon find to their cost that in the art of war we are the first of mankind. Let us however adopt various modes of proceeding, for perfection and success can only be the result of frequent experiment."

In this manner, Mardonius seconded the speech of Xerxes.

A total silence prevailed in the assembly, no one daring to oppose what had been said; till at length Artabanus, son of Hystaspes, and uncle to Xerxes, deriving confidence from his relationship, thus delivered his sentiments: "Unless, O King, different sentiments be submitted to the judgment, no alternative of choice remains, the one introduced is of necessity adopted. The purity of gold cannot be ascertained by a single specimen; it is known and approved by comparing it with others. It was my advice to Darius, your father and my brother, that he should by no means undertake an expedition against the Scythians, a people without towns and cities. Allured by his hopes of subduing them, he disregarded my admonitions; and proceeding to execute his purpose was obliged to return, having lost numbers of his best troops. The men, O King, whom you are preparing to attack, are far superior to the Scythians, and alike formidable by land and sea. I deem it therefore my duty to forewarn you of the dangers you will have to encounter.

"You say that, throwing a bridge over the Hellespont, you will lead your forces through Europe into Greece; but it may possibly happen, that either on land or by sea, or perhaps by both, you may sustain a defeat, for our enemies are reported to be valiant. Of this indeed we have had sufficient testimony; for if the Athenians by themselves routed the numerous armies of Datis and Artaphernes, it proves that we are not, either by land or sea, perfectly invincible. If, preparing their fleet, they shall be victorious by sea, and afterwards sailing to the Hellespont, shall destroy your bridge, we may dread all that is bad. I do not argue in this respect from my own private conjecture; we can all of us remember how very narrowly we escaped destruction, when your father, throwing bridges over the Thracian Bosphorus and the Ister, passed into Scythia. The guard of this pass was entrusted to the Ionians, whom the Scythians urged to break it down, by the most earnest importunity. If at this period Histiaeus of Miletus had not opposed the sentiments of the rest, there would have been an end of the Persian name.

"It is painful to repeat, and afflicting to remember, that the safety of our prince and his dominions depended on a single man. Listen therefore to my advice, and where no necessity demands it, do not involve yourself in danger. For the present, dismiss this meeting; revolve the matter more seriously in your mind, and at a future and seasonable time make known your determination. For my own part, I have found from experience, that deliberation produces the happiest effects. In such a case, if the event does not answer our wishes, we still merit the praise of discretion, and fortune is alone to be blamed. He who is rash and inconsiderate, although fortune may be kind, and anticipate his desires, is not the less to be censured for temerity. You may have observed how the thunderbolt of heaven chastises the insolence of the more enormous animals, whilst it passes over without injury the weak and insignificant: before these weapons of the gods you must have seen how the proudest palaces and the loftiest trees fall and perish. The most conspicuous things are those which are chiefly singled out

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as objects of the divine displeasure. From the same principle it is that a mighty army is sometimes overthrown by one that is contemptible: for the Deity in his anger sends his terrors among them, and makes them perish in a manner unworthy of their former glory. Perfect wisdom is the prerogative of Heaven alone, and every measure undertaken with temerity is liable to be perplexed with error, and punished by misfortune. Discreet caution, on the contrary, has many and peculiar advantages, which if not apparent at the moment, reveal themselves in time.

"Such, O King, is my advice; and little does it become you, O son of Gobryas, to speak of the Greeks in a language foolish as well as false. By calumniating Greece, you excite your sovereign to war, the great object of all your zeal: but I entreat you to forbear. Calumny is a restless vice, where it is indulged there are always two who offer injury. The calumniator himself is injurious, because he traduces an absent person; he is also injurious who suffers himself to be persuaded without investigating the truth. The person traduced is doubly injured, first by him who propagates, and secondly by him who receives the calumny. If this war be a measure of necessity, let it be prosecuted; but let the king remain at home with his subjects. Suffer the children of us two to remain in his power, as the test of our different opinions; and do you, Mardonius, conduct the war with whatever forces you shall think expedient. If, agreeably to your representations, the designs of the king shall be successful, let me and my children perish; but if what I predict shall be accomplished, let your children die, and yourself too, in case you shall return. If you refuse these conditions, and are still resolved to lead an army into Greece, I do not hesitate to declare, that all those who shall be left behind will hear that Mardonius, after having involved the Persians in some conspicuous calamity, became a prey to dogs and ravenous birds, in the territories either of Athens or Lacedæmon, or probably during his march thither. Thus you will know, by fatal experience, what those men are, against whom you endeavour to persuade the king to prosecute a war."

When Artabanus had finished, Xerxes thus angrily replied: "Artabanus, you are my father's brother, which alone prevents your receiving the chastisement due to your foolish speech. This mark of ignominy shall however adhere to you—as you are so dastardly and mean, you shall not accompany me to Greece, but remain at home, the companion of our women. Without your assistance, I shall proceed in the accomplishment of my designs; for I should ill deserve to be esteemed the son of Darius, who was the son of Hystaspes, and reckoned among his ancestors Arsames, Ariaramnes, Teispes, Cyrus, Cambyses, Teispes, and Achæmenes, if I did not gratify my revenge upon the Athenians. I am well assured, that if we on our parts were tranquil, they would not be, but would invade and ravage our country. This we may reasonably conclude from their burning of Sardis, and their incursions into Asia. Neither party can therefore recede; we must advance to the attack of the Greeks, or we must prepare to sustain theirs; we must either submit to them, or they to us; in enmities like these there can be no medium. Injured as we have been, it becomes us to seek for revenge; for I am determined to know what evil is to be dreaded from those whom Pelops the Phrygian, the slave of my ancestors, so effectually subdued, that even to this day they, as well as their country, are distinguished by his name."

On the approach of evening the sentiments of Artabanus gave great inquietude to Xerxes, and after more serious deliberation with himself in the night, he found himself still less inclined to the Grecian war. Having decided on the subject, he fell asleep, when, as the Persians relate, the following vision

appeared to him :— He dreamed that he saw before him a man of unusual size and beauty, who thus addressed him : “ Are you then determined, O Persian, contrary to your former resolutions, not to lead an army against Greece, although you have ordered your subjects to prepare their forces ? This change in your sentiments is absurd in itself, and will certainly be censured by the world. Resume therefore, and persist in what you had resolved by day.” Having said this, the vision disappeared.

The impression made by the vision vanished with the morning. Xerxes a second time convoked the former meeting, and again addressed them :

“ Men of Persia,” said he, “ you will forgive me, if my former sentiments are changed. I am not yet arrived at the full maturity of my judgment ; and they who wish me to prosecute the measures which I before seemed to approve, do not remit their importunities. When I first heard the opinion of Artabanus, I yielded to the emotions of youth, and expressed myself more petulantly than was becoming, to a man of his years. To prove that I see my indiscretion, I am resolved to follow his advice. It is not my intention to undertake an expedition against Greece ; remain therefore in tranquillity.”

The Persians hearing these sentiments, prostrated themselves with joy before the king. On the following night the same phantom appeared a second time to Xerxes in his sleep, and spake to him as follows : “ Son of Darius, disregarding my admonitions as of no weight or value, you have publicly renounced all thoughts of war. Hear what I say : unless you immediately undertake that which I recommend, the same short period of time which has seen you great and powerful, shall behold you reduced and abject.”

Terrified at the vision, the king leaped from his couch, and sent for Artabanus. As soon as he approached, “ Artabanus,” exclaimed Xerxes, “ in return for your salutary counsel, I reproached and insulted you ; but as soon as I became master of myself I endeavoured to prove my repentance by adopting what you proposed. This however, whatever may be my wishes, I am unable to do. As soon as my former determinations were changed, I beheld in my sleep a vision, which first endeavoured to dissuade me, and has this moment left me with threats. If what I have seen proceed from the interference of some deity, who is solicitous that I should make war on Greece, it will doubtless appear to you, and give you a similar mandate. This will I think be the case, if you will assume my habit, and after sitting on my throne retire to rest in my apartment.”

Artabanus was at first unwilling to comply, alleging that he was not worthy to sit on the throne of the king. But being urged, he finally acquiesced, after thus expressing his sentiments : “ I am of opinion, O King, that to think well, and to follow what is well-advised, is alike commendable : both these qualities are yours ; but the artifice of evil counsellors misleads you. Thus, the ocean is of itself most useful to mankind, but the stormy winds render it injurious, by disturbing its natural surface. Your reproaches gave me less uneasiness than to see that when two opinions were submitted to public deliberation, the one aiming to restrain, the other to countenance the pride of Persia, you preferred that which was full of danger to yourself and your country, rejecting the wiser counsel, which pointed out the evil tendency of ambition. Now that you have changed your resolution with respect to Greece, a phantom has appeared, and, as you say, by some divine interposition, has forbidden your present purpose of dismissing your forces. But, my son, I dispute the divinity of this interposition, for of the fallacy of dreams I, who am more experienced than yourself, can produce sufficient testimonies. Dreams in general originate from those incidents which have most occu-

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pied the thoughts during the day. Two days since, you will remember that this expedition was the object of much warm discussion: but if this vision be really sent from heaven, your reasoning upon it is just, and it will certainly appear to me as it has done to you, expressing itself to a similar effect; but it will not show itself to me dressed in your robes, and reclining on your couch, sooner than if I were in my own habit and my own apartment. No change of dress will induce the phantom, if it does appear, to mistake me for you. If it shall hold me in contempt, it will not appear to me, however I may be clothed. It unquestionably however merits attention; its repeated appearance I myself must acknowledge to be a proof of its divinity. If you are determined in your purpose, I am ready to go to rest in your apartment: but till I see the phantom myself I shall retain my former opinions."

Artabanus, expecting to find the king's dream of no importance, did as he was ordered. He accordingly put on the robe of Xerxes, seated himself on the royal throne, and afterward retired to the king's apartment. The same phantom which had disturbed Xerxes appeared to him,¹ and thus addressed him: "Art thou the man who, pretending to watch over the conduct of Xerxes, art endeavouring to restrain his designs against Greece? Your perverseness shall be punished both now and in future; and as for Xerxes himself, he has been forewarned of the evils he will suffer, if disobedient to my will."

Such were the threats which Artabanus heard from the spectre, which at the same time made an effort to burn out his eyes with a hot iron. Alarmed at his danger, Artabanus leaped from his couch, and uttering a loud cry, went instantly to Xerxes. After relating his vision, he thus spake to him: "Being a man, O King, of much experience, and having seen the undertakings of the powerful foiled by the efforts of the weak, I was unwilling that you should indulge the fervour of your age. Of the ill effects of inordinate ambition, I had seen a fatal proof, in the expedition which Cyrus undertook against the Massagetae; I knew also what became of the army of Cambyses in their attack of Ethiopia; and lastly, I myself witnessed the misfortunes of Darius, in his hostilities with the Scythians. The remembrance of these incidents induced me to believe that if you continued a peaceful reign, you would beyond all men deserve the character of happy: but as your present inclination seems directed by some supernatural influence, and as the Greeks seem marked out by heaven for destruction, I acknowledge that my sentiments are changed; do you therefore make known to the Persians the extraordinary intimations you have received, and direct your dependents to hasten the preparations you had before commanded. Be careful, in what relates to yourself, to second the intentions of the gods."

The vision indeed had so powerfully impressed the minds of both, that as soon as the morning appeared, Xerxes communicated his intentions to the Persians; which Artabanus, in opposition to his former sentiments, now openly and warmly approved.

Whilst everything was making ready for his departure, Xerxes saw a third vision. The magi to whom it was related were of opinion that it portended to Xerxes unlimited and universal empire. The king conceived himself to be crowned with the wreath of an olive tree, whose branches covered all the earth, but that this wreath suddenly and totally disappeared. After the above interpretation of the magi had been made known in the

[¹ Larcher^d reasonably supposes that this was a plot of Mardonius to impose on Xerxes; and that some person, dressed and disguised for the purpose, acted the part of the ghost.]

national assembly of the Persians, the governors departed to their several provinces, eager to execute the commands they had received, in expectation of the promised reward. Xerxes was so anxious to complete his levies that no part of the continent was left without being ransacked for this purpose. After the reduction of Egypt, four entire years were employed in assembling the army and collecting provisions; but in the beginning of the fifth he began his march with an immense body of forces.^b

Darius was three years in preparing for an expedition against Greece; in the fourth Egypt revolted, and in the following year Darius died; this therefore was the fifth year after the battle of Marathon. Xerxes employed four years in making preparations for the same purpose; in the fifth he began his march, he advanced to Sardis, and there wintered; in the beginning of the following spring he entered Greece. This therefore was in the eleventh year after the battle of Marathon; which account agrees with that given by Thucydides.^f

Of all the military expeditions, the fame of which has come down to us, this was far the greatest, much exceeding that which Darius undertook against Scythia, as well as the incursion made by the Scythians, who, pursuing the Cimmerians, entered Media, and made themselves entire masters of almost all the higher parts of Asia; an incursion which afforded Darius the pretence for his attack on Scythia. It surpasses also the famous expedition of the sons of Atreus against Troy, as well as that of the Mysians and Teucrians before the Trojan War. These nations, passing over the Bosphorus into Europe, reduced all the inhabitants of Thrace, advancing to the Ionian Sea, and thence as far as the southern part of the river Peneus.

None of the expeditions already mentioned, nor indeed any other, may at all be compared with this of Xerxes. It would be difficult to specify any nation of Asia, which did not accompany the Persian monarch against Greece, or any waters, except great rivers, which were not exhausted by his armies. Some supplied ships, some a body of infantry, others of horse; some provided transports for the cavalry and the troops; others brought long ships to serve as bridges; many also brought vessels laden with corn, all which preparations were made for three years, to guard against a repetition of the calamities which the Persian fleet had formerly sustained, in their attempts to double the promontory of Mount Athos. The place of rendezvous for the triremes was at Elæus of the Chersonesus, from whence detachments from the army were sent, and by force of blows compelled to dig a passage through Mount Athos, with orders to relieve each other at certain regular intervals. The undertaking was assisted by those who inhabited the mountain, and the conduct of the work was confided to Bubares, the son of Megabazus, and Antachæus, son of Artæus, both of whom were Persians.^b

This incident Richardson conceives to be utterly incredible. The promontory was, as he justly remarks, no more than two hundred miles from Athens, and yet Xerxes is said to have employed a number of men, three years before his crossing the Hellespont, to separate it from the continent, and make a canal for his shipping. Themistocles, also, who from the time of the battle of Marathon had been incessantly alarming the Athenians with another Persian invasion, never endeavoured to support his opinion by any allusion to this canal, the very digging of which must have filled all Greece with astonishment, and been the subject of every public conversation. Pococke, who visited Mount Athos, also deems the event highly improbable, and says that he could not perceive the smallest vestige of any such undertaking.^f

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Bury thinks that the canal was actually dug, the reason being not that which Herodotus later suggests, a mere desire for display, but an obedience to the axiom of Persian strategy that the army and the fleet should not lose touch with each other. But leaving the riddle unsolved, as needs we must, let us proceed with the narrative, Herodotus acting as guide.^a

Athos is a large and noble mountain projecting into the sea, and inhabited; where it terminates on the land side, it has the appearance of a peninsula, and forms an isthmus of about twelve stadia in breadth: the surface of this is interspersed with several small hills, reaching from the Acanthian Sea to that of Torone, which is opposite. Where Mount Athos terminates, stands a Grecian city, called Sane; in the interior parts, betwixt Sane and



THE HELLESPONT

the elevation of Athos, are situated the towns of Dium, Olophyxus, Acrothoum, Thyssus, and Cleonæ, inhabited by Greeks. It was the object of the Persians to detach these from the continent.

They proceeded to dig in this manner: the barbarians marked out the ground in the vicinity of Sane with a rope, assigning to each nation their particular station; then sinking a deep trench, whilst they at the bottom continued digging, the nearest to them handed the earth to others standing immediately above them upon ladders; it was thus progressively elevated, till it came to the summit, where they who stood received and carried it away. The brink of the trench giving way, except in that part where the Phœnicians were employed, occasioned a double labour; and this, as the trench was no wider at top than at bottom, was unavoidable. But in this, as in other instances, the Phœnicians discovered their superior sagacity, for in the part allotted to them they commenced by making the breadth of the trench twice as large as was necessary; and thus proceeding in an inclined direction, they made their work at the bottom of the prescribed dimensions. In this part was a meadow, which was their public place for business and for commerce, and where a vast quantity of corn was imported from Asia.^b

Plutarch, in his treatise *De Ira cohibenda*, has preserved a ridiculous letter, supposed to have been written by Xerxes to Mount Athos. It was to this effect: "O thou miserable Athos, whose top now reaches to the heavens, I give thee in charge not to throw any great stones in my way, which may impede my work; if thou shalt do this, I will cut thee in pieces and cast thee into the sea." This threat to the mountain is however at least as sensible as the chastisement inflicted upon the Hellespont; so that if one anecdote be true, the other may also obtain credit.^f

The motive of Xerxes in this work was, as far as we are able to conjecture, the vain desire of exhibiting his power, and of leaving a monument to posterity. When with very little trouble he might have transported his vessels over the isthmus, he chose rather to unite the two seas by a canal, of sufficient diameter to admit two triremes abreast. Those employed in this business were also ordered to throw bridges over the river Strymon.

For these bridges Xerxes provided cordage made of the bark of the biblos, and of white flax. The care of transporting provisions for the army was committed jointly to the Egyptians and Phœnicians, that the troops, as well as the beasts of burden, in this expedition to Greece, might not suffer from famine. After examining into the nature of the country, he directed stores to be deposited in every convenient situation, which were supplied by transports and vessels of burden, from the different parts of Asia. Of these, the greater number were carried to that part of Thrace which is called the "White Coast"; others to Tyrodiza of the Perinthians; the remainder were severally distributed at Doriscus, at Eion on the banks of the Strymon, and in Macedonia.

Whilst these things were carrying on, Xerxes, at the head of all his land forces, left Critalla in Cappadocia, and marched towards Sardis: it was at Critalla that all those troops were appointed to assemble who were to attend the king by land; who the commander was, that received from the king the promised gifts, on account of the number and goodness of his troops, we are unable to decide, nor indeed can we say whether there was any competition on the subject. Passing the river Halys, they came to Phrygia, and continuing to advance, arrived at Celænæ, where are the fountains of the Mæander, as well as those of another river of equal size with the Mæander, called Catarrhactes, which rising in the public square of Celænæ, empties itself into the Mæander. In the forum of this city is suspended the skin of Marsyas, which the Phrygians say was placed there after he had been flayed by Apollo.

In this city lived a man named Pythius, son of Atys, a native of Lydia, who entertained Xerxes and all his army with great magnificence: he further engaged to supply the king with money for the war. Xerxes was on this induced to inquire of his Persian attendants who this Pythius was, and what were the resources which enabled him to make these offers: "It is the same," they replied, "who presented your father Darius with a plane-tree and a vine of gold, and who, next to yourself, is the richest of mankind."¹

[¹ Many wonderful anecdotes are related of the riches of individuals in more ancient times; among which this does not seem to be the least marvellous. The sum of which Pythius is said to have been possessed amounted to five millions and a half of sterling money [\$27,500,000]; this is according to the estimate of Prideaux; that given by Montfaucon differs essentially. "The denii," says this last writer, "weighed eight modern louis-d'ors; therefore Pythius possessed thirty-two millions of louis-d'ors" [£25,000,000, \$128,000,000].

Montfaucon, relating the story of Pythius, adds these reflections:

"A man might in those days safely be rich, provided he obtained his riches honestly; and how great must have been the circulation in commerce, if a private man could amass so prodigious a sum! The wealth which the Roman Crassus possessed was not much inferior; when

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These last words filled Xerxes with astonishment; and he could not refrain from asking Pythius himself the amount of his wealth: "Sir," he replied, "I conceal nothing from you, nor affect ignorance; but as I am able I will fairly tell you. — As soon as I heard of your approach to the Grecian sea, I was desirous of giving you money for the war; on examining into the state of my affairs, I found that I was possessed of two thousand talents of silver, and four millions, wanting only seven thousand, of gold staters of Darius; all this I give you—my slaves and my farms will be sufficient to maintain me."

"My Lydian friend," returned Xerxes, much delighted, "since I first left Persia, you are the only person who has treated my army with hospitality, or who, appearing in my presence, has voluntarily offered me a supply for the war; you have done both; in acknowledgment for which I offer you my friendship; you shall be my host, and I will give you the seven thousand staters, which are wanting to make your sum of four millions complete. — Retain, therefore, and enjoy your property; persevere in your present mode of conduct, which will invariably operate to your happiness."

Xerxes having performed what he promised, proceeded on his march; passing by a Phrygian city, called Anava, and a lake from which salt is made, he came to Colosse. This also is a city of Phrygia, and of considerable eminence; here the Lycus disappears, entering abruptly a chasm in the earth, but at the distance of seven stadia it again emerges, and continues its course to the Mæander. The Persian army, advancing from Colosse, came to Cydrara, a place on the confines of Phrygia and Lydia; here a pillar had been erected by Cræsus, with an inscription defining the boundaries of the two countries.

On entering Lydia from Phrygia they came to a place where two roads met, the one on the left leading to Caria, the other on the right to Sardis: to those who go by the latter it is necessary to cross the Mæander, and to pass Callatebus, a city where honey is made of the tamarisk and wheat. Xerxes here found a plane tree, so very beautiful, that he adorned it with chains of gold, and assigned the guard of it to one of the immortal band; the next day he came to the principal city of the Lydians.

When arrived at Sardis, his first step was to send heralds into Greece, demanding earth and water, and commanding that preparations should be made to entertain him. He did not, however, send either to Athens or Lacedæmon: his motive for repeating the demand to the other cities, was the expectation that they who had before refused earth and water to Darius would, from their alarm at his approach, send it now; this he wished positively to know.

XERXES BRIDGES THE HELLESPONT

Whilst he was preparing to go to Abydos, numbers were employed in throwing a bridge over the Hellespont, from Asia to Europe; betwixt Sestos and Madytus, in the Chersonesus of the Hellespont, the coast toward the sea

he had consecrated a tenth of his property to Hercules, and at ten thousand tables feasted all the people of Rome, beside giving as much corn to every citizen as was sufficient to last him three months, he found himself still possessed of seventy-one hundred Roman talents, equivalent to a million and a half of our money. The gold which Solomon employed in overlaying the sanctum sanctorum of the Temple, which was no more than thirty feet square and thirty feet high, amounted to four millions three hundred and twenty thousand pounds sterling. The gold which he had in one year from Ophir was equal to three millions two hundred and forty thousand pounds. /]

from Abydos is rough and woody. After this period, and at no remote interval of time, Xanthippus, son of Ariphron, and commander of the Athenians, in this place took Antayctes, a Persian, and governor of Sestos, prisoner; he was crucified alive: he had formerly carried some females to the temple of Protesilaus in Elæus, and perpetrated what is detestable.

They on whom the office was imposed proceeded in the work of the bridge, commencing at the side next Abydos. The Phœnicians used a cordage made of linen, the Egyptians the bark of the biblos: from Abydos to the opposite continent is a space of seven stadia. The bridge was no sooner completed, than a great tempest arose, which tore in pieces and destroyed the whole of their labour.

When Xerxes heard of what had happened, he was so enraged, that he ordered three hundred lashes to be inflicted on the Hellespont, and a pair of fetters to be thrown into the sea. We are told that he even sent some executioners to brand the Hellespont with marks of ignominy; but it is certain, that he ordered those who inflicted the lashes to use these barbarous and mad expressions: "Thou ungracious water, thy master condemns thee to this punishment for having injured him without provocation. Xerxes the king will pass over thee, whether thou consentest or not: just is it that no man honours thee with sacrifice, for thou art insidious, and of an ungrateful flavour." After thus treating the sea, the king commanded those who presided over the construction of the bridge to be beheaded.

These commands were executed by those on whom that unpleasing office was conferred. A bridge was then constructed by a different set of architects, who performed it in the following manner: they connected together ships of different kinds, some long vessels of fifty oars, others three-banked galleys, to the number of three hundred and sixty on the side towards the Euxine Sea, and three hundred and thirteen on that of the Hellespont.¹

When these vessels were firmly connected to each other, they were secured on each side by anchors of great length; on the upper side, because of the winds which set in from the Euxine; on the lower, toward the Ægean Sea, on account of the south and southeast winds. They left however openings in three places, sufficient to afford a passage for light vessels, which might have occasion to sail into the Euxine or from it: having performed this, they extended cables from the shore, stretching them upon large capstans of wood; for this purpose they did not employ a number of separate cables, but united two of white flax with four of biblos. These were alike in thickness, and apparently so in goodness, but those of flax were in proportion much the more solid, weighing not less than a talent to every cubit.

[¹It seems a matter of certainty that Herodotus' numbers must be erroneous. Vessels placed transversely must reach to a much greater extent than the same number placed side by side; yet here the greater number of ships is stated to have been on the side where they were arranged transversely, that is, across the channel, with their broadsides to the stream. What the true numbers were it is vain to conjecture, it is sufficient to have pointed out that the present must be wrong.]

Since the Hellespont, in the neighbourhood of Abydos, has a very considerable bend in its course, first running northward from Abydos towards Sestos, and then taking a pretty sharp turn to the eastward, may it not have been, that the two lines of ships were disposed on different sides of the angle just mentioned, by which it might truly be said, that the ships in one line presented their heads to the Euxine, the other their sides, although the heads of both were presented to the current? The different numbers in the two lines certainly indicate different breadths of the strait, which can only be accounted for by their being at some distance from each other: for it cannot be supposed that the line was placed obliquely across the strait.

The cables extended from each shore appear to have been for the sole purpose of supporting the bridgeways. The ships were kept in their places by anchors ahead and astern; by the lateral pressure of each other, and by side-fastening.^e

[481-480 B.C.]

When the pass was thus secured, they sawed out rafters of wood, making their length equal to the space required for the bridge; these they laid in order across upon the extended cables, and then bound them fast together. They next brought unwrought wood, which they placed very regularly upon the rafters; over all they threw earth, which they raised to a proper height, and finished all by a fence on each side, that the horses and other beasts of burden might not be terrified by looking down upon the sea.

The bridges were at length completed, and the work at Mount Athos finished: to prevent the canal at this last place being choked up by the flow of the tides, deep trenches were sunk at its mouth. The army had wintered at Sardis, but on receiving intelligence of the above, they marched at the commencement of the spring for Abydos. At the moment of their departure, the sun, which before gave his full light, in a bright unclouded atmosphere, withdrew his beams, and the darkest night succeeded. Xerxes, alarmed at this incident, consulted the magi upon what it might portend. They replied, that the protection of Heaven was withdrawn from the Greeks; the sun, they observed, was the tutelary divinity of Greece, as the moon was of Persia. The answer was so satisfactory to Xerxes, that he proceeded with increased alacrity. During the march, Pythius the Lydian, who was much intimidated by the prodigy which had appeared, went to the king; deriving confidence from the liberality he had shown and received, he thus addressed him: "Sir, I entreat a favour no less trifling to you, than important to myself."

Xerxes, not imagining what he was about to ask, promised to grant it, and desired to know what he would have. Pythius on this became still more bold: "Sir," he returned, "I have five sons, who are all with you in this Grecian expedition; I would entreat you to pity my age, and dispense with the presence of the eldest. Take with you the four others, but leave one to manage my affairs; so may you return in safety, after the accomplishment of your wishes."

Xerxes, in great indignation, made this reply: "Infamous man! you see me embark my all in this Grecian war; myself, my children, my brothers, my domestics, and my friends, how dare you then presume to mention your son, you who are my slave, and whose duty it is to accompany me on this occasion, with all your family, and even your wife? Remember this, the spirit of a man resides in his ears; when he hears what is agreeable to him, the pleasure diffuses itself over all his body; but when the contrary happens, he is anxious and uneasy. If your former conduct was good, and your promises yet better, you still cannot boast of having surpassed the king in liberality. Although your present behaviour is base and insolent, you shall be punished less severely than you deserve: your former hospitality preserves yourself and four of your children; the fifth, whom you most regard, shall pay the penalty of your crime."

As soon as he had finished, the king commanded the proper officers to find the eldest son of Pythius, and divide his body in two; he then ordered one part of the body thrown on the right side of the road, the other on the left, whilst the army continued their march betwixt them.

HOW THE HOST MARCHED

The march was conducted in the following order: first of all went those who had the care of the baggage; they were followed by a promiscuous body of strangers of all nations, without any regularity, but to the amount of more

than half the army; after these was a considerable interval, for these did not join the troops where the king was; next came a thousand horse, the flower of the Persian army, who were followed by the same number of spear-men, in like manner selected, trailing their pikes upon the ground; behind these were ten sacred horses called Nisæan, with very superb trappings (they take their name from a certain district in Media, called Nisæus, remarkable for producing horses of an extraordinary size); the sacred car of Jupiter was next in the procession, it was drawn by eight white horses, behind which, on foot, was the charioteer, with the reins in his hands, for no mortal is permitted to sit in this car; then came Xerxes himself, in a chariot drawn by Nisæan horses; by his side sat his charioteer, whose name was Patiramphes, son of Otanes the Persian.

Such was the order in which Xerxes departed from Sardis; but as often as occasion required, he left his chariot for a common carriage. A thousand of the first and noblest Persians attended his person, bearing their spears according to the custom of their country; and a thousand horse, selected like the former, immediately succeeded. A body of ten thousand chosen infantry came next; a thousand of these had at the extremity of their spears a pomegranate of gold, the remaining nine thousand, whom the former enclosed, had in the same manner pomegranates of silver. They who preceded Xerxes, and trailed their spears, had their arms decorated with gold: they who followed him had, as we have described, golden pomegranates: these ten thousand foot were followed by an equal number of Persian cavalry; at an interval of about two furlongs, followed a numerous, irregular, and promiscuous multitude.

From Lydia the army continued its march along the banks of the Caicus, to Mysia, and leaving Mount Cænæ on the left, proceeded through Atarnis to the city Carina. Moving hence over the plains of Thebe, and passing by Adramyttium and Antandros, a Pelasgian city, they left Mount Ida to the left, and entered the district of Ilium. In the very first night which they passed under Ida, a furious storm of thunder and lightning arose, which destroyed numbers of the troops. From hence they advanced to the Scamander; this river first of all, after their departure from Sardis, failed in supplying them with a quantity of water sufficient for their troops and beasts of burden. On his arrival at this river, Xerxes ascended the citadel of Priam, desirous of examining the place. Having surveyed it attentively, and satisfied himself concerning it, he ordered a thousand oxen to be sacrificed to the Trojan Minerva, at the same time the magi directed libations to be offered to the manes of the heroes; when this was done, a panic spread itself in the night through the army. At the dawn of morning they moved forwards, leaving to the left the towns of Rhœteum, Ophryneum, and Dardanus, which last is very near Abydos: the Gergithæ and Teucri were to their right.

On their arrival at Abydos, Xerxes desired to take a survey of all his army: the inhabitants had, at his previous desire, constructed for him, on an eminence, a seat of white marble; upon this he sat, and directing his eyes to the shore, beheld at one view, his land and sea forces. He next wished to see a naval combat; one was accordingly exhibited before him, in which the Phœnicians of Sidon were victorious. The view of this contest, as well as of the number of his forces, delighted Xerxes exceedingly.

When the king beheld all the Hellespont crowded with ships, and all the shore, with the plains of Abydos, covered with his troops, he at first congratulated himself as happy, but he afterward burst into tears.

Artabanus, the uncle of Xerxes, who with so much freedom had at first opposed the expedition against Greece, observed the king's emotion: "How

[480 B.C.]

different, Sir," said he, addressing him, "is your present behaviour, from what it was a few minutes since! you then esteemed yourself happy, you now are dissolved in tears."

"My reflection," answered Xerxes, "on the transitory period of human life, excited my compassion for this vast multitude, not one of whom will complete the term of an hundred years! But tell me, has the vision which you saw impressed full conviction on your mind, or do your former sentiments incline you to dissuade me from this Grecian war?—speak without reserve."

"May the vision, O King," replied Artabanus, "which we have mutually seen, succeed to both our wishes! For my own part I am still so full of apprehensions, as not at all to be master of myself: after reflecting seriously on the subject, I discern two important things, exceedingly hostile to your views."

"What, my good friend, can these two things possibly be?" replied Xerxes; "do you think unfavourably of our land army, as not being sufficiently numerous? Do you imagine the Greeks will be able to collect one more powerful? Can you conceive our fleet inferior to that of our enemies?—or do both these considerations together distress you? If our force does not seem to you sufficiently effective, reinforcements may soon be provided."

"No one, Sir," answered Artabanus, "in his proper senses, could object either to your army, or to the multitude of your fleet: should you increase their number, the more hostile would the two things be of which I speak; I allude to the land and the sea. In case of any sudden tempest, you will find no harbour, as I conjecture, sufficiently capacious or convenient for the protection of your fleet; no one port would answer this purpose, you must have the whole extent of the continent; your being without a resource of this kind, should induce you to remember that fortune commands men, and not men fortune. This is one of the calamities which threaten you; I will now explain the other. The land is also your enemy; your meeting with no resistance will render it more so, as you will be thus seduced imperceptibly to advance, it is the nature of man, never to be satisfied with success: thus, having no enemy to encounter every moment of time, and addition to your progress, will be gradually introductive of famine. He, therefore, who is truly wise, will as carefully deliberate about the possible event of things, as he will be bold and intrepid in action."

Xerxes made this reply: "What you allege, Artabanus, is certainly reasonable; but you should not so much give way to fear, as to see everything in the worst point of view: if in consulting upon any matter we were to be influenced by the consideration of every possible contingency, we should execute nothing. It is better to submit to half of the evil which may be the result of any measure, than to remain in inactivity from the fear of what may eventually occur. You are sensible to what a height the power of Persia has arrived, which would never have been the case, if my predecessors had either been biassed by such sentiments as yours, or listened to such advisers: it was their contempt of danger which promoted their country's glory, for great exploits are always attended with proportionable danger. We, therefore, emulous of their reputation, have selected the best season of the year for our enterprise; and having effectually conquered Europe, we shall return without experience of famine or any other calamity: we have with us abundance of provisions, and the nations among which we arrive will supply us with corn, for they against whom we advance are not shepherds, but husbandmen."

"Since, Sir," returned Artabanus, "you will suffer no mention to be made of fear, at least listen to my advice: where a number of things are to

be discussed, prolixity is unavoidable. Cyrus, son of Cambyses, made all Ionia tributary to Persia, Athens excepted; do not, therefore, I entreat you, lead these men against those from whom they are immediately descended: without the Ionians, we are more than a sufficient match for our opponents. They must either be most base, by assisting to reduce the principal city of their country; or, by contributing to its freedom, will do what is most just. If they shall prove the former, they can render us no material service; if the latter, they may bring destruction on your army. Remember, therefore, the truth of the ancient proverb, When we commence a thing we cannot always tell how it will end."

"Artabanus," interrupted Xerxes, "your suspicions of the fidelity of the Ionians must be false and injurious; we have had sufficient testimony of their constancy, as you yourself must be convinced, as well as all those who served under Darius against the Scythians. It was in their power to save or to destroy all the forces of Persia, but they preserved their faith, their honour, and their gratitude; add to this, they have left their wives, their children, and their wealth, in our dominions, and therefore dare not meditate anything against us. Indulge, therefore, no apprehensions, but cheerfully watch over my family and preserve my authority: to you, I commit the exercise of my power."

Xerxes after this interview dismissed Artabanus to Susa, and a second time called an assembly of the most illustrious Persians. As soon as they were met, he thus addressed them: "My motive, Persians, for thus convoking you, is to entreat you to behave like men, and not dishonour the many great exploits of our ancestors: let us individually and collectively exert ourselves. We are engaged in a common cause; and I the rather call upon you to display your valour, because I understand we are advancing against a warlike people, whom if we overcome, no one will in future dare oppose us. Let us, therefore, proceed, having first implored the aid of the gods of Persia."

On the same day they prepared to pass the bridge: the next morning, whilst they waited for the rising of the sun, they burned on the bridge all manner of perfumes, and strewed the way with branches of myrtle. When the sun appeared, Xerxes poured into the sea a libation from a golden vessel, and then addressing the sun, he implored him to avert from the Persians every calamity, till they should totally have vanquished Europe, arriving at its extremest limits.

Xerxes then threw the cup into the Hellespont, together with a golden goblet, and a Persian scimitar. We are not able to determine whether the king, by throwing these things into the Hellespont, intended to make an offering to the sun, or whether he wished thus to make compensation to the sea, for having formerly chastised it.

When this was done, all the infantry and the horse were made to pass over that part of the bridge which was toward the Euxine; over that to the Ægean, went the servants of the camp, and the beasts of burden. They were preceded by ten thousand Persians, having garlands on their heads; and these were followed by a promiscuous multitude of all nations—these passed on the first day. The first who went over the next day were the knights, and they who trailed their spears; these also had garlands on their heads: next came the sacred horses, and the sacred car; afterwards Xerxes himself, who was followed by a body of spear-men, and a thousand horse. The remainder of the army closed the procession, and at the same time the fleet moved to the opposite shore: it is said that the king himself was the last who passed the bridge.

[480 B.C.]

As soon as Xerxes had set foot in Europe, he saw his troops driven over the bridge by the force of blows; and seven whole days and as many nights were consumed in the passage of his army. [Later authorities than Herodotus say that the crossing took two days and that the term seven days and nights was based first on the greatly exaggerated estimate of Xerxes' host, and secondly on the peculiar sanctity of the number seven.]

When Xerxes had passed the Hellespont, an inhabitant of the country is said to have exclaimed: "Why, O Jupiter, under the appearance of a Persian, and for the name of Jupiter taking that of Xerxes, art thou come to distract and persecute Greece? or why bring so vast a multitude, when able to accomplish thy purpose without them?"

When all were gone over, and were proceeding on their march, a wonderful prodigy appeared, which, though disregarded by Xerxes, had an obvious meaning—a mare brought forth a hare¹: from this it might have been inferred, that Xerxes, who had led an army into Greece with much ostentation and insolence, should be involved in personal danger, and compelled to return with dishonour. Whilst yet at Sardis, he had seen another prodigy—a mule produced a young one, which had the marks of both sexes those of the male being beneath.

Neither of these incidents made any impression on his mind, and he continued to advance with his army by land, whilst his fleet, passing beyond the Hellespont, coasted along the shore in an opposite direction. The latter sailed toward the west, to the promontory of Sarpedon, where they were commanded to remain; the former proceeded eastward through the Chersonesus, having on their right the tomb of Helle, the daughter of Athamas; on their left the city of Cardia. Moving onward, through the midst of a city called Agora, they turned aside to the Gulf of Melas, and a river of the same name, the waters of which were not sufficient for the troops. Having passed this river, which gives its name to the above-mentioned gulf, they directed their march westward, and passing Ænos, a city of Æolis, and the lake Stentoris, they came to Doriscus.

Doriscus is on the coast, and is a spacious plain of Thrace, through which the great river Hebrus flows. Here was a royal fort called Doriscus, in which Darius, in his expedition against Scythia, had placed a Persian garrison. This appearing a proper place for the purpose, Xerxes gave orders to have his army here marshalled and numbered. The fleet being all arrived off the shore near Doriscus, their officers arranged them in order near where Sale, a Samothracian town, and Zone are situated. At the extremity of this shore is the celebrated promontory of Serrhium, which formerly belonged to the Ciconians. The crews having brought their vessels to shore, enjoyed an interval of repose, whilst Xerxes was drawing up his troops on the plain of Doriscus.^b

THE SIZE OF XERXES' ARMY

A curious instance of extreme critical scepticism is the opinion of the English lexicographer, Charles Richardson: "I remain still in doubt," says he, "whether any such expedition was ever undertaken by the paramount sovereign of Persia. Disguised in name by some Greek corruption, Xerxes may possibly have been a feudatory prince or viceroy of the western districts; and that an invasion of Greece may have possibly taken place under this

[¹ This story will probably excite a smile from the English reader, whom it will remind of Mary Tofts and her rabbits. — BELOE.]

prince, I shall readily believe, but upon a scale I must also believe infinitely narrower than the least exaggerated description of the Greek historians."

In Herodotus the reputed followers of Xerxes amount to 5,283,220; Isocrates, in his *Panathenaicos*, estimates the land army in round numbers at five million. And with them Plutarch in general agrees; but such myriads appeared to Diodorus, Pliny, Ælianus, and other later writers, so much stretched beyond all belief, that they at once cut off about four-fifths, to bring them within the line of possibility. Yet what is this, but a singular and very unauthorised liberty in one of the most consequential points of the expedition? What circumstance in the whole narration is more explicit in Herodotus, or by its frequent repetition, not in figures, but in words at length, seems less liable to the mistake of copiers?

Upon this subject, Larcher^d, who probably had never seen Richardson's book, writes as follows:

"This immense army astonishes the imagination, but still is not incredible. All the people dependent on Persia were slaves; they were compelled to march, without distinction of birth or profession. Extreme youth or advanced age were probably the only reasons which excused them from bearing arms. The only reasonable objection to be made to this recital of Herodotus is that which Voltaire has omitted to make — where were provisions to be had for so numerous an army? But Herodotus has anticipated this objection: 'We have with us,' says Xerxes, 'abundance of provisions, and all the nations among which we shall come, not being shepherds, but husbandmen, we shall find corn in their country, which we shall appropriate to our own use.' Subsequent writers have, it is true, differed from Herodotus, and diminished the number of the army of Xerxes; but Herodotus, who was in some measure a contemporary, and who recited his history to Greeks assembled at Olympia, where were many who fought at Salamis and Plataea, is more deserving of credit than later historians."

The truth perhaps may lie betwixt the two different opinions of Richardson and Larcher. It is not likely, as there were many exiles from Greece at the court of Persia, that Xerxes should be ignorant of the numbers and resources of Greece. To lead there so many millions seems at first sight not only unnecessary but preposterous. Admitting that so vast an army had marched against Greece, no one of common-sense would have thought of making an attack by the way of Thermopylae, where the passage must have been so tedious, and any resistance, as so few in proportion could possibly be brought to act, might be made almost on equal terms: whilst, on the contrary, to make a descent, they had the whole range of coast before them. With respect to provisions, the difficulty appears still greater, and almost insurmountable. We cannot think, with Larcher, that the numbers recorded by Herodotus are consistent with probability.

Rennell^e says, that the Persians may be compared, in respect to the rest of the army of Xerxes, with the Europeans in a British army in India, composed chiefly of sepoys and native troops.

Probably Xerxes had not many more actual soldiers than the Greeks; the rest were desultory hordes fit only for plunder, and four-fifths of the whole were followers of the camp with rice, provisions, etc. The army that marched under Lord Cornwallis at the siege of Seringapatam, in the first campaign, consisted of twenty thousand troops, but the followers were more than one hundred thousand. This is the case in all Eastern countries.^f

But let us hear what Herodotus has to say concerning the size of Xerxes' horde, for after all the modern critics have only his account as a basis:

[480 B.C.]

We are not able to specify what number of men each nation supplied, as no one has recorded it. The whole amount of the land forces was seventeen hundred thousand. Their mode of ascertaining the number was this: they drew up in one place a body of ten thousand men; making these stand together as compactly as possible, they drew a circle round them. Dismissing these, they enclosed the circle with a wall breast high; into this they introduced another and another ten thousand, till they thus obtained the precise number of the whole. They afterwards ranged each nation apart.

The generals in chief of all the infantry were Mardonius, son of Gobryas; Tritantæchmes, son of Artabanus, who had given his opinion against the Grecian war; and Smerdomenes, son of Otanes, which last two were sons of two brothers of Darius, the uncles of Xerxes. To the above may be added Masistes, son of Darius by Atossa; Gergis, son of Arinus; and Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus.

These were the commanders of all the infantry, except of the ten thousand chosen Persians, who were led by Hydarnes, son of Hydarnes. These were called the Immortal Band, and for this reason, if any of them died in battle, or by any disease, his place was immediately supplied. They were thus never more nor less than ten thousand. The Persians surpassed all the rest of the army, not only in magnificence but valour; they were also remarkable for the quantity of gold which adorned them: they had with them carriages for their women, and a vast number of attendants splendidly provided. They had also camels and beasts of burden to carry their provisions, beside those for the common occasions of the army. The Persian horse, except a small number, whose casques were ornamented with brass and iron, were habited like the infantry.

There appeared of the Sagartii a body of eight thousand horse. These people lead a pastoral life, were originally of Persian descent, and used the Persian language: their dress is something betwixt the Persian and the Pæctyan; they have no offensive weapons, either of iron or brass, except their daggers: their principal dependence in action is upon cords made of twisted leather, which they use in this manner: when they engage an enemy they throw out these cords, having a noose at the extremity; if they entangle in them either horse or man, they without difficulty put them to death. These forces were embodied with the Persians. The cavalry of the Medes, and also of the Cissians, are accoutred like their infantry. The Indian horse likewise were armed like their foot; but beside led horses they had chariots of war, drawn by horses and wild asses. The armour of the Bactrian and Caspian horse and foot were alike. This was also the case with the Africans, only it is to be observed that these last all fought from chariots. The Paricanian horse were also equipped like their foot, as were the Arabians, all of whom had camels, by no means inferior to the horse in swiftness.

These were the cavalry, who formed a body of eighty thousand, exclusive of camels and chariots. They were drawn up in regular order, and the Arabians were disposed in the rear, that the horses might not be terrified, as a horse cannot endure a camel. Harmamithres and Tithæus, the sons of Datis, commanded the cavalry; they had shared this command with Pharnuches, but he had been left at Sardis indisposed. As the troops were marching from Sardis he met with an unfortunate accident: a dog ran under the feet of his horse, which being terrified reared up and threw his rider. Pharnuches was in consequence seized with a vomiting of blood, which finally terminated in a consumption. His servants, in compliance with the orders of their master, led the horse to the place where the accident

happened, and there cut off his legs at the knees. Thus was Pharnuches deprived of his command.^b

We give the account of the Persian fleet as stated by Herodotus, that the reader may compare it with that which follows of Diodorus Siculus :

Phœnicians	300
Egyptians	200
Cyprians	150
Cilicians	100
Pamphylians	30
Lycians	50
Dorians	30
Carians	70
Ionians	100
Islanders	17
Æolians	60
People of the Hellespont	100
	<u>1207</u>

According to Diodorus Siculus,

Dorians	40
Æolians	40
Ionians	100
Hellespontians	80
Islanders	50
Egyptians	200
Phœnicians	300
Cilicians	80
Carians	80
Pamphylians	40
Lycians	40
Cyprians	150
	<u>1200^f</u>

The commanders-in-chief of the sea forces were Ariabignes, son of Darius, Prexaspes, son of Aspathines, and Megabazus, son of Megabates, together with Achæmenes, another son of Darius. The other leaders we forbear to specify, it not appearing necessary ; but it is impossible not to speak, and with admiration, of Artemisia, who, though a female, served in this Grecian expedition. On the death of her husband she enjoyed the supreme authority, for her son was not yet grown up, and her great spirit and vigour of mind alone induced her to exert herself on this occasion. She was the daughter of Lygdamis, by her father's side of Halicarnassus, by her mother of Cretan descent. She had the conduct of those of Halicarnassus, Cos, Nisyros, and Calynda. She furnished five ships, which next to those of the Sidonians, were the best in the fleet. She was also distinguished among all the allies for the salutary counsels which she gave the king. Such were the maritime forces.^b Leaving this vast armament on its prosperous course towards Greece, let us see what has been happening meanwhile in that busy little nation.



GREEK RINGS



CHAPTER XVIII. PROCEEDINGS IN GREECE FROM MARATHON TO THERMOPYLÆ

O Land of Solon, Plato, and of men
Whose glorious like earth ne'er shall see again !
—NICHOLAS MICHELL.

OUR information respecting the affairs of Greece immediately after the repulse of the Persians from Marathon, is very scanty.

Cleomenes and Leotychides, the two kings of Sparta (the former belonging to the elder or Eurysthenid, the latter to the younger or the Proclid, race), had conspired for the purpose of dethroning the former Proclid king Demaratus : and Cleomenes had even gone so far as to tamper with the Delphian priestess for this purpose. His manœuvre being betrayed shortly afterwards, he was so alarmed at the displeasure of the Spartans, that he retired into Thessaly, and from thence into Arcadia, where he employed the powerful influence of his regal character and heroic lineage to arm the Arcadian people against his country. The Spartans, alarmed in their turn, voluntarily invited him back with a promise of amnesty. But his renewed lease did not last long : his habitual violence of character became aggravated into decided insanity, insomuch that he struck with his stick whomsoever he met ; and his relatives were forced to confine him in chains under a helot sentinel. By severe menaces, he one day constrained this man to give him his sword, with which he mangled himself dreadfully and perished.

But what surprises us most is, to hear that the Spartans, usually more disposed than other Greeks to refer every striking phenomenon to divine agency, recognised on this occasion nothing but a vulgar physical cause : Cleomenes had gone mad (they affirmed) through habits of intoxication, learnt from some Scythian envoys who had come to Sparta.

The general course of the war with Ægina, and especially the failure of the enterprise concerted with Nicodromus in consequence of delay in borrowing ships from Corinth, were well calculated to impress upon the Athenians the necessity of enlarging their naval force. And it is from the present time that we trace among them the first growth of that decided tendency towards maritime activity which coincided so happily with the expansion of their democracy, and opened a new phase in Grecian history as well as a new career for themselves.

The exciting effect produced upon them by the repulse of the Persians at Marathon has been dwelt upon. Miltiades, the victor in that field, having been removed from the scene under circumstances already described, Aristides and Themistocles became the chief men at Athens : and the former

was chosen archon during the succeeding year. His exemplary uprightness in magisterial functions ensured to him lofty esteem from the general public, not without a certain proportion of active enemies, some of them sufferers by his justice. These enemies naturally became partisans of his rival Themistocles, who had all the talents necessary for bringing them into co-operation: and the rivalry between the two chiefs became so bitter and menacing, that even Aristides himself is reported to have said, "If the Athenians were wise, they would cast both of us into the barathrum."

THEMISTOCLES AND ARISTIDES



THEMISTOCLES

Of the particular points on which their rivalry turned, we are unfortunately little informed. But it is highly probable that one of them was the important change of policy above alluded to, — the conversion of Athens from a land-power into a sea-power; the development of this new and stirring element in the minds of the people. By all authorities, this change of policy is ascribed principally and specially to Themistocles. On that account, if for no other reason, Aristides would probably be found opposed to it: but it was moreover a change not in harmony with that old-fashioned Hellenism, undisturbed uniformity of life, and narrow range of active duty and experience which Aristides seems to have approved in common with the subsequent philosophers. The seaman was naturally more of a wanderer and cosmopolite than the heavy-armed soldier: the modern Greek seaman even at this moment is so to a remarkable degree, distinguished for the variety of his ideas, and the quickness of his intelligence: the land-service was a type of steadiness and inflexible ranks, the sea-service that of mutability and adventure. Such was the idea strongly entertained by Plato and other philosophers: though we may remark that they do not render justice to the Athenian seaman, whose training was far more perfect and laborious, and his habits of obedience far more complete, than that of the Athenian hoplite or horseman: a training beginning with Themistocles, and reaching its full perfection about the commencement of the Peloponnesian War.

In recommending extraordinary efforts to create a navy as well as to acquire nautical practice, Themistocles displayed all that sagacious appreciation of the circumstances and dangers of the time for which Thucydides gives him credit: and there can be no doubt that Aristides, though the honest politician of the two, was at this particular crisis the less essential to his country. Not only was there the struggle with Ægina, a maritime power equal or more than equal, and within sight of the Athenian harbour, but there was also in the distance a still more formidable contingency to guard against. The Persian armament had been driven with disgrace from Attica back to Asia; but the Persian monarch still remained with undiminished means of aggression as well as increased thirst for revenge; and Themistocles knew well that the danger from that quarter would recur greater than ever. He believed that it would recur again in the same way, by an expedition across the Ægean like that of Datis to Marathon; against which the best defence would be found in a numerous and well-trained fleet.

[489-481 B.C.]

Nor could the large preparations of Darius for renewing the attack remain unknown to a vigilant observer, extending as they did over so many Greeks subject to the Persian empire. Such positive warning was more than enough to stimulate the active genius of Themistocles, who now prevailed upon his countrymen to begin with energy the work of maritime preparation, as well against Ægina as against Persia. Not only were two hundred new ships built, and citizens trained as seamen, but the important work was commenced, during the year when Themistocles was either archon or general, of forming and fortifying a new harbour for Athens at Piræus, instead of the ancient open bay of Phalerum. The latter was indeed somewhat nearer to the city, but Piræus with its three separate natural ports, admitting of being closed and fortified, was incomparably superior in safety as well as in convenience. It is not too much to say with Herodotus, that the Æginean war was "the salvation of Greece, by constraining the Athenians to make themselves a maritime power." The whole efficiency of the resistance subsequently made to Xerxes turned upon this new movement in the organisation of Athens, allowed as it was to attain tolerable completeness through a fortunate concurrence of accidents; for the important delay of ten years between the defeat of Marathon and the fresh invasion by which it was to be avenged was, in truth, the result of accident. First, the revolt of Egypt; next, the death of Darius; thirdly, the indifference of Xerxes at his first accession towards Hellenic matters—postponing until 480 B.C., an invasion which would naturally have been undertaken in 487 or 486 B.C., and which would have found Athens at that time without her wooden walls—the great engine of her subsequent salvation.

Another accidental help, without which the new fleet could not have been built—a considerable amount of public money—was also by good fortune now available to the Athenians. It is first in an emphatic passage of the poet Æschylus, and next from Herodotus on the present occasion, that we hear of the silver mines of Laurium in Attica, and the valuable produce which they rendered to the state. At what time they first began to be worked, we have no information; but it seems hardly possible that they could have been worked with any spirit or profitable result, until after the expulsion of Hippias and the establishment of the democratical constitution of Cleisthenes. Neither the strong local factions, by which different portions of Attica were set against each other before the time of Pisistratus—nor the rule of that despot succeeded by his two sons—were likely to afford confidence and encouragement. But when the democracy of Cleisthenes first brought Attica into one systematic and comprehensive whole, with equal rights assigned to each part, and with a common centre at Athens—the power of that central government over the mineral wealth of the country, and its means of binding the whole people to respect agreements concluded with individual undertakers, would give a new stimulus to private speculation in the district of Laurium. It was the practice of the Athenian government either to sell, or to let for a long term of years, particular districts of this productive region to individuals or companies; on consideration partly of a sum or fine paid down, partly of a reserved rent equal to one twenty-fourth part of the gross produce.

We are told by Herodotus that there was in the Athenian treasury, at the time when Themistocles made his proposition to enlarge the naval force, a great sum arising from the Laurian mines, out of which a distribution was on the point of being made among the citizens—ten drachmæ [about 8 shillings or \$2] to each man. Themistocles availed himself of this precious

opportunity — set forth the necessities of the war with Ægina, and the still more formidable menace from the great enemy in Asia — and prevailed upon the people to forego the promised distribution for the purpose of obtaining an efficient navy. One cannot doubt that there must have been many speakers who would try to make themselves popular by opposing this proposition and supporting the distribution; insomuch that the power of the people generally to feel the force of a distant motive as predominant over a present gain, deserves notice as an earnest of their approaching greatness.

Immense indeed was the recompense reaped for this self-denial, not merely by Athens but by Greece generally, when the preparations of Xerxes came to be matured, and his armament was understood to be approaching. The orders for equipment of ships and laying in of provisions, issued by the Great King to his subject Greeks in Asia, the Ægean, and Thrace, would of course become known throughout Greece proper; especially the vast labour bestowed on the canal of Mount Athos, which would be the theme of wondering talk with every Thasian or Acanthian citizen who visited the festival games in the Peloponnesus. All these premonitory evidences were public enough, without any need of that elaborate stratagem whereby the exiled Demaratus is alleged to have secretly transmitted, from Susa to Sparta, intelligence of the approaching expedition. The formal announcements of Xerxes all designated Athens as the special object of his wrath and vengeance. Other Grecian cities might thus hope to escape without mischief: so that the prospect of the great invasion did not at first provoke among them any unanimous disposition to resist. Accordingly, when the first heralds despatched by Xerxes from Sardis in the autumn of 481 B.C., a little before his march to the Hellespont, addressed themselves to the different cities with demand of earth and water, many were disposed to comply. Neither to Athens, nor to Sparta, were any heralds sent; and these two cities were thus from the beginning identified in interest and in the necessity of defence. Both of them sent, in this trying moment, to consult the Delphian oracle; while both at the same time joined to convene a Panhellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth, for the purpose of organising resistance against the expected invader.

CONGRESS AT CORINTH

We have pointed out the various steps whereby the separate states of Greece were gradually brought, even against their own natural instincts, into something approaching more nearly to political union. The present congress, assembled under the influence of common fear from Persia, has more of a Panhellenic character than any political event which has yet occurred in Grecian history. It extends far beyond the range of those Peloponnesian states which constitute the immediate allies of Sparta: it comprehends Athens, and is even summoned in part by her strenuous instigation: moreover it seeks to combine every city of Hellenic race and language, however distant, which can be induced to take part in it—even the Cretans, Corcyræans, and Sicilians. It is true that all these states do not actually come, but earnest efforts are made to induce them to come: the dispersed brethren of the Hellenic family are entreated to marshal themselves in the same ranks for a joint political purpose—the defence of the common hearth and metropolis of the race. This is a new fact in Grecian history, opening scenes and ideas unlike to anything which has gone before—enlarging prodigiously the functions and duties

[481 B.C.]

connected with that headship of Greece which had hitherto been in the hands of Sparta, but which is about to become too comprehensive for her to manage — and thus introducing increased habits of co-operation among the subordinate states, as well as rival hopes of aggrandisement among the leaders. The congress at the Isthmus of Corinth marks such further advance in the centralising tendencies of Greece, and seems at first to promise an onward march in the same direction: but the promise will not be found realised.

Its first step was indeed one of inestimable value. While most of the deputies present came prepared, in the name of their respective cities, to swear reciprocal fidelity and brotherhood, they also addressed all their efforts to appease the feuds and dissensions which reigned among particular members of their own meeting. Of these the most prominent, as well as the most dangerous, was the war still subsisting between Athens and Ægina. The latter was not exempt, even now, from suspicions of *medising* (*i. e.*, embracing the cause of the Persians), which had been raised by her giving earth and water ten years before to Darius. But her present conduct afforded no countenance to such suspicions: she took earnest part in the congress as well as in the joint measures of defence, and willingly consented to accommodate her difference with Athens. In this work of reconciling feuds, so essential to the safety of Greece, the Athenian Themistocles took a prominent part, as well as Cheileus of Tegea in Arcadia. The congress proceeded to send envoys and solicit co-operation from such cities as were yet either equivocal or indifferent, especially Argos, Coreyra, and the Cretan and Sicilian Greeks; and at the same time to despatch spies across to Sardis, for the purpose of learning the state and prospects of the assembled army.

These spies presently returned, having been detected, and condemned to death by the Persian generals, but released by express order of Xerxes, who directed that the full strength of his assembled armament should be shown to them, in order that the terror of the Greeks might be thus magnified. The step was well calculated for such a purpose: but the discouragement throughout Greece was already extreme, at this critical period when the storm was about to burst upon them. Even to intelligent and well-meaning Greeks, much more to the careless, the timid, or the treacherous — Xerxes with his countless host appeared irresistible, and indeed something more than human. Of course such an impression would be encouraged by the large number of Greeks already his tributaries: and we may even trace the manifestation of a wish to get rid of the Athenians altogether, as the chief objects of Persian vengeance and chief hindrance to tranquil submission. This despair of the very continuance of Hellenic life and autonomy breaks forth even from the sanctuary of Hellenic religion, the Delphian temple; when the Athenians, in their distress and uncertainty, sent to consult the oracle. Hardly had their two envoys performed the customary sacrifices, and sat down in the inner chamber near the priestess Aristonice, when she at once exclaimed: "Wretched men, why sit ye there? Quit your land and city, and flee afar! Head, body, feet, and hands are alike rotten: fire and sword, in the train of the Syrian chariot, shall overwhelm you: nor only your city, but other cities also, as well as many even of the temples of the gods — which are now sweating and trembling with fear, and foreshadow, by drops of blood on their roofs, the hard calamities impending. Get ye away from the sanctuary, with your souls steeped in sorrow."

So terrific a reply had rarely escaped from the lips of the priestess. The envoys were struck to the earth by it, and durst not carry it back to Athens.

In their sorrow they were encouraged yet to hope by an influential Delphian citizen named Timon (we trace here as elsewhere the underhand working of these leading Delphians on the priestess), who advised them to provide themselves with the characteristic marks of supplication, and to approach the oracle a second time in that imploring guise: "O lord, we pray thee (they said), have compassion on these boughs of supplication, and deliver to us something more comfortable concerning our country; else we quit not this sanctuary, but remain here until death." Upon which the priestess replied: "Athene with all her prayers and all her sagacity cannot propitiate Olympian Zeus. But this assurance I will give you, firm as adamant. When everything else in the land of Cecrops shall be taken, Zeus grants to Athene that the wooden wall alone shall remain unconquered, to defend you and your children. Stand not to await the assailing horse and foot from the continent but turn your backs and retire: you shall yet live to fight another day. O divine Salamis, thou too shalt destroy the children of women, either at the seed-time or at the harvest."

This second answer was a sensible mitigation of the first. It left open some hope of escape, though faint, dark, and unintelligible: and the envoy wrote it down to carry back to Athens, not concealing probably the terrific sentence which had preceded it. When read to the people, the obscurity of the meaning provoked many different interpretations. What was meant by "the wooden wall"? Some supposed that the Acropolis itself, which had originally been surrounded with a wooden palisade, was the refuge pointed out; but the greater number, and among them most of those who were by profession expositors of prophecy, maintained that the wooden wall indicated the fleet. But these professional expositors, while declaring that the god bade them go on shipboard, deprecated all idea of a naval battle and insisted on the necessity of abandoning Attica forever: the last line of the oracle, wherein it was said that Salamis would destroy the children of women, appeared to them to portend nothing but disaster in the event of a naval combat. Such was the opinion of those who passed for the best expositors of the divine will. It harmonised completely with the despairing temper then prevalent, heightened by the terrible sentence pronounced in the first oracle; and emigration to some foreign land presented itself as the only hope of safety even for their persons. The fate of Athens—and of Greece generally, which would have been helpless without Athens—now hung upon a thread, when Themistocles, the great originator of the fleet, interposed with equal steadfastness of heart and ingenuity, to insure the proper use of it. He contended that if the god had intended to designate Salamis as the scene of a naval disaster to the Greeks, that island would have been called in the oracle by some such epithet as "wretched Salamis:" but the fact that it was termed "divine Salamis," indicated that the parties destined to perish there, were the enemies of Greece, not the Greeks themselves. He encouraged his countrymen therefore to abandon their city and country, and to trust themselves to the fleet as the wooden wall recommended by the god, but with full determination to fight and conquer on board. Great indeed were the consequences which turned upon this bold stretch of exegetical conjecture. Unless the Athenians had been persuaded by some plausible show of interpretation, that the sense of the oracle encouraged instead of forbidding a naval combat, they would in their existing depression have abandoned all thought of resistance.

Even with the help of an encouraging interpretation, however, nothing less than the most unconquerable resolution and patriotism could have

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enabled the Athenians to bear up against such terrific denunciations from the Delphian god, and persist in resistance in place of seeking safety by emigration. Herodotus emphatically impresses this truth upon his readers: nay, he even steps out of his way to do so, proclaiming Athens as the real saviour of Greece. Writing as he did about the beginning of the Peloponnesian War — at a time when Athens, having attained the maximum of her empire, was alike feared, hated, and admired, by most of the Grecian states — he knows that the opinion which he is giving will be unpopular with his hearers generally, and he apologises for it as something wrung from him against his will by the force of the evidence. Nor was it only that the Athenians dared to stay and fight against immense odds: they, and they alone, threw into the cause that energy and forwardness whereby it was enabled to succeed, as will appear further in the sequel.

But there was also a third way, not less deserving of notice, in which they contributed to the result. As soon as the congress of deputies met at the Isthmus of Corinth, it became essential to recognise some one commanding state: and with regard to the land-force, no one dreamt of contesting the pre-eminence of Sparta. But in respect to the fleet, her pretensions were more disputable, since she furnished at most only sixteen ships, and little or no nautical skill; while Athens brought two-thirds of the entire naval force, with the best ships and seamen. Upon these grounds the idea was at first started, that Athens should command at sea and Sparta on land: but the majority of the allies manifested a decided repugnance, announcing that they would follow no one but a Spartan. To the honour of the Athenians, they at once waived their pretensions, as soon as they saw that the unity of the confederate force at this moment of peril would be compromised. To appreciate this generous abnegation of a claim in itself so reasonable, we must recollect that the love of pre-eminence was among the most prominent attributes of the Hellenic character; a prolific source of their greatness and excellence, but producing also no small amount both of their follies and their crimes. To renounce at the call of public obligation a claim to personal honour and glory, is perhaps the rarest of all virtues in a son of Hellen.

We find thus the Athenians nerved up to the pitch of resistance, prepared to see their country wasted, and to live as well as to fight on shipboard, when the necessity should arrive; furnishing two-thirds of the whole fleet, and yet prosecuting the building of fresh ships until the last moment; sending forth the ablest and most forward leader in the common cause, while content themselves to serve like other states under the leadership of Sparta. During the winter preceding the march of Xerxes from Sardis, the congress at the isthmus was trying, with little success, to bring the Grecian cities into united action. Among the cities north of Attica and the Peloponnesus, the greater number were either inclined to submit, like Thebes and the greater part of Bœotia, or were at least lukewarm in the cause of independence: so rare at this trying moment (to use the language of the unfortunate Plataeans fifty-three years afterwards) was the exertion of resolute Hellenic patriotism against the invader. Even in the interior of the Peloponnesus, the powerful Argos maintained an ambiguous neutrality. It was one of the first steps of the congress to send special envoys to Argos, setting forth the common danger and soliciting co-operation. The result is certain, that no co-operation was obtained — the Argives did nothing throughout the struggle; but as to their real position, or the grounds of their refusal, contradictory statements had reached the ears of Herodotus. They themselves affirmed that they

were ready to have joined the Hellenic cause, in spite of dissuasion from the Delphian oracle — exacting only as conditions that the Spartans should conclude a truce with them for thirty years, and should equally divide the honours of headship with Argos.

Such was the story told by the Argives themselves, but seemingly not credited either by any other Greeks, or by Herodotus himself. The prevalent opinion was, that the Argives had a secret understanding with Xerxes and some even affirmed that they had been the parties who invited him into Greece, as a means both of protection and of vengeance to themselves against Sparta after their defeat by Cleomenes. And Herodotus himself evidently believed that they *medised*, though he is half afraid to say so, and disguises his opinion in a cloud of words which betray the angry polemics going on about the matter, even fifty years afterwards. It is certain that in act the Argives were neutral.

The Cretans declined to take any part, on the ground of prohibitory injunctions from the oracle; the Coreyræans promised without performing, and even without any intention to perform. Their neutrality was a serious loss to the Greeks, since they could fit out a naval force of sixty triremes, second only to that of Athens. With this important contingent they engaged to join the Grecian fleet, and actually set sail from Coreyra; but they took care not to sail round Cape Malea, or to reach the scene of action.

The envoys who visited Coreyra proceeded onward on their mission to Gelo the despot of Syracuse. Of that potentate, regarded by Herodotus as more powerful than any state in Greece, we shall speak more fully in a subsequent chapter: it is sufficient to mention now, that he rendered no aid against Xerxes. Nor was it in his power to do so, whatever might have been his inclinations; for the same year which brought the Persian monarch against Greece, was also selected by the Carthaginians for a formidable invasion of Sicily, which kept the Sicilian Greeks to the defence of their own island. It seems even probable that this simultaneous invasion had been concerted between the Persians and Carthaginians.

The endeavours of the deputies of Greeks at the isthmus had thus produced no other reinforcement to their cause except some fair words from the Coreyræans. It was about the time when Xerxes was about to pass the Hellespont, in the beginning of 480 B.C., that the first actual step for resistance was taken, at the instigation of the Thessalians. Though the great Thessalian family of the Aleuadæ were among the companions of Xerxes, and the most forward in inviting him into Greece, with every promise of ready submission from their countrymen — yet it seems that these promises were in reality unwarranted. The Aleuadæ were at the head only of a minority, and perhaps were even in exile, like the Pisistratidæ: while most of the Thessalians were disposed to resist Xerxes — for which purpose they now sent envoys to the isthmus, intimating the necessity of guarding the passes of Olympus, the northernmost entrance of Greece. They offered their own cordial aid in this defence, adding that they should be under the necessity of making their own separate submission, if this demand were not complied with. Accordingly a body of ten thousand Grecian heavy-armed infantry, under the command of the Spartan Euænetus and the Athenian Themistocles, were despatched by sea to Alus in Achaia Phthiotis, where they disembarked and marched by land across Achaia and Thessaly. Being joined by the Thessalian horse, they occupied the defile of Tempe, through which the river Peneus makes its way to the sea, by a cleft between the mountains Olympus and Ossa.

[480 B.C.]

THE VALE OF TEMPE

The long, narrow, and winding defile of Tempe formed then, and forms still, the single entrance, open throughout winter as well as summer, from lower or maritime Macedonia into Thessaly. The

lofty mountain precipices approach so closely as to leave hardly room enough in some places for a road : it is thus eminently defensible, and a few resolute men would be sufficient to arrest in it the progress of the most numerous host. But the Greeks soon discovered that the position was such as they could not hold—first, because

the powerful fleet of Xerxes would be able to land troops in their rear; secondly, because there was also a second entrance passable in summer, from upper Macedonia into Thessaly, by the mountain passes over the range of Olympus. It was in fact by this second pass, evading the insurmountable difficulties of Tempe, that the advancing march of the Persians was destined to be made, under the auspices of Alexander, king of Macedon, tributary to them and active in their service. That prince sent a communication of the fact to the Greeks at Tempe, admonishing them that they would be trodden under foot by the countless host approaching, and urging them to renounce their hopeless position. He passed for a friend, and probably believed himself to be acting as such, in dissuading the Greeks from unavailing resistance to Persia: but he was in reality a very dangerous mediator; and as such the Spartans had good reason to dread him, in a second intervention of which we shall hear more hereafter.

On the present occasion, the Grecian commanders were quite ignorant of the existence

of any other entrancé into Thessaly, besides Tempe, until their arrival in that region. Perhaps it might have been possible to defend both entrances at once, and considering the immense importance of arresting the march of the Persians at the frontiers of Hellas, the attempt would have been worth some risk. So great was the alarm, however, produced by the unexpected discovery, justifying or seeming to justify the friendly advice of Alexander, that they remained only a few days at Tempe, then at once retired back to their ships, and returned by sea to the Isthmus of Corinth—about the time when Xerxes was crossing the Hellespont.

This precipitate retreat produced consequences highly disastrous and discouraging. It appeared to leave all Hellas north of Mount Cithæron and of the Megarid territory without defence, and it served either as reason or pretext for the majority of the Grecian states, north of that boundary, to make their submission to Xerxes, which some of them had already begun to do before. When Xerxes in the course of his march reached the Thermaic Gulf, within sight of Olympus and Ossa, the heralds whom he had sent from Sardis brought him tokens of submission from a third portion of the Hellenic name—the Thessalians, Dolopes, Ænians, Perrhæbians,



GREEK STANDARD BEARER

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Magnetes, Locrians, Dorians, Melians, Phthiotic Achæans, and Bœotians. Among the latter is included Thebes, but not Thespiæ or Plataea. The Thessalians, especially, not only submitted, but manifested active zeal and rendered much service in the cause of Xerxes, under the stimulus of the Aleuadae, whose party now became predominant: they were probably indignant at the hasty retreat of those who had come to defend them.

Had the Greeks been able to maintain the passes of Olympus and Ossa, all this northern fraction might probably have been induced to partake in the resistance instead of becoming auxiliaries to the invader. During the six weeks or two months which elapsed between the retreat of the Greeks from Tempe and the arrival of Xerxes at Therma, no new plan of defence was yet thoroughly organised; for it was not until that arrival became known at the isthmus, that the Greek army and fleet made its forward movement to occupy Thermopylæ and Artemisium.^b

XERXES REVIEWS HIS HOST

Xerxes having ranged and numbered his armament, was desirous to take a survey of them all. Mounted in his car, he examined each nation in its turn. To all of them he proposed certain questions, the replies to which were noted down by his secretaries. In this manner he proceeded from first to last through all the ranks, both of horse and foot. When this was done the fleet also was pushed off from land, whilst the monarch, exchanging his chariot for a Sidonian vessel, on the deck of which he sat beneath a golden canopy, passed slowly the heads of the ships, proposing in like manner questions to each, and noting down the answers. The commanders had severally moored their vessels at about four plethra from shore, in one uniform line, with their sterns out to sea, and their crews under arms, as if prepared for battle. Xerxes viewed them, passing betwixt their prow and the shore.

When he had finished his survey, he went on shore; and sending for Demaratus, the son of Ariston, who accompanied him in this expedition against Greece, he thus addressed him: "From you, Demaratus, who are a Greek, and, as I understand from yourself and others, of no mean or contemptible city, I am desirous of obtaining information: do you think that the Greeks will presume to make any resistance against me? For my own part, not to mention their want of unanimity, I cannot think that all the Greeks, joined to all the inhabitants of the west, would be able to withstand my power: what is your opinion on this subject?" "Sir," said Demaratus, in reply, "shall I say what is true, or only what is agreeable?" Xerxes commanded him to speak the truth.

"Since," answered Demaratus, "you command me to speak the truth it shall be my care to deliver myself in such a manner that no one hereafter speaking as I do, shall be convicted of falsehood. Greece has ever been the child of poverty; for its virtue it is indebted to the severe wisdom and discipline, by which it has tempered its poverty, and repelled its oppressors. To this praise all the Dorian Greeks are entitled; but I shall now speak of the Lacedæmonians only. You may depend upon it that your propositions which threaten Greece with servitude, will be rejected; and if all the other Greeks side with you against them, the Lacedæmonians will engage you in battle. Make no inquiries as to their number, for if they shall have but a thousand men, or even fewer, they will fight you."

[480 B.C.]

“What, Demaratus,” answered Xerxes, smiling, “think you that a thousand men will engage so vast a host? Tell me, you who, as you say, have been their prince, would you now willingly engage with ten opponents? If your countrymen be what you describe them, according to your own principles you, who are their prince, should be equal to two of them. If, therefore, one of them be able to contend with ten of my soldiers, you may be reasonably expected to contend with twenty: such ought to be the test of your assertions. But if your countrymen really resemble in form and size you, and such other Greeks as appear in my presence, it should seem that what you say is dictated by pride and insolence; for how can it be shown that a thousand, or ten thousand, or even fifty thousand men, all equally free, and not subject to the will of an individual, could oppose so great an army? Granting them to have five thousand men, we have still a majority of a thousand to one; they who like us are under the command of one person, from the fear of their leader, and under the immediate impression of the lash, are animated with a spirit contrary to their nature, and are made to attack a number greater than their own; but they who are urged by no constraint will not do this. If these Greeks were even equal to us in number, I cannot think they would dare to encounter Persians. The virtue to which you allude, is to be found among ourselves, though the examples are certainly not numerous; there are of my Persian guards men who will singly contend with three Greeks. The preposterous language which you use can only, therefore, proceed from your ignorance.”

“I knew, my lord, from the first,” returned Demaratus, “that by speaking truth I should offend you. I was induced to give you this representation of the Spartans, from your urging me to speak without reserve. You may judge, sir, what my attachment must be to those who, not content with depriving me of my paternal dignities, drove me ignominiously into exile. Your father received, protected, and supported me: no prudent man will treat with ingratitude the kindness of his benefactor. I will never presume to engage in fight with ten men, nor even with two, nor indeed willingly with one; but if necessity demanded, or danger provoked me, I would not hesitate to fight with any one of those, who is said to be a match for three Greeks. The Lacedæmonians, when they engage in single combat, are certainly not inferior to other men, but in a body they are not to be equalled. Although free, they are not so without some reserve; the law is their superior, of which they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of you: they are obedient to what it commands, and it commands them always not to fly from the field of battle, whatever may be the number of their adversaries. It is their duty to preserve their ranks, to conquer or to die. If what I say seem to you absurd, I am willing in future to be silent. I have spoken what I think, because the king commanded me, to whom may all he desires be accomplished.”

Xerxes smiled at these words of Demaratus, whom he dismissed without anger, civilly from his presence. After the above conference, he removed from Doriscus the governor who had been placed there by Darius, and promoted in his room Mascames, son of Megadostes. He then passed through Thrace with his army, towards Greece.

To this Mascames, as to the bravest of all the governors appointed either by himself or by Darius, Xerxes sent presents every year, and Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes continued to do the same to his descendants. Before this expedition against Greece, there had constantly been governors both in Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom, except Mascames, the Greeks afterwards expelled:

he alone retained Doriscus in his subjection, in defiance of the many and repeated exertions made to remove him. It was in remembrance of these services, that he and all his descendants received presents from the kings of Persia.

The only one of all those expelled by the Greeks, who enjoyed the good opinion of Xerxes, was Boges, the governor of Eion; he always mentioned this man in terms of esteem, and all his descendants were honourably regarded in Persia. Boges was not undeserving his great reputation: when he was besieged by the Athenians, under the conduct of Cimon, son of Miltiades, he might, if he had thought proper, have retired into Asia; this he refused, and defended himself to the last extremity, from apprehensions that the king might ascribe his conduct to fear. When no provisions were left, he caused a large pile to be raised; he then slew his children, his wife, his concubines, and all his family and threw them into the fire; he next cast all the gold and silver of the place from the walls into the Strymon; lastly, he leaped himself into the flames. This man is, therefore, very deservedly extolled by the Persians.

Xerxes, in his progress from Doriscus to Greece, compelled all the people among whom he came to join his army. All this tract of country, as far as Thessaly, as we have before remarked, had been made tributary to the king, first by Megabazus, and finally by Mardonius.

Xerxes having passed the exhausted bed of the Lissus, continued his march beyond the Grecian cities of Maronea, Dicæa, and Abdera. He proceeded onward through the more midland cities, in one of which is a lake almost of thirty stadia in circumference, full of fish, but remarkably salt: the waters of this proved only sufficient for the beasts of burden. The name of the city is Pistyrus. These Grecian and maritime cities were to the left of Xerxes as he passed them.

The nations of Thrace, through which he marched are these: the Pæti, Cicones, Bistones, Sapei, Dersæi, Edoni, and the Satræ. The inhabitants of the maritime towns followed by sea; those inland were, except the Satræ, compelled to accompany the army by land. The Satræ, as far as we know, never were subdued.

Xerxes continued to advance, and passed by two Pierian cities, one called Phagra, the other Pergamus; to his right he left the mountain Pangæus, keeping a westward direction, till he came to the river Strymon. To this river the magi offered a sacrifice of white horses. After performing these and many other religious rites to the Strymon, they proceeded through the Edonian district of the Nine Ways, to where they found bridges thrown over the Strymon: when they heard that this place was named the Nine Ways, they buried there alive nine youths and as many virgins, natives of the country. This custom of burying alive was common in Persia; and Amestris, the wife of Xerxes, when she was of an advanced age, commanded fourteen Persian children of illustrious birth to be interred alive in honour of that deity, who, as they suppose, exists under the earth.

On his arrival at Acanthus, the Persian monarch interchanged the rites of hospitality with the people, and presented each with a Median vest: he was prompted to this conduct by the particular zeal which they discovered towards the war, and from their having completed the work of the canal.

As soon as the royal will was made known by the heralds, the inhabitants of the several cities divided the corn which they possessed, and employed many months in reducing it to meal and flour. Some there were, who purchased at a great price the finest cattle they could procure, for the purpose of fat-

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tening them : others, with the same view of entertaining the army, provided birds both of the land and the water, which they preserved in cages and in ponds. Many employed themselves in making cups and goblets of gold and silver, with other utensils of the table : these last-mentioned articles were intended only for the king himself, and his more immediate attendants ; with respect to the army in general, it was thought sufficient to furnish them with provision. On the approach of the main body, a pavilion was erected, and properly prepared for the residence of the monarch, the rest of the troops remained in the open air. From the commencement of the feast to its conclusion, the fatigue of those who provided it is hardly to be expressed. The guests, after satisfying their appetite, passed the night on the place ; the next morning, after tearing up the pavilion, and plundering its contents, they departed, without leaving anything behind them.

Upon this occasion the witty remark of Megacreon of Abdera, has been handed down to posterity. If the Abderites, he observed, had been required to furnish a dinner as well as a supper, they must either have prevented the visit of the king by flight, or have been the most miserable of human beings.

These people, severe as was the burden, fulfilled what had been enjoined them. From Acanthus, Xerxes dismissed the commanders of his fleet, requiring them to wait his orders at Therma. Therma is situated near the Thermæan Gulf, to which it gives its name. He had been taught to suppose this the most convenient road ; by the command of Xerxes, the army had marched from Doriscus to Acanthus, in three separate bodies : one went by the seacoast, moving with the fleet, and was commanded by Mardonius and Masistes ; a second proceeded through the midst of the continent, under the conduct of Tritantæchmes and Gergis ; betwixt these went the third detachment, with whom was Xerxes himself, and who were led by Smerdomenes and Megabyzus.

As soon as the royal mandate was issued, the navy entered the canal which had been cut at Mount Athos, and which was continued to the gulf. Taking on board a supply of troops from these places, the fleet advanced towards the Thermæan Gulf, and doubling the Toronean promontory of Ampelos, they proceeded by a short cut to the Canastrean cape, the point, which of all the districts of Pallene, projects farthest into the sea. Coasting onward to the station appointed, they supplied themselves with troops from the cities in the vicinity of Pallene, and the Thermæan Gulf. From Ænea the fleet went in a straight direction to the Thermæan Gulf, and the coast of Mygdonia ; it ultimately arrived at Therma, where they waited for the king. Directing his march this way, Xerxes, with all his forces, left Acanthus, and proceeded over the continent through Pæonia and Crestonia. In the course of this march, the camels, which carried the provisions, were attacked by lions : in the darkness of the night they left their accustomed abode, and without molesting man or beast, fell upon the camels only. That the lions should attack the camels alone, animals they had never been known before to devour, or even by mistake to have seen, is a fact which we are totally unable to explain.

On his arrival at Therma, Xerxes halted with his army, which occupied the whole of the coast from Therma and Mygdonia, as far as the rivers Lydias and Haliæmon, which forming the limits of Bottiæis and Macedonia, meet at last in the same channel. Here the barbarians encamped. Xerxes, viewing from Therma, Olympus and Ossa, Thessalian mountains of an extraordinary height, betwixt which was a narrow passage where the Peneus poured its stream, and where was an entrance to Thessaly, was

desirous of sailing to the mouth of this river. For the way he had determined to march as the safest was through the high country of Macedonia, by the Perrhæbi, and the town of Gonnus. He instantly however set about the accomplishment of his wish. He accordingly went on board a Sidonian vessel, for on such occasions he always preferred the ships of that country; leaving here his land forces, he gave the signal for all the fleet to prepare to set sail. Arriving at the mouth of the Peneus, he observed it with particular admiration, and desired to know of his guides if it would not be possible to turn the stream, and make it empty itself into the sea in some other place.

Thessaly is said to have been formerly a marsh, on all sides surrounded by lofty mountains¹; to the east by Pelion and Ossa, whose bases meet each other; to the north by Olympus, to the west by Pindus; to the south by Othrys. The space betwixt these is Thessaly, into which depressed region many rivers pour their waters.

Xerxes inquiring of his guides whether the Peneus might be conducted to the sea by any other channel, received from them, who were well acquainted with the situation of the country, this reply: "As Thessaly, O King, is on every side encircled by mountains, the Peneus can have no other communication with the sea." "The Thessalians," Xerxes is said to have answered, "are a sagacious people. They have been careful to decline a contest for many reasons, and particularly as they must have discerned that their country would afford an easy conquest to an invader. All that would be necessary to deluge the whole of Thessaly, except the mountainous parts, would be to stop up the mouth of the river, and thus throw back its waters upon the country." This observation referred to the sons of Aleuas, who were Thessalians, and the first Greeks who submitted to the king. He presumed that their conduct declared the general sentiments of the nation in his favour. After surveying the place he returned to Therma.

He remained a few days in the neighbourhood of Pieria, during which interval a detachment of the third of his army was employed in clearing the Macedonian mountain, to facilitate the passage of the troops into the country of the Perrhæbi. The messengers who had been sent to require earth and water of the Greeks returned, some with and some without it. Xerxes sent no messengers either to Athens or to Sparta, for when Darius had before sent to these places, the Athenians threw his people into their pit of punishment, the Lacedæmonians into wells, telling them to get the earth and water thence, and carry it to their king. A long time after the incident we have related, the entrails of the victims continued at Sparta to bear an unfavourable appearance, till the people, reduced to despondency, called a general assembly, in which they inquired by their heralds, if any Lacedæmonian would die for his country. Upon this Sperthies, son of Aneristus, and Bulis, son of Nicolaus, Spartans of great accomplishments and distinction, offered themselves to undergo whatever punishment Xerxes the son of Darius should think proper to inflict on account of the murder of his ambassadors. These men therefore the Spartans sent to the Medes, as to certain death.




The magnanimity of these two men, as well as the words which they used, deserve admiration. On their way to Susa they came to Hydarnes, a native of Persia, and governor of the vanquished places in Asia near the sea: he entertained them with much liberality and kindness, and addressed them as follows: "Why, O Lacedæmonians, will you reject the friendship of the king? From me, and from my condition, you may learn how well he

[¹ Rennell & remarks that this description of Thessaly and that of the Straits of Thermopylæ prove how well Herodotus had considered the scenes of particular actions.]

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knows to reward merit. He already thinks highly of your virtue, and if you will but enter into his service, he will doubtless assign to each of you some government in Greece." "Hydarnes," they replied, "your advice with respect to us is inconsistent: you speak from the experience of your own but with an entire ignorance of our situation. To you servitude is familiar; but how sweet a thing liberty is, you have never known, if you had, you yourself would have advised us to make all possible exertions to preserve it."

When introduced, on their arrival at Susa, to the royal presence, they were first ordered by the guards to fall prostrate, and adore the king, and some force was used to compel them. But this they refused to do, even if they should dash their heads against the ground. They were not, they said, accustomed to adore a man, nor was it for this purpose that they came. After persevering in such conduct, they addressed Xerxes himself in these and similar expressions: "King of the Medes, we are sent by our countrymen to make atonement for those ambassadors who perished at Sparta." Xerxes with great magnanimity said he would not imitate the example of the Lacedæmonians. They in killing his ambassadors had violated the laws of nations; he would not be guilty of that with which he reproached them, nor, by destroying their messengers, indirectly justify their crime.^c



ANCIENT GREEK LYRES



CHAPTER XIX. THERMOPYLÆ

Everything among the Spartans conduced to plant in their hearts the most heroic courage, by the remembrance of their ancestors, whose principles and sentiments were the spur to the noblest actions. The lowest Spartans were exalted to a level with their greatest chiefs by a glorious death ; their memory was renewed by the most solemn offering to the latest posterity, and their images were placed next to those of the gods. — *Adapted from BONNY.*

THE FAMOUS STORY AS TOLD BY HERODOTUS

XERXES encamped in Trachinia at Melis; the Greeks, in the straits. These straits the Greeks in general call Thermopylæ; the people of the country Pylæ only. Here then were the two armies stationed, Xerxes occupying all the northern region as far as Trachinia, the Greeks that of the south. The Grecian army, which here waited the approach of the Persian, was composed of three hundred Spartans in complete armour; five hundred Tegeatæ, and as many Mantineans; one hundred and twenty men from Orchomenos of Arcadia, a thousand men from the rest of Arcadia, four hundred Corinthians, two hundred from Phlius, and eighty from Mycenæ. The above came from the Peloponnesus: from Bœotia there were seven hundred Thespians and four hundred Thebans.

In addition to the above, the aid of all the Opuntian Locrians had been solicited, together with a thousand Phocians. To obtain the assistance of these the Greeks had previously sent emissaries among them, saying, that they were the forerunners only of another and more numerous body, whose arrival was every day expected. They added, that the defence of the sea was confided to the people of Athens and Ægina, in conjunction with the rest of the fleet; that there was no occasion for alarm, as the invader of Greece was not a god, but a mere human being; that there never was nor could be any mortal superior to the vicissitudes of fortune; that the most exalted characters were exposed to the greatest evils; he therefore, a mortal, now advancing to attack them, would suffer for his temerity. These arguments proved effectual, and they accordingly marched to Trachis to join their allies.

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Leonidas and His Allies

These troops were commanded by different officers of their respective countries : but the man most regarded, and entrusted with the chief command, was Leonidas of Sparta. His ancestors were traced back to Hercules. An accident had placed him on the throne of Sparta ; for, as he had two brothers older than himself, Cleomenes and Dorieus, he had entertained no thoughts of the government ; but Cleomenes dying without male issue, and Dorieus not surviving (for he ended his days in Sicily) the crown came to Leonidas, who was older than Cleombrotus, the youngest of the sons of Anaxandrides, and who had married the daughter of Cleomenes. On the present occasion he took with him to Thermopylæ a body of three hundred chosen men, all of whom had children. To these he added the Theban troops who were conducted by Leontiades, son of Eurymachus.¹ Leonidas had selected the Thebans to accompany him, because a suspicion generally prevailed that they were secretly attached to the Medes. These therefore he summoned to attend him, to ascertain whether they would actually contribute their aid, or openly withdraw themselves from the Grecian league. With hostile sentiments they nevertheless sent the assistance required.²

The march of this body under Leonidas was accelerated by the Spartans, that their example might stimulate their allies to action, and that they might not make their delay a pretence for going over to the Medes. The celebration of the Carnean festival³ protracted the march of their main body ; but it was their intention to follow with all imaginable expedition, leaving only a small detachment for the defence of Sparta. The rest of the allies were actuated by similar motives, for the Olympic games happened to recur at this period ; and as they did not expect an engagement would immediately take place at Thermopylæ, they sent only a detachment before them.

Such were the motives of the confederate body. The Greeks who were already assembled at Thermopylæ were seized with so much terror on the approach of the Persians that they consulted about a retreat. Those of the Peloponnesus were in general of opinion that they should return and guard

¹ Beneath is the number of Greeks who appeared on this occasion, according to the different representations of Herodotus, Pausanias, and Diodorus Siculus :

	HERODOTUS.	PAUSANIAS.	DIODORUS.
Spartans	300	300	300
Tegeatæ	500	500	Lacedæmonians 700
Mantineans	500	500	The other na-
Orchomenians	120	120	tions of the
Arcadians	1,000	1,000	Peloponnesus . 3,000
Corinthians	400	400	
Phliasians	200	200	
Mycenæans	80	80	
Totals	3,100	3,100	4,000

The above came from the Peloponnesus ; those who came from the other parts of Greece were, according to the authors above mentioned :

Thespians	700	700	Milesians	1,000
Thebans	400	400	400
Phocians	1,000	1,000	1,000
Opuntian Locrians	6,000	7,400
Totals	5,200	11,200		7,400 ^c

[² Plutarch upbraids Herodotus for thus slandering the Thebans ; and Diodorus says, that Thebes was divided into two parties, one of which sent four hundred men to Thermopylæ.^c] [Bury^d thinks it is certain that this tale was invented in the light of Thebes' later Median policy.]

[³ This was continued for seven days at Sparta. Various reasons are assigned for its institution ; Theocritus says it commemorated the cessation of a pestilence.^e]

the isthmus ; but as the Phocians and Locrians were exceedingly averse to this measure, Leonidas prevailed on them to continue on their post. He resolved however to send messengers round to all the states, requiring supplies, stating that their number was much too small to oppose the Medes with any effect.

Whilst they thus deliberated, Xerxes sent a horseman to examine their number and their motions. He had before heard, in Thessaly, that a small band was collected at this passage, that they were led by Lacedæmonians, and by Leonidas of the race of Hercules. The person employed performed his duty : all those who were without the entrenchment he was able to reconnoitre ; those who were within for the purpose of defending it, eluded his observation. The Lacedæmonians were at that period stationed without ; of these some were performing gymnastic exercises, whilst others were employed in combing their hair. He was greatly astonished, but he leisurely surveyed their number and employments, and returned without molestation, for they despised him too much to pursue him. He related to Xerxes all that he had seen.

Xerxes, on hearing the above, was little aware of what was really the case, that this people were preparing themselves either to conquer or to die. The thing appeared to him so ridiculous, that he sent for Demaratus the son of Ariston, who was then with the army. On his appearing, the king questioned him on this behaviour of the Spartans, expressing his desire to know what it might intimate. "I have before, Sir," said Demaratus, "spoken to you of this people, at the commencement of this expedition ; and as I remember, when I related to you what I knew you would have occasion to observe, you treated me with contempt. I am conscious of the danger of declaring the truth, in opposition to your prejudices ; but I will nevertheless do so. It is the determination of these men to dispute this pass with us, and they are preparing themselves accordingly. It is their custom before any enterprise of danger to adorn their hair. Of this you may be assured, that if you vanquish these, and their countrymen in Sparta, no other nation will presume to take up arms against you : you are now advancing to attack a people whose realms and city are the fairest, and whose troops are the bravest of Greece." These words seemed to Xerxes preposterous enough ; but he demanded a second time, how so small a number could contend with his army. "Sir," said Demaratus, "I will submit to suffer the punishment of falsehood, if what I say does not happen."

Xerxes Assails the Pass

Xerxes was still incredulous ; he accordingly kept his position without any movement for four days, in expectation of seeing them retreat. On the fifth day, observing that they continued on their post, merely as he supposed from the most impudent rashness, he became much exasperated, and sent against them a detachment of Medes and Cissians, with a command to bring them alive to his presence. The Medes in consequence attacked them, and lost a considerable number. A reinforcement arrived ; but though the onset was severe, no impression was made. It now became universally conspicuous, and no less so to the king himself, that he had many troops, but few men.¹ The above engagement continued all day.

[¹ According to Plutarch, Leonidas being asked how he dared to encounter so prodigious a multitude with so few men, replied : "If you reckon by number, all Greece is not able to oppose a small part of that army ; but if by courage, the number I have with me is sufficient."]

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The Medes, after being very roughly treated, retired, and were succeeded by the band of Persians called by the king "the Immortal," and commanded by Hydarnes. These it was supposed would succeed without the smallest difficulty. They commenced the attack, but made no greater impression than the Medes: their superior numbers were of no advantage, on account of the narrowness of the place; and their spears also were shorter than those of the Greeks. The Lacedæmonians fought in a manner which deserves to be recorded; their own excellent discipline, and the unskillfulness of their adversaries, were in many instances remarkable, and not the least so when in close ranks they affected to retreat. The barbarians seeing them retire, pursued them with a great and clamorous shout; but on their near approach the Greeks faced about to receive them. The loss of the Persians was prodigious, and a few also of the Spartans fell. The Persians, after successive efforts made with great bodies of their troops to gain the pass, were unable to accomplish it and obliged to retire.

It is said of Xerxes himself that, being a spectator of the contest, he was so greatly alarmed for the safety of his men, that he leaped thrice from his throne. On the following day, the barbarians succeeded no better than before. They went to the onset as against a contemptible number, whose wounds they supposed would hardly permit them to renew the combat: but the Greeks, drawn up in regular divisions, fought each nation on its respective post, except the Phocians, who were stationed on the summit of the mountain to defend the pass. The Persians, experiencing a repetition of the same treatment, a second time retired.

The Treachery of Ephialtes

Whilst the king was exceedingly perplexed what conduct to pursue in the present emergency, Ephialtes, the son of Eurydemus, a Malian, demanded an audience: he expected to receive some great recompense for showing him the path which led over the mountain to Thermopylæ: and he indeed it was who thus rendered ineffectual the valour of those Greeks who perished on this station. This man, through fear of the Lacedæmonians, fled afterwards into Thessaly; but the Pylagoræ, calling a council of the Amphictyons at Pylæ for this express purpose, set a price upon his head, and he was afterwards slain by Athenades, a Trachinian, at Anticyra, to which place he had returned.

The intelligence of Ephialtes gave the king infinite satisfaction, and he instantly detached Hydarnes, with the forces under his command, to avail himself of it. They left the camp at the first approach of evening; the Malians, the natives of the country, discovered this path, and by it conducted the Thessalians against the Phocians, who had defended it by an entrenchment, and deemed themselves secure. It had never, however, proved of any advantage to the Malians.

The path of which we are speaking commences at the river Asopus. This stream flows through an aperture of the mountain called Anopæa, which is also the name of the path. This is continued through the whole length of the mountain, and terminates near the town of Alpenus. Following the track which has been described, the Persians passed the Asopus, and marched all night, keeping the Etean Mountains on the right, and the Trachinian on the left. At the dawn of morning they found themselves at the summit, where a band of a thousand Phocians in arms was stationed, both to defend their own country and this pass.

The approach of the Persians was discovered to the Phocians in this manner: whilst they were ascending the mountain they were totally concealed by the thick groves of oak; but from the stillness of the air they were discovered by the noise they made by trampling on the leaves, a thing which might naturally happen. The Phocians ran to arms, and in a moment the barbarians appeared, who, seeing a number of men precipitately arming themselves, were at first struck with astonishment. They did not expect an adversary; and they had fallen in among armed troops. Hydarnes, apprehending that the Phocians might prove to be Lacedæmonians, inquired of



THE PASS OF THERMOPYLÆ

Ephialtes who they were. When he was informed, he drew up the Persians in order of battle. The Phocians, not able to sustain the heavy flight of arrows, retreated up the mountain, imagining themselves the objects of this attack, and expecting certain destruction: but the troops with Hydarnes and Ephialtes did not think it worth their while to pursue them, and descended rapidly down the opposite side of the mountain.

To those Greeks stationed in the straits of Thermopylæ, Megistias the soothsayer had previously, from inspection of the entrails, predicted that death awaited them in the morning. Some deserters had also informed them of the circuit the Persians had taken; and this intelligence was in the course of the night circulated through the camp. All this was confirmed by their sentinels, who early in the morning fled down the sides of the mountain. In this predicament, the Greeks called a council, who were greatly

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divided in their opinions: some were for remaining on their station, others advised a retreat. In consequence of their not agreeing, many of them dispersed to their respective cities; a part resolved to continue with Leonidas.

It is said, that those who retired only did so in compliance with the wishes of Leonidas, who was desirous to preserve them: but he thought that he himself, with his Spartans, could not without the greatest ignominy forsake the post they had come to defend. Obedient to the direction of their leader, the confederates retired. The Thespians and Thebans¹ alone remained with the Spartans, the Thebans indeed very reluctantly, but they were detained by Leonidas as hostages. The Thespians were very zealous in the cause, and refusing to abandon their friends, perished with them. The leader of the Thespians was Demophilus, son of Diadromas.

The Final Assault

Xerxes early in the morning offered a solemn libation, then waiting till the hour of full forum, he advanced from his camp: to the above measure he had been advised by Ephialtes. The descent from the mountain is much shorter than the circuitous ascent. The barbarians with Xerxes approached; Leonidas and his Greeks proceeded, as to inevitable death, a much greater space from the defile than they had yet done. Till now they had defended themselves behind their entrenchment, fighting in the most contracted part of the passage; but on this day they engaged on a wider space, and a multitude of their opponents fell. Behind each troop of Persians, officers were stationed with whips in their hands, compelling with blows their men to advance. Many of them fell into the sea, where they perished; many were trodden under foot by their own troops, without exciting the smallest pity or regard. The Greeks, conscious that their destruction was at hand from those who had taken the circuit of the mountain, exerted themselves with the most desperate valour against their barbarian assailants.

Their spears being broken in pieces, they had recourse to their swords. Leonidas fell in the engagement, having greatly signalled himself; and with him, many Spartans of distinction, as well as others of inferior note. Many illustrious Persians also were slain, among whom were Abrocomes and Hyperanthes, sons of Darius.

These two brothers of Xerxes fell as they were contending for the body of Leonidas: here the conflict was the most severe, till at length the Greeks by their superior valour four times repelled the Persians, and drew aside the body of their prince. In this situation they continued till Ephialtes and his party approached. As soon as the Greeks perceived them at hand, the scene was changed, and they retreated to the narrowest part of the pass. Having repassed their entrenchment, they posted themselves, all except the Thebans, in a compact body, upon a hill, which is at the entrance of the straits, and where a lion of stone has been erected in honour of Leonidas. In this situation, they who had swords left, used them against the enemy, the rest exerted themselves with their hands and their teeth. The barbarians rushing upon them, some in front, after overturning their wall, others surrounding and pressing them in all directions, finally overpowered them.

Such was the conduct of the Lacedæmonians and Thespians; but none

[¹ Diodorus Siculus speaks only of the Thespians. Pausanias says that the people of Mycenæ sent eighty men to Thermopylæ, who had part in this glorious day; and in another place he says that all the allies retired before the battle, except the Thespians and people of Mycenæ.^c]

of them distinguished themselves so much as Dienecees the Spartan. A speech of his is recorded, which he made before they came to any engagement. A certain Trachinian having observed that the barbarians would send forth such a shower of arrows that their multitude would obscure the sun; he replied, like a man ignorant of fear, and despising the numbers of the Medes, "our Trachinian friend promises us great advantages; if the Medes obscure the sun's light, we shall fight them in the shade, and be protected from the heat." Many other sayings have been handed down as monuments of this man's fame. Next to him, the most distinguished of the Spartans were, Alpheus and Maron, two brothers, the sons of Orisiphantus; of the Thespians, the most conspicuous was Dithyrambus, son of Harmatidas. All these were interred in the place where they fell, together with such of the confederates as were slain before the separation of the forces by Leonidas. Upon their tomb was this inscription:

"Here once, from Pelops' seagirt region brought,
Four thousand men three hostile millions fought."

This was applied to them all collectively. The Spartans were thus distinguished:

"Go, stranger, and to list'ning Spartans tell,
That here, obedient to their laws, we fell."

There was one also appropriated to the prophet Megistias:

"By Medes cut off beside Sperchius' wave,
The seer Megistias fills this glorious grave:
Who stood the fate he well foresaw to meet,
And, link'd with Sparta's leaders, scorn'd retreat."

All these ornaments and inscriptions, that of Megistias alone excepted, were here placed by the Amphictyons.

Of these three hundred, there were two named Eurytus and Aristodemus; both of them, consistently with the discipline of their country, might have secured themselves by retiring to Sparta, for Leonidas had permitted them to leave the camp; but they continued at Alpenus, being both afflicted by a violent disorder of the eyes: or, if they had not thought proper to return home, they had the alternative of meeting death in the field with their fellow-soldiers. In this situation, they differed in opinion what conduct to pursue. Eurytus having heard of the circuit made by the Persians, called for his arms, and putting them on, commanded his helot to conduct him to the battle. The slave did so, and immediately fled, whilst his master died fighting valiantly. Aristodemus pusillanimously stayed where he was. If either Aristodemus, being individually diseased, had retired home, or if they had returned together, we cannot think that the Spartans could have shown any resentment against them; but as one of them died in the field, which the other, who was precisely in the same circumstances, refused to do, it was impossible not to be greatly incensed against Aristodemus.

Aristodemus, on his return, was branded with disgrace and infamy; no one would speak with him; no one would supply him with fire; and the opprobrious term of trembler was annexed to his name; but he afterwards, at the battle of Plataea, effectually atoned for his former conduct. It is also said that another of the three hundred survived; his name was Pantites, and he had been sent on some business to Thessaly. Returning to Sparta, he felt himself in disgrace, and put an end to his life.

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The Thebans, under the command of Leontiades, hitherto constrained by force, had fought with the Greeks against the Persians; but as soon as they saw that the Persians were victorious, when Leonidas and his party retired to the hill, they separated themselves from the Greeks. In the attitude of suppliants they approached the barbarians, assuring them, what was really the truth, that they were attached to the Medes; that they had been among the first to render earth and water; that they had only come to Thermopylæ on compulsion, and could not be considered as accessory to the slaughter of the king's troops. The Thessalians confirming the truth of what they had asserted, their lives were preserved. Some of them however were slain; for as they approached, the barbarians put several to the sword; but the greater part, by the order of Xerxes, had the royal marks impressed upon them, beginning with Leontiades himself. Eurymachus his son was afterwards slain at the head of four hundred Thebans, by the people of Plataea, whilst he was making an attempt upon their city. In this manner the Greeks fought at Thermopylæ.^b

DISCREPANT ACCOUNTS OF THE DEATH OF LEONIDAS

Such is the story of this memorable contest as Herodotus tells it. He is our most important source by far, and his simple words give a more realistic picture than is conveyed by any modern paraphrase. It is well to recall, however, that there are discrepant accounts of the death of Leonidas. None of these is so plausible as the description just given, but two of them are worth citing, to illustrate the historical uncertainties that attach to the subject.^a Plutarch, in his parallels between the Romans and Greeks, thus describes the death of Leonidas: "Whilst they were at dinner, the barbarians fell upon them: upon which Leonidas desired them to eat heartily, for they were to sup with Pluto. Leonidas charged at the head of his troops, and after receiving a multitude of wounds, got up to Xerxes himself, and snatched the crown from his head. He lost his life in the attempt; and Xerxes, causing his body to be opened, found his heart hairy. So says Aristides, in his first book of his Persian History." This fiction seems to have been taken from the *λασιόν κῆρ* of Homer.

Diodorus Siculus tells us that Leonidas, when he knew that he was circumvented, made a bold attempt by night to penetrate to the tent of Xerxes; but this the Persian king had forsaken on the first alarm. The Greeks however proceeded in search of him from one side to the other, and slew a prodigious multitude. When morning approached, the Persians perceiving the Greeks so few in number, held them in contempt; but they still did not dare to attack them in front; encompassing them on both sides, and behind, they slew them all with their spears. Such was the end of Leonidas and his party.^c

AFTER THERMOPYLÆ

Where the Spartans fell, they were afterwards buried: their tomb, as Simonides sang, was an altar; a sanctuary, in which Greece revered the memory of her second founders.

The inscription of the monument raised over the slain, who died from first to last in defence of the pass, recorded that four thousand men from the Peloponnesus had fought at Thermopylæ with three hundred myriads.

We ought not to expect accuracy in these numbers : the list in Herodotus, if the Locrian force is only supposed equal to the Phocian, exceeds six thousand men : the Phocians, it must be remembered, were not engaged. But it is not easy to reconcile either account with the historian's statement, that the Grecian dead amounted to four thousand, unless we suppose that the helots, though not numbered, formed a large part of the army of Leonidas. The lustre of his achievement is not diminished by their presence. He himself and his Spartans no doubt considered their persevering stand in the post entrusted to them, not as an act of high and heroic devotion, but of simple and indispensable duty. Their spirit spoke in the lines inscribed upon their monument, which bade the passenger tell their countrymen, that they had fallen in obedience to their laws.

The Persians are said to have lost twenty thousand men : among them were several of royal blood. To console himself for this loss, and to reap the utmost advantage from his victory, Xerxes sent over to the fleet, which, having heard of the departure of the Greeks, was now stationed on the north coast of Eubœa, and by public notice invited all who were curious, to see the chastisement he had inflicted on the men who had dared to defy his power. That he had previously buried the greater part of his own dead seems natural enough, and such an artifice, so slightly differing from the universal practice of both ancient and modern belligerents, scarcely deserved the name of a stratagem. He is said also to have mutilated the body of Leonidas, and as this was one of the foremost he found on a field which had cost him so dear, we are not at liberty to reject the tradition on the ground that such ferocity was not consistent with the respect usually paid by the Persians to a gallant enemy.

At Thermopylæ Xerxes learnt a lesson which he had refused to receive from the warnings of Demaratus ; and he inquired, with altered spirit, whether he had to expect many such obstacles in the conquest of Greece. The Spartan told him that there were eight thousand of his countrymen, who would all be ready to do what Leonidas had done, and that at the isthmus he would meet with a resistance more powerful and obstinate than at Thermopylæ. But if, instead of attacking the Peloponnesus on this side, where he would find its whole force collected to withstand him, he sent a detachment of his fleet to seize the island of Cythera, and to infest the coast of Laconia, the confederacy would be distracted, and its members, deprived of their head and perhaps disunited, would successively yield to his arms. The plan, whether Demaratus or Herodotus was the author, found no supporters in the Persian council.


He had now the key of northern Greece in his hands, and it only remained to determine towards which side he should first turn his arms. The Thessalians, who ever since his arrival in their country had been zealous in his service, now resolved to make use of their influence, and to direct the course of the storm to their own advantage. These Thessalians, who are mentioned on this occasion by Herodotus without any more precise description, were probably the same nobles who, against the wishes of their nation, had invited and forwarded the invasion. They had now an opportunity of gratifying either their cupidity or their revenge ; and they sent to the Phocians to demand a bribe of fifty talents, as the price at which they would consent to avert the destruction which was impending over Phocis. The Phocians however either did not trust their faith, or would not buy their safety of a hated rival. The Thessalians then persuaded Xerxes to cross that part of the Cetean chain which separates the vale of the Sperchius from

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the little valley of Doris. The Dorians were spared, as friends. Those of the Phocians who had the means of escaping took refuge on the high plains that lie under the topmost peaks of Parnassus, or at Amphissa. But on all that remained in their homes, on the fields, the cities, the temples of the devoted land, the fury of the invader, directed and stimulated by the malice of the Thessalians, poured undistinguishing ruin. Fire and sword, the cruelty and the lust of irritated spoilers, ravaged the vale of the Cephissus down to the borders of Bœotia. The rich sanctuary of Apollo at Abæ was sacked and burnt, and fourteen towns shared its fate. At Panopeus, Xerxes divided his forces; or rather detached a small body round the foot of Parnassus to Delphi, with orders to strip the temple of its treasures, and lay them at his feet. He had learnt their value from the best authority at Sardis. The great army turned off toward the lower vale of the Cephissus, to pursue its march through Bœotia to Athens.^h



REMAINS OF THE TOMB OF LEONIDAS OF SPARTA



ELEUSIS, PART OF THE ISLAND OF SALAMIS

CHAPTER XX. THE BATTLES OF ARTEMISIUM AND SALAMIS

A king sate on the rocky brow
Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis ;
And ships, by thousands, lay below,
And men in nations ; — all were his,
He counted them at break of day,
And when the sun set where were they ?

— BYRON.

THE days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at the latter place and retired to Chalcis, were induced to return, by the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent storm, and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy's fleet, in spite of the damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle, and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended. Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiades to maintain his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove their families and their property. But even such postponement was thought unsafe, and refused : and he was on the point of giving orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon, to Themistocles, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in defence of the island. Themistocles employed the money adroitly and successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiades, with large presents besides to the other leading chiefs : the most unmanageable among them was the Corinthian Adimantus, who at first threatened to depart with his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillised, by a present of three talents.

However Plutarch may be scandalised at such inglorious revelations preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question the bribery here described. But Themistocles doubtless was only tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money, that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish without the money—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium. It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a more favourable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that Themistocles, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and the great originator of maritime energies

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in his country, concurred unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium : but his high mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome—yet still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral. It was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait : but at any rate to procure for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus, they would have packed up and removed long before ; for a text of Bacis gave them express warning ; but, having neglected the sacred writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for such presumption.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they would have gained an easy victory, for the Greek fleet would have fled, as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack. But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape. Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south, in the rear of the Greeks,—and postponing their own attack in front until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron round outside of the island of Sciathus, it became known immediately among the Greeks, through a deserter—Seyllias of Scione. This man, the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium, and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of the late destructive storm and the despatch of the intercepting squadron.

BATTLE OF ARTEMISIUM

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under the inspirations of Themistocles, to go out and offer battle to the main fleet near Aphetæ. Wanting to acquire some practical experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed, of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of the afternoon, when little daylight remained. Their boldness in thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships, astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries : to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the circumference ; in this position, compressed into a narrow space, they seemed to be

awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a larger circle around them : but on a second signal given, their ships assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less than thirty of them ; in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus, despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks : but the near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet retired to its former station — the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to Artemisium.

The result of this first day's combat, though indecisive in itself, surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the middle of summer, — a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of Greece, — the most violent wind, rain, and thunder prevailed during the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely recovered from the former storm at Sepias Acte, were almost driven to despair by this repetition of the same peril : the more so when they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging to the Greeks ; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh Athenian ships, which reinforced them the next day, raised them to a still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day, they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked and destroyed some Cilician ships even at their moorings ; the fleet having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to come out and fight.

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such insults, — still less to let their master hear of them. About noon on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half moon ; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet into action ; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great loss and damage on both sides : the Egyptians bore off the palm of valour among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater, and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating fragments, still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater proportion with reference to their inferior total : and the Athenian vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one-half of their number out of condition to renew it. The Egyptians alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders — and Themistocles, as it seems, among them — determined that they could no longer venture to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval force farther

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into Greece: though this was in fact a surrender of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistocles to give them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were thus employed in organising their retreat, they received news which rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abronychus, stationed with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear. Themistocles, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some neighbouring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against their fathers, but to desert, if possible—or at least, to fight as little and as backwardly as they could. Themistocles hoped by this stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus to diminish their efficiency. With no longer delay than was requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet, which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached the island of Salamis.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed by a citizen of Histiaæ to the Persians at Apheta, who at first disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiaæ and the neighbouring territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead, Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators: he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were left out—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at Thermopylæ, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the slain helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public as it must have been, really deceived very few.

The sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band. But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet been taken. Meanwhile the invading force, army, and fleet, was in its progress towards Attica and the Peloponnesus, without the least preparations

— and, what was still worse, without any combined and concerted plan — for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Locrians, and Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Plataea, now joined him. Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader, Attaginus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon to most of the Bœotian towns, as well to protect them from plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other hand, abandoned their city, and fled into the Peloponnesus; while the Plataeans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at Artemisium, were disembarked at Chalcis as the fleet retreated, for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from Carystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades — so that the losses sustained by the storm at Sepias and the fights at Artemisium, if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the Greeks.

At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, near fifty years after these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the threshold of the Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions against him; a reproach true almost to the letter. It was only when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas, that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither they rushed with all their available population under the conduct of Cleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Scironian road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy. The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasiens, Troezenians, and Hermionians, were all present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day. As a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent position: they considered it as their last chance, abandoning all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the navy of Xerxes, while it professedly threw out not only Attica, but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a hair's breadth of ruin.

ATHENS ABANDONED

If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting, according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready to sustain Leon-

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idas, or at any rate to co-operate in the defence of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or property : but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full march from Thermopylae, that the road to Attica was open to him, and that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of their own isthmus and their own separate existence. The fleet from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbour of Trœzen, there to await such reinforcements as could be got together : but the Athenians entreated Eurybiades to halt at Salamis, so as to allow them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While Eurybiades was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had reached Trœzen came over to join him ; and in this way Salamis became for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate intention beforehand.

Meanwhile Themistocles and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalerum, and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion, and still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Oropus, within the narrow space of less than six days ; for no longer interval elapsed before Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived even sooner.

The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in carrying out the helpless exiles ; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind reception and generous support were provided for them,—the Trœzenian population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations of religion as well as of traffic with Athens,—but in part also to Ægina : there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go farther than Salamis. Themistocles impressed upon the sufferers that they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls ; and either his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the Acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of Athene Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell, as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess, a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey cake was placed once in the month. The honey cake had been hitherto regularly consumed ; but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained untouched : the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example, confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.

The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have ensued on the actual capture of the city.¹ Some few individuals, too poor to hope for

¹ In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times. These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his *Visit to Greece* (London, 1825), Letters vi, vii, x. He states, p. 92, "Three times have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain-side by their own feeble hands. Many have

maintenance, or too old to care for life elsewhere, — confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation of the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be inexpugnable, — shut themselves up in the Acropolis along with the administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western front with wooden doors and palisades. When we read how great were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, we may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither, to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.

In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening, neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy — arm as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution. Political dissensions were suspended: Themistocles proposed to the people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only included but even specially designated among them his own great opponent Aristides, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus the accuser, and Cimon, the son of Miltiades, were partners in the same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully marching through the Ceramicus to dedicate their bridles in the Acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on shipboard, instead of on horseback. It was absolutely essential to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles, but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in the public treasury — but the senate of Areopagus, then composed in large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its public authority as well as its private contributions and example to others, and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachmæ for every soldier serving.

This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible resource of Themistocles, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either discovered or pretended that the Gorgon's head from the statue of Athene was lost, and directing upon this ground every man's baggage to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might be carrying out, available to the public service. By the most strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for removing the whole population of Attica, — those of military competence to the fleet at Salamis, — the rest to some place of refuge, — together with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred prisoners. Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired, so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in something like fighting condition.

perished too, from exposure to an intemperate climate; many, from diseases contracted through the loathsomeness of their habitations; many, from hunger and misery. On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra." In the war between the Turks and Venetians in 1688, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth.

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THE FLEET AT SALAMIS

The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted of three hundred and sixty-six ships, — a force far greater than at Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty among which, however, were lent to the Chalcidians, and manned by them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian, sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sicyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven from Ambracia, and as many from Eretria, five from Træzen, three from Hermione, and the same number from Leucas; two from Ceos, two from Styra, and one from Cythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their captains and seamen to Salamis; — all these triremes, together with a small squadron of the inferior vessels called penteconters, made up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent citizen named Phaÿllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games. The entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at Lade, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt, however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on the point even than Herodotus.

Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalerum with the coast adjoining. His land force had been put in motion under the guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied with the celebration of the Olympic games. "What prize does the victor receive?" he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmes, son of the monarch's uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders: "Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for honour!" Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves during the Homeric times.

Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining favourable terms. Nor would they even listen to a proposition of the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty talents were paid to them. The proposition being indignantly refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris, which *medised* and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the

Cephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian Locrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable of which were Elatea and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ and Plataea: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the Acropolis at Athens.

XERXES AT DELPHI

Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi, especially the profuse donations of Cræsus. The Delphians, in the extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain, together with Aceratus, the religious superior: but evidences of superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple; and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schiste, up that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athene Pronæa, on a sudden, dreadful thunder was heard, two vast mountain crags detached themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing many to death, the war shout was also heard from the interior of the temple of Athene. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also, as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylacus and Auto-noüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athene the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.¹ Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary and treasures, which re-

¹ Compare the account given in Pausanias (X, 23) of the subsequent repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention: there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from the summit is mentioned. Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind the traveller of these passages. The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes upon the Delphian temple seems not easy to reconcile with the words of Mardonius: still less can it be reconciled with the statement of Plutarch, who says that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.

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remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of the Phocian Philomelus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently, the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis and Platæa.

ATHENS TAKEN

Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him the members of the Pisistratid family, who doubtless thought their restoration already certain, and a few Athenian exiles attached to their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the handful of men collected in the Acropolis ventured to defy him: nor could all the persuasions of the Pisistratids, eager to preserve the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.

The Athenian Acropolis — a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to south — had no practicable access except on the western side: moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic wall. Obligated to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called Areopagus: from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates; that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones, which they rolled down upon them in the ascent.

For a time the Great King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded, and seemingly even unfortified: moreover, the attention of the little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple. The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian host, and the whole Acropolis was presently in their hands. Its defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames. The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise, very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of Cyrus.

Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched to Susa intelligence of the fact,

which is said to have excited unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy predictions of his uncle Artabanus. On the next day but one, the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins of the Acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the ground: they discovered that the sacred olive tree near the chapel of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athene, though burnt to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens afterwards believed this encouraging portent, as well as that which was said to have been seen by Dicæus, an Athenian companion of the Pisistratids, in the Thriasian plain.

It was now the day set apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in the territory, Dicæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city: not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive tree suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigour. So hopeless did the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.

About the time of the capture of the Acropolis, the Persian fleet also arrived safely in the Bay of Phalerum, reinforced by ships from Carystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible storm at Sepias Acte—an estimate certainly not admissible.

XERXES INSPECTS HIS FLEET

Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet, now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly, wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favour of immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of Halicarnassus in Caria; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait of Salamis, predicting that if the land-force were moved forwards to attack the Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the island, and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That Queen Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question; and the historian of Halicarnassus

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may have had means of hearing the grounds on which her opinion rested: but we find a difficulty in believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of the maritime subjects of Persia — an estimate not merely insulting to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote, and though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good temper, and even esteemed the Carian queen the more highly: though he resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the next day, while the land-force should move forwards towards the Peloponnesus.

Whilst, on the shore of Phalerum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming unanimity and precluded all real deliberation, great, indeed, was the contrast presented by the neighbouring Greek armament at Salamis, among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning. It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being already in Attica, Eurybiades convoked the chiefs to consider what position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them, especially those from the Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the land service — while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of escape. In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her Acropolis by the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence, that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority came to a vote for removing to the isthmus, but as night was approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.

Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder that the Peloponnesian chiefs—the Corinthian in particular, who furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory the land-battle at the isthmus seemed about to take place—should manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat, they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land. On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favourable position, in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity of the allied fleet: since Megara and Ægina would thus be left uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for the defence of their homes, while the Athenians also, a large portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina, would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at the isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even

the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for the squadrons of Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, etc., each fearing that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite of the efforts of Eurybiades to keep them together. Hence the order for quitting Salamis and repairing to the isthmus was nothing less than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition, however, and in spite of the protest of Themistocles, the obstinate determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the following morning.

SCHEMES OF THEMISTOCLES

When Themistocles returned to his ship, with the gloom of this melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the island as well as for that of the squadron, he found an Athenian friend named Mnesiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs had determined. Concerning this Mnesiphilus, who is mentioned generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistocles. On learning what had been resolved, Mnesiphilus burst out into remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail: there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any aggregate cause and country to fight for. He vehemently urged Themistocles again to open the question, and to press by every means in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a resolution to stay and fight at Salamis.

Themistocles had already in vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by ill success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to the ship of Eurybiades, asked permission to speak with him, and being invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking to Eurybiades alone, Themistocles was enabled to bring him partially round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiades had explained the object and formally opened the discussion, Themistocles addressed himself to each of the chiefs separately, pouring forth at large his fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the Corinthian Adimantus rebuked him by saying, "Themistocles, those who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal, are scourged." "True," rejoined the Athenian, "but those who lag behind the signal win no crowns."

Eurybiades then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous resolve: upon which Themistocles began the debate, and vehemently enforced the

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necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and not in the open waters at the isthmus, as well as of preserving Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would be not less effective for the defence of the Peloponnesus than if it took place at the isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded, and concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In the bosom of the Corinthian Adimantus, especially, this feeling of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of Themistocles, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free Grecian city to represent, Athens being in the power of the enemy: nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiades had no right to count the vote of Themistocles, until the latter could produce some free city as accrediting him to the synod.

Such an attack, alike ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians to carry away the fleet to their isthmus: it provoked a bitter retort against them from Themistocles, who reminded them that while he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiades, and addressing him personally, he said: "If thou wilt stay here, and fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin. For with us, all our means of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the prophecies announce that we are one day to colonise. You chiefs then, when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now saying."

Eurybiades had before been nearly convinced by the impressive pleading of Themistocles. But this last downright menace clenched his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not, however, put the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling; the succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat, and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æacid heroes of Salamis, — Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to implore Æacus himself and the remaining Æacids. It seems to have been on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.

But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over the formidable menace of Themistocles, and were further strengthened by the advices from the isthmus. The messengers from that quarter depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the impending land invasion. Why were they not there also,

to join hands and to help in the defence, — even if worsted at sea, — at least on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica, already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the insanity of Eurybiades: at length the common feeling broke out in public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs was demanded and convoked. Here the same angry debate, and the same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian chiefs clamouring for immediate departure, while the Athenians, Æginetans, and Megarians were equally urgent in favour of staying to fight. It was evident to Themistocles that the majority of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the orders of Eurybiades; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent, when he resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sicinnus his slave — seemingly an Asiatic Greek, who understood Persian, and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and teaching of the children of his master — was instructed to acquaint them privately and in the name of Themistocles, who was represented as wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that they were more likely to fight against each other than against any common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly espouse the Persian cause.

Such was the important communication despatched by Themistocles across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighbouring continent on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped signal honour from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem, he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter days, as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch: nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.

It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the strait of Salamis on both sides during the night, to the north as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica, — its headquarters were in the Bay of Phalerum, but doubtless parts of it would occupy those three natural harbours, as yet unimproved by art, which belonged to the deme of Piræus, — and would perhaps extend besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalerum: while the Greek fleet was in the harbour of the town called Salamis, in the portion of the island facing Mount Ægaleos, in Attica.

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During the night, a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from Piræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round to the north of the town and harbour of Salamis, so as to shut up the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis : while another portion blocked up the other issue between Piræus and the southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on the desert island of Psyttalea, near to that corner. These measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait close on their own harbour the next morning.

Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the midst of which Themistocles had sent over his secret envoy, continued without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat impossible : nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical, where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval force on the other—especially as Eurybiades himself was favourable to the view of Themistocles. Accordingly, the debate was still unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new turn.

The ostracised Aristides arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistocles himself, he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis ; not uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the Peloponnesians to retire to the isthmus. He was the first to bring the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from Ægina, had only eluded under favour of night. He caused Themistocles to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their common country, apprised him that the new movement of the Persians excluded all hope of now reaching the isthmus and rendered farther debate useless. Themistocles expressed his joy at the intelligence, and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent. He moreover desired Aristides to go himself into the synod, and communicate the news : for if it came from the lips of Themistocles, the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth even on the assertion of Aristides : nor was it until the arrival of a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.

THE BATTLE OF SALAMIS

Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne, upon one of the projecting declivities of Mount Ægaleos, near the Heracleum, and immediately overhanging the sea, from whence he could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct of his subject troops. He was

persuaded himself that they had not done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and that his presence would inspire them with fresh valour: moreover, his royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet—which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to the Athenians on the Grecian left—were placed the Phœnicians and Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians, approaching from the side of Piræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistocles and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board, they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to bring to their aid Æacus, with the other Æacid heroes. Honoured with this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening enemy.

The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians; and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight: for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first disposed to hesitate, and even backed water for a space, so that some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering over them, who exclaimed, with a voice that rang through the whole fleet, “Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?” The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the Greeks at the commencement of the battle. The brave Athenian captains Aminias and Lycomedes (the former, brother of the poet Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the inspirations of their own ardour: though according to the version current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æacid heroes, which first set this honourable example. The Naxian Democritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action. Aminias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his ship full against a Phœnician, and the two became entangled so that he could not again get clear; other ships came in aid on both sides, and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candour, tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that, with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and some even averse, the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves generally with great bravery: Phœnicians, Cyprians, Cilicians, Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes, serving as soldiers on shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore watching their behaviour.

Their signal defeat was not owing to any want of courage, but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks: thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other: those in the front could not recede,

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nor could those in the rear advance : the oar blades were broken by collision, the steersmen lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship's course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle.

While the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to Phalerum : Democritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The chief admiral, Ariabignes, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate was great : the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand. It appears that the Phœnician seamen of the fleet threw the blame of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks ; and some of them, driven ashore during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes, excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons, that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phœnicians as dastardly calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off : his wrath and vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on whom to vent it.

In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle, the conduct of Artemisia of Halicarnassus was such as to give him full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable ; she then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Aminias, but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades ; she charged the trireme of the Carian prince, Damasithymus of Calynda, ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew perished. Had Aminias been aware that the vessel which he was following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to relax in the pursuit, for the Athenian captains were all indignant at the idea of a female invader assailing their city ; but knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus charge and destroy another enemy's ship, he concluded her to be a deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape. At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons around him on shore, who recognised the ship of Artemisia, but supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked to him, "Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how she has just sunk an enemy's ship?" Assured that it was really her deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, "My men have become women ; my women, men." Thus was Artemisia

not only preserved, but exalted to a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of his own ships, among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the true story.

Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate; but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss is to be added the destruction of all those troops whom they had landed before the battle in the island of Psyttalea: as soon as the Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristides carried over some Grecian hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were choice troops; in great proportion the native Persian guards.

THE RETREAT OF XERXES

Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second engagement. But they were relieved from this necessity by the pusillanimity of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject nations—Phœnicians, Egyptians, Cilicians, Cyprians, Pamphylians, Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board, in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval subjects; he fancied that they could make no resistance to the Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the Danube. Against the Phœnicians, from whom he had expected most, his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from the fleet in the night, and departed homeward. Such a capital desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes, though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalerum in the night, not without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on board. They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there to guard the bridge against his arrival.

This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of the monarch—it was farther embittered by anger against Mardonius, as the instigator of this ruinous

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enterprise. That general knew full well that there was no safety for him in returning to Persia with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes of being yet able to do, and to advise the return of Xerxes himself to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by representing that the recent blow was after all not serious—that it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon worthless foreign slaves, like Phœnicians, Egyptians, etc., while the native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable, fully adequate to execute the monarch's revenge upon Hellas; that Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he were disposed; and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops.

This proposition afforded at the same time consolation for the monarch's wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted, approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself from the obligation of further service. "If Mardonius desires to remain (she remarked, contemptuously), by all means let him have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens." Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halicarnassian queen, by entrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport them to Ephesus.

The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure of the hostile fleet from the Bay of Phalerum, and immediately put themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros without success. Themistocles and the Athenians are even said to have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of Xerxes, had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiades and the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistocles readily suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful Sicinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he, Themistocles, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge, and that he had thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe retreat. Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems more probable that Themistocles fabricated the intention, with a view of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.

Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility, seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested—since Themistocles lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the obligation thus conferred

—and though extraordinary, they will not appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game, even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate, but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistocles knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle; moreover, a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks proved successful.

He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great gods — Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that “Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that they were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who always stayed with them and would never quit the island — Poverty and Helplessness. In these gods the Andrians put their trust, refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities, Themistocles sent round to various other cities, demanding from them private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack. From Carystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for himself apart from the other generals, but it appears that Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence the fleet was brought back to Salamis.

The intimation sent by Themistocles perhaps had the effect of hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians, Medes, Sacæ, Bactrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all, according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces, under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to winter in Thessaly, and to postpone further military operations until the ensuing spring.

Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont, by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were circulated, inconsistent with each other, fanciful, and even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralisers Seneca or Juvenal, delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and shadow, magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing: the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted, so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of the country through which they passed — an insufficient maintenance, eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery, and occasioned

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many to be left behind among the cities through whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After forty-five days' march from Attica, he at length found himself at the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had arrived long before him. But the short-lived bridge had already been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdera still showed the gilt scimitar and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never, since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the terror of the repulsed invader—who re-entered Sardis, with a broken army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it as the presumed conqueror of the western world.

THE SPOILS OF VICTORY

Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific cloud impending over her was dispersed. In the division of the booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among them were three Phœnician triremes, which were offered in dedication to Ajax at Salamis, to Athene at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the Isthmus of Corinth; further presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi, who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the Æginetans, the second place of honour was awarded to the Athenians; the Æginetan Polycritus, and the Athenians Eumenes and Aminias, being ranked first among the individual combatants.

Besides the first and second prizes of valour, the chiefs at the isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first prize, but that Themistocles had a large majority of votes for the second. The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it; so that Themistocles was disappointed of his reward, though exalted so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he received from the Lacedæmonians honours such as were never paid before or afterwards to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed given to Eurybiades as the first prize, but a like crown was at the same time conferred on Themistocles as a special reward for unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the city

afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select youths called *hippeis*, who formed the active guard and police of the country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honour to the frontiers of Tegea. Such demonstrations were so astonishing, from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed by some authors to their fear lest Themistocles should be offended by being deprived of the general prize.^b

SYRACUSAN VICTORY OVER CARTHAGE

On the very same day on which the Persians were defeated at Salamis, another portion of the Hellenic race, the Sicilian Greeks, also obtained a victory over an immense barbarian force. There is reason to believe that the invasion of Sicily by the Carthaginians was concerted with Xerxes, and that the simultaneous attack on two distinct Grecian peoples, by two immense armaments, was not merely the result of chance. It was, however, in the internal affairs of Sicily that the Carthaginians sought the pretext and the opportunity for their invasion. About the year 481 B.C., Theron, despot of Agrigentum, a relative of Gelo, the powerful ruler of Syracuse, expelled Terillus from Himera, and took possession of that town. Terillus, backed by some Sicilian cities which formed a kind of Carthaginian party, applied to the Carthaginians to restore him. The Carthaginians complied with the invitation; and in the year 480 B.C., Hamilcar landed at Panormus with a force composed of various nations, which is said to have amounted to the enormous sum of three hundred thousand men. Having drawn up his vessels on the beach, and protected them with a rampart, Hamilcar proceeded to besiege the Himeræans, who on their part prepared for an obstinate defence. At the instance of Theron, Gelo marched to the relief of the town with fifty thousand foot and five thousand horse. An obstinate and bloody engagement ensued, which, by a stratagem of Gelo's, was at length determined in his favour. The ships of the Carthaginians were fired, and Hamilcar himself slain. According to the statement of Diodorus, one hundred and fifty thousand Carthaginians fell in the engagement, while the greater part of the remainder surrendered at discretion, twenty ships alone escaping with a few fugitives. This account may justly be regarded as an exaggeration; yet it cannot be doubted that the victory was a decisive one, and the number very great of the prisoners and slain.

In Sicily, Greek taste made the sinews of the prisoners subserve the purposes of art; and many of the public structures which adorned and distinguished Agrigentum rose by the labour of the captive Carthaginians. Thus were the arms of Greece victorious on all sides, and the outposts of Europe maintained against the incursions of the semi-barbarous hordes of Asia and Africa. *f*



CHAPTER XXI. FROM SALAMIS TO MYCALE

THE battle of Salamis is a watchword of Greek triumph, and yet it by no means solved the problem of independence, for a great army was still in the country, enjoying the confidence and aid of many Greek allies. The defeated Persian fleet itself was still of sufficient power to be a lively danger.

The remainder of the fleet of Xerxes, which, flying from Salamis, arrived in Asia, after transporting the king and his forces from the Chersonesus to Abydos, wintered at Cyme. In the commencement of the spring it assembled at Samos, where some other vessels had continued during the winter. This armament was principally manned by Persians and Medes, and was under the conduct of Mardonites, the son of Bagæus, and Artayntes, son of Artachæus, whose uncle Amitres had been joined to him as his colleague. As the alarm of their former defeat was not yet subsided, they did not attempt to advance farther west, nor indeed did any one impel them to do so. Their vessels, with those of the Ionians, amounted to three hundred, and they stationed themselves at Samos, to secure the fidelity of Ionia. They did not think it probable that the Greeks would penetrate into Ionia, but would be satisfied with defending their country. They were confirmed in this opinion, as the Greeks, after the battle of Salamis, never attempted to pursue them, but were themselves content to retire also.

With respect to their affairs at sea, the Persians were sufficiently depressed; but they expected that Mardonius would do great things by land. Remaining on their station at Samos, they consulted how they might annoy the enemy, and they anxiously attended to the progress and affairs of Mardonius.

The approach of the spring, and the appearance of Mardonius in Thessaly, roused the Greeks. Their land army was not yet got together, but their fleet, consisting of a hundred and ten ships, was already at Ægina, under the command of Leotychides. He was descended in a right line from Hercules. He was of the second royal family, and all his ancestors, except the two named after Leotychides, had been kings of Sparta. The Athenians were commanded by Xanthippus, son of Arhiphon.

When the fleet of the Greeks had arrived at Ægina, the same individuals who had before been at Sparta to entreat the assistance of that people to deliver Ionia, arrived among the Greeks. Herodotus, the son of Basilides, was with them; they were in all seven, and had together concerted the death of Strattis, tyrant of Chios. Their plot having been discovered by one of the accomplices, the other six had withdrawn themselves to Sparta, and now came to Ægina to persuade the Greeks to enter Ionia: they were induced, though not without difficulty, to advance as far as Delos. All beyond this, the Greeks viewed as full of danger, as well because they were ignorant of the country, as because they supposed the enemy's forces were in

all these parts strong and numerous: Samos they considered as not less remote than the pillars of Hercules. Thus the barbarians were kept by their apprehensions from advancing beyond Samos, and the Greeks, notwithstanding the solicitations of the Chians, would not move farther eastward than Delos. Their mutual alarm thus kept the two parties at a distance from each other.

Whilst the Greeks thus moved to Delos, Mardonius, who had wintered in Thessaly, began to break up his quarters. His first step was to send an European, whose name was Mys, to the different oracles, ordering him to use his endeavours, and consult them all.

MARDONIUS MAKES OVERTURES TO ATHENS

As soon as the oracular declarations had been conveyed to Mardonius, he sent Alexander the Macedonian, son of Amyntas, ambassador to Athens. His choice of him was directed from his being connected with the Persians by ties of consanguinity and from his being a man of munificent and hospitable spirit. For these reasons he deemed him the most likely to conciliate the Athenians, who were represented to him as a valiant and numerous people, and who had principally contributed to the defeats which the Persians had sustained by sea. He reasonably presumed, that if he could prevail on them to unite their forces with his own, he might easily become master of the sea. His power by land was in his opinion superior to all resistance, and as the oracles had probably advised him to make an alliance with the Athenians, he hoped by these means effectually to subdue the Greeks.

When Alexander arrived at Athens, as deputed by Mardonius, he delivered the following speech: "Men of Athens, Mardonius informs you by me, that he has received a commission from the king of the following import: 'Whatever injuries the Athenians may have done me, I willingly forgive: return them therefore their country; let them add to it from any other they may prefer, and let them enjoy their own laws. If they will consent to enter into an alliance with me, you have my orders to rebuild all their temples which I have burned.'

"It will be my business to do all this unless you prevent me. I will now give you my own sentiments: What infatuation can induce you to continue your hostilities against a king to whom you can never be superior, and whom you cannot always resist: you already know the forces and exploits of Xerxes: neither can you be ignorant of the army under me. If you should even repel and conquer us, of which if you be wise you can indulge no hope, another army not inferior in strength will soon succeed ours. Do not, therefore, by endeavouring to render yourselves equal to so great a king, risk not only the loss of your native country, but the security of your persons: accept, therefore, of our friendship, and avail yourselves of the present honourable opportunity of averting the indignation of Xerxes. Be free, and let us mutually enter into a solemn alliance without fraud or treachery. Let, then, my offers prevail with you as their importance merits, for to you alone of all the Greeks, the king forgives the injuries he has sustained, wishing to become your friend."

The Lacedæmonians having heard that this prince was gone to Athens to invite the Athenians to an alliance with the Persians, were exceedingly alarmed. They could not forget the oracle which foretold that they, with the rest of the Dorians, should be driven from the Peloponnesus by a junc-

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tion of the Medes with the Athenians, to whom therefore they lost no time in sending ambassadors. These were present at the Athenian council, for the Athenians had endeavoured to gain time, well knowing that the Lacedæmonians would learn that an ambassador was come to invite them to a confederacy with the Persians, and would consequently send deputies to be present on the occasion; they therefore deferred the meeting, that the Lacedæmonians might be present at the declaration of their sentiments.

When Alexander had finished speaking, the Spartan envoys made this immediate reply: "We have been deputed by the Spartans, to entreat you not to engage in anything which may operate to the injury of our common country, nor listen to any propositions of Xerxes; such a conduct would not be equitable in itself, and would be particularly base in you from various reasons: you were the first promoters of this war, in opposition to our opinion; it was first of all commenced in vindication of your liberties, though all Greece was afterwards drawn into the contest. It will be most of all intolerable, that the Athenians should become the instruments of enslaving Greece, who, from times the most remote, have restored their liberties to many. Your present condition does not fail to excite in us sentiments of the sincerest pity, who, for two successive seasons, have been deprived of the produce of your lands, and have so long seen your mansions in ruin. From reflecting on your situation, we Spartans, in conjunction with your other allies, undertake to maintain, as long as the war shall continue, not only your wives, but such other parts of your families as are incapable of military service. Let not, therefore, this Macedonian Alexander, softening the sentiments of Mardonius, seduce you: the part he acts is consistent; a tyrant himself, he espouses the interests of a tyrant. If you are wise you will always remember, that the barbarians are invariably false and faithless."

After the above address of the Spartans, the Athenians made this reply to Alexander: "It was not at all necessary for you to inform us, that the power of the Persians was superior to our own: nevertheless, in defence of our liberties, we will continue our resistance to the utmost of our abilities. You may be assured that your endeavours to persuade us into an alliance with the barbarians never will succeed: tell, therefore, Mardonius, on the part of the Athenians, that as long as the sun shall continue its ordinary course, so long will we avoid any friendship with Xerxes, and so long will we continue to resist him. Tell him, we shall always look with confidence to the protecting assistance of those gods and heroes whose shrines and temples he has contemptuously destroyed. Hereafter do not you presume to enter an Athenian assembly with overtures of this kind, lest whilst you appear to mean us well, you prompt us to do what is abominable. We are unwilling that you should receive any injury from us, having been our guest and our friend."

The above was the answer given to Alexander; after which the Athenians thus spoke to the Lacedæmonians: "That the Spartans should fear our entering into an alliance with the barbarians seems natural enough; but in doing this, as you have had sufficient testimonies of Athenian firmness, you certainly did us injury. There is not upon earth a quantity of gold, nor any country so rich or so beautiful, as to seduce us to take part with the Medes, or to act injuriously to the liberties of Greece.

"If of ourselves we were so inclined, there still exist many important circumstances to deter us: in the first place, what is of all motives the most powerful, the shrines and temples of our deities, consumed by fire, and levelled with the ground, prompt us to the prosecution of a just revenge, and

manifestly compel us to reject every idea of forming an alliance with him who perpetrated these impieties. In the next place, our common consanguinity, our using the same language, our worship of the same divinities, and our practice of the same religious ceremonies, render it impossible that the Athenians should prove perfidious. If you knew it not before, be satisfied now, that as long as one Athenian shall survive, we will not be friends with Xerxes; in the mean time, your interest in our fortunes, your concern for the ruin of our mansions, and your offers to provide for the maintenance of our families, demand our gratitude, and may be considered as the perfection of generosity. We will however, bear our misfortunes as we may be able, and not be troublesome to you; be it your care to bring your forces into the field as expeditiously as possible; it is not probable that the barbarian will long defer his invasion of our country, he will be upon us as soon as he shall be informed that we have rejected his proposals: before he shall be able to penetrate into Attica, it becomes us to advance to the assistance of Bœotia."

MARDONIUS MOVES ON ATHENS

On receiving this answer from the Athenians, the ambassadors returned to Sparta. As soon as Mardonius heard from Alexander the determination of the Athenians, he moved from Thessaly, directing by rapid marches his course towards Athens. Wherever he came, he furnished himself with supplies of troops. The princes of Thessaly were so far from repenting of the part they had taken, that they endeavoured still more to animate Mardonius. Of these, Thorax of Larissa, who had attended Xerxes in his flight, now openly conducted Mardonius into Greece.

As soon as the army in its progress arrived at Bœotia, the Thebans received Mardonius. They endeavoured to persuade him to fix his station where he was, assuring him that a place more convenient for a camp, or better adapted for the accomplishment of his purpose, could not be found. They told him that by staying here he might subdue the Greeks without a battle. He might be satisfied, they added, from his former experience, that as long as the Greeks were united, it would be impossible for any body of men to subdue them. "If," said they, "you will be directed by our advice, you will be able, without difficulty, to counteract their wisest counsels. Send a sum of money to the most powerful men in each city: you will thus create anarchy in Greece, and by the assistance of your partisans, easily overcome all opposition."

This was the advice of the Thebans, which Mardonius was prevented from following, partly by his earnest desire of becoming a second time master of Athens, and partly by his pride. He was also anxious to inform the king at Sardis, by means of fires disposed at certain distances along the islands, that he had taken Athens. Proceeding therefore to Attica, he found it totally deserted; the inhabitants, as he was informed, being either at Salamis or on board the fleet. He then took possession of Athens a second time, ten months after its capture by Xerxes. Whilst he continued at Athens, he despatched to Salamis, Muriichides, a native of the Hellespont, with the same propositions that Alexander the Macedonian had before made to the Athenians.

Muriichides went to the council, and delivered the sentiments of Mardonius. A senator named Lycidas gave his opinion, that the terms offered by Muriichides were such as it became them to listen to, and communicate to

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the people; he said this, either from conviction, or seduced by the gold of Mardonius; but he had no sooner thus expressed himself, than both the Athenians who heard him, and those who were without, rushed with indignation upon him, and stoned him to death.¹ They dismissed Muriichides without injury. The Athenian women soon heard of the tumult which had been excited at Salamis on account of Lycidas, when, in a body mutually stimulating each other, they ran impetuously to his house, and stoned his wife and his children.

ATHENS APPEALS TO SPARTA

These were the inducements with the Athenians for returning to Salamis: as long as they entertained any expectation of assistance from the Peloponnesus, they stayed in Attica; but when they found their allies careless and inactive, and that Mardonius was already in Bœotia, they removed with all their effects to Salamis. At the same time they sent envoys to Lacedæmon, to complain that the Spartans, instead of advancing with them to meet the barbarian in Bœotia, had suffered him to enter Attica. They told them by what liberal offers the Persian had invited them to his friendship; and they forewarned them, that if they were not speedy in their communication of assistance, the Athenians must seek some other remedy. The Lacedæmonians were then celebrating what are called the *hyacinthia*, which solemnity they deem of the highest importance; they were also at work upon the wall of the isthmus, the battlements of which were already erected.

The ephori heard the deputies, but deferred answering them till the next day; when the morrow came, they put them off till the day following, and this they did for ten days successively. In this interval, the Peloponnesians prosecuted with great ardour on the isthmus, their work of the wall, which they nearly completed. Why the Spartans discovered so great an anxiety on the arrival of Alexander at Athens, lest the Athenians should come to terms with the Medes, and why now they did not seem to concern themselves about them, is more than we are able to explain, unless it was that the wall of the Isthmus was unfinished, after which they did not want the aid of the Athenians: but when Alexander arrived at Athens, this work was not completed, although from terror of the Persians they eagerly pursued it.

The answer and motions of the Spartans were finally these: on the day preceding that which was last appointed, a man of Tegea, named Chileus, who enjoyed at Lacedæmon greater reputation than any other foreigner, inquired from one of the ephori what the Athenians had said; which when he knew, he thus addressed them: "Things, O ephori, are thus circumstanced. If the Athenians, withdrawing from our alliance, shall unite with the Persian, strong as our wall on the isthmus may be, the enemy will still find an easy entrance into the Peloponnesus. Let us therefore hear them, before they do anything which may involve Greece in ruin."

The ephori were so impressed by what Chileus had said, that without communicating with the deputies of the different states, whilst it was yet night, they sent away a detachment of five thousand Spartans, each accompanied by seven helots, under the conduct of Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus.

¹ A man of the name of Cyrsilus had ten months before met a similar fate for having advised the people to stay in their city and receive Xerxes. The Athenian women in like manner stoned his wife. During the French Revolution the women of Paris, better distinguished by the name of *Poissardes*, in every particular imitated this brutality, and whoever differed with them in opinion were exposed to the danger of the *Lanterne*.^c

With these forces Pausanias left Sparta : the deputies, ignorant of the matter, when the morning came went to the ephori, having previously resolved to return to their respective cities : "You, O Lacedæmonians," they exclaimed, "lingering here, solemnise the *hyacinthia*, and are busy in your public games, basely deserting your allies. The Athenians, injured by you, and but little assisted by any, will make their peace with the Persians on the best terms they can obtain. When the enmity betwixt us shall have ceased, and we shall become the king's allies, we shall fight with him wherever he may choose to lead us : you may know therefore what consequences you have to expect."

In answer to this declaration of the ambassadors, the ephori protested, upon oath, that they believed their troops were already in Oresteum, on their march against the strangers ; by which expression they meant the barbarians. The deputies, not understanding them, requested an explanation. When the matter was properly represented to them, they departed with astonishment to overtake them, accompanied by five thousand armed troops from the neighbourhood of Sparta.

Whilst these were hastening to the isthmus, the Argives, as soon as they heard of the departure of Pausanias at the head of a body of troops from Sparta, sent one of their fleetest messengers to Mardonius in Attica. They had before undertaken to prevent the Lacedæmonians from taking the field. When the herald arrived at Athens, "I am sent," said he to Mardonius, "by the Argives, to inform you that the forces of Sparta are already on their march, and we have not been able to prevent them ; avail yourself therefore of this information." Saying this, he returned.

MARDONIUS DESTROYS ATHENS AND WITHDRAWS

Mardonius, hearing this, determined to stay no longer in Attica. He had continued until this time, willing to see what measures the Athenians would take ; and he had refrained from offering any kind of injury to the Athenian lands, hoping they would still make peace with him. When it was evident that this was not to be expected, he withdrew his army, before Pausanias and his detachment arrived at the isthmus. He did not however depart without setting fire to Athens,¹ and levelling with the ground whatever of the walls, buildings, or temples, still remained entire. He was induced to quit his station, because the country of Attica was ill adapted for cavalry, and because in case of defeat he had no other means of escape but through straits where a handful of men might cut off his retreat. He therefore determined to remove to Thebes, that he might have the advantage of fighting near a confederate city and in a country convenient for his cavalry.

Mardonius was already on his march, when another courier came in haste to inform him, that a second body of a thousand Spartans was moving towards Megara. He accordingly deliberated how he might intercept this latter party. Turning aside towards Megara, he sent on his cavalry to ravage the Megarian lands. These were the extreme limits on the western parts of Europe, to which the Persian army penetrated.

¹ The fate of Athens has been various. It was first burned by Xerxes ; the following year by Mardonius ; it was a third time destroyed in the Peloponnesian War ; it received a Roman garrison to protect it against Philip son of Demetrius, but was not long afterwards ravaged and defaced by Sulla ; in the reign of Arcadius and Honorius it was torn in pieces by Alaric, king of the Goths.

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Another messenger now came to tell him, that the Greeks were assembled with great strength at the isthmus; he therefore turned back through Decelea. The Boeotian chiefs had employed their Asopian neighbours as guides, who conducted Mardonius first to Sphendaleas, and thence to Tanagra. At Tanagra, Mardonius passed the night, and the next day came to Scolos, in the Theban territory. Here the lands of the Thebans, though the friends and allies of the Medes, were laid waste, not from any enmity, but from the urgent necessities of the army. The general was desirous to fortify his camp, and to have some place of refuge in case of defeat. His camp extended from Erythrae, by Hysiae, as far as Platea, on the banks of the Asopus. It was protected by a wall, which did not continue the whole extent of the camp, but which occupied a space of ten stadia in each of the four fronts.

Whilst Mardonius was stationed in Boeotia, all the Greeks who were attached to the Persians supplied him with troops, and joined him in his attack on Athens; the Phocians alone did not; these had indeed, and with apparent ardour, favoured the Medes, not from inclination but necessity. A few days after the entertainment given at Thebes, they arrived with a thousand well-armed troops under the command of Harmocydes, one of their most popular citizens. Mardonius, on their following him to Thebes, sent some horsemen, commanding them to halt by themselves in the plain where they were: at the same moment, all the Persian cavalry appeared in sight. A rumour instantly circulated among those Greeks who were in the Persian camp, that the Phocians were going to be put to death by the cavalry. The same also spread through the Phocians, on which account their leader Harmocydes thus addressed them:

"My friends, I am convinced that we are destined to perish by the swords of these men, and from the accusations of the Thessalians. Let each man therefore prove his valour. It is better to die like men, exerting ourselves in our own defence, than to suffer ourselves to be slain tamely and without resistance: let these barbarians know, that the men whose deaths they meditate are Greeks."

With these words Harmocydes animated his countrymen. When the cavalry had surrounded them, they rode up as if to destroy them: they made a show of hurling their weapons, which some of them probably did. The Phocians upon this closed their ranks, and on every part fronted the enemy. The Persians seeing this, faced about and retired. We are not able to decide whether, at the instigation of the Thessalians, the Phocians were actually doomed to death; or whether, observing them determined to defend themselves, the Persians retired from the fear of receiving some injury themselves, and as if they had been so ordered by Mardonius, merely to make experiment of their valour. After the cavalry were withdrawn, a herald came to them on the part of Mardonius: "Men of Phocis," he exclaimed, "be not alarmed; you have given a proof of resolution which Mardonius had been taught not to expect; assist us therefore in the war with alacrity, for you shall neither outdo me nor the king in generosity."

The Lacedæmonians arriving at the isthmus, fortified their camp. As soon as this was known to the rest of the Peloponnesians, all were unwilling to be surpassed by the Spartans, as well they who were actuated by a love of their country, as they who had seen the Lacedæmonians proceed on their march. The victims which were sacrificed having a favourable appearance, they left the isthmus in a body, and came to Eleusis. The sacrifices at this place being again auspicious, they continued to advance, having been joined

at Eleusis by the Athenians, who had passed over from Salamis. On their arrival at Erythræ, in Bœotia, they learned that the barbarians were encamped near the Asopus ; then they marched to the foot of Mount Cithæron.

A PRELIMINARY SKIRMISH

As they did not descend into the plain¹ Mardonius sent the whole of his cavalry against them, under the command of Masistius, called by the Greeks Macistius. He was a Persian of distinction, and was on this occasion mounted on a Nisæan horse, decorated with a bridle of gold, and other splendid trappings. When they came near the Greeks, they attacked them in squadrons, did them considerable injury, and by way of insult called them women. The situation of the Megarians being most easy of access, was most exposed to the enemy's attack. Being hardly pressed by the barbarians, they sent a herald, who thus addressed the Grecian commanders : " We Megarians, O allies, are unable to stand the shock of the enemy's cavalry in our present position : if you are not speedy in relieving us, we shall be compelled to quit the field."

After this report of the heralds, Pausanias wished to see if any of the Greeks would voluntarily offer themselves to take the post of the Megarians. All refused, except a chosen band of three hundred Athenians, commanded by Olympiodorus, the son of Lampon.

This body, which took upon itself the defence of a post declined by all the other Greeks encamped at Erythræ, brought with them a band of archers. The engagement, after an obstinate dispute, terminated thus : The enemies' horse attacked in squadrons ; the steed of Masistius, being conspicuous above the rest, was wounded in the side by an arrow ; it reared, and becoming unruly from the pain of the wound, threw its rider. The Athenians rushed upon him, seized the horse, and notwithstanding his resistance, killed Masistius. In doing this, however, they had some difficulty, on account of his armour. Over a purple tunic he wore a breastplate covered with plates of gold. This repelled all their blows, which some person perceiving, killed him by wounding him in the eye. The death of Masistius was unknown to the rest of his troops ; they did not see him fall from his horse, and were ignorant of his fate, their attention being entirely occupied by succeeding in regular squadrons to the charge. At length making a stand, they perceived themselves without a leader. Upon this they rushed in with united force to bring off the body of Masistius.

The Athenians seeing them advance in a collected body, called out for relief. While the infantry were moving to their support, the body of

¹Plutarch relates some particulars previous to this event, which are worth transcribing :

Whilst Greece found itself brought to a most delicate crisis, some Athenian citizens of the noblest families of the place, seeing themselves ruined by the war, and considering that with their effects they had also lost their credit and their influence, held some secret meetings, and determined to destroy the popular government of Athens ; in which project if they failed, they resolved to ruin the state, and surrender Greece to the barbarians. This conspiracy had already made some progress, when it was discovered to Aristides. He at first was greatly alarmed, from the juncture at which it happened ; but as he knew not the precise number of conspirators, he thought it expedient not to neglect an affair of so great importance, and yet not to investigate it too minutely, in order to give those concerned opportunity to repent. He satisfied himself with arresting eight of the conspirators ; of these, two as the most guilty were immediately proceeded against, but they contrived to escape. The rest he dismissed, that they might show their repentance by their valour, telling them, that a battle should be the great tribunal to determine their sincerity and good intentions to their country.^c

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Masistius was vigorously disputed. While the three hundred were alone, they were compelled to give ground, and recede from the body; but other forces coming to their relief, the cavalry in their turn gave way, and, with the body of their leader, lost a great number of their men. Retiring for the space of two stadia, they held a consultation, and being without a commander, determined to return to Mardonius. On their arrival at the camp, the death of Masistius spread a general sorrow through the army, and greatly afflicted Mardonius himself. They cut off the hair from themselves, their horses, and their beasts of burden, and all Bœotia resounded with their cries and lamentations. The man they had lost, was, next to Mardonius, most esteemed by the Persians and the king.

The Greeks having not only sustained but repelled the attacks of the cavalry, were inspired with increasing resolution. The body of Masistius, which from its beauty and size deserved admiration, they placed on a carriage, and passed through the ranks, while all quitted their stations to view it. They afterwards determined to remove to Plataea; they thought this a more commodious place for a camp than Erythræ, as well for other reasons as because there was plenty of water. To this place, near which is the fountain of Gargaphia, they resolved to go and pitch a regularly fortified camp. Taking their arms, they proceeded by the foot of Cithæron, and passing Hysia, came to Plataea. They drew themselves up in regular divisions of the different nations, near the fountain of Gargaphia and the shrine of the hero Androcrates, some on a gently rising ground, others on the plain.

In the arrangement of the several nations, a violent dispute arose betwixt the Tegeatæ and Athenians, each asserting their claim to one of the wings, in vindication of which they appealed to their former as well as more recent exploits. The Tegeatæ spoke to this effect:

"The post which we now claim has ever been given us by the joint consent of the allies, in all the expeditions made beyond the Peloponnesus: we not only speak of ancient but of less distant periods. After the death of Eurystheus, when the Heraclidæ made an attempt to return to the Peloponnesus, the rank we now vindicate was allowed us. With you, O Lacedæmonians, we do not enter into competition, we are willing that you should take your post in which wing you think proper; the command of the other, which has so long been allowed us, we now claim. Not to dwell upon the action we have recited, we are certainly more worthy of this post than the Athenians. On your account, O Spartans, as well as for the benefit of others, we have fought again and again with success and glory. Let not then the Athenians be on this occasion preferred to us; for they have never in an equal manner distinguished themselves in past or in more recent periods."


The Athenians made this reply: "We are well aware, that the motive of our assembling here is not to spend our time in altercations, but to fight the barbarians; but since it has been thought necessary to urge on the part of the Tegeatæ their ancient as well as more recent exploits, we feel ourselves obliged to assert that right, which we receive from our ancestors, to be preferred to the Arcadians as long as we shall conduct ourselves well. Those Heraclidæ, whose leader they boast to have slain at the isthmus, after being rejected by all the Greeks with whom they wished to take refuge from the servitude of the people of Mycenæ, found a secure retreat with us alone. In conjunction with them we chastised the insolence of Eurystheus, and obtained a complete victory over those possessing the Peloponnesus. The Argives, who under Polynices fought against Thebes, remaining unburied,

we undertook an expedition against the Cadmeans, recovered the bodies, and interred them in our country at Eleusis. A further instance of our prowess was exhibited in our repulsion of the Amazons, who advanced from the river Thermodon to invade Attica. We were no less conspicuous at the siege of Troy.

“But this recital is vain and useless; the people who were then illustrious might now be base, or dastards then, might now be heroes. Enough therefore of the examples of our former glory, though we are still able to introduce more and greater; for if any of the Greeks at the battle of Marathon merited renown, we may claim this, and more also. On that day we alone contended with the Persian, and after a glorious and successful contest were victorious over an army of forty-six different nations; which action must confessedly entitle us to the post we claim; but in the present state of affairs, all dispute about rank is unseasonable; we are ready, O Lacedæmonians, to oppose the enemy wherever you shall choose to station us. Wherever we may be, we shall endeavour to behave like men. Lead us on therefore, we are ready to obey you.”

When the Athenians had thus delivered their sentiments, the Lacedæmonians were unanimous in declaring that the Arcadians must yield to the people of Athens the command of one of the wings. They accordingly took their station in preference to the Tegeatæ.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA



GREEK OFFICER
(After Hope)

The Greeks who came afterwards, with those who were present before, were thus disposed. The Lacedæmonians, to the number of ten thousand, occupied the right wing; of these, five thousand were Spartans, who were followed by thirty-five thousand helots lightly armed, allowing seven helots to each Spartan. The Tegeatæ, to the number of fifteen hundred, were placed by the Spartans next themselves, in consideration of their valour, and as a mark of honour. Nearest the Tegeatæ were five thousand Corinthians, who, in consequence of their request to Pausanias, had contiguous to them three hundred Potidæans of Pallene. Next in order were six hundred Arcadians of Orchomene, three thousand Sicyonians, eight hundred Epidaurians, and a thousand Træzenians. Contiguous to these last were two hundred Lepreatæ; next to whom were four hundred Mycenæans and Tirynthians. Stationed by the Tirynthians were, in regular succession, a thousand Phliasians, three hundred Hermionians, six hundred Eretrians and Styrians; next came four hundred Chalcidians, five hundred Ambracians, eight hundred Leucadians and Anactorians; to whom two hundred Paleans of Cephallenia, and five hundred Æginetæ, successively joined. Three thousand Megarians and six hundred Platæans

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were contiguous to the Athenians, who to the number of eight thousand, under the command of Aristides, son of Lysimachus, occupied the left wing at the other extremity of the army.

The amount of this army, independent of the seven helots to each Spartan, was thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men, all of them completely armed and drawn together to repel the barbarian. Of the light-armed troops were the thirty-five thousand helots, each well prepared for battle, and thirty-four thousand five hundred attendant on the Lacedæmonians and other Greeks,¹ reckoning a light-armed soldier to every man; the whole of these therefore amounted to sixty-nine thousand five hundred.

Thus the whole of the Grecian army assembled at Plataea, including both the heavy- and light-armed troops, was one hundred and eight thousand two hundred men; adding to these one thousand and eight hundred Thespians, who were with the Greeks, but without arms, the complete number was one hundred and ten thousand. These were encamped on the banks of the Asopus.

The barbarian army having ceased to lament Masistius, as soon as they knew that the Greeks were advanced to Plataea, marched also to that part of the Asopus nearest to it; where they were thus disposed by Mardonius. Opposed to the Lacedæmonians were the Persians, who, as they were superior in number, fronted the Tegeatæ also. Of this body the select part was opposed to the Lacedæmonians, the less effective to the Tegeatæ. In making which arrangement, Mardonius followed the advice of the Thebans. Next to the Persians were the Medes, opposed to the Corinthians, Potidæans, Orchomenians, and Sicyonians. The Bactrians were placed next, to encounter the Epidaurians, Træzenians, Lepreatæ, Tirynthians, Mycæneans, and Phliasians. Contiguous to the Bactrians the Indians were disposed, in opposition to the Hermionians, Eretrians, Styrians, and Chalcidians. The Sacæ, next in order, fronted the Ambracians, Anaactorians, Leucadians, Paleans, and Æginetæ. The Athenians, Plateans, and Megarians were ultimately faced by the Boeotians, Locrians, Melians, Thessalians, and a thousand Phocians. All the Phocians did not assist the Medes; some of them, about Parnassus, favoured the Greeks, and from that station attacked and harassed both the troops of Mardonius and those of the Greeks who were with him. The Macedonians and Thessalians were also opposed to the Athenians.

In this manner Mardonius arranged those nations who were the most numerous and the most illustrious; with these were promiscuously mixed bodies of Phrygians, Thracians, Mysians, Paonians, and others. To the above might be added the Ethiopians, and those Egyptians named Hermotyrians and Calasirians, who alone of that country follow the profession of arms. These had formerly served on board the fleet, whence they had been removed to the land-forces by Mardonius when at Phalerum: the Egyptians had not been reckoned with those forces which Xerxes led against Athens. We have before remarked, that the barbarian army consisted of three hundred thousand men; the number of the Greek confederates of Mardonius, as it was never taken, cannot be ascertained; but as far as conjecture may determine, they amounted to about fifty thousand men. Such was the arrangement of the infantry; the cavalry were posted apart by themselves.

¹ Let it be remembered, to the honour of Greece, that on this occasion the Greeks, whose number only amounted to one hundred and ten thousand, were opposed by fifty thousand of their treacherous countrymen.

Both armies being thus ranged in nations and squadrons, on the following day offered sacrifices. The sacrifices promised victory to the Greeks if they acted on the defensive, but the contrary if, passing the Asopus, they began the fight. Mardonius, though anxious to engage, had nothing to hope from the entrails, unless he acted on the defensive only. He had also sacrificed according to the Grecian rites, using as his soothsayer Hegesistratus, an Elean, and the most illustrious of the Telliadæ. The Spartans had formerly seized this man, thrown him into prison, and menaced him with death, as one from whom they had received many and atrocious injuries. In this distress, alarmed not merely for his life, but with the idea of having previously to suffer many severities, he accomplished a thing which can hardly be told. He was confined in some stocks bound with iron, but accidentally obtaining a knife, he perpetrated the boldest thing which has ever been recorded.

Calculating what part of the remainder he should be able to draw out, he cut off the extremity of his foot; this done, notwithstanding he was guarded, he dug a hole under the wall, and escaped to Tegea, travelling only by night, and concealing himself in the woods during the day. Eluding the strictest search of the Lacedæmonians, he came on the third night to Tegea, his keepers being astonished at his resolution, for they saw the half of his foot, but could not find the man. In this manner Hegesistratus escaped to Tegea, which was not at that period in amity with Sparta. When his wound was healed he procured himself a wooden foot, and became an avowed enemy to Sparta. His animosity against the Lacedæmonians proved ultimately of no advantage to himself; he was taken in the exercise of his office at Zacynthus, and put to death. The fate of Hegesistratus was subsequent to the battle of Plataæ: at the time of which we were speaking, Mardonius, for a considerable sum, had prevailed with him to sacrifice, which he eagerly did, as well from his hatred of the Lacedæmonians, as from the desire of reward; but the appearance of the entrails gave no encouragement to fight, either to the Persians or their confederate Greeks, who also had their own appropriate soothsayer, Hippomachus of Leucadia. As the Grecian army continually increased, Timagenidas of Thebes, son of Herpyis, advised Mardonius to guard the pass of Cithæron, representing that he might thus intercept great bodies, who were every day thronging to the allied army of the Greeks.

The hostile armies had already remained eight days encamped opposite to each other, when the above counsel was given to Mardonius. He acknowledged its propriety, and immediately on the approach of night detached some cavalry to that part of Cithæron leading to Plataæ, a place called by the Bœotians the "Three Heads," by the Athenians the "Heads of Oak." This measure had its effect, and they took a convoy of five hundred beasts of burden, carrying a supply of provisions from the Peloponnesus to the army: with the carriages, they took also all the men who conducted them. Masters of this booty, the Persians, with the most unrelenting barbarity, put both men and beasts to death: when their cruelty was satiated, they returned with what they had taken to Mardonius.

After this event two days more passed, neither army being willing to engage. The barbarians, to irritate the Greeks, advanced as far as the Asopus, but neither army would pass the stream. The cavalry of Mardonius greatly and constantly harassed the Greeks. The Thebans, who were very zealous in their attachment to the Medes, prosecuted the war with ardour, and did everything but join battle; the Persians and Medes supported them and performed many illustrious actions.

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In this situation things remained for the space of ten days: on the eleventh, the armies retaining the same position with respect to each other, and the Greeks having received considerable reinforcements, Mardonius became disgusted with their inactivity. He accordingly held a conference with Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who was one of the few Persians whom Xerxes honoured with his esteem: it was the opinion of Artabazus that they should immediately break up their camp, and withdraw beneath the walls of Thebes, where was already prepared a magazine of provisions for themselves, and corn for their cavalry: here they might at their leisure terminate the war by the following measures. They had in their possession a great quantity of coined and uncoined gold, with an abundance of silver and plate: it was recommended to send these with no sparing hand to the Greeks, and particularly to those of greatest authority in their respective cities. It was urged, that if this were done, the Greeks would soon surrender their liberties, nor again risk the hazard of a battle. This opinion was seconded by the Thebans, who thought that it would operate successfully. Mardonius was of a contrary opinion, fierce, obstinate, and unyielding. His own army he thought superior to that of the Greeks, and that they should by all means fight before the Greeks received further supplies; that they should give no importance to the declarations of Hegesistratus, but without violating the laws of Persia, commence a battle in their usual manner. This opinion of Mardonius nobody thought proper to oppose, for to him, and not to Artabazus, the king had confided the supreme command of the army. He therefore ordered that everything should be properly disposed to commence the attack early in the morning.

When the night was far advanced, and the strictest silence prevailed through the army, which was buried in sleep, Alexander, son of Amyntas, general and prince of the Macedonians, rode up to the Athenian outposts, and earnestly desired to speak with their commanders. On hearing this, the greater number continued on their posts, while some hastened to their officers, whom they informed that a horseman was arrived from the enemy's army, who, naming the principal Greeks, would say nothing more than that he desired to speak with them.

The commanders lost no time in repairing to the advanced guard, where, on their arrival, they were thus addressed by Alexander: "I am come, O Athenians, to inform you of a secret which you must impart to Pausanias only, lest my ruin ensue. Nor would I speak now, were not I anxious for the safety of Greece. I from remote antiquity am of Grecian origin, and I would not willingly see you exchange freedom for servitude: I have therefore to inform you, that if Mardonius and his army could have drawn favourable omens from their victims, a battle would long since have taken place: intending to pay no further attention to these, it is his determination to attack you early in the morning, being afraid, as I suppose, that your forces will be yet more numerous. Be, therefore, on your guard; but if he still defer his purpose of an engagement, do you remain where you are, for he has provisions but for a few days more. If the event of this war shall be agreeable to your wishes, it will become you to make some efforts to restore my independence, who, on account of my partiality to the Greeks, have exposed myself to so much danger in thus acquainting you with the intention of Mardonius, to prevent the barbarians attacking you by surprise. I am Alexander of Macedon."

When he had thus spoken, he returned to his station in the Persian camp.

The Athenian chiefs went to the right wing, and informed Pausanias of what they had learned from Alexander. Pausanias, who stood in much awe of the Persians, addressed them thus in reply:

"As a battle is to take place in the morning, I think it advisable that you, Athenians, should front the Persians, and we, those Bæotians and Greeks who are now posted opposite to you. You have before contended with the Medes, and know their mode of fighting by experience at Marathon; we have never had this opportunity; but we have before fought the Bæotians, and Thessalians; take, therefore, your arms, and let us exchange situations."

"From the first," answered the Athenians, "when we observed the Persians opposed to you, we wished to make the proposal we now hear from you; we have been only deterred by our fear of offending you: as the overture comes from you, we are ready to comply with it."

This being agreeable to both, as soon as the morning dawned they changed situations; this the Bæotians observed, and communicated to Mardonius. The Persian general immediately exerted himself to oppose the Lacedæmonians with his troops. Pausanias, on seeing his scheme thus detected, again removed the Spartans to the right wing, as did Mardonius instantly his Persians to the left.



THE FIELD OF PLATEA

THE BATTLE OF PLATEA

When the troops had thus resumed their former posts, Mardonius sent a herald with this message to the Spartans: "Your character, O Lacedæmonians, is highly celebrated among all these nations, as men who disdain to fly; who never desert your ranks, determined either to slay your enemies or die. Nothing of this is true: we perceive you in the act of retreating, and of deserting your posts before a battle is commenced: we see you delegating to

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the Athenians the more dangerous attempt of opposing us, and placing yourselves against our slaves, neither of which actions is consistent with bravery. We are, therefore, greatly deceived in our opinion of you; we expected, that from a love of glory you would have despatched a herald to us, expressing yourselves desirous to combat with the Persians alone. Instead of this we find you alarmed and terrified; but as you have offered no challenge to us, we propose one to you. As you are esteemed the most illustrious of your army, why may not an equal number of you on the part of the Greeks, and of us on the part of the barbarians, contend for victory? If it be agreeable to you, the rest of our common forces may afterwards engage; if this be unnecessary, we will alone engage; and whichever conquers shall be esteemed victorious over the whole of the adverse army."

The herald, after delivering his commission, waited some time for an answer; not receiving any, he returned to Mardonius. He was exceedingly delighted, and already anticipating a victory, sent his cavalry to attack the Greeks; these with their lances and arrows materially distressed the Grecian army, and forbade any near approach. Advancing to the Gargaphian fountain, which furnished the Greeks with water, they disturbed and stopped it up. The Lacedæmonians alone were stationed near this fountain, the other Greeks, according to their different stations, were more or less distant, but all of them in the vicinity of the Asopus; but as they were debarred from watering here, by the missile weapons of the cavalry, they all came to the fountain. In this predicament the leaders of the Greeks, seeing the army cut off from the water, and harassed by the cavalry, came in crowds to Pausanias on the right wing, to deliberate about these and other emergencies. Unpleasant as the present incident might be, they were still more distressed from their want of provision; their servants, who had been despatched to bring this from the Peloponnesus, were prevented by the cavalry from returning to the camp.

The Grecian leaders, after deliberating upon the subject, determined, if the Persians should for one day more defer coming to an engagement, to pass to the island opposite to Plataea, and about ten stadia from the Asopus and the fountain Gargaphia, where they were at present encamped. This island is thus connected with the continent: the river, descending from Cithæron to the plain, divides itself into two streams, which, after flowing separately for about the distance of three stadia, again unite, thus forming the island which is called Oëroë, who, according to the natives, is the daughter of Asopus.

The Greeks by this measure proposed to themselves two advantages; first to be secure of water, and secondly to guard against being further annoyed by the enemy's cavalry. They resolved to decamp at the time of the second watch by night, lest the Persians, perceiving them, should pursue and harass them with their cavalry. It was also their intention, when arrived at the spot where the Asopian Oëroë is formed by the division of the waters flowing from Cithæron, to detach one-half of their army to the mountain to relieve a body of their servants, who, with a convoy of provisions, were there encompassed.

After taking the above resolutions, they remained all that day much incommoded by the enemy's horse: when these, at the approach of evening, retired, and the appointed hour was arrived, the greater part of the Greeks began to move with their baggage, but without any design of proceeding to the place before resolved on. The moment they began to march, occupied with no idea but that of escaping the cavalry, they retired towards Plataea, and fixed themselves near the temple of Juno, which is opposite to the city,

and at the distance of twenty stadia from the fountain of Gargaphia : in this place they encamped.

Pausanias, observing them in motion, gave orders to the Lacedæmonians to take their arms, and follow their route, presuming they were proceeding to the appointed station. The officers all showed themselves disposed to obey the orders of Pausanias, except Amompharetus, the son of Poliadas, captain of the band of Pitanaæ, who asserted that he would not fly before the barbarians, and thus be accessory to the dishonour of Sparta : he had not been present at the previous consultation, and knew not what was intended. Pausanias and Euryanax, though indignant at his refusal to obey the orders which had been issued, were still but little inclined to abandon the Pitanaæ, on the account of their leader's obstinacy ; thinking, that by their prosecuting the measure which the Greeks in general had adopted, Amompharetus and his party must unavoidably perish. With these sentiments the Lacedæmonians were commanded to halt, and pains were taken to dissuade the man from his purpose, who alone, of all the Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ, was determined not to quit his post.

At this crisis the Athenians determined to remain quietly on their posts, knowing it to be the genius of the Lacedæmonians to say one thing and think another. But as soon as they observed the troops in motion, they despatched a horseman to learn whether the Lacedæmonians intended to remove, and to inquire of Pausanias what was to be done. When the messenger arrived, he found the men in their ranks, but their leaders in violent altercation. Pausanias and Euryanax were unsuccessfully attempting to persuade Amompharetus not to involve the Lacedæmonians alone in danger by remaining behind, when the Athenian messenger came up to them. At this moment, in the violence of dispute, Amompharetus took up a stone with both his hands, and throwing it at the feet of Pausanias, exclaimed : "There is my vote for not flying before the foreigners !"

Pausanias, after telling him that he could be only actuated by frenzy, turned to the Athenian, who delivered his commission. He afterwards desired him to return, and communicate to the Athenians the state in which he found them, and to entreat them immediately to join their forces, and act in concert, as should be deemed expedient.

The messenger accordingly returned to the Athenians, whilst the Spartan chiefs continued their disputes till the morning. Thus far Pausanias remained indecisive, but thinking, as the event proved, that Amompharetus would certainly not stay behind, if the Lacedæmonians actually advanced, he gave orders to all the forces to march forward by the heights, in which they were followed by the Tegeans. The Athenians, keeping close to their ranks, pursued a route opposite to that of the Lacedæmonians ; these last, who were in great awe of the cavalry, advanced by the steep paths which led to the foot of Mount Cithæron ; the Athenians marched over the plain.

Amompharetus, never imagining that Pausanias would venture to abandon them, made great exertions to keep his men on their posts ; but when he saw Pausanias advancing with his troops, he concluded himself effectually given up ; taking therefore his arms, he with his band proceeded slowly after the rest of the army. These continuing their march for a space of ten stadia, came to a place called Agriopiæ, near the river Moloës, where is a temple of the Eleusinian Ceres, and there halted, waiting for Amompharetus and his party. The motive of Pausanias in doing this was, that he might have the opportunity of returning to the support of Amompharetus, if he should be still determined not to quit his post. Here Amompharetus and his band

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joined them; the whole force of the enemy's horse continuing as usual to harass them. As soon as the Barbarians discovered that the spot where the Greeks had before encamped was deserted, they put themselves in motion, overtook, and materially distressed them.

Mardonius being informed that the Greeks had decamped by night, and seeing their former station unoccupied, led the Persians over the Asopus, and pursued the path which the Greeks had taken, whom he considered as flying from his arms. The Lacedæmonians and Tegeatæ were the sole objects of his attack, for the Athenians, who had marched over the plain, were concealed by the hills from his view. The other Persian leaders seeing the troops moving, as if in pursuit of the Greeks, raised their standards, and followed the rout with great impetuosity, but without regularity or discipline; they hurried on with tumultuous shouts, considering the Greeks as absolutely in their power.

When Pausanias found himself thus pressed by the cavalry, he sent a horseman with the following message to the Athenians: "We are menaced, O Athenians, by a battle, the event of which will determine the freedom or slavery of Greece; and in this perplexity you, as well as ourselves, have, in the preceding night, been deserted by our allies. It is nevertheless our determination to defend ourselves to the last, and to render you such assistance as we may be able. If the enemy's horse had attacked you, we should have thought it our duty to have marched with the Tegeatæ, who are in our rear, and still faithful to Greece, to your support. As the whole operation of the enemy seems directed against us, it becomes you to give us the relief we materially want; but if you yourselves are so circumstanced, as to be unable to advance to our assistance, at least send us a body of archers. We confess, that in this war your activity has been far the most conspicuous, and we therefore presume on your compliance with our request."

The Athenians, without hesitation, and with determined bravery, advanced to communicate the relief which had been required. When they were already on their march, the confederate Greeks, in the service of the king, intercepted and attacked them: they were thus prevented from assisting the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance which gave them extreme uneasiness. In this situation the Spartans, to the amount of fifty thousand light-armed troops, with three thousand Tegeatæ,¹ who on no occasion were separated from them, offered a solemn sacrifice, with the resolution of encountering Mardonius.

The victims, however, were not auspicious, and in the mean time many of them were slain, and more wounded. The Persians, under the protection of their bucklers, showered their arrows upon the Spartans with prodigious effect. At this moment Pausanias, observing the entrails still unfavourable, looked earnestly towards the temple of Juno at Plataea, imploring the interposition of the goddess, and entreating her to prevent their disgrace and defeat.

Whilst he was in the act of supplicating the goddess, the Tegeatæ advanced against the barbarians: at the same moment the sacrifices became favourable, and Pausanias, at the head of his Spartans, went up boldly to the

¹ Of the Spartans there were	5,000
Seven helots to each Spartan	35,000
Lacedæmonians	5,000
A light-armed soldier to each Lacedæmonian	5,000
Tegeatæ	1,500
Light-armed Tegeatæ	1,500
Total	53,000 o

enemy. The Persians, throwing aside their bows, prepared to receive them. The engagement commenced before the barricade: when this was thrown down, a conflict took place near the temple of Ceres, which was continued with unremitted obstinacy till the fortune of the day was decided.

The barbarians, seizing their adversaries' lances, broke them in pieces, and discovered no inferiority either in strength or courage; but their armour was inefficient, their attack without skill, and their inferiority, with respect to discipline, conspicuous. In whatever manner they rushed upon the enemy, from one to ten at a time, they were cut in pieces by the Spartans.

Mardonius Falls and the Day is Won

The Greeks were most severely pressed where Mardonius himself, on a white horse, at the head of a thousand chosen Persians, directed his attack. As long as he lived, the Persians, both in their attack and defence, conducted themselves well, and slew great numbers of the Spartans; but as soon as Mardonius was slain, and the band which fought near his person, and which was the flower of the army, was destroyed, all the rest turned their backs and fled. They were much oppressed and encumbered by their long dresses, besides which, being lightly armed, they had to oppose men in full and complete armour.

On this day, as the oracle had before predicted, the death of Leonidas was amply revenged upon Mardonius, and the most glorious victory which has ever been recorded, was then obtained by Pausanias. Mardonius was slain by Æmnestus, a Spartan of distinguished reputation. Æmnestus long after this Persian war, together with three hundred men, was killed in an engagement at Stenyclarus, in which he opposed the united force of the Messenians.

The Persians, routed by the Spartans at Plataea, fled in the greatest confusion towards their camp, and to the wooden entrenchment which they had constructed in the Theban territories. It seems somewhat surprising that although the battle was fought near the grove of Ceres, not a single Persian took refuge in the temple, nor was slain near it; but the greater part of them perished beyond the limits of the sacred ground. Such was the issue of the battle of Plataea.

Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, who had from the first disapproved of the king's leaving Mardonius behind him, and who had warmly, though unsuccessfully, endeavoured to prevent a battle, determined on the following measures. He was at the head of no small body of troops; they amounted to forty thousand men: being much averse to the conduct of Mardonius, and foreseeing what the event of an engagement must be, he prepared and commanded his men to follow him wherever he should go, and to remit or increase their speed by his example. He then drew out his army, as if to attack the enemy; but he soon met the Persians flying from them: he then immediately and precipitately fled with all his troops in disorder, not directing his course to the entrenchment or to Thebes, but towards Phocis, intending to gain the Hellespont with all possible speed.

Of those Greeks who were in the royal army, all except the Boeotians, from a preconceived design, behaved themselves ill. The Boeotians fought the Athenians with obstinate resolution: those Thebans who were attached to the Medes made very considerable exertions, fighting with such courage, that three hundred of their first and boldest citizens fell by the swords of the Athenians. They fled at length, and pursued their way to Thebes, avoiding

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the route which the Persians had taken with the immense multitude of confederates, who, so far from making any exertions, had never struck a blow.

In the midst of all this tumult, intelligence was conveyed to those Greeks posted near the temple of Juno, and remote from the battle, that the event was decided, and Pausanias victorious. The Corinthians instantly, without any regularity, hurried over the hills which lay at the foot of the mountain, to arrive at the temple of Ceres. The Megarians and Phliasians, with the same intentions, posted over the plain, the more direct and obvious road. As they approached the enemy, they were observed by the Theban horse, commanded by Asopodorus, son of Timander, who, taking advantage of their want of order, rushed upon them and slew six hundred, driving the rest towards Mount Cithæron. Thus did these perish ingloriously.

The Persians, and a promiscuous multitude along with them, as soon as they arrived at the entrenchment, endeavoured to climb the turrets before the Lacedæmonians should come up with them. Having effected this, they endeavoured to defend themselves as well as they could. The Lacedæmonians soon arrived, and a severe engagement commenced.

Before the Athenians came up, the Persians not only defended themselves well, but had the advantage, as the Lacedæmonians were ignorant of the proper method of attack; but as soon as the Athenians advanced to their support, the battle was renewed with greater fierceness, and was long continued. The valour and firmness of the Athenians finally prevailed. Having made a breach they rushed into the camp: the Tegeatæ were the first Greeks that entered, and were they who plundered the tent of Mardonius, taking from thence, among other things, the manger from which his horses were fed, made entirely of brass, and very curious. This was afterwards deposited by the Tegeatæ in the temple of the Alean Minerva: the rest of the booty was carried to the spot where the common plunder was collected. As soon as their entrenchment was thrown down, the barbarians dispersed themselves different ways, without exhibiting any proof of their former bravery; they were, indeed, in a state of stupefaction and terror, from seeing their immense multitude overpowered in so short a period.

AFTER THE BATTLE

So great was the slaughter made by the Greeks, that of this army, which consisted of three hundred thousand men, not three thousand escaped, if we except the forty thousand who fled with Artabazus. The Lacedæmonians of Sparta lost ninety-one men; the Tegeatæ sixteen; the Athenians fifty-two.¹

Of those who most distinguished themselves on the part of the barbarians, are to be reckoned the Persian infantry, the Sacian cavalry, and lastly, Mardonius himself. Of the Greeks, the Tegeatæ and Athenians were eminently conspicuous; they were, nevertheless, inferior to the Lacedæmonians. The most daring of the Spartans, was Aristodemus; the same who alone returning from Thermopylæ fell into disgrace and infamy; next to him, Posidonius, Phylocyon, and Anompharetus the Spartan, behaved the best. Nevertheless, when it was disputed in conversation what individual had on that day most distinguished himself, the Spartans who were present said, that

¹ The Greeks, according to Plutarch, lost in all 1360 men: all those who were slain of the Athenians were of one particular tribe. Plutarch is much incensed at Herodotus for his account of this battle; but the authority of our historian seems entitled to most credit.^e [Bury, however, thinks he gave the Athenians too large a share in the victory.]

Aristodemus, being anxious to die conspicuously, as an expiation of his former crime, in an emotion of fury had burst from his rank, and performed extraordinary exploits; but that Posidonius had no desire to lose his life, and therefore his behaviour was the more glorious: but this remark might have proceeded from envy. All those slain on this day, were highly honoured, except Aristodemus. To him, for the reason above mentioned, no respect was paid, as having voluntarily sought death.

Among the troops of the Æginetæ, assembled at Plateæ, was Lampon, one of their principal citizens, and son of Pytheas. This man went to Pausanias, giving him the following most impious counsel: "Son of Cleombrotus, what you have done is beyond comparison splendid, and deserving admiration. The deity, in making you the instrument of Greece's freedom, has placed you far above all your predecessors in glory: in concluding this business so conduct yourself that your reputation may be still increased, and that no barbarian may ever again attempt to perpetrate atrocious actions against Greece. When Leonidas was slain at Thermopylæ, Mardonius and Xerxes cut off his head, and suspended his body from a cross. Do the same with respect to Mardonius, and you will deserve the applause of Sparta and of Greece, and avenge the cause of your uncle Leonidas." Thus spake Lampon, thinking he should please Pausanias.

"Friend of Ægina," replied Pausanias, "I thank you for your good intentions, and commend your foresight; but what you say violates every principle of equity.¹ After elevating me, my country, and this recent victory, to the summit of fame, you again depress us to infamy, in recommending me to inflict vengeance on the dead. You say, indeed, that by such an action I shall exalt my character; but I think it is more consistent with the conduct of barbarians than of Greeks, as it is one of those things for which we reproach them. I must therefore dissent from the Æginetæ, and all those who approve their sentiments. For me, it is sufficient to merit the esteem of Sparta, by attending to the rules of honour, both in my words and actions: Leonidas, whom you wish me to avenge, has, I think, received the amplest vengeance. The deaths of this immense multitude must sufficiently have atoned for him, and for those who fell with him at Thermopylæ. I would advise you in future, having these sentiments, to avoid my presence; and I would have you think it a favour, that I do not punish you."

Pausanias afterwards proclaimed by a herald, that no person should touch any of the booty; and he ordered the helots to collect the money into one place. They, as they dispersed themselves over the camp, found tents decorated with gold and silver, couches of the same, goblets, cups, and drinking vessels of gold, besides sacks of gold, and silver cauldrons placed on carriages. The dead bodies they stripped of bracelets, chains, and scimitars of gold; to their habits of various colours they paid no attention. Many things of value the helots secreted, and sold to the Æginetæ; others, unable to conceal, they were obliged to produce. The Æginetæ from this became exceedingly rich; for they purchased gold of the helots at the price of brass.

From the wealth thus collected, a tenth part was selected for sacred purposes. To the deity of Delphi was presented a golden tripod, resting on a three-headed snake of brass: it was placed near the altar. To the Olympian god they erected a Jupiter, ten cubits high: to the god of the isthmus, the figure of Neptune, in brass, seven cubits high. When this was done, the remainder of the plunder was divided among the army, according to their

¹ Pausanias altered materially afterwards. He aspired to the supreme power, became magnificent and luxurious, fierce and vindictive.^o

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merits; it consisted of Persian concubines, gold, silver, beasts of burden, with various riches. What choice things were given to those who most distinguished themselves at Plataea, has never been mentioned, though certain presents were made them. It is certain, that a tenth part of the whole was given to Pausanias, consisting among other things of women, horses, talents, and camels.

It is further recorded, that when Xerxes fled from Greece, he left all his equipage to Mardonius: Pausanias seeing this composed of gold, silver, and cloth of the richest embroidery, gave orders to the cooks and domestics to prepare an entertainment for him, as for Mardonius. His commands were executed, and he beheld couches of gold and silver, tables of the same, and everything that was splendid and magnificent. Astonished at the spectacle, he again with a smile directed his servants to prepare a Lacedæmonian repast. When this was ready the contrast was so striking, that he laughing sent for the Grecian leaders: when they were assembled, he showed them the two entertainments. "Men of Greece," said he, "I have called you together to bear testimony to the king of Persia's folly, who forsook all this luxury to plunder us who live in so much poverty." These were the words which Pausanias is said to have used to the Grecian leaders.

In succeeding times, many of the Plataeans found on the field of battle, chests of gold, silver, and other riches. This thing also happened: when the flesh had fallen from the bones of the dead bodies, the Plataeans, in removing them to some other spot, discovered a skull as one entire bone, without any suture. Two jaw bones also were found with their teeth, which though divided were of one entire bone, the grinders as well as the rest. The body of Mardonius was removed the day after the battle; but it is not known by whom.



SARCOPHAGI AT PLATÆA

The Greeks, after the division of the plunder at Plataea, proceeded to inter their dead, each nation by themselves. The Lacedæmonians sunk three trenches: in the one they deposited the bodies of their priests; in the second were interred the other Spartans; in the third, the helots. The Tegeatæ were buried by themselves, but with no distinction: the Athenians in like manner, and also the Megarians and Phliasians who were slain by the cavalry. Mounds of earth were raised over the bodies of all these people. With respect to the others shown at Plataea, they were raised by those, who being ashamed of their absence from the battle, wished to secure the esteem of posterity.

THE GREEKS ATTACK THEBES

Having buried their dead on the plain of Plataea, the Greeks, after serious deliberation, resolved to attack Thebes, and demand the persons of those who had taken part with the Medes. Of these the most distinguished were

Timagenidas and Attaginus, the leaders of the faction. They determined, unless these were given up, not to leave Thebes without utterly destroying it.

On the eleventh day after the battle, they besieged the Thebans, demanding the men whom we have named. They refused to surrender them, in consequence of which their lands were laid waste and their walls attacked. This violence being continued, Timagenidas, on the twentieth day, thus addressed the Thebans: "Men of Thebes, since the Greeks are resolved not to retire from Thebes till they shall either have destroyed it, or you shall deliver us into their power, let not Bœotia on our account be farther distressed. If their demand of our persons be merely a pretence to obtain money, let us satisfy them from the wealth of the public, as not we alone but all of us have been equally and openly active on the part of the Medes; if their real object in besieging Thebes is to obtain our persons, we are ready to go ourselves, and confer with them." The Thebans approving his advice, sent immediately a herald to Pausanias, saying they were ready to deliver up the men. As soon as this measure was determined, Attaginus fled, but his children were delivered to Pausanias, who immediately dismissed them, urging that infants could not possibly have any part in the faction of the Medes. The other Thebans who were given up, imagined they should have the liberty of pleading for themselves, and by the means of money hoped to escape. Pausanias suspecting that such a thing might happen, as soon as he got them in his power, dismissed all the forces of the allies; then removing the Thebans to Corinth, he there put them to death.

THE FLIGHT OF THE PERSIAN REMNANT

Artabazus son of Pharnaces fled from Platæa to the Thessalians. They received him with great hospitality, and entirely ignorant of what had happened, inquired after the remainder of the army. The Persian was fearful that if he disclosed the whole truth, he might draw upon him the attack of all who knew it, and consequently involve himself and army in the extreme danger. This reflection had before prevented his communication of the matter to the Phocians: and on the present occasion he thus addressed the Thessalians:

"I am hastening, as you perceive, with great expedition to Thrace, being despatched thither from our camp with this detachment, on some important business. Mardonius with his troops follows me at no great distance: show him the rights of hospitality and every suitable attention. You will finally have no occasion to repent of your kindness."

He then proceeded through Thessaly and Macedonia, immediately to Thrace, with evident marks of being in haste. Directing his march through the midst of the country, he arrived at Byzantium, with the loss of great numbers of his men, who were either cut in pieces by the Thracians, or quite worn out by fatigue and hunger. From Byzantium, he passed over his army in transports, and thus effected his return to Asia.

CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS IN IONIA

On the very day¹ of the battle of Platæa, a victory was gained at Mycale in Ionia. Whilst the Grecian fleet was yet at Delos, under the command of Leotychides the Lacedæmonian, ambassadors came to them from Samos.

[¹ Bury declares it to have been a few days later.]

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On their arrival, they sought the Grecian leaders, whom Hegesistratus (one of the ambassadors) addressed with various arguments. He urged that as soon as they should show themselves, all the Ionians would shake off their dependence, and revolt from the Persians; he told them that they might wait in vain for the prospect of a richer booty. He implored also their common deities, that being Greeks, they would deliver those who also were Greeks from servitude, and avenge them on the barbarian. He concluded by saying, that this might be easily accomplished, as the ships of the enemy were slow sailers, and by no means equal to those of the Greeks.

The Samians, with an oath, engaged to become the confederates of the Greeks. Leotychides then dismissed them all excepting Hegesistratus, who, on account of his name, he chose to take along with him. The Greeks, after remaining that day on their station, on the next sacrificed with favourable omens; Deiphonus, son of Evenius of Apollonia, in the Ionian Gulf, being their minister.

The Greeks having sacrificed favourably, set sail from Delos towards Samos. On their arrival at Calami of Samos, they drew themselves up near the temple of Juno, and prepared for a naval engagement. When the Persians heard of their approach, they moved with the residue of their fleet towards the continent, having previously permitted the Phenicians to retire. They had determined, after a consultation, not to risk an engagement, as they did not think themselves a match for their opponents. They therefore made towards the continent, that they might be covered by their land forces at Mycale, to whom Xerxes had intrusted the defence of Ionia. These, to the amount of sixty thousand, were under the command of Tigranes the Persian, one of the handsomest and tallest of his countrymen. To these troops the commanders of the fleet resolved to retire: it was also their intention to draw their vessels on shore, and to throw up an intrenchment round them, which might equally serve as a protection to their vessels and themselves. After this resolution, they proceeded on their course, and were carried near the temple of the Eumenidæ at Mycale. Here the Persians drew their ships to land, defending them with an intrenchment formed of stones, branches of fruit trees cut down upon the spot, and pieces of timber closely fitted together. In this position they were ready to sustain a blockade, and with hopes of victory, being prepared for either event.

When the Greeks received intelligence that the barbarians were retired to the continent, they considered them as escaped out of their hands. They were exceedingly exasperated, and in great perplexity whether they should return or proceed towards the Hellespont. Their ultimate determination was to follow the enemy towards the continent. Getting therefore all things ready for an engagement by sea, and providing themselves with scaling ladders, and such other things as were necessary, they sailed to Mycale. When they approached the enemy's station, they perceived no one advancing to meet them; but beheld the ships drawn on shore, secured within an intrenchment, and a considerable body of infantry ranged along the coast. Leotychides upon this advanced before all the rest in his ship, and coming as near the shore as he could, thus addressed the Ionians by a herald:

“Men of Ionia, all you who hear me, listen to what I say, for the Persians will understand nothing of what I tell you. When the engagement shall commence, remember first of all our common liberties; in the next place take notice, our watch-word is Hebe. Let those who hear me, inform all who do not.”

The motive of this conduct was the same with that of Themistocles at Artemisium. These expressions, if not intelligible to the barbarians, might make the desired impression on the Ionians; or if explained to the former, might render the fidelity of the latter suspected.

When Leotychides had done this, the Greeks approached the shore, disembarked, and prepared for battle. The Persians observing this, and knowing the purport of the enemy's address to the Ionians, took their arms from the Samians, suspecting them of a secret attachment to the Greeks. The Samians had purchased the freedom of five hundred Athenians, and sent them back with provisions to their country, who having been left in Attica, had been taken prisoners by the Persians, and brought away in the barbarian fleet. The circumstance of their thus releasing five hundred of the enemies of Xerxes, made them greatly suspected. To the Milesians, under pretence of their knowledge of the country, the Persians confided the guard of the paths to the heights of Mycale: their real motive was to remove them to a distance. By these steps the Persians endeavoured to guard against those Ionians, who might wish, if they had the opportunity, to effect a revolt. They next heaped their bucklers upon each other, to make a temporary rampart.

THE BATTLE OF MYCALE

The Greeks being drawn up, advanced to attack the barbarians: as they were proceeding, a herald's wand was discovered on the beach, and a rumour circulated through the ranks, that the Greeks had obtained a victory over the forces of Mardonius and Bœotia.¹ On the same day that their enemies were slaughtered at Plataea, and were about to be defeated at Mycale, the rumour of the former victory being circulated to this distance, rendered the Greeks more bold, and animated them against every danger. It appears farther worthy of observation, that both battles took place near the temple of the Eleusinian Ceres. The battle of Plataea, as we have before remarked, was in the vicinity of the temple of Ceres; the one at Mycale was in a similar situation.

The Athenians, who with those that accompanied them, constituted one-half of the army, advanced by the coast, and along the plain: the Lacedæmonians and their auxiliaries made their way by the more woody and mountainous places.

Whilst the Lacedæmonians were making a circuit, the Athenians in the other wing were already engaged. The Persians, as long as their entrenchment remained uninjured, defended themselves well, and without any inferiority; but when the Athenians, with those who supported them, increased their exertions, mutually exhorting one another, that they and not the Lacedæmonians might have the glory of the day, the face of things was changed; the rampart was thrown down, and a sensible advantage was obtained over the Persians. They sustained the shock for a considerable time, but finally gave way, and retreated behind their entrenchments. The Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Trœzenians, rushed in with them; for this part of the army was composed of these different nations.

¹ It is unnecessary to remark, that the superstition of Herodotus is in this passage conspicuous. Diodorus Siculus is most sagacious, when he says that Leotychides, and those who were with him, knew nothing of the victory of Plataea; but that they contrived this stratagem to animate their troops. Polyænus relates the same in his *Stratagemata*.^e "These things which happen by divine interposition," says Herodotus, "are made known by various means."

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When the wall was carried, the barbarians gave no testimony of their former prowess, but, except the Persians, indiscriminately fled. These last, though few in number, vigorously resisted the Greeks, who poured in upon them in crowds. Artayntes and Ithamitres, the commanders of the fleet, saved themselves by flight: but Mardontes, and Tigranes the general of the land-forces, were slain. Whilst the Persians still refused to give ground, the Lacedæmonians and their party arrived, and put all who survived to the sword. Upon this occasion many of the Greeks were slain, and among a number of the Sicyonians, Perilaus their leader. The Samians, who were in the Persian army, and from whom their weapons had been taken, no sooner saw victory incline to the side of the Greeks, than they assisted them with all their power. The other Ionians seeing this, revolted also, and turned their arms against the barbarians. The Milesians had been ordered, the better to provide for the safety of the Persians, to guard the paths to the heights, so that in case of accident the barbarians, under their guidance, might take refuge on the summits of Mycale; with this view, as well as to remove them to a distance, and thus guard against their perfidy, the Milesians had been so disposed; but they acted in direct contradiction to their orders. Those who fled, they introduced directly into the midst of their enemies, and finally were active beyond all the rest in putting them to the sword. In this manner did Ionia a second time revolt from the Persian power.

AFTER MYCALE

In this battle the Athenians most distinguished themselves, and next to the Athenians, they who obtained the greatest reputation were the Corinthians, Trœzenians, and Sicyonians. The greater number of the barbarians being slain, either in the battle or in the pursuit, the Greeks burned their ships, and totally destroyed their wall: the plunder they collected upon the shore, among which was a considerable quantity of money. Having done this, they sailed from the coast. When they came to Samos, they deliberated on the propriety of removing the Ionians to some other place, wishing to place them in some part of Greece where their authority was secure; but they determined to abandon Ionia to the barbarians. They were well aware both of the impossibility of defending the Ionians on every emergency, and of the danger which these would incur from the Persians, if they did not. The Peloponnesian magistrates were of opinion, that those nations who had embraced the cause of the Medes should be expelled, and their lands given to the Ionians. The Athenians would not consent that the Ionians should be transported from their country, nor would they allow the Peloponnesians to decide on the destruction of Athenian colonies. Seeing them tenacious of this opinion, the Peloponnesians no longer opposed them. Afterwards the people of Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and the other islands who had assisted with their arms in the present exigence, were received into the general confederacy, having by an oath, promised constant and inviolable fidelity. This ceremony performed, they sailed towards the Hellespont, meaning to destroy the bridge, which they expected to find in its original state.

The barbarians who saved themselves by flight, came to the heights of Mycale, and thence escaped in no great numbers to Sardis. During the retreat, Masistes, son of Darius, who had been present at the late unfortunate engagement, severely reproached Artayntes the commander-in-chief: among other things, he said, that in the execution of his duty he had behaved more

like a woman than a man, and had materially injured the interests of his master. To say that a man is more dastardly than a woman is with the Persians the most infamous of all reproaches. Artayntes, after bearing the insult for some time, became at length so exasperated, that he drew his scimitar, intending to kill Masistes. He was prevented by Xenagoras, son of Praxilaus, a native of Halicarnassus, who happening to be behind Artayntes, seized him by the middle, and threw him to the ground : at the same time the guards of Masistes came up. Xenagoras by this action not only obtained the favour of Masistes, but so much obliged Xerxes, by thus preserving his brother, that he was honoured with the government of all Cilicia. Nothing further of consequence occurred on their way to Sardis, where they found the king, who after his retreat from Athens, and his ill success at sea, had there resided.

The Greeks, sailing from Mycale towards the Hellespont, were obliged by contrary winds to put in at Lectum : thence they proceeded to Abydos. Here they found the bridge, which they imagined was entire, and which was the principal object of their voyage, effectually broken down. They on this held a consultation ; Leotychides, and the Lacedæmonians with him, were for returning to Greece ; the Athenians, with their leader Xanthippus, advised them to continue where they were, and make an attempt on the Chersonesus. The Peloponnesians returned ; but the Athenians, passing from Abydos to the Chersonesus, laid siege to Sestus. To this place, as by far the strongest in all that district, great numbers had retired from the neighbouring towns, as soon as it was known that the Greeks were in the Hellespont : among others was Œobazus of Cardia, a Persian who had previously collected here all that remained of the bridge. The town itself was possessed by the native Æolians, but they had with them a great number of Persians and other allies. The governor of this place, under Xerxes, was Artayctes, a Persian, of a cruel and profligate character.

Whilst they were prosecuting the siege, the autumn arrived. The Athenians, unable to make themselves masters of the place, and uneasy at being engaged in an expedition so far from their country, entreated their leaders to conduct them home. They refused to do this, till they should either succeed in their enterprise, or be recalled by the people of Athens, so intent were they on the business before them.

The besieged, under Artayctes, were reduced to such extremity of wretchedness, that they were obliged to boil for food the cords of which their beds were composed. When these also were consumed, Artayctes, Œobazus, and some other Persians, fled, under cover of the night, escaping by an avenue behind the town, which happened not to be blockaded by the enemy.

When the morning came, the people of the Chersonesus made signals to the Athenians from the turrets, and opened to them the gates. The greater part commenced a pursuit of the Persians, the remainder took possession of the town. Œobazus fled into Thrace ; but he was here seized by the Absinthians, and sacrificed, according to their rites, to their god Plistorus : his followers were put to death in some other manner. Artayctes and his adherents, who fled the last, were overtaken near the waters of Ægos, where, after a vigorous defence, part were slain, and part taken prisoners. The Greeks put them all in chains, Artayctes and his son with the rest, and carried them to Sestus. Conducting him therefore to the shore where the bridge of Xerxes had been constructed, they there crucified him ; though some say this was done upon an eminence near the city of Madytus. The son was stoned in his father's presence.

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The Athenians, after the above transactions, returned to Greece, carrying with them, besides vast quantities of money, the fragments of the bridge, to be suspended in their temples.^b

A REVIEW OF RESULTS

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks, now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient: the men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the malignity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks throughout these critical years, are forced to deal very harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends, and who intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed, not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness of Xerxes. Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus or the judgment of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force; but it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of co-operation, than that which they actually manifested.

A GLANCE FORWARD

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval, that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes, that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers, that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia, that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis, and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platea. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been

sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages: Demosthenes and Brasidas, the Cyreian army and Xenophon, Agesilaus, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon, Alexander: for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe, with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next two centuries, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactic and manœuvring in Greece, and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents, thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon—ability in command, with vigour in execution.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member: the post of second dignity in the line at Platæa had indeed been adjudged to her, but only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put together: even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry superior even to the Spartans: nor had any Athenian officer committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mycale, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous conquest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistocles; next, Aristides. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Panhellenic patriotism, which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably, but the second time a culpable neglect, in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistocles and the imposing Athenian naval force.


Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their movable property irrecoverably destroyed, we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending

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their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the same selfishness again prevalent among them; ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.⁹



GREEK WOMAN WITH MIRROR
(From a Painting on a Greek Vase)



A GREEK DRINKING HORN

CHAPTER XXII. THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

WHEN the Persians had retreated from Europe after being conquered both by sea and land by the Greeks, and those of them had been destroyed who had fled with their ships to Mycale, Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, returned home with the allies that were from the Peloponnesus, as we have already noted ; while the Athenians, and the allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, stayed behind, and laid siege to Sestus, of which the Medes were in possession. Having spent the winter before it, they took it, after the barbarians had evacuated it ; and then sailed away from the Hellespont, each to his own city. And the people of Athens, when they found the barbarians had departed from their country, proceeded immediately to carry over their children and wives, and the remnant of their furniture, from where they had put them out of the way ; and were preparing to rebuild their city and their walls. For short spaces of the enclosure were standing, and, though the majority of the houses had fallen, a few remained in which the grandees of the Persians had themselves taken up their quarters.

ATHENS REBUILDS HER WALLS

The Lacedæmonians, perceiving what they were about to do, sent an embassy to them ; partly because they themselves would have been more pleased to see neither them nor any one else in possession of a wa^{ll} ; but still more because the allies instigated them, and were afraid of their numerous fleet, which before they had not had, and of the bravery they had shown in the Persian War. And they begged them not to build their walls, but rather to join them in throwing down those of the cities out of the Peloponnesus ; not betraying their real wishes, and their suspicious feelings towards the Athenians ; but representing that the barbarian, if he should again come against them, would not then be able to make his advances from any stronghold, as in the present instance he had done from Thebes ; and the Peloponnesus, they said, was sufficient for all, as a place to retreat into and sally forth from. When the Lacedæmonians had thus spoken, the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, answered that they would send ambassadors to them concerning what they spoke of ; and they immediately

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dismissed them. And Themistocles advised them to send himself as quickly as possible to Lacedæmon, and having chosen other ambassadors besides himself, not to despatch them immediately, but to wait till such time as they should have raised their wall to the height most absolutely necessary for fighting from ; and that the whole population in the city, men, women, and children, should build it, sparing neither private nor public edifice, from which any assistance towards the work would be gained, but throwing down everything. After giving these instructions, and suggesting that he would himself manage all other matters there, he took his departure. On his arrival at Lacedæmon he did not apply to the authorities, but kept putting off and making excuses. And whenever any of those who were in office asked him why he did not come before the assembly, he said that he was waiting for his colleagues ; that owing to some engagement they had been left behind ; he expected, however, that they would shortly come, and wondered that they were not already there.

When they heard this, they believed Themistocles through their friendship for him ; but when every one else came and distinctly informed them that the walls were building, and already advancing to some height, they did not know how to discredit it. When he found this, he told them not to be led away by tales, but rather to send men of their own body who were of good character, and would bring back a credible report after inspection. They despatched them therefore ; and Themistocles secretly sent directions about them to the Athenians, to detain them, with as little appearance of it as possible, and not to let them go until they themselves had returned back ; (for by this time his colleagues, Abronychus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, had also come to him with the news that the wall was sufficiently advanced) for he was afraid that the Lacedæmonians, when they heard the truth, might not then let them go. So the Athenians detained the ambassadors, as was told them ; and Themistocles, having come to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, then indeed told them plainly that their city was already walled, so as to be capable of defending its inhabitants ; and if the Lacedæmonians or the allies wished to send any embassy to them, they should in future go as to men who could discern what were their own and the general interests. For when they thought it better to abandon their city and to go on board their ships, they said that they had made up their minds, and had the courage to do it, without consulting them ; and again, on whatever matters they had deliberated with them, they had shown themselves inferior to none in judgment. And so at the present time, likewise, they thought it was better that their city should have a wall, and that it would be more expedient for their citizens in particular, as well as for the allies in general ; for it was not possible for any one without equal resources to give any equal or fair advice for the common good. Either all therefore, he said, should join the confederacy without walls, or they should consider that the present case also was as it ought to be.

The Lacedæmonians, on hearing this, did not let their anger appear to the Athenians ; for they had not sent their embassy to obstruct their designs, but to offer counsel, they said, to their state ; and besides, they were at that time on very friendly terms with them owing to their zeal against the Mede ; in secret, however, they were annoyed at failing in their wish. So the ambassadors of each state returned home without any complaint being made.

In this way, Thucydides continues, the Athenians walled their city in a short time. And the building shows even now that it was executed in

haste; for the foundations are laid with stones of all kinds, and in some places not wrought together, but as the several parties at any time brought them to the spot: and many columns from tombs, and wrought stones, were worked up in them.^b

THE NEW ATHENS

The first indispensable step, in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistocles, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea,—a contingency at that time seemingly probable,—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands: it was the great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it, and Themistocles, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Piræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun: for he had already, while in office two or three years before, made his countrymen sensible that the open roadstead of Phalerum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbours of Piræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders: but Themistocles now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Piræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit [about seven and a half miles], was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison. We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated. In respect to thickness, however, his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space—of course, at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts—was filled up, “not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal.” The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the

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exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured to impress upon them that Piræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world. We may even suspect that if Themistocles could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Piræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, we shall hear from Pericles, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistocles, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistocles it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydides so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment. However, Piræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine: its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy, were well calculated to call back those metics, or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning, unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited.

To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistocles proposed to exempt them from the *metoikion*, or non-freeman's annual tax: but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly: much of the trading, professional, and handicraft business was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them.

We are further told that Themistocles prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say; but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government. It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Piræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistocles thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta, intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force; yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle

of Plataea (478 B.C.), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of the Peloponnesus were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristides and Cimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government: next, they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonesus, was a post of great moment, as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured, seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine Sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

THE MISCONDUCT OF PAUSANIAS

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiades, we noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success: this distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder: the concubines, horses, camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the ephors when he returned home. His newly acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod. Nevertheless, he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it. These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias, himself, to the following effect: “Pausanias, the Spartan commander, having taken these captives, sends them back, in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid, I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the sea-board, through whom we may hereafter correspond.”

Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Beotia)

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to supersede Megabates in the satrapy of Daseylium; the new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to further actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport: "Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands forever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium: and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them, but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering, degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Heraclid, and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied with funds for corruption, his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King, as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were not deliberately laid and veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire — (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate, even in Alexander the Great), — he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards, — he copied the Persian chiefs, both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Cleonice, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her. Moreover, his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet, mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Doreis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hegemony, was in the hands of Athens, and Doreis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognise his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised, whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece: while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground — as well from kindred race, as

from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristides and Cimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally, addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race; entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens as leader instead of Sparta. The Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him, — even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for insuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorcis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorcis, having only a small force, and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.

ATHENS TAKES THE LEADERSHIP



TYPE OF GREEK HELMET

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece — considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations, such as the Persian invasion — into two distinct organised camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. The example of their king Leotychides, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychides was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down

the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person: in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment, and razed his house to the ground; he died afterwards in exile at Tegea. Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Heraclid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly emancipated Greeks.

[478 B.C.]

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics. According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and more the president of something like a Panhellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and impotent pretensions of Argos.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Panhellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens — the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Platea, towards Sparta. Along with this national schism and called into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course, the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states, but the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS

The general conditions of the confederacy of Delos were regulated in a common synod of the members appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos — of old, the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city; and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each: their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod, nor had they at this time power to enforce any regulation not approved by that body. It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistocles on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity: it was no less her good fortune now — in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, without precedents to guide them, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities — not to have Themistocles; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious probity of Aristides. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristides was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies, but also maintained its place in general esteem, after Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.

Respecting this first assessment, we scarcely know more than one single fact — the aggregate in money was four hundred and sixty talents [equal to about £106,000 or \$530,000].

Of the items composing such aggregate, of the individual cities which paid it, of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and money, we are entirely ignorant: the little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydides, in his brief sketch, makes us clearly understand the difference between presiding Athens, with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and imperial Athens, with her subject allies in 432 B.C.; the Greek word equivalent to ally left either of these epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states, — and he indicates the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers, called the *hellenotamiae*, to receive and administer the common fund, — that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept, — and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*; a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual, and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

The public import of the name *hellenotamiae*, coined for the occasion, the selection of Delos as a centre, and the provision for regular meetings of the members, demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth, the protection of the Ægean Sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution: any island or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others: and we cannot doubt that the general feeling of this common danger as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward.

How it was that the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal, not an Athenian empire: nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection, than Athens.

We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficial consequences, not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean Sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realised, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much charge-

[477-470 B.C.]

able with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add that, in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriscus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country, which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalcidic peninsula, — Argilus, Stagiras, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus, etc., — which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristides, were not less anxious to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Cos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios, the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Miletus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great — such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalcidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Nor was it by any means certain, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, that, even with that aid, the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong, not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states — traitors within, as well as exiles without.

THE TREASON OF PAUSANIAS

Among these, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals; yet the presumptions of *medism*, or treacherous correspondence with the Persians, appeared so strong that, though not found guilty, he was still not re-appointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece, and he came out with this view to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermione, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus: his great station and celebrity still gave him a strong hold on men's opinions, and he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force: and we may be very sure that the terror excited by his presence as well as by his known designs tended materially to accelerate the organisation of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Colonæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy: until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him, with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald:

if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes, the means for which were abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the ephors; who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition, and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers. Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly, Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege; with a view, first, to destroy the board of ephors, and render himself despot in his own country, next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the ephors, who, nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few helots might inform, probably, many others, both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus, intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident, or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated, and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master; but, on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected, with some uneasiness, that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination, if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had further taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily reclose the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a discovery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the ephors.

[ca. 470 B.C.]

But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence. Partly from the suspicion which, in antiquity, always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture, partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal, the ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tenarus, under the shelter of a double tent, or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason : upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that, after a long and faithful service, — with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence, — he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary ; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed ephors ; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street, not far from the temple of Athene Chalciœus (or of the Brazen House) ; but as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose ; and he fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tenarus, in a narrow-roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building ; where the ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story, not recognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners, his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the ephors was to cast his body into the ravine, or hollow, called the Cœadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals : probably, his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until, some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. Nor was the oracle satisfied even with this reinterment : pronouncing the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athene, it enjoined that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece, or among the Carthaginians, even at this period, such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims : on the present occasion, Athene, or Hecæsius, the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues ; not, however, without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent, and of his being general at Plataea, where

it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself, the Athenian Themistocles.

The chronology of this important period is not so fully known as to enable us to make out the full dates of particular events; but we are obliged—in consequence of the subsequent events connected with Themistocles, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well marked as to date—to admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only



THE DYING PAUSANIAS CARRIED FROM THE TEMPLE

explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistocles, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens: and the charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

POLITICAL CHANGES AT ATHENS

The rivalry of Themistocles and Aristides had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of co-operation against a common enemy. Nor was it apparently resumed, during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both in effective service, and in prominent posts. Themistocles stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Piræus: Aristides is commander of the fleet, and first organiser of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover, we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter: he had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistocles as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since

[478-476 B.C.]

the battle of Salamis, become an established fact: a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the exile at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Cimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the Acropolis, as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard, is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it.

We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hardship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Clisthenes. At the time when that constitution was first established, it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece: it had worked extremely well and had diffused among the people a sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them. Early after the return to Attica, the Clisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class of the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristides, a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Clisthenean constitution. No political system would work after the Persian War, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. We rather imagine that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time, afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle: after a certain length of experience, it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition, or choice by lot, was never applied, as we have before remarked, to all offices at Athens—never, for example, to the strategi, or generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis,—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties,—that the archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten strategi: we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics,

or non-freemen, while the strategi perform military duties without him. The special and important change which characterised the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was the more accurate line drawn between the archons and the strategi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the strategi, and rendering the archons purely civil magistrates, — administrative, as well as judicial. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian War downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

THE DOWNFALL OF THEMISTOCLES

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristides appears to have sympathised; and the popularity thus insured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief from his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy. On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistocles, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprang up against him, men sympathising with Aristides, and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristides himself. Of these, the chief were Cimon, son of Miltiades and Alcmaeon; moreover, it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistocles immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him — a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Piræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him. He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity, by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobule, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristides had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.

But the main cause of his discredit was the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy, the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistocles, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organising the new confederacy, is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust, restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistocles, the poet Timocreon of Ialysus in Rhodes, who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted

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by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timocreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistocles, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless, they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timocreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristides as in his censure of Themistocles, whom he denounces as "a lying and unjust traitor."

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistocles to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistocles had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias, suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards, which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistocles also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct: we must recollect, also, that Themistocles had given some colour to these presumptions, even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistocles since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens, and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias, procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against him at Athens; by secret instigations, and, as it is said, by bribes, to his political opponents. But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistocles himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alcmaeon and Cimon, tempered, indeed, by a generous moderation on the part of Aristides, his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but, as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favour: his splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents, — Aristides, Cimon, Alcmaeon, and others; nor can we wonder that they were anxious to get rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, we have already stated that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly, and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including, of course, a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may well conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings — especially when one of those parties was Themistocles, a man alike vast in his

abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristides: and lastly, the friends of Themistocles himself, elate with his acquittal and his seemingly augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favour, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistocles.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of the Peloponnesus, when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydides seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistocles. According to Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans, but to have kept them secret while refusing to co-operate in them, but probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens, publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Panhellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta. Whether this latter request would have been granted, or whether Themistocles would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Coreyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favourably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent.

Here, however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy — Admetus, king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admetus was not at home; and Themistocles, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms, and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admetus returned, Themistocles revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger, entreating protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity. He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admetus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms, an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the king of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna, in the Thermaic Gulf, where he found a merchant ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament: had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wonted

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subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistocles: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast, without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated, and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.

Thus did Themistocles, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the *Ægean*. At Athens, he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated: nevertheless, as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation, his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents [about £16,000 or \$80,000] according to Theophrastus, to one hundred talents according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents. The poverty of Aristides at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistocles, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favourite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards: we have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydides. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of two hundred talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandane, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learned Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandane: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps on his way back, threatened him with still further perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, etc., with several other uncertified details, which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydides. Indeed, Ephorus, Dinon, Clitarchus, and Heracledes, from whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistocles had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him: whereas, Thucydides and Charon, the two contemporary authors, for the former is nearly contemporary, asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydides, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover,—what is more strange, though it seems true,—he was received as an actual benefactor of the

Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions, in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a Quaker: "I, Themistocles, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks, in consequence of my attachment to thee, but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer, and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though we shall not readily believe that he was so transported, as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistocles the Athenian,"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him. In the course of the year granted, Themistocles had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence: no Greek, says Thucydides, had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were eminently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia, on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents [£10,000 or \$50,000] yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighbouring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsacus on the Hellespont, for wine. Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistocles received altogether: but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia, he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens. How long his residence at Magnesia lasted we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydides; who at the same time notices a rumour partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistocles himself that the promises made could never be performed—a further proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling, not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tender-

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
ness towards his memory (his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there). These friends further stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica, at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If, however, we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place: nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions of Thucydides, that he himself was satisfied of the fact: moreover, we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Themistocles in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really enclosed within it.

Aristides died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistocles; but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine Sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Craterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristides as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ [£180, or \$900], on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute on the allies — which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact, — but that fact at the same time the most honourable of all, — that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses, that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalerum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus, and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor, and even at that remote day, some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man, named Lysimachus, descendant of the just Aristides, was to be seen at Athens, near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli [3d. or 6 cents] for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.

On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristides with Themistocles. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition, ended his life at Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant, the Athenian Themistocles, attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.^c



GREEK SEAL RINGS



GREEK BOAT
(From a wall decoration)

CHAPTER XXIII. THE GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

Athens ! thou birthplace of the great, the free !
Though bowed thy power, and dimmed thy name may be,
Though old Renown's once dazzling sun hath set,
Fair beams the star of Memory o'er thee yet.
City ! where sang the bard, and taught the sage,
Thy shrines may fall, thou ne'er wilt know old age ;
Fresh shall thy image glow in every heart,
And but with Time's last hour thy fame depart.

—NICHOLAS MICHELL.

THE history of this time with its rush of events and its startling changes exhibits on the Athenian side a picture of astonishing and almost preternatural energy.^b The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian War, and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens, — partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent in the minds of the subjects, — partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward, both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian War venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphemus at Camarina in 415 B.C., to have been heard by Themistocles or Aristides fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial state of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, when her allies, except Chios and Lesbos, were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean Sea was an Athenian lake, was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers, suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta, holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive

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schemes of some new conqueror, and even bringing up by association into men's fancies the mythical Minos of Crete, and others, as having been rulers of the *Ægean* in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B.C.; for we may gather from the intimation of Thucydides, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before, no one cared for the times immediately succeeding. Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed — if we except the careful Thucydides — from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire: credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian War downwards at results which perhaps Themistocles may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristides and Cimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Doreis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second coming out, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them; they had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable, and to create and organise a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian War, which Thucydides introduces as "the throwing off of his narrative," he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C., and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C., he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion, on the Strymon, with its Persian garrison; next, the capture of Scyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian cleruchs, or out-citizens; thirdly, the war with Carystus in Eubœa and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydides states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself; for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Scyros in the time of Thucydides was the property of outlying Athenian citizens, or cleruchs.

Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly established confederate force: for it is certain that the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions, that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont, all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Mascames, governor of Doriscus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress. Of those who were captured

by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Boges, governor of Eion." Boges, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and further resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile, slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it, threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon, and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames. His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Cimon, has been mentioned, as already stated, by Thucydides; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed by Thucydides, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language, that Mascames maintained himself in Doriscus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be of itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect: the battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, drove the Persians out of Greece, and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt, the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments: an operation never short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor, indeed, always practicable, as the case of Doriscus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighbourhood, and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy: while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian War: it was by these, combined with the present fear, that they were enabled to organise the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks, to bring together deliberative deputies, to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions, and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by these same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired, the confederacy would never have become a working reality, the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen, unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organised operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

But after a few years several of the confederates becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the

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confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labour and privation, it was a welcome relief, while to the Athenians, full of ardour and patient of labour, as well as discipline, for the aggrandisement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens. But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together.

The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient, but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens, by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India was made over to the English.

Under such circumstances several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute, and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede, but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other, conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years, the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing, so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy: the allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power, and that, too, without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined; it would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed and qualified to push all the advantages offered, and even to look out for new, we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honourable causes: voluntary invitation, efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy, unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty, and inability to break up the confederacy without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean Sea to the Persians.

There were two causes, besides that which has just been adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy,

imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city, as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos, on its first large and equal basis. Next, — and this is the great cause of all, — Athens, having defeated the Persians, and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success, everything to apprehend from defeat, and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head, the subject-allies had great reason to complain throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance : but on the point of practical grievances or oppression they had little ground for discontent and little feeling of actual discontent. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred : the movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves ; and the positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form and vanished. Nothing, however, can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens, and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact that, while the former shrank from personal service, and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it, the latter were “ready enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions. The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to have exceeded what the reality justified : but when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Lade, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia, we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labour, as that which broke up the confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterised the Athenians of that day, we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible : it was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

It has already been mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristides, and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money (about £92,000, or \$460,000). At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money but in ships ; but this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute, of course, became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents at the commencement of the Peloponnesian War, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy ; from whence we may infer that it was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the

[476-466 B.C.]

difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money, as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number, at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinope and Ægina, subsequently added.


Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony, or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire, the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action, and not well authenticated as to dates.

The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity, — whether the first absolutely or not, we cannot determine, — between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion, on the Strymon, where the Persian governor, Boges, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects, as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Seyros, seemingly about 470 B.C., and the Dryopes in the town and district of Carystus, in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalcis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with, and expelled from their island. Seyros was barren, and had little to recommend it, except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos, prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution: the mass of the islanders threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime; and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Cimon with the Athenian armament who conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the Ægean Sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos, which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians, and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognised adjunct, or outlying portion, of Attica: moreover, there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus, whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Seyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city: they had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Cimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C., and after being welcomed by the people in solemn and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city; the monument called the Theseum, with its sacred precinct being built on the spot, and invested with

the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage. Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian War.

THE VICTORIES OF CIMON



GREEK HELMET AND WEAPONS
(In the British Museum)

It was about two years or more after this incident, that the first breach of union in the confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades,—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and eight thousand hoplites,—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time they were more jealous of Athens. After a siege of unknown duration by Athens and the confederate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject; its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed: whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Cimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him two hundred triremes from Athens, and one hundred from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the southwestern and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Caria and Lycia: among others, the important trading city of Phaselis, though at first resisting, and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Cimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustes and Pherendates, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of two hundred ships, but a further reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, and the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Cimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them vigorously: partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous

[468-465 B.C.]

resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore, so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Cimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them.

The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Cimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils. The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phaselis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them; but it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularise her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, and at the same time it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.^c

Athens, become, within a very few years, from the capital of a small province, in fact though not yet in avowed pretension, the head of an empire, exhibited a new and singular phenomenon in politics, a sovereign people; a people, not, as in many other Grecian democracies, sovereign merely of that state which themselves, maintained by slaves, composed, but supreme over other people in subordinate republics, acknowledging a degree of subjection, yet claiming to be free. Under this extraordinary political constitution philosophy and the arts were beginning to make Athens their principal resort. Migrating from Egypt and the east, they had long been fostered on the western coast of Asia. In Greece itself they had owed some temporary encouragement principally to those called tyrants; the Pisistratidæ at Athens, and Periander at Corinth. But their efforts were desultory and comparatively feeble till the communication with the Asian Greeks, checked and interrupted by their subjection to Persia, was restored, and Athens, chief of the glorious confederacy by whose arms the deliverance had been effected, began to draw everything toward itself as a common centre, the capital of an empire. Already science and fine taste were so far perfected that Æschylus had exhibited tragedy in its utmost dignity, and Sophocles and Euripides were giving it the highest polish, when Cimon returned in triumph to his country.

MITFORD'S VIEW OF THE PERIOD

It was the peculiar felicity of Athens in this period that, of the constellation of great men which arose there, each was singularly fitted for the situation in which the circumstances of the time required him to act; and none filled his place more advantageously than Cimon. But the fate of all those great men, and the resources employed, mostly in vain, to avert it, sufficiently mark, in this splendid era, a defective constitution, and law and justice

ill assured. Aristides, we are told, though it is not undisputed, had founded his security upon extreme poverty: Cimon endeavoured to establish himself by a splendid, and almost unbounded, yet politic liberality. To ward against envy, and to secure his party with that tremendous tyrant, as the comic poet not inaptly calls the sovereign people, he made a parade of throwing down the fences of his gardens and orchards in the neighbourhood of Athens, and permitted all to partake of their produce; a table was daily spread at his house for the poorer citizens, but more particularly for those of his own ward, whom he invited from the agora, the courts of justice, or the general assembly; a bounty which both enabled and disposed them to give their time at his call whenever his interest required their support. In going about the city he was commonly attended by a large retinue, handsomely clothed; and if he met an elderly citizen ill clad, he directed one of his attendants to change cloaks with him. To the indigent of higher rank he was equally attentive, lending or giving money, as he found their circumstances required, and always managing his bounty with the utmost care that the object of it should not be put to shame.¹

His conduct, in short, was a continual preparation for an election; not, as in England, to decide whether the candidate should or should not be a member of the legislature; but whether he should be head of the commonwealth or an exile.² In his youth he had affected a roughness of manners, and a contempt for the elegances generally reckoned becoming his rank, and which his fortune enabled him to command. In his riper years he discovered that virtue and grossness have no natural connection: he became himself a model of politeness, patronised every liberal art, and studied to procure elegant as well as useful indulgences for the people. By him were raised the first of those edifices which, for want of a more proper name, we call porticos, under whose magnificent shelter, in their torrid climate, it became the delight of the Athenians to assemble, and pass their leisure in promiscuous conversation. The widely celebrated groves of Academia acknowledged him as the founder of their fame. In the wood, before rude and without water, he formed commodious and elegant walks, and adorned them with running fountains. Nor was the planting of the agora, or great market-place of Athens, with that beautiful tree, the oriental plane, forgotten as a benefit from Cimon; while, ages after him, his trees flourished, affording an agreeable and salutary shade to those who exposed their wares there, and to those who came to purchase them. Much, if not the whole of these things, we are given to understand, was done at his private expense; but our information upon the subject is inaccurate. Those stores, with which his victories had enriched the treasury, probably furnished the sums employed upon some of the public works executed under his direction, as, more especially, the completion of the fortification of the citadel, whose principal defence hitherto, on the southern side, had been the precipitous form of the rock.

While with this splendid and princely liberality Cimon endeavoured to confirm his own interest, he was attentive to promote the general welfare, and to render permanent the superiority of Athens among the Grecian republics. The citizens of the allied states grew daily more impatient of the

¹ Plutarch says that "Cimon's house was a kind of common hall for all the people; the first fruits of his lands were theirs; whatever the seasons produced of excellent and agreeable, they freely gathered; nor were strangers in the least debarred from them: so that he in some measure revived the community of goods, which prevailed in the reign of Saturn, and which the poets tell so much of."

² Gorgias the Leontine gave him this character: "He got riches to use them, and used them so as to be honoured on their account."

[465-463 B.C.]

requisitions regularly made to take their turn of service on shipboard, and longed for uninterrupted enjoyment of their homes, in that security against foreign enemies which their past labours had, they thought, now sufficiently established. But that the common interest still required the maintenance of a fleet was a proposition that could not be denied, while the Persian empire existed, or while the Grecian seas offered temptation for piracy. Cimon therefore proposed that any commonwealth of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, by furnishing ships, and paying a sum of money to the common treasury: the Athenians would then undertake the manning of the fleet. The proposal was at the moment popular; most of the allies acceded to it, unaware or heedless of the consequences; for, while they were thus depriving themselves of all maritime force, making that of Athens irresistible, they gave that ambitious republic claims upon them, uncertain in their nature, and which, as they might be made, could now also be enforced, at its pleasure.

Having thus at the same time strengthened itself and reduced to impotence many of the allied states, the Athenian government became less scrupulous of using force against any of the rest which might dispute its sovereign authority. The reduction of Eion, by the confederate arms under Cimon, had led to new information of the value of the adjacent country; where some mines of gold and silver, and a lucrative commerce with the surrounding Thracian hordes, excited avidity. But the people of the neighbouring island of Thasos, very anciently possessed of that commerce, and of the more accessible mines, insisted that these, when recovered from the common enemy by the arms of that confederacy of which they were members, should revert entire to them. The Athenians, asserting the right of conquest, on the contrary, claimed the principal share as their own. The Thasians, irritated, renounced the confederacy. Cimon then was commanded to lead the confederate armament against them. They venturing an action at sea, were defeated; and Cimon, debarking his forces on the island, became quickly master of everything but the principal town, to which he laid siege. The Athenians then hastened to appropriate that inviting territory on the continent, which was their principal object, by sending thither a colony of no less than ten thousand men, partly Athenian citizens, partly from the allied commonwealths.

The Thasians had not originally trusted in their own strength alone for the hope of final success. Early in the dispute they had sent ministers to Lacedæmon, soliciting protection against the oppression of Athens. The pretence was certainly favourable, and the Lacedæmonian government, no longer pressed by domestic troubles, determined to use the opportunity for interfering to check the growing power of the rival commonwealth, so long an object of jealousy, and now become truly formidable. Without a fleet capable of contending with the Athenian, they could not send succour immediately to Thasos: but they were taking measures secretly for a diversion in its favour, by invading Attica, when a sudden and extraordinary calamity, an earthquake which overthrew the city of Sparta, and in its immediate consequences threatened destruction to the commonwealth, compelled them to confine all their attention at home. Nevertheless the siege, carried on with great vigour, and with all the skill of the age under the direction of Cimon, was, during three years, obstinately resisted. Even then the Thasians obtained terms, severe indeed, but by which they obviated the miseries, death often for themselves and slavery for their families, to which Grecian people, less able to defend themselves, were frequently

reduced by Grecian arms. Their fortifications however were destroyed; their ships of war were surrendered; they paid immediately a sum of money; they bound themselves to an annual tribute; and they yielded all claim upon the opposite continent, and the valuable mines there.

The sovereignty of the Athenian people over the allied republics would thus gain some present confirmation; but in the principal object their ambition and avarice were, apparently through over-greediness, disappointed. The town of Eion stood at the mouth of the river Strymon. For the new settlement a place called the Nine Ways, a few miles up the river, was chosen; commodious for the double purpose of communicating with the sea, and commanding the neighbouring country. But the Edonian Thracians, in whose territory it was, resenting the encroachment, infested the settlers with irregular but continual hostilities. To put an end to so troublesome a war the whole force of the colony marched against them. As the Greeks advanced, the Edonians retreated; avoiding a general action, while they sent to all the neighbouring Thracian tribes for assistance, as in a common cause. When they were at length assembled in sufficient numbers, having engaged the Greeks far within a wild and difficult country, they attacked, overpowered, and cut in pieces their army, and annihilated the colony.

Cimon, on his return to Athens, did not meet the acclamations to which he had been accustomed. Faction had been busy in his absence. Apparently the fall of the colony of the Nine Ways furnished both instigation and opportunity, perhaps assisted by circumstances of which no information remains. A prosecution was instituted against him, on the pretence, according to the biographers, that he ought to have extended the Athenian dominion by conquest in Macedonia, and that bribes from Alexander, king of that country, had stopped his exertions. The covetous ambition indeed of the Athenian people, inflamed by interested demagogues, was growing boundless. Cimon, indignant at the ungrateful return for a life divided between performing the most important services to his country, and studying how most to gratify the people, would enter little into particulars in refuting a charge, one part of which he considered as attributing to him no crime, the other as incapable of credit, and therefore beneath his regard. He told the assembled people that "they mistook both him and the country which it was said he ought to have conquered. Other generals have cultivated an interest with the Ionians and the Thessalians, whose riches might make an interference in their concerns profitable. For himself, he had never sought any connection with those people; but he confessed he esteemed the Macedonians, who were virtuous and brave, but not rich; nor would he ever prefer riches to those qualities, though he had his satisfaction in having enriched his country with the spoils of its enemies." The popularity of Cimon was yet great; his principal opponents apparently found it not a time for pushing matters to extremity against him, and such a defence sufficed to procure an honourable acquittal.

Meanwhile Lacedæmon had been in the utmost confusion and on the brink of ruin. In the year 464 B.C. the earthquake came suddenly at mid-day, with a violence before unheard of. The youths of the principal families, assembled in the gymnasium at the appointed hour for exercise, were in great numbers crushed by its fall: many of both sexes and of all ages were buried under the ruins of other buildings: the shocks were repeated; the earth opened in several places; vast fragments from the summits of Taygetus were tumbled down its sides: in the end only five houses remained

[464-462 B.C.]

standing in Sparta, and it was computed that twenty thousand lives were lost.

The first strokes of this awful calamity filled all ranks with the same apprehensions. But, in the continuance of it, that wretched multitude, excluded from all participation in the prosperity of their country, began to found hope on its distress: a proposal, obscurely made, was rapidly communicated, and the helots assembled from various parts with one purpose, of putting their severe masters to death, and making the country their own. The ready foresight and prudent exertion of Archidamus, who had succeeded his grandfather Leotychides in the throne of the house of Procles, preserved Lacedæmon. In the confusion of the first alarm, while some were endeavouring to save their most valuable effects from the ruins of the city, others flying various ways for personal safety, Archidamus, collecting what he could of his friends and attendants about him, caused trumpets to sound to arms, as if an enemy were at hand. The Lacedæmonians, universally trained to the strictest military discipline, obeyed the signal; arms were the only necessities sought; and civil rule, dissipated by the magnitude of the calamity, was, for the existing circumstances, most advantageously supplied by military order. The helots, awed by the very unexpected appearance of a regular army instead of a confused and flying multitude, desisted from their meditated attempt; but, quitting the city, spread themselves over the country, and excited their fellows universally to rebellion.

The greater part of those miserable men, whom the Lacedæmonians held in so cruel a bondage, were descendants of the Messenians, men of the same blood with themselves, Greeks and Dorians. Memory of the wars of their ancestors, of their hero Aristomenes, and of the defence of Ithome, was not obsolete among them. Ithome accordingly they seized and made their principal post; and they so outnumbered the Lacedæmonians that, though deficiently armed, yet, being not without discipline acquired in attendance upon their masters in war, they were capable of being formidable even in the field. Nor was it thus only that the rebellion was distressing.¹ The Lacedæmonians, singularly ready and able in the use of arms, were singularly helpless in almost every other business. Deprived of their slaves they were nearly deprived of the means of subsistence; agriculture stopped, and mechanic arts ceased. Application was therefore made to the neighbouring allies for succour. The zealous friendship of the Æginetans upon the occasion we find afterwards acknowledged by the Lacedæmonian government, and assistance came from as far as Plataea. Thus re-enforced the spirited and well-directed exertions of Archidamus quickly so far reduced the rebellion that the insurgents remaining in arms were blockaded in Ithome. But the extraordinary natural strength of that place, the desperate obstinacy of the defenders, and the deficiency of the assailants in the science of attack, giving reason to apprehend that the business might not be soon accomplished, the Lacedæmonians sent to desire assistance from the Athenians, who were esteemed, beyond the other Greeks, experienced and skilful in the war of sieges.

This measure seems to have been on many accounts imprudent. There was found at Athens a strong disposition to refuse the aid. But Cimon, who, with a universal liberality, always professed particular esteem for the Lacedæmonians, prevailed upon his countrymen to take the generous part; and a considerable body of forces marched under his command into the Peloponnesus.

[¹ This war has been called the Third Messenian War.]

Upon their arrival at the camp of the besiegers an assault upon the place was attempted, but with so little success that recourse was again had to the old method of blockade. It was in the leisure of that inactive and tedious mode of attack that principally arose those heartburnings which first occasioned an avowed national aversion between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and led, not indeed immediately, but in a direct line, to the fatal Peloponnesian War. All the prudence and all the authority of Cimon could not prevent the vivacious spirit of the Athenians from exulting, perhaps rather insultingly, in the new pre-eminence of their country; wherever danger called, they would be ostentatiously forward to meet it; and an assumed superiority, without a direct pretension to it, was continually appearing.

The Spartan pride was offended by their arrogance; the Spartan gravity was disturbed by their lively forwardness: it began to be considered that, though Greeks, they were Ionians, whom the Peloponnesians considered as an alien race; and it occurred that if, in the continuance of the siege, any disgust should arise, there was no security that they might not renounce their present engagements, and even connect themselves with the helots; who, as Greeks, had, not less than the Lacedæmonians, a claim to friendship and protection from every other Grecian people. Mistrust thus arose on one side; disgust became quickly manifest on both; and the Lacedæmonians shortly resolved to dismiss the Athenian forces. This however they endeavoured to do, as far as might be, without offence, by declaring that an "assault having been found ineffectual, the assistance of the Athenians was superfluous for the blockade, and the Lacedæmonians would not give their allies unnecessary trouble." All the other allies were however retained, and the Athenians alone returned home; so exasperated by this invidious distinction that, on their arrival at Athens, the party adverse to Cimon proposing a decree for renouncing the confederacy with Lacedæmon, it was carried. An alliance with Argos, the inveterate enemy of Sparta, immediately followed; and soon after the Thessalians acceded to the new confederacy.

While Lacedæmon was engaged with this dangerous insurrection, a petty war arose in the Peloponnesus, affording one of the most remarkable, among the many strong instances on record, of the miseries to which the greater part of Greece was perpetually liable from the defects of its political system. Argos, the capital of Argolis, and formerly of the Peloponnesus under the early kings of the Danaan race, or perhaps before them, lost its pre-eminence, as we have already seen, during the reigns of the Persidæan and Pelopidæan princes, under whom Mycenæ became the first city of Greece. On the return of the Heraclidæ, Temenus fixed his residence at Argos, which thus regained its superiority. But, as the oppressions, arising from a defective political system, occasioned very generally through Greece the desire, so the troubles of the Argive government gave the means for the inferior towns to become independent republics. Like the rest, or perhaps more than the rest, generally oppressive, that government was certainly often ill-conducted and weak; and Lacedæmon, its perpetual enemy, fomented the rebellious disposition of its dependencies. During the ancient wars of Sparta and Messenia, the Argives had expelled the people of their towns of Asine and Nauplia, and forced them to seek foreign settlements; a resource sufficiently marking a government both weak and oppressive. Mycenæ was now a much smaller town than Argos; but its people, encouraged by Lacedæmon, formed lofty pretensions. The far-famed temple of Juno, the tutelar deity of the country, situated about five miles from

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Argos, and little more than one from Mycenæ, was considered by the Argives as theirs; and, from the time, it was supposed, of the Heraclidæ, the priestess had been appointed and the sacred ceremonies administered under the protection of their government. Nevertheless the Mycenæans now claimed the right to this superintendency. The games of Nemea, from their institution, or, as it was called, their restoration, had been under the direction of the Argives; but the Mycenæan government claimed also the prior right to preside there. These however were but branches of a much more important claim; for they wanted only power, or sufficient assistance from Sparta, to assert a right of sovereignty over Argos itself and all Argolis; and they were continually urging another pretension, not the less invidious to Argos because better founded, a pretension to merit with all the Greek nation for having joined the confederacy against Persia, while the Argives allied themselves with the common enemy of Greece. The favourable opportunity afforded by the helot rebellion was eagerly seized by the Argives for ridding themselves of such troublesome and dangerous neighbours, whom they considered as rebellious subjects. Laying siege to Mycenæ they took the place, reduced the surviving people to slavery, and dedicating a tenth of the spoil to the gods destroyed the town, which was never rebuilt.

At Athens, after the banishment of Themistocles, Cimon remained long in possession of a popularity which nothing could resist; and his abilities, his successes, and his moderation, his connection with the aristocratical interest, and his favour with the people, seemed altogether likely to insure, if anything could insure, permanency and quiet to his administration. But in Athens, as in every free government, there would always be a party adverse to the party in the direction of public affairs: matters had been for some time ripening for a change; and the renunciation of the Lacedæmonian alliance was the triumph of the opposition.^d



TEMPLE OF ERECHTHEUS



CHAPTER XXIV. THE RISE OF PERICLES

This was the ruler of the land
When Athens was the land of fame:
This was the light that led the band
When earth was like a living flame;
The centre of earth's noblest ring —
Of more than men the more than king.
—GEORGE CROLY.

CIMON was beyond dispute the ablest and most successful general of his day: and his victories had shed a lustre on the arms of Athens, which almost dimmed the glories of Marathon and Salamis. But while he was gaining renown abroad, he had rivals at home, who were endeavouring to supplant him in the affections of the people, and to establish a system of domestic and foreign policy directly counter to his views, and were preparing contests for him in which his military talents would be of little avail. While Themistocles and Aristides were occupying the political stage, an extraordinary genius had been ripening in obscurity, and was only waiting for a favourable juncture to issue from the shade into the broad day of public life. Xanthippus, the conqueror of Mycale, had married Agariste, a descendant of the famous Clisthenes, and had left two sons, Ariphron and Pericles. Of Ariphron little is known beside his name: but Pericles, to an observing eye, gave early indications of a mind formed for great things, and a will earnestly bent on them.

In his youth he had not rested satisfied with the ordinary Greek education, but had applied himself, with an ardour which was not even abated by the lapse of years, nor stifled by his public avocations, to intellectual pursuits, which were then new at Athens, and confined to a very narrow circle of inquisitive spirits. His birth and fortune afforded him the means of familiar intercourse with all the men most eminent in every kind of knowledge and art, who were already beginning to resort to Athens as a common seat of learning. Thus, though Pythoclides taught him to touch the cithara, he sought the elements of a higher kind of music in the lessons of Damon, who was believed to have contributed mainly to train him for his political career: himself no ordinary person; for he was held up by the comic poets to public jealousy, as a secret favourer of tyranny, and was driven from Athens by the process of ostracism. But Pericles also entered with avidity into the abstrusest philosophical speculations, and even took pleasure in the arid subtleties of the Eleatic school, or at

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least in the ingenuity and the dialectic art with which they were unfolded to him by Zeno. But his principal guide in such researches, and the man who appears to have exercised the most powerful and durable influence on his mind and character, was the philosopher Anaxagoras, with whom he was long united in intimate friendship. Not only his public and private deportment, and his habits of thought, but the tone and style of his eloquence were believed to have been formed by his intercourse with Anaxagoras. It was commonly supposed that this effect was produced by the philosopher's physical speculations, which, elevating his disciple above the ignorant superstition of the vulgar, had imparted to him the serene condescension and dignified language of a superior being. But we should be loth to believe that it was the possession of such physical secrets as Anaxagoras was able to communicate, that inspired Pericles with his lofty conceptions, or that he was intoxicated with the little taste of science which had weaned him from a few popular prejudices. We should rather ascribe so deep an impression to the distinguishing tenet of the Anaxagorean system, by which the philosopher himself was supposed to have acquired the title of Mind.

It was undoubtedly not for the mere amusement of his leisure that Pericles had enriched his mind with so many rare acquirements. All of them were probably considered by him as instruments for the use of the statesman: and even those which seemed most remote from all practical purposes, may have contributed to the cultivation of that natural eloquence, to which he owed so much of his influence. He left no specimens of his oratory behind him, and we can only estimate it, like many other fruits of Greek genius, by the effect it produced. The few minute fragments preserved by Plutarch, which were recorded by earlier authors because they had sunk deep in the mind of his hearers, seem to indicate that he loved to concentrate his thoughts in a bold and vivid image: as when he called Ægina the eyesore of Piræus, and said that he descried war lowering from the Peloponnesus. But though signally gifted and accomplished for political action, it was not without much hesitation and apprehension that he entered on a field, where he saw ample room indeed for the display of his powers, but also many enemies and great dangers. The very superiority of which he could not but be conscious, suggested a motive for alarm, as it might easily excite suspicion in the people of views adverse to their freedom: and these fears were heightened by some circumstances, trifling in themselves, but capable of awakening or confirming a popular prejudice.

His personal appearance was graceful and majestic, notwithstanding a remarkable disproportion in the length of his head, which became a subject of inexhaustible pleasantry for the comic poets of this day: but the old men who remembered Pisistratus, were struck by the resemblance which they discovered between the tyrant and the young heir of the Alcæonids, and not only in their features, but in the sweetness of voice, and the volubility of utterance, with which both expressed themselves. Still, after the ostracism of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, while Cimon was engaged in continual expeditions, Pericles began to present himself more and more to the public eye, and was soon the acknowledged chief of a powerful party, which openly aimed at counteracting Cimon's influence, and introducing opposite maxims into the public counsels.

To some of the ancients indeed it appeared that the course of policy adopted by Pericles was entirely determined by the spirit of emulation, which induced him to take a different ground from that which he found already occupied by Cimon: and that, as Cimon was at the head of the

aristocratical party which had been represented by Aristides, he therefore placed himself in the front of that which had been led by Themistocles. The difference between these parties, after the revolution by which the ancestor of Pericles had undermined the power of the old aristocracy, was for some time very faintly marked, and we have seen that Aristides himself was the author of a very democratical measure, which threw the first officers of the state open to all classes of the citizens. The aristocracy had no hope of recovering what it had lost; but, as the commonalty grew more enterprising, it became also more intent on keeping all that it had retained, and on stopping all further innovation at home. Abroad too; though it was no longer a question, whether Athens should continue to be a great maritime power, or should reduce her navy to the footing of the old *naucraries*, and though Cimon himself had actively pursued the policy of Themistocles, there was room for great difference of opinion as to the course which was to be followed in her foreign relations. The aristocratical party wished, for their own sake at least as much as for that of peace and justice, to preserve the balance of power as steady as possible in Greece, and directed the Athenian arms against the Persian empire with the greater energy, in the hope of diverting them from intestine warfare. The democratical party had other interests, and concurred only with that part of these views which tended towards enriching and aggrandising the state.

It is difficult wholly to clear Pericles from the charge of having been swayed by personal motives in the choice of his political system, as it would be to establish it. But even if it were certain that his decision was not the result of conviction, it might as fairly be attributed to a hereditary prepossession in favour of the principles for which his ancestors had contended, and which had probably been transmitted in his family, as to his competition with Cimon, or to his fear of incurring the suspicion that he aimed at a tyranny, or unconstitutional power; a suspicion to which he was much more exposed in the station which he actually filled. But if his personal character might seem better adapted to an aristocratical than to a democratical party, it must also render us unwilling to believe, that he devoted himself to the cause of the commonalty merely that he might make it the instrument of his own ambition. There seems to be much better ground for supposing that he deliberately preferred the system which he adopted, as the most consistent, if not alone reconcilable, with the prosperity and safety of Athens: though his own agency in directing and controlling it might be a prominent object in all his views. But he might well think that the people had gone too far to remain stationary, even if there was any reason why it should not seize the good which lay within its reach. Its greatness had risen with the growth of the commonalty, and, it might appear to him, could only be maintained and extended by the same means: at home by a decided ascendancy of the popular interest over that of the old aristocracy, and every other class in the state; abroad by an equally decided supremacy over the rest of Greece.

The contest between the parties seems for some time to have been carried on, without much violence or animosity, and rather with a noble emulation in the service of the public, than with assaults on one another. Cimon had enriched his country with the spoil and ransom of the Persians; and he had also greatly increased his private fortune. His disposition was naturally inclined to liberality, and he made a munificent use of his wealth.

The state of things had undergone a great change at Athens in favour of the poorer class, since Solon had been obliged to interpose, to protect them from the rigour of creditors, who first impoverished, and then enslaved

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them. Since this time the aristocracy had found it expedient to court the commonalty which it could no longer oppress, and to part with a portion of its wealth for the sake of retaining its power. There were of course then, as at all times, benevolent individuals, who only consulted the dictates of a generous nature: but the contrast between the practice which prevailed before and after the age of Solon, seems clearly to mark the spurious origin of the ordinary beneficence. Yet Isocrates, when he extols the bounty of the good old times, which prevented the pressure of poverty from being ever felt, speaks of land granted at low rents, sums of money advanced at low interest, and asserts that none of the citizens were then in such indigence, as to depend on casual relief. Cimon's munificence therefore must have been remarkable, not only in its degree, but in its kind: and was not the less that of a demagogue, because he sought popularity, not merely for his own sake, but for that of his order and his party.

Such was the light in which it was viewed by Pericles; and some of the measures which most strongly marked his administration were adopted to counteract its effects. He was not able to rival Cimon's profusion, and he even husbanded his private fortune with rigid economy, that he might keep his probity in the management of public affairs free both from temptation and suspicion. His friend Demonides is said first to have suggested the thought of throwing Cimon's liberality into the shade, and rendering it superfluous, by proposing a similar application of the public revenue. Pericles perhaps deemed it safer and more becoming, that the people should supply the poorer citizens with the means of enjoyment out of its own funds, than that they should depend on the bounty of opulent individuals. He might think that the generation which had raised their country to such a pitch of greatness, was entitled to reap the fruits of the sacrifice which their fathers had made, in resigning the produce of the mines of Laurium to the use of the state.

Very early therefore he signalised his appearance in the assembly by becoming the author of a series of measures, all tending to provide for the subsistence and gratification of the poorer class at the public expense. But we must here observe, that, while he was courting the favour of the multitude by these arts, he was no less studious to command its respect. From his first entrance into public life, he devoted himself with unremitting application to business; he was never to be seen out of doors, but on the way between his house and the seat of council: and, as if by way of contrast to Cimon's convivial tastes, declined all invitations to the entertainments of his acquaintance — once only during the whole period he broke through this rule, to honour the wedding of his relative Euryptolemus with his presence — and confined himself to the society of a very select circle of intimate friends. He bestowed the most assiduous attention on the preparation of his speeches, and so little disguised it, that he used to say he never mounted the *bema*, without praying that no inappropriate word might drop from his lips. The impression thus produced was heightened by the calm majesty of his air and carriage, and by the philosophical composure which he maintained under all provocations.¹ And he was so careful to avoid the effect which familiarity might have on the people, that he was sparing even in his attendance at the assembly, and, reserving his own appearance for great occasions, carried many of his measures through the agency of his friends

¹ Plutarch tells a story — characteristic if not true — of a rude fellow who, after railing at Pericles all day, as he was transacting business in public, followed him after dusk with abusive language to his door, when Pericles ordered one of his servants to take a light, and conduct the man home.

and partisans. Among them the person whose name is most frequently associated with that of Pericles was Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, a person not much less conspicuous for his rigid integrity than Aristides himself, and who seems to have entered into the views of Pericles with disinterested earnestness, and fearlessly to have borne the brunt of the conflict with the opposite party.

Immediately after the conquest of Thasos an occasion occurred for the two parties to measure their strength. As has been described, Cimon had received instructions, before he brought home his victorious armament, to attempt some further conquest on the mainland between the newly conquered district and Macedonia. Plutarch says, that he was expected to have invaded Macedonia, and to have added a large tract of it to the dominions of Athens. Yet it does not clearly appear how the conquest of Thasos afforded an opportunity of effecting this with greater ease: nor is any motive suggested for such an attack on the territories of Alexander. We might hence be inclined to suspect, that the expedition which Cimon had neglected to undertake, though called for by the people's wishes, if not by their express orders, was to have been directed, not against Macedonia, but against the Thracian tribes on its frontier, who had so lately cut off their colonists on the Strymon: a blow which the Athenians were naturally impatient to avenge, but which the king of Macedonia might well be supposed to have witnessed without regret, even if he did not instigate those who inflicted it. However this may be, Cimon's forbearance disappointed and irritated the people, and his adversaries inflamed the popular indignation by ascribing his conduct to the influence of Macedonian gold. This part of the charge at least was undoubtedly groundless; and Pericles, though appointed by the people one of Cimon's accusers, when he was brought to trial for treason, seems to have entered into the prosecution with reluctance. The danger however was great, and Elpinice came to the house of Pericles to plead with him for her brother. Pericles, playfully, though it would seem not quite so delicately as our manners would require, reminded her that she was past the age at which female intercession is most powerful; but in effect he granted her request; for he kept back the thunder of his eloquence, and only rose once, for form's sake, to second the accusation. Plutarch says that Cimon was acquitted; and there seems to be no reason for doubting the fact, except a suspicion, that this was the trial to which Demosthenes alludes, when he says that Cimon narrowly escaped with his life, and was condemned to a penalty of fifty talents: a singular repetition of his father's destiny.

THE AREOPAGUS

This however was only a prelude to a more momentous struggle, which involved the principles of the parties, and excited much stronger feelings of mutual resentment. It appears to have been about this time that Pericles resolved on attacking the aristocracy in its ancient and revered stronghold, the Areopagus. We have seen that this body, at once a council and a court of justice, was composed, according to Solon's regulation, of the ex-archons. Its character was little altered after the archonship was filled by lot, so long as it was open to none but citizens of the wealthiest class. But, by the innovation introduced by Aristides, the poorest Athenian might gain admission to the Areopagus. Still the change which this measure produced in its composition was probably for a long time scarcely perceptible, and attended with no effect on its maxims and proceedings. When Pericles made his attack

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on it, it was perhaps as much as ever an aristocratical assembly. The greater part of the members had come in under the old system, and most of those who followed them probably belonged to the same class; for though in the eye of the law the archonship had become open to all, it is not likely that many of a lower station would immediately present themselves to take their chance. But even if any such were successful, they could exert but little influence on the general character of the council, which would act much more powerfully on them. The poor man who took his seat among a number of persons of superior rank, fortune, and education, would generally be eager to adopt the tone and conform to the wishes of his colleagues; and hence the prevailing spirit might continue for many generations unaltered. This may be the main point which Isocrates had in view, when he observed that the worst men, as soon as they entered the Areopagus, seemed to change their nature. Pericles therefore had reason to consider it as a formidable obstacle to his plans. He did not however attempt, or perhaps desire, to abolish an institution so hallowed by tradition; but he aimed at narrowing the range of its functions, so as to leave it little more than an august name. Ephialtes was his principal coadjutor in this undertaking, and by the prominent part which he took in it exposed himself to the implacable enmity of the opposite party, which appears to have set all its engines in motion to ward off the blow.

It is not certain whether this struggle had begun, or was only impending, at the time of the embassy which came from Sparta to request the aid of the Athenians against Ithome. But the two parties were no less at variance on this subject than on the other. The aristocratical party considered Sparta as its natural ally, and did not wish to see Athens without a rival in Greece. Cimon was personally attached to Sparta, possessed the confidence of the Spartans, and took every opportunity of expressing the warmest admiration for their character and institutions; and, to mark his respect for them, gave one of his sons the name of Lacedæmonius. He himself was in some degree indebted to their patronage for his political elevation, and had requited their favour by joining with them in the persecution of Themistocles. When therefore Ephialtes dissuaded the people from granting the request of the Spartans, and exclaimed against the folly of raising a fallen antagonist, Cimon urged them "not to permit Greece to be lamed, and Athens to lose her yoke-fellow." This advice prevailed, and Cimon was sent with a large force to assist the Spartans at the siege of Ithome.

The first effect produced by the affront Sparta later gave to Athens, was, as we have seen, a resolution to break off all connection with Sparta, and, to make the rupture more glaring, they had entered into an alliance with Sparta's old rival, Argos.

This turn of events was extremely agreeable to the democratical party at Athens, not only in itself, on account of the assistance which they might hope to receive from Argos, but because it immediately afforded them a great advantage in their conflict with their domestic adversaries, and in particular furnished them with new arms against Cimon. He instantly became obnoxious, both as the avowed friend of Sparta, and as the author and leader of the expedition which had drawn so rude an insult on his countrymen. The attack on the authority of the Areopagus was now prosecuted with greater vigour, and Cimon had little influence left to exert in its behalf. Yet his party seems not by any means to have remained passive, but to have put forth all its strength in a last effort to save its citadel: and it was supported by an auxiliary which had in its possession some very powerful engines to wield in its defence.

This was the poet Æschylus, who was attached to it by his character and his early associations. Himself a Eupatrid, perhaps connected with the priestly families of Eleusis, his deme, if not his birth-place, he gloried in the laurels which he had won at Marathon, above all the honours earned by his sword and by his pen, though he had also fought at Salamis, and had founded a new era of dramatic poetry. He was an admirer of Aristides, whose character he had painted in one of his tragedies, under the name of an ancient hero, with a truth which was immediately recognised by the audience.



The contest with Persia, which was the subject of one of his great works, probably appeared to him the legitimate object for the energies of Greece. Beside this general disposition to side with Cimon's party, against Pericles, the whole train of his poetical and religious feelings was nourished by a study of the mythical and religious traditions of Greek antiquity. In his tragedy, entitled the *Eumenides*, he exhibits the mythical origin of the court and council of Areopagus, in the form which best suited his purpose, tracing it to the cause first pleaded there between the Argive matricide Orestes, who pledges his country to eternal alliance with Athens, and the "dread goddesses," who sought vengeance for the blood which he had shed. The poet brings these terrible beings on the stage, as well as the tutelary goddess of the city, who herself institutes the tribunal, "to last throughout all ages," and exhorts her people to preserve it as the glory and safeguard of the city; and the spectators are led to consider the continuance of the blessings which the pacified avengers promise to the land, as depending on the permanence of the institution which had succeeded to their function.^b

Owing to a misunderstanding as to the date of this tragedy, it was long believed that Æschylus wrote it in reproof of Pericles for diminishing the power of the Areopagus. When it became certain that the play was not produced till 458, a new light was thrown on the affair, showing Æschylus as a defender of the merely judicial function of the Areopagus, for Pericles and Ephialtes left the Areopagus its judicial dignity and merely removed its political weight, as will be more fully shown in a later chapter. Æschylus therefore appears as one in no sense protesting, but rather as showing the true origin and strictly judicial function of the Areopagus, and approving Ephialtes who carried the day and reduced its pretensions.^a

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CIMON EXILED

This triumph of Pericles and his party over the Areopagus seems to have been immediately followed by the ostracism of Cimon, which took place about two years after the return of the Athenians from Messenia: and it is therefore not improbable that his exile may have been not so much an effect of popular resentment, as a measure of precaution, which may have appeared necessary even to the moderate men of both parties, for the establishment of public tranquillity.^b

The new character which Athens had assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroachments — on the one side upon Cleonæ, on the other side upon Megara: on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connection, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens. This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Crissæan gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pegæ was situated, and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geranea, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling within sight of Piræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Pericles was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Piræus: but we may be sure that Piræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians under Inarus (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the rebels, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour: and the inscription which remains — a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechthid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Italiæis, Ægina, and Megara — brings forcibly before us that remarkable energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of the Peloponnesian land-force, and to insure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succour from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, and were erected for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

THE WAR WITH CORINTH

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermione), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependence, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Cœcryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat—neither of them apparently very decisive—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side.

In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian War—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithome, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission. The Corinthians and Epidaurians, however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of three

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hundred hoplites, did their best to aid her further by an attack upon Megara ; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three exigencies at one and the same time — to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myronides marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young ; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debatable advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force, that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat ; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch and having only one narrow entrance. Myronides, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.

THE LONG WALLS

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account — partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Pericles, which were now becoming ascendant in the city — the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller a distance, between Megara and Nisæa : for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (about $4\frac{1}{2}$ English miles) to join Athens with Piræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (nearly 4 English miles) to join it with Phalerum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians — as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistocles himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians — being regarded as the second great stride, at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Piræus. But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Cimon had been recently ostracised ; and the democratical movement pressed by Pericles and Ephialtes (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success ; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution.

Now the Long Walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Pericles, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistocles when he first schemed the Piræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of land attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Cimon, which was attached to the Lacedæmonian connection, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Piræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Piræus and Phalerum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athene. When to all these grounds of opposition we add the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt, we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any further proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Conon after the victory of Cnidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the helots in Ithome were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of fifteen hundred troops of their own, and ten thousand of their various allies, under the regent Nicomedes. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phocians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phocians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Plataea: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganised, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their further aggrandisement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organising Arcadia and Messene against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the

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hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics, and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.

But there was also a further design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens was so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Pericles, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Boeotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, encamping at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate co-operation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracised Cimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Boeotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of one thousand Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myronides at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on.

Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement. But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geranea, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

CIMON RECALLED

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracised Cimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Cleneis. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Pericles, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Acamantii, aware of this application and repulse of Cimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he

escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Cimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracised leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried — proposed too by Pericles himself — to abridge the ten years of Cimon's ostracism, and permit his immediate return.

We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistocles had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristides from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis: and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydides dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress — a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Cimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myronides into Bœotia: the extreme precision of this date (being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars wherein Thucydides is thus precise) marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Ctenophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces, or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Ctenophyta was the last, Myronides was completely victorious. The Athenians became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns; reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta, establishing democratical governments, and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connection, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired; Phocis and Locris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies, the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence, maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need, from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pegæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmides displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methone and of Gythium. He took Chalcis,

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a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupactus belonging to the Ozolian Locrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, disembarked troops near Sicyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town, and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only Zacynthus and Cephallenia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connection began. During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sicyon, with a force of one thousand hoplites under Pericles himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pegæ in the Crissaean Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmides, defeating the Sicyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Acarnania, taking the Achaean allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Ceniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phocian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites; while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (460-455 B.C.). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarus; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except that strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus, drove the Athenians and their allies, after an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosopitis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Cyrene: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarus himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians, very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmides, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the helots or Messenians at Ithome, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient

Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from the Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmides at Naupactus (recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Locrians), where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

THE FIVE-YEARS' TRUCE

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no further expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phocis from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithome, which occupied them at home; but still more perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geranea, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithome, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer. This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Cimon, who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Pericles that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service, so as not to interfere with his influence at home. Accordingly Cimon, having equipped a fleet of two hundred triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens — while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Citium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxicrates, became so embarrassed for want of provisions that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Cilician fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.

From this time forward no further operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phaselis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Cyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. This was called the Peace of Callias.

We may believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Cimonian Treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Cimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on, were gained after his death. Nay more — the probability is, that if Cimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at

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all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Pericles either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it — victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Pericles whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite.

THE CONFEDERACY BECOMES AN EMPIRE

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Pericles, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the Acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state: nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the free will of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence; and Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary, every subjugation of a seceder, tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority of the Delian synod; and, what was still worse, it materially altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies — exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians — the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians.

Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power, possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, Locris, together with Achaia and Trœzen in the Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still further increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pegæ, the Athenians had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian isthmus: but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geranea, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of the Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica. Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in

an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt.

Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 448 B.C.—after the conclusion of five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Cimonian Peace between Persia and Athens—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon further aggrandisement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age; and accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states which had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, etc., as well as Sparta, the once-recognised head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her pre-eminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the upstart despot-city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate, threatened nevertheless still further increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian War. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war: nor shall we thoroughly appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

COMMENCEMENT OF DECLINE

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this widespread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phocians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phocians, who were then their allies. The Delphians were members of the Phocian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it

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belonged to them separately or to the Phocians collectively. The favour of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phocis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Bœotia, Phocis, Locris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of garrisons, but through domestic parties favourable to Athens, and a suitable form of government—just in the same way as Sparta maintained her influence over her Peloponnesian allies. After the victory of Cnophyta, the Athenians had broken up the governments in the Bœotian cities established by Sparta before the battle of Tanagra, and converted them into democracies at Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men had thus been sent into exile; and as the same process had taken place in Phocis and Locris, there was at this time a considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phocian, Locrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, etc., all bitterly hostile to Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power. We learn further that the democracy established at Thebes after the battle of Cnophyta was ill conducted and disorderly, which circumstance laid open Bœotia still further to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak point. These various exiles, all joining their forces and concerting measures with their partisans in the interior, succeeded in mastering Orchomenos, Chæronea, and some other less important places in Bœotia.

The Athenian general Tolmides marched to expel them, with one thousand Athenian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness. The hoplites of Tolmides principally youthful volunteers and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding force: nor would the people listen even to Pericles, when he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard, and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers as well as greater caution. Fatally indeed were his predictions justified. Though Tolmides was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæronea, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Coronea, by the united body of exiles and their partisans.

No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmides himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether: in all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy. Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians, and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmides had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them.

We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphaacteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Boeotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phocis and Locris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Pericles himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sicyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the Long Walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geranea, Plistoanax, king of Sparta, was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Cleandridas, had been attached to him by the ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Pericles, it is said, persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian War, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Cleandridas never came back, and Plistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athene at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Pericles returned with his forces to Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmides, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and five thousand hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalcis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the *hippobotæ*. But the inhabitants of Histiea at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with, the free population being all or in great part expelled, and the land distributed among Athenian cleruchs or out-settled citizens.

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Coronea. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens,

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was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Pericles, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Pericles would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace; but we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pegæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning the Peloponnesus altogether, and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian War.^d

THE GREATNESS OF PERICLES

Athens now rested six years, unengaged in any hostilities; a longer interval of perfect peace than she had before known in above forty years elapsed since she rose from her ashes after the Persian invasion. It is a wonderful and singular phenomenon in the history of mankind, little accounted for by anything recorded by ancient, or imagined by modern writers, that, during this period of turbulence, in a commonwealth whose whole population in free subjects amounted scarcely to thirty thousand families, art, science, fine taste, and politeness should have risen to that perfection which has made Athens the mistress of the world through all succeeding ages. Some sciences indeed have been carried higher in modern times, and art has put forth new branches, of which some have given new helps to science: but Athens, in that age, reached a perfection of taste that no country has since surpassed; but on the contrary all have looked up to, as a polar star, by which, after sinking in the deepest barbarism, taste has been guided in its restoration to splendour, and the observation of which will probably ever be the surest preservative against its future corruption and decay.

One great point of the policy of Pericles was to keep the people always either amused or employed. During peace an exercising squadron of sixty trireme galleys was sent out for eight months in every year. Nor was this without a further use than merely engaging the attention of the people, and maintaining the navy in vigour. He sometimes took the command in person: and, sailing among the distant dependencies of the empire, settled disputes between them, and confirmed the power and extended the influence of Athens. The Ægean and the Propontis did not bound his voyages: he penetrated into the Euxine; and finding the distant Grecian settlement of Sinope divided between Timesileus, who affected the tyranny, and an opposing party, he left there Lamachus with thirteen ships, and a land-force with whose assistance to the popular side the tyrant and those of his faction were expelled. The justice of what followed may indeed appear questionable. Their houses and property, apportioned into six hundred lots, were offered to so many Athenian citizens; and volunteers were not wanting to accept the offer, and settle at Sinope. To disburden the government at home, by providing advantageous establishments, in distant parts, for the poor and discontented among the sovereign citizens of Athens, was a policy more than once resorted to by Pericles. It was during his administration, in the year, according to Diodorus, in which the Thirty Years' Truce was concluded, that the deputation came from the Thessalian adventurers who had been expelled by the Crotoniats from their attempted establishment in the deserted territory of Sybaris, in consequence of which, under his patronage, the colony was settled with which the historian Herodotus then, and afterward the orator Lysias, passing to Thurii, both established themselves there.

A GREEK FEDERATION PLANNED

Plutarch has attributed to Pericles a noble project, unnoticed by any earlier extant author, but worthy of his capacious mind, and otherwise also bearing some characters of authenticity and truth. It was no less than to unite all Greece under one great federal government, of which Athens should be the capital. But the immediate and direct avowal of such a purpose would be likely to raise jealousies so numerous and extensive as to form insuperable obstacles to the execution. The religion of the nation was that alone in which the Grecian people universally claimed a clear common interest; and even in this every town and almost every family claimed something peculiar to itself. In the vehemence of public alarm, during the Persian invasion, vows had been, in some places, made to the gods for sacrifices, to an extent beyond what the votaries, when blessed with deliverance beyond hope, were able to perform; and some temples, destroyed by the invaders, were not yet restored; probably because the means of those in whose territories they had stood were deficient. Taking these circumstances then for his ground, Pericles proposed that a congress of deputies from every republic of the nation should be assembled at Athens, for the purpose first of inquiring concerning vows for the safety of Greece yet unperformed, and temples, injured by the barbarians, not yet restored; and then of proceeding to concert measures for the lasting security of navigation in the Grecian seas, and for the preservation of peace by land also between all the states composing the Greek nation. The naval question, but still more the ruin which, in the Persian invasion, had befallen northern Greece, and especially Attica, while Peloponnesus had felt nothing of its evils, gave pretensions for Athens to


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take the lead in the business. On the motion of Pericles, a decree of the Athenian people directed the appointment of ministers to invite every Grecian state to send its deputies. Plutarch, rarely attentive to political information, has not at all indicated what attention was shown, or what participation proposed, for Lacedæmon. His prejudices indeed we find very generally adverse to the Lacedæmonian government, and favouring the Athenian democracy. But, judging from the friendship which, according to the authentic information of Thucydides, subsisted between Pericles and Archidamus, king of Lacedæmon, through life, it is little likely that, in putting forward the project for the peace of Greece, Pericles would have proposed anything derogatory to the just weight and dignity of Sparta; which indeed would have been, with peace the pretence, only putting forward a project of contest.

Pericles, when he formed his coalition with Cimon, seems to have entered heartily into the enlarged views of that great man; and, with the hope that, through their coalition, both the oligarchical and the democratical powers in Athens might be held justly balanced, had early in view to establish the peace of Greece on a union between Athens and Lacedæmon. It is however evident, from the narrative of Thucydides, that Archidamus rarely could direct the measures of the Lacedæmonian government. On a view of all information, then, it may seem probable that the project of Pericles was concerted with Archidamus; and that the opposition of those in Lacedæmon, of an adverse faction concurred with opposition from those in Athens, who apprehended injury to their interests from a new coalition with the aristocratical party, to compel the great projector to abandon his magnificent and beneficent purpose.^f



RUINS OF HALIARTUS



CHAPTER XXV. ATHENS AT WAR

PEACE between Lacedæmon and Athens was indispensable towards the quiet of the rest of the nation, but, in the want of such a union as Pericles had projected, was unfortunately far from being insured; and, when war began anywhere, though among the most distant settlements of the Grecian people, how far it might extend was not to be foreseen. A dispute between two Asiatic states of the Athenian confederacy led Athens into a war which greatly endangered the truce made for thirty years, when it had scarcely lasted six. Miletus and Samos, each claiming the sovereignty of Priene, originally a free Grecian commonwealth, asserted their respective pretensions by arms. The Milesians, not till they were suffering under defeat, applied to Athens for redress, as of a flagrant injury done them. The usual feuds within every Grecian state furnished assistance to their clamour; for, the aristocracy prevailing at that time in Samos, the leaders of the democratical party joined the enemies of their country in accusing the proceedings of its government before the Athenian people.

THE SAMIAN WAR

The opposition at Athens maliciously imputed the measures following to the weak compliance of Pericles with the solicitations of Aspasia in favour of her native city; but it appears clearly, from Thucydides, that no such motive was needful: the Athenian government would of course take cognisance of the cause; and, as might be expected, a requisition was sent to the Samian administration to answer, by deputies at Athens, to the charges urged against them. The Samians, unwilling to submit their claim to the arbitration of those who they knew were always systematically adverse to the aristocratical interest, refused to send deputies. A fleet of forty trireme galleys however brought them to immediate submission; their government was changed to a democracy, in which those who had headed the opposition of course took the lead; and to insure permanent acquiescence from the aristocratical party, fifty men and fifty boys, of the first families of the island, were taken as hostages, and placed under an Athenian guard in the island of Lemnos.

What Herodotus mentions, as an observation applicable generally, we may readily believe was on this occasion experienced in Samos, "that the

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lower people were most unpleasant associates to the nobles." A number of these, unable to support the oppression to which they found themselves exposed, quitted the island, and applied to Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis. The project of conquering Greece by arms appears to have been abandoned by the Persian government; but the urgency for constantly watching its politics, and interfering, as occasion might offer, with a view to the safety, if not to the extension, of the western border of the empire, was obvious; and it appears that the western satraps were instructed accordingly. The Samian refugees were favourably received by Pissuthnes. They corresponded with many of their party yet remaining in the island, and they engaged in their interest the city of Byzantium, itself a subject ally of Athens. Collecting then about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, they crossed by night the narrow channel which separates Samos from the continent, and, being joined by their friends, they surprised and overpowered the new administration. Without delay they proceeded to Lemnos, and so well conducted their enterprise that they carried off their hostages, together with the Athenian guard set over them. To win then more effectually the favour of the satrap, the Athenian prisoners were presented to him. Assured of assistance from Byzantium, being also not without hopes from Lacedæmon, they prepared to prosecute their success by immediately undertaking an expedition against Miletus.

Information of these transactions arriving quickly at Athens, Pericles, with nine others, according to the ancient military constitution, joined with him in command, hastened to Samos with a fleet of sixty trireme galleys. Pericles met the Samian fleet and defeated it. He debarked his infantry on the island of Samos, and laid siege to the city by land and sea.

In the ninth month from the commencement of the siege, it capitulated: the ships of war were surrendered, the fortifications were destroyed, the Samians bound themselves to the payment of a sum of money by instalment for the expenses of the war, and gave hostages as pledges of their fidelity to the sovereign commonwealth of Athens. The Byzantines, not waiting the approach of the coercing fleet, sent their request to be readmitted to their former terms of subjection, which was granted.

This rebellion, alarming and troublesome at the time to the administration of Athens, otherwise little disturbed the internal peace of the commonwealth; and, in the event, contributed rather to strengthen its command over its dependencies. Pericles took occasion from it to acquire fresh popularity. On the return of the armament to Athens the accustomed solemnities, in honour of those who had fallen in the war, were performed with new splendour; and, in speaking the funeral oration, he exerted the powers of his eloquence very highly to the gratification of the people. As he descended from the *bema*, the stand whence orations were delivered to the people, the women presented him with chaplets; an idea derived from the ceremonies of the public games, where the crowning with a chaplet was the distinction of the victors, and, as something approaching to divine honour, was held among the highest tokens of admiration, esteem, and respect.

THE WAR WITH CORCYRA

The threatened renewal of general war in Greece having been obviated by the determination of the Peloponnesian congress not to interfere between the Athenians and their Asiatic allies, peace prevailed during the next three

years after the submission of the Samians; or, if hostilities occurred anywhere, they were of so little importance that no account of them remains. A fatal spark then, raising fire in a corner of the country hitherto little within the notice of history, the blaze rapidly spread over the whole with inextinguishable fury; insomuch that the further history of Greece, with some splendid episodes, is chiefly a tale of calamities, which the nation, in ceaseless exertions of misdirected valour and genius, brought upon itself.

The island of Coreyra had been occupied, in an early age, by a colony from Corinth. The political connection of colonies with the mother-country will always depend upon their respective strength; and the Grecian colonies, all having been the offspring of very small states, in many instances acquired more than the parent's force. Coreyra, already populous, had not yet entirely broken its connection with Corinth, when the resolution was taken by its government to settle a colony on the Illyrian coast. An embassy was therefore sent, in due form, to desire a Corinthian for the leader. Phaleus, of a family boasting its descent from Hercules, was accordingly appointed to that honour: some Corinthians and others of Dorian race accompanied him; and Phaleus thus became the nominal founder of Epidamnus, which was however considered as a Coreyræan, not a Corinthian colony.

But in process of time Epidamnus, growing populous and wealthy, followed the example of its mother-country, asserted independency, and maintained the claim. Like most other Grecian cities, it was then, during many years, torn by sedition; and a war supervening with the neighbouring barbarians, it fell much from its former flourishing state. But the spirit of faction remaining in spite of misfortune untamed, the commonalty at length expelled all the higher citizens. These, finding refuge among the Illyrians, engaged with them in a predatory war, which was unremittingly carried on against the city by land and sea. Unable thus to rest, and almost to subsist, the Epidamnians in possession requested assistance from Coreyra. This humble supplication however being rejected, they hastened a deputation to Corinth.

Fortunately for their object, though peace had not yet been broken, yet animosity between Corinth and Coreyra had so risen that the Coreyræans, who had long refused political dependency, now denied to the Corinthians all those honours and compliments usually paid by Grecian colonies to their parent states. Under stimulation thus from affront, and with encouragement from the oracle, the prospect of an acquisition of dominion was too tempting, and the proposal of the Epidamnians was accepted. But Corinth had at this time only thirty ships of war, whereas Coreyra was able to put to sea near four times the number; being, next to Athens, the most powerful maritime state of Greece. Application for naval assistance was therefore made to the republics with which Corinth was most bound in friendship, and thus more than forty vessels were obtained. It had been the settled policy of the Coreyræans, islanders and strong at sea, to engage in no alliances. They had avoided both the Peloponnesian and the Athenian confederacy; and hitherto with this policy they had prospered. But, alarmed now at the combination formed against them, and fearing it might still be extended, they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Sicyon; who prevailed so far that ministers from those two states accompanied them to Corinth, as mediators in the existing differences. In presence of these the Coreyræan ambassadors proposed to submit the matters in dispute to the arbitration of any Peloponnesian states, or to the Delphian oracle, which the Corinthians had supposed already favourable to them. The Corinthians

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however, now prepared for war, and apparently persuaded that neither Lacedæmon nor Sicyon would take any active part against them, refused to treat upon any equal terms, and the Coreyræan ambassadors departed (435 B.C.).

The Corinthians then hastened to use the force they had collected. The Coreyræans had manned those of their ships which were already equipped, and hastily prepared some of those less in readiness, when their herald returned, bearing no friendly answer. With eighty galleys then they quitted their port, met the enemy off Actium, and gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen ships. Returning to Coreyra, they erected their trophy on the headland of Leucinne, and they immediately put to death all their prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom, as pledges, they kept in bonds. Epidamnus surrendered to their forces on the same day.

The opportunities now open, for both revenge and profit, were not neglected by the Coreyræans. During that year, unopposed on the sea, there was scarcely an intermission of their smaller enterprises; by some of which they gained booty, by others only gave alarm, but by all together greatly distressed the Corinthians and their allies (434 B.C.).

But since their misfortune off Actium the Corinthians had been unremittingly assiduous in repairing their loss, and in preparing to revenge it. Triremes were built, all necessities for a fleet were largely collected, rowers were engaged throughout Peloponnesus, and where else in any part of Greece they could be obtained for hire. The Coreyræans, informed of these measures, notwithstanding their past success were uneasy with the consideration that their commonwealth stood single, while their enemies were members of an extensive confederacy; of which, though a part only had yet been induced to act, more powerful exertions were nevertheless to be apprehended. In this state of things it appeared necessary to abandon their ancient policy, and to seek alliances. Thucydides gives us to understand that they would have preferred the Peloponnesian to the Athenian confederacy; induced, apparently, both by their kindred origin, and their kindred form of government. But they were precluded by the circumstances of the existing war, Corinth being one of the most considerable members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and it was beyond hope that Lacedæmon could be engaged in measures hostile to so old and useful an ally. It was therefore finally resolved to send an embassy to Athens. As soon as the purpose of the Coreyræans was known at Corinth, ambassadors were sent thence to Athens to remonstrate against it.

The Athenian people were assembled to receive the two embassies, each of which, in presence of the other, made its proposition in a formal oration. The point to be determined was highly critical for Athens. A truce existed, but not a peace, with a confederacy inferior in naval force, but far superior by land; and Attica, a continental territory, was open to attack by land. But next to Athens Coreyra was the most powerful maritime republic; and to prevent the accession of its strength, through alliance, or through conquest, to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was, for the Athenian people, highly important. In the articles of the truce moreover it was expressly stipulated, that any Grecian state, not yet a member of either confederacy, might at pleasure be admitted to either. But, notwithstanding this, it was little less than certain that, in the present circumstances, an alliance with Coreyra must lead to a rupture with the Peloponnesians; and this consideration occasioned much suspense in the minds of the Athenians. Twice the assembly was held to debate the question. On the first day, the arguments

of the Corinthian ambassadors had so far effect that nothing was decided: on the second, the spirit of ambition, ordinary in democracy, prevailed, and the question was carried for alliance with Coreyra.

Meanwhile the earnestness with which the Corinthians persevered in their purpose of prosecuting war against the Coreyræans, now to be supported by the power of Athens, appears to mark confidence in support, on their side, from the Lacedæmonian confederacy; some members of which indeed were evidently of ready zeal. The Corinthians increased their own trireme galleys to ninety. The Eleans, resenting the burning of Cyllene, had exerted themselves in naval preparation, and sent ten triremes completely manned to join them. Assistance from Megara, Leucas, and Ambracia made their whole fleet a hundred and fifty: the crews would hardly be less than forty thousand men. With this large force they sailed to Chimerium, a port of Thesprotia, over against Coreyra, where, according to the practice of the Greeks, they formed their naval camp.

The Athenian government meanwhile, desirous to confirm their new alliance, yet still anxious to avoid a rupture with the Peloponnesian confederacy, had sent ten triremes to Coreyra, under the command of Lacedæmonius, son of Cimon; but with orders not to fight, unless a descent were made on the island, or any of its towns were attacked. The Coreyræans, on receiving intelligence that the enemy was approaching, put to sea with a hundred and ten triremes, exclusive of the Athenian, and formed their naval camp on one of the small islets called Sybota, the Sow-leas or Sow-pastures, between their own island and the main. Their land-forces at the same time, with a thousand auxiliaries from Zacynthus, encamped on the headland of Leucimne in Coreyra, to be prepared against invasion; while on the opposite coast of the continent the barbarians, long since friendly to Corinth, assembled in large number. The Corinthians however, moving in the night, perceived in the dawn the Coreyræan fleet approaching. Both prepared immediately to engage.

So great a number of ships had never before met in any action between Greeks and Greeks. The onset was vigorous; and the battle was maintained, on either side, with much courage but little skill. Both Coreyræan and Corinthian ships were equipped in the ancient manner, very inartificially. The decks were crowded with soldiers, some heavy-armed, some with missile weapons; and the action, in the eye of the Athenians, trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembled a battle of infantry rather than a sea-fight. Once engaged, the number and throng of the vessels made free motion impossible: nor was there any attempt at the rapid evolution of the diecplūs, as it was called, for piercing the enemy's line and dashing away his oars, the great objects of the improved naval tactics; but the event depended, as of old, chiefly upon the heavy-armed soldiers who fought on the decks. Tumult and confusion thus prevailing everywhere, Lacedæmonius, restrained by his orders from fighting, gave yet some assistance to the Coreyræans, by showing himself wherever he saw them particularly pressed, and alarming their enemies. The Coreyræans were, in the left of their line, successful: twenty of their ships put to flight the Megarians and Ambracians who were opposed to them, pursued to the shore, and, debarking, plundered and burnt the naval camp. But the Corinthians, in the other wing, had meanwhile been gaining an advantage which became decisive through the imprudent forwardness of the victorious Coreyræans. The Athenians now endeavoured, by more effectual assistance to their allies, to prevent a total rout: but disorder was already too prevalent, and advantage of

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numbers too great against them. The Corinthians pressed their success; the Corcyræans fled, the Athenians became mingled among them; and in the confusion of a running fight acts of hostility passed between the Athenians and Corinthians. The defeated however soon reached their own shore, whither the conquerors did not think proper to follow.

In the action several galleys had been sunk; most by the Corinthians, but some by the victorious part of the Corcyræan fleet. The crews had recourse, as usual, to their boats; and it was common for the conquerors, when they could seize any of these, to take them in tow and make the men prisoners: but the Corinthians, in the first moment of success, gave no quarter; and, unaware of the disaster of the right of their fleet, in the hurry and confusion of the occasion, not easily distinguishing between Greeks and Greeks, inadvertently destroyed many of their unfortunate friends. When pursuit ceased, and they had collected whatever could be recovered of the wrecks and the dead, they carried them to a desert harbour, not distant, on the Thesprotian coast, called, like the neighbouring islets, Sybota: and depositing them under the care of their barbarian allies, who were there encamped, they returned, on the afternoon of the same day, with the purpose of renewing attack upon the Corcyræan fleet.

The Corcyræans meanwhile had been considering the probable consequences of leaving the enemy masters of the sea. They dreaded descents upon their island, and consequent ravage of their lands. The return of their victorious squadron gave them new spirits: Lacedæmonius encouraged them with assurance that, since hostilities had already passed, he would no longer scruple to afford them his utmost support; and they resolved upon the bold measure of quitting their port and, though evening was already approaching, again giving the enemy battle. Instantly they proceeded to put this in execution. The pæan, the song of battle, was already sung, when the Corinthians began suddenly to retreat. The Corcyræans were at a loss immediately to account for this; but presently they discovered a squadron coming round a headland, which had concealed it longer from them than from the enemy. Still uncertain whether it might be friendly or hostile, they also retreated into their port; but shortly, to their great joy, twenty triremes under Glaucon and Andocides, sent from Attica, in the apprehension that the small force under Lacedæmonius might be unequal to the occurring exigencies, took their station by them.

Next day the Corcyræans did not hesitate, with the thirty Athenian ships, for none of those under Lacedæmonius had suffered materially in the action, to show themselves off the harbour of Sybota, where the enemy lay, and offer battle. The Corinthians came out of the harbour, formed for action, and so rested. They were not desirous of risking an engagement against the increased strength of the enemy, but they could not remain conveniently in the station they had occupied, a desert shore, where they could neither refit their injured ships, nor recruit their stock of provisions; and they were encumbered with more than a thousand prisoners; a very inconvenient addition to the crowded complements of their galleys. Their object therefore was to return home: but they were apprehensive that the Athenians, holding the truce as broken by the action of the preceding day, would not allow an unmolested passage. It was therefore determined to try their disposition by sending a small vessel with a message to the Athenian commanders, without the formality of a herald. This was a service not without danger. Those Corcyræans, who were near enough to observe what passed, exclaimed, in the vehemence of their animosity, "that the bearers should be

put to death;" which, considering them as enemies, would have been within the law of war of the Greeks. The Athenian commanders however thought proper to hold a different conduct. To the message delivered, which accused them of breaking the truce, by obstructing the passage of Corcyra, they replied that "it was not their purpose to break the truce, but only to protect their allies. Wherever else the Corinthians chose to go, they might go without interruption from them; but any attempt against Corcyra, or any of its possessions, would be resisted by the Athenians to the utmost of their power."

Upon receiving this answer, the Corinthians, after erecting a trophy at Sybota on the continent, proceeded homeward. In their way they took by stratagem Anaetorium, a town at the mouth of the Ambracian Gulf, which had formerly been held in common by their commonwealth and the Corcyræans; and, leaving a garrison there, proceeded to Corinth. Of their prisoners they found near eight hundred had been slaves, and these they sold. The remainder, about two hundred and fifty, were strictly guarded, but otherwise treated with the utmost kindness. Among them were some of the first men of Corcyra; and through these the Corinthians hoped, at some future opportunity, to recover their ancient interest and authority in the island.

The Corcyræans meanwhile had gratified themselves with the erection of a trophy on the island Sybota, as a claim of victory, in opposition to the Corinthian trophy on the continent. The Athenian fleet returned home; and thus ended, without any treaty, that series of actions which is distinguished among Greek writers by the name of the Corcyræan, or, sometimes, the Corinthian war.^b

THE WAR WITH POTIDÆA AND MACEDONIA

The Corinthians had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy, through one of her widespread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallene, which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalcidice, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs, was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonised from Corinth, and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of *Epidemiurgi*. On various points of the neighbouring coast, also, there were several small towns belonging to the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalcidice, was held by the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, son of that Alexander who had taken part, fifty years before, in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axius and Strymon. Now Perdiccas had been for some time the friend and

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ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country, apparently on the higher course of the Axios near the Pæonian tribes, with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdiccas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands: for the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land-neighbour, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour of Sitalces and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports. Perdiccas immediately began to incite and aid the Chalcidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens, and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Coreyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens. And he further prevailed on many of the Chalcidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small town on the seacoast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalcidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdiccas further assigned some territory near Lake Bolbe to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant either of his hostile preparations or of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth after the Coreyraean sea-fight immediately after which they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallene, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland — requiring them further both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites, under Archestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdiccas in the Thermaic gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalcidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time, and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty Years' Truce still subsisting: at Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about midsummer 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalcidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance. Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdiccas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in co-operation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country, under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned

his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa ; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians, hired for the occasion — under Aristeus, son of Adimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament, however, was speedily sent forth — forty triremes and two thousand Athenian hoplites under Callias, son of Calliades, with four other commanders — who on reaching the Thermaic gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdiccas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf — next attacking, though without effect, the town of Beroæ — and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gignonus, near which they encamped.

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdiccas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalcidians, and sent two hundred horse to join them, under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls, in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side towards Olynthus — which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation. He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalcidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Callias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus ; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance ; but the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water : he effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile, the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion : nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only three

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hundred men, while the Athenians lost one hundred and fifty, together with the general, Callias.

The victory was, however, quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalcidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallene: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormion with sixteen hundred fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis, in the peninsula of Pallene, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle: but the challenge not being accepted, he undertook, and finished without obstruction, the blockading wall on the side of Pallene, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormion at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalcidic and Botticæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristæus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard, and break out suddenly from the harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only five hundred defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalcidians, and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sernyla, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town: it had, however, been so well provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Coreyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted later.^c



GREEK TERRA-COTTA FIGURE




CHAPTER XXVI. IMPERIAL ATHENS UNDER PERICLES

Athens the stately-walled, magnificent ! — PINDAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Pericles and Ephialtes, described in a preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed ; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its further development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for any personal exertion. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency ; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn. The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece : and the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns ; the reverses immediately preceding the Thirty Years' Truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Pericles formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy, and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters. This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had undertaken ; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or institute control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny : no ship of war except those of Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training. And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in



(Courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York)

RESTORATION OF THE PARTHENON



[460-430 B.C.]

the disastrous period preceding the Thirty Years' Truce, when Athens lost Megara and Boeotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to one thousand, according to a verse of Aristophanes, which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydides at about six hundred talents [£120,000 or \$600,000]. Of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or no information. It was placed under the superintendence of the Hellenotamie; originally officers of the confederacy, but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue, from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War is stated by Xenophon at one thousand talents: customs, harbour, and market-dues, receipt from the silver mines at Laurium, rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metie, etc., may have made up a larger sum than four hundred talents; which sum, added to the six hundred talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanes, during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian War, B.C. 422, gives the general total of that time as "nearly two thousand talents": this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. Whatever may have been the actual magnitude of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian War, we know that during the larger part of the administration of Pericles, the revenue including tribute, was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; inasmuch that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in the Acropolis during the years preceding the Peloponnesian War—which treasure when at its maximum reached the great sum of ninety-seven hundred talents [£1,940,000 or \$9,700,000], and was still at six thousand talents, after a serious drain for various purposes, at the moment when that war began. This system of public economy, constantly laying by a considerable sum year after year—in which Athens stood alone, since none of the Peloponnesian states had any public reserve whatever—goes far of itself to vindicate Pericles from the charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and also to exonerate the Athenian demos from that reproach of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which it is common to advance against them. After the death of Cimon, no further expeditions were undertaken against the Persians, and even for some years before his death, not much appears to have been done. The tribute money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it. And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory: she was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely

Pericles and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens; and the sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to patriotism.

To establish Athenian interests in the dependent territories, was one important object in the eyes of Pericles, and while he discountenanced all distant and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many cleruchies and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted one thousand citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, five hundred to Naxos, and two hundred and fifty to Andros. In the Chersonese, he further repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus, which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Cimon, had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiades, about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilised Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Pericles even extended into the Euxine Sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinope, then governed by a despot named Timesileus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent.

Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile with his friends: the properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinopians. We may presume that on this occasion Sinope became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Cotyora and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinope further eastward, which the ten thousand Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Pericles or not. Moreover, the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet, under the command of Pericles, produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast, contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city — some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion — others poor, and hiring themselves out as labourers. The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, as well as the territory of Histiaea, on the north of Euboea, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that, shortly before the Peloponnesian War, she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Piræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War. Nor were these relations confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settle-

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ments founded by Athens during this period were, Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy. Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Truce with Sparta, 443 B.C.

The fourteen years between the Thirty Years' Truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian War, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Phidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture. Since the death of Cimon, Pericles had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told for more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty Years' Truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmides into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Pericles had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger than before; and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Cimon—Thucydides, son of Melesias.

The new chief was a relative of Cimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to those of Pericles: a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydides, the political and parliamentary opposition against Pericles assumed a constant character and organisation such as Cimon, with his exclusively military aptitudes, had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the “honourable and respectable” citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section, so as to be conspicuously parted from the demos. In this manner, their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens. Thucydides himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Pericles—perhaps hardly inferior even to him.

Such an opposition made to Pericles, in all the full license which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydides, son of Melesias, introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Pericles, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict. As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Pericles towards the Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydides contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own Acropolis, under pretence of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians, but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues.

To this Pericles replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute-money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy,—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future,—that under such circumstances she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical, and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Pericles in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydides. And considering the ground of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look at the very large sum which Pericles continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defence. What Thucydides and his partisans appear to have urged, was that this common fund should still continue to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Cimon during his life. But Pericles was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt.

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucydides and his party to this projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydides, in order to procure the banishment of Pericles, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Pericles and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydides to ostracism. And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydides was completely broken by it: and we hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Pericles.

The ostracism of Thucydides apparently took place about two years after the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Truce (443-442 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Periclean works belong. The southern wall of the Acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Cimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the Long Walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Pericles, at what precise time we do not know. The Long Walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Piræus, another from Athens to Phalerum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Piræus would be interrupted. Accordingly, Pericles now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Piræus, and within a short distance (seemingly near one furlong) from it:

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so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phaleric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Piræus, alleged by Isocrates to have cost one thousand talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000] were constructed; while the town itself of Piræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets: and Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Piræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora. At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularised also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.

The new scheme upon which the Piræus was laid out, was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the Acropolis formed the real glory of the Periclean age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity; next, the splendid temple of Athene, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs; lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the Acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian War began. Progress was also made in restoring or reconstructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athene Polias, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian War seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Demeter, at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athene, at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture; three statues of Athene, all by the hand of Phidias, decorated the Acropolis, one colossal, forty-seven feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon, a second of bronze, called the Lemnian Athene, a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athene Promachos, placed between the Propylæa, and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Piræus by sea.

It is not, of course, to Pericles that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs; but the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenian and Grecian history, they are phenomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens was ruined by the occupation

of Xerxes: since that period, the Greeks had seen, first, the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale; next, the addition of Piræus with its docks and magazines; thirdly, the junction of the two by the Long Walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, etc., in Greece; lastly, the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Phidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnotus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœcile.^b

Plutarch says: “That which was the chief delight of the Athenians and the wonder of strangers, and which alone serves for a proof that the boasted power and opulence of ancient Greece is not an idle tale, was the magnificence of the temples and public edifices. Works were raised of an astonishing magnitude, and inimitable beauty and perfection, every architect striving to surpass the magnificence of the design with the elegance of the execution; yet still the most wonderful circumstance was the expedition with which they were completed. Phidias was appointed by Pericles superintendent of all the public edifices.”^f

It thus appears that the gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta. The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the Acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in: if we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than three thousand talents in the aggregate [£600,000 or \$3,000,000].

The expenditure of so large a sum was, of course, a source of revenue and of great private gain to all manner of contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artisans of various descriptions, etc., concerned in it: in one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods: marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athene, and ivory employed in its place; while the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents [£8000 or \$40,000]. A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Pericles knew well that the visible splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

JUDICIAL REFORMS OF PERICLES

Before Ephialtes advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations

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brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers, Ephialtes and Pericles were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

It was now that Pericles and Ephialtes carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine), which were transferred to the newly created panels of salaried dicasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate Heliæa. Ephialtes first brought down the laws of Solon from the Acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market-place, where the dicasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularised.

In the representation of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is, that Pericles was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dicasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Cimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse; as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Pericles did was, to make himself popular by paying the dicasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dicasts, distributed into ten regiments and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organised: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Pericles really did was, to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority: while on the other hand a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprung up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dicastery by whom the cause was to be tried.

While the magistrates individually were thus restricted to simple administration, they experienced still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognisance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them—for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended all the prerogatives of the senate of Areopagus—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtes as impious and guilty innovations. How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried,—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment,—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtes caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra named Aristodiceus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known

instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C. —marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Cimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtes produced an effect unfavourable in every way to the party who procured it. The popular party in their resentment must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Pericles, the superior leader left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes — already mentioned — the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Piræus, the same oligarchical party, which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtes, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable correspondence with Sparta — invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Cimon and his immediate friends. Cimon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Pericles henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise, whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy as well as to the administration of Pericles — and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, in the interval between the defeat of Coronea and the Thirty Years' Truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Pericles, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called *nomophylaces*, or law-guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These *nomophylaces* sat alongside of the *Proedri* or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws: they were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law.

Another important change, which we may with probability refer to Pericles, is the institution of the *nomothetæ*. These men were in point of fact dicasts, members of the six thousand citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dicasts for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and acting together throughout the entire year: they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose. According to the reform now introduced, the ecclesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred,

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became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a psephism—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The *thesmothetæ* were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an ecclesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary.

The effect of this institution was to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Pericles at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated nomothetæ. This was the *Graphè Paranomon*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dicastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphè Paranomon*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dicastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the thesmothetæ.

That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. Aristophon, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphè Paranomon* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger, the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree.

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Pericles and Ephialtes, — changes full of practical results, — the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Clisthenes had begun and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dicasteries and the *nomothetæ* are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Pericles. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide — providing popular, numerous, and salaried dicasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws — this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (excepting the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Pericles made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenes — though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dicasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider : first, that personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta ; next, that in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them. We know also from the same unsuspected source, that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all.

To make rich criminals amenable to justice has been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanour of rich men like Critias, Alcibiades, and Midias, even under the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Clisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness, even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dicasteries established by Pericles were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation : their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect — it served further to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact that, in important causes the dicastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers to give dignity to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them — as Aristophanes and Xenophon give us plainly to understand. If we except

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the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dicasteries afforded the only organ which Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dicasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dicasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dicasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree.

RHETORS AND SOPHISTS

The first establishment of the dicasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophocles. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse, in which also some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated; not always happily, for several of the early rhetors adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Periclean age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar moral and intellectual endowments, or often indeed the same person, considered in different points of view; either as professing to improve the moral character, or as communicating power and facility of expression, or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the commonplaces of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, etc. Antiphon of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalcedon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Theodorus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antiphon was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dicastery and preserved down to the later critics. These men were mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended

in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens — while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term “sophist,” which Herodotus applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, etc., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly, and to answer any question proposed to them.

Though they passed from one town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain — they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public. For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dicastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists. Moreover Socrates — himself a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a sophist — but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers — Socrates or rather Plato, speaking through the person of Socrates — carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Socrates himself would have been if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, or from those unfavourable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the *Apologia* of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity, however, for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the ecclesia, but still more from the contentions before the dicastery — in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dicasteries constituted by Pericles opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away. And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanes derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time, most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true — nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian War. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenes a material alteration had taken place.

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The establishment of these paid dicasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta and, as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that all the dicasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanes selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his ridicule. Pericles has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to insure pay to dicasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dicasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dicasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established — and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the six thousand heliasts who filled the dicasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.^b

PHIDIAS ACCUSED

The public works which were undertaken through the advice of Pericles were executed under his inspection; the choice of the artists employed and of the plans adopted, was probably entrusted in a great measure to his judgment; and the large sums expended on them passed through his hands. This was an office which it was scarcely possible to exercise at Athens without either exciting suspicion or giving a handle for calumny. We find that Cratinus in one of his comedies threw out some hints as to the tardiness with which Pericles carried on the third of the Long Walls which he had persuaded the people to begin. "He had been long professing to go on with it, but in fact did not stir a step." Whether the motives to which this delay was imputed were such as to call his integrity into question, does not appear; but in time his enemies ventured openly to attack him on this ground. Yet the first blow was not aimed directly at himself, but was intended to wound him through the side of a friend. Phidias, whose genius was the ruling principle which animated and controlled every design for the ornament of the city, had been brought, as well by conformity of taste as by the nature of his engagement, into an intimate relation with Pericles. To ruin Phidias was one of the readiest means both of hurting the feelings and of shaking the credit of Pericles. If Phidias could be convicted of a fraud on the public, it would seem an unavoidable inference that Pericles had shared the profit. The ivory statue of the goddess in the Parthenon, which was enriched with massy ornaments of pure gold, appeared to offer a groundwork for a charge which could not easily be refuted. To give it the greater weight, a man named Menon, who had been employed by Phidias in some of the details of the work, was induced to seat himself in the agora with the ensigns of

a suppliant, and to implore pardon of the people as the condition of revealing an offence in which he had been an accomplice with Phidias. He accused Phidias of having embezzled a part of the gold which he had received from the treasury. But this charge immediately fell to the ground through a contrivance which Pericles had adopted for a different end. The golden ornaments had been fixed on the statue in such a manner, that they could be taken off without doing it any injury, and thus afforded the means of ascertaining their exact weight. Pericles challenged the accusers of Phidias to use this opportunity of verifying their charge; but they shrank from the application of this decisive test.

Though however they were thus baffled in this part of their attempt, they were not abashed or deterred; for they had discovered another ground, which gave them a surer hold on the public mind. Some keen eye had observed two figures among those with which Phidias had represented the battle between Theseus and the Amazons on the shield of the goddess, in which it detected the portraits of the artist himself, as a bald old man, and that of Pericles in all the comeliness of his graceful person. To the religious feelings of the Athenians this mode of perpetuating the memory of individuals, by connecting their portraits with an object of public worship, appeared to violate the sanctity of the place; and it was probably also viewed as an arrogant intrusion, no less offensive to the majesty of the commonwealth. It seems as if Menon's evidence was required even to support this charge. Phidias was committed to prison, and died there. The informer, who was a foreigner, was rewarded with certain immunities; and, as one who in the service of the state had provoked a powerful enemy, was placed by a formal decree under the protection of the Ten Generals.

ASPASIA AT THE BAR

This success emboldened the enemies of Pericles to proceed. They had not indeed established any of their accusations; but they had sounded the disposition of the people, and found that it might be inspired with distrust and jealousy of its powerful minister, or that it was not unwilling to see him humbled. They seem now to have concerted a plan for attacking him, both directly and indirectly, in several quarters at once; and they began with a person in whose safety he felt as much concern as in his own, and who could not be ruined without involving him in the like calamity.

This was the celebrated Aspasia, who had long attracted almost as much of the public attention at Athens as Pericles himself. She was a native of Miletus, which was early and long renowned as a school for the cultivation of female graces. She had come, it would seem, as an adventurer to Athens, and by the combined charms of her person, manners, and conversation, won the affections and the esteem of Pericles. Her station had freed her from the restraints which custom laid on the education of the Athenian matron: and she had enriched her mind with accomplishments which were rare even among the men. Her acquaintance with Pericles seems to have begun while he was still united to a lady of high birth, before the wife of the wealthy Hipponicus. We can hardly doubt that it was Aspasia who first disturbed this union, though it is said to have been dissolved by mutual consent. But after parting from his wife, who had borne him two sons, Pericles attached himself to Aspasia by the most intimate relation which the laws permitted him to contract with a foreign woman; and she acquired an ascendancy over him, which

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soon became notorious, and furnished the comic poets with an inexhaustible fund of ridicule, and his enemies with a ground for serious charges. On the stage she was the Hera of the Athenian Zeus, the Omphale, or the Dejanira of an enslaved or a faithless Hercules. The Samian War was ascribed to her interposition on behalf of her birthplace; and rumours were set afloat which represented her as ministering to the vices of Pericles by the most odious and degrading of offices. There was perhaps as little foundation for this report, as for a similar one in which Phidias was implicated; though among all the imputations brought against Pericles this is that which it is the most difficult clearly to refute.

But we are inclined to believe that it may have arisen from the peculiar nature of Aspasia's private circles, which, with a bold neglect of established usage, were composed not only of the most intelligent and accomplished men to be found at Athens, but also of matrons, who it is said were brought by their husbands, to listen to her conversation; which must have been highly instructive as well as brilliant, since Plato did not hesitate to describe her as the preceptress of Socrates, and to assert that she both formed the rhetoric of Pericles, and composed one of his most admired harangues. The innovation which drew women of free birth, and good condition, into her company for such a purpose, must, even where the truth was understood, have surprised and offended many; and it was liable to the grossest misconstruction. And if her female friends were sometimes seen watching the progress of the works of Phidias, it was easy, through his intimacy with Pericles, to connect this fact with a calumny of the same kind.

There was another rumour still more dangerous, which grew out of the character of the persons who were admitted to the society of Pericles and Aspasia. Athens had become a place of resort for learned and ingenious men of all pursuits. None were more welcome at the house of Pericles than such as were distinguished by philosophical studies, and especially by the profession of new speculative tenets. He himself was never weary of discussing such subjects; and Aspasia was undoubtedly able to bear her part in this, as well as in any other kind of conversation. The mere presence of Anaxagoras, Zeno, Protagoras, and other celebrated men, who were known to hold doctrines very remote from the religious conceptions of the vulgar, was sufficient to make a circle in which they were familiar pass for a school of impiety. Such were the materials out of which the comic poet Hermippus, laying aside the mask, framed a criminal prosecution against Aspasia. His indictment included two heads: an offence against religion, and that of corrupting Athenian women to gratify the passions of Pericles.

ANAXAGORAS ALSO ASSAILED

This cause seems to have been still pending, when one Diopithes procured a decree, by which persons who denied the being of the gods, or taught doctrines concerning the celestial bodies which were inconsistent with religion, were made liable to a certain criminal process. This stroke was aimed immediately at Anaxagoras—whose physical speculations had become famous, and were thought to rob the greatest of the heavenly beings of their inherent deity—but indirectly at his disciple and patron Pericles. When the discussion of this decree, and the prosecution commenced against Aspasia, had disposed the people to listen to other less probable charges, the main attack was opened, and the accusation which in the affair of Phidias had been silenced

by the force of truth, was revived in another form. A decree was passed on the motion of one Dracontides, directing Pericles to give in his accounts to the Prytanis, to be submitted to a trial, which was to be conducted with extraordinary solemnity ; for it was to be held in the citadel, and the jurors were to take the balls with which each signified his verdict, from the top of an altar. But this part of the decree was afterwards modified by an amendment moved by Agnon, which ordered the cause to be tried in the ordinary way, but by a body of fifteen hundred jurors. The uncertainty of the party which managed these proceedings, and their distrust as to the evidence which they should be able to procure, seem to be strongly marked by a clause in this decree, which provided that the offence imputed to Pericles might be described either as embezzlement, or by a more general name, as coming under the head of public wrong.

Yet all these machinations failed at least of reaching their main object. The issue of those which were directed against Anaxagoras cannot be exactly ascertained through the discrepancy of the accounts given of it. According to some authors he was tried, and condemned either to a fine and banishment or to death ; but in the latter case made his escape from prison. According to others he was defended by Pericles, and acquitted. Plutarch says that Pericles, fearing the event of a trial, induced him to withdraw from Athens ; and it seems to have been admitted on all hands, that he ended his long life in quiet and honour at Lampsacus. The danger which threatened Aspasia was also averted ; but it seems that Pericles, who pleaded her cause, found need for his most strenuous exertions, and that in her behalf he descended to tears and entreaties, which no similar emergency of his own could ever draw from him. It was indeed probably a trial more of his personal influence than of his eloquence ; and his success, hardly as it was won, may have induced his adversaries to drop the proceedings instituted against himself, or at least to postpone them to a fitter season. After weathering this storm he seems to have recovered his former high and firm position, which to the end of his life was never again endangered, except by one very transient gust of popular displeasure. He felt strong enough to resist the wishes, and to rebuke the impatience of the people. Yet it was a persuasion so widely spread among the ancients as to have lasted even to modern times, that his dread of the persecution which hung over him, and his consciousness that his expenditure of the public money would not bear a scrutiny, were at least among the motives which induced him to kindle the war which put an end to the Thirty Years' Truce.^c



GREEK TERRA-COTTA HEADS

(In the British Museum)



GREEK COINS

CHAPTER XXVII. MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE AGE OF PERICLES

Hail, Nature's utmost boast ! unrivalled Greece !
My fairest reign ! where every power benign
Conspired to blow the flower of human kind,
And lavished all that genius can inspire.

— JAMES THOMSON.

COST OF LIVING AND WAGES



PERICLES

EVERYWHERE in the ancient world, but in a higher or less degree in different countries, the necessities of life upon the whole were cheaper than they are at the present day. But with regard to particular articles, examples enough of the contrary are found. The main causes of this comparative cheapness were the less amount of money in circulation, the uncommon fruitfulness of the southern countries which the Greeks inhabited, or with which they traded ; countries which at that time were cultivated with an extraordinary degree of care, but are at present neglected ; and the impossibility of exportation to the distant regions which had no intercourse, or but little, with the countries lying on the Mediterranean Sea. The last is especially the reason of the great cheapness of wine. The large quantities of the same which were produced in all southern regions, were not distributed over so considerable an extent of the earth as at present. Nevertheless in considering the prices of commodities in ancient times the difference of times and places must be well weighed.

In Rome and Athens wine was not, in the most flourishing condition of the state, as cheap as it was in Upper Italy and in Lusitania. In Upper Italy, the Sicilian medimnus of wheat, which was equal to the Attic medimnus, and considerably less than the Prussian bushel (or than $1\frac{1}{2}$ English bushels), was worth, even in the times of Polybius, according to the account of that historian, only four oboli. This price seems to rest upon an inaccurate comparison of the Roman with the Greek coin, and particularly upon the supposition that the modius, one-sixth of the medimnus, was worth two asses, the medimnus, therefore, worth twelve asses ; which,

estimating the denarius to be equivalent to the drachma, would be equal to $4\frac{1}{2}$ oboli. To this last amount four ancient oboli of the standard of Solon (11.4 cents) may certainly be estimated as equivalent. The medimnus of barley was worth the half of this price, the metretes of wine (about ten English gallons), was worth as much as the medimnus of barley.

In the time of Solon, indeed, an ox was worth only five drachmæ, a sheep one drachma, and the medimnus of grain the same. But gradually the prices increased five fold; of several articles seven, ten and twenty fold. After the examples of modern times this will not appear strange. The amount of ready money was not only increased, but by the increase of population, and of intercourse, its circulation was accelerated: so that already in the age of Socrates, Athens was considered an expensive place of residence.

The cheapness of commodities, in ancient times, has generally been exaggerated by some, who supposed the assumption, that prices were on an average ten times lower than in the eighteenth century, to come the nearest to the truth. The prices of grain, according to which the prices of many other articles must be regulated, show the contrary. It is difficult to designate average prices, however; since so few, and those only very casual accounts, are extant. Letronne designates the value of the medimnus of grain at two and a half drachmæ as the average price in Greece, in particular at the city of Athens, about the year 400 B.C.; and in accordance with this, he assumes the value of grain, compared with that of silver, to have been in the relation of 1 to 3146; the same at Rome, fifty years before the Christian era, to have been in the relation of 1 to 2681, in France, before the year 1520 in the relation of 1 to 4320, and in the nineteenth century in the relation of 1 to 1050. This estimation, according to which the present prices of grain are three times as high as they were during the period of the most flourishing condition of Greece, appears the most probable.

The most temperate man needed daily, at least, an obolus for his food, one-fourth of an obolus for a chœnix of grain, according to the price of barley in the time of Socrates; together, annually, reckoning the year at 360 days, 75 drachmæ; for clothes and shoes at least 15 drachmæ. A family, therefore, of four adult persons must have needed at least 360 drachmæ (£12 or \$60) for these necessaries of life. The sum requisite, however, in the time of Demosthenes, must have been $22\frac{1}{2}$ drachmæ higher for each person; for 4 persons, therefore, 90 drachmæ (£3 or \$15) higher. To this must be added the cost of a habitation, the value of which, estimated at least at 3 minæ, would involve, according to the common rate of interest (12 per cent.), an annual expense of 36 drachmæ (£1 or \$5). So that the poorest family of 4 adult free persons, if they did not wish to live upon bread and water, needed upon an average about £17 or \$85 annually.

Socrates did not have, as was falsely reported, two wives at the same time, but one after the other; Myrto, who was poor when he married her, and who probably had no dowry, and Xanthippe. He also had three children. Of these, Lamprocles was already adult at the death of his father, but Sophroniscus and Menexenus were minors. He prosecuted no manual art after he had sacrificed the employment of his youth to the never-resting effort to acquire wisdom. His teaching procured him no income. According to Xenophon he lived upon his property, which, if it should have found a good purchaser (*ὠνητὴς*), the house included, might easily have brought, altogether, five minæ; and he needed only a small addition from his friends. From this it has been inferred, that living was extraordinarily cheap at Athens. It is evident, however, that Socrates with his family could

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not live upon the interest of so small an amount of property. For, however poor the house may have been, its value can scarcely be estimated at less than three minæ. So that, without taking the furniture into consideration, the remainder of his property from which interest could be derived, could have amounted to but two minæ, and the income from it, according to the common rate of interest, to only twenty-four drachmæ. With this sum he could not have procured even the amount of barley which was requisite for himself and his wife, to say nothing of the other necessities of life, and of the support of his children.

The history of the ancient sages is so entangled and garnished with traditions, and the circumstances of their lives are so differently represented even by contemporary writers, that we can seldom find firm ground on which to stand. Thus, according to the defence of Socrates composed by Plato, the former is represented to have affirmed that he could pay for his liberation only about a mina of silver; and Eubulides says the same. According to others, he estimated the amount which he should pay at twenty-five drachmæ, and in the defence ascribed to Xenophon he is represented as neither having himself estimated any amount, nor having allowed his friends to do so. Thus the well-informed Demetrius of Phalerum affirmed, in opposition to Xenophon, that Socrates had, beside his house, seventy minæ at interest in the possession of Crito. And Libanius informs us that he had lost eighty minæ, which he had inherited from his father, by the insolvency of a friend, in whose hands he had placed it, and who certainly cannot have been, as Schneider supposed, the wealthy Crito.

But assuming that Xenophon's account is perfectly correct, we must suppose that the mother of the young boys supported herself and both the children, either by labour or from her dowry, and that Lamprocles supported himself, and that the famed economy of Socrates probably consisted, among other things, in this also, that he kept them at work. And then, again, suppose that he always lived upon his twenty-four drachmæ, with a small additional sum from his friends, yet no one could live as he did. It is true, that he is said to have frequently offered sacrifices at home, and upon the public altars. But they were doubtless only baked dough, shaped into the forms of animals, after the manner of the poor; properly bread, therefore, a great part of which was at the same time eaten, and to which his family also contributed. He lived in the strictest sense upon bread and water, except when invited to entertainments at the tables of others, and could therefore be particularly glad, as he is said to have been, on account of the cheapness of barley, when four chœnices sold for an obolus. He wore no undergarment; even his outside garment was poor, and the same one was worn both summer and winter. He generally went barefooted, and his dress-sandals, which he occasionally wore, may have lasted him his life-time. His walk for pleasure and exercise before his house served him instead of a relish for his meal. In short, no slave was so poorly maintained as was Socrates. The drachma [about 8½d. or 17 cents] which he gave Prodicus was certainly the largest sum ever spent by him at one time. And it may boldly be affirmed, without wishing to disparage his exalted genius, that, in respect to his indigence, and a certain cynicism in his character, the representation of Aristophanes was not much exaggerated, but in the essential particulars was delineated from the life.

If in the time of Socrates four persons lived upon £17 or \$85 a year, they must have been satisfied with but a scanty allowance. He who wished to live respectably, needed even then, and still more in the time of Demos-

thenes, a sum considerably larger. According to the speech against Phænipus, there were left to the complainant and his brother by their father, forty-five minæ to each, on which, it is said, one could not easily live, namely, upon the interest of it, which amounted, according to the common rate of interest, to 540 drachmæ (£19 or \$95).

Mantitheus in Demosthenes asserts that he could have been maintained and educated upon the interest of his mother's dowry, which amounted to a talent; consequently, according to the usual rate of interest, upon 720 drachmæ (£25 or \$125), annually. For the maintenance of the young Demosthenes himself, his sister still younger, and his mother, seven minæ (£24 or \$120) were annually paid, without reckoning anything for their habitation, since they dwelt in their own house. The cost of the education of Demosthenes was not included in this sum. For that the guardians remained in debt. Lysias refers, in one of his speeches, to the knavish account of the guardian of the children of Diodotus. He had, for example, charged for clothing, shoes, and hair-cutting over a talent for a period of less than eight years, and for sacrifices and festivals more than four thousand drachmæ, and he ultimately would pay a balance of only two minæ of silver, and thirty Cyzicene staters, whereby his wards had become impoverished. Lysias remarks, that if he had charged more than any one in the city had ever done before for two boys, and their sister, a pedagogue, and a female servant, his account could not have amounted to more than a thousand drachmæ (£35 or \$175) annually. This would be not much less than three drachmæ daily, and must certainly appear to have been too much in the time of that orator for three children and two attendants.

In the time of Solon one must certainly have been able to travel quite a distance with an obolus, since that lawgiver forbid that a woman should take with her upon a march, or a journey, a larger quantity of meat and drink than could be purchased for that sum, and a basket of larger dimensions than an ell in length. On the contrary, when the citizens of Træzen, according to Plutarch, resolved to give to each of the old men, women, and children who fled from Athens upon the approach of Xerxes, two oboli daily, it appears to be a large sum for the purpose. In the most flourishing period of the state, however, even a single person could maintain himself but indifferently on two or three oboli a day. Notwithstanding all this, the cheapness and facility of living still remained very great. In accordance with the noble reverence of the Greeks for the dead, the death of a man, his interment, and monument, often occasioned more expense than many years of his life, since private persons appropriated three, ten, fifty, and even 120 minæ, to that purpose.

The value of the property of the Athenian people, excluding the property of the state, and the mines, was according to a probable computation, at thirty thousand to forty thousand talents. Of these if only twenty thousand talents be considered productive property, every one of the twenty thousand citizens would have had, if the property had been equally divided, the interest of a talent, or, according to the common rate of interest, 720 drachmæ as an annual income. On this, with the addition of the profit from their labour, they might all have lived in a respectable manner. They would in that case have realised what the ancient sages and statesmen considered the highest prosperity of a state. But a considerable number of the citizens were poor. Others possessed a large amount of property, on which they could fare luxuriously on account of the cheapness of living, and the high rate of interest, and yet at the same time could increase their means, because property augmented exceedingly fast.

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This inequality corrupted the state, and the manners of the people. Its most natural consequence was the submissiveness of the poor towards the rich, although they believed that their rights were equal. The rich followed the practice, afterwards so notorious and decried at Rome, of suing for the favour of the people, sometimes in a nobler, sometimes in a baser manner.

In proportion to the cheapness of the necessities of life, the wages of labour must have been less in ancient times than at present. And all the multitude of those who sought labour as the means of subsistence must have diminished its price, since competition everywhere produces this result. In this number, beside the *thetes* and aliens under the protection of the state; a great part of the slaves are to be included; so that the families of slaves belonging to the rich, lessened the profit of the poorer class of citizens. The Phocians, by whom the keeping of slaves is said to have been in the earlier periods of their state prohibited, not unjustly reproached Mnason, who possessed a thousand slaves and more, for depriving an equal number of poor citizens of the means of subsistence. After the Peloponnesian War even citizens who had been accustomed to a higher standing were compelled to support themselves, whatever it might have cost them to submit to it, as day labourers, or in some other way, by the labour of their hands. For they had lost their landed property in foreign states, and on account of the want of money, and the decrease of the population, rents had depreciated, and loans were not to be had.

Nevertheless, we do not find that daily wages were excessively low. Lucian represents the daily wages of an agricultural labourer or gardener, on a remote estate lying near the frontiers of Attica, to have been, in the time of Timon, four oboli (5½d. or 11.4 cents). The wages of a porter are the same in Aristophanes, and of a common labourer, who carried dirt, they were three oboli. When Ptolemy sent to the Rhodians one hundred house builders, together with 350 labourers, in order to restore the buildings destroyed by an earthquake, he gave them fourteen talents annually for their food, three oboli a day for each man. We know not, however, by what standard the money was estimated. This was, if they were slaves, for other aliment beside grain; if they were free men, it was only a part of their wages, since a man needs something else besides his food. In 408 B.C., a sawyer (*πρίστυς*) who sawed for a public building, received a drachma a day. A carpenter, who worked on the same building, received five oboli a day. We find that in the time of Pericles, as it seems, a drachma, as daily wages, was given to each of a number of persons working by the day. It is not at all probable that they were artisans, but only common labourers.

Persons in higher stations, or those who laboured with the pen, were, according to genuine democratic principles, not better paid. The architect of the temple of Minerva Polias received no more than a stone sawyer,



DRESS OF A GREEK LABOURER
(After Hope)

or common labourer engaged upon the building, namely, a drachma ($8\frac{1}{2}$ d. or 17 cents) daily. The undersecretary (*ὑπογραμματεὺς*) of the superintendents of the public buildings received daily five oboli ($7\frac{1}{4}$ d. or 14.25 cents). For particular services, in which a certain deference is manifested by the labourer to the person served, a high price was paid in Athens, as is the case in all large cities. When Bacchus in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes wishes to have his bundle carried by a porter, the latter demands two drachmæ. When the god offers the ghost nine oboli, he replies that before he will do so, he must become alive again. If this conversation in the realm of departed spirits is not a scene from real life, it has no point. A living porter at Athens was probably just as shameless in his demands, and if less were offered, he might have said: "I must die before I do it."

The fare for a voyage by sea, particularly for long voyages, was extraordinarily low. For sailing from Ægina to the Piræus, more than sixteen miles, two oboli (3d. or 6 cents) were paid in the time of Plato. For sailing from Egypt, or Pontus, to the Piræus, a man, with his family and baggage, paid in the same period at the most two drachmæ (1s. 5d. or 35 cents). This is a proof that commerce was very lucrative, so that it was not found necessary to take a high fare from passengers. In the time of Lucian four oboli were given for being conveyed from Athens to Ægina. The freight of timber seems to have been higher, according to Demosthenes, who mentions that for transporting a ship-load from Macedonia to Athens, 1,750 drachmæ were paid. The enormous vessel for conveying grain named *Isis*, which in the time of the emperors brought so much grain from Egypt to Italy, that, according to report, the cargo was sufficient to last the whole of Attica a year, earned in freight at least twelve talents annually. The freight of a talent in weight from Ceos, which lay directly opposite Sunium, to Athens, was an obolus.

The price of a bath, although it is not barely a compensation for labour was two oboli. A delicate little gentleman is represented by Philemon to have paid four persons each six chalcæ, as appears from a passage of Pollux, for plucking out the hair of his body with pitch, that he might have a feminine skin. Moreover, the rich had their own, and the Athenian people public baths.

The pay of the soldiers was different in different periods, and according to circumstances. It fluctuated between two oboli, and, including the money given for subsistence, two drachmæ for a hoplite and his servant. The cavalry received from twice to fourfold the pay of the infantry; officers, commonly twice, generals four fold the same. For, as in respect to labour performed for daily wages, the higher station had not a relatively higher estimation in the same degree, as at the present day. The money given for subsistence was commonly equal in amount to the pay. For from two to three oboli a day the soldier could maintain himself quite well, especially since in many places living was much cheaper than in Athens. His pay was partly as surplus, partly for clothes and weapons, and if booty were added, he might become rich. This explains the saying of the comedian Theopompus, that a man could support a wife on two oboli of pay daily; with four oboli a day his fortune was made. The pay alone of the soldier is here meant, without the money given him for subsistence.

The pay of the judges, and of those who attended the assemblies of the people (*ἐκκλησιασταί*) amounted at least to three oboli a day, and like the theoricon served only as an additional supply for the subsistence of the citizens. The heliast in Aristophanes shows clearly how difficult it was,

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with that sum, to procure bread, food, and wood for three persons. He does not include clothing and habitation, because he sustained the expenses for them out of his own property. The pay of senators and of ambassadors was higher. Persons engaged in the liberal arts and sciences, and prostitutes, were paid the highest prices.

The ancient states maintained public, salaried physicians; for example, Hippocrates is said to have been public physician at Athens. These, again, had servants, particularly slaves, who attended to their masters' business among the poorer class, and among the slaves. The celebrated physician Democedes, of Croton, received, about 540 B.C. notwithstanding there was little money in circulation at that time, the high salary of a talent of silver (£211:10 or \$1026, since Attic money seems to be meant). When called to Athens he received one hundred minæ (£350 or \$1750), until Polyerates of Samos gave him two talents. In like manner, no doubt, practitioners in many other arts were paid by the state; as, for example, architects at Rhodes and Cyzicus, and certainly in every place of importance. For it cannot be supposed that all architects, particularly those invited from foreign countries, would have exercised their art, as several did at Athens, for daily wages.

The compensation of musicians, and of theatrical performers, was very high. Amœbeus, a singer of ancient Athens, received every time he sang in public, an Attic talent. That the players on the flute demanded a high price for their services, is well known. In a Coreyrean inscription, a late one indeed, but executed before the dominion of the Romans was established in that island, fifty Corinthian minæ were designated as the compensation, beside their expensive maintenance, for the services of three players on the flute, three tragedians, and three comedians at the celebration of a festival. The compensation of distinguished theatrical performers was not less, although, beside the period of their engagement at Athens, they earned large sums in travelling, and performing at the various cities and places on their route. For example, Polus or Aristodemus is said to have earned a talent in two days, or even in one day, or for performing in a single drama. All these artists received, in addition, prizes of victory. Also common itinerant theatrical performers, jugglers, conjurers, fortune-tellers, enjoyed a competency; although the sum paid by the individual spectator was small, a few chalci, or oboli, but sometimes even a drachma. The custom of paying fees for apprenticeship to the trades and arts, and also to the medical profession, was established even in the time of Socrates. For a part of the instruction in music, and for athletic exercises, it was the duty of the tribes in Athens to provide. Each tribe had its own teachers, whose lessons the youth of the whole tribe attended. In the other schools each individual paid for his instruction; we know not how much. The legislation of Charondas, in which the salaries of the teachers are said to have been permanently established, would have made an exception, if the laws from which Diodorus derived his information, had not been fictitious.

The teachers of wisdom and eloquence, or sophists, were not paid by the state until later times. But in earlier periods, they required large sums from their scholars. In this they imitated the mercenary lyric poets, whose inspiration frequently slumbered until incited by gold. Protagoras of Abdera is said to have been the first who taught for money. He required from each scholar, for a complete course of instruction, an hundred minæ (£350 or \$1750). Gorgias asked the same price, and yet his property at his death amounted to only one thousand staters. Zeno of Elea, in other respects

unlike the sophists, required the same amount. Since the price for teaching wisdom was so high, it was natural that there should be chaffering about it, and that an agreement upon reasonable terms should be sought. Hippias earned, while yet a young man, in connection with Protagoras, in a short time, 150 minæ. Even from a small city he earned more than twenty minæ, not by long courses of lessons, as it seems, but by a shorter method of proceeding. But gradually the increased number of teachers reduced the price. Evenus of Paros, as early as the time of Socrates, required, to the general derision, only ten minæ (£35 or \$175); while for the same sum Isocrates taught the whole art of oratory. And this appears to have been in the age of Lycurgus, the usual honorary of a teacher of eloquence. At length the Socratic philosophers found it convenient to teach for a compensation. Aristippus was the first who did so. Moreover, payment was also sometimes required from each auditor for single discourses, as, for example, by Prodicus, one, two, four, to fifty drachmæ. Antiphon was the first who wrote speeches and orations for money. He required high prices for them.^b

SCHOOLS, TEACHERS, AND BOOKS

It is remarkable that the frequent notices which occur of schoolmasters and their schools, supply so little clear information as to the habits or social position of this important part of the community; nor does it appear whether they were a distinct class, or merely a lower grade of sophists or rhetors. They seem, however, to have belonged to the upper rank of citizens in some states, and to have been received in the best circles. Such as they were, the lessons they taught were limited to the Greek tongue. Instruction in foreign languages was never esteemed in Greece either a necessary or an important branch of general education. This is a peculiarity which forms also a signal defect of Greek culture as compared with that of modern times.

In Athens, and probably in other Greek republics, every citizen was under at least a moral obligation to provide his sons with a competent knowledge of letters. The discipline of the schools was also under state control. Yet the government nowhere seems to have provided or maintained them, or to have appointed or paid the schoolmasters, whose livelihood depended on the fees of their pupils. The amount of those fees has not been recorded. But more distinct notices have been transmitted of the charges made by literary professors of the higher class. The fees said to have been paid for a course of instruction to some of the earlier and more distinguished sophists and philosophers are so extravagant as to be scarcely credible, even when attested, as they are in some instances, by the best contemporaneous authority. Protagoras is taunted by Plato as the first professor of the higher branches of learning who taught for hire. If this imputation be well founded, his older contemporaries, Zeno and Gorgias, must have been speedily led to follow his example: for Zeno is said by Plato himself to have been paid 100 minæ, or upwards of £400 [\$2000], by each disciple, for a course of lectures; and Gorgias also to have been richly remunerated by his pupils. The fees of both Protagoras and Gorgias are rated by other authorities at the same amount as those of Zeno. This sum, taking into account the high value of the precious metals in ancient times, would be equal to about £2000, or \$10,000. But prices were afterwards greatly reduced, as the number of professors increased, and the former blind veneration for their magic powers of communicating knowledge, or for the value of the knowledge communicated, declined.

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Isocrates, the younger contemporary of Protagoras, and probably the better master of the two, was satisfied with ten minæ [£40 or \$200] for the course; which sum seems afterwards to have remained the ordinary rate of payment.

No distinct notice occurs of the existence, during the Attic period, either at Athens or elsewhere, of a public library, in the familiar sense of a miscellaneous collection of books for the use of the citizens; although, as in the time of Pisistratus, standard editions of the popular works recited at public solemnities, and more especially of the dramas of Æschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, were preserved at Athens under the charge of the city clerk. Private libraries had, however, already become sufficiently voluminous or curious to merit being specially recorded. Such were those of Euripides, the poet, and of Plato, part of whose collection was purchased at Tarentum, in Italy, from the heirs of its former proprietor, Philolaus, and another part at Syracuse; those of Euthydemus mentioned by Xenophon, of Aristotle, of Nicoerates of Cyprus, and of the Athenian archon, Euclides. The varied character of the works stored in the library of a literary professor, towards the close of this period, is illustrated by a scene in a comedy of Alexis, the humour of which turns on the gluttony of Hercules, a hero habitually burlesqued for that failing in Greek satirical literature. The youthful demigod, when directed by his master, the poet Linus, to select the book he preferred from his preceptor's collection,—described as containing the poems of Homer, Orpheus, Hesiod, Chærilus, Epicharmus, the tragedians, and the popular prose classics,—makes choice of a cookery book.

That books of all kinds, then commonly in use, abounded during the greater part of the Attic period appears, not only from the general familiarity which the educated ranks possessed with the text of the national classics, but still more from the absence of any allusion to a scarcity of copies as interposing a serious obstacle to the attainment of such knowledge. The book trade, as a distinct branch of commerce, seems indeed to have been still limited, as in truth it was, comparatively, in every age prior to the invention of printing; and remained, probably in a great measure, in the hands of professional copyists.

Booksellers, however, and a book mart at Athens, are mentioned by authors flourishing during the Peloponnesian War; and occasional notices occur of book scribes or copyists, and of bookbinding. A trade in books or paper is also mentioned by Xenophon as having been carried on about the same date, between Greece and the coasts of the Euxine Sea. A considerable time, however, seems to have been required to bring the works, even of the most popular authors, into general circulation; and the disciples of distinguished philosophers, Hermodorus for example, a scholar of Plato, appear to have made profit by being the first to transport copies of their masters' lectures into distant localities.^c

THE POSITION OF A WIFE IN ATHENS

It was generally the father who chose a wife for his son, looking less to her person than to her family and dowry. This is one of the respects in which the historic position of women differed from the heroic. No longer does the man with splendid gifts win a wife from many suitors; the father must dower his daughter appropriately in order to place her with a husband, and so the daughter often appeared as a burden to the family; so, also, the foundations of petticoat government in marriage were often laid, since the man

was only the usufructuary, not the owner of the dowry. How much equality of fortune was considered, and how much a poor family, unable to offer a dowry itself, shrank from the proposals of a rich man, one may gather from the *Trinummus* of Plautus, in which the whole action turns upon this point. Lesbonicus, who is unable to dower his sister, says to the suitor in the play: "I will not have you think how you can help my poverty; think, rather, that I, though poor, am not dishonourable, so people shall not say that I have let you have my own sister for a mistress, without any dowry like this, rather than for a wife."

Very often young men were obliged by their fathers to marry, that they might at last be reclaimed from a disorderly life, and thereby, also, discharging their duty to the state. This is what happens, for instance, to the libertine Lesbonicus in the same play by Plautus. Resignedly he receives the news that he is betrothed: "I will have her, this one or that one, any one you like"; whereon the father-in-law comments, "A hundred wives would not be punishment enough for his sins!" The ancients themselves felt the unkindness that lay in this treatment of girls. The feeling is most strongly expressed in a fragment of Sophocles, where young maidens complain:

"But when, light of heart, we reach the time of maidenhood, we are cast from the house and sold, far from the home-gods and mother and father; and yet, when the wedding is over, we must sing praises and believe that it is right as it is."

We cannot wonder if in the early days of marriage the atmosphere was often cold, the heavens clouded. For this reason Plato wished that before marriage there should be a nearer acquaintance between the interested persons, so that no one should be deceived; and he proposed the arranging of special games, in which young men and maidens should perform dances. The statement, however, that no free-born Athenian ever married from love and passionate inclination is a gross exaggeration, the outcome of a one-sided and prejudiced view. In many comedies the plot turns on a young man's passion for a maiden who in the end is discovered to be a citizen, and generally the lost daughter of a rich man. And every one must remember the glorified love of the prince's son Hæmon for the heroic Antigone. It is incredible that in these instances the



GREEK WOMAN
(From a vase)

author presented situations that never occurred in the actual world. But other indications are to be found. If we look up the life of Cimon, for instance, in Plutarch, we shall find the following passages:

"But when Callias came, a rich Athenian who had fallen in love with Elpinice, and begged that he might pay her father's fine for him, she consented, and her brother Cimon gave her to Callias for a wife. So much is certain that Cimon loved his wife Isodice too passionately and made himself too unhappy over her death, if one may judge by the elegies composed for his consolation."

Only we must not think that such a passion was "romantic" in the modern sense; its birth was more natural and sensual, and it did not rise to a transcendent deification of the beloved. Sometimes it may well have happened that love put in an appearance after marriage, as in *The Mother-in-law*

[460-410 B.C.]

of Terence, where Pamphilus, attracted by the noble qualities of the wife he once despised, gradually becomes untrue to his mistress. The peculiarly prosaic and cool relations that existed between man and wife, along with the leading motive for marriage, is most clearly expressed in a document of the highest interest to the historian of morals, the speech against the courtesan Neaira, which is attributed to Demosthenes. "Mistresses," he says, "are kept for pleasure, and housekeepers for daily attendance and personal service; but a man marries a woman that he may beget legitimate children, of the same station on both sides, and have a faithful guardian in the house."

Companionable intercourse between man and wife was necessarily hindered by the sharp division between their occupations, and reduced itself, no doubt, to very few hours in the day. "Because," Ischomachus says, "it is better for a woman to stay in than to be away from home, whereas it is ignominious for a man to stay at home and not concern himself with what is going on in the world." So, in the same piece of Xenophon, Socrates says to Aristobulus: "Is there any one to whom you talk less than to your wife?" And the disciple answers, "No one, or at least very few." We learn, however, from comedies and other sources, that in reality things did not wear so sorry an aspect, and that feminine curiosity and jealousy led to all sorts of questions and talks. On the other hand, there was no question of any intercourse with other men; in fact a wife withdrew if her husband, by chance, brought a guest home with him. If the husband were not at home it would have been reckoned a gross incivility for another man to enter the house. Indeed, Demosthenes mentions a case where a friend, who had been summoned by a servant for help, did not venture into the house because the master was away. So what Cornelius Nepos says about the Greek woman is true: "She does not appear at dinner except among relatives; she stays in the inner part of the house where no one is admitted but her nearest kinsmen."

Euripides, indeed, went so far as to forbid the visits of women among themselves, for he writes in the *Andromache*: "Never, never—for I do not say it only for this one occasion—ought intelligent men, who are married, to allow other women to visit their wives, for they are the teachers of wickedness. One corrupts the marriage because she gains something by it, another wants a companion in sinning." But things were not so bad on the whole in this respect either. In the *Regiment of Women*, by Aristophanes, a neighbour says to Blephyrus, who misses his wife when he gets up in the morning, "What can it be? Do you think one of her friends has asked her to breakfast, perhaps?" And the husband answers, "I think that must be it. After all, she is not so bad as that comes to, so far as I know."

Phidias symbolised the solitariness of the home-keeping wife by the tortoise, on whose back he set the statue of Aphrodite Urania in Elis. But the acutest note of women's relations to the outer world is in the *Thesmophoriazuse* of Aristophanes, where the women speak themselves: "If we are an evil, why do you marry us, and allow us neither to go out, nor to be caught looking from the windows, and insist on guarding the evil with so much care? And if a woman goes out and you find her before the door, you get into a rage, whereas you ought to be pleased and bring a thank offering, if you were really rid of the evil and did not find her sitting there any more when you came home. Then when we take a peep out of the window every man wants to look at the evil, and when one blushes and draws in one's head, they all want all the more to see the evil peep out." Even on occasions when fear and necessity would break through conventional restrictions, we find the women going no farther than the door of the house; and

the orator Lycurgus actually complains because after the battle of Chæro-neia, the women inquired after the fate of their own men-folk from their door-ways.

Walking in the street was made a very difficult matter even for married women. Even Solon left directions on this subject; and among other things he said that no woman, when she went out, must have more than three pieces of clothing, nor more than one obolus' worth of food and drink with her, nor must she carry any basket of more than two feet. Also she must not travel by night, except in a carriage, and then have a light carried before her. In the times of the Diadochi, indeed, special superintendents were appointed in Athens to check the immorality and extravagance of women, such as were already established in other cities, Syracuse, for example. Since the husband generally did the marketing himself, and walks had not yet, it would seem, become fashionable, although they were recommended by a woman disciple of Pythagoras, Phintys, there were hardly any other motives left for going out except the attendance at religious functions and the play.^d



PRIESTESS OF CERES



RUINS ON ACROPOLIS AT ATHENS

CHAPTER XXVIII. ART OF THE PERICLEAN AGE

ARCHITECTURE

POLICY united with natural inclination to induce Pericles to patronise the arts, and call forth their finest productions for the admiration and delight of the Athenian people. The Athenian people were the despotic sovereign; Pericles the favourite and minister, whose business it was to indulge the sovereign's caprices that he might direct their measures; and he had the skill often to direct even their caprices. That fine taste, which he possessed eminently, was in some degree general among the Athenians; and the gratification of that fine taste was one means by which he retained his influence. Works were undertaken, according to the expression of Plutarch, in whose time they remained still perfect, of stupendous magnitude, and in form and grace inimitable; all calculated for the accommodation or in some way for the gratification of the multitude. Phidias was superintendent of the works: under him many architects and artists were employed, whose merit entitled them to fame with posterity, and of whose labours (such is the hardness of the Attic marble, their principal material, and the mildness of the Attic atmosphere) relics, which have escaped the violence of men, still, after the lapse of more than two thousand years, exhibit all the perfection of design, and even of workmanship, which earned that fame.^c

But the Greeks had not attained all at once to the architectural perfection which we admire on the Acropolis. They had assigned their gods the crest of the mountains or the deep forests for their first abode; they desired to have them nearer to themselves and, from the earliest times, they built them dwellings, at first rustic and clumsy, but which were gradually embellished and attracted other arts with religious pomp; the poets celebrating the gods and their native country, the philosophers raising the great problems of nature and of the soul. The temple was the centre of Hellenic life.

But the gods, like men, have to reckon with time. Before sending out the radiations of their divine majesty from the midst of the wonders of art,

those destined to become the glorious dwellers on Olympus were at first obscure and indefinite personalities, inhabiting the trunk of an oak, then wretched wooden structures, and later on houses of stone and sometimes of brass, like the Athene Chalciæcus of Sparta. It was only with the progress of civilised life that their habitation grew in size and loftiness. The true temples, and the most ancient of them, those of Corinth, Samos, and Metapontum — date only from the seventh century.

The Greeks were acquainted neither with the pointed arch nor the dome. Some have thought to find that at Tiryns and Mycenæ, but if some of the bays and galleries end in a point, it is because the courses draw closer and closer together and end by meeting at the top. The method is therefore clumsy and barbarous; it was abandoned for the lintel and the pediment.

All the Greek temples resemble one another in their general plan of construction; and yet the architectural combinations might be very numerous, inasmuch as they all differ in the nature of the material employed and the



RUINS OF THE PARTHENON

ornamentation which decorates them, in the number of the columns and the size of the intercolumniations, which determine the proportions of the edifice, above all in the character peculiar to each of the three orders — the Doric, the Ionic, and the Corinthian. A single member of the structure, the column with the portion of the entablature which it supports, determines this character.

The first temples worthy of the name were in the Doric style. The walls were large and heavy, the columns short and stunted without any base, like the stake which had been the primitive support, but with flutings, a capital, and a double pediment stretching above a wide face, like an eagle with outstretched wings — the expression is Pindar's. The whole edifice, built of ordinary stone, was hidden, as in the case of many of the Egyptian temples, under a coat of stucco which displayed vivid colours. The remains of this are to be seen at Assus, on the coast of Asia; at Corinth, Delphi and Ægina in Greece; at Syracuse, Agrigentum and Selinus in Sicily; at Metapontum and especially at Paestum in Italy, where the grandest ruins in the ancient Doric order are to be found. The common characteristic of these buildings, which nearly all belong to the seventh or sixth century, was their sturdy but

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heavy and thick-set appearance. The columns have a height of only four diameters—four and two-thirds at most; and the stucco in coming off has displayed the poverty of the material employed. Even the temple of Olympia was built of a hard and porous tufa which the stucco had concealed under a brilliant covering. That of Ægina was also of stone, not marble; there remain of it at least some beautiful ruins.

We must go to Athens to find Doric architecture in its severe elegance. Even in the temple of Ægina the column is higher: five and a third diameters; at the Theseum it is five and a half; at the Parthenon, six, and this is the proportion which is most pleasing to the eye. Of these three temples the first, in which we can still find traces of an archaic character, belongs to the sixth century; the second, which has better proportions, to the first half of the fifth; the third is the architectural triumph of the age of Pericles.

The Parthenon, built entirely of Pentelic marble, is not the most vast of the Greek temples, but its execution is more perfect and it is this which made it the masterpiece of Hellenic art. A very small detail will show the finish of the work. It is with difficulty and by the assistance of eye and hand that one succeeds in discovering the joints of the tambours forming the colonnade which surrounds the building, so skilfully have these enormous masses been adjusted. Even in her masons Athens possessed artists.

The interior of the Parthenon contained two halls: the smaller at the back, the *opisthodomus*, enclosed the public treasure; the larger, or *cella*, contained the statue of the goddess born without mother from the thought of the master of the gods, and who was as the soul of which the Parthenon was the material casing. Figures in high relief, about twice life size, adorned the two pediments of the temple. The frieze, which ran round the *cella* and *opisthodomus* at a height of thirteen metres (42 ft., 8 ins.), and to a length of more than one hundred and sixty metres (525 ft.), represented the procession of the great Panathenæa.

The work was finished in 435 B.C. It is neither the centuries nor the barbarians that have mutilated it. The Parthenon was still almost intact in 1687, when on the 27th of September Morosini bombarded the citadel. One of the projectiles, setting fire to the barrels of powder stored in the temple, blew up a part of it; then the Venetian desired that the statues should be taken down from the pediment and he broke them. Lord Elgin, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, tore down the bas-reliefs of the frieze and the metopes: this was another disaster. The Ilissus or Cephissus, the Hercules or Theseus, the Charities, “vernal goddesses”—called by some the Three Fates, by others Demeter, Core, and Iris—are still, though somewhat mutilated, the most precious of our relics of antiquity. In 1812 some other Englishmen carried off the frieze of the temple of Phigalia (Bassæ), built by Ictinus. All these fragments of masterpieces were sold for hard cash, and it is under the damp and gloomy sky of England that we are reduced to admiring the remains of that which was the imperial mantle which Pericles wrapped about Pallas Athene. Thus to understand the incomparable magnificence of the Parthenon, we must render back to it in imagination what men have taken away, then place it on its lofty rock, one hundred and fifty-six metres (512 ft.) high, whence a magic panorama is unrolled before the eyes, and surround it with the buildings of the Acropolis; the Erechtheum, which exhibited all the graces of art, beside the severe grandeur of the principal temple; the bronze statue of Athene Promachus, “she who fought in the front rank,” to which the artist gave a colossal height, so that the sailors arriving from the high sea steered by the plume on her helmet and the gold

tip of her lance, *maris stella*; and lower down, at the only place by which the rock was accessible, the wonderful vestibule of the Propylæa and the temple of Victory which formed one of its wings; but, above all, it must be seen wrapped in the blazing light of the eastern sky, compared to which our clearest day is but a twilight.

One thing has been observed in the Parthenon which proves the profound artistic sense the Greeks possessed and how well they understood how to correct geometry by taste. In all the Parthenon there is no surface which is absolutely flat. As the columns owe their full beauty only to the fact that they exhibit towards their centre a slight outward curve, of which the eye is not aware, so the entire building, colonnades and walls, is inclined slightly inwards towards an invisible point which would be lost in the region of the clouds, and all the horizontal lines are convex. But all with such delicacy that it is sufficient to allow the eye and the light to wander gently over the surfaces and to give the monument at once the grace of art and the solidity of strength; but not enough for it to assume the compressed and heavy aspect of a truncated pyramid like the Egyptian temples. On the southern facade the rise of the curve is only one hundred and twenty-three millimetres (about $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches).

The Propylæa, the masterpiece of civil and military architecture, belonged, like the Parthenon, to the Doric order, and stood at the only accessible point of the Acropolis. The architect Mnesicles disposed its various parts in such a manner as to give an aspect of grandeur to the entrance to the Holy of Holies of pagan Athens and also to secure its defence. Epaminondas would have transported it to Thebes to adorn the Cadmea: six centuries after, Pausanias admired it more than the Parthenon, and Plutarch said: "These works have preserved a freshness, a virginity which time cannot wither; they appear still bright with youth as if a breath would animate them and as if they had an immortal soul."

Athens had other monuments which were erected at very diverse epochs: the Anaceum, the temple of Castor and Pollux, where the sale of slaves took place; the Pantheon or temple of all the gods, the work of the emperor Hadrian; the octagonal Tower of the Winds, an indifferent work built about the first century before Christ. On each of its eight sides, corresponding to the quarters of the principal winds, was sculptured the figure of one of them. This tower still exists, as well as the choragic monument erected by the choregus Lysicrates, in 334 B.C., on the occasion of the victory of the Aca-mantid tribe in a chorus. The remains of the theatre of Bacchus are still to be seen on the south-eastern slope of the citadel, some of the marble seats bearing very beautiful sculptures. But the Stadium beyond the Ilissus, according to Pausanias one of the wonders of Athens, has disappeared and the excavations made there produced nothing remarkable.

Like its capital, Attica too had monuments of victory, of patriotic pride, and pious gratitude to the gods: and all these monuments were constructed in the severe style whose principal models we have just studied. In the sacred city of Eleusis, in sight of Salamis, a vast religious edifice was built, capable of containing the multitude of those initiated into the mysteries of Ceres. Rhamnus which overlooks the plain of Marathon, raised a sanctuary to Nemesis, the goddess of just vengeance; and on the summit of Cape Sunium, two temples consecrated to Poseidon and Athene, the tutelary deities of Attica, signalised from afar, to sailors coming from the isles or the coast of Asia, their approach to the ground where the Persians had found a tomb and the Greeks liberty. When on the days of the sacred festivals, the

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people arrived in long *theoria* (embassies) at the promontory now called Cape Colonna, they saw extending at their feet that sea which had now become their own domain, and fervently thanked the two divinities for having given them: for their leaders, political wisdom; for their mariners, favourable winds. At a later time philosophy was to take its seat near the temple of the gods, and we, like it, believe that Sunium heard some of the discourses of Plato.

The school of Athens extended her influence to distant places. It did not build the temple of Olympia, but Phidias made the statue of Zeus; Pæonius of Mende and Alcámenes of Lemnos have been credited, without absolute proof, with the sculptures of the two pediments, on one of which was represented the combat of Pelops and Ctenomachus, and on the other the contests of the Lapithæ and Centaurs at the nuptials of Pirithous.



RUINS OF TEMPLE OF THE OLYMPIAN JOVE. ATHENS

Time, barbarians, perhaps fire, destroyed the temple, and the Alpheus, in overflowing its banks, covered the plain of Altis which Pausanias had seen in such beauty with eight or ten metres (about 26 or 32 ft.) of alluvium. Before the *Expédition de Morée*, which brought away some fragments for the Louvre, even the spot in which so much magnificence stood was unknown. The successful excavations of the German commission have brought to light a victory of Pæonius, a Hermes of Praxiteles and other masterpieces.

The Ionic style is also native to the coast of Asia, where the Doric had preceded it. It was exhibited there in all its grace in the sixth century, when the temple of Ephesus was erected. The Cretan Chersiphron and his son Metagenes began its construction, which was carried on, like that of our Gothic cathedrals, with a tardiness that extended it over two or three centuries. Its columns, several of which were given by Cræsus, had a height of eight diameters, with bases which lacked the Doric columns and voluted capitals which the ancients compared to the drooping curls of a woman's hair. Of the Ionic temple at Samos, burned by the Persians, a single column

remains upright, and according to the diameter of the base it was sixteen metres (about 52½ ft.) high. This temple was therefore a colossal structure. At Athens the Erechtheum and the temple of the Wingless Victory are in the same style, but of very small dimensions. The first contained the oldest image of Athene: a statue of olive wood which was said to have fallen from heaven. In the second was a warlike Minerva; in order to attach her permanently to the fortunes of Athens, the sculptor had not given her the wings which are the attributes of the fickle goddess of lucky battles.

In the time of Pericles the Corinthian style has not yet appeared but is about to do so. It is related that Callimachus, having seen on a child's tomb at Corinth, a basket filled with its playthings and enveloped in the graceful curves of the leaves of an acanthus, took from it the idea of the Corinthian capital. The date of his birth is unknown, but since Ictinus after the plague of Athens, and Scopas in 396 constructed, the one at Phigalia, the other at Tegea, two temples in which traces have been found of the new style of architecture, its invention must have followed very soon after the construction of the Propylæa.

There is a question concerning Greek architecture which has only been answered in our own day, that of polychromy. In spite of our very decided preference for bare stone, we have been forced to recognise that the Greeks had a different taste. Light and colour are the joy of the eyes; but their rôle is not the same in countries in which the sky often appears like a shroud suspended above the earth, and in those where that earth, animated by the sun, sings, with its thousand voices, the poem of nature. In the north a wan light casts gloom upon the monuments; thus we are not loath to build them with materials which at first give them a dazzling whiteness. In the south they are too vividly illuminated, and the dazzling brightness of the marble would burn the eyes if the sun did not clothe the stone in a golden tint which rests the gaze. Colour, unnecessary and somewhat incommoding to the sculptor, whose main concern is with the form and truth of outline, furnishes the architect on the contrary with a valuable means of animating the great flat surfaces which in their nakedness would be cold and lifeless. He does not, like the polychromic sculptor, seek to create a deceitful illusion; colour and ornamentation make no false pretence, and are a charm the more when, in the case of a building standing in the midst of a sacred wood, it establishes a needful harmony between the work of art and that of nature.

Egypt and Asia were prodigal of colour, whether in painting or by the use of enamelled faïences with which the monuments of Persia are still covered. The most ancient inhabitants of Hellas passed under their influence. Colour has been found on the walls of dwellings older than Homer by ten centuries; it was to be seen at Tiryns, one of the capitals of the heroic age, and on the prows of the first ships which ventured into the midst of the waves. This usage continued through the epochs which succeeded; but, as in every domain of art, the Greeks modified this legacy of their ancestors and of the peoples which had preceded them in civilised life, according to the requirements of a delicate taste. Hues more or less vivid covered the stone of the temple, even the sculptures of the frieze, the metopes, and the pediment; terra-cottas, whose colours mixed with a kind of paste were indestructible, decorated the upper parts of the monument and enlivened these severe structures. But a distinction must be drawn between the polychromy of Athens in the time of Pericles and that of other Hellenic countries. In Sicily, in greater Greece, even in Ægina, where the materials which the architects had to dispose of were of a coarse description, it may be

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that the temples received a brilliant colouring. But at Athens the beautiful Pentelic marble employed in the construction of the temples was certainly not entirely concealed under crude and violent colours. The words of Plutarch, quoted above, on the freshness and youth preserved by the monuments of the Acropolis, when six centuries had already passed over them, does not allow us to believe in more than a moderate colouration for the columns and walls. At one point only of the building there was certainly greater variety. In all countries women, who are ingenious artists, apply themselves to adorning their heads, and with reason: it is the stronghold from which formidable arrows are shot. Ictinus also decorated the upper portions of the Parthenon with all the graces he could call into play. Ornaments of gilt bronze fastened to the draperies of the figures, inlaid enamels, and magnificent carvings running all along the frieze. On festival days treasures and garlands were added, so that the edifice wore on its brow, as it were, a crown of flowers and foliage over a circlet of precious stones.

Antiquity has preserved us no details concerning the artists; we are ignorant of even the native country of most of them. For centuries their works spoke for them, but the very ruins of the monuments they raised have perished. Only the Parthenon still proudly lifts its mutilated head above the mass of rubbish.

A great poet saw a gloomy vision of Europe dying and Paris vanishing. Twenty-five centuries before, Thucydides drew a less poetic but more faithful fantasy for Athens and Lacedæmon. Comparing the sterility of the one to the fertility of the other, he said. "Let both towns be destroyed and the mere débris of the monuments and temples of Athens will reveal a glorious city; the ruins of Lacedæmon will be only those of a large village."



GREEK COMEDIAN

SCULPTURE


Art is a natural instinct which is to be found even amongst the last of the savages who were the prehistoric inhabitants of Gaul, and which the most intelligent of animals do not possess. This instinct is developed or arrested, not, as has been said, according to race, but in response to the social influences to which a people is subjected amidst melancholy and severe or peaceful and smiling scenes which extinguish or call forth the creative imagination. These influences, working through the centuries, predisposed Hellas to change the paths which art had been pursuing in the East; and

habits which were easily acclimatised in Greece, but which could not have had their birth on the banks of the Nile and Euphrates, favoured this slow evolution.

Thanks to a good system of education, to long-continued gymnastic exercises and to a life in the open air, often without clothing and always without a dress which could hamper the harmonious development of the body, the Greeks became the most beautiful race under the sun. As they had always before their eyes the *ephebi*, so agile in the race, the wrestlers and the athletes, who displayed so much virile grace, the æsthetic sense developed in them with a strength which, when nature had given genius to the artists, produced masterpieces. Religion still further increased this tendency. Their gods having been conceived in the image of man, as a superior humanity, the sculptors, as the religious conscience grew more elevated and taste was purified, took their ideal for the representations of the dwellers on Olympus from human beauty carried to perfection. The people even looked upon it as a gift of heaven, and after death men were accorded heroic honours on account of their beauty.

Herodotus has preserved us a fact which exhibits the Greek character : Philip of Croton was venerated as a hero after his death, in a small building erected to him because he was the most beautiful man of his time, and the old historian agrees with the Egestans who had made this singular kind of god. He does not ask if Xerxes had truly royal qualities. "In his vast army," he says, "none was more worthy by his beauty of the sovereign power." In one of the choregiæ in which he often triumphed by his magnificence, Nicias had given the part of Dionysus to a young slave so perfectly handsome and so nobly attired that on his appearance the people broke into applause. Nicias liberated him at once, considering, he said, that it was an impiety to retain in servitude a man who had been hailed by the Athenians in the character of a god. Nicias indeed was performing a very popular act ; it was the handsome *ephebus*, not the god, who had excited the admiration of the spectators.

From first to last Greece thought thus. Many a time in the *Odyssey*, Ulysses and Telemachus fancy that they see a god when they unexpectedly encounter a tall and beautiful man ; and the cold and severe Aristotle writes : "If amongst mortals any were born resembling the images of the gods, the rest of mankind would agree in swearing to them an eternal obedience." Simonides, without going so far, made beauty the second of the four conditions necessary to happiness, and Isocrates said : "Virtue is so honoured only because it is moral beauty." It was because he was the most beautiful of the *ephebi* that Sophocles was charged, after Salamis, with the task of leading the chorus which sung the hymn of victory ; and it is said Phidias engraved on the finger of Zeus at Olympia : "Pantarces is beautiful" — a sacrilege which might have exposed him to great danger. We no longer possess this inscription, but we find a similar one on a painted vase, where



MINERVA
(From a statue)

[460-430 B.C.]

Victory is offering a crown to a handsome *ephebus*. The gods themselves had the reputation of being sensible of this advantage, which had procured many mortals the honour of their love. At Ægium Jupiter desired that his priests should be chosen from among the young men who had carried off the prize for beauty; for this merit Ganymede was snatched up to heaven, that he might serve as cup-bearer to the gods, and Apollo admitted into his sanctuary the statue of Phryne, the most admired of the courtesans of Greece. It is notorious how Hyperides saved the beautiful *hetæra* from a capital charge, when she was standing before the judges, by simply tearing away at an appropriate moment the veil which hid her beauty. The recollection of these facts serves to explain the divine honours paid to Antinous by the most Grecian of the Roman emperors; but they also show how much this worship of beauty, of which the Greeks had made a religion and from which Plato was to weave a theory, went to form the artists, and, to a certain extent, the philosophers of Greece. Did not Plato utter words whence has been legitimately derived the famous saying that Beauty is the splendour of goodness? The jurisconsults of the Roman empire called themselves the priests of law; Phidias and Polyclitus might have styled themselves the priests of the beautiful; and this trait suffices to mark the difference between the two civilisations, the Greek and the Roman. Beauty is the perpetual aspiration of the French spirit which seeks it in everything, in the great spectacles of nature or in the works of famous writers and artists.

Amongst the statues of which the ancients were most proud, are some which amaze us by their colossal height, and others which shock our taste by the diversity of the colours and materials employed. The Egyptians treated their Pharaohs and their gods in a similar fashion, as did the Persians their kings, the Athenians the people or the senate personified, and we ourselves do the same to translate certain ideas: the Saint Borromeo of Lake Maggiore and the Liberty of New York are colossi. Executed to be seen from afar, they strike the eye by their mass, and are the expression in stone of elevated sentiments: of holiness, patriotism, or independence. On the promontory where they are placed between earth and heaven they appear as the very genius of the people which erected them, a shining witness of their gratitude, and the figurative representation of their inmost thought.

The art of colossal sculpture was at the service of the gods, and was in its place in or near their temples. It was the same with the chryselephantine sculpture, and for the same reasons. The most celebrated of these sculptures and those which from ancient descriptions we know the best, were the Athene of the Parthenon and the Zeus of Olympia.



APOLLO

(From a Statue now in the Museum at Naples)

Reaching with her pedestal to a height of fifteen metres (about 49 ft.), Minerva stood erect, enveloped in a talaric tunic, the dress of virgins. In one hand she held a Victory, in the other the spear round which the serpent Erichthonius was coiled. The draperies were of gold, the naked parts of ivory, the head of Medusa, on the Ægis, in silver, the eyes being of precious stones.

How did this Minerva, which was seen by Julian as late as the fourth century of our era, finally perish? The Christians have been charged with this, but the accusation should be brought against her wealth. So much gold could not escape the barbarians, whoever they were, whether invaders from the north, needy princes, or ordinary thieves. The pillage of the Parthenon had already begun in the time of Isocrates and the Athene of Julian must have been only a ruin.

Phidias was also summoned to Olympia. The treasures accumulated in the temple from the offerings of all Greece, permitted him to execute a work which surpassed that of the Parthenon.



MINERVA

(From a Greek vase)

On a throne of cedar wood, inlaid with gold and ivory, ebony, and precious stones, and covered with bas-reliefs and paintings, Zeus was majestically seated. His thick hair and beard were of gold; of gold and ivory was the Victory he carried in his right hand, in token that his will was always triumphant; of gold, too, mingled with other metals was the royal sceptre surmounted by an eagle, which he held in his left hand. On the head was the crown of olive leaves, which was given to the victors in the games, but, as was fitting, that of the god was gold, as well as his sandals and his mantle, which revealed his naked breast in ivory. His visage had the virile beauty proper to the father of gods and men; his tranquil gaze was indeed that of the all-powerful whom no passion stirs and behind whose broad forehead should reside the vast intelligence of the orderer of worlds. Placed at the back of the *naos*, at the point where the trend of the architectural lines attracted the gaze, the statue, fifteen or sixteen metres (49 or 52 ft. high, seemed still more colossal than it was.

The Olympian Jupiter shared the fate of the Minerva of the Parthenon; he was too rich for an age grown too barbarous and beliefs too hostile. It is said that in


393 Theodosius had it transported to Constantinople, where it perished some years later in one of the great conflagrations that so often visited the new capital of the Empire; it is not likely that it was so long respected. Already in the second century Lucian laughs at this "honest fellow, the exterminator of giants, who remained seated so quietly while brigands shaved his golden hair."

[460-430 B.C.]

Other towns besides Athens and Olympia had chryselephantine statues. Costly materials were used for the Juno at Argos, the Æsculapius of Epidaurus, and others.

Phidias did not confine himself to representing gods, that is to say to making colossi: with his own hands, or more often through those who worked under his direction, he lavished less divine sculpture on the frieze, the metopes, and the double pediment of the temple, the figures of which, as seen from below, do not appear to be of more than ordinary height. Those which he chiselled on Minerva's shield and on her sandals, were still smaller. The magnificent fragments which remain to us from the two pediments, Demeter and Core, Iris and Cephisus, the Charities or Fates, the Hercules or Theseus, are the works of his school and we may say of his mind. In spite of their mutilations, these marbles, like those of the Victory untying her sandal, may be ranged beside, if not above, the most glorious creations of Renaissance sculpture in the purity of the style and the calm serenity of the figures, which neither have their limbs twisted in violent action nor their brows overcharged with thought, as happened when statuary strove to rival painting. What a puissant life is in these divinities tranquilly seated in the pediments, and how calm on their fiery horses are the riders in the Panathenæic procession! Later on the school of grace and voluptuousness will appear, with an Athenian, Praxiteles, as its chief; still later, passion will agitate the marble: then the decay of art begins—such a drama as the "Farnese bull"¹ depicts may not fittingly be presented in stone.

It is to the eternal honour of Phidias that he finally broke with hieratic art, whose influence is still traceable in the beautiful statues of Ægina, with their admirably studied but lifeless shapes and grinning heads exhibiting, even in pain and death, the same idiotic smile. The great artist sought the beauty which is the spiritual essence of things, whether it be in the soul seen through the body; or nature contemplated in her most harmonious expansion; and this ideal beauty he realised without making the effort visible. This is supreme art; for there is no grandeur without simplicity.



GREEK LYRES

PAINTING, MUSIC, ETC.

If the description in the *Iliad* of the shield of Achilles is a work of imagination, those of the Athene of the Parthenon and the Zeus of Olympia, as given by Pausanias after an attentive study of the works themselves, show

¹ A famous group now in the Museum at Naples.

that the school of Athens had carried the art of carving metal and ivory to a high degree of perfection, as well as that of working hard stones for casts or in relief. Yet this skill was borrowed from the school of Argos, where work in bronze was held in high honour.

It was not so with painting, which in Greece had never the perfection of statuary, whatever may be said on the faith of anecdotes more famous than veracious. Modern painting seeks to move; that of the ancients was rather sculptural in its character, in the sense that it sacrificed colouring to design and the effects of light and shade to form—a stranger to what might be called, if we have Rembrandt in mind, the drama of light and shade, or, in referring to the Venetians, the harmonious chant of colours. Sicyon

was the first Greek town which had a school for design. Athens, Miletus, and subsequently Corinth, followed this example. We shall see presently that Greece had great painters, and that those of Athenian origin did not occupy the first rank in this art. But it would be rash to speak of Greek painting except according to the judgment of the ancients, since nothing of it remains save painted vases, which belong to industry rather than art; and the mural decorations at Pompeii and Herculaneum, which are too often mere conventional productions, executed hurriedly and probably for small payment by workmen rather than artists. The Roman mosaics were also made by Greek hands, but there is not one, except the battle of Issus, which is of a high order of art.

The Greeks possessed the merit of realising that the highest intellectual culture is one of the conditions of greatness in the individual and the state; and they understood how to utilise every means of attaining it. In their plan of education, besides the study of poets and philosophers to form the mind, and gymnastic exercise to develop suppleness and strength, they included music, which habituates the mind to harmony, and dancing, which bestows grace. These two secondary arts were the chief ones at Lacedæmon; they also ranked high among the Athenians, though



LYRE PLAYER

Athens did not set her mark on them as she did on architecture and the art of statuary. They were indispensable auxiliaries at festivals, sacrifices, and funerals, and played a part in the performance of religious rites. The marvellous effects of the lyre of Orpheus were universally kept in mind, and Achilles, the hero who was the ideal type of warlike courage, was represented celebrating his exploits on the cithara; in the *Iliad* or the *Odyssey* there is no feast to which a melodious singer is not invited. Down to the last days of Greece the beneficent action of music was believed in: Polybius attributed the misfortunes of the Arcadians to the neglect among them of the art which calms the passions and which, by teaching the rules of harmony, trains the learner not to violate public peace. Damon the musician, a friend of Pericles

[460-430 B.C.]

and of Socrates, held that musical methods could not be changed without threatening the foundation of morality and the laws of the city. Plato thinks the same, and Aristotle calls music "the greatest charm of life." It is well known how much importance was attached to it by the school of the Pythagoreans, who professed to hear the music of the celestial spheres turning harmoniously through infinite space.

The Greeks also conceived of dancing in another fashion from ours, for they had introduced into it number and measure, which in art are a manifestation of beauty, but no longer remain so when whirling speed is substituted for grace. With them the dance formed part of their religious solemnities and military education. "The ancients," says Plato in the Seventh Book of the *Laws*, "have bequeathed us a great number of beautiful dances." In the Dorian cities dancing was one of the necessary rites in the worship of Apollo, and the gravest people participated. Theseus, returning from Crete, danced the *γέφανος* in the holy island of Delos, to celebrate his victory over the Minotaur; and the Spartans, in annual commemoration of their triumph over the people of Thyrea danced the *γυμνοπαῖδια* before the images of Apollo, Diana, and Latona, singing verses of Aleman and the Cretan Thaletas. The Bacchic dances, with thyrsi and lighted torches, were a mimic representation of the life of Dionysus.

In the neighbourhood of Eleusis was to be seen the fountain of beautiful dances, Callichorum, where the initiated chanted the invocation to Iacchus as they danced: "O adored god, approach at our voice. Iacchus! Iacchus! come and dance the sacred thiasus in this meadow, thy well-beloved home; strike the ground with a bold foot and mingle in our free and joyous dances, inspired by the graces who rule our consecrated chorus."

Plato, in his treatise on "Law," which is a kind of commentary on Athenian legislation and customs, attaches extreme importance, even for the moral education of youth, to the possession by the *ephebi* of the "art of choruses," which includes song and dance.

We may well believe that demoralising dances existed in Ionia and elsewhere. At Sparta and Athens the Pyrrhic dance was a military exercise and a patriotic training. The *ephebi* danced them at the greater and lesser Panathenæa, imitating all the movements of a combat for attack, defence, or the evasion of darts. And was not the heroic circle of the Suliote women a recollection of these warlike dances? Having taken refuge on the summit of a mountain to escape a harem or the yataghan of the Turks, they sang their funeral hymn, joined hands and danced on this narrow peak, which was surrounded by precipices. Each time that the ring approached the abyss, the circle was narrowed, for one of their number detached herself from it to fling herself down; and one after another, all threw themselves over.



GREEK DANCING GIRL
(Hope)

THE ARTISTS OF THE OTHER CITIES OF HELLAS

The fifth century is the golden age of Greek art. We have told of the artists whom Athens gave to the world; we shall now see what others the rest of Hellas produced — such at least whose names have come down to us with an indication of their works.

Chersiphron and his son Metagenes of Knossos, in Crete, are outside the period with which we are dealing, for they began the construction of the great temple of Ephesus in the sixth century.

The domain of statuary had a great artist whom the ancients have compared to Phidias, Polyclitus of Sicyon or Argos. The artists of the century of Pericles did not confine themselves to one corner of the regions of art; they cultivated the whole. Polyclitus was as much a skilful architect as a great sculptor. At Epidaurus he erected a circular monument, the Tholus, and a theatre which was much admired by the ancients; at Argos his Juno was the rival of the Minerva of the Parthenon, though it did not stand as high, and was less costly. Phidias lived with the gods in spirit, Polyclitus dwelt more among men. He even wrote on the proportions of the human body, and applied his knowledge to his Doryphorus, which was called the “canon,” or the “rule.” The ancients divided the palm for statuary between the two great artists: giving it to the one for his gods; to the other for his Canephorus, which Verres stole from the Sicilians, his Amazon, which triumphed over that of Phidias in the famous competition at Ephesus, and his statues of successful athletes, such as the Diadumenus and the two Astragalizontes, or dice-players. Myron, whom we might have included among the Athenian artists, went further in his imitation of nature; his bronze cow was famous, and still more so his Discobolus, whose attitude must have been very difficult to render.

Polygnotus of Thasos, whom Cimon brought from that town in 463, lived for a long time on the banks of the Ilissus, and was given the rights of an Athenian citizen as a reward for his labours in the decoration of the temple of Theseus, the Anaceum, the Pœcile, and a part of the Propylæa. There was some stiffness in the designs of Polygnotus; his was a sculptural painting which, nevertheless, obtained great effects by very simple means. The ancients lauded the expression and beauty of his figures, but they have neither the grace nor the dramatic character which the painters of the period that followed were to give to their works. The arts of painting and statuary are two sisters who resemble each other, and both follow the variations of taste: the first with a vivacity at times imprudent, the second with more reserve. Zeuxis of Heraclea Pontica and his rival, Parrhasius of Ephesus, were younger than Polygnotus. Their painting was already more scientific, less ideal, and nearer reality. Aristotle reproaches Zeuxis with yielding too much to Ionian effeminacy. If we are to believe anecdotes whose frequent repetition does not make them more authentic, these painters even succeeded in deceiving the eye: the one with a bunch of grapes which the birds came to peck at, the other with a curtain which Zeuxis attempted to draw back, thinking that it concealed the real picture. These would be triumphs of ingenuity rather than art. It is to be noted that both men drew freely on the abundant resources of ancient poetry. Both attained to great fame and opulence. In spite of the misfortunes of the times, Greece still had gold for her favourite painters. Archelaus, king of Macedon, paid four hundred minæ for the painting of Zeuxis in his palace, and Parrhasius never appeared in public without a robe of purple fringed with gold. He considered him-


[460-410 B.C.]

self "master of the elegancies," as well as of his art, so we need not wonder at his having inclined to effeminate gracefulness. "His Theseus," said Ephranor, "is fed on roses; mine was fed on meat." But it was at a later time, with Lysippus and Pamphilus, that the school of Sicyon was to have its full splendour.

The sight of the sculptors and painters turning to Homer for their inspiration, calls forth the remark that the *Iliad* was the Bible of Greece, as much for art as for religion. As our churches of the Middle Ages constituted, by means of their windows, a grand book of religious instruction, so the walls and pediments of the Greek temples exhibited to the eye legends which spoke of the divinities and heroes of the Hellenic race. Thus, while in Rome art was to be merely a foreign importation, in Greece it came from the very heart of the country; and this was the secret of its greatness.^b



APOLLO MUSAGETES



CHAPTER XXIX. GREEK LITERATURE

ORATORY AND LYRIC POETRY

OF all branches of literature there is none more closely interwoven with political life than oratory. This art could only have been developed among the Ionians, for no other race had the same innate taste for vivacious utterance, or the same feeling for fluency, copiousness, and brilliancy of speech. Nor is there any doubt that the kind of oratory which aims at influencing the feeling and directing the resolutions of the civic body was first practised in the cities of Ionia. But it was at Athens that Greek oratory was brought to its true perfection. There the public oration developed side by side with freedom of speech and the duty of speaking which was encumbent on every Attic citizen. It seemed so intimately connected with the life of Attica that the state of Theseus was represented as founded by it.

For this reason oratory was not the subject of a special study that could be conceived of apart from public life, but the simple expression of practical experience and statesman-like prudence; for at that period men could not have imagined a popular leader who was not at the same time a statesman proved in peace and war and had not won by his public career the right to be listened to by his fellow-citizens. And as oratory grew into a power which dominated the life of the community, so language itself was advanced to a new stage in development, when Athens became the centre of the world. What grew out of the local dialect was a new idiom, in which the power inherent in the Greek language first came to its full maturity by becoming the vehicle of Attic culture.

The Greek language had undergone a many-sided development in Ionia. The Ionic dialect was the repository not only of the Homeric and post-Homeric epics and hymns, but of the whole treasure of elegiac and iambic poetry. Ionia was the first country to avail herself largely of the art of writing. This was first put to use in connection with the art of the country; the epic poems which had been composed without the aid of writing, and had become the property of the nation, were by its aid disseminated, cast into permanent

form, and continued. Reading and writing were first introduced into the schools of the Rhapsodists, which is the reason why Homer himself is represented as a schoolmaster; and when the later epic poets — Arctinus, Lesches, and others — who sang in Ionia after the beginning of the Olympiads, made the great epic the starting-point of their own poems, in which they endeavoured to amplify, supplement, and connect the substance of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, writing was a common accomplishment among poets, and the rhapsodic art itself took on more of the character of a science in consequence.

At this point, however, and in Ionia as before, there came into being a wholly novel method of literary statement, intended, not to rouse the emotions of a crowded audience, but to spread abroad the results of scientific research. Philosophers and historians wrote for the public in prose, and in the sixth century the taste for reading and writing spread with great rapidity through the whole of Ionia, where Samos, in particular, became a school for the cultivation of the art of writing.

At this time, however, prose did not develop in contrast to poetry; as yet no distinction was made between the two classes of composition. The colloquial language of ordinary life, the lively popular note, was simply adopted by writers of fables, and from the tales of Æsop the maxims of homely wit and wisdom passed into literature. Archilochus was fond of using them, so was Herodotus. Men were so accustomed to learn from the poets that even speculative philosophers set forth their theories in poetic garb, like Xenophanes, who wandered about reciting his doctrines in the form of a rhapsody. The narratives of Herodotus are composed with a view to stirring the listening crowd, and the poetic character of his descriptions is unmistakable. His style flows on with the ease of an epic recitation, his sentences hang together loosely; poet-like he sees around him the audience which he desires to enchant and thrill with the charm of his story. Even in philosophy no attempt was made to reproduce the sequence of ideas in clear and exact terms. The teachings of Heraclitus bore the character of Sibylline oracles; he delighted in figurative language which suggested rather than followed up an idea, and apart from the abstruseness of his thought the construction of his sentences was so far from plain that it was impossible to determine precisely the grammatical sequence of his discourse.

Thus, great as was the wealth of Ionian literature, it had as yet no prose, while other parts of the country were even more backward. Generally speaking, we may say that the distinction between poetry and prose as two separate forms of literature was not recognised by the Greeks till late. We need only recall the hymns of Pindar to see how phrases and ideas of an entirely prosaic order occur side by side with the loftiest flights of poetic imagery. It was reserved for Athenian literature to create a prose style. The language was sufficiently new and supple to take and reproduce the peculiar impress of the Attic spirit; and this, as compared with the Ionic spirit, manifests itself in language, as in garb and manners, by greater simplicity and smoothness of form.

The dialect spoken in Attica occupied a sort of intermediate position among the dialects of the various tribes of Greece, and was therefore admirably fitted to become the medium of communication among all educated Greeks. For, although closely akin to Ionic, the Attic dialect had remained free from many Ionic peculiarities developed in the islands and on the further coast — particularly from the tendency to soften the vowel sounds.

Side by side with the eloquence which subserved political ends and was designed to guide the masses, there developed in Athens the speech of the

law courts, which from the outset was more strictly in accordance with regular rules and bore more likeness to a literary exercise, by reason of the rise of a class of writers who composed pleas for others. For it was the law in Attica that every man must conduct his own case, so that even those who had their speeches composed by counsel were themselves obliged to deliver them. Accordingly the personality of the orator, which carried such weight in political speeches, fell completely into the background; he was a mere writer of orations (*logographos*), and dealt with public instead of private affairs. This kind of oratory entered into much closer relations with sophistry, because the latter aimed at giving the mind such versatility as would enable it to handle with skill any subject presented to it and to discover in each the greatest variety of interesting matter.

A peculiar kind of public oration which attained to importance in the Athens of Pericles was the speech in honour of citizens who had fallen in battle. By a special statute which dates from the time of Cimon, a speech of this character was associated with a public funeral; and it was the custom to commission the most approved orator of the day to deliver this funeral



A GREEK ORATOR

oration in the name of the community, as an honourable distinction and acknowledgment of the public services of the deceased. Wordy and elaborate eulogiums did not suit the taste of the time. At such moments, when the citizens felt themselves smitten with grievous loss, it seemed a worthier task to bid them take courage, to turn their mourning into thanksgiving, their sorrow into joy and pride, by holding up before them the lofty interests of the public service for which their fellow citizens had laid down their lives, and to encourage the hearers to the same joyful self sacrifice.

Considering that all the arts and sciences flourished most vigorously during the period of the Persian wars, the fruits of which came to maturity in the years of peace under Pericles, it may well surprise us that the lyric art, the very one which is wont to be most closely associated with every spiritual movement, did not keep pace with the development of the other arts; and that the Wars of Liberation, so national, so just, and crowned, after grievous trials, with such amazing success, found no fuller echo in popular minstrelsy. Various circumstances combine to explain the fact.

The home of Æolian lyric poetry was more remote from the agitations of the times, and the inspiration which had called forth the poems of Alcæus

and Sappho a hundred years before had burnt low. Choral lyric poetry, on the other hand, was too completely interwoven with religious worship and earlier conditions of life, it was too much accustomed to put its art at the service of the old families whose glories belonged to the past rather than the present, to find itself at home in these changed times. The Theban bard, in particular, was too deeply concerned for his native city — which had reaped nothing but shame and misery from the Wars of Liberation — and for Delphi — which had from the first looked with disfavour on the national aspirations after liberty — to appreciate dispassionately the glories of the new era, though he was too large hearted and liberal minded to refuse the victorious city of Athens its need of admiration and praise in song. The Thebans punished Pindar for calling Athens “the pillar of Hellas”; the Athenians rewarded him, rightly esteeming his tribute a triumph of the good cause. In Sparta nothing was done to celebrate the Wars of Liberation. The Spartan constitution allowed no freedom of intellectual life, and furnished too little in the way of comfort and contentment to prove a favourable soil for poetry.

In the elegy, the oldest form of Greek lyric—so perfect an expression of the Ionic spirit in its varied measures and uses—a new form had been evolved in Ionia itself, side by side with the older one in which Theognis had expounded his party rancour and Solon his statesman-like wisdom—a lighter form which touched upon life in accents untinged by grief, the song of joyous conviviality, giving the gaiety of the banquet a higher consecration by the introduction of ethical ideas. “To drink, to jest, to bear a just mind,” sang Ion, and brought public affairs gracefully into the conversation. Dionysius the Athenian, a statesman of note in the age of Pericles, associated himself with Ion in this form of verse, and the lighter kind of elegy so appealed to the intellectual character of contemporary Athens that even Sophocles and Æschylus composed elegies of this sort. The fifth century was so rich in life and movement that these occasional verses were produced in great abundance; the epigram itself is no more than a subsidiary kind of elegiac verse. Its concise form was due to its original purpose, which was to serve as an inscription on some public monument, and it is therefore more closely connected with the great events of the time than any other kind of poetry. Simonides of Ceos was esteemed above all other Greeks as a writer of occasional verse in the best sense of the term, so much so that Sparta commissioned the Ionian poet to sing the praise of her Leonidas. With inimitable felicity he immortalised the events of the Wars of Liberation in brief pregnant epigrams



GREEK COMEDIAN

inscribed on monuments of every sort, sang the praises of the fallen in elegies, and celebrated the days of Artemisium and Marathon in grand cantatas which were performed by festal choirs.

The state did what it could to advance the cause of art. It offered poets brilliant opportunities for distinguishing themselves at the celebrations held in honour of its victories, and gave prizes for the best performances. As Themistocles had been assisted by Simonides, so Cimon was assisted by the genius of Ion, who in like manner laboured to hand down his fame to posterity. Pericles was led by his own tastes as well as by political considerations to do all that lay in his power to foster the art of song in Athens. For this purpose he introduced the musical competitions at the Panathenæa, and so summoned all men of talent to vie publicly one with another. He himself was the organiser and lawgiver in this department, and settled with profound artistic knowledge the manner in which the singers and cithara-players should appear at the festivals. If in spite of all these efforts lyric poetry did not take the place we might have anticipated in the Athens of Pericles, and Simonides found no worthy successors, the principal reason must be sought in the fact that another stronger and richer voice of poetry arose, into which the lyric was merged and so lost its individual importance.

Of all kinds of lyric poetry none was cultivated in Athens so admirably and successfully as the dithyrambus, the chant in praise of the god Dionysus, the giver of blessings—the branch of religious poetry which showed a capacity for development beyond all others. Lasus of Hermione, the tutor of Pindar, had changed this form of song (originally no more than the medium of an enthusiastic nature worship) into an artistically constructed choral chant and invested it with such splendour by bold and varied measures and the rippling music of flutes, as to cast the fame of Arion, its original inventor, into the shade. From the Peloponnesus Lasus brought the new art to the court of the Pisistratidæ at Athens. At that time everything connected with the worship of Dionysus was regarded with special favour, the dithyrambus was introduced into state festivals, and wealthy citizens vied with one another in equipping and training Bacchic choirs, composed of fifty singers who danced circling the flaming altars of Dionysus; and no expense was spared to procure new songs for the Attic Dionysia from the greatest masters, such as Pindar and Simonides. The latter could boast that he had won no less than fifty dithyrambic victories at Athens. But the evolution of the dithyrambus did not stop there.

The dithyrambus not only included every metre and rhythm known to earlier kinds of lyric poetry, but it contained elements which tended to pass beyond the limitations of the lyric. For the festal chorus regarded the god whose praises they sang as an immanent presence and, as it were, lived through all that befell him, whether of persecution or victory; and it was therefore but a short step to pass beyond the assumption that their audience was acquainted with the events which formed the subject of their chants, and to call them to mind by narration or set them forth by spectacular representation. The leaders of the dithyrambic chorus accordingly interspersed their singing with recitations, and thus epic and song were combined. The epic recitation was then rendered more effective by the aid of action and costume, the god himself was made visible in his suffering and triumph, the leader of the chorus undertook the part, the dancers were transformed into satyrs—attendants of the god and partakers of his fortunes; and thus from the union of the old forms of poetry there sprang a new form, the drama, the richest and most perfect of all.

The Greeks were by nature gifted with dramatic talent. Their natural vivacity induced them to clothe every doubt or deliberation in the form of a dialogue. Thus even in Homer we find the germ of the drama, which now reaped the benefit of the entire evolution of the older art methods. For all that dance and song had invented in the way of balanced rhythm, effective metre, and poetic imagery, was here united, enlivened by the art of mimicry, which made the person of the actor the instrument of artistic exposition, and warmed by the joyous fires of the Bacchic festival.

The cycle of representation could not but be limited so long as the action was confined by ceremonial considerations to the subjects offered by the worship of Bacchus. The Greeks therefore went a step farther and in place of the fortunes of Bacchus took other subjects equally well calculated to arouse lively sympathy, and thus (when this form of art had been invented) there flowed in an abundance of materials and fertile themes, the storehouse of Homeric and post-Homeric epos was flung open, the national heroes were introduced to the nation in a novel and striking guise, and a vast field of activity was opened to dramatic art.

This advance had already been made beyond the borders of Attica; for before the time of Clisthenes the hero Adrastus had been substituted for Dionysus, and it may be that a similar enlargement of the scope of dithyrambic poetry had also taken place at Corinth. But it was at Athens alone that these rudiments of the drama reached their full development. As the epic had mirrored the heroic days of old, as the lyric kept pace with the development of the nation for three centuries after the decline of the epic, so the drama was the form of poetry which began to flower at the moment when Athens became the pivot of Greek history. Originating from humble beginnings in the time of Solon, it grew in magnitude and importance with the growth of the city's greatness, and is associated with the history of Athens in every stage of its development.

THE FOUNDATION OF THE ART OF TRAGEDY

Thespis was the founder of Attic tragedy, for it was he who introduced the alternation of recitation and song and arranged the stage and costumes. The story goes that Solon had small liking for the new art, believing the violent excitement of the emotions by the representation of imaginary events to be prejudicial, but that the tyrants favoured this popular diversion, like everything else connected with the democratic worship of Dionysus, because it suited the purpose of their policy to provide brilliant entertainments for the population at the expense of wealthy citizens. About 550 B.C. they summoned the chorus leader from Icaria to the city, competitions between rival tragic choruses were introduced, and the stage near the black poplar in the market place became a centre of Attic festivity.

With the restoration of peace all civic festivals took a higher flight, the various constituents fell apart, tragedy rejected the baser elements of Bacchic festivity and assumed greater dignity, it was cast into definite artistic forms by Pratinas and Chœrilus, and became freer and freer in its choice of subject. The old element was not abandoned for all that, the rustic youth would not be deprived of their accustomed masquerade, and the people were left their satyr choruses. But the two forms, which could not be combined without mutual detriment, were separated, and thus the satyr drama grows up side by side with tragedy. Pratinas, who migrated

to Athens from Phlius, gave these plays their typical form, and they retained their original character of Bacchic jollity, their rustic and homely features, and the merry rout of the satyrs with their wild dances and rude jests. Thus these elements were preserved to literature and yet prevented from molesting or hampering the further development of tragedy.


The period in which Athens took her place as a great power and sent her triremes across the sea to support the Ionian revolt, likewise constituted an epoch in the history of Attic tragedy. About that time the wooden scaffoldings from which the audience had looked on at the plays of Pratinas, Chærilus, Phrynichus, and the youthful Æschylus, gave way; and the

drama had already attained such consequence in Athens that the building of a magnificent theatre was taken in hand. A permanent stage of stone was built within the precincts sacred to Dionysus on the southern declivity of the citadel, and seats for spectators, rising one above the other in semi-circular rows, were built into the rock of the Acropolis in such wise that the audience commanded a view of Hy-mettus and the Ilissus on the left and of the harbour on the right.

Meanwhile the artistic structure of tragedy was steadily advancing towards perfection. The subject-matter grew more varied, music and the dance were used in a greater variety of forms, female characters were added. Nevertheless the lyric element remained predominant down to the time of the Persian wars; and Phrynichus, the greatest predecessor of Æschylus, was most admired for his charming choral songs. It was with the great drama of the War of Liberation that the theatrical drama began to unfold its full powers, and nowhere do we perceive

more clearly the manifestation of the newly-acquired energy which pervaded every department of Attic life.

The man destined to give utterance in tragic art to the spirit of the great age was Æschylus, the son of Euphorion of Eleusis, a scion of an ancient family, through which he claimed association with one of the most venerable sanctuaries of the land. This is why he calls himself the pupil of Demeter, thus testifying that the solemn services of the temple at Eleusis had not failed to exercise a lasting influence upon his mind. As a boy he witnessed the fall of the tyrants: when come to man's estate he fought at Marathon, being then thirty-five years old, and he himself declared, in the inscription on his tombstone, that he took pride, not in his tragedies, but in his share in that great day, though there he had been but a citizen among citizens, while as a poet he was without peer among his contemporaries. For it was he whose creative genius laid the foundations of Attic tragedy, making all previous achievements look like imperfect attempts.



GREEK POET

He introduced a second actor on the stage, and thus made the play a real drama, by which means lively colloquy first became possible. Dialogue, for which the Athenians were singularly well qualified by their love of talking, readiness and acute reasoning faculty, was thus transferred to the stage, and this gave it a wholly novel interest. The language of the dialogue was in the main that of ordinary life, while older phonetic principles prevailed in the chorus, which was thus less familiar to the ear and produced an impression of solemnity and dignity which suited well with its character of the oldest element of tragedy and the religious centre about which it had crystallised. The choruses were shortened to allow the action to proceed more vigorously, the characters of the *dramatis personæ* were more sharply defined, a distinction was made between leading and secondary parts, and the parts of secondary characters of lower station bore the stamp of the common people, as distinguished from the heroic figures of the play. The stage itself was brought to a higher pitch of perfection. It was effectively fitted up as an ideal scene by Agatharchus, the son of Eudemus, an artist from Samos, who cultivated scene painting scientifically as a branch of art, and mechanism was pressed into the service to raise shades from the depths of the earth or cause gods to hover in the air by artificial means. The spectacle as a whole gained in solemn dignity no less than in spiritual import and moral significance.

The principal aim of the earlier poets had been to express and induce emotional moods; but the object of the drama was to present the legends of olden times completely in their general connection, and for this purpose Attic drama was so arranged that three tragedies were joined to form a single whole, in order to display upon a harmonious plan the successive developments of the mythical story, and these three tragedies, which were so many acts of one great drama, were followed by a Satyr-drama as afterpiece. This led back from the affecting solemnity of the tragedies to the popular sphere of the Dionysian festival, where the diverting adventures witnessed and enacted by the satyrs restored the minds of the spectators to innocent mirth. It was a healthy trait of popular sentiment which thus mingled jest and earnest, and one of which we see other evidences in vase painting and the sculptures of the temples.

Such was the tetralogy of Attic drama, which, if not invented by Æschylus yet received its artistic consummation at his hands. The dithyrambic chorus was divided into groups, each consisting of twelve (and later of fifteen) persons, so that there was a special chorus for each part of the tetralogy, to follow sympathetically the action of the *dramatis personæ* and fill up the pauses with dance and song. The *orchestra*, where the chorus was placed, lay between the stage and the spectators, just as the chorus itself symbolically occupied an intermediate position between the audience and the heroes of the drama.

The Greeks were accustomed to look upon the poets as their teachers, and no man could gain recognition as a poet among them who had only talent, imagination, and artistic skill to show as proofs of his poetic vocation; this required a thorough education of heart and mind and clear insight into things human and divine. Hence the calling of a poet laid claim to the whole man and the man's whole life, and none conceived of it more nobly than Æschylus. Like Pindar he takes his hearers into the very heart of the myth, drawing out its moral earnestness and illuminating it with the light of historical experience. Humanity, as represented by Æschylus in the Titan Prometheus, with its constancy through struggles and misery, its

proud self-respect, its indefatigable inventive genius, with its tendency, too, to rashness and arrogant boasting, is the generation of his own contemporaries, with their reckless aspirations; but no wisdom avails man save that which comes from Zeus, no skill and intelligence save that which is based on devout morality. Thus, without petty premeditation the poet becomes a true teacher of the people; in an age of incipient scepticism he endeavours to uphold the religion of his forefathers, to purify popular conceptions and to draw forth the kernel of wholesome truth from the many-hued tinsel of popular fables. It was the mission of the poet to maintain harmony between popular tradition and advancing knowledge.

But the poets lived in the midstream of civic life, and it is not to be supposed that, in a city like Athens, men who at public festivals set forth the creations of their genius in the public eye, could remain indifferent to the questions of their own day. They were obliged of necessity to belong to one party or another, and if they were sincere and candid, their views as to what was for the good of the commonwealth could not but appear in their works. Their choice of subject was still limited in the main to mythology; man's strength of will, his deeds and sufferings, the contradiction between laws human and divine, were still set forth by preference in the characters of the Homeric age of which the tradition survived in the epos. These were the prototypes of the human race, their sufferings were the sufferings and entanglements incident to the whole human race; in contemplating them the spectators were to be freed from what was personal in their sorrows and cares, the narrow bounds of their self-consciousness were to be widened, and they were to receive from the performance not only the highest artistic pleasure, but a cheering and healing purification of their hearts. These heroes of olden times were in harmony with the ideal character which the dramatists were bent on giving to the whole world of the stage; but the impression was none the less striking because the audience was transported into a dim and legendary past. We feel the spirit of the warrior of Marathon in the warlike plays of Æschylus, and the spectator of his *Seven against Thebes* glowed with eagerness to strike a blow for his country.

Meanwhile Phrynichus had ventured to put modern events on the stage, and his *Fall of Miletus* and *Phænissæ* were no doubt fraught with political intention. Æschylus followed the example of his predecessor in a far grander style when, four years after the production of the *Phænissæ* of Phrynichus, he produced his drama of the *Persæ*. He depicted the fall of the Great King. But with fine artistic instinct he chose Persia, not Attica, for the scene of his tragedy. He brings before our eyes the consequences of the battle, its reaction upon the hostile empire, in its own capital. Darius is conjured from the grave that in the person of the pious and prudent ruler may be set forth the glory of the inviolate Persian empire, while his successor returns from Hellas shorn of all dignity, a warning example of the ruin which foolish arrogance brings upon all sovereign power. The whole composition is pervaded by the idea of retribution, which had been awakened in the Greek mind by the Persian wars.

In the tragedy of Phrynichus, Themistocles is extolled above all other men, while Æschylus only alludes to him in passing as the inventor of a subtle stratagem. On the other hand the latter gives a detailed account of the fight on Psyttalea, so exalting the fame of Aristides, who contributed substantially to the victory of Salamis, not by sea, but by land.

The *Persæ* was the middle play of a trilogy and comes to no final conclusion. The shade of Darius hints at other defeats in the future, and at

the struggles of Plataea. From *Glaucois*, the third play of the trilogy, an allusion to Himera has been preserved. The first part, *Phineus*, takes its name from the mythical seer who revealed to the Argonauts their coming voyage to the land of the northern barbarians. Hence, it is extremely probable that all three plays were linked together by a single idea, the idea (present to all thinking men of the time) of the great struggle between barbarian and Greek, between Asia and Europe, which had its mythical prelude in the voyage of the Argonauts, and came to its glorious issue on the battle-fields of Greece and Sicily. In like manner Herodotus had conceived of the Persian War as one link in a great chain of historical development, and Pindar had associated Salamis, Plataea, and Himera as ranking equally among the glorious days of the Greeks; and we may be sure that the trilogy of the *Persæ* would not have been acted at the court of Hiero unless it had fully satisfied the tyrant's love of praise.

Æschylus represented the legendary history of the house of Pelops in the three plays of the *Oresteia*, and that of the royal house of Thebes and the Thracian king, Lycurgus, each in a cycle of three dramas; he worked up the legend of Prometheus so that the conflicts and discords of the several parts find a satisfactory solution in a larger order of things; and thus the poet wove legend and history into a single piece. Prehistoric and present times, East and West, the mother-country and the colonies, all form parts of a grand picture, of a chain of events linked together by prophecy and reciprocal reaction. The poet looks forward and backward, and prophet-like interprets the course of history, seeing the inner necessity revealed to the eye of the spirit. He uplifts the hearts of his people by setting forth the waxing power of the Greeks, the waning might of the barbarians on every side, without a taint of scorn or malicious triumph to vitiate the moral majesty of his work. At the same time he moderates the pride of victory, by pointing to the guilt which brought about the Persian overthrow and to the eternal laws of divine justice, the observance of which is the inexorable condition of the prosperity of the Greeks.

In the tragedies on mythical subjects there was no lack of passages which permitted of or actually challenged application to the events of the day. Next to Aristides, it was Cimon to whom the muse of Æschylus did homage. Like Cimon, the poet was the champion of a common Hellenism, of patriarchal customs, the rule of the best, the discipline of the good old times, and so when the waves of popular agitation rose higher and higher till they threatened the very Areopagus, the last bulwark, the septuagenarian poet led his muse into the strife of conflicting parties and exerted his utmost powers to impress upon his fellow-citizens the sacred dignity of the Areopagus as a divine institution and to warn them of the consequences of sinful license. The *Eumenides* of Æschylus is a brilliant example of the way in which a great imaginative work may be made to serve a special purpose and express a particular tendency without losing anything of its transparent lucidity or of the sublimity which stamps it as a masterpiece for all time. But though the Areopagus remained unmolested as a court of justice (and we should like to fancy the poem of Æschylus an influential factor in the matter) the poet felt alien and solitary in the city where democracy had completely gained the ascendant. This was not the freedom for which he had bled in the field; the band of those who had fought in the Wars of Liberation dwindled and dwindled; the *Oresteia* was the last work he produced in Athens; and he died in his seventieth year at Gela in Sicily (456 B.C.), after a residence there of about two years.

The day of the warriors of Marathon was past, and the new age, the age of Pericles, found exponents in a younger generation, and on the Attic stage in Sophocles. Like Æschylus he was of noble birth, as is indicated by his appointment to be a priest of the hero, Halon, but his father was a craftsman and the head of a great smithy for the manufacture of weapons. He was born in the metalliferous district of Colonus about B.C. 496 and grew up amidst the delightful rural scenery of the valley of the Cephissus, in the shade of the sacred olives that had witnessed the first beginnings of national history, yet near the capital and near the sea, which he overlooked from the crags of Colonus, and where he saw the port grow up during his boyhood years. In the early bloom of youthful beauty he led the dance at the festival held in honour of the victory of Salamis; twelve years later he entered the lists as a rival of the great poet Æschylus, whose inspiring art had attracted him to follow the same path to poetic fame. It was a day of unwonted excitement throughout Athens when all men awaited the issue of the contest between the ambitious young poet and Æschylus, then close upon sixty years of age and twice already the wearer of the laurel crown.



REPRESENTATION OF A RECEPTION OF BACCHUS

The occasion was the same Dionysian festival on which Cimon, having brought the Thracian campaign to a glorious close, came up from the Piræus and offered his thank-offerings to the gods in the orchestra of the theatre. The people were in raptures over the relics of Theseus which he had brought back, and amidst the assenting acclamations of the assembled citizens the archon Apsephion appointed Cimon and his fellow-generals umpires, as being the worthiest representatives of the ten tribes. The result was that the prize was awarded to the *Triptolemus* trilogy of Sophocles.

There was no opposition between the art of Sophocles and that of his predecessor. The former looked up reverentially to the man whose original genius had led the way to the consummation of tragic art. Envy and jealousy were foreign to his lovable disposition. But he was an independent-minded pupil of his great master, and a man of very different endowments. His genius was gentler, simpler, and more tranquil, the extremes of pathos and pomp were repugnant to his taste. Accordingly he toned down the force of the theatrical diction which Æschylus had introduced, and, without degrading his characters to the common level, tried to make them more human, so that the spectators could feel more closely akin to them. This method is intimately connected with the altered treatment of the subjects of tragedy.

In the treatment of tragic legend Æschylus reached the greatest heights to which the genius of Greece ever soared; in this sphere no man could surpass him. But Sophocles realised that the legends could not always be presented to the people with the same breadth of handling without their interest being gradually exhausted. It was therefore necessary to develop more vital action within the various tragedies, to conceive the characters more definitely, and excite a more vivid psychological interest.

Æschylus had already treated the trilogy in such a manner that it was not bound to the thread of a single myth, and the combination, if not dissolved by Sophocles, was so far loosened as to make each tragedy of the three complete in itself, leading up to its appropriate close within the limits of the action and capable of being judged as a separate composition. The result was much greater freedom, the motive of each play could be treated in fuller detail and the poetic picture enhanced by the prominence given to secondary characters. Thus, in his treatment of the legend of Orestes, Sophocles suffers the act of matricide and its perpetrator to fall into the background and gives quite a new turn to the familiar subject by making Electra the leading character in place of her brother Orestes, showing the whole course of the action as reflected in her spirit, and thus securing an opportunity of creating a study of varied emotion and a type of womanly heroism to which the picture of her sister's dissimilar temperament serves as an admirable foil.

In order to take full advantage of the resources of a more refined and advanced style of art, Sophocles introduced a third actor on the stage and thus opened the way to incomparably greater vividness of treatment no less than to much greater variety of colouring and grouping in the *dramatis personæ*. Moreover, Sophocles, though an adept in the song and dance, was the first poet to abandon the practice of appearing in the parts he had created. From that time the professions of poet and actor were distinct, and the art of the latter acquired greater independent value. A less active part, outside the scope of the action, was assigned to the chorus, and the dramatic element became more significantly prominent as the nucleus of the tragedy. Æschylus himself recognised the advance, for he not only adopted the improvements in the outward setting of tragedy thus effected, but spurred on by his younger rival, rose to the height of a maturer art in his dramas.

To the influence of Sophocles was due the increased fondness for Attic subjects; his *Triptolemus* extolled Attica as the home of a superior civilisation, which spread victoriously from that centre to distant lands, he brings the legend of Œdipus to an harmonious close on Attic soil, at Colonus, his own birth-place, and even in the *Electra* he manifests the Athenian point of view by taking the overthrow of unlawful dominion and the successful struggle for liberty as the purpose of the action.

His tragedies contributed more than any other works to give spiritual significance, as Pericles strove to do, to the age of Athenian might and splendour. Like Pericles, Sophocles endeavoured to maintain the ascendancy of the ancient worship and customs of the country, the unwritten precepts of sacred law, while at the same time mastering every step of intellectual progress and every enlargement of the bounds of knowledge. His diction bears the stamp of a trained and powerful intellect, which often carries terseness to the verge of obscurity; but with what skill does he preserve the charm of graceful expression, what a spirit of felicitous harmony pervades all his works! He was a man after Pericles' own heart, and his personal intimacy with the latter is proved by the gay and unaffected manner in which the

statesman treats the poet as his colleague in the camp. Sophocles was never a partisan or party writer in the same sense as Æschylus, and as Phrynichus seems to have been, but his art was a mirror of the noblest tendencies of the time, a glorified version of the Athens of Pericles. We meet with his clear and sound judgment on civil affairs in every passage in which he praises prudent counsel as the safeguard of states, and the Attic people rightly appreciated him as the true poet of his age, for none ever won so many prizes or enjoyed his fame so unmolested as Sophocles, nor could Euripides (who though only fifteen or sixteen years his junior belonged to a totally different era) gain any success as his rival until the age of Pericles was past. And even to him Sophocles was never obliged to yield the palm.

COMEDY

Side by side with tragedy, and from the same germ, *i.e.*, from the Bacchic festivities, comedy developed. It is full sister to tragedy, but grew up longer in rustic freedom and fell much later under the discipline and training of the city; and for that reason it retained more faithfully the character of its source. For its origin was the jollity of the vintage, the merry-making of country folk over the increase of another year, which is found in all wine-growing districts. Swarms of masked holiday-makers sang the praises of the genial god and in tipsy merriment played all kinds of jokes and tricks on every one who met the procession and gave an opening for pranks and raillery, the events of the day were freely exploited, and he who hit upon the merriest quips was rewarded by the hearty laughter and applause of a grateful audience.

Thus the autumnal festival was kept in Attica in its day, and more particularly in the district of Icaria, not far from Marathon. The worship of Dionysus as there celebrated made it in a manner the nursery of the whole body of Athenian drama, for Thespis came from Icaria. Thither, too, came Susarion of Megara, bringing from his native place the rude wit of Megarian farce and setting the fashion which remained in vogue for the time in Attica. From his school arose Mæson, who was very popular in the time of the Pisistratidæ. The next step was the transference of the rustic stage to the capital, where it was recognised by the government as a part of the Dionysian festival and supported out of the public funds. This took place in the time of Cimon, after the Persian wars, and the energetic temper which at that time pervaded the life of Athens proved its vigour by transforming the rude, half-foreign farce into a well-organised form of art, full of significance and thoroughly Attic in character, of which we must regard Chionides and Magnes of Icaria as the founders.

When once the Icarian drama was naturalised in the home of tragedy many of the concomitants of the tragic drama were transferred to it, public contests in comedy were instituted by the state, prizes were adjudicated and awarded, and the cost of the chorus was defrayed from the public funds; moreover it was similarly arranged in such matters as the stage, the dialogue, the chorus, and the number of actors, without, however, forfeiting its peculiar characteristics. For tragedy carried the spectators into a loftier sphere, and strove by every means at her command to present figures and conditions on a grander scale than that of ordinary life, while comedy maintained the closest relations with contemporary and common life. It remained more unaffected in dance, versification, and diction no less than in poetic design;

may, to such an extent did it retain its topical character and its adaptation to the events of the hour that the poet used the choir to interrupt the course of the action entirely in order to discuss his personal affairs or the burning questions of the time with the audience in lengthy *parabases*.

This kind of dramatic composition could only flourish in a democratic atmosphere, and it was associated with the democracy in every stage of its development. Occupied from the outset with the preposterous and ridiculous side of life, it castigated all follies, defects, and weaknesses, and amidst the variety and publicity of the civic life of Athens it could never lack either subjects for mirth or a witty, ingenious, and laughter-loving audience ready to catch at every allusion. But it also served the purpose of bringing abuses and contradictions in public life to light. This was the serious side of its calling, for unless inspired by a serious and patriotic temper its humour would have grown dull, ineffective, and contemptible. The aim of the comic poets was to be not mere frivolous provokers of mirth, but teachers of men, and leaders of the people, even as the tragic poets were; and in an age of feverish excitement the severest of their censures were directed against new-fangled ways. Comedy was aristocratic in character, it championed native custom against foreign ways, it ruthlessly denounced every evil tendency in life and art, and every instance of misconduct or abuse of power. It cherished the memory of the heroes of the Wars of Liberation and encouraged others to emulate their example, and it was fond of subjects which had some bearing on important contemporary events, as we see in the *Thracian Women* of Cratinus, which was associated with the establishment of colonies in Thrace.

The founders of comedy as an Attic art are Crates and Cratinus. Cratinus was slightly younger than Æschylus, and like him was endowed with original creative genius, but his taste for unrestrained freedom and his inexhaustible fund of humour marked him out as a born comic poet, while his rude veracity qualified him to make comedy a power in the state. It became so about the time that Pericles came into power, and though Cratinus was not the sort of man to commit himself unreservedly to one or other of the contesting parties, we know that in his *Archilochi* (a comedy in which the chorus was composed of scoffers like Archilochus) he brought an Attic citizen upon the stage immediately after the death of Cimon and put in his mouth a lament for "the divine man," "the most hospitable, the best of all Panhellenes, with whom he had hoped to spend a serene old age—but now he had passed away before him." The mighty Cratinus was succeeded by Aristophanes and Eupolis, both unmistakably akin to him in mind and feeling, but gentler, more moderate, and stricter in their adherence to the rules of art. But Aristophanes alone combined with these qualities a wealth of creative invention in nothing inferior to the genius of Cratinus.

THE GLOEY OF ATHENS

All these men, — philosophers and historians, orators and poets, — each one of whom marks an epoch in the development of art and science, were not merely contemporaries, but lived together in the same city, some born there and nourished from their youth on the glories of their native place, others attracted thither by the same glory; nor was their association merely local, they laboured, consciously or unconsciously, at a common task. For whether they were personally intimate or not with the great statesman who was the centre of the Attic world, nay, even if they were numbered among his

opponents, they could not but render him substantial help in his life-work of making Athens the intellectual capital of Greece.

Here whatever germs of culture were introduced from foreign parts gained new life, the Ionian study of countries and peoples became history as soon as Herodotus came into touch with Athens; the Peloponnesian dithyrambus grew into tragedy at Athens, the farce of Megara into Attic comedy; here the philosophy of Ionia and Magna Græcia met to supplement each other's defects and prepare the way for the development of Attic philosophy; even sophistry was nowhere turned to such account as at Athens. In earlier times every district, city, and island had had its peculiar school and tendencies, but now all vigorous intellectual movements

crowded together at Athens; local and tribal peculiarities of temperament and dialect were reconciled; and as the drama (the most Attic of all the arts) absorbed all art-methods into itself, to reproduce them in organic harmony, so from all the achievements of the genius of Greece there grew a general culture which was at once the heritage of Attica and of the Greek nation. Vehemently as other states might oppose the political predominance of Athens, none could deny that the city where Æschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus, Zeno, Anaxagoras, Protagoras, Crates, and Cratinus all laboured together, was the focus of all lofty aspirations, the heart of the nation, Hellas in Hellas.

Slight as is our knowledge of the personal relations of these great contemporaries, there are a few traditions from which we can gather some idea of the intercourse of Pericles with the most eminent among them and of their intercourse with one another. We know that Pericles equipped the chorus for a theatrical performance in which Æschylus carried off the prize. We know of the friendship of Herodotus and




HERODOTUS


Sophocles, and we actually possess the beginning of some occasional verses addressed to Herodotus by the poet, then in the fifty-fifth year of his age; a letter in elegiac metre dating from the time when the historian migrated to Thurii, and withdrew from the delightful society of the best men of Athens. Sophocles was before all things sociable, and we hear that he formed a circle of men skilled in the fine arts and dedicated it to the Muses, and that it held regular meetings. This reciprocal stimulus resulted in a steady advance in all directions. In every branch of art we can trace the epochs of development as surely as in the structure of the trimetre of the drama. But as, generally speaking, Greek art owed its unflinching progress to the fact that the younger artists did not endeavour to gain a start by rash attempts at originality, but held fast the good in all things and readily adopted and perfected methods that had once gained acceptance, so in Athens we see the elder masters gratefully praised and honoured by their pupils, like Æschylus by Sophocles and Cratinus by Aristophanes.

It is one of the most notable characteristics of the intellectual life of Athens that her eminent men, however high a view they took of their own calling, did not owe their pre-eminence in it to any narrow-minded restriction of their interest to their own peculiar sphere. This versatility was rendered possible by the vitality for which the contemporaries of Pericles were remarkable, and it seems as though the brilliant prime of the Greek nation manifested itself most plainly in the frequent combination of extraordinary mental and physical powers. We cannot but admire the men who retained their vital force unimpaired to extreme old age and advanced in the practice of their art to the last.

Sophocles, after having composed 113 dramas, is said to have read the chorus of the *Œdipus at Colonus* aloud, to disprove the rumour that he was incapable of managing his own affairs by reason of the infirmities of old age. Cratinus was ninety-one when he produced *Dame Bottle*, the saucy comedy with which he defeated Aristophanes, who had looked upon him as a rival whose day was over. Simonides, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno, were likewise examples of healthy and vigorous old age. Timocreon combined the skill of an athlete with the profession of a poet. Polus, Sophocles' favourite actor, was competent to take the leading part in eight tragedies in four days. Lastly, the sterling capacity and versatility of the masters of those days is shown by the fact that though extraordinarily prolific authors of imaginative works, they spared time to strive after scientific certainty concerning the problems and resources of their art, and combined absolute self-possession and the love of theoretical study with the enthusiasm of the artist temperament. Thus Lasus, the inventor of the perfected form of the dithyrambus, was at the same time an accomplished critic and one of the first writers on the theory of music; and Sophocles himself wrote a treatise on the tragic chorus, to set forth his views as to its place and purpose in tragedy. In like manner the most distinguished architects wrote scientific treatises on the principles of their art, Polyclitus worked out the theory of numbers which lies at the root of plastic symmetry, and Agatharchus the principles of optics, according to which he had arranged the decoration of the stage. In so doing he took the first step towards the teaching of perspective, which was subsequently developed by Democritus and Anaxagoras.⁶



ARISTOPHANES



CHAPTER XXX. THE OUTBREAK OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

No admirer of Greek civilisation can turn from the peaceful age of Pericles and follow the next step in Grecian history without a feeling of sadness, for he has to see the most cultured people of antiquity torn by internal dissensions and interstate jealousies; he has to see the people who represent the acme of culture harassed for a generation by an imbecile strife, which shall leave it so weakened that it will become an easy prey to outside foes. In every succeeding generation, when men have studied the history of classical times, the same feeling of amazement has prevailed, and has often found expression in contemplating this period of the Peloponnesian War; but it remained for John Ruskin to invent the vivid phrase which in three words epitomises the entire story, when he speaks of this amazing conflict as the "suicide of Greece." It was in truth nothing less than that.

There was no great question at issue between the Athenian and Spartan peoples that must be decided by the arbitrament of arms or otherwise. There was no reason outside the temperament of the people themselves why the Athenians on the one hand, and the Spartans on the other, might not have gone on indefinitely, each people pre-eminent in its own territory, and each standing aloof from the other; but that interstate jealousy which was responsible for so many things in Grecian history came as a determining influence which at last could not longer be controlled. Persian might, which dared not re-enter Greece, but which longed for the overthrow of an old enemy, urged on one side or the other, as seemed for the moment best to serve that end. The remaining Grecian cities took sides with Athens or Sparta according to their predilections, or their own personal enmities and jealousies, and there resulted a war which involved practically all the cities of Greece, and which, after continuing for a full generation, brought Hellas as a whole to destruction.

OUR SOURCES

The history of this war has been preserved to posterity in far greater detail than has the history of any preceding conflict anywhere in the world. The Athenian general Thucydides, who himself took an active part in the earlier stages of the war, commanding forces in the field until finally he suffered the displeasure of the Athenians, determined from the outset, as he himself tells us, to write a complete history of the conflict which he believed would be the most memorable of all in the annals of history. The work

which he produced has probably been more widely celebrated and more universally applauded than any other piece of historical composition that was ever written. All manner of extravagant things have been said about it. Every one has heard, for example, of Macaulay's saying that he felt he might perhaps equal any other piece of historical writing that had ever been done except the seventh book of Thucydides, before which he felt himself helpless. This eulogy is of a piece with much more that has been said in similar kind by a multitude of other critics. It has even been alleged that no historian of a later period has ever dealt out such impartial judgment as is to be found in the pages of Thucydides. Seemingly forgetful of the meaning of words, critics have even assured us that no period of like extent of the world's history, ancient or modern, is so fully known to us as this period of the Peloponnesian War through the history of Thucydides.

To any one, who himself will take up the history of Thucydides, either in the original or in such a translation as the admirable one of Dale, two things will at once be apparent; in the first place it will not long be open to doubt, to any one who is familiar with the literature of antiquity, that this work of Thucydides, considered in relation to the time in which it was written, is really an extraordinary production; but, in the second place, it will be equally clear that if we are to consider the work not in comparison with the writings of ancient authors but as a part of world-literature, then much that has been said of it must be regarded as fulsome eulogy.

To say that this work covers the period of the Peloponnesian War as no modern period of history has been covered; to say that no modern historian has dealt with his topic with the calm impartiality of Thucydides; to say that no writer can hope to produce an historical narrative comparable to the seventh book, or to any other book, of Thucydides—to say such things as these is to abandon the broad impartial view from which alone criticism worthy of the name is possible, and to come under the spell of other minds. *The History of the Peloponnesian War* is a great book; as an historical composition it is one of the greatest ever written: but when one has said that one has said enough. Its style, by common consent, is not such as to make it a model, and its matter is very largely the recital of bald facts with evidence of an insight into the political motives beneath the surface, which seems extraordinary only because the predecessors of Thucydides and some of his successors had seemed so woefully to lack such insight. As to the impartiality of the narrative, we must not overlook the significance of Professor Mahaffy's remark, that for most of the period covered in the history of Thucydides this history itself is our sole authority. That it does, nevertheless, evince a high degree of impartiality and a broad sweep of intellect on the part of its author will not be questioned; but Professor Mahaffy makes an estimate, which no one who is not fully under the spell of antiquity would think of disputing, when he asserts his belief that such modern historians as, for example, Thirlwall, must be accredited with at least as high a degree of impartiality as Thucydides can claim.

But all this must not be taken as in any sense denying that the work of Thucydides is a marvellous production. Considering the time when it was written, and that its author was a participant in many of the events which he describes, it is astonishing that his work should be measurably free from partiality. That it is so was, perhaps, at least in some measure, due to the fact that Thucydides was banished from Athens, and hence wrote his history not so much from the Athenian standpoint, as from the standpoint of a man without a country, who was at enmity with both Spartans and Athenians.

But, partial or impartial, the history of Thucydides remains, and presumably must always remain, the sole contemporary record open to posterity of that great struggle through which Greece, as it were, voluntarily threw away her prestige and her power.

Thucydides, to be sure, did not complete his history of the war, or, if he did, his later chapters have not been preserved to us. The former supposition is doubtless the correct one, because the thread of the narrative, which Thucydides dropped so abruptly, was taken up by Xenophon, also a contemporary. It was a not unusual custom among the ancient authors to write important works as explicit continuations of the works of other writers. Xenophon's narrative of the events of the later years of the Peloponnesian War is such a work. Like the history of Thucydides it is practically our sole authority for the period that it covers, but, by common consent of critics, it takes a much lower level than the work which it supplements.

Xenophon was also an exile from Athens; but he differed from Thucydides in being an ardent friend of Sparta, and his prejudices are well known to readers of his works. One must suppose, however, that the favourite pupil of Socrates may be depended upon for reasonable impartiality when he deals with matters of fact. But, be this as it may, it is Xenophon, and Xenophon alone, who tells us most that we know at first hand, not alone of the closing years of the Peloponnesian War, but of many in the period succeeding. We shall constantly support our narrative of the events of this period, therefore, by references to the pages of Xenophon, as well as to those of Thucydides.^a

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR

Even before the recent hostilities at Corcyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty Years' Truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence and general slowness in resolving might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians — but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed — had given them no encouragement.


The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Pericles, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views. The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Corcyraean dispute, was her decree passed in regard to Megara, prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition

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was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosure. In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemocritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians. We may reasonably suppose that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before — which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief — the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge. Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty Years' Truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce, and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Pericles compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Corcyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others; complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus — either in violation of the Thirty Years' Truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies; but if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy — if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general



ATTENDANT OF A GREEK
WARRIOR
(From a vase)

assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydides has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the ephor, Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydides himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the 'Thirty Years' Truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew that, as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure—of Athens, as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height, especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterwards to build the Long Walls from the city to the sea. The Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy, not by acting, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow. In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologising for the tartness of these reproofs—which however, as the Spartans were now well disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. "You do not reflect" he says "how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. They are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: you are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires. They again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own

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judgment, and keep alive their hopes in desperate circumstances : your peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power, you have no faith even in what your judgment guarantees, when in difficulties you despair of all escape. They never hang back, you are habitual laggards : they love foreign service, you cannot stir from home : for they are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some further gain, while you fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march ; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others, while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service. When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them : yet the acquisitions when realised appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want ; for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at are almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase, knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty, and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper that they will neither remain at rest themselves nor allow rest to others.

"Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians — yet ye still hang back from action. Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character : but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious ; and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act, yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance. It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours."

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens, if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica, they (the Corinthians) would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past, and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future, to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up, and

what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.

In her position, he asserted, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise — no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they had suffered, while under Persia; worse they would suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens this was only because subjects always hated the present dominion, whatever that might be.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken. At any time previous to the affair of Corcyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all “strangers,” and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language — expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion: the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honour of Sparta only. He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens — and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down. Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error; such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation. Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this — which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them *in terrorem* without being actually consumed — so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years, war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold them responsible for

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the good or bad issue of what was now determined ; admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valour.

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan ; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas, one of the five ephors to whom it fell to put the question for voting, closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man, the temper of the assembly, and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgment, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

"I don't understand," he said, "these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge — that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good. But we are the same now as we were then : we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong : we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings. Others have in abundance wealth, ships, and horses — but we have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians : nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Nor let any one tell us that we can with honour deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong — it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are : let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers."

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly — which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the *ay* or *no* of the English House of Commons — the presiding ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger. Yet Sthenelaidas affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority — since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He therefore directed a division — like the speaker of the English House of Commons when his decision in favour of *ay* or *no* is questioned by any member — "Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to that side ; such as think the contrary, to the other side." The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydides seems hardly certain that it was really given) was — that if

they did their best they would be victorious, and that the gods would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately: and the majority decided for war. This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately, may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.


Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty Years' Truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest; and if Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians. Thucydides, recognising these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies. That the extraordinary aggrandisement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well-calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B.C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the Thirty Years' Truce — and moreover that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was likely to grow.

Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out scarcely any hope of possible gain, and the certainty of prodigious loss and privation — even granting that at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Pericles, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Coreyræan dispute. But Pericles was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens — and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan

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assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose — of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel. Meanwhile the deputies retiring home from the congress to their respective cities carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.



GREEK HELMETS AND STANDARD

PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFLICT

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Pericles, their chief opponent in that city. His mother Agariste belonged to the great family of the Alcæonids, who were supposed to be under an inexorable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor Megacles nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Cylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses. Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre: about seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Cleomenes, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Clisthenes (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Cleomenes to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras, the rival of Clisthenes, had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Pericles (the grand-nephew of Clisthenes), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies: religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out." If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Pericles with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety; and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Pericles with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it; and not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed, as we have seen,

through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him — his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Phidias. It is said also that Dracontides proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Pericles should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dicasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar: this latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dicasts should be fifteen hundred in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.

If Pericles was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honourably acquitted: for the language of Thucydides respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of peculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried; indeed, another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanes in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian War, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Pericles, in order to escape this danger, “blew up the Peloponnesian War,” and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her, especially that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on. We know enough, however, to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Pericles were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydides that the war depended upon far deeper causes — that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it; that it was not Pericles, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is that, in a year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian War, Pericles was hard pressed by the accusations of political enemies — perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection. And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient Cylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Pericles and his family might be banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war; to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honour even by the greatest Athenian families. On this occasion, however, the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alcæmonids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had an account of sacrilege to clear off: for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants; and the sanctuary of Athene Chalciecus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege, was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Pericles. Probably the actual effect of that demand was to strengthen him in the public esteem — very different from the effect of the same manœuvre when practised before by Cleomenes against Clisthenes.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required: (1) to withdraw their troops from

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Potidæa; (2) to replace Ægina in its autonomy; (3) to repeal the bill of exclusion against the Megarians.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that the war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periclean leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa; but on the other hand, the party opposed to Pericles would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and this advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained however on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war and had sent three envoys in mere compliance with the exigencies of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: “The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it may stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous.” Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favour of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such however was not the fact.

The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the majority of the assembly, while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of the war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Pericles for refusing to concede such a trifle. Against this opinion Pericles entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halicarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydides: the latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians. Now let none of you believe that we shall be going to war about a trifle if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war—let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you upon a footing of equality.”

Pericles then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public : they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war : they were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means : in a border-war or a single land battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief ; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi. For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards, Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics : she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens was vulnerable : Attica unfortunately was not an island — it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land battle to avert it : they had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, and they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.

“ Mourn not for the loss of land and house,” continued the orator : “ reserve your mourning for men : houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them. Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many further grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourself new self-imposed risks ; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy. But these are matters for further discussion, when we come to actual operations : for the present, let us dismiss these envoys with the answer — That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory ; for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other : That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we had them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made ; and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to their allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta : That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought to make up our minds that war is inevitable : the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack : and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians — having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess — both repelled the invader and brought

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matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors."

These animating encouragements of Pericles carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration, but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand. With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydides, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Pericles. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will ever submit to, and as would have even left her without decent security for her individual rights. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian War to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case.

The aggressive sentiment, partly fear and partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the 'Thirty Years' Truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy, the truce could hardly be said to be in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture.

A few weeks undoubtedly passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse; though individuals who passed the borders did not think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course greater probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Platæa, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise which marks the opening of hostilities in the Peloponnesian war.^b



GREEK HELMETS

THE SURPRISE OF PLATÆA

War had been only threatened, not declared; and peaceful intercourse, though not wholly free from distrust, was still kept up between the subjects of the two confederacies. But early in the following spring, 431 B.C., in the fifteenth year of the Thirty Years' Truce, an event took place which closed all prospects of peace, precipitated the commencement of war, embittered the animosity of the contending parties, and prepared some of the most tragical scenes of the ensuing history. In the dead of night the city of Plataea was surprised by a body of three hundred Thebans, commanded by two of the great officers called *Bœotarchs*. They had been invited by a Plataean named Nauchides, and others of the same party, who hoped with the aid of the Thebans to rid themselves of their political opponents, and to break off the relation in which their city was standing to Athens, and transfer its alliance to Thebes. The Thebans, foreseeing that a general war was fast approaching, felt the less scruple in strengthening themselves by this acquisition, while it might be made with little cost and risk. The gates were unguarded, as in time of peace, and one of them was secretly opened to the invaders, who advanced without interruption into the marketplace. Their Plataean friends wished to lead them at once to the houses of their adversaries, and to glut their hatred by a massacre. But the Thebans were more anxious to secure the possession of the city, and feared to provoke resistance by an act of violence. Having therefore halted in the marketplace, they made a proclamation inviting all who were willing that Plataea should become again, as it had been in former times, a member of the Bœotian body, to join them.

The Plataeans who were not in the plot, imagined the force by which their city had been surprised to be much stronger than it really was, and, as no hostile treatment was offered to them, remained quiet, and entered into a parley with the Thebans. In the course of these conferences they gradually discovered that the number of the enemy was small, and might be easily overpowered; and, as they were in general attached to the Athenians, or at least strongly averse to an alliance with Thebes, they resolved to make the attempt, while the darkness might favour them, and perplex the strangers. To avoid suspicion they met to concert their plan of operation by means of passages opened through the walls of their houses; and having barricaded the streets with wagons, and made such other preparations as they thought necessary, a little before daybreak they suddenly fell upon the Thebans.

The little band made a vigorous defence, and twice or thrice repulsed the assailants; but as these still returned to the charge, and were assisted by

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the women and slaves, who showered stones and tiles from the houses on the enemy, all at the same time raising a tumultuous clamour, and a heavy rain increased the confusion caused by the darkness, they at length lost their presence of mind, and took to flight. But most were unable to find their way in the dark through a strange town, and several were slain as they wandered to and fro in search of an outlet. The gate by which they were admitted had in the meanwhile been closed, and no other was open. Some, pressed by their pursuers, mounted the walls, and threw themselves down on the outside, but for the most part were killed by the fall. A few were fortunate enough to break open one of the gates in a lone quarter, with an axe which they obtained from a woman, and to effect their escape. The main body, which had kept together, entered a large building adjoining the walls, having mistaken its gates, which they found open, for those of the town, and were shut in. The Plataeans at first thought of setting fire to the building; but at length the men within, as well as the rest of the Thebans who were still wandering up and down the streets, surrendered at discretion.

Before their departure from Thebes it had been concerted that as large a force as could be raised should march the same night to support them. The distance between the two places was not quite nine miles, and these troops were expected to reach the gates of Plataea before the morning; but the Asopus, which crossed their road, had been swollen by the rain, and the state of the ground and the weather otherwise retarded them, so that they were still on their way when they heard of the failure of the enterprise. Though they did not know the fate of their countrymen, as it was possible that some might have been taken prisoners, they were at first inclined to seize as many of the Plataeans as they could find without the walls, and to keep them as hostages. The Plataeans anticipated this design, and were alarmed, for many of their fellow citizens were living out of the town in the security of peace, and there was much valuable property in the country. They therefore sent a herald to the Theban army to complain of their treacherous attack, and call upon them to abstain from further aggression, and to threaten that, if any was offered, the prisoners should answer for it with their lives. The Thebans afterwards alleged that they had received a promise, confirmed by an oath, that, on condition of their retiring from the Plataean territory, the prisoners should be released; and Thucydides seems disposed to believe this statement. The Plataeans denied that they had pledged themselves to spare the lives of the prisoners, unless they should come to terms on the whole matter with the Thebans; but it does not seem likely that, after ascertaining the state of the case, the Thebans would have been satisfied with so slight a security. It is certain however that they retired, and that the Plataeans, as soon as they had transported their movable property out of the country into the town, put to death all the prisoners—amounting to 180, and including Eurymachus, the principal author of the enterprise, and the man who possessed the greatest influence in Thebes.

On the first entrance of the Thebans into Plataea a messenger had been despatched to Athens with the intelligence, and the Athenians had immediately laid all the Boeotians in Attica under arrest; and when another messenger brought the news of the victory gained by the Plataeans, they sent a herald to request that they would reserve the prisoners for the disposal of the Athenians. The herald came too late to prevent the execution: and the Athenians, foreseeing that Plataea would stand in great need of defence, sent

a body of troops to garrison it, supplied it with provisions, and removed the women and children and all persons unfit for service in a siege.

After this event it was apparent that the quarrel could only be decided by arms. Plataea was so intimately united with Athens, that the Athenians felt the attack which had been made on it as an outrage offered to themselves, and prepared for immediate hostilities. Sparta, too, instantly sent notice to all her allies to get their contingents ready by an appointed day for the invasion of Attica. Two-thirds of the whole force which each raised were ordered to march, and when the time came assembled in the isthmus, where King Archidamus put himself at their head. An army more formidable, both in numbers and spirit, had never issued from the peninsula; and Archidamus thought it advisable, before they set out, to call the principal officers together, and to urge the necessity of proceeding with caution and maintaining exact discipline, as soon as they should have entered the enemy's territory; admonishing them not to be so far elated by their superior numbers as to believe that the Athenians would certainly remain passive spectators of their inroads. And though all except himself were impatient to move, he would not yet take the decisive step, without making one attempt more to avert its necessity. He still cherished a faint hope, that the resolution of the Athenians might be shaken by the prospect of the evils of war which were now so imminent, and he sent Melesippus to sound their disposition. But the envoy was not able to obtain an audience from the people, nor so much as to enter the walls. A decree had been made, at the instigation of Pericles, to receive no embassy from the Spartans while they should be under arms. Melesippus was informed that if his government wished to treat with Athens, it must first recall its forces. He himself was ordered to quit Attica that very day, and persons were appointed to conduct him to the frontier, to prevent him from holding communication with any one by the way. On parting with his conductors he exclaimed, "This day will be the beginning of great evils to Greece."

Such a prediction might well occur to any one, who reflected on the nature of the two powers which were now coming into conflict, and on the great resources of both, which, though totally different in kind, were so evenly balanced that no human eye could perceive in which scale victory hung; and the termination of the struggle could seem near only to one darkened by passion. The strength of Sparta, as was implied in the observation of Sthenelaidas, lay in the armies which she could collect from the states of her confederacy. The force which she could thus bring into the field is admitted by Pericles, in one of the speeches ascribed to him by Thucydides, to be capable of making head against any that could be raised by the united efforts of the rest of Greece. Within the isthmus her allies included all the states of Peloponnesus, except Achaia and Argos; and the latter was bound to neutrality by a truce which still wanted several years of its term. Hence the great contest now beginning was not improperly called the Peloponnesian War. Beyond the isthmus she was supported by Megara and Thebes, which drew the rest of Bœotia along with it; and Attica would thus have been completely surrounded on the land side by hostile territories, if Plataea and Oropus had not been politically attached to it. The Locrians of Opus, the Dorians of the mother-country, and the Phocians (though these last were secretly more inclined to the Athenians, who had always taken their part in their quarrels with Delphi, the stanch friend of Sparta) were also on her side. Thessaly, Acarnania, and the Amphilocheian Argos, were in alliance with her enemy; but for this very reason, and more especially from their hostility to the

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Messenians of Naupactus, the Ætolians were friendly to her ; and she could also reckon on the Corinthian colonies, Anactorium, Ambracia, and Leucas.

The power which Sparta exerted over her allies was much more narrowly limited than that which Athens had assumed over her subjects. The Spartan influence rested partly on the national affinity by which the head was united to the Dorian members of the confederacy, but still more on the conformity, which she established or maintained among all of them, to her own oligarchical institutions. This was the only point in which she encroached on the independence of any. Every state had a voice in the deliberations by which its interests might be affected ; and if Sparta determined the amount of the contributions required by extraordinary occasions, she was obliged carefully to adjust it to the ability of each community. So far was she from enriching herself at the expense of the confederacy, that at the beginning of the war there was, as we have seen, no common treasure belonging to it, and no regular tribute for common purposes. But, to compensate for these defects, her power stood on a more durable basis of goodwill than that of Athens ; and though in every state there was a party attached to the Athenian interest on political grounds, yet on the whole the Spartan cause was popular throughout Greece ; and while Athens was forced to keep a jealous eye on all her subjects, and was in continual fear of losing them, Sparta, secure of the loyalty of her own allies, could calmly watch for opportunities of profiting by the disaffection of those of her rivals.

At home indeed her state was far from sound, and the Athenians were well aware of her vulnerable side ; but abroad, and as chief of the Peloponnesian confederacy, she presented the majestic and winning aspect of the champion of liberty against Athenian tyranny and ambition : and hence she had important advantages to hope from states which were but remotely connected with her, and were quite beyond the reach of her arms. Many powerful cities in Italy and Sicily were thus induced to promise her their aid, and it was on this she founded her chief expectations of forming a navy, which might face that of Athens. Her allies in this quarter engaged to furnish her with money and ships, which, it was calculated, would amount to no less than five hundred, though for the present it was agreed that they should wear the mask of neutrality, and admit single Athenian vessels into their ports. But as she was conscious that she should still be deficient in the sinews of war, she already began to turn her eyes to the common enemy of Greece, who was able abundantly to supply this want, and would probably be willing to lavish his gold for the sake of ruining Athens, the object of his especial enmity and dread.

The extent of the Athenian empire cannot be so exactly computed. In the language of the comic stage, it is said to comprehend a thousand cities ; and it is difficult to estimate what abatement ought to be made from this playful exaggeration. The subjects of Athens were in general more opulent than the allies of Sparta, and their sovereign disposed of their revenues at her pleasure. The only states to which she granted more than a nominal independence were some islands in the western seas, Corcyra, Zacynthus, and Cephallenia — points of peculiar importance to her operations and prospects in that quarter, though even there she was more feared than loved. At the moment of the revolt of Potidæa her empire had reached its widest range, and her finances were in the most flourishing condition ; and at the outbreak of the war her naval and military strength was at its greatest height. Pericles, as one of the ten regular generals, or ministers of war, before the Peloponnesian army had reached the frontier, held an assembly,

in which he gave an exact account of the resources which the republic had at her disposal.

Her finances, beside the revenue which she drew from a variety of sources, foreign and domestic, were nourished by the annual tribute of her allies, which now amounted to six hundred talents [£120,000 or \$600,000]. Six thousand, in money, still remained in the treasury, after the great expenditure incurred on account of the public buildings, and the siege of Potidæa, before which the sum had amounted to nearly ten thousand. But to this, Pericles observed, must be added the gold and silver which, in various forms of offerings, ornaments, and sacred utensils, enriched the temples or public places, which he calculated at five hundred talents, without reckoning the precious materials employed in the statues of the gods and heroes. The statue of Athene in the Parthenon alone contained forty talents, weight of pure gold, in the ægis, shield, and other appendages. If they should ever be reduced to the want of such a supply, there could be no doubt that their tutelary goddess would willingly part with her ornaments for their service, on condition that they were replaced at the earliest opportunity.

They could muster a force of 13,000 heavy-armed, beside those who were employed in their various garrisons, and in the defence of the city itself, with the long walls and the fortifications of its harbours, who amounted to 16,000 more; made up, indeed, partly of the resident aliens, and partly of citizens on either verge of the military age. The military force also included 1200 calvary and 1600 bowmen, beside some who were mounted; and they had 300 galleys in sailing condition.

PERICLES' RECONCENTRATION POLICY

After rousing the confidence of the Athenians by this enumeration, Pericles urged them without delay to transport their families and all their movable property out of the enemy's reach, and, as long as the war should last, to look upon the capital as their home. To encourage a patriotic spirit by his example, and at the same time to secure himself from imputations to which he might be exposed, either by the Spartan cunning, or by an indiscreet display of private friendship, he publicly declared, that if Archidamus, who was personally attached to him by the ties of hospitality, should, either from this motive, or in compliance with orders which might be given in an opposite intention, exempt his lands from the ravages of war, they should from that time become the property of the state.


To many of his hearers that which he required was a very painful sacrifice. Many had been born, and had passed all their lives, in the country. They were attached to it, not merely by the profit or the pleasure of rural pursuits, but by domestic and religious associations. For though the incorporation of the Attic townships had for ages extinguished their political independence, it had not interrupted their religious traditions, or effaced the peculiar features of their local worship; and hence the Attic countryman clung to his deme with a fondness which he could not feel for the great city. In the period of increasing prosperity which had followed the Persian invasion, the country had been cultivated and adorned more assiduously than ever. All was now to be left or carried away. Reluctantly they adopted the decree which Pericles proposed; and, with heavy hearts, as if going into exile, they quitted their native and hereditary seats. If the rich man sighed to part from his elegant villa, the husbandman still more deeply

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felt the pang of being torn from his home, and of abandoning his beloved fields, the scenes of his infancy, the holy places where his forefathers had worshipped, to the ravages of a merciless invader. All however was removed: the flocks and cattle to Eubœa and other adjacent islands; all beside that was portable, and even the timber of the houses, into Athens, to which they themselves migrated with their families.

The city itself was not prepared for the sudden influx of so many new inhabitants. A few found shelter under the roofs of relatives or friends; but the greater part, on their arrival, found themselves houseless as well as homeless. Some took refuge in such temples as were usually open; others occupied the towers of the walls; others raised temporary hovels on any vacant ground which they could find in the city, and even resorted for this purpose to a site which had hitherto been guarded from all such uses by policy, aided by a religious sanction. It was the place under the western wall of the citadel, called, from the ancient builders of the wall, the Pelasgicum: a curse had been pronounced on any one who should tenant it; and men remembered some words of an oracle, which declared it *better untrodden*. The real motive for the prohibition was probably the security of the citadel; but all police seems to have been suspended by the urgency of the occasion. It was some time before the newcomers bethought themselves of spreading over the vacant space between the long walls, or of descending to Piræus. But this foretaste of the evils of war did not damp the general ardour, especially that of the youthful spirits, which began at Athens, as elsewhere, to be impatient of repose. Numberless oracles and predictions were circulated, in which every one found something that accorded with the tone of his feelings. Even those who had no definite hopes, fears, or wishes shared the excitement of men on the eve of a great crisis. The holy island of Delos had been recently shaken by an earthquake. It was forgotten, or was never known out of Delos itself, that this had happened already, just before the first Persian invasion. It was deemed a portent, which signified new and extraordinary events, and it was soon combined with other prodigies, which tended to encourage similar forebodings. Such was the state in which the Athenians awaited the advance of the Peloponnesian army.^c

Adolf Holme compares the Periclean policy of voluntary reconcentration with the acts of the Dutch, when in the sixteenth century they let the Spanish destroy their crops, and then opened the dikes and flooded their own country. We may compare also the compulsory reconcentration of the country people in the cities as carried out by General Weyler in Cuba, in 1897, and by Lord Kitchener in South Africa, in 1901.^a



OFFICERS' HELMETS

THE FIRST YEAR'S RAVAGE

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica — which territory he entered by the road of Cœnoë, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica

towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Cœnoe, which had been put in so good a state of defence that, after all the various modes of assault—in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful—had been tried in vain, and after a delay of several days before the place, he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king, his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Cœnoe, were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

After having spent several days before Cœnoe without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Platæa. His army was of irresistible force, not less than sixty thousand hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch, or of one hundred thousand, according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder, even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light armed also. But as Thucydides, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right hand until he came to Cropia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ.

He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and northwesterly from Athens, and visible from the city walls; and here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than three thousand hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal burning from the forests of ilex on the neighbouring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanes, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy “hearts of oak,” but peculiarly vehement and irritable. It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme, which could not have contained less than twelve thousand free inhabitants of both sexes

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and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves, completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost in inflaming this temper, and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.

Though his calculation was not realised, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Pericles, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Plistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens, generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together, angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Pericles was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering: he was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general: the rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practical means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten. This burst of spontaneous discontent was of course fomented by the numerous political enemies of Pericles, and particularly by Cleon,¹ now rising into importance as an opposition-speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public.

But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgment or the firmness of Pericles. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene a public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorised character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens. It appears that he as general, or rather the board of ten generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the ecclesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting, and of postponing even those regular

¹ "Cleon," says Thucydides, "attacked him with great acrimony, making use of the general resentment against Pericles, as a means to increase his own popularity, as Hermippus testifies in these verses:—

"Sleeps then, thou king of Satyrs, sleeps the spear,
While thundering words make war? Why boast thy prowess,
Yet shudder at the sound of sharpened swords,
Spite of the flaming Cleon?"

meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realising itself in any rash public resolution. That Pericles should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honourable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact that his refusal to call the ecclesia was efficacious to prevent the ecclesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the ecclesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution — assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Pericles, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion — is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Pericles thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder. At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica. Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Achaenæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a northwesterly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilessus and Mount Parnes, on the road passing through Decelea. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the northwestern road near Oropus, which brought them into Bœotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens — the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes. It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

Meanwhile, the Athenian expedition, under Caranus, Proteas, and Socrates, joined by fifty Corcyraean ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methone (Modon), on the southwestern peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory. The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas, the son of Tellis — a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards — who happened to be on guard at a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with one hundred men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark — an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honours bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighbourhood and three hundred chosen men from the central Elean territory. Strong winds on a harbourless coast now

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induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbour of Phea on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Phea and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked — the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Acarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighbouring Acarnanian town of Palærus, as well as Astacus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Cephallenia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion — with its four distinct towns or districts, Pale, Cranii, Same, and Proni. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September — the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydides.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Cleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Locrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Locrian towns of Thronium and Alope were sacked, and further devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalante opposite to the Locrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Locrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa. It was further determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans, with their wives and children, were all put on ship-board and landed in Peloponnesus, where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos; some of them, however, found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian cleruchs, or citizen proprietors, sent hither by lot.

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that Athens could never hold out more than a year or two, and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Pericles, and laid waste the greater part of the territory; while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, joined their fellow citizens in the Megarid, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together; there were ten thousand citizen hoplites (independent of three thousand others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa), and three thousand metic hoplites, besides a large number of light troops. Against so large a force the

Megarians could make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian ecclesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the strategi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office, that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable. Not only their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables were rooted up, and their situation was that of a besieged city pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, many centuries afterward, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment are to be added. Moreover, Thucydides notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August; had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme. Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land; what these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000] out of the treasure in the Acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make any different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover, they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity. It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against the proposer of this forbidden change, and next appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mitford¹ to

¹ "A measure followed which, taking place at the time when Thucydides wrote and Pericles spoke, and while Pericles held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks," says Mr. Mitford, "both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism of democratical government. A decree of the people directed that a thousand talents should be set apart in the treasury in the citadel, as a deposit, not to be touched unless the enemy should attack the city by sea; a circumstance which implied the prior ruin of the Athenian fleet, and the only one, it was supposed, which could superinduce the ruin of the commonwealth. But in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant, the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus, no balancing power remained, confidence so failed that the denunciation of capital punishment was added against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should concur in, any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances. It was at the same time ordered, by the same authority, that a hundred triremes should be yearly selected, the best of the fleet, to be employed on the same occasion only."

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be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government. But we must recollect, first, that the sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative; and if he obtained an affirmative decision he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden; next, he would move the proposition itself; in fact, such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done. But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve; it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose; it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgment of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.


Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, we consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Pericles, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Pericles (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Piræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is truly wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency: and we shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be forever to the credit of their

foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered further abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disembarking and ravaging parts of the Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade, and of the neighbouring Chalcidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalces, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodorus, a citizen of Abdera; who engaged to render him, and his son Sadocus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdera, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodorus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Sitalces that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honour of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadocus. Nymphodorus further established a good understanding between Perdicas II of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalcidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover, the town of Astacus in Acarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer, in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and one thousand hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Acarnania and upon the island of Cephallenia. in the latter they were entrapped into an ambushade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.^b



GREEK TERRA-COTTA
(In the British Museum)



CHAPTER XXXI. THE PLAGUE; AND THE DEATH OF PERICLES

THE ORATION OF PERICLES

It was towards the close of autumn that Pericles, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign, on the occasion of the conquest of Samos. One of the remarkable features in this discourse is its business-like, impersonal character: it is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and to decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby their forefathers and they had acquired it—Pericles proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.

“We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbours,—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the Many and not towards the Few: in regard to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man; while looking to public affairs, and to claims of individual influence, every man’s chance of advancement is determined not by party favour but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department: nor does poverty, or obscure station, keep him back, if he really has the means of benefiting the city. And our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other’s diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks, which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame.

“Besides this, we have provided for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments, the daily

charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no *xenelasia* to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him; for we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our native bravery, for warlike efficiency. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy — partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all — if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

“Now if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law — we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

“In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated: we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it disgraceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he may rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also — the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders — or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasonings about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities — extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness — debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

“In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece; while, viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality; and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all cities

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stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded by suffering defeat from feeble hands — her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior. Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, while the truth when known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

“Such is the city on behalf of which these warriors have nobly died in battle, vindicating her just title to unimpaired rights — and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence — and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her.”

Pericles pursues at considerable additional length the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which we have already made is so long, that no further addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians — is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Pericles, as well as in others afterwards. “Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honourable sense of shame in their actions” — such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse — an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another — and an absence even of those “black looks” which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Pericles deserves particular attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies — an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta — it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the

Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Pericles contrasts with the *xenelasia* or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly, an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgment, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow citizens of the speaker. It must be taken however as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Pericles and his contemporaries; nor would it have suited either the period of the Persian War fifty years before, or that of Demosthenes seventy years afterwards.

At the former period, the art, letters, philosophy, adverted to with pride by Pericles, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which we have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian War, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all—but noway surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Pericles delivered his discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was delivered at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum: for though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty Years' Truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, in so far as the sense of greatness was concerned; and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was delivered at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which

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Pericles never disguised either to himself or to his fellow citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripides had designated it in his tragedy *Medea*, represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus—and a picture of Athens in her social glory was well calculated both to arouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country residences and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city. Such calamities might indeed be foreseen: but there was one still greater calamity, which, though actually then impending, could not be foreseen.^b

At the very beginning of the next summer the Peloponnesians and their allies, with two-thirds of their forces, as on the first occasion, invaded Attica, under the command of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians; and after encamping, they laid waste the country. When they had not yet been many days in Attica, the plague first began to show itself among the Athenians; though it was said to have previously lighted on many places, about Lemnos and elsewhere. Such a pestilence, however, and loss of life as this, was nowhere remembered to have happened. For neither were physicians of any avail at first, treating it as they did, in ignorance of its nature,—nay, they themselves died most of all, inasmuch as they most visited the sick,—nor any other art of man. And as to the supplications that they offered in their temples, or the divinations, and similar means, that they had recourse to, they were all unavailing; and at last they ceased from them, being overcome by the pressure of the calamity.

THUCYDIDES' ACCOUNT OF THE PLAGUE

It is said to have first begun in the part of Ethiopia above Egypt, and then to have come down into Egypt, and Libya, and the greatest part of the king's territory.¹ On the city of Athens it fell suddenly, and first attacked the men in the Piræus; so that it was even reported by them that the Peloponnesians had thrown poison into the cisterns; for as yet there were no fountains there. Afterwards it reached the upper city also; and then they died much more generally. Now let every one, whether physician or unprofessional man, speak on the subject according to his views; from what source it was likely to have arisen, and the causes which he thinks were sufficient to have produced so great a change from health to universal sickness. I, however, shall only describe what was its character; and explain those symptoms by reference to which one might best be enabled to recognise it through this previous acquaintance, if it should ever break out again; for I was both attacked by it myself, and had personal observation of others who were suffering with it.

That year then, as was generally allowed, happened to be of all years the most free from disease, so far as regards other disorders; and if any one had any previous sickness, all terminated in this. Others, without any ostensible cause, but suddenly, while in the enjoyment of health, were seized at first with violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation of the eyes; and the internal parts, both the throat and the tongue, immediately

[¹ At the same time a plague was raging in Rome. The pestilence is believed to have been carried along the Carthaginian trade routes. It brought the population of Athens from 100,000 down below 80,000.]

assumed a bloody tinge, and emitted an unnatural and fetid breath. Next after these symptoms, sneezing and hoarseness came on; and in a short time the pain descended to the chest, with a violent cough. When it settled in the stomach, it caused vomiting; and all the discharges of bile that have been mentioned by physicians succeeded, and those accompanied with great suffering. An ineffectual retching also followed in most cases, producing a violent spasm, which in some cases ceased soon afterwards, in others not until a long time later.

Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor was it pale; but



GREEK FUNERAL PYRE

reddish, livid, and broken out in small pimples and sores. But the internal parts were burnt to such a degree that they could not bear clothing or linen of the very lightest kind to be laid upon them, nor to be anything else but stark naked; but would most gladly have thrown themselves into cold water if they could. Indeed many of those who were not taken care of did so, plunging into cisterns in the agony of their unquenchable thirst: and it was all the same whether they drank much or little. Moreover, the misery of restlessness and wakefulness continually oppressed them. The body did not waste away so long as the disease was at its height, but resisted it beyond all expectation: so that they either died in most cases on the ninth or the seventh day, through the internal burning, while they had still some degree of strength; or if they escaped that stage of the disorder, then, after it had further descended into the bowels, and violent ulceration was produced in them, and intense diarrhœa had come on, the greater part were afterwards carried off through the weakness occasioned by it. For the disease, which was originally seated in the head, beginning from above, passed throughout the whole body; and if any one survived its most fatal consequences, yet it marked him by laying hold of his extremities; for it settled on the pudenda, and fingers, and toes, and many escaped with the loss of these, while some also lost their eyes. Others, again, were seized on their first recovery with forgetfulness of everything alike, and did not know either themselves or their friends.

For the character of the disorder surpassed description; and while in other respects also it attacked every one in a degree more grievous than human nature could endure, in the following way, especially, it proved itself

[420 B.C.]

to be something different from any of the diseases familiar to man.¹ All the birds and beasts that prey on human bodies, either did not come near them, though there were many lying unburied, or died after they had tasted them. As a proof of this, there was a marked disappearance of birds of this kind, and they were not seen either engaged in this way, or in any other; while the dogs, from their domestic habits, more clearly afforded opportunity of marking the result I have mentioned.

The disease, then, to pass over many various points of peculiarity, as it happened to be different in one case from another, was in its general nature such as I have described. And no other of those to which they were accustomed afflicted them besides this at that time; or whatever there was, it ended in this. And of those who were seized by it some died in neglect, others in the midst of every attention. And there was no one settled remedy, so to speak, by applying which they were to give them relief: for what did good to one, did harm to another. And no constitution showed itself fortified against it, in point either of strength or weakness: but it seized on all alike, even those that were treated with all possible regard to diet. But the most dreadful part of the whole calamity was the dejection felt whenever any one found himself sickening (for by immediately falling into a feeling of despair, they abandoned themselves much more certainly to the disease, and did not resist it), and the fact of their being charged with infection from attending on one another, and so dying like sheep. And it was this that caused the greatest mortality amongst them; for if through fear they were unwilling to visit each other, they perished from being deserted, and many houses were emptied for want of some one to attend to the sufferers; or if they did visit them, they met their death, and especially such as made any pretensions to goodness; for through a feeling of shame they were unsparing of themselves, in going into their friends' houses when deserted by all others; since even the members of the family were at length worn out by the very moanings of the dying, and were overcome by their excessive misery. Still more, however, than even these, did such as had escaped the disorder show pity for the dying and the suffering, both from their previous knowledge of what it was, and from their being now in no fear of it themselves: for it never seized the same person twice, so as to prove actually fatal. And such persons were felicitated by others; and themselves, in the excess of their present joy, entertained for the future also, to a certain degree, a vain hope that they would never now be carried off even by any other disease.

In addition to the original calamity, what oppressed them still more was the crowding into the city from the country, especially the newcomers. For as they had no houses, but lived in stifling cabins at the hot season of the year, the mortality amongst them spread without restraint; bodies lying on one another in the death agony, and half-dead creatures rolling about in the streets and round all the fountains, in their longing for water. The sacred places also in which they had quartered themselves, were full of the corpses of those that died there in them: for in the surpassing violence of the calamity, men not knowing what was to become of them, came to disregard everything, both sacred and profane, alike. And all the laws were violated which they before observed respecting burials; and they buried them as each one could. And many from want of proper means, in

¹ According to Grote, "Diodorus mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcellus and the Romans."

consequence of so many of their friends having died, had recourse to shameless modes of sepulture; for on the piles prepared for others, some, anticipating those who had raised them, would lay their own dead relatives and set fire to them; and others, while the body of a stranger was burning, would throw on the top of it the one they were carrying, and go away.

In other respects also the plague was the origin of lawless conduct in the city, to a greater extent than it had before existed. For deeds which formerly men hid from view, so as not to do them just as they pleased, they now more readily ventured on; since they saw the change so sudden in the case of those who were prosperous and quickly perished, and of those who before had had nothing, and at once came into possession of the property of the dead. So they resolved to take their enjoyment quickly, and with a sole view to gratification; regarding their lives and their riches alike as things of a day. As for taking trouble about what was thought honourable, no one was forward to do it; deeming it uncertain whether, before he had attained to it, he would not be cut off; but everything that was immediately pleasant, and that which was conducive to it by any means whatever, this was laid down to be both honourable and expedient. And fear of gods, or law of men, there was none to stop them; for with regard to the former they esteemed it all the same whether they worshipped them or not, from seeing all alike perishing; and with regard to their offences against the latter, no one expected to live till judgment should be passed on him, and so to pay the penalty of them; but they thought a far heavier sentence was impending in that which had already been passed upon them; and that before it fell on them, it was right to have some enjoyment of life.

Such was the calamity which the Athenians had met with, and by which they were afflicted, their men dying within the city, and their land being wasted without. In their misery they remembered this verse amongst other things, as was natural they should; the old men saying that it had been uttered long ago:

“A Dorian war shall come, and plague with it.”

Now there was a dispute amongst them, and some asserted that it was not “a plague” (*loimos*), that had been mentioned in the verse by the men of former times, but “a famine” (*limos*): the opinion, however, at the present time naturally prevailed that “a plague” had been mentioned: for men adapted their recollections to what they were suffering. But, I suppose, in case of another Dorian war ever befalling them after this, and a famine happening to exist, in all probability they will recite the verse accordingly. Those who were acquainted with it recollected also the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, when on their inquiring of the god whether they should go to war, he answered, “that if they carried it on with all their might, they would gain the victory; and that he would himself take part with them in it.” With regard to the oracle then, they supposed that what was happening answered to it. For the disease had begun immediately after the Lacedæmonians had made their incursion; and it did not go into the Peloponnesus, worth even speaking of, but ravaged Athens most of all, and next to it the most populous of the other towns. Such were the circumstances that occurred in connection with the plague.

The Peloponnesians, after ravaging the plain, passed into the Paralian territory, as it is called, as far as Laurium, where the gold mines of the Athenians are situated. And first they ravaged the side which looks towards Peloponnesus; afterwards, that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros.

[430 B.C.]

Pericles being general at that time as well as before, maintained the same opinion as he had in the former invasion, about the Athenians not marching out against them.

While they were still in the plain, before they went to the Paralian territory, he was preparing an armament of a hundred ships to sail against the Peloponnesus; and when all was ready, he put out to sea. On board the ships he took four thousand heavy-armed of the Athenians, and three hundred cavalry in horse transports, then for the first time made out of old vessels: a Chian and Lesbian force also joined the expedition with fifty ships. When this armament of the Athenians put out to sea, they left the Peloponnesians in the Paralian territory of Attica. On arriving at Epidaurus, in the Peloponnesus, they ravaged the greater part of the land, and having made an assault on the city, entertained some hope of taking it; but did not, however, succeed. After sailing from Epidaurus, they ravaged the land belonging to Træzen, Ialice, and Hermione; all which places are on the coast of the Peloponnesus. Proceeding thence they came to Prasæ, a maritime town of Laconia, and ravaged some of the land, and took the town itself, and sacked it. After performing these achievements, they returned home; and found the Peloponnesians no longer in Attica, but returned.

Now all the time that the Peloponnesians were in the Athenian territory, and the Athenians were engaged in the expedition on board their ships, the plague was carrying them off both in the armament and in the city, so that it was even said that the Peloponnesians, for fear of the disorder, when they heard from the deserters that it was in the city, and also perceived them performing the funeral rites, retired the quicker from the country. Yet in this invasion they stayed the longest time, and ravaged the whole country: for they were about forty days in the Athenian territory.

The same summer Hagnon, son of Nicias, and Cleopompus, son of Clinias, who were colleagues with Pericles, took the army which he had employed, and went straightway on an expedition against the Chalcidians Thrace-ward, and Potidæa, which was still being besieged: and on their arrival they brought up their engines against Potidæa, and endeavoured to take it by every means. But they neither succeeded in capturing the city, nor in their other measures, to any extent worthy of their preparations: for the plague attacked them, and this indeed utterly overpowered them there, wasting their force to such a degree, that even the soldiers of the Athenians who were there before were infected with it by the troops which came with Hagnon, though previously they had been in good health. Phormion, however, and his sixteen hundred, were no longer in the neighbourhood of the Chalcidians (and so escaped its ravages). Hagnon therefore returned with his ships to Athens, having lost by the plague fifteen hundred out of four thousand heavy-armed, in about forty days. The soldiers who were there before still remained in the country, and continued the siege of Potidæa.

After the second invasion of the Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, when their land had been again ravaged, and the disease and the war were afflicting them at the same time, changed their views, and found fault with Pericles, thinking that he had persuaded them to go to war, and that it was through him that they had met with their misfortunes; and they were eager to come to terms with the Lacedæmonians. Indeed they sent ambassadors to them, but did not succeed in their object. And their minds being on all sides reduced to despair, they were violent against Pericles. He therefore, seeing them irritated by their present circumstances, and doing everything that he himself expected them to do, called an assembly, (for he was still general)

wishing to cheer them, and by drawing off the irritation of their feelings to lead them to a calmer and more confident state of mind.

The Lacedæmonians and their allies the same summer made an expedition with a hundred ships against the island of Zacynthus, which lies over against Elis. The inhabitants are a colony of the Achæans of the Peloponnesus, and were in alliance with the Athenians. On board the fleet were a thousand heavy-armed of the Lacedæmonians, and Cnemus, a Spartan, as admiral. Having made a descent on the country, they ravaged the greater part of it; and when they did not surrender, they sailed back home.

At the end of the same summer, Aristeus, a Corinthian, Aneristus, Nicolaus, and Stratodemus, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, Timagoras, a Tegean, and Pollis, an Argive in a private capacity, being on their way to Asia, to obtain an interview with the king, if by any means they might prevail on him to supply money and join in the war, went first to Thrace, to Sitalces the son of Teres, wishing to persuade him, if they could, to withdraw from his alliance with the Athenians. He gave orders to deliver them up to the Athenian ambassadors; who, having received them, took them to Athens. On their arrival the Athenians, being afraid that if Aristeus escaped he might do them still more mischief (for even before this he had evidently conducted all the measures in Potidæa and their possessions Thrace-ward) without giving them a trial, though they requested to say something in their own defence, put them to death that same day, and threw them into pits; thinking it but just to requite them in the same way as the Lacedæmonians had begun with; for they had killed and thrown into pits the merchants, both of the Athenians and their allies, whom they had taken on board trading vessels about the coast of the Peloponnesus. Indeed all that the Lacedæmonians took on the sea at the beginning of the war, they butchered as enemies, both those who were confederates of the Athenians and those who were neutral.

The following winter, the Athenians sent twenty ships round the Peloponnese, with Phormion as commander, who, making Naupactus his station, kept watch that no one either sailed out from Corinth and the Crissæan Bay, or into it. Another squadron of six they sent towards Caria and Lycia, with Melesander as commander; to raise money from those parts, and to hinder the privateers of the Peloponnesians from making that their rendezvous, and interfering with the navigation of the merchantmen from Phaselis and Phœnicia, and the continent in that direction. But Melesander, having gone up the country into Lycia with a force composed of the Athenians from the ships and the allies, and being defeated in a battle, was killed, and lost a considerable part of the army.

The same winter, when the Potidæans could no longer hold out against their besiegers, the inroads of the Peloponnesians into Attica having had no more effect towards causing the Athenians to withdraw, and their provisions being exhausted, and many other horrors having befallen them in their straits for food, and some having even eaten one another; under these circumstances, they made proposals for a capitulation to the generals of the Athenians who were in command against them, Xenophon, son of Euripides, Histiodorus, son of Aristoclide, and Phanomachus, son of Callimachus; who accepted them, seeing the distress of their army in so exposed a position, and the state having already expended 2000 talents [£400,000 or \$2,000,000] on the siege. On these terms therefore they came to an agreement; that themselves, their children, wives, and auxiliaries, should go out of the place with one dress each — but the women with two — and with a

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fixed sum of money for their journey. According to this treaty, they went out to Chalcidice, or where each could : but the Athenians blamed the generals for having come to an agreement without consulting them ; for they thought they might have got possession of the place on their own terms ; and afterwards they sent settlers of their own to Potidæa and colonised it. These were the transactions of the winter ; and so ended the second year of this war.^c

LAST PUBLIC SPEECH OF PERICLES

In his capacity of strategus, Pericles convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydides ; but that of Pericles himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances — an impregnable mind conscious not only of right purposes but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen, while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness ; and he now addressed them not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him — seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which, for the moment, overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, throughout this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne : but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare — though less true at present). “Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity — nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged — but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopt when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you : yet inhabiting as ye do a great city and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to

your present unnatural depression — that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea — one-half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle — an ornamental accessory not worth considering : and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy ; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honour and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained : moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so ; for ye hold your empire like a despotism — unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them ; still less on account of this unforeseen distemper : I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also of any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune : her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen : and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory ; display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no further embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress.”

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydides to reproduce — together with the age and character of Pericles — carried the assent of the assembled people ; who, when in the Pnyx and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no further propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour. But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Pericles, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents — Cleon, Simmias, or Lacratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction — took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dicastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, according to different authors.¹

[¹ Bury *δ* says: “ He was found guilty of ‘ theft ’ to the trifling amount of five talents ; the verdict was a virtual acquittal, though he had to pay a fine of ten times the amount.” But as an Attic talent was equal to £200 or \$1000, the theft of five talents was hardly trifling and a fine of £10,000 or \$50,000 was a rather unsatisfactory “ acquittal.”]

[430 B.C.]

The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. But the event disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favour, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Pericles as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence and he was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.

But that life, long, honourable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Pericles was preaching to his countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering—he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alcibiades and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and his re-election to the office of strategus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps indeed the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law—in the present temper of the city; which was further displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Pericles singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Pericles, one branch of the great Alcæonid gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Pericles to legitimise, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.

THE END AND GLORY OF PERICLES

It was thus that Pericles was reinstated in his post of strategus as well as in his ascendancy over the public counsels—seemingly about August or September—430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever, which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Pericles replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking, “What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune; and is, at best, common to me with many other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed: no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine.”

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors, both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other: Telecleides, Cratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanes, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Hercules and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher, who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy—“his majestic intelligence.” There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted. throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Pericles towards opponents was always mild and liberal.¹

¹ “Pericles,” says Plutarch, “undoubtedly deserved admiration, not only for the candour and moderation which he ever retained, amidst the distractions of business and the rage of his enemies, but for that noble sentiment which led him to think it his most excellent attainment, never to have given way to envy or anger, notwithstanding the greatness of his power, nor to have nourished an implacable hatred against his greatest foe. In my opinion, this one thing, I mean his mild and dispassionate behaviour, his unblemished integrity and irreproachable conduct during his whole administration, makes his appellation of Olympian, which would otherwise be vain and absurd, no longer exceptionable; nay, gives it a propriety.”

The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him, contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Cimon, though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well founded, and those who read the last speech just given out of Thucydides will at once recognise in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favour.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. “He gave the reins to the people.” in Plutarch’s words, “and shaped his administration for their immediate spectacle or festival or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill.”

The charge here made against Pericles, and supported by allegations in themselves honourable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydides in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Pericles with his successors in the express circumstance that they did so, while he did not. The language of the contemporary historian well deserves to be cited: “Pericles, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favour, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such a manner as to alarm and beat them down; when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence; so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favour of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition.”

It will be seen that the judgment here quoted from Thucydides contradicts, in the most unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Pericles of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes the opposite qualities—self-judgment, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Pericles began (so that biographer

says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgment of Thucydides, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier.

The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dicasteries, took place when Pericles was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterwards belonged to him (Ephialtes in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Pericles, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination) — so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Pericles was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydides considered these changes as injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Pericles on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is eminently favourable.

Though Thucydides does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Pericles, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgment of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Pericles of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city — yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honour. It cannot be shown of Pericles that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less — the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy — assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmides at Coronea in Bœotia would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history.

Pericles is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which, those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Cimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at: the ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratic movement of Athens he regularised, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to the individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Pericles found it and as he left it, is unquestionably, the pacific and intellectual development — rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which, if we add great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil, extension of Athenian trade, attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of

Phormion), enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls, lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realised during the political life of Pericles, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Pericles in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C., would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action, his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field, his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development, his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.^b

WILHELM ONCKEN'S ESTIMATE OF PERICLES

Among the important personages of antiquity, there is none on whom posterity has so fully agreed in its judgment, as on Pericles. When we meet with this name in modern works, we find but one general voice acknowledging his greatness, one voice of admiration for the unusual qualities which distinguished him.

Even the opposers of his political administration were just to him, even those who, in the great rising of Athenian democracy, saw the beginning of a splendid misery, did not deny their respect to the man, who by this development was assigned a place in the first rank. Without wishing to do so they heaped praise on him, in which we must decline to join, although we are the last to wish to rob him of his well-deserved fame. In the political revolution which resulted in the sovereignty of the constitutional demos, and in checking the ruin which only too soon followed, they credited him with so much blame and merit, as even had he divided it with Ephialtes and others, would still have surpassed the power of any mortal, though he were the greatest of the great.

Such great political events as those here mentioned, are not the work of individual men, not the act of a party, however great may be the aggregate of the particular forces it may have at command. They have their root in the nature of the conditions, in the disposition of the circumstances, in the requirements of society, in alliance with which the individual, like Antæus, derives fresh strength out of every defeat, and without which he is but rolling the stone of Sisyphus.

For such a deeply rooted change in the forms of political life in a community, whether that change be for good or evil, elementary forces are necessary which are neither subject to the command nor to the violence of the individual, which human will can neither loose nor arrest, and in the present case we have to deal with a revolution to effect which the agitators employed but a single lever, a single weapon, the convincing word, the power of oratory, the weight of reason.

Also the advent of the internal decay which, as is supposed, followed so rapidly on the violent exertion of the power of the Athenian mob at home, would not, had the times really been ripe for it, have awaited the death of

Pericles, an event usually regarded, in flattering enough recognition of the greatness of the man, as the thunderbolt which struck and came to set fire to the heaped-up seeds of corruption.

But the unsought-for praise which springs from this misunderstanding again strikingly proves how universally spread, how deeply rooted is the respect of posterity for this one great Athenian. It is remarkable, however, that his immediate and more remote contemporaries, held an opinion quite different. In examining their judgments on this statesman, we see that with all the deplorable incompleteness of tradition an almost complete unanimity of opinion is found, but this unanimity is not for, but against, Pericles. To our great surprise we discover that the most diverse channels which voiced public opinion, the most various representatives of the universal judgment, seem to have entered into a regular conspiracy against the memory of this man, against the fame of his public and of his personal character.

Highly gifted comic poets such as Cratinus and Eupolis, not to mention others, frivolous anecdote-mongers such as Stesimbrotus of Thasos and Idomeneus of Lampsacus, rhetorical historians like Ephorus, whom Diodorus follows, and earnest philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, are unanimous in repudiating and condemning Pericles. One would understand if they satisfied themselves with a truly Greek disparagement of his great qualities, and exaggeration of his defects, although one might wonder at the unanimity of this proceeding: but they do not stop at this; some at least even go so far as to stamp Pericles as a criminal.

Idomeneus of Lampsacus reproached him with an assassination of the worst kind, committed on his true friend and confederate Ephialtes. Ephorus accused him of embezzling public money and of extensive thefts of public property entrusted to his administration; and comparatively speaking Plato's judgment is mild, when he consigns him to the ranks of those common demagogues who are not particular as to their means of fraudulently obtaining the favour of the populace. And Aristotle who had cleared him of many serious accusations does not admit him among the statesmen and patriots of the highest rank, but gives preference to such men as Nicias, Thucydides, and even Theramenes.


The reason of this extraordinary fact lies in the partisan spirit which though notorious is not always rightly estimated, and by which the overwhelming majority of the Greek writers whose works have come down to us were animated against the Athenian democracy, so that the champion of popular government which they condemned in principle, cannot possibly find favour in their sight.


On what then does the judgment of posterity repose, a judgment that is in direct opposition to such an imposing number of authorities? Is it a conjecture to which a tacit agreement of competent judges gave a legal authority? Is it the result of an arbitrary process which on grounds of innate probability and by an undisputed verdict clears the historical kernel of all the dross with which the hate and envy, mistakes and calumnies of contemporaries had surrounded it? Or if this judgment is based on the authentic foundation of evidence, is it surely not merely commended, by its innate rectitude, but also confirmed by an unequivocal testimony?

The latter is the case. Our judgment of Pericles is based on the immovable foundation of a testimony which stands alone, not only in this respect but also in the whole of Greek literature, the testimony of Thucydides. It is to Thucydides that his greatest contemporary owes the honour accorded to his name by posterity. His summing up amounts to this: Pericles owes

the authoritative position which he occupies in the Athenian state, neither to cunning nor force, but exclusively to the trust of his fellow citizens: their trust in the tried greatness of his spirit, the universally recognised purity of his character, the immovable firmness of his will.

He stood, in truth, above the people, whom he ruled as a prince; raised even above the suspicion of dishonesty, raised above the reproach of cringing submissiveness, he stood firm in his superior influence on the resolution of the multitude, because he had not gained possession of it by the employment of unseemly means, but through the esteem of the citizens for his aptitude for government. He did not give way to the pressure of the changing fancies and moods of the moment. He met the anger of the multitude with unflinching pride, he brought the insolent to their senses, and encouraged the faint hearted to self-confidence. It was a democracy in appearance only, in deed and truth it was the rule of an individual man, of the greatest of the great, over the people.^e





GREEK WAR GALLEY

CHAPTER XXXII. THE SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

AMONG students of Greek history the little town of Platæa takes a large hold upon the affections. We have seen how its old time devotion to Athens brought upon it a sudden descent from the arch-enemy Thebes at the very outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. It was a case of Greek against Greek, of Theban duplicity versus Platæan wile. The success of Platæa was so neat and exasperating as to inspire a desperate revenge. Now it was no longer a playtime for trickery, and on both sides the sterner elements of human nature were put to test. The siege of Platæa lasted from the summer of the third year of the war (429 B.C.) to the summer of the fifth year (427 B.C.) but it seems better to tell it in isolated continuity. Accordingly three separate portions of Thirlwall's vivid history are here brought together.^a

In the beginning of the summer 429 B.C., a Peloponnesian army was again assembled at the isthmus, under the command of Archidamus. But instead of invading Attica, which was perhaps thought dangerous on account of the pestilence, he gratified the wishes of the Thebans, by marching into the territory of Platæa, where he encamped, and prepared to lay it waste. But before he had committed any acts of hostility, envoys from Platæa demanded an audience, and, being admitted, made a solemn remonstrance against his proceedings in the name of religion. They reminded the Spartans that, after the glorious battle which secured the liberty of Greece, Pausanias in the presence of the allied army, and in the public place of Platæa, where he had just offered a sacrifice in honour of the victory, formally reinstated the Platæans in the independent possession of their city and territory, which he placed under the protection of all the allies, with whom they had shared the common triumph, to defend them from unjust aggression. They complained that the Spartans were now about to violate this well-earned privilege, which had been secured to Platæa by solemn oaths, at the instigation of her bitterest enemies, the Thebans. And they adjured him, by the gods who had been invoked to witness the engagement of Pausanias, as well as by those of Sparta, and of their violated territory, to desist from his enterprise.

[429 B.C.]

Archidamus in reply admitted the claim of the Plateans, but desired them to reflect that the rights on which they insisted implied some corresponding duties; that, if the Spartans were pledged to protect their independence, they were themselves no less bound to assist the Spartans in delivering those who had once been their allies in the struggle with Persia, from the tyranny of Athens. Yet Sparta, as she had already declared, did not wish to force them to take a part in the war which she was waging for the liberties of Greece, but would be satisfied if they would remain neutral, and would admit both parties alike to amicable intercourse, without aiding either. The envoys returned with this answer, and, after laying it before the people, came back, instructed to reply: that it was impossible for them to accede to the proposal of Archidamus, without the consent of the Athenians, who had their wives and children in their hands; and they should have reason to fear either the resentment of their present allies, who on the retreat of the Spartans might come and deprive them of their city; or the treachery of the Thebans, who under the cover of neutrality, might find another opportunity of surprising them. But the Spartan, without noticing the ties that bound them to Athens, met the last objection with a new offer.

"Let them commit their city, houses, and lands, to the custody of the Spartans, with an exact account of the boundaries, the number of their trees, and all other things left behind, which it was possible to number. Let them withdraw, and live elsewhere until the end of the war. The Spartans would then restore the deposit entrusted to them, and in the meanwhile would provide for the cultivation of the land, and pay a fair rent."

It is possible that this proposal may have been honestly meant; though it is as likely that it was suggested by the malice of the Thebans. For it was evident that the Plateans could not accept it without renouncing the friendship of the Athenians, to whom they had committed their families, and in the most favourable contingency, which would be the fall of their old ally, casting themselves upon the honour of an enemy for their political existence; while nevertheless the speciously liberal offer, if rejected, would afford a pretext for treating them with the utmost rigour. This the Plateans probably perceived; and therefore, when their envoys returned with the proposal of the Spartans, requested an armistice, that they might lay it before the Athenians, promising to accept it if they could obtain their consent.

Archidamus granted their request; but the answer brought from Athens put an end, as might have been expected, to the negotiation. It exhorted them to keep their faith with their ally, and to depend upon Athenian protection. Thus urged and emboldened, they resolved, whatever might befall them, to adhere to the side of Athens, and to break off all parley with the enemy, by a short answer, delivered not through envoys, but from the walls: that it was out of their power to do as the Spartans desired.¹ Archidamus, on receiving this declaration, prepared for attacking the city. But first, with great solemnity, he called upon the gods and heroes of the land to witness, that he had not invaded it without just cause, but after the Plateans had first abandoned their ancient confederates; and that whatever they might hereafter suffer would be a merited punishment of the perverseness with which they had rejected his equitable offers.

[¹ In the words of Thucydides, "Never to desert the Athenians, to bear any devastation of their lands, nay, if such be the case, to behold it with patience, and to suffer any extremities to which their enemies might reduce them; that, further, no person should stir out of the city, but an answer be given from the walls; that it was impossible for them to accept the terms proposed by the Lacedæmonians."]

THE SPARTANS AND THEBANS ATTACK PLATÆA

His first operation, after ravaging the country, was to invest the city with a palisade, for which the fruit trees cut down by his troops furnished materials. This slight inclosure was sufficient for his purpose, as he hoped that the overwhelming superiority of his numbers would enable him to take the place by storm. The mode of attack which he chiefly relied upon, was the same which we have seen employed by the Persians against the Ionian cities. He attempted to raise a mound to a level with the walls. It was piled up with earth and rubbish, wood and stones, and was guarded on either side by a strong lattice-work of forest timber. For seventy days and seventy nights the troops, divided into parties which constantly relieved each other, were occupied in this labour without intermission, urged to their tasks by the Lacedæmonians who commanded the contingents of the allies. But as the mound rose, the besieged devised expedients for averting the danger.

First they surmounted the opposite part of their wall with a superstructure of brick—taken from the adjacent houses which were pulled down for the purpose—secured in a frame of timber, and shielded from fiery missiles by a curtain of raw hides and skins, which protected the workmen and their work. But as the mound still kept rising as fast as the wall, they set about contriving plans for reducing it. And first, issuing by night through an opening made in the wall, they scooped out and carried away large quantities of the earth from the lower part of the mound. But the Peloponnesians, on discovering this device, counteracted it, by repairing the breach with layers of stiff clay, pressed down close on wattles of reed. Thus baffled, the besieged sank a shaft within the walls, and thence working upon a rough estimate, dug a passage under ground as far as the mound, which they were thus enabled to undermine. And against this contrivance the enemy had no remedy, except in the multitude of hands, which repaired the loss almost as soon as it was felt.

But the garrison, fearing that they should not be able to struggle long with this disadvantage, and that their wall would at length be carried by force of numbers, provided against this event, by building a second wall, in the shape of a half-moon, behind the raised part of the old wall, which was the chord of the arc. Thus in the worst emergency they secured themselves a retreat, from which they would be able to assail the enemy to great advantage, and he would have to recommence his work under the most unfavourable circumstances. This countermure drove the besiegers to their last resources. They had already brought battering engines to play upon the walls. But the spirit and ingenuity of the besieged had generally baffled these assaults; though one had given an alarming shock to the superstructure in front of the half-moon. Sometimes the head of an engine was caught up by means of a noose; sometimes it was broken off by a heavy beam, suspended by chains from two levers placed on the wall.

Now, however, after the main hope of the Peloponnesians, which rested on their mound, was completely defeated by the countermure, Archidamus resolved to try a last extraordinary experiment. He caused the hollow between the mound and the wall, and all the space which he could reach on the other side, to be filled up with a pile of faggots, which, when it had been steeped in pitch and sulphur, was set on fire. The blaze was such as had perhaps never before been kindled by the art of man; Thucydides compares it to a burning forest. It penetrated to a great distance within the city; and if it had been seconded, as the besiegers hoped, by a favourable wind,

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would probably have destroyed it. The alarm and confusion which it caused for a time in the garrison were great; a large tract of the city was inaccessible. Yet it does not appear that Archidamus made any attempt to take advantage of their consternation and disorder. He waited; but the expected breeze did not come to spread the flames, and — according to a report which the historian mentions, but does not vouch for — a sudden storm of thunder and rain arose to quench them.

Thus thwarted and disheartened, and perhaps unable to keep the whole of his army any longer in the camp, he reluctantly determined to convert the siege to a blockade, which it was foreseen would be tedious and expensive. A part of the troops were immediately sent home: the remainder set about the work of circumvallation, which was apportioned to the contingents of the confederates. Two ditches were dug round the town, and yielded materials for a double line of walls, which were built in the intermediate space on the edge of each trench. The walls were sixteen feet asunder; but the interval was occupied with barracks for the soldiers, so that the whole might be said to form one wall. At the distance of ten battlements from each other were large towers, which covered the whole breadth of the rampart. At the autumnal equinox the lines were completed, and were left, one-half in the custody of the Bœotians, the other in that of their allies. The troops who were not needed for this service were then led back to their homes. The garrison of the place at this time consisted of four hundred Plataeans, and eighty Athenians; and 110 women who had been retained, when all the useless hands were sent to Athens, to minister to the wants of the men.

PART OF THE PLATÆANS ESCAPE; THE REST CAPITULATE

Athens could do nothing for the relief of Plataea. The brave garrison had begun to suffer from the failure of provisions; and, as their condition grew hopeless, two of their leading men, Theænetus a soothsayer, and Eupompidas, one of the generals, conceived the project of escaping across the enemy's lines. When it was first proposed, it was unanimously adopted: but as the time for its execution approached, half of the men shrank from the danger, and not more than 220 adhered to their resolution. The contrivers of the plan took the lead in the enterprise. Scaling ladders of a proper height were the first requisite; and they were made upon a measurement of the enemy's wall, for which the besieged had no other basis than the number of layers of brick, which were sedulously counted over and over again by different persons, until the amount, and consequently the height of the wall, was sufficiently ascertained. A dark and stormy night, in the depth of winter, was chosen for the attempt; it was known that in such nights the sentinels took shelter in the towers, and left the intervening battlements unguarded; and it was on this practice that the success of the adventure mainly depended. It was concerted, that the part of the garrison which remained behind should make demonstrations of attacking the enemy's lines on the side opposite to that by which their comrades attempted to escape. And first a small party, lightly armed, the right foot bare, to give them a surer footing in the mud, keeping at such a distance from each other as to prevent their arms from clashing, crossed the ditch, and planted their ladders, unseen and unheard; for the noise of their approach was drowned by the wind. The first who mounted were twelve men armed with short swords, led by Ammeas son of Corcebus. His followers, six on each side,

proceeded immediately to secure the two nearest towers. Next came another party with short spears, their shields being carried by their comrades behind them. But before many more had mounted, the fall of a tile, broken off from a battlement by one of the Plateans, as he laid hold of it, alarmed the nearest sentinels, and presently the whole force of the besiegers was called to the walls. But no one knew what had happened, and the general confusion was increased by the sally of the besieged. All therefore remained at their posts; only a body of three hundred men, who were always in readiness to move toward any quarter where they might be needed, issued from one of the gates in search of the place from which the alarm had arisen. In the meanwhile the assailants had made themselves masters of the two towers between which they scaled the wall, and, after cutting down the sentinels, guarded the passages which led through them, while others mounted by ladders to the roofs, and thence discharged their missiles on all who attempted to approach the scene of action. The main body of the fugitives now poured through the opening thus secured, applying more ladders, and knocking away the battlements: and as they gained the other side of the outer ditch, they formed upon its edge, and with their arrows and javelins protected their comrades, who were crossing, from the enemy above. Last of all, and with some difficulty — for the ditch was deep, the water high, and covered with a thin crust of ice — the parties which occupied the towers effected their retreat; and they had scarcely crossed, before the three hundred were seen coming up with lighted torches. But their lights, which discovered nothing to them, made them a mark for the missiles of the Plateans, who were thus enabled to elude their pursuit, and to move away in good order.

All the details of the plan seem to have been concerted with admirable forethought. On the first alarm fire signals were raised by the besiegers to convey the intelligence to Thebes. But the Plateans had provided against this danger, and showed similar signals from their own walls, so as to render it impossible for the Thebans to interpret those of the enemy. This precaution afforded additional security to their retreat. For instead of taking the nearest road to Athens, they first bent their steps toward Thebes, while they could see their pursuers with their blazing torches threading the ascent of Cithæron. After they had followed the Theban road for six or seven furlongs, they struck into that which led by Erythræ and Hysie to the Attic border, and arrived safe at Athens. Out of the 220 who set out together, one fell into the enemy's hands, after he had crossed the outer ditch. Seven turned back panic-struck, and reported that all their companions had been cut off: and at daybreak a herald was sent to recover their bodies. The answer revealed the happy issue of the adventure.

By this time the remaining garrison of Plataea was reduced to the last stage of weakness. The besiegers might probably long before have taken the town without difficulty by assault. But the Spartans had a motive of policy for wishing to bring the siege to a different termination. They looked forward to a peace which they might have to conclude upon the ordinary terms of a mutual restitution of conquests made in the war. In this case, if Plataea fell by storm, they would be obliged to restore it to Athens; but if it capitulated, they might allege that it was no conquest. With this view their commander protracted the blockade, until at length he discovered by a feint attack that the garrison was utterly unable to defend the walls. He then sent a herald to propose that they should surrender, not to the Thebans, but to the Spartans, on condition that Spartan judges alone should

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decide upon their fate. These terms were accepted, the town delivered up, and the garrison, which was nearly starved, received a supply of food. In a few days five commissioners came from Sparta to hold the promised trial. But instead of the usual forms of accusation and defence, the prisoners found themselves called upon to answer a single question : Whether in the course of the war they had done any service to Sparta and her allies. The spirit which dictated such an interrogatory was clear enough. The prisoners however obtained leave to plead for themselves without restriction ; their defence was conducted by two of their number, one of whom, Lacon son of Aiminestus, was *proxenus* of Sparta.

The arguments of the Plataean orators, as reported by Thucydides, are strong, and the address which he attributes to them is the only specimen he has left of pathetic eloquence. They could point out the absurdity of sending five commissioners from Sparta, to inquire whether the garrison of a besieged town were friends of the besiegers ; a question which, if retorted upon the party which asked it, would equally convict them of a wanton aggression. They could appeal to their services and sufferings in the Persian War, when they alone among the Boeotians remained constant to the cause of Greece, while the Thebans had fought on the side of the barbarians in the very land which they now hoped to make their own with the consent of Sparta. They could plead an important obligation which they had more recently conferred on Sparta herself, whom they had succoured with a third part of their whole force, when her very existence was threatened by the revolt of the Messenians after the great earthquake. They could urge that their alliance with Athens had been originally formed with the approbation, and even by the advice, of the Spartans themselves ; that justice and honour forbade them to renounce a connection which they had sought as a favour, and from which they had derived great advantages ; and that, as far as lay in themselves, they had not broken the last peace, but had been treacherously surprised by the Thebans, while they thought themselves secure in the faith of treaties. Even if their former merits were not sufficient to outweigh any later offence which could be imputed to them, they might insist on the Greek usage of war, which forbade proceeding to the last extremity with an enemy who had voluntarily surrendered himself ; and as they had proved, by the patience with which they had endured the torments of hunger, that they preferred perishing by famine to falling into the hands of the Thebans, they had a right to demand that they should not be placed in a worse condition by their own act, but if they were to gain nothing by their capitulation, should be restored to the state in which they were when they made it.

But unhappily for the Plataeans they had nothing to rely upon but the mercy or the honour of Sparta : two principles which never appear to have had the weight of a feather in any of her public transactions ; and though the Spartan commissioners bore the title of judges, they came in fact only to pronounce a sentence which had been previously dictated by Thebes. Yet the appeal of the Plataeans was so affecting, that the Thebans distrusted the firmness of their allies, and obtained leave to reply. They very judiciously and honestly treated the question as one which lay entirely between the Plataeans and themselves. They attributed the conduct of their ancestors in the Persian War, to the compulsion of a small, dominant faction, and pleaded the services which they had themselves since rendered to Sparta. They depreciated the patriotic deeds of the Plataeans, as the result of their attachment to Athens, whom they had not scrupled to abet in all her undertakings against the liberties of Greece. They defended the attempt which

they had made upon Plataea during the peace, on the ground that they had been invited by a number of its wealthiest and noblest citizens, and they charged the Plataeans with a breach of faith in the execution of their Theban prisoners, whose blood called for vengeance as loudly as they for mercy.

These were indeed reasons which fully explained and perhaps justified their own enmity to Plataea, and did not need to be aided by so glaring a falsehood, as the assertion that their enemies were enjoying the benefit of a fair trial. But the only part of their argument, that bore upon the real question, was that in which they reminded the Spartans that Thebes was their most powerful and useful ally. This the Spartans felt; and they had long determined that no scruples of justice or humanity should endanger so valuable a connection. But it seems that they still could not devise any more ingenious mode of reconciling their secret motive with outward decency, than the original question, which implied that if the prisoners were their enemies, they might rightfully put them to death; and in this sophistical abstraction all the claims which arose out of the capitulation, when construed according to the plainest rules of equity, were overlooked. The question was again proposed to each separately, and when the ceremony was finished by his answer or his silence, he was immediately consigned to the executioner. The Plataeans who suffered amounted to two hundred; their fate was shared by twenty-five Athenians, who could not have expected or claimed milder treatment, as they might have been fairly excepted from the benefit of the surrender. The women were all made slaves. If there had been nothing but inhumanity in the proceeding of the Spartans, it would have been so much slighter than that which they had exhibited towards their most unoffending prisoners from the beginning of the war, as scarcely to deserve notice. All that is very signal in this transaction is the baseness of their cunning, and perhaps the dullness of their invention.

The town and its territory were, with better right, ceded to the Thebans. For a year they permitted the town to be occupied by a body of exiles from Megara, and by the remnant of the Plataeans belonging to the Theban party. But afterwards—fearing perhaps that it might be wrested from them—they razed it to the ground, leaving only the temples standing. But on the site, and with the materials of the demolished buildings, they erected an edifice 200 feet square, with an upper story, the whole divided into apartments, for the reception of the pilgrims who might come to the quinquennial festival, or on other sacred occasions. They also built a new temple, which together with the brass and the iron found in the town, which were made into couches, they dedicated to Hera, the goddess to whom Pausanias was thought to have owed his victory. The territory was annexed to the Theban state lands, and let for a term of ten years. So, in the ninety-third year after Plataea had entered into alliance with Athens, this alliance became the cause of its ruin.^b

NAVAL AND OTHER COMBATS

While Archidamus was holding Plataea by the throat, other enterprises were meeting with varied success. Athens sent 2000 hoplites and 200 horse to Chalcidian Thrace under the Xenophon to whom Potidaea had surrendered. He made an assault on the town of Spartolus, only to lose a desperate battle, and to be crushed on his retreat; Xenophon and two associated generals were killed, and with them 430 hoplites, a loss of about 25 per cent.

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In Thrace, Sitalces, king of an immense realm, came to the aid of Athens against the double-dealing Macedonian king, Perdiccas. He invaded Macedonia and the Chalcidian territory, and voyaged far and wide until the severity of winter and the failure of Athenian aid led him to retire.

Meanwhile, the Spartans had tried to wrest the Ionian Sea from Athens. Their expedition against Cephallenia and Zacynthus in 430 B.C. had failed, but now a powerful horde was gathered against Acarnania. Sparta sent a thousand hoplites under the admiral Cnemus. Corinth, Leucadia, Anactorium, and Ambracia furnished troops, and other bodies came from barbaric Epirots and Macedonian tribes otherwise obscure, including 1000 Chaonians, 1000 Orestæ besides Thesprotians, Molossians, Atintanes, and Paravæi. Even the Macedonian king, Perdiccas, a professed ally of Athens, sent 1000 Macedonians. These arrived, however, too late; fortunately for them, since the troops, without waiting for the fleet, marched against the Acarnanian city of Stratus in such disorderly pride that they fell into ambush, and, after a chaotic retreat, dispersed.

The fleet which was to have collaborated in the campaign hoped to evade the vigilance of the Athenian fleet as Cnemus had done, but the imperial fleet was under the command of the great and cunning Phormion, who was not deterred from attack by inferiority of numbers. Interesting naval chess-play followed.^a

Now the fleet from Corinth and the rest of the confederates coming from the Crissæan Bay, which ought to have joined Cnemus, in order to prevent the Acarnanians on the coast from succouring their countrymen in the interior, did not do so; but they were compelled, about the same time as the battle was fought at Stratus, to come to an engagement with Phormion and the twenty Athenian vessels that kept guard at Naupactus. For Phormion kept watching them as they coasted along out of the gulf, wishing to attack them in the open sea. But the Corinthians and the allies were not sailing to Acarnania with any intention to fight by sea, but were equipped more for land service. When, however, they saw them sailing along opposite to them, as they themselves proceeded along their own coast, and on attempting to cross over from Patræ in Achaia to the mainland opposite, on their way to Acarnania observed the Athenians sailing against them from Chalcis and the river Evenus (for they had not escaped their observation when they had endeavoured to bring to secretly during the night); under these circumstances they were compelled to engage in the mid passage. They had separate commanders for the contingents of the different states that joined the armament, but those of the Corinthians were Machaon, Isocrates, and Agatharcidas.

And now the Peloponnesians ranged their ships in a circle, as large as they could without leaving any opening, with their prows turned outward and their sterns inward; and placed inside all the small craft that accompanied them, and their five best sailers, to advance out quickly and strengthen any point on which the enemy might make his attack.

On the other hand, the Athenians, ranged in a single line, kept sailing round them, and reducing them into a smaller compass; continually brushing past them, and making demonstrations of an immediate onset; though they had previously been commanded by Phormion not to attack them till he himself gave the signal. For he hoped that their order would not be maintained like that of a land-force on shore, but that the ships would fall foul of each other, and that the other craft would cause confusion; and if the wind should blow from the gulf, in expectation of which he was sailing

round them, and which usually rose towards morning, that they would not remain steady an instant. He thought, too, that it rested with him to make the attack, whenever he pleased, as his ships were the better sailers; and that then would be the best time for making it. So when the wind came down upon them, and their ships, being now brought into a narrow compass, were thrown into confusion by the operation of both causes—the violence of the wind, and the small craft dashing against them—and when ship was falling foul of ship, and the crews were pushing them off with poles, and in their shouting, and trying to keep clear, and abusing each other, did not hear a word either of their orders or the boatswains' directions; while, through inexperience, they could not lift their oars in the swell of the sea, and so rendered the vessels less obedient to the helmsmen; just then, at that favourable moment, he gave the signal.

And the Athenians attacked them, and first of all sank one of the admiral-ships, then destroyed all wherever they went, and reduced them to such a condition, that owing to their confusion none of them thought of resistance, but they fled to Patræ and Dyme, in Achaia. The Athenians having closely pursued them, and taken twelve ships, picking up most of the men from them, and putting them on board their own vessels, sailed off to Molycrium; and after erecting a trophy at Rhium, and dedicating a ship to Neptune, they returned to Naupactus. The Peloponnesians also immediately coasted along with their remaining ships from Dyme and Patræ to Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and Cnemus and the ships that were at Leucas, which were to have formed a junction with these, came thence, after the battle of Stratus, to the same port.

Then the Lacedæmonians sent to the fleet, as counsellors to Cnemus, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron; commanding him to make preparations for a second engagement more successful than the former, and not to be driven off the sea by a few ships. For the result appeared very different from what they might have expected (particularly as it was the first sea-fight they had attempted); and they thought that it was not so much their fleet that was inferior, but that there had been some cowardice; for they did not weigh the long experience of the Athenians against their own short practice of naval matters. They despatched them, therefore, in anger; and on their arrival they sent round, in conjunction with Cnemus, orders for ships to be furnished by the different states, while they refitted those they already had, with a view to an engagement. Phormion, too, on the other hand, sent messengers to Athens to acquaint them with their preparations, and to tell them of the victory they had gained; at the same time desiring them to send him quickly the largest possible number of ships, for he was in daily expectation of an immediate engagement. They despatched to him twenty; but gave additional orders to the commander of them to go first to Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortyn, who was their *proxenus*, persuaded them to sail against Cydonia, telling them that he would reduce it under their power; for it was at present hostile to them. His object, however, in calling them in was, that he might oblige the Polichnitæ, who bordered on the Cydonians. The commander, therefore, of the squadron went with it to Crete, and in conjunction with the Polichnitæ laid waste the territory of the Cydonians; and wasted no little time in the country, owing to adverse winds and the impossibility of putting to sea.

During the time that the Athenians were thus detained on the coast of Crete, the Peloponnesians at Cyllene, having made their preparations for an engagement, coasted along to Panormus in Achaia, where the land-force of

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the Peloponnesians had come to support them. Phormion, too, coasted along to the Rhium near Molycrium, and dropped anchor outside of it, with twenty ships, the same as he had before fought with. This Rhium was friendly to the Athenians; the other, namely, that in the Peloponnesus, is opposite to it; the distance between the two being about seven stadia of sea, which forms the mouth of the Crissæan Gulf. At the Rhium in Achaia, then, being not far from Panormus, where their land-force was, the Peloponnesians also came to anchor with seventy-seven ships, when they saw that the Athenians had done the same. And for six or seven days they lay opposite each other, practising and preparing for the battle; the Peloponnesians intending not to sail beyond the Rhia into the open sea, for they were afraid of a disaster like the former; the Athenians, not to sail into the straits, for they thought that fighting in a confined space was in favour of the enemy.

Now when the Athenians did not sail into the narrow part of the gulf to meet them, the Peloponnesians, wishing to lead them on even against their will, weighed in the morning, and having formed their ships in a column four abreast, sailed to their own land towards the inner part of the gulf, with the right wing taking the lead, in which position also they lay at anchor. In this wing they had placed their twenty best sailers; that if Phormion, supposing them to be sailing against Naupactus, should himself also coast along in that direction to relieve the place, the Athenians might not, by getting outside their wing, escape their advance against them, but that these ships might shut them in. As they expected, he was alarmed for the place in its unprotected state; and when he saw them under weigh, against his will, and in great haste too, he embarked his crews and sailed along shore; while the land-forces of the Messenians at the same time came to support him. When the Peloponnesians saw them coasting along in a single file, and already within the gulf and near the shore (which was just what they wished), at one signal they suddenly brought their ships round and sailed in a line, as fast as each could, against the Athenians, hoping to cut off all their ships. Eleven of them, however, which were taking the lead, escaped the wing of the Peloponnesians and their sudden turn into the open gulf; but the rest they surprised, and drove them on shore, in their attempt to escape, and destroyed them, killing such of the crews as had not swum out of them. Some of the ships they lashed to their own and began to tow off empty, and one they took men and all; while in the case of some others, the Messenians, coming to their succour, and dashing into the sea with their armour, and boarding them, fought from the decks, and rescued them when they were already being towed off.

To this extent then the Peloponnesians had the advantage, and destroyed the Athenian ships; while their twenty vessels in the right wing were in pursuit of those eleven of the enemy that had just escaped their turn into the open gulf. They, with the exception of one ship, got the start of them and fled for refuge to Naupactus; and facing about, opposite the temple of Apollo, prepared to defend themselves, in case they should sail to shore against them. Presently they came up, and were singing the pæan as they sailed, considering that they had gained the victory; and the one Athenian vessel that had been left behind was chased by a single Leucadian far in advance of the rest. Now there happened to be a merchant vessel moored out at sea, which the Athenian ship had time to sail round, and struck the Leucadian in pursuit of her amidship, and sunk her. The Peloponnesians therefore were panic-stricken by this sudden and unlooked-for achievement; and moreover, as they were pursuing in disorder, on account of the advantage

they had gained, some of the ships dropped their oars, and stopped in their course, from a wish to wait for the rest—doing what was unadvisable, considering that they were observing each other at so short a distance—while others even ran on the shoals, through their ignorance of the localities.

The Athenians, on seeing this, took courage, and at one word shouted for battle, and rushed upon them. In consequence of their previous blunders and their present confusion, they withstood them but a short time and then fled to Panormus, whence they had put out. The Athenians pursued them closely, and took six of the ships nearest to them, and recovered their own, which the enemy had disabled near the shore and at the beginning of the engagement, and had taken in tow. Of the men, they put some to death, and made others prisoners. Now on board the Leucadian ship, which went down off the merchant vessel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian; who, when the ship was destroyed, killed himself, and falling overboard was floated into the harbour of Naupactus. On their return, the Athenians erected a trophy at the spot from which they put out before gaining the victory; and all the dead and the wrecks that were near their coast they took up, and gave back to the enemy theirs under truce. The Peloponnesians also erected a trophy, as victors, for the defeat of the ships they had disabled near the shore; and the ship they had taken they dedicated at Rhium, in Achaia, by the side of the trophy. Afterwards, being afraid of the reinforcement from Athens, all but the Leucadians sailed at the approach of night into the Crissæan Bay and the port of Corinth. Not long after their retreat, the Athenians from Crete arrived at Naupactus, with the twenty ships that were to have joined Phormion before the engagement. And thus ended the summer.

Before, however, the fleet dispersed which had retired to Corinth and the Crissæan Bay, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the rest of the Peloponnesian commanders wished, at the suggestion of the Megarians, to make an attempt upon Piræus, the port of Athens; which, as was natural from their decided superiority at sea, was left unguarded and open. It was determined, therefore, that each man should take his oar, and cushion, and *tropoter*, and go by land from Corinth to the sea on the side of Athens; and that after proceeding as quickly as possible to Megara, they should launch from its port, Nisæa, forty vessels that happened to be there, and sail straightway to Piræus. For there was neither any fleet keeping guard before it, nor any thought of the enemy ever sailing against it in so sudden a manner; and as for their venturing to do it openly and deliberately, they supposed that either they would not think of it, or themselves would not fail to be aware beforehand, if they should. Having adopted this resolution, they proceeded immediately to execute it; and when they had arrived by night, and launched the vessels from Nisæa, they sailed, not against Athens as they had intended, for they were afraid of the risk (some wind or other was also said to have prevented them), but to the headland of Salamis looking towards Megara; where there was a fort, and a guard of three ships to prevent anything from being taken in or out of Megara. So they assaulted the fort, and towed off the triremes empty; and making a sudden attack on the rest of Salamis, they laid it waste.

Now fire signals of an enemy's approach were raised towards Athens, and a consternation was caused by them not exceeded by any during the whole war. For those in the city imagined that the enemy had already sailed into Piræus; while those in Piræus thought that Salamis had been taken, and that they were all but sailing into their harbours: which indeed, if they would but have not been afraid of it, might easily have been done; and it was not a wind that would have prevented it. But at daybreak the Athe-

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nians went all in a body to Piræus to resist the enemy; and launched their ships, and going on board with haste and much uproar, sailed with the fleet to Salamis, while with their land-forces they mounted guard at Piræus. When the Peloponnesians saw them coming to the rescue, after overrunning the greater part of Salamis, and taking both men and booty, and the three ships from the port of Budorum, they sailed for Nisæa as quickly as they could; for their vessels too caused them some alarm, as they had been launched after lying idle a long time, and were not at all water-tight. On their arrival at Megara they returned again to Corinth by land. When the Athenians found them no longer on the coast of Salamis, they also sailed back; and after this alarm they paid more attention in future to the safety of Piræus, both by closing the harbours, and by all other precautions.

During this winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians had dispersed, the Athenians at Naupactus under the command of Phormion, after coasting along to Astacus, and there disembarking, marched into the interior of Acarnania, with four hundred heavy-armed of the Athenians from the ships and four hundred of the Messenians. From Stratus, Coronta, and some other places, they expelled certain individuals who were thought to be untrue to them; and having restored Cynes, son of Theolytus, to Coronta, returned again to their vessels and sailed home to Athens at the return of spring, taking with them such of the prisoners from the naval battles as were freemen (who were exchanged man for man), and the ships they had captured. And so ended this winter, and the third year of the war.^c

Bury, following Grote, says, that after this, Phormion "silently drops out of history, and as we find his son Asopius sent out in the following summer at the request of the Acarnanians, we must conclude that his career had been cut short by death: Duruy says he died in 428 B.C., and that "the city gave him an honourable funeral and placed his tomb beside that of Pericles." Asopius after failing in an assault on Œniadæ, was killed before Leucas.^d





CHAPTER XXXIII. THE FOURTH TO THE TENTH YEARS — AND PEACE

THE fourth year of the war, 428 B.C., opened with the third invasion of Attica by Archidamus, but the Periclean policy of remaining within the walls was continued. Athens herself remaining impregnable, revolt broke out among her allies.^a

One of the most remarkable events in the history of the Peloponnesian war is the revolt of Mytilene. The island of Lesbos contained five Æolian towns, which were indeed connected in a certain way, but were yet perfectly independent of one another; Mytilene, however, by the advantages of its position and by its excellent harbour, had risen far above the other four towns. The three smaller ones among them, Pyrrha, Eresus, and Antissa, had absolutely joined Mytilene, and were guided by it; but Methymna had not done so, and the relation in which the Lesbians stood to Athens was still very favourable: their contingent consisted in ships commanded by Lesbians, and they paid no tribute. But the fate of Samos had warned the few places standing in the same relation, Chios and Lesbos, and had rendered them suspicious of the intentions of the Athenians; and they feared lest the Athenians should treat them as they had treated the smaller islands, and should reduce them to the same state of dependence as Samos, by ordering them to deliver up their ships and pay tribute. But the more such places became aware of their importance, and the more they felt that by going over to the other side, they would cast a great weight into the scale, the more they naturally became inclined to revolt. Thus the Mytileneans were prepared for the step they took, and the revolt spread thence over the whole of Lesbos, with the exception of Methymna, which, as is always the case in confederations of states, from jealousy of Mytilene, sided with the Athenians, and directed their attention to the fact that treasonable plots were formed in Lesbos, and that a revolt was near at hand.

THE REVOLT OF MYTILENE

At first the Athenians, with incredible carelessness, paid little attention to the information, a neglect which was the consequence of the strange anarchical condition of Athens, where the government had in reality no power. There was no magistracy to take the initiative, or to form a preliminary resolution or *probuleuma* in such cases. The people might indeed meet, and did meet every day, and any demagogue might propose a measure; but when

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this was not done, there was no authority on which it was incumbent to introduce such measures, and nothing was done. At Mytilene, on the other hand, although under the supremacy of Athens democracy everywhere gained the upper hand, there seems to have been a powerful aristocratic element, and the government must have been very strong. Everything was carefully and cautiously prepared, and was kept profoundly secret. The revolt was determined upon, and public opinion was in favour of it. But as they wished to proceed safely, and provide themselves sufficiently with arms and provisions, the undertaking was delayed, and the Athenians, who at first had neglected everything, at last fitted out an expedition which was to take Mytilene by surprise.

But on this occasion it became evident how injurious it was to Athens, down to the end of the war, that at such times of urgent necessity the government still continued to be as before, and that there had not been instituted a separate magistrate for war to take such measures in time. As all proceedings were public, and neither the preparations nor their object could be kept secret, all the plans were known to everybody, as they were discussed in the popular assembly. It was indeed resolved there to surprise Mytilene; but this decree was ludicrous, and its consequences might be foreseen.

A Mytilenean, who was staying at Athens, or some one else anxious to do them a service, on hearing of it, went to Eubœa, took a boat, and informed the Mytileneans of the danger that was threatening them. Had this not been done, the revolt would have been prevented, and that for the good of the Mytileneans themselves. The intention of the Athenians was to surprise the city during the celebration of a festival, which the Mytileneans solemnised at a considerable distance from their city, in conjunction with the other Lesbians. Knowing the design of the Athenians, they did not go out to the festival, and determined to raise the standard of revolt at once. They quickly applied to the Peloponnesians, with whom they had, no doubt, been already negotiating, and requested the Spartans to send them succour of some kind or another. The Spartans sent them a commander without a force, which was anything but what they would have liked. He undertook the command in the city, and exhorted them to be courageous and persevering. They were expected to undergo the hardships of famine for the sake of the Spartans, but the general did not bring them any additional strength to repel the Athenians. They had nothing but their own forces.

The Athenian fleet now arrived and blockaded the city; after several little engagements the Mytileneans were reduced to extremities. Their envoys had at length prevailed upon the Peloponnesians to send them a motley fleet to relieve Mytilene. But it set sail with the usual slowness of the Spartans, and did not arrive until Mytilene, compelled by famine, had surrendered. Such was the care shown to save Mytilene! The long endurance of famine, shows how strongly the Mytileneans were bent upon escaping from the dominion of their enemies. How fearful it must have been, may be inferred from the fact, that in the end they preferred surrendering at discretion to an enraged enemy. The courage of the Mytileneans was like that of the Campanians in the Hannibalic War: they allowed themselves to be shut up like sheep in a fold, to be starved, and thus there remained nothing for them in the end, but to surrender. Many of those who had been most conspicuous, were taken prisoners by Paches, the Athenian general. The capitulation contained nothing else but a promise that the Athenian commander would not, on his own authority, order any one to be put to death, and that he would leave the decision to the people of Athens.

The war had already assumed the most fearful character: Alcidas, the Spartan admiral of the Peloponnesian fleet, which went to the relief of the Mytileneans, had, on his voyage, indulged in the most cruel piracy; he had captured all the ships he met with, without any regard as to what place they belonged to, and had thrown into the sea the crews of the allies and subjects of the Athenians, for whose deliverance the Spartans pretended to be anxious, as well as those of Athenian vessels. This barbarous mode of warfare was practised by the Spartans from the very beginning of the war. They not only captured the Athenian ships which sailed round Peloponnesus, but mutilated the crews, chopping off the hands of the sailors, and then drowned them.

This inhuman cruelty of the Spartans excited in the minds of the Athenians a desire to make reprisals; and thus it unfortunately became quite a natural feeling among the Athenians to devise inhuman vengeance upon the Mytileneans. They felt that Athens had given the Mytileneans no cause for revolt, that the alliance with them had been left unaltered as it had been before, and that if the Mytileneans had succeeded in joining the Spartans, they would have brought Athens into great danger, partly by their power, and partly by their example. It was, moreover, thought necessary to terrify Chios by a striking example, in order that the oligarchical party there might not attempt a similar undertaking. Those who did not see the necessity for such a measure, at least imagined that they saw it, for reasons of this kind are never anything else than an evil pretext. With all enticements of this description, the people were induced to despatch orders to the general Paches to avenge on the Mytileneans what the Spartans had done to the Athenians. He was to put to death all the men capable of bearing arms, and to sell women and children into slavery.

But the minds of the Athenians were too humane for such a design to be entertained by them for any length of time; and although it had been possible to carry out such a decree, through the existing confusion of ideas about morality, yet the better voice had not yet died away in their bosoms. The historian need not tell us that thousands could not close their eyes during the night in consequence of the terrible decree; and that through fear lest it should be carried into effect, they assembled early in the morning, even before sunrise. The morning after the day on which the decree had been passed, all the people met earlier than usual, and demanded of the prytanes once more to put the question to the vote, to see whether the decree should be carried into effect or not. This was done, and although the ferocious Cleon struggled with all fury to obtain the sanction of the first decree, yet humanity prevailed at this second voting.^b

It is in this debate that Cleon first appears in the pages of Thucydides; he was opposed by Diodotus who, by calm logic rather than impassioned appeal, won the Athenians over to mercy. It is thus that Thucydides describes the escape of the Mytileneans: *a*

“And they immediately despatched another trireme with all speed, that they might not find the city destroyed through the previous arrival of the first; which had the start by a day and a night. The Mytilenean ambassadors having provided for the vessel wine and barley-cakes, and promising great rewards if they should arrive first, there was such haste in their course, that at the same time as they rowed they ate cakes kneaded with oil and wine; and some slept in turn while others rowed. And as there happened to be no wind against them, and the former vessel did not sail in any haste on so horrible a business, while this hurried on in the manner described;

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though the other arrived so much first that Paches had read the decree, and was on the point of executing the sentence, the second came to land after it, and prevented the butchery. Into such imminent peril did Mytilene come.

"The other party, whom Paches had sent off as the chief authors of the revolt, the Athenians put to death, according to the advice of Cleon, amounting to rather more than one thousand. They also dismantled the walls of the Mytileneans, and seized their ships."^c

It was resolved that only the leaders of the rebellion should be taken to account and conveyed to Athens, but that no harm should be done to the other Mytileneans. The Mytileneans were, of course, obliged to deliver up all their ships and arms; and their territory, with that of the other towns, except Methymna, made a *cleruchia*: that is, it was divided into equal lots, and given to Athenian citizens as fiefs. But this was, in point of fact, nothing else than the imposition of a permanent land-tax upon the former owners; for the Athenians let out their lots to the ancient proprietors for a small rent. The number of rebels who were carried to Athens and executed there, was, indeed, very great, sadly great; but they were real rebels, and their blood did not come upon the heads of the Athenians.

In the declamations of the sophists, we hear much of the evils of the Athenian democracy, of the misfortunes of the most distinguished men: and that of Paches is regarded as one of the most conspicuous cases. The people, it is said, were ungrateful towards Paches, the conqueror of Mytilene, who had, even before that conquest, distinguished himself as a general; and they now took him to account for the manner in which he had conducted the war; and he, in order to escape condemnation, made away with himself. This story is believed to have been related by the father of all sophists and declaimers, Isocrates, and is mentioned also by the sophists of later times, and by a Roman writer on military affairs. But the true account may be learnt from a poem of the *Greek Anthology*, where Paches is said to have abused his power in subduing the island: he dishonoured two noble ladies of Mytilene, who went to Athens to appeal to the sense of justice of the Athenian people.

On that occasion the Athenians showed their true humanity, for they forgot how dangerous enemies the Mytileneans had been to them, and notwithstanding the victory of Paches, they were inexorable towards him, and had he not put an end to his life, he would certainly have been condemned and handed over to the Eleven. Of this deed the friends of Athens need not be ashamed.

The conduct of the commander of the Spartan fleet, which appeared on the coast of Ionia, shows the Spartans in the same light in which they always appear, as immensely awkward and slow in all they undertook. It was in vain that the Corinthians and other enterprising people advised them to attack Mytilene, because the Athenians were in a newly-conquered city, and the appearance of a superior force of Peloponnesians would be sufficient to create a revolt in the city, and to crush the small force of the Athenians. But Alcidas, in torpid Spartan laziness, was immovable, and returned to Peloponnesus without undertaking or having effected anything, except that he received on board the suppliants who threw themselves into the sea, and carried on the most cruel piracy. The Spartans followed the principle of not punishing their generals, which was the very opposite to that of the Athenians, who often made their commanders responsible when fortune had been against them; and when they had neglected an opportunity, or been guilty of any crime, they never escaped unpunished.^d

It was shortly after the fate of Mytilene was sealed, that Plataea fell into the power of ruthless Sparta, as described previously. The affair of Mytilene was followed by an internal war in the island of Coreyra. In describing this sedition Thucydides is unwontedly vivid and his final moralising upon the bloody event, as Grote says, "will ever remain memorable as the work of an analyst and a philosopher."^a

THUCYDIDES' ACCOUNT OF THE REVOLT OF CORCYRA

Now the forty ships of the Peloponnesians which had gone to the relief of the Lesbians, (and which were flying, at the time we referred to them, across the open sea, and were pursued by the Athenians, and caught in a storm off Crete, and from that point had been dispersed,) on reaching the Peloponnese, found at Cyllene thirteen ships of the Leucadians and Ambracians, with Brasidas, son of Tellis, who had lately arrived as counsellor to Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians wished, as they had failed in saving Lesbos, to make their fleet more numerous, and to sail to Coreyra, which was in a state of sedition; as the Athenians were stationed at Naupactus with only twelve ships; and in order that they might have the start of them, before any larger fleet reinforced them from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas proceeded to make preparations for these measures.

For the Coreyreans began their sedition on the return home of the prisoners taken in the sea-fights off Epidamnus, who had been sent back by the Corinthians, nominally on the security of eight hundred talents given for them by their *proxeni*, but in reality, because they had consented to bring over Coreyra to the Corinthians. These men then were intriguing, by visits to each of the citizens, to cause the revolt of the city from the Athenians. On the arrival of a ship from Athens and another from Corinth, with envoys on board, and on their meeting for a conference, the Coreyreans voted to continue allies of the Athenians according to their agreement, but to be on friendly terms with the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been.

Now there was one Pithias, a volunteer *proxenus* of the Athenians, and the leader of the popular party; him these men brought to trial, on a charge of enslaving Coreyra to the Athenians. Having been acquitted, he brought to trial in return the five richest individuals of their party, charging them with cutting stakes in the ground sacred to Jupiter, and to the hero Alcinous; the penalty affixed being a stater for every stake. When they had been convicted, and, owing to the amount of the penalty, were sitting as suppliants in the temples, that they might be allowed to pay it by instalments, Pithias, who was a member of the council also, persuades that body to enforce the law. So when they were excluded from all hope by the severity of the law, and at the same time heard that Pithias was likely, while he was still in the council, to persuade the populace to hold as friends and foes the same as the Athenians did, they conspired together, and took daggers, and, having suddenly entered the council, assassinated Pithias and others, both counsellors and private persons, to the number of sixty. Some few, however, of the same party as Pithias, took refuge on board the Athenian trireme, which was still there.

Having perpetrated this deed, and summoned the Coreyreans to an assembly, they told them that this was the best thing for them, and that so they would be least in danger of being enslaved by the Athenians; and they moved, that in future they should receive neither party, except coming in a

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quiet manner with a single ship, but should consider a larger force as hostile. As they moved, so also they compelled them to adopt their motion. They likewise sent immediately ambassadors to Athens, to show, respecting what had been done, that it was for their best interests, and to prevail on the refugees there to adopt no measure prejudicial to them, that there might not be any reaction.

On their arrival, the Athenians arrested as revolutionists both the ambassadors and all who were persuaded by them, and lodged them in custody in Ægina. In the meantime, on the arrival of a Corinthian ship and some Lacedæmonian envoys, the dominant party of the Corevrians attacked the commonalty, and defeated them in battle. When night came on, the commons took refuge in the citadel, and on the eminences in the city, and there established themselves in a body, having possession also of the Hyllæic harbour; while the other party occupied the market-place, where most of them dwelt, with the harbour adjoining it, looking towards the mainland.

The next day they had a few skirmishes, and both parties sent about into the country, inviting the slaves, and offering them freedom. The greater part of them joined the commons as allies; while the other party was reinforced by eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After the interval of a day, a battle was again fought, and the commons gained the victory, having the advantage both in strength of position and in numbers: the women also boldly assisted them, throwing at the enemy with the tiling from the houses, and standing the brunt of the mêlée beyond what could have been expected from their nature. About twilight the rout of the oligarchical party was effected; and fearing that the commons might carry the arsenal at the first assault, and put them to the sword, they fired the houses round about the market-place, and the lodging-houses, to stop their advance, sparing neither their own nor other people's; so that much property belonging to the merchants was consumed, and the whole city was in danger of being destroyed, if, in addition to the fire, there had been a wind blowing on it. After ceasing from the engagement, both sides remained quiet, and kept guard during the night. On victory declaring for the commons, the Corinthian ship stole out to sea; while the greater part of the auxiliaries passed over unobserved to the continent.

The day following, Nicostratus son of Diitrephes, a general of the Athenians, came to their assistance from Naupactus with twelve ships and five hundred heavy-armed, and wished to negotiate a settlement, persuading them to agree with each other to bring to trial the ten chief authors of the sedition (who immediately fled), and for the rest to dwell in peace, having made an arrangement with each other, and with the Athenians, to have the same foes and friends. After effecting this he was going to sail away; but the leaders of the commons urged him to leave them five of his ships, that their adversaries might be less on the move; and they would themselves man and send with him an equal number of theirs. He consented to do so, and they proceeded to enlist their adversaries for the ships. They, fearing that they should be sent off to Athens, seated themselves as suppliants in the temple of the Dioscuri; while Nicostratus was trying to persuade them to rise, and to encourage them. When he did not prevail on them, the commons, having armed themselves on this pretext, alleged that they had no good intentions, as was evident from their mistrust in not sailing with them; and removed their arms from their houses, and would have despatched some of them whom they met with, if Nicostratus had not prevented it. The rest, seeing what was going on, seated themselves as suppliants in the

temple of Juno, their number amounting to not less than four hundred. But the commons, being afraid of their making some new attempt, persuaded them to rise, and transferred them to the island in front of the temple, and provisions were sent over there for them.

When the sedition was at this point, on the fourth or fifth day after the transfer of the men to the island, the ships of the Peloponnesians, three-and-fifty in number, came up from Cyllene, having been stationed there since their return from Ionia. The commander of them, as before, was Alcidas, Brasidas sailing with him as counsellor. After coming to anchor at Sybota, a port on the mainland, as soon as it was morning they sailed towards Coreyra.

The Coreyræans, being in great confusion, and alarmed both at the state of things in the city and at the advance of the enemy, at once proceeded to equip sixty vessels, and to send them out, as they were successively manned, against the enemy; though the Athenians advised them to let them sail out first, and afterwards to follow themselves with all their ships together. On their vessels coming up to the enemy in this scattered manner, two immediately went over to them, while in others the crews were fighting amongst themselves, and there was no order in their measures. The Peloponnesians, seeing their confusion, drew up twenty of their ships against the Coreyræans, and the remainder against the twelve of the Athenians, amongst which were the two celebrated vessels, *Salaminia* and *Paralus*.

The Coreyræans, coming to the attack in bad order, and by few ships at a time, were distressed through their own arrangements; while the Athenians, fearing the enemy's numbers and the chance of their surrounding them, did not attack their whole fleet, or even the centre of the division opposed to themselves, but took it in flank, and sank one ship. After this, when the Peloponnesians had formed in a circle, they began to sail round them, and endeavoured to throw them into confusion. The division which was opposed to the Coreyræans perceiving this, and fearing that the same thing might happen as had at Naupactus, advanced to their support. Thus the whole united fleet simultaneously attacked the Athenians, who now began to retire, rowing astern; at the same time wishing the vessels of the Coreyræans to retreat first, while they themselves drew off as leisurely as possible, and while the enemy were still ranged against them. The sea-fight then, having been of this character, ended at sunset.

The Coreyræans, fearing that the enemy, on the strength of his victory, might sail against the city, and either rescue the men in the island, or proceed to some other violent measures, carried the men over again to the sanctuary of Juno, and kept the city under guard. The Peloponnesians, however, though victorious in the engagement, did not dare to sail against the city, but withdrew with thirteen of the Coreyræan vessels to the continent, whence they had put out. The next day they advanced none the more against the city, though the inhabitants were in great confusion, and though Brasidas, it is said, advised Alcidas to do so, but was not equal to him in authority; but they landed on the promontory of Leucimne, and ravaged the country.

Meanwhile, the commons of the Coreyræans, being very much alarmed lest the fleet should sail against them, entered into negotiation with the suppliants and the rest for the preservation of the city. And some of them they persuaded to go on board the ships; for, notwithstanding the general dismay, they still manned thirty, in expectation of the enemy's advance against them. But the Peloponnesians, after ravaging the land till mid-day, sailed away; and at nightfall the approach of sixty Athenian ships

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from Leucas was signalled to them, which the Athenians had sent with Eurymedon son of Thucles, as commander, on hearing of the sedition, and of the fleet about to go to Coreyra with Alcidas.

The Peloponnesians then immediately proceeded homeward by night with all haste, passing along shore; and having hauled their ships over the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not be seen doubling it, they sailed back. The Coreyreans, on learning the approach of the Athenian fleet and the retreat of the enemy, took and brought into the city the Messenians, who before had been without the walls: and having ordered the ships they had manned to sail round into the Hyllæic harbour, while they were going round, they put to death any of their opponents they might have happened to seize; and afterwards despatched, as they landed them from the ships, all that they had persuaded to go on board. They also went to the sanctuary of Juno, and persuaded about fifty men to take their trial, and condemned them all to death. The majority of the suppliants, who had not been prevailed on by them, when they saw what was being done, slew one another there on the sacred ground; while some hanged themselves on the trees, and others destroyed themselves as they severally could. During seven days that Eurymedon stayed after his arrival with his sixty ships, the Coreyreans were butchering those of their countrymen whom they thought hostile to them; bringing their accusations, indeed, against those only who were for putting down the democracy; but some were slain for private enmity also, and others for money owed them by those who had borrowed it. Every mode of death was thus had recourse to; and whatever ordinarily happens in such a state of things, happened then, and still more. For father murdered son, and they were dragged out of the sanctuaries, or slain in them; while in that of Bacchus some were walled up and perished. So savagely did the sedition proceed; while it appeared to do so all the more from its being amongst the earliest.¹

For afterwards, even the whole of Greece, so to say, was convulsed; struggles being everywhere made by the popular leaders to call in the Athenians, by the oligarchical party, the Lacedæmonians. Now they would have had no pretext for calling them in, nor have been prepared to do so, in time of peace. But when pressed by war, and when an alliance also was maintained by both parties for the injury of their opponents and for their own gain therefrom, occasions of inviting them were easily supplied to such as wished to effect any revolution. And many dreadful things befell the cities through this sedition, which occur, and will always do so, as long as human nature is the same, but in a more violent or milder form, and varying in their phenomena, as the several variations of circumstances may in each case present themselves.

For in peace and prosperity both communities and individuals had better feelings, through not falling into urgent needs; whereas war, by taking away the free supply of daily wants, is a violent master, and assimilates most men's tempers to their present condition. The states then were thus torn by sedition, and the later instances of it in any part, from having heard what had been done before, exhibited largely an excessive refinement of ideas, both in the eminent cunning of their plans, and the monstrous cruelty of their vengeance. The ordinary meaning of words was changed by them as

[¹ Over five hundred of the oligarchical party escaped to Mount Istone, and when the Athenian fleet sailed away proceeded to make frequent raids upon the democratic strongholds, till in 425 the Athenian fleet on the way to Sicily paused in Coreyra and aided the people to storm Istone. The prisoners left to the mob were foully butchered and the oligarchical party annihilated.]

they thought proper. For reckless daring was regarded as courage that was true to its friends ; prudent delay, as specious cowardice ; moderation, as a cloak for unmanliness ; being intelligent in everything, as being useful for nothing. Frantic violence was assigned to the manly character ; cautious plotting was considered a specious excuse for declining the contest.

The advocate for cruel measures was always trusted ; while his opponent was suspected. He that plotted against another, if successful, was reckoned clever ; he that suspected a plot, still cleverer ; but he that forecasted for escaping the necessity of all such things, was regarded as one who broke up his party, and was afraid of his adversaries. In a word, the man was commended who anticipated one going to do an evil deed, or who persuaded to it one who had no thought of it. Moreover, kindred became a tie less close than party, because the latter was more ready for unscrupulous audacity. For such associations have nothing to do with any benefit from established laws, but are formed in opposition to those institutions by a spirit of rapacity. Again, their mutual grounds of confidence they confirmed not so much by any reference to the divine law as by fellowship in some act of lawlessness. The fair professions of their adversaries they received with a cautious eye to their actions, if they were stronger than themselves, and not with a spirit of generosity.

To be avenged on another was deemed of greater consequence than to escape being first injured oneself. As for oaths, if in any case exchanged with a view to a reconciliation, being taken by either party with regard to their immediate necessity, they only held good so long as they had no resources from any other quarter ; but he that first, when occasion offered, took courage to break them, if he saw his enemy off his guard, wreaked his vengeance on him with greater pleasure for his confidence, than he would have done in an open manner ; taking into account both the safety of the plan, and the fact that by taking a treacherous advantage of him he also won a prize for cleverness. And the majority of men, when dishonest, more easily get the name of talented, than, when simple, that of good ; and of the one they are ashamed, while of the other they are proud. Now the cause of all these things was power pursued for the gratification of covetousness and ambition, and the consequent violence of parties when once engaged in contention.

For the leaders in the cities, having a specious profession on each side, put forward, respectively, the political equality of the people, or a moderate aristocracy, while in word they served the common interests, in truth they made them their prizes. And while struggling by every means to obtain an advantage over each other, they dared and carried out the most dreadful deeds ; heaping on still greater vengeance, not only so far as was just and expedient for the state, but to the measure of what was pleasing to either party in each successive case : and whether by an unjust sentence of condemnation, or on gaining the ascendancy by the strong hand, they were ready to glut the animosity they felt at the moment. Thus piety was in fashion with neither party ; but those who had the luck to effect some odious purpose under fair pretences were the more highly spoken of. The neutrals amongst the citizens were destroyed by both parties ; either because they did not join them in their quarrel, or for envy that they should so escape.

Thus every kind of villainy arose in Greece from these seditions. Simplicity, which is a very large ingredient in a noble nature, was laughed down and disappeared ; and mutual opposition of feeling, with a want of confidence, prevailed to a great extent. For there was neither promise that

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could be depended on, nor oath that struck them with fear, to put an end to their strife; but all being in their calculations more strongly inclined to despair of anything proving trustworthy, they looked forward to their own escape from suffering more easily than they could place confidence in arrangements with others. And the men of more homely wit, generally speaking, had the advantage; for through fearing their own deficiency and the cleverness of their opponents, lest they might be worsted in words, and be first plotted against by means of the versatility of their enemy's genius, they proceeded boldly to deeds. Whereas their opponents, arrogantly thinking that they should be aware beforehand, and that there was no need for their securing by action what they could by stratagem, were unguarded and more often ruined.

It was in Coreyra then that most of these things were first ventured on; both the deeds which men who were governed with a spirit of insolence, rather than of moderation, by those who afterwards afforded them an opportunity of vengeance, would do as the retaliating party; or which those who wished to rid themselves of their accustomed poverty, and passionately desired the possession of their neighbours' goods, might unjustly resolve on; or which those who had begun the struggle, not from covetousness, but on a more equal footing, might savagely and ruthlessly proceed to, chiefly through being carried away by the rudeness of their anger. Thus the course of life being at that time thrown into confusion in the city, human nature, which is wont to do wrong even in spite of the laws, having then got the mastery of the law, gladly showed itself to be unrestrained in passion, above regard for justice, and an enemy to all superiority. They would not else have preferred vengeance to religion, and gain to innocence; in which state envy would have had no power to hurt them. And so men presume in their acts of vengeance to be the first to violate those common laws on such questions, from which all have a hope secured to them of being themselves rescued from misfortune; and they will not allow them to remain, in case of any one's ever being in danger and in need of some of them.^c

DEMOSTHENES AND SPHACTERIA

These massacres at Coreyra, Mytilene, Plataea, and Melos were doubly disastrous; iniquity always striking back at its perpetrators, thus making two victims. Through such reversions to the barbarity of former days the sense of right, of justice will everywhere become enfeebled until it finally disappears.

As though nature herself had wished to take part in the general disorder, earthquakes visited Attica, Eubœa, and all of Bœotia, particularly Orchomenos. Pestilence had never made its appearance in the Peloponnesus; now for a year it raged among the Athenians with terrible mortality. Since its outbreak it had carried off forty-three hundred hoplites, three hundred horsemen, and innumerable victims among the general population. This was the last blow fate dealt the Athenians. To appease the god to whom all pollution was an offence, they caused the island of Apollo to be thoroughly purified as had already been done by the Pisistratidæ. Birth and death being alike forbidden at Delos, the remains of the dead buried there were exhumed and sent elsewhere, and the sick were transported to Rhenea, a neighbouring island. Finally, there were instituted in honour of Apollo games and horse-races which were to be celebrated every four years, the

Greeks as well as the Romans thinking to gain thus the protection of a god, whom they caused to be represented by images at these festivals.

The Ionians, excluded from the Peloponnesian solemnities, flocked to those of Delos, where Nicias, at the first celebration, made himself remarkable for the magnificence of his gifts. In one night he caused to be constructed between Delos and Rhenea a bridge seven hundred metres long, carpeted and decorated with wreaths, across which was to pass the procession of the dead exiled in the name of religion from the holy island (425 B.C.).

It is a proof of the part taken by the people of Athens in the great things accomplished by Pericles, that in the four years passed without his enlightened counsel, they had displayed under the double scourge of plague and war that steadfastness he had particularly enjoined upon them: no disturbances took place in the city and no pettiness of spirit was shown in the choice of military chiefs. In vain Cleon thundered from the tribune. Into the hands of none but tried generals, were they noble, rich, or friends of peace, like Nicias and Demosthenes, was given the command of their armies. At Mytilene and Coreyra those who had placed their trust in Lacedæmon had perished; the destruction of Plataea was the only check received by Athens. She began to turn her gaze toward Sicily; soon she sent there twenty galleys to aid the Leontini against Syracuse. Her pretext was community of origin with the Leontini, but in reality she wished to prevent the exportation of Sicilian grain into the Peloponnesus.

Demosthenes was a true general, able and bold; to him war was a science made up of difficult combinations as well as courage. Leaving to his colleague, Nicias, the seas near Athens he set out for western waters, to destroy the influence of Corinth even in the gulf that bears his name. Aided by the Acarnanians he had the preceding year (426) vanquished in the land-battle of Olpæ, by force of superior tactics, the Peloponnesians, who lost so many men that the general had three hundred panoplies, his share of the plunder, consecrated in the temple at Athens. But this Acarnanian War, related at such length by Thucydides, could not have very serious results. An audacious enterprise by Demosthenes seemed, at one moment, to have brought it to a close. Struck, while navigating around the Peloponnesus, by the advantageous position of Pylos a promontory on the coast of Messene which commands the present harbour of Navarino, the best seaport of the peninsula, left deserted by the Spartans since the Messenian War, the idea came to him that if he could occupy it with Messenians he would be "attaching a burning torch to the flank of the Peloponnesus." He obtained from the people permission to act on this idea; but when the fleet which had set out for Coreyra and Italy arrived at Pylos, the generals commanding it shrank from the project and refused to execute it. The winds interposed in Demosthenes' behalf, by driving the ships on to the coast and forcing the Athenians to land. Once on shore the soldiers, with that industry that characterised the Athenians, set to work to construct walls and fortifications, without either tools for cutting stone or hods for carrying mortar. At the end of six days the rampart was about finished and Demosthenes, with six galleys, took up his position on the point (425).

Sparta was with reason alarmed at this move, the place chosen by Demosthenes at the west of the Peloponnesus, forming an excellent station for hostile fleets, and from Pylos the Athenians would be able to spread agitation through all Messene, perhaps even to incite the helots to fresh revolt. The Peloponnesian army was at once recalled from Attica where it had only

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arrived two weeks before, and also the fleet from Coreyra with the end in view of blockading Pylos by land and by sea. At the entrance to this harbour was an island fifteen stadia [not quite two miles] long called Sphacteria. The Lacedæmonians landed on this island a force of four hundred and twenty hoplites, and barred the channel on either side with vessels having their prows turned outward. Pylos had no other defence seaward than the difficulty of effecting a landing on her shores, but it was on this side that the attack began. It lasted two days and was unsuccessful. Brasidas, who had displayed great valour, was covered with wounds and lost his shield, which the waters carried over to the Athenians. There was still hope for the Lacedæmonians; but at this point forty Athenian galleys arriving from Zacynthus, assailed their fleet and after a furious combat drove their ships upon the land. Thus Sphacteria was surrounded by an armed circle that kept close guard about her night and day.

Sparta was thrown into consternation by the news of this defeat. Her population that in Lycurgus' time numbered nine thousand was reduced in the year of the battle of Plataea to five thousand, which in another quarter of a century had dwindled to seven hundred; hence she could not support the loss of the men now held under siege by the Athenians. The ephors went in person to Pylos to examine the condition of affairs and saw no other way to preserve the lives of their fellow-citizens than to conclude an armistice with the Athenian generals. It was agreed that Laconia should send ambassadors to Athens, and that she should immediately surrender all the vessels, sixty galleys, that she had in the port of Pylos; Athens to continue the blockade of Sphacteria but allowing to pass in daily, two Attic phœnices of flour, two cotyles of wine, and a portion of meat per soldier, with half that allowance for the menials.

The Lacedæmonian deputies appeared in the assembly at Athens and, contrary to their usual custom, delivered a long discourse offering peace in exchange for the Spartan prisoners and adding that the treaty once made, all other cities would follow their example and lay down arms. Where now were all the causes of complaint held against Athens at the commencement of the war? The Spartans deserted their allies and the cause they had formerly held so just for the sake of some fellow-citizens in danger. But had they not also the preceding year betrayed the Ambracians after the defeat at Olpæ? Unfortunately Pericles was no longer there to urge upon the people a prudent generosity. Cleon exhorted the assembly to demand the restitution of the towns ceded when the 'Thirty Years' Truce was concluded, and the deputies, unable to accept such terms, retired without having accomplished anything.

The armistice ceased with their return; but the Athenians, pretending the violation of certain conditions, refused to give up the Spartan vessels, which was an entirely gratuitous breach of faith since the ships were no longer of any use to the Spartans. Famine was the greatest danger the besieged had to fear; the island, thickly wooded as it was, offering peril to the enemy that would attempt to take it by force. Freedom was promised each helot who would carry provisions through the blockade, and many attempting and succeeding, the four hundred and twenty were enabled to hold out till the approach of winter.

The Athenians at Pylos had also to fear for themselves the difficulty of obtaining provisions through the severe season. The army already suffered, and this fact became known at Athens. Cleon, who had rejected the overtures of the Lacedæmonians, laid the blame on the generals. It was because

of their lack of resolution, he said, that hostilities were so prolonged. In this he was right, the Athenians at Pylos numbering ten thousand men as against four hundred and twenty Spartans. Nicias, in a constant state of alarm, believed success even with their superior force impossible, and to silence the demagogue proposed to him to go himself to Sphacteria.

Cleon hesitated, but the impatient people took the general at his word, and Cleon was obliged to go; promising that in twenty days all trouble would be at an end. In truth this was time enough to effect his purpose when he once seriously set to work. He first prudently requested that Demosthenes co-operate with him, and was wise enough to take counsel of this able man at every step. Shortly after his arrival at Pylos a fire lighted on Sphacteria to cook food and imperfectly extinguished, was fanned by a violent wind into a blaze that destroyed the whole forest. This accident removed the principal obstacle in the way of an attack. Demosthenes made the preparations aided by Cleon, and one night they fell upon the island with their entire force. Having among their troops many that were lightly armed, they were able to reach the highest points and from there sorely harass the Lacedæmonians who were unused to the methods of attack of an enemy that uttered wild cries and fled as soon as they had struck. The ashes of the recently consumed forest rose into the air and blinded the besieged men, and unable longer to distinguish objects they stood motionless in one place and received from every side projectiles that their felt cuirasses were ill-fitted to turn aside. To render the combat a little less unequal they retired in a body to an elevated fort at the extremity of the island. This position gave them a decided advantage, and they were beginning to repulse their assailants when there appeared upon the rocks above them a corps of Messenians who had outflanked them.

They saw the necessity of surrendering, but named a condition: that they be allowed to consult with the Lacedæmonians who were stationed on the neighbouring coast. Their compatriots replied: "You are free to act as you think best provided you incur no dishonour." At this they laid down their arms and surrendered; the course wherein dishonour formerly lay for Sparta apparently containing it no more. One hundred and twenty-eight were killed in the engagement: of the two hundred and ninety-two survivors one hundred and twenty belonged to the noblest families of Sparta. Some one praised in the hearing of one of the prisoners the courage of those of his companions who had been slain: "It would be impossible," he said, "to esteem the darts too highly if they are capable of distinguishing a brave man from a coward." This retort was, for a Spartan, very Athenian in spirit. The blockade had lasted fifty-two days.

His victory at Sphacteria raised Cleon high in the estimation of the people. A decree gave him the right to live in the Prytaneum at the cost of the republic, and to perpetuate the memory of his success a statue of Victory was erected on the Acropolis. Aristophanes in revenge presented six months later his comedy of the *Knights*, in which Cleon as the "Paphlagonian," the slave who ingratiates himself with Demos for the purpose of robbing him, causes blows to rain upon the faithful servants Nicias and Demosthenes, and finally serves up to his master the cake of Pylos that Demosthenes alone has prepared. We will only say in conclusion that though all the honour of the affair may go to Demosthenes, Cleon manifested in it an energy that was not without effect; that even in the account of Thucydides he does not appear to have borne himself discreditably as captain or soldier; and lastly, that all that he promised he performed.

[425 B.C.]

The balance of power was now disturbed, fortune leaned to the side of the Athenians. Nevertheless, while the Lacedæmonians were taking their land-forces economically over into Attica from Laconia, Athens was ruining herself by maintaining fleets in all the seas of Greece, recruiting at heavy cost the rowers to man them. Her annual expenses amounted to twenty-five hundred talents. In 425 the reserved funds amassed by Pericles being exhausted, it became necessary to increase both the tribute paid her by her allies and the tax laid upon the revenues of her citizens. One of these measures was to cause disaffection later, and the other, that which weighed upon the rich, was to give rise to plots against the popular government, germs of disaster that the future was to bring to fruition.

FURTHER ATHENIAN SUCCESSES

The Athenians had as yet no forebodings, but applied rare vigour to the following up of their success. Nicias, at the head of a considerable armament, landed on the isthmus and defeated the Corinthians, then he proceeded to the capture of Methone between Træzen and Epidaurus on the peninsula, and extending towards Ægina. A garrison was left behind a wall that closed the isthmus, and from this post which communicated by fire signals with Piræus the Athenians made frequent raids into Argolis (425). The following year Nicias took the island of Cythera which, situated near the southern coast of the Peloponnesus, offered great facility for making raids into that district and for waylaying ships bound there. It commanded, moreover, the seas of Crete and Sicily in both of which Athens had stationed fleets for the support of the cities at war with Syracuse.

After having ravaged Laconia for seven days with impunity, Nicias returned to Thyrea in Cynuria, where the Spartans had established the Æginetans. He took the city despite the proximity of a Lacedæmonian army which did not venture to aid it, and his prisoners were sent to Athens and there put to death. This new-born national greatness, if such a return to savagery can merit the name, increased constantly in power: the foe was a criminal meriting punishment and his defeat equivalent to a sentence of death. In just this period occurred a tragedy, the story of which we would refuse to receive were it not for Thucydides' direct affirmation; the massacre of two thousand of the bravest helots for the sole purpose of weakening the corps and of frightening those of their companions to whom the success of Athens might have given the idea of revolt. Overwhelmed by so many reverses and fearful of seeing war established permanently around Laconia, at Pylos, Cythera, and Cynuria, the Spartans shrank from further action. Whatever step they took might lead them into error and having never learned the lessons of misfortune, they remained irresolute and timid. The Athenians, on the contrary, were full of confidence in their good fortune. The Greeks in Sicily having brought their wars to a close by a general reconciliation, the generals sent to that country by the Athenians allowed themselves to be included in the treaty. On their return the people condemned two of them to exile and one to a heavy fine, on the pretext that they had it in their power to subjugate Sicily but had been bought off by presents. The Athenian people believed themselves to be irresistible, and in the loftiness of their aspirations denied to any enterprise, whether practicable or not, the possibility of defeat. This was the forerunner of the fatal madness that seized them when Alcibiades planned the unfortunate expedition into Sicily.

Athens was thus taking everywhere the offensive, and Sparta, paralysed, had entirely ceased to act; she had recourse again to Darius, begging aid more insistently than ever, thus betraying the cause of all Greece and dimming the glory of their deeds at Thermopylæ. The Athenians intercepted the Persian Artaphernes in Thrace. In the letter this envoy bore, the king set forth that not being able to grasp the meaning of the Spartans — no two of their envoys delivering to him the same message — he had thought best in order to come to a clear understanding, to send them a deputy. Athens at once took steps to neutralise Sparta's measures; perhaps even to supplant her in the favour of the Great King, and sent Artaphernes back honourably accompanied by ambassadors. From now on Greece was to witness the shameful spectacle offered by the descendants of the victors of Salamis and Platæa bowing down to the successors of Xerxes. At Ephesus the embassy learnt of the death of the Great King and went no further; but Athens had none the less been false, in intent if not in deed, to all the traditions of her past, and was to expiate her sin without delay.

A CHECK TO ATHENS; BRASIDAS BECOMES AGGRESSIVE

Demosthenes' able plan had succeeded; the Peloponnesus was encircled by hostile posts; there now remained but to shut off the isthmus and imprison the Spartans in their retreat. One way of doing this was to occupy Megara, but a still better method would be to obtain an alliance with Bœotia. The attempt on Megara having failed, Demosthenes turned his attention to Bœotia. He held secret communication with the inhabitants of Chæronea, who promised to deliver over the city to a body of Athenians who were to leave Naupactus unseen, aided by the Phocians, while he himself was to storm Siphæ on the Gulf of Crissa, the Athenian general Hippocrates being charged with the capture of Delium, on the Eubœan side. These three enterprises were to be executed the same day, and if they succeeded, Bœotia, like the Peloponnesus, would be encircled by a hostile ring, and Thebes would be separated from Lacedæmon. But too many were in the secret to allow of its being kept, the enemy was warned and the three Athenian forces, failing to act in concert, lost the advantage that would have lain in a simultaneous attack.

The enterprise against Siphæ and Chæronea failed also and Hippocrates, delayed a few days in his advance, found arrayed against him in one body all the Bœotian forces that he and his colleagues had plotted to divide. He succeeded in occupying Delium and fortified the temple of Apollo found there. To the Bœotians it was profanation to turn a temple into a fortress, and this scruple was shared by many of the Athenians who entered but half-heartedly into the combat. A thousand hoplites with their chief perished in the action; contrary to sacred usage Thebes let the bodies of the dead lie without sepulture seventeen days, until the taking of Delium; holding them to be sacrilegious evil-doers whose wandering souls were to receive punishment in the infernal world.

Socrates had taken part in this battle. In company with his friend Laches and some others equally brave, he had held his ground to the last, retreating step by step before the Theban cavalry. Simultaneously with this display of heroism Aristophanes was writing his comedy, the *Clouds*.

Sparta possessed but one man of ability, Brasidas, who had saved Megara, menaced Piræus, and almost defeated Demosthenes at Pylos. Clear-sighted

[424 B.C.]

and brave to the point of audacity, he possessed an additional weapon, one that was capable of inflicting cruel wounds, and that the Spartans had hitherto known little how to use, eloquence. The sea being closed to him, he decided that it would be possible to injure Athens seriously both in fortune and renown without leaving the land. The very policy she had used against Sparta, Pylos, Cythera, and Methone, could now be turned against her in Chalcidice and Thrace. At the commencement of the war she had forced Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, to enter her alliance and had gained the friendship of Sitalces the powerful king of the Odrysians, whose territory extended from the Ægean Sea to the Danube, and from Byzantium to the source of the Strymon, a distance not to be covered under thirty days' travel.

At Athens' instigation Sitalces had in 429 invaded Macedonia, but since then his zeal had cooled. Perdiccas, on his side, had never lost an opportunity of secretly injuring the Athenians. Even at this moment he was urging Sparta to send an expedition to Chalcidice and the coast of Thrace. To deprive Athens of these regions whence she obtained her timber was to attack her in her navy, and to carry at the same time the centre of hostilities towards the north, was to draw her away from the Peloponnesus which had lately suffered so many ills. Brasidas was charged with the enterprise, but Sparta refused to engage in it deeply. He raised a force of seven hundred helots who were armed as hoplites, to which were added a thousand Peloponnesians attracted by Perdiccas' promises. This was little; but Brasidas held in reserve the treacherous but magical word, Liberty, that was to open for him many gates.

He took possession in this way of Acanthus, Stagira, and Amphipolis itself fell into his power, he having entered one of its suburbs by stealth, and won over all the inhabitants by the generosity of his conditions. Amphipolitans and Athenians alike he permitted to remain with retention of all their rights and property; he also accorded to those who wished to leave, five days in which to carry away all their belongings. Not for an age had war been carried on with such humanity, and it was a Spartan who was setting the example! We must also note the lack of eagerness shown by Athens' allies to cast off her yoke which, viewed in the light of facts, takes on an aspect much less odious than that in which it is represented by rhetoricians.

THE BANISHMENT OF THUCYDIDES

The approach of so active an enemy as Brasidas, and the blows he had dealt, should have led the Athenian generals in that region to concentrate their forces on the continent not far from Amphipolis, which was Athens' principal stronghold on that side. One of these commanders had gone with seven galleys to Thasos, where there was no need of his presence, the island being secure from menace. Though too late to save Amphipolis he arrived in time to save the port, Eion. At the suggestion of Cleon the people punished this act of negligence by a twenty years' sentence of exile. It is to this sentence that posterity owes a masterwork in which vigorous thoughts are expressed in a style of great conciseness, the exiled one being Thucydides, who employed his leisure in writing the history of the Peloponnesian War. The real culprit was Eucles, the commander of Amphipolis, who had allowed himself to be taken by surprise.

In according liberty to the towns he took, Brasidas deprived Athens of many subjects without bestowing any on Lacedæmonia who had no desire for

conquest in such distant regions ; hence the success of the adventurous general astonished Greece without arousing great enthusiasm in Sparta ; neither did it cause much vexation at Athens after the first outburst of anger to which Thucydides fell a victim. Deprived of a few cities of importance, Athens retained her island empire ; the loss of Amphipolis being her most serious reverse.

King Plistoanax, exiled in 445 from Sparta for having lent ear to the propositions of Pericles, had taken refuge on Mount Lycæus in Arcadia near the temple of Zeus, and had dwelt there nineteen years. The partisans of peace recalled the exile, who returned to his native land filled with the determination to end the war. Neither was Athens, for the moment, in a bellicose mood.

A TRUCE DECLARED ; TWO TREATIES OF PEACE

Her desire to reduce expenses and Sparta's to recover captives that belonged to her most influential families brought about, in fact, a sort of union between the two nations. In March, 423, a truce of one year was declared, the conditions being that each side should retain all its possessions. The population forming the Peloponnesian league were authorised to navigate the waters surrounding their own coasts and those of their allies, but they were forbidden the use of war-galleys. The signers of the treaty must guarantee to all free access to the temple and oracle of Pythian Apollo, must harbour no refugees, free or slave, must protect all heralds and deputies journeying by land or sea, must, in a word, aid by every means in their power the conclusion of permanent peace.

While the treaty was being concluded at Athens, Brasidas entered Scione, on the peninsula of Pallene where he was received with open arms, the inhabitants decreeing him a golden crown, and binding his head with fillets as though he had been a victorious athlete. This victory being achieved two days after the conclusion of peace, the conquered territory ought to have been given back ; this Sparta refused to do and hostilities broke out again. Nicias, arriving with a considerable force, took Scione, then Mende, which was delivered over to him by the people, and persuaded Perdiccas to ally himself again with Athens. Brasidas failed in an enterprise against Potidæa. The following year Cleon was named general. He urged Athens and with reason to repeat against Potidæa the vigour of her action at Pylos, it being necessary to check the advance of Brasidas. He first seized Torone and Galepsus, then established himself at Eion to await the auxiliaries that were on their way to him from Thrace and Macedonia. But his soldiers carried him along with them in a rush to Amphipolis, where Brasidas was stationed. This latter took advantage of a false move on the part of the Athenians to attack them by surprise, and won a victory that cost him his life. Cleon also fell in this action. In the account of Thucydides Cleon was one of the first to seek flight, but according to Diodorus he died bravely. Brasidas, mourned by all his allies who took part, fully armed, in his funeral procession, was interred with the ceremonies accorded to one of the ancient heroes. His tomb was enclosed within a consecrated circle and in his honour were instituted annual games and sacrifices (422).

The death of these two men facilitated the conclusion of peace ; Brasidas by his activity and success, Cleon by his discourses having been for long

[421 B.C.]

the chief sustainers of war. Athens, which had experienced a serious check, lost confidence, as did also Sparta, the victory of Amphipolis having been gained not by her native troops but by a body of mercenaries upon whom no reliance could be placed; the war she had lightly undertaken against Athens had lasted ten years, with the menace of another contest in the near future; the 'Thirty Years' Truce concluded with the Argives was on the point of expiring, and lastly her naval ports were still in the hands of the enemy and her citizens were still held captive. In both cities the balance of influence was on the side of the peace partisans, prudent Nicias in Athens, and the easy-going Plistoanax in Lacedæmon. There were two treaties of peace which were finally concluded in 421.

The first treaty guaranteed to the Greeks, according to usage, the right to offer sacrifices at Delphi, to consult its oracle and to attend its festivals. It was agreed that each side should restore the cities taken in war; Thebes alone was to be allowed to retain Plataea, in exchange for which the Athenians would keep Nisæa in the Megarid, and Anactorium and Sollium in Acarnania. It was stipulated that "what was decreed for the majority of the allies should bind them all, unless hindrances should occur on the part of the gods and heroes." All the allies save Corinth, Megara, and the Eleans, accepted these conditions. It was finally decided that peace should be ratified by an oath renewed each year and inscribed upon the columns of Olympia and Delphi, of the temple of Poseidon on the isthmus, in the citadel at Athens, and the Amyclæum at Sparta.

One of the articles of the treaty read that prisoners should be restored on both sides. When those of Sphacteria arrived, they were degraded from their rights as citizens, that the stain on Spartan courage might be removed by showing that Lacedæmon recognised no compromise with duty, even in the face of death. It is true that shortly after, these same citizens were reinstated in their former position.

The first of these treaties which brought temporary cessation to the ills the people had suffered for the last ten years, bore the name of the honourable man who had been instrumental in having it drawn, Nicias. Who had profited by all the blood that had been shed? Sparta had increased neither in strength nor in glory, while Greece simply retained her original empire, her people not for a moment renouncing the hatred that had armed them against each other. No side had gained, and civilisation had lost what ten years of peace would have added to the brilliancy of the Age of Pericles.^e





CHAPTER XXXIV. THE RISE OF ALCIBIADES

THUCYDIDES remarks that after the Peace of Nicias, there was but one of the predictions current at the commencement of the Peloponnesian War that was reputed to have received its fulfilment: it was the one which declared that the war would last three times nine years. There were indeed three acts in this war; we have seen the first: the second was the uneasy truce which extends from 421 to 413 when, though there was no general war, war was everywhere. The last, from 413 to 404, includes the catastrophe and the train of circumstances which brought it about.

The first period is filled with Pericles; his policy survives him, and in spite of Cleon his spirit governs Athens; the second and third are entirely taken up by Alcibiades, his passions, his services, and his crimes.

Alcibiades whose descent was derived from Ajax, was connected on his mother's side with the Alcmaeonids. The death of his father Clinias, killed at Coronea, left him to the guardianship of his relatives, Pericles and Ariphron, who, on his attaining his majority, handed him over one of the great fortunes in Athens. With wealth and noble blood, he joined that beauty which in the estimation of this artist-people added to the brilliance of talents and virtue on the brows of Sophocles and Pericles, and always seemed a gift of the gods, even on the features of an athlete. Parasites, flatterers, all who are attracted by fortune, grace, and boldness, thronged round the footsteps of this rich and witty young man, who had become what in Athens was a power, namely the ruler of fashion. Accustomed in the midst of this train to find himself applauded for his wild actions, Alcibiades dared everything, and all with impunity. The force and flexibility of his temperament rendered him capable of vice and virtue, abstinence and debauchery, according to the hour, the day, or the place. In the city of Lycurgus there was no Spartan more harsh towards his body; in Asia he outdid the satraps in luxury and self-indulgence. But his audacity and his indomitable petulance compromised the long meditated plans of his ambition for the sake of a jest or an orgy. Lively and diverse passions carried him now in one direction, now in another, and always to excess, while in the stormy versatility of his character he did not find the curb which might have restrained him, namely, the sense of right and duty.

One day he was to be seen with Socrates, welcoming with avidity the noble lessons of the philosopher, and weeping with admiration and enthusiasm; but on the morrow he would be crossing the agora with a trailing robe and indolent, dissolute mien, and would go with his too complacent friends to plunge into shameful pleasures. Yet the sage contended for him, and sometimes with success, against the crowd of his corruptors. In the

[450-421 B.C.]

early wars they shared the same tent. Socrates saved Alcibiades at Potidæa, and at Delium Alcibiades protected the retreat of Socrates.

From his childhood he exhibited the half heroic, half savage nature of his mind. He was playing at dice on the public way when a chariot approached; he told the charioteer to wait; the latter paid no heed and continued to advance; Alcibiades flung himself across the road and called out, "Now pass if you dare." He was wrestling with one of his comrades and not being the strongest, he bit the arm of his adversary. "You bite like a woman." "No, but like a lion," he answered. He had caused a Cupid throwing a thunderbolt to be engraved on his shield.

He had a superb dog which had cost him more than seven thousand drachmæ. When all the town had admired it he cut off its tail, its finest ornament, that it might be talked of still more. "Whilst the Athenians are interested in my dog," he said, "they will say nothing worse concerning me." One day he was passing in the public square; the assembly was tumultuous and he inquired the cause; he was told that a distribution of money was on hand; he advanced and threw some himself amid the applause of the crowd: but according to the fashion among the exquisites of the day he was carrying a pet quail under his mantle: the terrified bird escaped and all the people ran, shouting, after it, that they might bring it back to its master. Alcibiades and the people of Athens were made to understand one another. "They detest him," said Aristophanes, "need him and cannot do without him."

One day he laid a wager to give a blow in the open street to Hipponicus, one of the most eminent men in the town; he won his bet, but the next day he presented himself at the house of the man he had so grossly insulted, removed his garments and offered himself to receive the chastisement he had deserved. He had married Hipparete, a woman of much virtue, and responded to her eager affection only by outrageous conduct. After long endurance she determined to lay a petition for divorce before the archon. Alcibiades, hearing this, hurried to the magistrate's house and under the eyes of a cheering crowd carried off his wife in his arms across the public square, she not daring to resist; and brought her back to his house where she remained, well-pleased with this tender violence.

Alcibiades treated Athens as he did Hipponicus and Hipparete, and Athens, like Hipparete and Hipponicus, often forgave this medley of faults and amiable qualities in which there was always something of that wit and audacity which the Athenians prized above everything. His audacity indeed made sport alike of justice and religion. He may be excused for beating a teacher in whose school he had not found the *Iliad*: but at the *Dionysia* he struck one of his adversaries, in the very middle of the spectacle, regardless of the solemnity; and at another time, in order the better to celebrate a festival, he carried off the sacred vessel which was required at that very moment for a public and religious service. A painter having refused to work for him he kept him prisoner until he had finished decorating his house, but dismissed him loaded with presents. On one occasion when a poet was pursued by justice, he tore the act of indictment from the public archives. In a republic these actions were not very republican. But all Greece had such a weakness for Alcibiades! At Olympia he had seven chariots competing at once, thus eclipsing the magnificence of the kings of Syracuse and Cyrene; and he carried off two prizes in the same race, while another of his chariots came in fourth. Euripides sang of his victory and cities joined together to celebrate it. The Ephesians erected him a magnificent pavilion;

the men of Chios fed his horses and provided him with a great number of victims; the Lesbians gave him wine and the whole assembly of Olympia took their seats at festive tables to which a private individual had invited them. Posterity, less indulgent than contemporaries, whilst recognising the eminent qualities of the man, will condemn the bad policy which made the expedition to Sicily, and the bad citizen who so many times gave the scandalous example of violating the laws and who dared to arm against his own country, to raise his hand against his mother. Alcibiades will remain the type of the most brilliant, but the most immoral and consequently the most dangerous citizen of a republic.

In spite of his birth which classed him among the Eupatrids, Alcibiades, like Pericles, went over to the side of the people, and made himself the



ALCIBIADES.

adversary of a man very different from himself, the superstitious Nicias, who was also a noble, rich and tried by long services. But Alcibiades had the advantage of him in audacity, fascination, and eloquence. Demosthenes regards him as the first orator of his time; not that he had a great flow of language; on the contrary, as his phrases did not come quickly enough, he frequently repeated the last words of his sentences; but the force and elegance of his speech and a certain lisp which was not displeasing, rendered him irresistible. His first political act was an unwelcome measure. He suggested an increase of the tribute of the allies, an imprudence which Pericles would not have committed. But Alcibiades had different schemes and different doctrines. He believed in the right of might and he made use of it; he looked forward to gigantic enterprises and he prepared the necessary means in advance. His inaction began to weigh on him. He was thirty-one years old and had as yet done nothing; so he bestirred himself considerably on the occasion of the treaty of 421. He would have liked to supplant Nicias and win the honour of the peace for himself. His flatteries to the prisoners of Sphacteria met with no

success; the Spartans relied more on the old general, and Alcibiades bore them a grudge in consequence.

There was no lack of men opposed to this treaty. It was signed amidst the applause of the old, the rich, and the cultivators, but in it Athens, through Nicias' fault, had allowed herself to be ignominiously tricked. The merchants who during the war had seen the sea closed to their rivals and open to their own vessels, the sailors, the soldiers, and all the people of the Piræus who lived on their pay or their booty, formed a numerous party. Alcibiades constituted himself its chief. The warlike spirit which was to disappear only with Greece itself soon gave him allies from outside.

What Sparta and Athens were doing on a large scale was being done by other towns on a small one. Strong or weak, obscure or illustrious, all had the same ambition: all desired subjects. The Eleans had subdued the Lepreatæ, Mantinea and the towns in her neighbourhood; Thebes had knocked down the walls of Thespiæ in order to keep that town at her mercy; and Argos had transferred within her own walls the inhabitants of several townships of Argos, though in doing so she granted them civil rights. Sparta

[421-420 B.C.]

watched with annoyance this movement for the concentration of lesser cities round more powerful ones. She proclaimed the independence of the Leptæa, and secretly encouraged the defection of the subjects of Mantinea and the hatred of Epidaurus against Argos. But since Sphacteria she had lost her prestige. At Corinth, at Megara, in Boeotia, it was openly said that she had basely sacrificed the interests of her allies; indignation was especially felt at her alliance with Athens. The Peloponnesian league was in fact dissolved; one people dreamed of reconstituting it for their own advantage.

The repose and prosperity of Argos in the midst of the general conflict had increased her resources and her liberal policy towards the towns of the district had augmented her strength. But the new-comers were a powerful reinforcement to the democratic party whose influence impelled Argos on a line of policy opposed to that of the Spartans. This town therefore might and wished to become the centre of an anti-Lacedæmonian league. Mantinea, where the democracy predominated; the Eleans, who had been offended by Lacedæmon; Corinth, which, by the treaty of Nicias, lost two important towns in Acarnania, were ready to join their grudges and their forces. The Argives skilfully seized the opportunity; twelve deputies were sent to all the Greek cities which desired to form a confederation from which the two cities which were equally menacing to the common liberty, namely Sparta and Athens, should be excluded. But an agreement could not be arrived at. A league of the northern states was thus rendered abortive; nothing could yet be done without Sparta or Athens.

Between these two towns there were many grounds for discontent. The lot had decided that Sparta should be the first to make the restitutions agreed on at the treaty of 421. For Athens the most valuable of these restitutions was that of Amphipolis and the towns of Chalcidice. Sparta withdrew her garrisons but did not restore the towns; and yet Nicias, deceived by the ephors, led the people to commit the mistake of not keeping the pledges which they had in their possession until Lacedæmon should have put an end to her bad faith. Sparta had negotiated for all her allies; and the most powerful were refusing to observe her engagements. The Boeotians restored Panactum, but kept the Athenian prisoners and only agreed to a truce of ten days. Athens, which had thought to win peace, was, ten days later, again at war with the Boeotians and uninterruptedly with Chalcidice. As regards the latter she had just given a terrible example of her anger. The whole male population of Scione had been put to death as a punishment for its recent revolt, in virtue of a decree of the people which the generals had carried with them.

All this furnished material which Alcibiades might work up into a war. First, he prevented the Athenians from evacuating Pylos. The helots and Messenians were simply withdrawn thence at the instance of Lacedæmon and were transported to Cephallenia. Then, warned by his friends at Argos that Sparta was seeking to draw that city into her alliance, he answered that Athens herself was quite ready to join the Argives. Athens at once concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Argives, the Mantineans and the Eleans. In the ardour of hatred against Sparta it was agreed that the alliance should last a hundred years; a long period for such spirits (420). We here remark a new and important point; it is that the alliance was concluded on a perfect footing of equality. The command of the allied troops was to belong to the people which should demand aid and on whose territory war should be made.

The neutrality of the Argolid and of the centre of the Peloponnesus had hitherto preserved Lacedæmon from a continental invasion. War, after having long hovered on the outskirts of the peninsula, had not ventured, within the last few years, to do more than lay hold of certain points on the coasts to the west, south, and east, which were quite remote from Sparta, at Pylos, Cythera, and Methone. But now the Argives, the Mantineans and the Eleans were about to introduce it into the heart of the Peloponnesus, to bring it in the very face of the helots. Sparta became once more the patient, deliberate city of former days, even to the point of submitting to outrageous insults. On account of the despatch of the helots to Lepreum during the sacred truce, the Eleans had condemned the Lacedæmonians to a fine of two thousand minæ, and on their refusal to pay had excluded them by decree from the Olympic games. A Spartan of distinction, named Lichas, had however a chariot competing in the same race in which Alcibiades had displayed so much magnificence and obtained wreaths. When the judges learnt his name they had him ignominiously driven away with blows. Sparta did not avenge this outrage; she had ceased to believe in herself. At last Alcibiades passed over into the Peloponnesus with a few troops.

At Argos he persuaded the people to seize a port on the Saronic Gulf from the Epidaurians; from thence the Argives might the more easily receive succours from Athens which was in possession of Ægina opposite Epidaurus. But the Lacedæmonians sent this town three hundred hoplites who arrived by sea and repelled all attacks. At this news the Athenians wrote at the base of the column on which the treaty had been engraved, that Sparta had violated the peace, and the war began (419).

It was in vain that Aristophanes produced about this time his comedy entitled the *Peace*, resuming the theme he had taken up seven years before in the *Acharnians*. It was to no purpose that he personified War as a giant who crushes the towns in a mortar, using the generals for his pestles, and showed that with the return of Peace, drawn at last from the cavern in which she has been captive for thirteen years, banquets and feasts will recommence, the whole town will be given up to joy, and the armourers only will be in despair; he persuaded no one, not even the judges of the competition, who refused him the first prize.

The Lacedæmonians, under the command of Agis, entered the Argolid with the contingents of Bœotia, Megara, Corinth, Phlius, Pellene, and Tegea. The Argive general, cut off from the town by a clever manœuvre, proposed a truce which Agis accepted. This was not what was desired by the Athenians, who arrived shortly after, to the number of a thousand hoplites and three hundred horsemen; Alcibiades spoke in presence of the people of Argos and prevailed with them: the truce was broken, a march was made on Orchomenos and it was taken. The blame of the rupture fell on Agis. The Spartans, angry at his having given their enemies time to make this conquest, wished first to demolish his house and condemn him to a fine of a hundred thousand drachmæ; his prayers won his pardon; but it was determined that in future the kings of Sparta should be assisted in the war by a council of ten Spartans.

To repair his mistake, Agis went in search of the allies; he encountered them near Mantinea. "The two armies," says Thucydides, "advanced against each other; the Argives with impetuosity, the Lacedæmonians slowly and, according to their custom, to the sound of a great number of pipes which beat time and kept them in line." The Lacedæmonian left was driven in, but the right, commanded by the king, retrieved the fight and

[418-416 B.C.]

carried the day (418). This battle, which cost the allies eleven hundred men and the Spartans about three hundred, is regarded by Thucydides as the most important which the Greeks had fought for a long time. It restored the reputation of Sparta in the Peloponnesus, and in Argos the preponderance of the wealthy who suppressed the popular commune, put its leaders to death and made an alliance with Lacedæmon.

This treaty broke up the confederation recently agreed on with Athens, Elis, and Mantinea. The last-named town even thought itself sufficiently endangered by the defection of Argos to consent to descend once more to the rank of an ally of the Spartans. A treaty, dictated by the latter, decreed that all the states, great and small, should be free and should keep their national laws with their independence. Sparta desired nothing but divisions and weakness round her. To the policy of concentration advocated by Athens, she opposed the policy of isolation which was to put all Greece at her feet, but would also afterwards place her, with Sparta herself, at the feet of Macedonia and of the Romans (417).

The victory of Agis was that of the oligarchy. At Sicyon, in Achaia, it again raised its head or established itself more firmly. We have just seen how it resumed power in Argos. But in that town, if we are to believe Pausanias, a crime analogous to those which founded the liberties of the people in Rome brought about the fall of the tyrants three months later. Expelled by an insurrection, the chief citizens retired to Sparta, whilst the people appealed to the Athenians, and men, women, and children laboured to join Argos with the sea by means of long walls. Alcibiades hurried thither with masons and carpenters to aid in the work; but the Lacedæmonians, under the guidance of the exiles, dispersed the workers. Argos, exhausted by these cruel discords, did not recover herself; and with her fell that idea of a league of secondary states which might perhaps have spared Greece many misfortunes by imposing peace and a certain caution on the two great states (417).

The Athenians, who were acting weakly in Chalcidice, had recently lost two towns there and had seen the king of Macedon withdraw from their alliance; they resolved to avenge themselves for all their embarrassments on the Dorian island of Melos, which was insulting their maritime empire by its independence. At Naxos and Samos they had shown themselves merciful, because they were amongst the Ionians where they could reckon on a democratic party; at Melos, an outpost of the Dorians in the Cretan Sea, they were implacable because the blow struck at these islanders, faithful to their metropolis, was to find a mournful echo in Lacedæmon. A squadron of thirty-eight galleys summoned the town to submit, and on its refusal an army besieged it, took it, and exterminated all the adult male population. The women and children were sold (416). Before the attack a conference had taken place with the Melians.

"In order to obtain the best possible result for our negotiations," said the Athenians, "let us start from a principle with which both sides shall be really satisfied, a principle which we know well and would employ with people who are as well acquainted with it as we are: it is that business between men is regulated by the laws of justice when an equal necessity obliges them to submit to it; but that those who have the advantage in strength do all that is in their power and that it is the part of the weak to yield," and further: "nor do we fear that the divine protection will forsake us. In our principles and in our actions we neither depart from the idea which men have conceived of the Divinity nor from the line of conduct

which they preserve amongst themselves. We believe, according to the received opinion, that the gods, and we know very well that men, by a necessity of nature, dominate wherever they have force. This is not a law that we have made ; it is not we who have first applied it ; we profit by it and shall transmit it to times to come ; you yourselves, with the power which we enjoy, would follow the same course."

The theory of force has rarely been so distinctly expressed. The reputation of the Athenians has suffered by it, without their having derived the slightest profit from this evil deed. But let us observe, even while we think with horror of the sanguinary act performed at Melos, that the practice, if not the theory of this right of the strongest is a very old one ; it is the principle on which the whole of antiquity is based ; it is nothing but the famous law, *salus populi suprema lex*, so many times evoked to justify odious enterprises or iniquitous cruelties ; and it must be acknowledged with sadness that in all times and in almost all places men have thought with Euripides, "that wisdom and glory are : to hold a victorious hand over the head of one's enemies." Force is as old as the world, it is right which emerges slowly : can we believe that its reign will not come ?

The Dorian colonists of Melos had counted on the support of Sparta. "She will abandon you," the Athenians had answered ; and the prudent city which, for its part regarded all things from the point of view of utility, had sent neither ship nor soldier. This inertia inflated the hopes of Athens : she believed that the moment had come for annexing to her empire the great island of the West where internal divisions had roused in several cities the desire for foreign protection.^b



FROM A GREEK VASE



CHAPTER XXXV. THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION

THE largest island in the Mediterranean, Sicily has been a stepping-stone between African, Asiatic, and European nations. Freeman^e has compared it with Great Britain in its "geographical and historical position." Its original inhabitants seem to have been the Sicans who were invaded first by the Elymians and then by the Sicels. Relations with Sicily were begun as early as the Mycenaean age, and jars of Aegean ware have been unearthed in the tombs of Syracuse. The Phœnicians established factories and trading places in Sicily, and then came the Greeks overflowing the island and founding many a city and stronghold. As we have seen in a previous chapter, Sicily became one of the earliest and most important of the Greek colonies.

SICILIAN HISTORY

The African city of Carthage, which we think of chiefly along with Roman history, early took up the grievances of the Phœnicians against the Greeks. In the sixth century B.C., various settlements had fallen by the ears with one another. About 580 B.C. the Greek adventurer Pentathlus threatened the Phœnician settlements, but was defeated and slain. Carthage, however, was awakened to the danger from Greek land-hunger, and about 560 B.C. sent an expedition under Malchus, who gave a severe check to Greek encroachment and an encouragement to Carthaginian ambition. Finally, by 480 B.C., the Carthaginians were ready to combine with the Persians against Greek prosperity and independence. While Xerxes assailed the mother-country, Carthage by agreement sent an enormous expedition against the Sicilian Greeks. Their general was Hamilcar, and the magnificence of his host has been as splendidly exaggerated as that of Xerxes. His success was equal to that of the Persian, except that Xerxes escaped alive, while Hamilcar perished.

The chief instruments of the Sicilian victory were the tyrants who had gathered to themselves supreme power in their own cities or groups of cities as the tyrants of the mother-country had previously done. In Sicily there were four powerful masters of four chief cities: Anaxilaus of Rhegium in Italy, who crossing the straits, took possession of Zancle; his father-in-law Terillus of Himera; Gelo of Syracuse and his father-in-law, Theron of

Acragas. It was a quarrel between Theron and Terillus that gave the Carthaginians their immediate excuse for invading Sicily. Terillus being thwarted by Theron played a treacherous part like that of Hippias, and begged the Persians to attack Acragas. Terillus called in Carthage to his aid against Theron. There is a tradition that the defeat of the Carthaginians happened on the same day as the battle of Salamis. Such traditions are always subject to scepticism, and yet the coincidence of Vicksburg and Gettysburg in American history is hardly more incredible.

Theron had called on Gelo to aid him in expelling the Carthaginians, and Gelo had won the greater glory. He died two years later leaving his younger brother Hiero to succeed him. It was Hiero's privilege to thwart the ambition of the Etruscans as his elder brother had foiled Carthage. The naval battle of Cyme was the brilliant victory which led Pindar to write one of his loftiest songs. He and Simonides, Æschylus, and Bacchylides, were all received with honour at the opulent court of Hiero. The glitter of court life, however, was small compensation for the tyranny of the various despots of Sicily. Their ambitions clashed at the least pretext, always at the cost of the blood of their subjects. They had a curious way of deporting the inhabitants of an entire city to some other place to suit their own whims. And gradually time took its revenge upon them. Theron left as his heir a weak son, Thrasydæus who went to battle with Hiero, and, losing the battle, lost also his prestige and his power, for the cities Himera and Acragas formed themselves into democracies. Five years later, in 467 B.C., Hiero died, and his tyranny fell to his brother Thrasybulus whose bloodthirsty and tax-hungry cruelties aroused a revolution. He was besieged in Syracuse, compelled to surrender and sent into exile.

Life in Sicily is not to this day so quiet as in certain other portions of the globe, and it was inevitable in the change from despotism to democracy that there should be much friction and bloodshed, but the cities lost none of the prosperity they had acquired under the tyrants. Syracuse continued to be the principal city and power in the island; Agrigentum, as the Romans named Acragas, being the second in power.

Now a new source of danger appeared, this time not from a foreign invasion, or from the ambition of such pretenders as had tried to re-establish the power of Gelo. The new threat came from a racial jealousy. The old inhabitants, the Sicels, who had been crowded into the interior, gave birth to a Napoleonic ambition. A young man named Ducetius who first appeared in 461, having fed upon certain small successes in acquiring power, showed his ingenuity in 453 by forming a federation of Sicel towns with himself as prince. He seized an early opportunity to assail the Greeks, and justified the fidelity of the Sicels by capturing the towns of Morgantium, Ætna, and the Acragantine stronghold of Motya, building a new city—Palice. He now became important enough to merit the anger of Syracuse, and a large force from Syracuse and Agrigentum marched against him. The toy Napoleon met his little Waterloo. His partisans deserted him and he found himself alone. A desperate resolve occurred to him as the only means of saving his life. He rode by night to the gates of Syracuse, entered the city secretly, and sat himself down before the altar in the market place. He was soon surrounded by a crowd who had too keen a sense of the dramatic not to forgive him and let him off with the easy exile to Corinth. From this Elba this Napoleon soon emerged. He violated his parole laying the blame on an oracle, and took a body of colonists to Sicily where he founded the city of Calacta (or Kale Akte). He began gradually to reach out for

[440-431 B.C.]

more power, but his death in 440 ended his schemes and left his federation as a prize for Syracuse.

While Syracuse was beginning to plume itself upon its leadership and to dream of more definite control, the city of Athens was building an empire, not over one island but many. It was only natural that she should wish to stand well with the rich cities of Sicily. At first there could hardly have been any thought of conquest, and Grote^f points out that Plutarch is mistaken and is contradicted by Thucydides, when he implies that even as late as the quarrel between Corinth and Corcyra, the Athenians had thought of dominion over Sicily. Professor Bury^d however sees a distinct desire to have influence, if not conquest, from a very early day. He says:

“During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered to western Greece beyond the seas. We can surmise some oblique glances, as early as the days of Themistocles; and we have seen how under Pericles a western policy definitely began. An alliance was formed with the Elymian town of Segesta, and subsequently treaties of alliance (the stone records are still partly preserved) were concluded with Leontini and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian cities against the Dorian, which were predominant in number and power, and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. The same purpose of counter-acting the Dorian predominance may be detected in the foundation of Thurii. But Thurii did not effect this purpose. The colonists were a mixed body; other than Athenian elements gained the upper hand; and, in the end, Thurii became rather a Dorian centre and was no support to Athens. It is to be observed that at the time of the foundation of Thurii, and for nigh thirty years more, Athens is seeking merely influence in the west, she has no thought of dominion. The growth of her connection with Italian and Sicilian affairs was forced upon her by the conditions of commerce and the rivalry of Corinth.” Adolph Holm^b is equally positive in accusing the Athenians of an early desire to obtain a footing in Sicily.

The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. found Sicily in a high state of prosperity, political equality, and intellectual health. According as the various cities had been founded by Dorian or Ionian colonists their family prejudices inclined them towards Sparta or Athens. The war in fact, according to Müller,^h was called by the oracles, the Dorian War. The preponderance in Sicily was largely toward Sparta and Corinth, for Corinth had been the mother-city to Syracuse. Grote^f thus discusses the feelings of the various cities at this time:

“In that struggle the Italian and Sicilian Greeks had no direct concern, nor anything to fear from the ambition of Athens; who, though she had founded Thurii in 443 B.C., appears never to have aimed at any political ascendancy even over that town—much less anywhere else on the coast. But the Sicilian Greeks, though forming a system apart in their own island, from which it suited the dominant policy of Syracuse to exclude all foreign interference, were yet connected by sympathy, and one side even by alliances, with the two main streams of Hellenic politics. Among the allies of Sparta were numbered all or most of the Dorian cities of Sicily—Syracuse, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, perhaps Himera and Messana—together with Locri and Tarentum in Italy; among the allies of Athens, perhaps, the Chalcidic or Ionic Rhegium in Italy. Whether the Ionic cities in Sicily—Naxos, Catana, and Leontini—were at this time united with Athens by any special treaty, is very doubtful. But if we examine the state of politics prior to the breaking out of the war, it will be found that the connection of the

Sicilian cities on both sides with central Greece was rather one of sympathy and tendency, than of pronounced obligation and action. The Dorian Sicilians, though sharing the antipathy of the Peloponnesian Dorians to Athens, had never been called upon for any co-operation with Sparta; nor had the Ionic Sicilians yet learned to look to Athens for protection against Syracuse."

Sparta counted apparently upon the active assistance of Syracuse, and demanded that the Dorians in Italy and Sicily should contribute to her both ships and money. She realised no ships, a little money, and profuse expressions of interest and sympathy. The awakening of the old Dorio-Ionic blood feud suggested to the Syracusans, however, that while the Peloponnesian War was remote from them both geographically and commercially, it yet furnished a good excuse for attacking such cities in Sicily as were in any way attached to Athens. Naxos, Catana, and Leontini were looked upon as the first prizes to be seized. These towns were so far from being able to send aid to Athens that they were compelled to ask aid of her. They succeeded in forming an alliance with Camarina, which was a Dorian city but jealous of Syracuse, and with the town of Rhegium in Italy. The friendship of Rhegium brought over to Syracuse the Italian city of Locri. With the aid of Locri and practically all the Dorian cities, Syracuse was so strong that the Ionic allies were soon in desperate straits. They sent their eloquent orator Gorgias to implore the Athenians for aid and to advise them to grant it, lest when Syracuse had conquered all Sicily she should send her troops and ships to the aid of the Spartans and Corinthians. The Athenians sent twenty triremes under Laches, who after various minor successes fell under suspicion as to his honesty and efficiency, and was called home.

The Ionians sent another appeal to Athens, and received the promise of forty more triremes. In the spring of 425 this fleet left Athens under command of Eurymedon and Sophocles. It was this fleet which, almost accidentally, paused on the Spartan coast at Pylos with the result that it gained for Athens the renowned victory of Sphacteria, as previously described. This victory was very profitable to Athens in its immediate glory, but was of very gloomy purport in the Sicilian matter, for the fleet having delayed to take part in the victory, and later pausing at Coreyra, did not reach Sicily before September. This delay had given the Syracusan allies time to undo what little had been achieved by Laches. He had won the friendship of the town of Messana, thus giving Athens command of the straits. The delay however had weakened the friendship of Messana, and lost its alliance. Furthermore, the cities which Athens had come to aid were found to be in a decided humour to put an end to the civil war. A congress of Sicilian cities was called at Gela.

This congress at Gela takes on a decided importance in political history because of the theories brought forward there by a Syracusan orator, Hermocrates, whose political creed has been compared to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States. The creed was not successfully carried out, and as has often happened in the history of the United States, the promulgators of the doctrine were by no means consistent in their actions. Hermocrates pleaded for a policy, which in modern phrase would be called "Sicily for the Sicilians." He wished Sicily to regard herself as an entity, considering all foreigners to be outsiders, and all interference to be meddling. He was not rash enough or un-Grecian enough to deny the Sicilian cities the luxury of fighting with one another; but he called for unity against the invader or the intriguer from other shores. From his speech, as imagined by Thucydides, the peroration is worth quoting for its cool common sense:

[425-416 B.C.]

“And I call on you all, of your own free will, to act in the same manner as myself, and not to be compelled to do it by your enemies. For there is no disgrace in connections giving way to connections, whether a Dorian to a Dorian, or a Chalcidian to those of the same race; in a word, all of us who are neighbours, and live together in one country, and that an island, and are called by the one name of Sicilians. For we shall go to war again, I suppose, when it may so happen, and come to terms again amongst ourselves by means of general conferences; but to foreign invaders we shall always, if we are wise, offer united resistance, inasmuch as by our separate losses we are collectively endangered; and we shall never in future call in any allies or mediators. For by acting thus we shall at the present time avoid depriving Sicily of two blessings—riddance both of the Athenians and of civil war—and shall in future enjoy it by ourselves in freedom, and less exposed to the machinations of others.”


The Athenian expedition having been coldly received by the cities it came to rescue, returned to Athens, where Eurymedon was fined and Sophocles banished on a charge of bribery. And now the reservation made by Hermocrates as to the right of the Sicilian cities to war upon one another, was soon justified. And to such an extent that the Ionic cities began to realise that the Syracusans had been chiefly anxious to expel the foreign invader, in order that the island might be left entirely to Syracusan ambition. In the city of Leontini the aristocrats crushed the democrats, and turned the city into a Syracusan fort after destroying the greater portion of it. The common people appealed to Athens, and received in reply two triremes under Phæax in B.C. 422. Before he had accomplished anything the Peace of Nicias put a temporary close to the war.

In 417 B.C. the two Sicilian cities of Selinus and Segesta (or Egesta) quarrelled over a bit of territory. Syracuse aided Selinus, and Segesta, after appealing in vain to Agrigentum and to Carthage, sent envoys to Athens. The Leontine people also reminded Athens that Syracuse, having destroyed Leontini and assailed Segesta, was planning and accomplishing the gradual reduction of all Sicilian cities favourable to Athens, and thus building up an empire which would give Sparta unlimited aid. The people of Segesta asked only for men and ships, and promised to provide ample money for expenses.

The idea of such an armada delighted the fire-brand Alcibiades, who saw in it a chance to be a leader and to find an abundance of the things he most desired—adventure, notoriety, and money. The cautious Nicias opposed the scheme, and secured a delay until ambassadors could be sent to Segesta to learn if the city were really wealthy enough to pay as it promised. And now it was a case of Greek meeting Sicilian. The people of Segesta had sent secret expeditions to all their friendly towns, Phœnician or Grecian, to borrow all the treasure they could wheedle out of their prospective allies. When the Athenian envoys appeared, they were taken to the temple of Venus and shown a great array of gifts, “bowls, wine ladles, censers, and other articles of furniture in no small quantity.” These were all silver or of silver gilt, and made a far greater showing than they merited. Then the Athenians were put through a round of entertainments. In each case the host displayed all his own plate, and in addition a large portion of the common fund, which was passed from house to house surreptitiously. The gullible Athenians were overwhelmed by the evident opulence of the private citizens of Segesta, and when sixty talents of uncoined silver (valued at over £12,000 or \$60,000) were handed over to the Athenians for the first month’s expenses of the fleet, the embassy was thoroughly duped, and returned

to Athens glowing with enthusiasm for an alliance with such a western Gollconda. Then followed a tug of war between Nicias and Alcibiades. Nicias was to be one of the commanders of the expedition, and he could well claim that it was no fear of bodily danger that made him averse to it. He opposed it purely as a piece of folly. Alcibiades replied in favour of the expedition, and it was so evident that the people were determined to send the fleet that Nicias in a last effort tried to alarm the city by magnifying the difficulties of the task and demanding a tremendous force. To the Athenians, in their drunkenness for empire, and in that frenzy of "Westward Ho!" which, in the fifteenth century, attacked all Europe, the opposition of Nicias was only wind on flame. They rejoiced the more at the magnificence of the problem.

To decide upon sending a fleet of one hundred triremes instead of the sixty asked for, was folly enough; but to elect Nicias as the commander of the expedition, and to ally with him his bitter opponent, Alcibiades, was pure delirium. Still, Athens had just conquered Melos, and no task was too gigantic for her hopes.^a



GREEK DOOR KEYS

THE MUTILATION OF THE HERMÆ

For the two or three months immediately succeeding the final resolution taken by the Athenians to invade Sicily, the whole city was elate and bustling with preparation. The prophets, circulators of oracles, and other accredited religious advisers, announced generally the favourable dispositions of the gods, and promised a triumphant result. All classes in the city, rich and poor, — cultivators, traders, and seamen, — old and young, all embraced the project with ardour; as requiring a great effort, yet promising unparalleled results, both of public aggrandisement and individual gain. Each man was anxious to put down his own name for personal service; so that the three generals, Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, when they proceeded to make their selection of hoplites, instead of being forced to employ constraint or incur ill-will, as happened when an expedition was adopted reluctantly with many dissentients, had only to choose the fittest among a throng of eager volunteers.

Such efforts were much facilitated by the fact that five years had now elapsed since the Peace of Nicias, without any considerable warlike operations. While the treasury had become replenished with fresh accumulations, and the triremes increased in number, the military population, reinforced by additional numbers of youth, had forgotten both the hardships of the war and the pressure of epidemic disease. Hence the fleet now got together, while it surpassed in number all previous armaments of Athens, except a single one in the second year of the previous war under Pericles, was incomparably superior even to that, and still more superior to all the rest in

[415 B.C.]

the other ingredients of force, material as well as moral, in picked men, universal ardour, ships as well as arms in the best condition, and accessories of every kind in abundance. Such was the confidence of success, that many Athenians were prepared for trade as well as for combat; so that the private stock, thus added to the public outfit and to the sums placed in the hands of the generals, constituted an unparalleled aggregate of wealth. After between two and three months of active preparations, the expedition was almost ready to start, when an event happened which fatally poisoned the prevalent cheerfulness of the city. This was the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, one of the most extraordinary events in all Grecian history.

The *Hermæ*, or half-statues of the god *Hermes*, were blocks of marble about the height of the human figure. The upper part was cut into a head, face, neck, and bust; the lower part was left as a quadrangular pillar, broad at the base, without arms, body, or legs, but with the significant mark of the male sex in front. They were distributed in great numbers throughout Athens, and always in the most conspicuous situations. The religious feeling of the Greeks considered the god to be planted or domiciliated where his statue stood, so that the companionship, sympathy, and guardianship of *Hermes* became associated with most of the manifestations of conjunct life at Athens, political, social, commercial, or gymnastic.

About the end of May 415 B.C., in the course of one and the same night, all these *Hermæ*, one of the most peculiar marks of the city, were mutilated by unknown hands. Their characteristic features were knocked off or levelled, so that nothing was left except a mass of stone with no resemblance to humanity or deity. All were thus dealt with in the same way, save and except very few: nay, *Andocides* affirms that there was but one which escaped unharmed. If we take that reasonable pains, which is incumbent on those who study the history of Greece, to realize in our minds the religious and political associations of the Athenians,—noted in ancient times for their superior piety, as well as for their accuracy and magnificence about the visible monuments embodying that feeling,—we shall in part comprehend the intensity of mingled dismay, terror, and wrath, which beset the public mind, on the morning after this nocturnal sacrilege, alike unforeseen and unparalleled. Amidst all the ruin and impoverishment which had been inflicted by the Persian invasion of Attica, there was nothing which was so profoundly felt or so long remembered as the deliberate burning of the statues and temples of the gods. If we could imagine the excitement of a Spanish or Italian town, on finding that all the images of the Virgin had been defaced during the same night, we should have a parallel, though a very inadequate parallel, to what was now felt at Athens—where religious associations and persons were far more intimately allied with all civil acts and with all the proceedings of everyday life—where, too, the god and his efficiency were more forcibly localised, as well as identified with the presence and keeping of the statue. To the Athenians, when they went forth on the following morning, each man seeing the divine guardian at his doorway dishonoured and defaced, and each man gradually coming to know that the devastation was general,—it would seem that the town had become as it were godless—that the streets, the market-place, the porticoes, were robbed of their divine protectors; and what was worse still, that these protectors, having been grossly insulted, carried away with them alienated sentiments—wrathful and vindictive instead of tutelary and sympathising.

Such was the mysterious incident which broke in upon the eager and bustling movement of Athens a few days before the Sicilian expedition was

in condition for starting. In reference to that expedition, it was taken to heart as a most depressing omen. The mutilation of the *Hermæ*, however, was something much more ominous than the worst accident. It proclaimed itself as the deliberate act of organised conspirators, not inconsiderable in number, whose names and final purpose were indeed unknown, but who had begun by committing sacrilege of a character flagrant and unheard of. For intentional mutilation of a public and sacred statue, where the material afforded no temptation to plunder, is a case to which we know no parallel: much more, mutilation by wholesale—spread by one band and in one night throughout the entire city. Though neither the parties concerned, nor their purposes, were ever more than partially made out, the concert and conspiracy itself is unquestionable.

It seems probable, as far as we can form an opinion, that the conspirators had two objects, perhaps some of them one and some the other—to ruin Alcibiades—to frustrate or delay the expedition. Indeed the two objects were intimately connected with each other; for the prosecution of the enterprise, while full of prospective conquest to Athens, was yet more pregnant with future power and wealth to Alcibiades himself. Such chances would disappear if the expedition could be prevented; nor was it at all impossible that the Athenians, under the intense impression of religious terror consequent on the mutilation of the *Hermæ*, might throw up the scheme altogether.

Few men in Athens either had, or deserved to have, a greater number of enemies, political as well as private, than Alcibiades; many of them being among the highest citizens, whom he offended by his insolence, and whose liturgies and other customary exhibitions he outshone by his reckless expenditure. His importance had been already so much increased and threatened to be so much more increased by the Sicilian enterprise, that they no longer observed any measures in compassing his ruin. That which the mutilators of the *Hermæ* seemed to have deliberately planned, his other enemies were ready to turn to profit.

While the senate of Five Hundred were invested with full powers of action, Diognetus, Pisander, Charicles, and others, were named commissioners for receiving and prosecuting inquiries: and public assemblies were held nearly every day to receive reports. The first informations received, however, did not relate to the grave and recent mutilation of the *Hermæ*, but to analogous incidents of older date; to certain defacements of other statues, accomplished in drunken frolic—and above all, to ludicrous ceremonies celebrated in various houses, by parties of revellers caricaturing and divulging the Eleusinian mysteries. It was under this latter head that the first impeachment was preferred against Alcibiades.

But Alcibiades saw full well the danger of having such charges hanging over his head, and the peculiar advantage which he derived from his accidental position at the moment. He implored the people to investigate the charges at once; proclaiming his anxiety to stand trial and even to suffer death, if found guilty,—accepting the command only in case he should be acquitted,—and insisting above all things on the mischief to the city of sending him on such an expedition with the charge undecided, as well as on the hardship to himself of being asspersed by calumny during his absence, without power of defence. Such appeals, just and reasonable in themselves, and urged with all the vehemence of a man who felt that the question was one of life or death to his future prospects, were very near prevailing. His enemies could only defeat them by the trick of putting up fresh speakers, less notorious for hostility to Alcibiades. These men affected a tone of

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candour, deprecated the delay which would be occasioned in the departure of the expedition, if he were put upon his trial forthwith; and proposed deferring the trial until a certain number of days after his return. Such was the determination ultimately adopted: the supporters of Alcibiades probably not fully appreciating its consequences, and conceiving that the speedy departure of the expedition was advisable even for his interest, as well as agreeable to their own feelings. And thus his enemies, though baffled in their first attempt to bring on his immediate ruin, carried a postponement which insured to them leisure for thoroughly poisoning the public mind against him, and choosing their own time for his trial. They took care to keep back all farther accusation until he and the armament had departed.

THE FLEET SAILS

The spectacle of its departure was indeed so imposing, and the moment so full of anxious interest, that it banished even the recollection of the recent sacrilege. The entire armament was not mustered at Athens; for it had been judged expedient to order most of the allied contingents to rendezvous at once at Coreyra. But the Athenian force alone was astounding to behold. The condition, the equipment, the pomp both of wealth and force, visible in the armament, were still more impressive than the number. At day-break on the day appointed, when all the ships were ready in Piræus for departure, the military force was marched down in a body from the city and embarked. They were accompanied by nearly the whole population, metics and foreigners as well as citizens, so that the appearance was that of a collective emigration like the flight to Salamis sixty-five years before. While the crowd of foreigners, brought thither by curiosity, were amazed by the grandeur of the spectacle—the citizens accompanying were moved by deeper and more stirring anxieties. Their sons, brothers, relatives, and friends, were just starting on the longest and largest enterprise which Athens had ever undertaken; against an island extensive as well as powerful, known to none to them accurately, and into a sea of undefined possibilities—glory and profit on the one side, but hazards of unassignable magnitude on the other. At this final parting, ideas of doubt and danger became far more painfully present than they had been in any of the preliminary discussions; and in spite of all the reassuring effect of the unrivalled armament before them, the relatives now separating at the water's edge could not banish the dark presentiment that they were bidding each other farewell for the last time.

The moment immediately succeeding this farewell—when all the soldiers were already on board and the *celeustes* was on the point of beginning his chant to put the rowers in motion—was peculiarly solemn and touching. Silence having been enjoined and obtained, by sound of trumpet, the crews in every ship, and the spectators on shore, followed the voice of the herald in praying to the gods for success, and in singing the pæan. On every deck were seen bowls of wine prepared, out of which the officers and the *epibatæ* made libations, with goblets of silver and gold. At length the final signal was given, and the whole fleet quitted Piræus in single file—displaying the exuberance of their yet untried force by a race of speed as far as Ægina. Never in Grecian history was an invocation more unanimous, emphatic, and imposing, addressed to the gods; never was the refusing nod of Zeus more stern or peremptory.^f

The customary libations were poured out ; and, after the triumphant pean had been sung, the whole fleet set sail, and contended for the prize of naval skill and celerity, until they reached the shores of Ægina, from whence they enjoyed a prosperous voyage to their confederates at Coreyra.

At Coreyra the commanders reviewed the strength of the armament, which consisted of a hundred and thirty-four ships of war, with a proportional number of transports and tenders. The heavy-armed troops, exceeding five thousand, were attended with a sufficient body of slingers and archers. The army, abundantly provided with every other article, was extremely deficient in horses, which amounted to no more than thirty. But, at a moderate computation, we may estimate the whole military and naval strength, including slaves and servants, at twenty thousand men.¹


With this powerful host, had the Athenians at once surprised and assailed the unprepared security of Syracuse, the expedition, however adventurous and imprudent, might, perhaps, have been crowned with success. But the timid mariners of Greece would have trembled at the proposal of trusting such a numerous fleet on the broad expanse of the Ionian Sea. They determined to cross the narrowest passage between Italy and Sicily, after coasting along the eastern shores of the former, until they reached the strait of Messina. That this design might be executed with the greater safety, they despatched three light vessels to examine the disposition of the Italian cities, and to solicit admission into their harbours. Neither the ties of consanguinity, nor the duties acknowledged by colonies towards their parent state, could prevail on the suspicious Thurians to open their gates, or even to furnish a market, to their Athenian ancestors. The towns of Tarentum and Locri prohibited them the use of their harbours, and refused to supply them with water ; and they coasted the whole extent of the shore, from the promontory of Iapygia to that of Rhegium, before any one city would allow them to purchase the commodities for which they had immediate use. The magistrates of Rhegium granted this favour, but they granted nothing more.

A considerable detachment was sent to examine the preparations and the strength of Syracuse, and to proclaim liberty, and offer protection, to all the captives and strangers confined within its walls.

With another detachment Alcibiades sailed to Naxos, and persuaded the inhabitants to accept the alliance of Athens. The remainder of the armament proceeded to Catana, which refused to admit the ships into the harbour, or the troops into the city. But on the arrival of Alcibiades, the Catanians allowed him to address the assembly, and propose his demands. The artful Athenian transported the populace, and even the magistrates themselves, by the charms of his eloquence ; the citizens flocked from every quarter, to hear a discourse which was purposely protracted for several hours ; the soldiers forsook their posts ; and the enemy, who had prepared to avail themselves of this negligence, burst through the unguarded gates, and became masters of the city. Those of the Catanians who were most attached to the interests of Syracuse, fortunately escaped death by the celerity of their flight. The rest accepted the proffered friendship of the Athenians. This success would probably have been followed by the surrender of Messina, which Alcibiades had filled with distrust and sedition. But when the plot was ripe for execution, the man who had contrived, and who alone could conduct it, was disqualified from serving his country. The arrival of the Salaminian galley recalled Alcibiades to Athens, that he might stand trial for his life.

[¹ Adolph Holm rates it at thirty thousand men.]

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GREEK CITY SEALS

ALCIBIADES TAKES FLIGHT

Alcibiades escaped to Thurii, and afterwards to Argos: and when he understood that the Athenians had set a price on his head, he finally took refuge in Sparta, where his active genius seized the first opportunity to advise and promote those fatal measures, which, while they gratified his private resentment, occasioned the ruin of his country.

The removal of Alcibiades soon appeared in the languid operations of the Athenian armament. The cautious timidity of Nicias, supported by wealth, eloquence, and authority, gained an absolute ascendant over the more warlike and enterprising character of Lamachus, whose poverty exposed him to contempt. Instead of making a bold impression on Selinus or Syracuse, Nicias contented himself with taking possession of the inconsiderable colony of Hyccara. He ravaged, or laid under contribution, some places of smaller note, and obtained thirty talents from the Segestans, which, added to the sale of the booty, furnished about thirty thousand pounds sterling, a sum that might be usefully employed in the prosecution of an expensive war. But this advantage did not compensate for the courage inspired into the Syracusans by delay, and for the dishonour sustained by the Athenian troops, in their unsuccessful attempts against Hybla and Himera, as well as for their dejection at being confined, during the greatest part of the summer, in the inactive quarters of Naxos and Catana.

Ancient Syracuse, of which the ruined grandeur still forms an object of admiration, was situated on a spacious promontory, washed on three sides by the sea, and defended on the west by abrupt and almost inaccessible mountains. The town was built in a triangular form, whose summit may be conceived on the lofty mountain Epipolæ. Adjacent to these natural fortifications, the western or inland division of the city was distinguished by the name of Tyche, or Fortune, being adorned by a magnificent temple of that flattering divinity. The triangle gradually widening towards the base, comprehended the vast extent of Achradina, reaching from the northern shore of the promontory to the southern island, Ortygia. This small island, composing the whole of modern Syracuse, formed but the third and least extensive division of the ancient; which was fortified by walls eighteen miles in circuit, enriched by a triple harbour, and peopled by above two hundred thousand warlike citizens or industrious slaves.

When the Syracusans heard the first rumours of the Athenian invasion, they despised, or affected to despise them, as idle lies invented to amuse the ignorance of the populace. The hostile armament had arrived at Rhegium before they could be persuaded, by the wisdom of Hermocrates, to provide against a danger which their presumption painted as imaginary. But when they received undoubted intelligence that the enemy had reached the Italian coast, when they beheld their numerous fleet commanding the sea of Sicily and ready to make a descent on their defenceless island, they were

seized with a degree of just terror and alarm proportional to their false security. The dilatory operations of the enemy not only removed the recent terror and trepidation of the Syracusans, but inspired them with unusual firmness. They requested the generals, whom they had appointed to the number of fifteen, to lead them to Catana, that they might attack the hostile camp. Their cavalry harassed the Athenians by frequent incursions, beat up their quarters, intercepted their convoys, destroyed their advanced posts, and even proceeded so near to the main body, that they were distinctly heard demanding, with loud insults, whether those boasted lords of Greece had left their native country, that they might form a precarious settlement at the foot of Mount *Ætna*.

NICIAS TRIES STRATEGY

Provoked by these indignities, and excited by the impatient resentment of his own troops, Nicias was still restrained from an open attempt against Syracuse by the difficulties attending that enterprise. He employed a stratagem. A citizen of Catana, whose subtle and daring genius, prepared alike to die or to deceive, ought to have preserved his name from oblivion, appeared in Syracuse as a deserter from his native city; the unhappy fate of which, in being subjected to the imperious commands, or licentious disorder of the Athenians, he lamented with perfidious tears, and with the plaintive accents of well-dissembled sorrow. "The Athenians," he said, "spurned the confinement of the military life; their posts were forsaken, their ships unguarded, they disdained the duties of the camp, and indulged in the pleasures of the city. On an appointed day it would be easy for the Syracusans, assisted by the conspirators of Catana, to attack them unprepared, to mount their undefended ramparts, to demolish their encampment, and to burn their fleet." This daring proposal well corresponded with the keen sentiments of revenge which animated the inhabitants of Syracuse. The day was named; the plan of the enterprise was concerted, and the treacherous Catanian returned home to revive the hopes, and to confirm the resolution, of his pretended associates.

The success of this intrigue gave the utmost satisfaction to Nicias, whose armament prepared to sail for Syracuse on the day appointed by the inhabitants of that city for assaulting, with their whole force, the Athenian camp. Already had they marched, with this view, to the fertile plain of Leontini, when, after twelve hours' sail, the Athenian fleet arrived in the great harbour, disembarked their troops, and fortified a camp without the western wall, near to a celebrated temple of Olympian Jupiter, a situation which had been pointed out by some Syracusan exiles, and which was well adapted to every purpose of accommodation and defence. Meanwhile the cavalry of Syracuse, having proceeded to the walls of Catana, had discovered, to their infinite regret, the departure of the Athenians. The unwelcome intelligence was conveyed, with the utmost expedition, to the infantry, who immediately marched back to protect Syracuse. The rapid return of the war-like youth restored the courage of the aged Syracusans. They were joined by the forces of Gela, Selinus, and Camarina; and it was determined to attack the hostile encampment.

The attack was begun with fury, and continued with perseverance for several hours. Both sides were animated by every principle that can inspire and urge the utmost vigour of exertion, and victory was still doubtful, when a tempest suddenly arose, accompanied with unusual peals of thunder. This

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event, which little affected the Athenians, confounded the unexperienced credulity of the enemy, who were broken and put to flight. The Syracusans escaped to their city, and the Athenians returned to their camp. In such an obstinate conflict the vanquished lost two hundred and sixty, the victors only fifty men.

The voyage, the encampment, and the battle, employed the dangerous activity, and gratified the impetuous ardour of the Athenians, but did not facilitate the conquest of Syracuse. Without more powerful preparations, Nicias despaired of taking the place, either by assault, or by a regular siege. Soon after his victory he returned with the whole armament to Naxos and Catana. Nicias had reason to expect that his victory over the Syracusans would procure him respect and assistance from the inferior states of Sicily. His emissaries were diffused over that island and the neighbouring coast of Italy. Messengers were sent to Tuscany, where Pisa and other cities had been founded by Greek colonies. An embassy was despatched to Carthage, the rival and enemy of Syracuse. Nicias gave orders to collect materials for circumvallation, iron, bricks, and all necessary stores. He demanded horses from the Segestans; and required from Athens reinforcements and a large pecuniary supply; and neglected nothing that might enable him to open the ensuing campaign with vigour and effect.

While the Athenians thus prepared for the attack of Syracuse, the citizens of that capital displayed equal activity in providing for their own defence. By the advice of Hermocrates, they appointed himself, Heraclides, and Sicanus; three, instead of fifteen generals. The commanders newly elected, both in civil and military affairs, were invested with unlimited power, which was usefully employed to purchase or prepare arms, daily to exercise the troops, and to strengthen and extend the fortifications of Syracuse. They likewise despatched ambassadors to the numerous cities and republics with which they had been connected in peace, or allied in war, to solicit the continuance of their friendship, and to counteract the dangerous designs of the Athenians.

Meanwhile the expected reinforcements arrived from Athens. In addition to his original force, Nicias had likewise collected a body of six hundred cavalry, and the sum of four hundred talents; and, in the eighteenth summer of the war, the activity of the troops and workmen had completed all necessary preparations for undertaking the siege of Syracuse.

The plan which Nicias adopted for conquering the city, was to draw a wall on either side. When these circumvallations had surrounded the place by land, he expected, by his numerous fleet, to block up the wide extent of the Syracusan harbours. The whole strength of the Athenian armament was employed in the former operations; and as all necessary materials had been provided with due attention, the works rose with a rapidity which surprised and terrified the besieged. Their former as well as their recent defeats deterred them from opposing the enemy in a general engagement; but the advice of Hermocrates persuaded them to raise walls which might traverse and interrupt those of the Athenians. The imminent danger urged the activity of the workmen; the hostile bulwarks approached each other; frequent skirmishes took place, in one of which the brave Lamachus unfortunately fell a victim to his rash valour; but the Athenian troops maintained their usual superiority.

Encouraged by success, Nicias pushed the enemy with vigour. The Syracusans lost hopes of defending their new works, or of preventing the complete circumvallation of their city. New generals were named in the

room of Hermocrates and his colleagues; and this injudicious alteration increased the calamities of Syracuse, which at length prepared to capitulate.

While the assembly deliberated concerning the execution of a measure, which, however disgraceful, was declared to be necessary, a Corinthian galley, commanded by Gongylus, entered the central harbour of Ortygia, which being strongly fortified, and penetrating into the heart of the city, served as the principal and most secure station for the Syracusan fleet. Gongylus announced a speedy and effectual relief to the besieged city. He acquainted the Syracusans, that the embassy, sent the preceding year to crave the assistance of Peloponnesus, had been crowned with success. His own countrymen had warmly embraced the cause of their kinsmen, and most respectable colony. They had fitted out a considerable fleet, the arrival of which might be expected every hour. The Lacedæmonians also had sent a small squadron, and the whole armament was conducted by the Spartan Gylippus, an officer of tried valour and ability.

While the desponding citizens of Syracuse listened to this intelligence with pleasing astonishment, a messenger arrived by land from Gylippus himself. That experienced commander, instead of pursuing a direct course, which might have been intercepted by the Athenian fleet, had landed with four galleys on the western coast of the island. The name of a Spartan general determined the wavering irresolution of the Sicilians. The troops of Himera, Selinus, and Gela flocked to his standard; and he approached Syracuse on the side of Epipolæ, where the line of contravallation was still unfinished, with a body of several thousand men.



GREEK MEDAL

SPARTAN AID

The most courageous of the citizens sallied forth to meet this generous and powerful protector. The junction was happily effected; the ardour of the troops kindled into enthusiasm; and they distinguished that memorable day by surprising several important Athenian posts. This first success reanimated the activity of the soldiers and workmen. The traverse wall was extended with the utmost diligence, and a vigorous sally deprived the enemy of the strong castle of Labdalum. Nicias, perceiving that the interest of the Athenians in Sicily would be continually weakened by delay, wished to bring the fortune of the war to the decision of a battle. Nor did Gylippus decline the engagement. The first action was unfavourable to the Syracusans, who had been imprudently posted in the defiles between their own and the enemy's walls, which rendered of no avail their superiority in cavalry and archers. The magnanimity of Gylippus acknowledged this error, for which he completely atoned by his judicious conduct in the succeeding engagements.

The Syracusans soon extended their works beyond the line of circumvallation, so that it was impossible to block up their city, without forcing their

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ramparts. The besiegers, while they maintained the superiority of their arms, had been abundantly supplied with necessaries from the neighbouring territory ; but every place was alike hostile to them after their defeat. The soldiers who went out in quest of wood and water, were unexpectedly attacked and cut off by the enemy's cavalry, or by the reinforcements which arrived from every quarter to the assistance of Syracuse ; and they were at length reduced to depend for every necessary supply on the precarious bounty of the Italian shore.

Nicias, whose sensibility deeply felt the public distress, wrote a most desponding letter to the Athenians. He honestly described, and lamented, the misfortunes and disorders of his army. The slaves deserted in great numbers ; the mercenary troops, who fought only for pay and subsistence, preferred the more secure and lucrative service of Syracuse. He therefore exhorted the assembly either to call them home without delay, or to send immediately a second armament, not less powerful than the first.

The principal squadrons of Syracuse lay in the harbour of Ortygia, separated, by an island of the same name, from the station of the Athenian fleet. While Hermocrates sailed forth with eighty galleys, to venture a naval engagement, Gylippus attacked the hostile fortifications at Plemmyrium, a promontory opposite to Ortygia, which confined the entrance of the Great Harbour. The defeat of the Syracusans at sea, whereby they lost fourteen vessels, was balanced by their victory on land, in which they took three fortresses, containing a large quantity of military and naval stores, and a considerable sum of money. In some subsequent actions, which scarcely deserve the name of battles, their fleet was still unsuccessful ; but as they engaged with great caution, and found everywhere a secure retreat on a friendly shore, their loss was extremely inconsiderable. The want of success, in their first attempt, did not abate their resolution to gain the command at sea.

By unexampled assiduity the Syracusans at length prevailed in a general engagement, which was fought in the Great Harbour. Seven Athenian ships were sunk, many more were disabled, and Nicias saved the remains of his shattered and dishonoured armament by retiring behind a line of merchantmen and transports, from the masts of which had been suspended huge masses of lead, named dolphins from their form, sufficient to crush by their falling weight the stoutest galleys of antiquity. This unexpected obstacle arrested the progress of the victors ; but the advantages already obtained elevated them with the highest hopes, and reduced the enemy to despair.

ALCIBIADES AGAINST ATHENS

The Athenian misfortunes in Sicily were attended by misfortunes at home still more dreadful. In the eighteenth year of the war, Alcibiades accompanied to Sparta the ambassadors of Corinth and Syracuse, who had solicited and obtained assistance to the besieged city. On that occasion the Athenian exile first acquired the confidence of the Spartans, by condemning, in the strongest terms, the injustice and ambition of his ungrateful countrymen, "whose cruelty towards himself equalled their inveterate hostility to the Lacedæmonian republic ; but that republic might, by following his advice, disarm their resentment. The town of Decelea was situated on the Attic frontier, at an equal distance of fifteen miles from Thebes and Athens. This place, which commanded an extensive and fertile plain, might be

surprised and fortified by the Spartans, who, instead of harassing their foes by annual incursions, might thus infest them by a continual war. The wisdom of Sparta had too long neglected such a salutary and decisive measure, especially as the existence of a similar design had often been suggested by the fears of the enemy, who trembled even at the apprehension of seeing a foreign garrison in their territory."

This advice first proposed, and often urged, by Alcibiades, was adopted in the commencement of the ensuing spring, when the warlike Agis led a powerful army into Attica. The defenceless inhabitants of the frontier fled before his irresistible arms; but instead of pursuing them, as usual, into the heart of the country, he stopped short at Decelea. As all necessary materials had been provided in great abundance, the place was speedily fortified on every side, and the walls of Decelea, which might be distinctly seen across the intermediate plain, bid defiance to those of Athens.

The latter city was kept in continual alarm by the watchful hostility of a neighbouring garrison. The open country was entirely laid waste, and the usual communication with the valuable island of Eubœa was interrupted, from which, in seasons of scarcity, or during the ravages of war, the Athenians commonly derived their supplies of corn, wine, and oil, and whatever is most necessary to life. Harassed by the fatigues of unremitting service, and deprived of daily bread, the slaves murmured, complained, and revolted to the enemy; and their defection robbed the state of twenty thousand useful artisans. Since the latter years of Pericles, the Athenians had not been involved in such distress.

The domestic calamities of the republic did not, however, prevent the most vigorous exertions abroad. Twenty galleys, stationed at Naupactus, watched the motions of the Peloponnesian fleet destined to the assistance of Syracuse; thirty carried on the war in Macedonia, to reduce the rebellion of Amphipolis; a considerable squadron collected tribute, and levied soldiers, in the colonies of Asia; another, still more powerful, ravaged the coast of Peloponnesus. Never did any kingdom or republic equal the magnanimity of Athens; never in ancient or modern times did the courage of any state entertain an ambition so far superior to its power, or exert efforts so disproportionate to its strength. Amidst the difficulties and dangers which encompassed them on every side, the Athenians persisted in the siege of Syracuse, a city little inferior to their own; and, undaunted by the actual devastation of their country, unterrified by the menaced assault of their walls, they sent, without delay, such a reinforcement into Sicily, as afforded the most promising hopes of success in their expedition against that island.

ATHENIAN REINFORCEMENTS

The Syracusans had scarcely time to rejoice at their victory, or Nicias to bewail his defeat, when a numerous and formidable armament appeared on the Sicilian coast. The foremost galleys, their prows adorned with gaudy streamers, pursued a secure course towards the harbour of Syracuse. The emulation of the rowers was animated by the mingled sounds of trumpet and clarion; and the regular decoration, the elegant splendour, which distinguished every part of the equipment, exhibited a pompous spectacle of naval triumph. Their appearance, even at a distance, announced the country to which they belonged; and both the joy of the besiegers and the terror of the besieged, testified that Athens was the only city in the world capable

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of sending to the sea such a beautiful and magnificent contribution. The Syracusans employed not unavailing efforts to check the progress, or to hinder the approach, of the hostile armament; which, besides innumerable foreign vessels and transports, consisted of seventy-three Athenian galleys, commanded by the experienced valour of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. The pikemen on board exceeded five thousand; the light-armed troops were nearly as numerous; and, including the rowers, workmen, and attendants, the whole strength may be reckoned equal to that originally sent with Nicias, which amounted to above twenty thousand men.

The misfortunes hitherto attending the operations in Sicily had lowered the character of the general; and this circumstance, as well as the superior abilities of Demosthenes, entitled him to assume the tone of authority in their conjunct deliberations. After ravaging the banks of the Anapus, and making some ineffectual attempts against the fortifications on that side, Demosthenes chose the first hour of a moonlit night, to proceed with the flower of the army to seize the fortresses in Epipolæ. The march was performed with successful celerity; the outposts were surprised, the guards put to the sword; and three separate encampments, of the Syracusans, the Sicilians, the allies, formed a feeble opposition to the Athenian ardour. As if their victory had already been complete, the assailants began to pull down the wooden battlements, or to urge the pursuit with a rapidity which disordered their ranks.

Meanwhile, the vigilant activity of Gylippus had assembled the whole force of Syracuse. At the approach of the enemy his vanguard retired. The Athenians were decoyed within the intricate windings of the walls, and their irregular fury was first checked by the firmness of a Theban phalanx. A resistance so sudden and unexpected might alone have been decisive; but other circumstances were adverse to the Athenians: their ignorance of the ground, the alternate obscurity of night, and the deceitful glare of the moon, which, shining in the front of the Thebans, illumined the splendour of their arms, and multiplied the terror of their numbers. The foremost ranks of the pursuers were repelled; and, as they retreated to the main body, encountered the advancing Argives and Coreyræans, who, singing the pæan in their Doric dialect and accent, were unfortunately taken for enemies. Fear, and then rage, seized the Athenians, who, thinking themselves encompassed on all sides, determined to force their way, and committed much bloodshed among their allies, before the mistake could be discovered.

To prevent the repetition of this dreadful error, their scattered bands were obliged at every moment to demand the watchword, which was at length betrayed to their adversaries. The consequence of this was doubly fatal. At every rencounter the silent Athenians were slaughtered without mercy, while the enemy, who knew their watchword, might at pleasure join, or decline, the battle, and easily oppress their weakness, or elude their strength. The terror and confusion increased; the rout became general; Gylippus pursued in good order with his victorious troops. The vanquished could not descend in a body with the celerity of fear, by the narrow passages through which they had mounted. Many abandoned their arms, and explored the unknown paths of the rocky Epipolæ. Others threw themselves from precipices, rather than await the pursuers. Several thousands were left dead or wounded on the scene of action; and in the morning the greater part of the stragglers were intercepted and cut off by the Syracusan cavalry.

ATHENIAN DISASTER

This dreadful and unexpected disaster suspended the operations of the siege. The Athenian generals spent the time in fruitless deliberations concerning their future measures, while the army lay encamped on the marshy and unhealthy banks of the Anapus. A general sickness broke out in the camp. Demosthenes urged this calamity as a new reason for hastening their departure, while it was yet possible to cross the Ionian Sea, without risking the danger of a winter's tempest. But Nicias opposed the design of leaving Sicily until they should be warranted to take this important step by the positive authority of the republic. The colleagues of Nicias were confounded with the firmness of an opposition so unlike the flexible timidity of his ordinary character, but they submitted to his opinion, an opinion equally fatal to himself and to them, and to the armament which they commanded.

Meanwhile the prudence of Gylippus profited by the fame of his victory, to draw a powerful reinforcement from the Sicilian cities; and the transports, so long expected from Peloponnesus, finally arrived in the harbour of Ortygia. This squadron formed the last assistance sent to either of the contending parties, and nothing further was required to complete the actors in the scene; for by the accession of the Cyrenians, Syracuse was either attacked or defended by all the various divisions of the Grecian name, which formed, in that age, the most civilised portion of the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The arrival of such powerful auxiliaries to the besieged, and the increasing force of the malady, totally disconcerted the Athenians. Even Nicias agreed to set sail. Every necessary preparation was made for this purpose, and the cover of night was chosen, as most proper for concealing their own disgrace, and for eluding the vengeance of the enemy. But the night appointed for their departure was distinguished by an inauspicious eclipse of the moon. The voyage was deferred till the mystical number of thrice nine days. But before the expiration of that time it was no longer practicable; for the design was soon discovered to the Syracusans, and this discovery, added to the encouragement derived from the circumstances of which we have already taken notice, increased their eagerness to attack the enemy by sea and land. Their attempts failed to destroy, by fire-ships, the Athenian fleet. They were more successful in employing superior numbers to divide the strength and to weaken the resistance of an enfeebled and dejected foe. During three days there was a perpetual succession of military and naval exploits. On the first day fortune hung in suspense; the second deprived the Athenians of a considerable squadron commanded by Eurymedon; and this misfortune was embittered on the third day, by the loss of eighteen galleys, with their crews.

A design, suggested by the wisdom of Hermocrates, was eagerly adopted by the active zeal of his fellow-citizens, who strove, with unremitting ardour, to throw a chain of vessels across the mouth of the Great Harbour, about a mile in breadth. The labour was complete before Nicias, totally occupied by other objects, attempted to interrupt it. After repeated defeats, and although he was so miserably tormented by the stone, that he had frequently solicited his recall, that virtuous commander, whose courage rose in adversity, used the utmost diligence to retrieve the affairs of his country. The shattered galleys were speedily refitted, and again prepared, to the number of a hundred and ten, to risk the event of a battle. As they had suffered greatly, on former occasions, by the hardness and massive solidity of the Syracusan prows, Nicias provided them with grappling-irons, fitted to prevent the recoil of

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their opponents, and the repetition of the hostile stroke. The decks were crowded with armed men, and the contrivance to which the enemy had hitherto chiefly owed their success, of introducing the firmness and stability of a military, into a naval engagement, was adopted in its full extent by the Athenians. When Gylippus and the Syracusan commanders were apprised of the designs of the enemy, they hastened to the defence of the bar which had been thrown across the entrance of the harbour. Even the Athenian grappling-irons had not been overlooked; to elude the dangerous grasp of these instruments, the prows of the Syracusan vessels were covered with wet and slippery hides.

The first impression of the Athenians was irresistible; they burst through the passage of the bar, and repelled the squadrons on either side. As the entrance widened, the Syracusans, in their turn, rushed into the harbour, which was more favourable than the open sea to their mode of fighting. Thither the foremost of the Athenians returned, either compelled by superior force, or that they might assist their companions. The engagement became general in the mouth of the harbour; and in this narrow space two hundred galleys fought, during the greatest part of the day, with an obstinate and persevering valour. It would require the expressive energy of Thucydides, and the imitative, though inimitable, sounds and expressions of the Grecian tongue, to describe the noise, the tumult, and the ardour of the contending squadrons. The battle was not long confined to the shock of adverse prows, and to the distant hostility of darts and arrows. The nearest vessels grappled, and closed with each other, and their decks were soon converted into a field of blood. While the heavy-armed troops boarded the enemy's ships, they left their own exposed to a similar misfortune; the fleets were divided into massive clusters of adhering galleys; and the confusion of their mingled shouts overpowered the voice of authority. The singular and tremendous spectacle of an engagement more fierce and obstinate than any that had ever been beheld in the Grecian seas, totally suspended the powers of the numerous and adverse battalions which encircled the coast.

Hope, fear, the shouts of victory, the shrieks of despair, the anxious solicitude of doubtful success, animated the countenances, the voice, and the gestures of the Athenians, whose whole reliance centred in their fleet. When at length their galleys evidently gave way on every side, the contrast of alternate, and the rapid tumult of successive passions, subsided in a melancholy calm. This dreadful pause of astonishment and terror was followed by the disordered trepidation of flight and fear; many escaped to the camp; others ran, uncertain whither to direct their steps; while Nicias, with a small, but undismayed band, remained on the shore to protect the landing of their unfortunate galleys. But the retreat of the Athenians could not probably have been effected, had it not been favoured by the actual circumstances of the enemy, as well as by the peculiar prejudices of ancient superstition. In this well-fought battle, the vanquished had lost fifty, and the victors forty vessels. It was incumbent on the latter to employ their immediate and most strenuous efforts to recover the dead bodies of their friends, that they might be honoured with the sacred and indispensable rites of funeral. The day was far spent; the strength of the sailors had been exhausted by a long continuance of unremitting labour; and both they and their companions on shore were more desirous to return to Syracuse to enjoy the fruits of victory, than to irritate the dangerous despair of the vanquished Athenians.

It is observed by the Roman orator Cicero, with no less truth than elegance, that not only the navy of Athens, but the glory and the empire of

that republic, suffered shipwreck in the fatal harbour of Syracuse. The despondent degeneracy which immediately followed this ever memorable engagement was testified in the neglect of a duty which the Athenians had never neglected before, and in denying a part of their national character, which it had hitherto been their greatest glory to maintain. They abandoned to insult and indignity the bodies of the slain; and when it was proposed to them by their commanders to prepare next day for a second engagement, since their vessels were still more numerous than those of the enemy, they, who had seldom avoided a superior, and who had never declined the encounter of an equal force, declared, that no motive could induce them to withstand the weaker armament of Syracuse. Their only desire was to escape by land, under cover of the night, from a foe whom they had not courage to oppose, and from a place where every object was offensive to their sight, and most painful to their reflection.

The behaviour of the Syracusans might have proved extremely favourable to this design. The coincidence of a festival and a victory demanded an accumulated profusion of such objects as soothe the senses and please the fancy. Amidst these giddy transports, the Syracusans lost all remembrance of an enemy whom they despised; even the soldiers on guard joined the dissolute or frivolous amusements of their companions; and, during the greatest part of the night, Syracuse presented a mixed scene of secure gayety, of thoughtless jollity, and of mad and dangerous disorder.

The firm and vigilant mind of Hermocrates alone withstood, but was unable to divert, the general current. It was impossible to rouse to the fatigues of war men buried in wine and pleasure, and intoxicated with victory; and, as he could not intercept by force, he determined to retard by stratagem, the intended retreat of the Athenians, whose numbers and resentment would still render them formidable to whatever part of Sicily they might remove their camp. A select band of horsemen, assuming the character of traitors, fearlessly approached the hostile ramparts, and warned the Athenians of the danger of departing that night, as many ambuscades lurked in the way, and all the most important passes were occupied by the enemy. The frequency of treason gained credit to the perfidious advice; and the Athenians, having changed their first resolution, were persuaded by Nicias to wait two days longer, that such measures might be taken as seemed best adapted to promote the safety and celerity of their march.

The superior rank of Nicias entitled him to a pre-eminence of toil and of woe; and he deserves the regard of posterity by his character and sufferings, and still more by the melancholy firmness of his conduct.^j

Few pages of history are more eloquent than those wherein Thucydides describes the epic miseries of the defeated host of Athens. They have furthermore the merit of great accuracy. The rest of this chapter may therefore be given over to his vivid and tragic picture of the retreat.^a

THUCYDIDES' FAMOUS ACCOUNT OF THE FINAL DISASTERS

When Nicias and Demosthenes thought they were sufficiently prepared, the removal of the army took place, on the third day after the sea-fight. It was a wretched scene then, not on account of the single circumstance alone, that they were retreating after having lost all their ships, and while both themselves and their country were in danger, instead of being in high hope;

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but also because, on leaving their camp, every one had grievous things both to behold with his eyes and to feel in his heart. For as the dead lay unburied, and any one saw a friend on the ground, he was struck at once with grief and fear. And the living who were being left behind, wounded or sick, were to the living a much more sorrowful spectacle than the dead, and more piteous than those who had perished. For having recourse to entreaties and wailings, they reduced them to utter perplexity, begging to be taken away, and appealing to each individual friend or relative that any of them might anywhere see; or hanging on their comrades, as they were now going away; or following as far as they could, and when in any case the strength of their body failed, not being left behind without many appeals to heaven and many lamentations. So that the whole army, being filled with tears and distress of this kind, did not easily get away, although from an enemy's country, and although they had both suffered already miseries too great for tears to express, and were still afraid for the future, lest they might suffer more. There was also amongst them much dejection and depreciation of their own strength. For they resembled nothing but a city starved out and attempting to escape;



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and no small one too, for of their whole multitude there were not less than forty thousand on the march.

Of these, all the rest took whatever each one could that was useful, and the heavy-armed and cavalry themselves, contrary to custom, carried their own food under their arms, some for want of servants, others through distrusting them; for they had for a long time been deserting, and did so in greatest numbers at that moment. And even what they carried was not sufficient; for there was no longer any food in the camp. Nor, again, was their other misery, and their equal participation in sufferings (though it affords some alleviation to endure with others), considered even on that account easy to bear at the present time; especially, when they reflected from what splendour and boasting at first they had been reduced to such an abject termination. For this was the greatest reverse that ever befell a Grecian army; since, in contrast to their having come to enslave others, they had to depart in fear of undergoing that themselves; and instead of the prayers and hymns, with which they sailed from home, they had to start on their return with omens the very contrary; going by land, instead of by sea, and relying on a military rather than a naval force. But nevertheless, in consequence of the greatness of the danger still impending, all these things seemed endurable to them.

Nicias, seeing the army dejected, and greatly changed, passed along the ranks, and encouraged and cheered them, as well as existing circumstances allowed; speaking still louder than before, as he severally came opposite to them, in the earnestness of his feeling, and from wishing to be of service to them by making himself audible to as many as possible. If he saw them anywhere straggling, and not marching in order, he collected and brought them to their post; while Demosthenes also did no less to those who were near him, addressing them in a similar manner. They marched in the form of a hollow square, the division under Nicias taking the lead, and that of Demosthenes following; while the baggage bearers and the main crowd of camp followers were enclosed within the heavy-armed.

When they had come to the river Anapus, they found drawn up a body of the Syracusans and allies; but having routed these, and secured the passage, they proceeded onwards; while the Syracusans pressed them with charges of horse, as their light-armed did with their missiles. On that day the Athenians advanced about five miles, and then halted for the night on a hill. The day following, they commenced their march at an early hour, and having advanced about two and a half miles, descended into a level district, and there encamped, wishing to procure some eatables from the houses (for the place was inhabited), and to carry on with them water from it, since for many miles before them, in the direction they were to go, it was not plentiful. The Syracusans, in the meantime, had gone on before, and were blocking up the pass in advance of them. For there was there a steep hill, with a precipitous ravine on either side of it, called the *Acraeum Lepas*. The next day the Athenians advanced, and the horse and dart-men of the Syracusans and allies, each in great numbers, impeded their progress, hurling their missiles upon them, and annoying them with cavalry charges. The Athenians fought for a long time, and then returned again to the same camp, no longer having provisions as they had before; and it was no more possible to leave their position, because of the cavalry.

Starting early, they began their march again, and forced their way to the hill which had been fortified; where they found before them the enemy's infantry drawn up for the defence of the wall many spears deep; for the pass was but narrow. The Athenians charged and assaulted the wall, but being annoyed with missiles by a large body from the hill, which was steep (for those on the heights more easily reached their aim), and not being able to force a passage, they retreated again, and rested. There happened also to be at the same time some claps of thunder and rain, as is generally the case when the year is now verging on autumn; in consequence of which the Athenians were still more dispirited, and thought that all these things also were conspiring together for their ruin. While they were resting, Gylippus and the Syracusans sent a part of their troops to intercept them again with a wall on their rear, where they had already passed: but they, on their side also, sent some of their men against them, and prevented their doing it. After this, the Athenians returned again with all their army into the more level country, and there halted for the night. The next day they marched forward, while the Syracusans discharged their weapons on them, surrounding them on all sides, and disabled many with wounds; retreating if the Athenians advanced against them, and pressing on them if they gave way; most especially attacking their extreme rear, in the hope that by routing them little by little, they might strike terror into the whole army. The Athenians resisted this mode of attack for a long time, but then, after advancing five or six furlongs, halted for rest on the plain; while the Syracusans went to their camp.

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During the night, their troops being in a wretched condition, both from the want of all provisions which was now felt, and from so many men being disabled by wounds in the numerous attacks that had been made upon them by the enemy, Nicias and Demosthenes determined to light as many fires as possible, and then lead off the army, no longer by the same route as they had intended, but in the opposite direction to where the Syracusans were watching for them, namely, to the sea. Now the whole of this road would lead the armament, not towards Catana, but to the other side of Sicily, to Camarina, and Gela, and the cities in that direction, whether Grecian or barbarian. They kindled therefore many fires, and began their march in the night.

And as all armies, especially the largest, are liable to have terrors and panics amongst them, particularly when marching at night, and through an enemy's country, and with the enemy not far off; so they also were thrown into alarm; and the division of Nicias, taking the lead as it did, kept together and got a long way in advance; while that of Demosthenes, containing about half or more, was separated from the others, and proceeded in greater disorder. By the morning, nevertheless, they arrived at the sea-coast, and entering on what is called the Helorine road, continued their march, in order that when they had reached the river Cacyparis, they might march up along its banks through the interior; for they hoped also that in this direction the Sicels, to whom they had sent, would come to meet them. But when they had reached the river, they found a guard of the Syracusans there too, intercepting the pass with a wall and a palisade, having carried which, they crossed the river, and marched on again to another called the Erineus; for this was the route which their guides directed them to take.

Demosthenes Surrenders His Detachment

In the meantime the Syracusans and allies, as soon as it was day, and they found that the Athenians had departed, most of them charged Gylippus with having purposely let them escape; and pursuing with all haste by the route which they had no difficulty in finding they had taken, they overtook them about dinner-time. When they came up with the troops under Demosthenes, which were behind the rest, and marching more slowly and disorderly, ever since they had been thrown into confusion during the night, at the time we have mentioned, they immediately fell upon and engaged them; and the Syracusan horse surrounded them with greater ease from their being divided, and confined them in a narrow space.

The division of Nicias was six miles in advance; for he led them on more rapidly, thinking that their preservation depended, under such circumstances, not on staying behind, if they could help it, and on fighting, but on retreating as quickly as possible, and only fighting as often as they were compelled. Demosthenes, on the other hand, was, generally speaking, involved in more incessant labour (because, as he was retreating in the rear, he was the first that the enemy attacked), and on that occasion, finding that the Syracusans were in pursuit, he was not so much inclined to push on, as to form his men for battle; until, through thus loitering, he was surrounded by them, and both himself and the Athenians with him were thrown into great confusion. Being driven back into a certain spot which had a wall all round it, with a road on each side, and many olive trees growing about, they were annoyed with missiles in every direction. This kind of attack the Syracusans naturally adopted, instead of close combat; since risking their lives against men reduced to despair was no longer for their advantage, so much as for that of

the Athenians. Besides, after success which was now so signal, each man spared himself in some degree, that he might not be cut off before the end of the business. They thought too that, even as it was, they should by this kind of fighting subdue and capture the Athenians.

At any rate, when, after plying the Athenians and their allies with missiles all day from every quarter, they saw them now distressed by wounds and other sufferings, Gylippus with the Syracusans and allies made a proclamation, in the first place, that any of the islanders who chose should come over to them, on condition of retaining his liberty; and some few states went over. Afterwards, terms were made with all the troops under Demosthenes, that they should surrender their arms, and that no one should be put to death, either by violence or imprisonment, or want of such nourishment as was most absolutely requisite. Thus there surrendered, in all, to the number of six thousand; and they laid down the whole of the money in their possession, throwing it into the hollow of shields, four of which they filled with it. These they immediately led back to the city, while Nicias and his division arrived that day on the banks of the river Erineus; having crossed which, he posted his army on some high ground.

Nicias Parleys, Fights, and Surrenders

The Syracusans, having overtaken him the next day, told him that Demosthenes and his division had surrendered themselves, and called on him also to do the same. Being incredulous of the fact, he obtained a truce to enable him to send a horseman to see. When he had gone, and brought word back again that they had surrendered, Nicias sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusans, saying that he was ready to agree with the Syracusans, on behalf of the Athenians, to repay whatever money the Syracusans had spent on the war, on condition of their letting his army go; and that until the money was paid, he would give Athenians as hostages, one for every talent. The Syracusans and Gylippus did not accede to these proposals, but fell upon this division also, and surrounded them on all sides, and annoyed them with their missiles until late in the day. And they too, like the others, were in a wretched plight for want of food and necessaries. Nevertheless, they watched for the quiet of the night, and then intended to pursue their march. And they were now just taking up their arms, when the Syracusans perceived it and raised their pæan. The Athenians, therefore, finding that they had not eluded their observation, laid their arms down again; excepting about three hundred men who forced their way through the sentinels, and proceeded, during the night, how and where they could.

As soon as it was day, Nicias led his troops forward; while the Syracusans and allies pressed on them in the same manner, discharging their missiles at them, and striking them down with their javelins on every side. The Athenians were hurrying on to reach the river Assinarus, being urged to this at once by the attack made on every side of them by the numerous cavalry and the rest of the light-armed multitude (for they thought they should be more at ease if they were once across the river), and also by their weariness and craving for drink. When they reached its banks, they rushed into it without any more regard for order, every man anxious to be himself the first to cross it; while the attack of the enemy rendered the passage more difficult. For being compelled to advance in a dense body, they fell upon and trod down one another; and some of them died immediately on the javelins and articles of baggage, while others were entangled together, and floated

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down the stream. On the other side of the river, too, the Syracusans lined the bank, which was precipitous, and from the higher ground discharged their missiles on the Athenians, while most of them were eagerly drinking in confusion amongst themselves in the hollow bed of the stream. The Peloponnesians, moreover, charged them and butchered them, especially those in the river. And thus the water was immediately spoiled; but nevertheless it was drunk by them, mud and all, and bloody as it was, it was even fought for by most of them.

At length, when many dead were now heaped one upon another in the river, and the army was destroyed, either at the river, or, if any part had escaped, by the cavalry, Nicias surrendered himself to Gylippus, placing more confidence in him than in the Syracusans; and desired him and the Lacedæmonians to do what they pleased with himself, but to stop butchering the rest of the soldiers. After this, Gylippus commanded to make prisoners; and they collected all that were alive, excepting such as they concealed for their own benefit (of whom there was a large number). They also sent a party in pursuit of the three hundred, who had forced their way through the sentinels during the night, and took them. The part of the army, then, that was collected as general property, was not large, but that which was secreted was considerable; and the whole of Sicily was filled with them, inasmuch as they had not been taken on definite terms of surrender, like those with Demosthenes. Indeed no small part was actually put to death; for this was the most extensive slaughter, and surpassed by none of all that occurred in this Sicilian war. In the other encounters also, which were frequent on their march, no few had fallen. But many also escaped; some at the moment, others after serving as slaves, and running away subsequently. These found a place of refuge at Catana.

The Fate of the Captives

When the Syracusans and allies were assembled together, they took with them as many prisoners as they could, with the spoils, and returned to the city. All the rest of the Athenians and the allies that they had taken, they sent down into the quarries, thinking this the safest way of keeping them; but Nicias and Demosthenes they executed, against the wish of Gylippus. For he thought it would be a glorious distinction for him, in addition to all his other achievements, to take to the Lacedæmonians the generals who had commanded against them. And it so happened, that one of these, namely Demosthenes, was regarded by them as their most inveterate enemy, in consequence of what had occurred on the island and at Pylos; the other, for the same reasons, as most in their interest; for Nicias had exerted himself for the release of the Lacedæmonians taken from the island, by persuading the Athenians to make a treaty. On this account the Lacedæmonians had friendly feelings towards him; and indeed it was mainly for the same reasons that he reposed confidence in Gylippus, and surrendered himself to him. But certain of the Syracusans (as it was said) were afraid, some of them, since they had held communication with him, that if put to the torture, he might cause them trouble on that account in the midst of their success; others, and especially the Corinthians, lest he might bribe some, as he was rich, and effect his escape, and so they should again incur mischief through his agency; and therefore they persuaded the allies, and put him to death. For this cause then, or something very like it, he was executed, having least of all the Greeks deserved to meet with such a

misfortune, on account of his devoted attention to the practice of every virtue.

As for those in the quarries, the Syracusans treated them with cruelty during the first period of their captivity. For as they were in a hollow place, and many in a small compass, the sun, as well as the suffocating closeness, distressed them at first, in consequence of their not being under cover; and then, on the contrary, the nights coming on autumnal and cold, soon worked in them an alteration from health to disease, by means of the change. Since, too, in consequence of their want of room, they did everything in the same place; and the dead, moreover, were piled up on one another—such as died from their wounds, and from the change they had experienced, and such like. There were, besides, intolerable stench; while at the same time they were tormented with hunger and thirst, for during eight months they gave each of them daily only a *cotyle*¹ of water, and two of corn. And of all the other miseries which it was likely that men thrown into such a place would suffer, there was none that did not fall to their lot. For some seventy days they thus lived all together; then the rest of them were sold, except the Athenians, and whatever Siceliots or Italians had joined them in the expedition.

The total number of those who were taken, though it were difficult to speak with exactness, was still not less than seven thousand. “And this,” says Thucydides in conclusion, “was the greatest Grecian exploit of all that were performed in this war; nay, in my opinion, of all Grecian achievements that we have heard of also; and was at once most splendid for the conquerors, and most disastrous for the conquered. For being altogether vanquished at all points, and having suffered in no slight degree in any respect, they were destroyed (as the saying is) with utter destruction, both army, and navy, and everything; and only a few out of many returned home. Such were the events which occurred in Sicily.”ⁱ

¹ The *cotyle* was a little more than half an English pint; and the allowance of food here mentioned was only half of that commonly given to a slave.



THE GROVES OF THE ACADEMY



CHAPTER XXXVI. CLOSE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

IN the populous and extensive kingdoms of modern Europe, the revolutions of public affairs seldom disturb the humble obscurity of private life; but the national transactions of Greece involved the interest of every family, and deeply affected the fortune and happiness of every individual. Had the arms of the Athenians proved successful in Sicily, each citizen would have derived from that event an immediate accession of wealth, as well as of power, and have felt a proportional increase of honour and security. But their proud hopes perished forever in the harbour of Syracuse. The succeeding disasters shook to the foundation the fabric of their empire.

In one rash enterprise they lost their army, their fleet, the prudence of their experienced generals, and the flourishing vigour of their manly youth — irreparable disasters which totally disabled them to resist the confederacy of Peloponnesus, reinforced by the resentment of a new and powerful enemy. While a Lacedæmonian army invested their city, they had reason to dread that a Syracusan fleet should assault the Piræus; that Athens must finally yield to these combined attacks, and her once prosperous citizens destroyed by the sword, or dragged into captivity, atone by their death or disgrace for the cruelties which they had recently inflicted on the wretched republics of Melos and Scione.

ATHENS AFTER THE SICILIAN DÉBACLE

The dreadful alternative of victory and defeat, renders it little surprising that the Athenians should have rejected intelligence, which they must have received with horror. The first messengers of such sad news were treated with contempt; but it was impossible long to withhold belief from the miserable fugitives, whose squalid and dejected countenances too faithfully attested the public calamity. Such evidence could not be refused; the arrogance of incredulity was abashed, and the whole republic thrown into consternation, or seized with despair. The venerable members of the Areopagus expressed the majesty of silent sorrow; but the piercing cries of woe extended many a mile along the lofty walls which joined the Piræus to the city; and the licentious populace raged with unbridled fury against the diviners and orators, whose blind predictions, and ambitious harangues, had promoted an expedition eternally fatal to their country.

The Athenian allies, or rather subjects, scattered over so many coasts and islands, prepared to assert their independence; the confederates of Sparta, among whom the Syracusans justly assumed the first rank, were unsatisfied with victory, and longed for revenge: even those communities which had hitherto declined the danger of a doubtful contest, meanly solicited to become parties in a war, which they expected must finally terminate in the destruction of Athens. Should all the efforts of such a powerful confederacy still prove insufficient to the ruin of the devoted city, there was yet another enemy behind, from whose strength and animosity the Athenians had everything to fear.

The long and peaceful reign of Artaxerxes expired four hundred and twenty-five years before the Christian era. There followed a rapid succession of kings, Xerxes, Sogdianus, Oechus; the last of whom assumed the name of Darius, to which historians have added the epithet of Nothus, the bastard, to distinguish this effeminate prince from his illustrious predecessor. But in the ninth year of his reign Darius was roused from his lethargy by the revolt of Egypt and Lydia. The defection of the latter threatened to tear from his dominion the valuable provinces of Asia Minor; a consequence which he determined to prevent by employing the bravery of Pharnabazus, and the policy of the crafty Tissaphernes, to govern respectively the northern and southern districts of that rich and fertile peninsula. The abilities of these generals not only quelled the rebellion in Lydia, but extended the arms of their master towards the shores of the Ægean, as well as of the Hellespont and Propontis; in direct opposition to the treaty which forty years before had been ratified between the Athenians, then in the height of their prosperity, and the unwarlike Artaxerxes. But the recent misfortunes of that ambitious people flattered the Persian commanders with the hope of restoring the whole Asiatic coast to the Great King, as well as of inflicting exemplary punishment on the proud city, which had resisted the power, dismembered the empire, and tarnished the glory of Persia.

The terror of such a formidable combination might have reduced the Athenians to despair. Their disasters and disgrace in Sicily destroyed at once the real and the ideal supports of their power; the loss of one-third of their citizens made it impossible to supply, with fresh recruits, the exhausted strength of their garrisons in foreign parts; the terror of their fleet was no more; and their multiplied defeats, before the walls of Syracuse, had converted into contempt that admiration in which Athens had been long held by Greeks and barbarians.

But in free governments there are many latent resources which public calamities alone can bring to light; and adversity, which to individuals endowed with inborn vigour of mind is the great school of virtue and of heroism, furnishes also to the enthusiasm of popular assemblies the noblest field for the display of national honour and magnanimity. Had the measures of the Athenians depended on one man, or even on a few, it is probable that the selfish timidity of a prince, and the cautious prudence of a council, would have sunk under the weight of misfortunes, too heavy for the unsupported strength of ordinary minds. But the first spark of generous ardour, which the love of virtue, of glory, and the republic, or even the meaner motives of ambition and vanity, excited in the assembled multitude, was diffused and increased by the natural contagion of sympathy; the patriotic flame was communicated simultaneously to every breast. With one mind and resolution the Athenians determined to brave the severity of fortune, and to withstand the assaults of the enemy.

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
In the year following the unfortunate expedition into Sicily, the Spartans prepared a fleet of a hundred sail, of which twenty-five galleys were furnished by their own seaports. This armament was destined to encourage and support the revolt of the Asiatic subjects of the Athenians. The islands of Chios and Lesbos, as well as the city Erythræ on the continent, solicited the Spartans to join them with their naval force. Their request was enforced by Tissaphernes, who promised to pay the sailors, and to victual the ships. At the same time, an ambassador from Cyzicus, a populous town situate on an island of the Propontis, entreated the Lacedæmonian armament to sail to the safe and capacious harbours which had long formed the wealth and the ornament of that city, and to expel the Athenian garrisons, to which the Cyzicenes and their neighbours reluctantly submitted. The Persian Pharnabazus seconded their proposal; offered the same conditions with Tissaphernes; and so little harmony subsisted between the lieutenants of the Great King, that each urged his particular demand with a total unconcern about the important interests of their common master. The Lacedæmonians held many consultations amongst themselves, and with their allies; hesitated, deliberated, resolved, and changed their resolution; and at length were persuaded by Alcibiades to prefer the overture of Tissaphernes and the Ionians to that of the Hellespontines and Pharnabazus.

The delay occasioned by this deliberation was the principal, but not the only cause which hindered the allies from acting expeditiously, at a time when expedition was of the utmost importance. A variety of private views diverted them from the general aim of the confederacy; and the season was far advanced before the Corinthians, who had been distinguished by excess of antipathy to Athens, were prepared to sail. The Athenians anticipated the designs of the rebels of Chios, and carried off seven ships as pledges of their fidelity. The squadron which returned from this useful enterprise, intercepted the Corinthians as they sailed through the Saronic Gulf; and having attacked and conquered them, pursued and blocked them up in their harbours. Meanwhile the Spartans sent to the Ionian coast such squadrons as were successively ready for sea, under the conduct of Alcibiades, Chalcideus, and Astyochus. The first of these commanders sailed to the isle of Chios, which was distracted by contending factions. The Athenian partisans were surprised and compelled to submit; and the city, which possessed forty galleys, and yielded in wealth and populousness to none of the neighbouring colonies, became an accession to the Peloponnesian confederacy. The strong and rich town of Miletus followed the example: Erythræ and Clazomenæ surrendered to Chalcideus; several places of less note were conquered by Astyochus.

When the Athenians received the unwelcome intelligence of these events, they voted the expenditure of a thousand talents, which in more prosperous times, they had deposited in the citadel, under the sanction of a decree of the senate and people, to reserve it for an occasion of the utmost danger. This seasonable supply enabled them to increase the fleet, which sailed under Phrynichus and other leaders, to the isle of Lesbos. Having secured the fidelity of the Lesbians, who were ripe for rebellion, they endeavoured to recover their authority in Miletus, anciently regarded as the capital of the Ionic coast. A bloody battle was fought before the walls of that place, between the Athenians and Argives on one side, and the Peloponnesians, assisted by the troops of Tissaphernes and the revolted Milesians, on the other. The Athenian bravery defeated, on this occasion, the superior number of Greeks and barbarians to whom they were opposed; but their Argive

auxiliaries were repulsed by the gallant citizens of Miletus so that in both parts of the engagement, the Ionic race, commonly reckoned the less warlike, prevailed over their Dorian rivals and enemies. Elevated with the joy of victory, the Athenians prepared to assault the town, when they were alarmed by the approach of a fleet of fifty-five sail which advanced in two divisions, the one commanded by the celebrated Hermocrates, the other by Theramenes the Spartan. Phrynichus prudently considered, that his own strength only amounted to forty-eight galleys, and refused to commit the last hope of the republic to the danger of an unequal combat. His firmness despised the clamours of the Athenian sailors, who insulted, under the name of cowardice, the caution of their admiral; and he calmly retired with his whole force to the isle of Samos, where the popular faction having lately treated the nobles with shocking injustice and cruelty, too frequent in Grecian democracies, were ready to receive with open arms the patrons of that form of government.

The retreat of the Athenian fleet acknowledged the naval superiority of the enemy; a superiority which was alone sufficient either to acquire or to maintain the submission of the neighbouring coasts and islands. In other respects too, the Peloponnesians enjoyed the most decisive advantages. Their galleys were victualled, their soldiers were paid by Tissaphernes, and they daily expected a reinforcement of a hundred and fifty Phœnician ships. But, in this dangerous crisis, fortune seemed to respect the declining age of Athens, and, by a train of accidents, singular and almost incredible, enabled Alcibiades, so long the misfortune and the scourge, to become the defence and the saviour of his country.



GREEK SANDALS

ALCIBIADES AGAIN TO THE FORE

During his long residence in Sparta, Alcibiades assumed the outward gravity of deportment, and conformed himself to the spare diet, and laborious exercises, which prevailed in that austere republic; but his character and his principles remained as licentious as ever. His intrigue with Timæa, the spouse of king Agis, was discovered by an excess of female levity. The queen, vain of the attachment of so celebrated a character, familiarly gave the name of Alcibiades to her son Leotychides; a name which, first confined to the privacy of her female companions, was soon spread abroad in the world. Alcibiades punished her folly by a most mortifying but well-merited declaration, boasting that he had solicited her favours from no other motive but that he might indulge the ambitious desire of giving a king to Sparta. The offence itself, and the shameless avowal, still more provoking than the offence, excited the keenest resentment in the breast of the injured husband. The magistrates and generals of Sparta, jealous of the fame, and envious of the merit of a stranger, readily sympathised with the misfortune, and encouraged the revenge of Agis; and, as the horrid practice of assassination was still

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disgracing the manners of Greece, orders were sent to Astyochus, who commanded in chief the Peloponnesian forces in Asia, secretly to destroy Alcibiades, whose power defied those laws which in every Grecian republic condemned adulterers to death. But the active and subtle Athenian had secured too faithful domestic intelligence in the principal families of Sparta to become the victim of this execrable design. With his usual address he eluded all the snares of Astyochus : his safety, however, required perpetual vigilance and caution, and he determined to escape from the situation, which subjected him to such irksome restraint.

Publicly banished from Athens, secretly persecuted by Sparta, he had recourse to the friendship of Tissaphernes, who admired his accomplishments, and respected his abilities, which, though far superior in degree, were similar in kind to his own. Tissaphernes was of a temper the more readily to serve a friend, in proportion as he less needed his services. Alcibiades, therefore, carefully concealed from him the dangerous resentment of the Spartans. In the selfish breast of the Persian no attachment could be durable unless founded on interest ; and Alcibiades, who had deeply studied his character, began to flatter his avarice, that he might insure his protection. He informed him, that by allowing the Peloponnesian sailors a drachma, or sevenpence sterling, of daily pay, he treated them with a useless and even dangerous liberality : that the pay given by the Athenians, even in the most flourishing times, amounted only to three oboli. Should the sailors prove dissatisfied with this equitable reduction, the Grecian character afforded an easy expedient for silencing their licentious clamours. It would be sufficient to bribe the naval commanders and a few mercenary orators, and the careless and improvident seamen would submit, without suspicion, the rate of their pay, as well as every other concern, to the influence and the authority of those who were accustomed to govern them.

Tissaphernes heard this advice with all the attention of an avaricious man to every proposal for saving his money ; and so true a judgment had Alcibiades formed of the Greeks, that Hermocrates the Syracusan was the only officer who disdained, meanly and perfidiously, to betray the interest of the men under his command : yet through the influence of his colleagues, the plan of economy was universally adopted.

The intrigues of Alcibiades sowed jealousy and distrust in the Peloponnesian fleet : they alienated the minds of the troops both from Tissaphernes and from their commanders : the Persian was ready to forsake those whom he had learned to despise ; and Alcibiades profited by this disposition to insinuate that the alliance of the Lacedæmonians was equally expensive and inconvenient for the Great King and his lieutenants.

These artful representations produced almost an open breach between Tissaphernes and his confederates. The advantage which Athens would derive from this rupture might have paved the way for Alcibiades to return to his country : but he dreaded to encounter that popular fury, whose effects he had fatally experienced, and whose mad resentment no degree of merit could appease ; he therefore applied secretly to Pisander, Theramenes, and other persons of distinction in the Athenian camp. To them he deplored the desperate state of public affairs, expatiated on his own credit with Tissaphernes, and insinuated that it might be yet possible to prevent the Phœnician fleet from sailing to assist the enemy. Assuming gradually more boldness, he finally declared that the Athenians might obtain not merely the neutrality, but perhaps the assistance of Tissaphernes, should they consent to abolish their turbulent democracy, so odious to the Persians,

and to entrust the administration of government to men worthy to negotiate with so mighty a monarch.

When the illustrious exile proposed this measure, it is uncertain whether he was acquainted with the secret cabals which had been already formed, both in the city and in the camp, for executing the design which he suggested. One man, the personal enemy of Alcibiades, alone opposed the general current. But this man was Phrynichus. The courage with which he invited dangers many have equalled, but none ever surpassed the boldness with which he extricated himself from difficulties. When he perceived that his colleagues were deaf to every objection against recalling the friend of Tissaphernes, he secretly informed the Spartan admiral Astyochus, of the intrigues which were carrying on to the disadvantage of his country. Daring as this treachery was, Phrynichus addressed a traitor not less perfidious than himself. Astyochus was become the pensioner and creature of Tissaphernes, to whom he communicated the intelligence. The Persian again communicated it to his favourite Alcibiades, who complained in strong terms to the Athenians of the baseness and villainy of Phrynichus.

The latter exculpated himself with address; but as the return of Alcibiades might prove fatal to his safety, he ventured, a second time, to write to Astyochus, gently reproaching him with his breach of confidence, and explaining by what means he might surprise the whole Athenian fleet at Samos; an exploit that must forever establish his fame and fortune. Astyochus again betrayed the secret to Tissaphernes and Alcibiades; but before their letters could be conveyed to the Athenian camp, Phrynichus, who, by some unknown channel, was informed of this second treachery, anticipated the dangerous discovery, by apprising the Athenians of their enemy's design to surprise their fleet. They had scarcely employed the proper means to counteract that purpose when messengers came from Alcibiades to announce the horrid perfidy of a wretch who had basely sacrificed to private resentment the last hope of his country. But the messengers arrived too late; the prior information of Phrynichus, as well as the bold and singular wickedness of his design, which no common degree of evidence was thought sufficient to prove, were sustained as arguments for his exculpation; and it was believed that Alcibiades had made use of a stratagem most infamous in itself, but not unexampled among the Greeks, for destroying a man whom he detested.

The opposition of Phrynichus, though it retarded the designs of Alcibiades, prevented not the measures of Pisander and his associates for abolishing the democracy. The soldiers at Samos were induced, by reasons above mentioned, to acquiesce in the resolution of their generals. But a more difficult task remained; to deprive the people of Athens of their liberty which, since the expulsion of the family of Pisistratus, they had enjoyed a hundred years. Pisander headed the deputation which was sent from the camp to the city to effect this important revolution. He acquainted the extraordinary assembly, summoned on that occasion in the theatre of Bacchus, of the measures which had been adopted by their soldiers and fellow-citizens at Samos. The compact band of conspirators warmly approved the example; but loud murmurs of discontent resounded in different quarters of that spacious theatre. Pisander asked the reason of this disapprobation. "Had his opponents anything better to propose? If they had, let them come forward and explain the grounds of their dissent: but, above all, let them explain how they could save themselves, their families, and their country, unless they complied with the demand of

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Tissaphernes. The imperious voice of necessity was superior to law; and when the actual danger had ceased, they might re-establish their ancient constitution." The opponents of Pisander were unable or afraid to reply: and the assembly passed a decree, investing ten ambassadors with full powers to treat with the Persian satrap.

Soon after the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of Asia, the Spartan commanders had concluded, in the name of their republic, a treaty with Tissaphernes; in which it was stipulated, that the subsidies should be regularly paid by the king of Persia, and that the Peloponnesian forces should employ their utmost endeavours to recover, for that monarch, all the dominions of his ancestors, which had been long unjustly usurped, and cruelly insulted, by the Athenians. This treaty seemed so honourable to the Great King, that his lieutenant could not venture openly to infringe it. Alarmed at the decay of his influence with the Persians, on which he had built the flattering hopes of returning to his country, Alcibiades employed all the resources of his genius to conceal his disgrace. By solicitations, entreaties, and the meanest compliances, he obtained an audience for his fellow-citizens. As the agent of Tissaphernes, he then proposed the conditions on which they might obtain the friendship of the Great King. Several demands were made, demands most disgraceful to the name of Athens: to all of which the ambassadors submitted. They even agreed to surrender the whole coast of Ionia to its ancient sovereign. But when the artful Athenian (fearful lest they should, on any terms, admit the treaty which Tissaphernes was resolved on no terms to grant) demanded that the Persian fleets should be allowed to sail, undisturbed, in the Grecian seas, the ambassadors, well knowing that should this condition be complied with, no treaty could hinder Greece from becoming a province of Persia, expressed their indignation in very unguarded language, and left the assembly in disgust.

This imprudence enabled Alcibiades to affirm, with some appearance of truth, that their own anger and obstinacy, not the reluctance of Tissaphernes, had obstructed the negotiation, which was precisely the issue of the affair most favourable to his views. His artifices succeeded, but were not attended with the consequences expected from them. The Athenians, both in the camp and city, perceived, by this transaction, that his credit with the Persians was less than he represented it; and the aristocratical faction were glad to get rid of a man, whose restless ambition rendered him a dangerous associate. They persisted, however, with great activity, in executing their purpose; of which Phrynichus, who had opposed them only from hatred of Alcibiades, became an active abettor. When persuasion was ineffectual, they had recourse to violence. Androcles, Hyperbolus, and other licentious demagogues, were assassinated. The people of Athens, ignorant of the strength of the conspirators, and surprised to find in the number many whom they least suspected, were restrained by inactive timidity, or fluctuated in doubtful suspense. The cabal alone acted with union and with vigour; and difficult as it seemed to subvert the Athenian democracy, which had subsisted a hundred years with unexampled glory, yet this design was undertaken and accomplished by the enterprising activity of Pisander, the artful eloquence of Theramenes, the firm intrepidity of Phrynichus, and the superintending wisdom of Antiphon.

He it was who formed the plan, and regulated the mode of attack, which was carried on by his associates. Pisander and his party boldly declared, that neither the spirit nor the forms of the established constitution (which had recently subjected them to such a weight of misfortunes) suited the present dangerous and alarming crisis. That it was necessary to new-model

the whole fabric of government; for which purpose five persons (whose names he read) ought to be appointed by the people, to choose a hundred others; each of whom should select three associates; and the four hundred thus chosen, men of dignity and opulence, who would serve their country without fee or reward, ought immediately to be invested with the majesty of the republic. They alone should conduct the administration uncontrolled, and assemble, as often as seemed proper, five thousand citizens, whom they judged most worthy of being consulted in the management of public affairs. This extraordinary proposal was accepted without opposition: the partisans of democracy dreaded the strength of the cabal; and the undiscerning multitude, dazzled by the imposing name of five thousand, a number far exceeding the ordinary assemblies of Athens, perceived not that they surrendered their liberties to the artifice of an ambitious faction.^b

THE OVERTHROW OF THE DEMOCRACY: THE FOUR HUNDRED

Full liberty being thus granted to make any motion, however anti-constitutional, and to dispense with all the established formalities, such as preliminary authorisation by the senate, Pisander now came forward with his substantive propositions to the following effect:

(1) All the existing democratical magistracies were suppressed at once, and made to cease for the future. (2) No civil functions whatever were hereafter to be salaried. (3) To constitute a new government, a committee of five persons were named forthwith, who were to choose a larger body of one hundred; that is, one hundred including the five choosers themselves. Each individual out of this body of one hundred, was to choose three persons. (4) A body of Four Hundred was thus constituted, who were to take their seat in the senate house, and to carry on the government with unlimited powers, according to their own discretion. (5) They were to convene the Five Thousand, whenever they might think fit. All was passed without a dissentient voice.

The invention and employment of this imaginary aggregate of Five Thousand was not the least dexterous among the combinations of Antiphon. No one knew who these Five Thousand were: yet the resolution just adopted purported—not that such a number of citizens should be singled out and constituted, either by choice, or by lot, or in some determinate manner which should exhibit them to the view and knowledge of others—but that the Four Hundred should convene the Five Thousand, whenever they thought proper: thus assuming the latter to be a list already made up and notorious, at least to the Four Hundred themselves. The real fact was that the Five Thousand existed nowhere except in the talk and proclamations of the conspirators, as a supplement of fictitious auxiliaries. They did not even exist as individual names on paper, but simply as an imposturous nominal aggregate. The Four Hundred, now installed, formed the entire and exclusive rulers of the state. But the mere name of the Five Thousand, though it was nothing more than a name, served two important purposes for Antiphon and his conspiracy. First, it admitted of being falsely produced, especially to the armament at Samos, as proof of a tolerably numerous and popular body of equal, qualified, concurrent citizens, all intended to take their turn by rotation in exercising the powers of government; thus lightening the odium of extreme usurpation to the Four Hundred, and passing them off merely as the earliest section of the Five Thousand, put into office for a few

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months, and destined at the end of that period to give place to another equal section. Next, it immensely augmented the means of intimidation possessed by the Four Hundred at home, by exaggerating the impression of their supposed strength. For the citizens generally were made to believe that there were five thousand real and living partners in the conspiracy; while the fact that these partners were not known and could not be individually identified, rather aggravated the reigning terror and mistrust; since every man, suspecting that his neighbour might possibly be among them, was afraid to communicate his discontent or propose means for joint resistance. In both these two ways, the name and assumed existence of the Five Thousand lent strength to the real Four Hundred conspirators. It masked their usurpation, while it increased their hold on the respect and fears of the citizens.

As soon as the public assembly at Colonus had, with such seeming unanimity, accepted all the propositions of Pisander, they were dismissed; and the new regiment of Four Hundred were chosen and constituted in the form prescribed. It now only remained to install them in the senate house. But this could not be done without force, since the senators were already within it; having doubtless gone thither immediately from the assembly, where their presence, at least the presence of the prytanes, or senators of the presiding tribe, was essential as legal presidents. They had to deliberate what they would do under the decree just passed, which divested them of all authority. Nor was it impossible that they might organise armed resistance; for which there seemed more than usual facility at the present moment, since the occupation of Decelea by the Lacedæmonians kept Athens in a condition like that of a permanent camp, with a large proportion of the citizens day and night under arms. Against this chance the Four Hundred made provision. They selected that hour of the day when the greater number of citizens habitually went home, probably to their morning meal, leaving the military station, with the arms piled and ready, under comparatively thin watch. While the general body of hoplites left the station at this hour, according to the usual practice, the hoplites — Andrian, Tenian, and others — in the immediate confidence of the Four Hundred, were directed, by private order, to hold themselves prepared and in arms, at a little distance off; so that if any symptoms should appear of resistance being contemplated, they might at once interfere and forestall it.

The Four Hundred then marched to the senate house, each man with a dagger concealed under his garment, and followed by their special body-guard of 120 young men from various Grecian cities, the instruments of the assassinations ordered by Antiphon and his colleagues. In this array they marched into the senate house, where the senators were assembled, and commanded them to depart; at the same time tendering to them their pay for all the remainder of the year — seemingly about three months or more down to the beginning of *Hecatombæon*, the month of new nominations — during which their functions ought to have continued. The senators were no way prepared to resist the decree just passed under the forms of legality, with an armed body now arrived to enforce its execution. They obeyed and departed, each man as he passed the door receiving the salary tendered to him. That they should yield obedience to superior force, under the circumstances, can excite neither censure nor surprise; but that they should accept, from the hands of the conspirators, this anticipation of an unearned salary, was a meanness which almost branded them as accomplices, and dishonoured the expiring hour of the last democratical authority. The Four Hundred now at last found themselves triumphantly installed in the senate house,

without the least resistance, either from within its walls or even from without, by any portion of the citizens.

Thus perished, or seemed to perish, the democracy of Athens, after an uninterrupted existence of nearly one hundred years since the revolution of Clisthenes. So incredible did it appear that the numerous, intelligent, and constitutional citizens of Athens should suffer their liberties to be overthrown by a band of four hundred conspirators, while the great mass of them not only loved their democracy, but had arms in their hands to defend it, that even their enemy and neighbour Agis, at Decelea, could hardly imagine the revolution to be a fact accomplished.

The ulterior success of the conspiracy—when all prospect of Persian gold, or improved foreign position, was at an end—is due to the combinations, alike nefarious and skillful, of Antiphon, wielding and organising the united strength of the aristocratical classes at Athens; strength always exceedingly great, but under ordinary circumstances working in fractions disunited and even reciprocally hostile to each other—restrained by the ascendent democratical institutions—and reduced to corrupt what it could not overthrow. Antiphon, about to employ this anti-popular force in one systematic scheme, and for the accomplishment of a predetermined purpose, keeps still within the same ostensible constitutional limits. He raises no open mutiny: he maintains inviolate the cardinal point of Athenian political morality—respect to the decision of the senate and political assembly, as well as to constitutional maxims.

He knows, however, that the value of these meetings, depends upon freedom of speech; and that, if that freedom be suppressed, the assembly itself becomes a nullity, or rather an instrument of positive imposture and mischief. Accordingly, he causes all the popular orators to be successively assassinated, so that no man dares to open his mouth on that side; while on the other hand, the anti-popular speakers are all loud and confident, cheering one another on, and seeming to represent all the feeling of the persons present. By thus silencing each individual leader, and intimidating every opponent from standing forward as spokesman, he extorts the formal sanction of the assembly and the senate to measures which the large majority of the citizens detest. That majority, however, are bound by their own constitutional forms; and when the decision of these, by whatever means obtained, is against them, they have neither the inclination nor the courage to resist. In no part of the world has this sentiment of constitutional duty, and submission to the vote of a legal majority, been more keenly and universally felt, than it was among the citizens of democratical Athens.¹ Antiphon thus finds means to employ the constitutional sentiment of Athens as a means of killing the constitution: the mere empty form, after its vital and protective efficacy has been abstracted, remains simply as a cheat to paralyse individual patriotism.


As Grecian history has been usually written, we are instructed to believe that the misfortunes, and the corruption, and the degradation of the democratical states are brought upon them by the class of demagogues, of whom Cleon, Hyperbolus, Androcles, etc., stand forth as specimens. These men are represented as mischief makers and revilers, accusing without just cause, and converting innocence into treason. Now the history of this conspiracy of the Four Hundred presents to us the other side of the picture. It shows

¹ This striking and deep-seated regard of the Athenians for all the forms of an established constitution, makes itself felt even by Mitford (*History of Greece* vol. iv. sect. v. ch. xix. p. 235).

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that the political enemies, against whom the Athenian people were protected by their democratical institutions, and by the demagogues as living organs of those institutions, were not fictitious but dangerously real. It reveals the continued existence of powerful anti-popular combinations, ready to come together for treasonable purposes when the moment appeared safe and tempting. It manifests the character and morality of the leaders, to whom the direction of the anti-popular force naturally fell. It proves that these leaders, men of uncommon ability, required nothing more than the extinction or silence of the demagogues, to be enabled to subvert the popular securities and get possession of the government. We need no better proof to teach us what was the real function and intrinsic necessity of these demagogues in the Athenian system, taking them as a class, and apart from the manner in which individuals among them may have performed their duty. They formed the vital movement of all that was tutelary and public spirited in democracy. Aggressive in respect to official delinquents, they were defensive in respect to the public and the constitution.

If that force, which Antiphon found ready made, had not been efficient, at an earlier period in stifling the democracy, it was because there were demagogues to cry aloud, as well as assemblies to hear and sustain them. If Antiphon's conspiracy was successful, it was because he knew where to aim his blows, so as to strike down the real enemies of the oligarchy and the real defenders of the people. We here employ the term demagogue because it is that commonly used by those who denounce the class of men here under review: the proper neutral phrase, laying aside odious associations, would be to call them popular speakers, or opposition speakers. But, by whatever name they may be called, it is impossible rightly to conceive their position in Athens, without looking at them in contrast and antithesis with those anti-popular forces against which they formed the indispensable barrier, and which come forth into such manifest and melancholy working under the organising hands of Antiphon and Phrynichus.^c



GREEK SEALS

THE REVOLT FROM THE FOUR HUNDRED

The conduct of the Four Hundred tyrants (for historians have justly adopted the language of Athenian resentment) soon opened the eyes and understanding of the most thoughtless. They abolished every vestige of ancient freedom; employed mercenary troops levied from the small islands of the Ægean, to overawe the multitude, and to intimidate, in some instances to destroy, their real or suspected enemies. Instead of seizing the opportunity of annoying the Peloponnesians, enraged at the treachery of Tissaphernes, and mutinous for want of pay and subsistence, they sent ambassadors to solicit peace from the Spartans on the most dishonourable terms. Their tyranny rendered them odious in the city, and their cowardice made them contemptible in the camp at Samos. Their cruelty and injustice were

described and exaggerated by the fugitives who continually arrived in that island. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two officers of high merit and distinction, though not actually entrusted with a share in the principal command, gave activity and boldness to the insurgents. The abettors of the new government were attacked by surprise: thirty of the most criminal were put to death, several others were banished, democracy was re-established in the camp, and the soldiers were bound by oath to maintain their hereditary government against the conspiracy of domestic foes, and to act with vigour against the public enemy.

Thrasybulus, who headed this successful and meritorious sedition, had a mind to conceive, a tongue to persuade, and a hand to execute the most daring designs. He exhorted the soldiers not to despair of effecting in the capital the same revolution which they had produced in the camp. Their most immediate concern was to recall Alcibiades, who had been deceived and disgraced by the tyrants, and who not only felt with peculiar sensibility, but could resent with becoming dignity, the wrongs of his country and his own. The advice of Thrasybulus was approved; soon after he sailed to Magnesia, and returned in company with Alcibiades.



GREEK SEALS

Though the army immediately saluted him general, Alcibiades left the care of the troops to his colleagues Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, and withdrew himself from the applauses of his admiring countrymen, on pretence of concerting with Tissaphernes the system of their future operations. But his principal motive was to show himself to the Persian, in the new and illustrious character with which he was invested; for having raised his authority among the Athenians by his influence with the satrap, he expected to strengthen this influence by the support of that authority. Before he returned to the camp, ambassadors had been sent by the tyrants, to attempt a negotiation with the partisans of democracy, who, inflamed by continual reports of the indignities and cruelties committed in Athens, prepared to sail thither to protect their friends and take vengeance on their enemies. Alcibiades judiciously opposed this rash resolution which must have left the Hellespont, Ionia, and the islands, at the mercy of the hostile fleet. But he commanded the ambassadors to deliver to their masters a short but pithy message: "That they must divest themselves of their illegal power, and restore the ancient constitution. If they delayed obedience, he would sail to the Piræus, and deprive them of their authority and their lives."

When this message was reported at Athens, it added to the disorder and confusion in which that unhappy city was involved. The Four Hundred who had acted with unanimity in usurping the government, soon disagreed about the administration, and split into factions, which persecuted each other as furiously as both had persecuted the people. Theramenes and Aristocrates condemned and opposed the tyrannical measures of their colleagues. The perfidious Phrynichus was slain: both parties prepared for taking arms; and the horrors of a Coreyrean sedition were ready to be renewed in Athens,

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when the old men, the children, the women, and strangers, interposed for the safety of a city which had long been the ornament of Greece, the terror of Persia, and the admiration of the world.

Had the public enemy availed themselves of this opportunity to assault the Piræus, Athens could not have been saved from immediate destruction. But the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus, long clamorous and discontented, had broken out into open mutiny, when they heard of the recall of Alcibiades, and the hostile intentions of Tissaphernes. They destroyed the Persian fortifications in the neighbourhood of Miletus; they put the garrisons to the sword; their treacherous commander, Astyochus, saved his life by flying to an altar; nor was the tumult appeased until the guilty were removed from their sight, and Mindarus, an officer of approved valour and fidelity, arrived from Sparta to assume the principal command.

The dreadful consequences which must have resulted to the Athenians, if, during the fury of their sedition, the enemy had attacked them with a fleet of a hundred and fifty sail, may be conceived by the terror inspired by a much smaller Peloponnesian squadron of only forty-two vessels commanded by the Spartan Agesandridas. The friends of the constitution had assembled in the spacious theatre of Bacchus. The most important matters were in agitation, when the alarm was given that some Peloponnesian ships had been seen on the coast. All ranks of men hastened to the Piræus; and prepared thirty-six vessels for taking the sea. When Agesandridas perceived the ardent opposition which he must encounter in attempting to land, he doubled the promontory of Sunium, and sailed towards the fertile island of Eubœa, from which, since the fortification of Decelea, the Athenians had derived far more plentiful supplies than from the desolated territory of Attica. To defend a country which formed their principal resource, they sailed in pursuit of the enemy, and observed them next day near the shore of Eretria, the most considerable town in the island.

The Eubœans, who had long watched an opportunity to revolt, supplied the Peloponnesian squadron with all necessities in abundance; but instead of furnishing a market to the Athenians, they retired from the coast on their approach. The commanders were obliged to weaken their strength by despatching several parties into the country to procure provisions; Agesandridas seized this opportunity to attack them: most of the ships were taken; the crews swam to land; many were cruelly murdered by the Eretrians, from whom they expected protection; and such only survived as took refuge in the Athenian garrisons scattered over the island.

The news of this misfortune were most alarming to the Athenians. Neither the invasion of Xerxes, nor even the defeat in Sicily, occasioned such terrible consternation. They dreaded the immediate defection of Eubœa; they had no more ships to launch; no means of resisting their multiplied enemies: the city was divided against the camp, and divided against itself. Yet the magnanimous firmness of Theramenes did not allow the friends of liberty to despair. He encouraged them to disburden the republic of its domestic foes, who had summoned, or who were at least believed to have summoned, the assistance of the Lacedæmonian fleet, that they might be enabled to enslave their fellow citizens. Antiphon, Pisander, and the most obnoxious, seasonably escaped; the rest submitted. A decree was passed, recalling Alcibiades, and approving the conduct of the troops at Samos. The sedition ceased. The democracy, which had been interrupted four months, was restored; and such are the resources of a free government, that even this violent fermentation was not unproductive of benefit to the state.

THE TRIUMPHS OF ALCIBIADES

The Spartans, who formerly rejected the friendship, now courted the protection of Pharnabazus; to whose northern province they sailed with the principal strength of their armament, proceeded northwards in pursuit of the enemy; and the important straits, which join the Euxine and Ægean seas, became, and long continued, the scene of conflict. In the twenty-first winter of the war, a year already distinguished by the dissolution and revival of their democracy, the Athenians prevailed in three successive engagements, including Cynossema, the event of which became continually more decisive.

The Spartans yielded possession of the sea, which they hoped soon to recover, and retired to the friendly harbours of Cyzicus, to repair their shattered fleet; while the Athenians profited by the fame of their victory, and by the terror of their arms, to demand contributions from the numerous and wealthy towns in that neighbourhood. It was determined, chiefly by the advice of Alcibiades, to attack the enemy at Cyzicus; for which purpose they sailed, with eighty galleys, to the small island of Proconnesus, near the western extremity of the Propontis, and ten miles distant from the station of the Peloponnesian fleet. Alcibiades surprised sixty vessels on a dark and rainy morning, as they were manœuvring at a distance from the harbour, and skilfully intercepted their retreat. As the day cleared up, the rest sailed forth to their assistance; the action became general; the Athenians obtained a complete victory, and their valour was rewarded by the capture of the whole Peloponnesian fleet, except the Syracusan ships, which were burned, in the face of a victorious enemy, by the enterprising Hermocrates. The Peloponnesians were assisted by Pharnabazus in equipping a new fleet; but were deprived of the wise counsels of Hermocrates, whose abilities were well fitted both to prepare and to employ the resources of war. The success of the Asiatic expedition had not corresponded to the sanguine hopes of his countrymen; the insolent populace accused their commanders of incapacity; and a mandate was sent from Syracuse, depriving them of their office, and punishing them with banishment.

Meanwhile Thrasyllus obtained at Athens the supplies which he had gone to solicit; supplies far more powerful than he had reason to expect. With these forces, Thrasyllus sailed to Samos. He took Colophon, with several places of less note, in Ionia; penetrated into the heart of Lydia, burning the corn and villages; and returned to the shore, driving before him a numerous body of slaves, and other valuable booty. His courage was increased by the want of resistance on the part of Tissaphernes, whose province he had invaded; of the Peloponnesian forces at Miletus; and of the revolted colonies of Athens. He resolved, therefore, to attack the beautiful and flourishing city of Ephesus, which was then the principal ornament and defence of the Ionic coast. The Athenians were defeated, with the loss of three hundred men; and retiring from the field of battle, they sought refuge in their ships, and prepared to sail towards the Hellespont.

During the voyage thither, they fell in with twenty Sicilian galleys, of which they took four, and pursued the rest to Ephesus. Having soon afterwards reached the Hellespont, they found the Athenian armament at Lampsacus, where Alcibiades thought proper to muster the whole military and naval forces. They made a conjunct expedition against Abydos. Pharnabazus defended the place with a numerous body of Persian cavalry. The disgraced troops of Thrasyllus rejoiced in an opportunity to retrieve their honour. They attacked, repelled, and routed the enemy.

[408-407 B.C.]

For several years the measures of the Athenians had been almost uniformly successful; but the twenty-fourth campaign was distinguished by peculiar favours of fortune. The Athenians returned in triumph to attack the fortified cities, which still declined submission; an undertaking in which Alcibiades displayed the wonderful resources of his extraordinary genius. By gradual approaches, by sudden assaults, by surprise, by treason, or by stratagem, he in a few months became master of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and at last of Byzantium itself. His naval success was equally conspicuous. The Athenians again commanded the sea. The small squadrons fitted out by the enemy successively fell into their power. It was computed by the partisans of Alcibiades, that, since assuming the command, he had taken or destroyed two hundred Syracusan and Peloponnesian galleys; and his superiority of naval strength enabled him to raise such contributions, both in the Euxine and Mediterranean, as abundantly supplied his fleet and army with every necessary article of subsistence and accommodation.

While the Athenian arms were crowned with such glory abroad, the Attic territory was continually harassed by King Agis, and the Lacedæmonian troops posted at Decelea. Their bold and sudden incursions frequently threatened the safety of the city itself; the desolated lands afforded no advantage to the ruined proprietors; nor could the Athenians venture without their walls, to celebrate their accustomed festivals. Alcibiades, animated by his foreign victories, hoped to relieve the domestic sufferings of his country; and after an absence of many years, distinguished by such a variety of fortune, eagerly longed to revisit his native city, and enjoy the rewards and honours usually bestowed by the Greeks on successful valour. This celebrated voyage, which several ancient historians studiously decorated with every circumstance of naval triumph, was performed in the twenty-fifth summer of the war. Notwithstanding all his services, the cautious son of Clinias, instructed by adversity, declined to land in the Piræus, until he was informed that the assembly had repealed the decrees against him, formally revoked his banishment, and prolonged the term of his command. Even after this agreeable intelligence he was still unable to conquer his well-founded distrust of the variable and capricious humours of the people; nor would he approach the crowded shore, till he observed, in the midst of the multitude, his principal friends and relations inviting him by their voice and action. He then landed amidst the universal acclamations of the spectators, who, unattentive to the naval pomp, and regardless of the other commanders, fixed their eyes only on Alcibiades. Next day an extraordinary assembly was summoned, by order of the magistrates, that he might explain and justify his apparent misconduct, and receive the rewards due to his acknowledged merit.

Before judges so favourably disposed to hear him, Alcibiades found no difficulty to make his defence. He was appointed commander-in-chief by sea and land. A hundred galleys were equipped, and transports were prepared for fifteen hundred heavy-armed men, with a proportional body of cavalry.

Several months had passed in these preparations, when the Eleusinian festival approached; a time destined to commemorate and to diffuse the temporal and spiritual gifts of the goddess Ceres, originally bestowed on the Athenians, and by them communicated to the rest of Greece.

Besides the mysterious ceremonies of the temple, the worship of that bountiful goddess was celebrated by vocal and instrumental music, by public shows, and exhibitions, which continued during several days, and above all, by the pompous procession, which marched for ten miles along the sacred road leading from Athens to Eleusis. This important part of the solemnity

had formerly been intermitted, because the Athenians, after the loss of Decelea, were no longer masters of the road, and were compelled, contrary to established custom, to proceed by sea to the temple of Ceres. Alcibiades determined to wipe off the stain of impiety which had long adhered to his character, by renewing, in all its lustre, this venerable procession. After sufficient garrisons had been left to defend the Athenian walls and fortresses, the whole body of heavy-armed troops were drawn out to protect the Eleusinian procession, which marched along the usual road to the temple, and afterwards returned to Athens, without suffering any molestation from the Lacedæmonians; having united, on this occasion alone, all the splendour of war with the pomp of superstition.

Soon after this meritorious enterprise, Alcibiades prepared to sail for Lesser Asia, accompanied by the affectionate admiration of his fellow citizens, who flattered themselves that the abilities and fortune of their commander would speedily reduce Chios, Ephesus, Miletus, and the other revolted cities and islands. The general alacrity, however, was somewhat abated by the reflection, that the arrival of Alcibiades in Athens coincided with the anniversary of the *plynteria*, a day condemned to melancholy idleness, from a superstitious belief that nothing undertaken on that day could be brought to a prosperous conclusion.


While the superstitious multitude trembled at the imaginary anger of Minerva, men of reflection and experience dreaded the activity and valour of Lysander, who, during the residence of Alcibiades at Athens, had taken the command of the Peloponnesian forces in the East. Years had added experience to his valour, and enlarged the resources, without abating the ardour, of his ambitious mind. In his transactions with the world, he had learned to soften the harsh asperity of his national manners; to gain by fraud what could not be effected by force; and, in his own figurative language, to "eke out the lion's with the fox's skin." This mixed character admirably suited the part which he was called to act.

Since the decisive action at Cyzicus, the Peloponnesians, unable to resist the enemy, had been employed in preparing ships on the coast of their own peninsula, as well as in the harbours of their Persian and Grecian allies. The most considerable squadrons had been equipped in Cos, Rhodes, Miletus, and Ephesus; in the last of which the whole armament, amounting to ninety sail, was collected by Lysander. But the assembling of such a force was a matter of little consequence, unless proper measures should be taken for holding it together, and for enabling it to act with vigour. It was necessary, above all, to secure pay for the seamen; for this purpose, Lysander, accompanied by several Lacedæmonian ambassadors, repaired to Sardis, to congratulate the happy arrival of Cyrus, a generous and valiant youth of seventeen, who had been entrusted by his father Darius with the government of the inland parts of Lesser Asia. Lysander excited the warmest emotions of friendship in the youthful breast of Cyrus, who drinking his health after the Persian fashion, desired him to ask a boon, with full assurance that nothing should be denied him. Lysander replied, with his usual address, "That he should ask what it would be no less useful for the prince to give, than for him to receive: the addition of an obolus a day to the pay of the mariners; an augmentation which, by inducing the Athenian crews to desert, would not only increase their own strength, but enfeeble the common enemy." Struck with the apparent disinterestedness of this specious proposal, Cyrus ordered him immediately ten thousand darics (above five thousand pounds sterling); with which he returned to Ephesus,

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discharged the arrears due to his troops, gave them a month's pay in advance, raised their daily allowance, and seduced innumerable deserters from the Athenian fleet.

While Lysander was usefully employed in manning his ships, and preparing them for action, Alcibiades attacked the small island of Andros. The resistance was more vigorous than he had reason to expect; and the immediate necessity of procuring pay and subsistence for the fleet, obliged him to leave his work imperfect. With a small squadron he sailed to raise contributions on the Ionian or Carian coast, committing the principal armament to Antiochus, a man totally unworthy of such an important trust. Even the affectionate partiality of Alcibiades seems to have discerned the unworthiness of his favourite, since he gave him strict orders to continue, during his own absence, in the harbour of Samos, and by no means to risk an engagement. This injunction, as it could not prevent the rashness, might perhaps provoke the vain levity of the vice-admiral, who after the departure of his friend, sailed to Notium near Ephesus, approached Lysander's ships, and with the most licentious insults challenged him to battle. The prudent Spartan delayed the moment of attack, until the presumption of his enemies had thrown them into scattered disorder. He then commanded the Peloponnesian squadrons to advance. His manœuvres were judicious, and executed with a prompt obedience. The battle was not obstinate, as the Athenians, who scarcely expected any resistance, much less assault, sunk at once from the insolence of temerity into the despondency of fear. They lost fifteen vessels, with a considerable part of their crews. The remainder retired disgracefully to Samos; while the Lacedæmonians profited by their victory by the taking of Eion and Delphinium. Though fortune thus favoured the prudence of Lysander, he declined to venture a second engagement with the superior strength of Alcibiades, who, having resumed the command, employed every artifice and insult that might procure him an opportunity to restore the tarnished lustre of the Athenian fleet.



GREEK BUCKLES
(In the British Museum)

ALCIBIADES IN DISFAVOUR AGAIN

But such an opportunity he could never again find. The people of Athens, who expected to hear of nothing but victories and triumphs, were mortified to the last degree, when they received intelligence of such a shameful defeat. As they could not suspect the abilities, they distrusted the fidelity, of their commander. Their suspicions were increased and confirmed by the arrival of Thrasybulus, who, whether actuated by a laudable zeal for the interest of the public service, or animated by a selfish jealousy of the fame and honours that had been so liberally heaped on a rival, formally impeached Alcibiades in the Athenian assembly. "His misconduct

had totally ruined the affairs of his country. A talent for low buffoonery was a sure recommendation to his favour. His friends were, partially, selected from the meanest and most abandoned of men, who possessed no other merit than that of being subservient to his passions. To such unworthy instruments the fleet of Athens was entrusted; while the commander-in-chief revelled in debauchery with the harlots of Abydos and Ionia, or raised exorbitant contributions on the dependent cities, that he might defray the expense of a fortress on the coast of Thrace, in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, which he had erected to shelter himself against the just vengeance of the republic."

In the assembly, Alcibiades was accused, and almost unanimously condemned; and that the affairs of the republic might not again suffer by the abuse of undivided power, ten commanders were substituted in his room; among whom were Thrasyllus, Leon, Diomedon; Conon, a character as yet but little known, but destined, in a future period, to eclipse the fame of his contemporaries; and Pericles, who inherited the name, the merit, and the bad fortune, of his illustrious father. The new generals immediately sailed to Samos; and Alcibiades sought refuge in his Thracian fortress.

They had scarcely assumed the command, when an important alteration took place in the Peloponnesian fleet. Lysander's year had expired, and Callicratidas, a Spartan of a very opposite character, was sent to succeed him.

Lysander reluctantly resigned his employment; but determined to render it painful, and if possible, too weighty for the abilities of his successor. For this purpose he returned to the court of Cyrus, to whom he restored a considerable sum of money still unexpended in the service of the Grecian fleet, and to whom he misrepresented, under the names of obstinacy, ignorance, and rusticity, the unaffected plainness, the downright sincerity, and the other manly, but uncomplying, virtues of the generous Callicratidas. When that commander repaired to Sardis to demand the stipulated pay, he could not obtain admission to the royal presence.

But Callicratidas could not, with honour or safety, return to the fleet at Ephesus, without having collected money to supply the immediate wants of the sailors. He proceeded, therefore, to Miletus and other friendly towns of Ionia; and having met the principal citizens, in their respective assemblies, he explained openly and fully the mean jealousy of Lysander, and the disdainful arrogance of Cyrus. By those judicious and honourable expedients, Callicratidas, without fraud or violence, obtained such considerable, yet voluntary contributions, as enabled him to gratify the importunate demands of the sailors, and to return with honour to Ephesus, in order to prepare for action. His first operations were directed against the isle of Lesbos, or rather against the strong and populous towns of Methymna and Mytilene, which respectively commanded the northern and southern divisions of that island. Methymna was taken by storm, and subjected to the depredations of the Peloponnesian troops.

CONON WINS AT ARGINUSÆ

Meanwhile Conon, the most active and enterprising of the Athenian commanders, had put to sea with a squadron of seventy sail, in order to protect the coast of Lesbos. But this design was attempted too late; nor, had it been more early undertaken, was the force of Conon sufficient to

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accomplish it. Callieratidas observed his motions, discovered his strength, and, with a far superior fleet, intercepted his retreat to the armament of Samos. The Athenians fled towards the coast of Mytilene, but were prevented from entering the harbour of that place by the resentment of the inhabitants, who rejoiced in an opportunity to punish those who had so often conquered, and so long oppressed, their city. In consequence of this unexpected opposition, the Athenian squadron was overtaken by the enemy. The engagement was more sharp and obstinate than might have been expected in such an inequality of strength. Thirty empty ships (for the most of the men swam to land) were taken by the Peloponnesians. The remaining forty were hauled up under the walls of Mytilene; Callieratidas recalled his troops from Methymna, received a reinforcement from Chios, and blocked up the Athenians by sea and land.

The Athenians reinforced their domestic strength with the assistance of their allies; all able-bodied men were pressed into the service; and, in a few weeks, they had assembled at Samos a hundred and fifty sail, which immediately took the sea, with a resolution to encounter the enemy.

Callieratidas did not decline the engagement. Having left fifty ships to guard the harbour of Mytilene, he proceeded with a hundred and twenty to Cape Malea, the most southern point of Lesbos. The Athenians had advanced, the same evening, to the islands or rather rocks, of Arginusæ, four miles distant from that promontory. The night passed in bold stratagems for mutual surprise, which were rendered ineffectual by a violent tempest of rain and thunder. The fight was long and bloody; passing, successively, through all the different gradations, from disciplined order and regularity to the most tumultuous confusion. The Spartan commander was slain charging in the centre of the bravest enemies. The hostile squadrons fought with various fortune in different parts of the battle, and promiscuously conquered, pursued, surrendered, or fled. Thirteen Athenian vessels were taken by the Peloponnesians; but, at length, the latter gave way on all sides: seventy of their ships were captured, the rest escaped to Chios and Phocæa.

The Athenian admirals, though justly elated with their good fortune, cautiously deliberated concerning the best means of improving their victory. Several advised that the fleet should steer its course to Mytilene, to surprise the Peloponnesian squadron which blocked up the harbour of that city. Diomedon recommended it as a more immediate and essential object of their care to recover the bodies of the slain, and to save the wreck of twelve vessels which had been disabled in the engagement. Thrasybulus observed, that by dividing their strength, both purposes might be effected. His opinion was approved. The charge of preserving the dying, and collecting the bodies of the dead, was committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus. Fifty vessels were destined to that important service, doubly recommended by humanity and superstition. The remainder sailed to the isle of Lesbos, in quest of the Peloponnesians on that coast, who narrowly escaped destruction through the well-conducted stratagem of Eteonicius, the Spartan vice-admiral.

While the prudent foresight of Eteonicius saved the Peloponnesian squadron at Mytilene, the violence of a storm prevented Theramenes and Thrasybulus from saving their unfortunate companions, all of whom, excepting one of the admirals and a few others who escaped by their extraordinary dexterity in swimming, were overwhelmed by the waves of a tempestuous sea; nor could their dead bodies ever be recovered. These

unforeseen circumstances were the more disagreeable and mortifying to the commanders, because, immediately after the battle, they had sent an advice-boat to Athens, acquainting the magistrates with the capture of seventy vessels mentioning their intended expeditions to Mytilene, Methymna, and Chios, from which they had reason to hope the most distinguished success; and particularly taking notice that the important charge of recovering the bodies of the drowned or slain had been committed to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, two captains of approved conduct and fidelity.

The joy with which the Athenians received this flattering intelligence was converted into disappointment and sorrow, when they understood that their fleet had returned to Samos, without reaping the expected fruits of victory. They were afflicted beyond measure with the total loss of the wreck, by which their brave and victorious countrymen had been deprived of the sacred rites of funeral; a circumstance viewed with peculiar horror, because it was supposed, according to a superstition consecrated by the belief of ages, to subject their melancholy shades to wander a hundred years on the gloomy banks of the Styx, before they could be transported to the regions of light and felicity. The relations of the dead lamented their private misfortunes; the enemies of the admirals exaggerated the public calamity; both demanded an immediate and serious examination into the cause of this distressful event, that the guilty might be discovered and punished.

THE TRIAL OF THE GENERALS


Amidst the ferment of popular discontents, Theramenes sailed to Athens, with a view to exculpate himself and his colleague, Thrasybulus. The letter sent thither before them had excited their fear and their resentment; since it rendered them responsible for a duty which they found it impossible to perform. Theramenes accused the admirals of having neglected the favourable moment to save the perishing, and to recover the bodies of the dead; and, after the opportunity of this important service was irrecoverably lost, of having devolved the charge on others, in order to screen their own misconduct. The Athenians greedily listened to the accusation, and cashiered the absent commanders. Conon, who during the action remained blocked up at Mytilene, was entrusted with the fleet. Protomachus and Aristogenes chose a voluntary banishment. The rest returned home to justify measures which appeared so criminal.

Archedemus, an opulent and powerful citizen, and Callixenus, a seditious demagogue, partly moved, by the entreaties of Theramenes, and partly excited by personal envy and resentment, denounced the admirals to the senate. The accusation was supported by the relatives of the deceased, who appeared in mourning robes, their heads shaved, their arms folded, their eyes bathed in tears, piteously lamenting the loss and disgrace of their families, deprived of their protectors, who had been themselves deprived of those last and solemn duties to which all mankind are entitled. A false witness swore in court, that he had been saved, almost by miracle, from the wreck, and that his companions, as they were ready to be drowned, charged him to acquaint his country how they had fallen victims to the neglect of their commanders.

An unjust decree, which deprived the commanders of the benefits of a separate trial, of an impartial hearing, and of the time as well as the means necessary to prepare a legal defence, was approved by a majority of the senate, and received with loud acclamations by the people, whose levity,

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insolence, pride, and cruelty, all eagerly demanded the destruction of the admirals. The senators were intimidated into a reluctant compliance with measures which they disapproved, and by which they were for ever to be disgraced. Yet the philosophic firmness of Socrates disdained to submit. He protested against the tameness of his colleagues, and declared that neither threats, nor danger, nor violence, could compel him to conspire with injustice for the destruction of the innocent.



GRECIAN GALLEY

But what could avail the voice of one virtuous man amidst the licentious madness of thousands? The commanders were accused, tried, condemned, and, with the most irregular precipitancy, delivered to the executioner. Before they were led to death, Diomedon addressed the assembly in a short but ever-memorable speech: "I am afraid, Athenians, lest the sentence which you have passed on us, prove hurtful to the republic. Yet I would exhort you to employ the most proper means to avert the vengeance of heaven. You must carefully perform the sacrifices which, before giving battle at Arginusæ, we promised to the gods in behalf of ourselves and of you. Our misfortunes deprive us of an opportunity to acquit this just debt, and to pay the sincere tribute of our gratitude. But we are deeply sensible that the assistance of the gods enabled us to obtain that glorious and signal victory." The disinterestedness, the patriotism, and the magnanimity of this discourse, must have appeased (if anything had been able to appease) the tumultuous passions of the vulgar. But their headstrong fury defied every restraint of reason or of sentiment. They persisted in their bloody purpose, which was executed without pity: yet their cruelty was followed by a speedy repentance, and punished by the sharp pangs of remorse, the intolerable pain of which they vainly attempted to mitigate by inflicting a well-merited vengeance on the detestable Callixenus.^b

This complication of injustice and ingratitude seemed to give the finishing blow to the Athenian state; they struggled for a while, after their defeat at Syracuse; but from hence they were entirely sunk.

The enemy, after their last defeat, had once more recourse to Lysander, who had so often led them to conquest: on him they placed their chief confidence, and ardently solicited his return. The Lacedæmonians, to gratify their allies, and yet to observe their laws, which forbade that honour being conferred twice on the same person, sent him with an inferior title, but with the power of admiral. Thus appointed, Lysander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampascus: the place was carried by storm, and abandoned by Lysander to the mercy of the soldiers. The Athenians, who followed him close, upon the news of his success, steered forward towards Sestus, and from thence, sailing along the coast, halted over against the enemy at Ægospotami, a place fatal to the Athenians.

THE BATTLE OF ÆGOSPOTAMI



GREEK CANDELABRUM
(After Hope)

The Hellespont is not above two thousand yards broad in that place. The two armies seeing themselves so near each other, expected only to rest the day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on that next. But Lysander had another design in view: he commanded the seamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themselves in readiness, and to wait his orders in profound silence. He ordered the land army, in like manner, to draw up in battle upon the coast, and to wait the day without any noise. On the morning, as soon as the sun was risen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lysander, though his ships were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay still without making any movement. In the evening, when the Athenians withdrew, he did not suffer his soldiers to go ashore, till two or three galleys, which he had sent out to observe them, were returned with advice that they had seen the enemy land. The next day passed in the same manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued reserve and apprehension, extremely augmented the security and boldness of the Athenians, and inspired them with a high contempt for an army, which fear prevented from showing themselves or attempting anything.

Whilst this passed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horse, and came to the Athenian generals, to whom he represented, that they came upon a very disadvantageous coast, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestus, with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to suffer the soldiers and mariners of the fleet, as soon as they were ashore, to straggle and disperse themselves at their pleasure, whilst the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accustomed to execute the orders of their general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal.

He offered also to attack the enemy by land, with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion, that, if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall upon them, and, if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the whole honour of it; but rejected also with insult his wise and salutary counsel: as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day, the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered battle, retiring in the evening according to custom, with a more insulting air than the days before. Lysander, as usual, detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence when they saw the

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Athenians landed, and to put a bright buckler¹ at each ship's head, as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself, in the meantime, ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put up in the ships' heads, and the admiral's galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forwards, in good order. The land army, at the same time, made all possible haste to the top of the promontory, to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place is about fifteen stadia, or two miles in breadth, which space was presently cleared, through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived from shore the enemy's fleet advancing in good order to attack him, upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys: but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some were run to the sutlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who, not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries, and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediately the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore, were cut in pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lysander took three thousand prisoners, with all their generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampsacus, amidst the sounds of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have achieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war, in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted seven-and-twenty years, and which perhaps, without him, had been of much longer continuance. Lysander immediately sent despatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The three thousand prisoners taken in this battle having been condemned to die, Lysander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them from handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lysander, therefore, caused him to be brought forth, and asked him what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer: "Accuse not people of crimes, who have no judges; but, as you are victors, use your

[¹ An early form of heliograph.]

right, and do by us as we had done by you, if we had conquered." At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adimantus,¹ who had opposed the decree.^e

THE FALL OF ATHENS



GREEK VASE

When he had arranged matters at Lampsacus, Lysander sailed against Byzantium and Chalcedon; where the inhabitants admitted him, after sending away the Athenian garrison under treaty. The party that had betrayed Byzantium to Alcibiades, at that time fled to Pontus, and afterwards to Athens, and became citizens there. The garrison troops of the Athenians, and whatever other Athenians he found anywhere, Lysander sent to Athens, giving them safe conduct so long as they were sailing to that place alone, and to no other; knowing that the more people were collected in the city and Piræus, the sooner there would be a want of provisions. And now, leaving Sthenelaus as Lacedæmonian harmost of Byzantium and Chalcedon, he himself sailed away to Lampsacus, and refitted his ships.

At Athens, on the arrival of the *Paralus* in the night, the tale of their disaster was told; and the lamentation spread from the Piræus up the Long Walls into the city, one man passing on the tidings to another; so that no one went to bed that night, not only through their mourning for the dead, but much more still because they thought they should themselves suffer the same things as they had done to the Melians (who were a colony from Lacedæmon), when they had reduced them by blockade, and to the Histieans, Scioneans, Toroneans, Æginetans, and many others of the Greeks. But the next day they convened an assembly, at which it was resolved to block up the harbours, with the exception of one, and to put the walls in order, and mount guard upon them, and in every other way to prepare the city for a siege.

Lysander, having come with two hundred ships from the Hellespont to Lesbos, regulated both the other cities in the island, and especially Mytilene; while he sent Eteonicus with ten ships to the Athenian possessions Thraceward, who brought over all the places there to the Lacedæmonians. And all the rest of Greece too revolted from Athens immediately after the sea-fight, except the Samians; they massacred the notables amongst them, and kept possession of the city. Afterwards Lysander sent word to Agis at Decelea, and to Lacedæmon, that he was sailing up with two hundred ships. And the Lacedæmonians went out to meet him *en masse*, and all the rest of the Peloponnesians but the Argives, at the command of the other Spartan king, Pausanias. When they were all combined, he took them to the city and encamped before it, in the academy—the gymnasium so called. Then Lysander went to Ægina, and restored the city to the Æginetans, having collected as many of them as he could; and so likewise to the Melians, and as many others as had been deprived of their city. After

[¹ He, with others, was accused of treachery, not without cause.]

[405-406 B.C.]

this, having ravaged Salamis, he came to anchor off the Piræus, with a hundred and fifty ships, and prevented all vessels from sailing into it.

The Athenians, being thus besieged by land and by sea, were at a loss what to do, as they had neither ships, nor allies, nor provisions; and they thought nothing could save them from suffering what they had done to others, not in self-defence, but wantonly wronging men of smaller states, on no other single ground, but their being allies of the Lacedæmonians. Wherefore they restored to their privileges those who had been degraded from them, and held out resolutely; and though many in the city were dying of starvation, they spoke not a word of coming to terms. But when their corn had now entirely failed, they sent ambassadors to Agis, wishing to become allies of the Lacedæmonians, while they retained their walls and the Piræus, and on these conditions to make treaty with them. He told them to go to Lacedæmon, as he had himself no power to treat. When the ambassadors delivered this message to the Athenians, they sent them to Lacedæmon. But when they were at Sellasia, near the Laconian territory, and the ephors heard what they proposed, which was the same as they had done to Agis, they bade them return from that very spot, and if they had any wish at all for peace, to come back after taking better advice.

When the ambassadors came home, and reported this in the city, dejection fell on all; for they thought they would be sold into slavery; and that even while they were sending another embassy, many would die of famine. But with respect to the demolition of their walls, no one would advise it: for Archestratus had been thrown into prison for saying in the council, that it was best to make peace with the Lacedæmonians on the terms they offered, which were, that they should demolish ten furlongs of each of the Long Walls; and a decree was then made, that it should not be allowed to advise on that subject. Such being the case, Theramenes said in the assembly, that if they would send him to Lysander, he would come back with full knowledge whether it was from a wish to enslave the city that the Lacedæmonians held out on the subject of the walls, or to have a guarantee for their good faith. Having been sent, he remained with Lysander three months and more, watching to see when the Athenians, from the failure of all their food, would agree to what any one might say. On his return in the fourth month, he reported in the assembly that Lysander had detained him all that time, and then told him to go to Lacedæmon. After this he was chosen ambassador to Lacedæmon with full powers, together with nine others. Now Lysander had sent, along with some others who were Lacedæmonians, Aristoteles, an Athenian exile, to carry word to the ephors that he had answered Theramenes, that it was they who were empowered to decide on the question of peace or war. So when Theramenes and the rest of the ambassadors were at Sellasia, being asked on what terms they had come, they replied that they had full powers to treat for peace; the ephors then ordered them to be called onward. Upon their arrival they convened an assembly, at which the Corinthians and Thebans contended most strenuously, though many others of the Greeks did so too, that they should conclude no treaty with the Athenians, but make away with them.

The Lacedæmonians, however, said they would not reduce to bondage a state which had done great good at the time of the greatest dangers that had ever befallen Greece; but they offered to make peace, on condition of their demolishing the Long Walls and Piræus, giving up all their ships but twelve, restoring their exiles, having the same friends and foes as the Lacedæmonians, and following, both by land and by sea, wherever they might

lead. Theramenes and his fellow-ambassadors carried back these terms to Athens. On their entering the city, a great multitude poured round them, afraid of their having returned unsuccessful: for it was no longer possible to delay, owing to the great numbers who were dying of famine. The next day the ambassadors reported on what conditions the Lacedæmonians were willing to make peace; and Theramenes, as their spokesman, said that they should obey the Lacedæmonians, and destroy the walls. When some had opposed him, but far more agreed with him, it was resolved to accept the peace. Subsequently Lysander sailed into the Piræus, and the exiles were restored; and they dug down the walls with much glee, to the music of women playing the flute, considering that day to be the beginning of liberty to Greece.

And so ended the year in the middle of which Dionysius the son of Hermocrates, the Syracusan, became tyrant, after the Carthaginians, though previously defeated in battle by the Syracusans, had reduced Agrigentum.^f

A REVIEW OF THE WAR

The confederacy of Delos was formed by the free and spontaneous association of many different towns, all alike independent; towns which met in synod and deliberated by equal vote—took by their majority resolutions binding upon all—and chose Athens as their chief to enforce these resolutions, as well as to superintend generally the war against the common enemy.

Now the only way by which the confederacy was saved from falling to pieces, was by being transformed into an Athenian empire. Such transformation (as Thucydides plainly intimates) did not arise from the ambition or deep-laid projects of Athens, but from the reluctance of the larger confederates to discharge the obligations imposed by the common synod, and from the unwarlike character of the confederates generally—which made them desirous to commute military service for money-payment, while Athens on her part was not less anxious to perform the service and obtain the money. By gradual and unforeseen stages, Athens thus passed from consulate to empire; in such manner that no one could point out the precise moment of time when the confederacy of Delos ceased, and when the empire began.

But the Athenian empire came to include (between 460-446 B.C.) other cities not parties to the confederacy of Delos. Athens had conquered her ancient enemy the island of Ægina, and had acquired supremacy over Megara, Bœotia, Phocis, and Locris, and Achaia in Peloponnesus. Her empire was now at its maximum; and had she been able to maintain it—or even to keep possession of the Megarid separately, which gave her the means of barring out all invasions from the Peloponnesus—the future course of Grecian history would have been materially altered. But her empire on land did not rest upon the same footing as her empire at sea. The exiles in Megara and Bœotia, etc., and the anti-Athenian party generally in those places—combined with the rashness of her general Tolmides at Coronea—deprived her of all her land-dependencies near home, and even threatened her with the loss of Eubœa. The peace concluded in 445 B.C. left her with all her maritime and insular empire (including Eubœa), but with nothing more; while by the loss of Megara she was now open to invasion from the Peloponnesus.

On this footing she remained at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War fourteen years afterwards. That war did not arise (as has been so often

[431-413 B.C.]

asserted) from aggressive or ambitious schemes on the part of Athens, but that, on the contrary, the aggression was all on the side of her enemies, who were full of hopes that they could put her down with little delay; while she was not merely conservative and defensive, but even discouraged by the certainty of destructive invasion, and only dissuaded from concessions, alike imprudent and inglorious, by the extraordinary influence and resolute wisdom of Pericles. That great man comprehended well both the conditions and the limits of Athenian empire. Athens was now understood (especially since the revolt and reconquest of the powerful island of Samos in 440 B.C.) by her subjects and enemies as well as by her own citizens, to be mistress of the sea. It was the care of Pericles to keep that belief within definite boundaries, and to prevent all waste of the force of the city in making new or distant acquisitions which could not be permanently maintained. But it was also his care to enforce upon his countrymen the lesson of maintaining their existing empire unimpaired, and shrinking from no effort requisite for that end. Though their whole empire was now staked upon the chances of a perilous war, he did not hesitate to promise them success, provided that they adhered to this conservative policy.

Following the events of the war, we shall find that Athens did adhere to it for the first seven years; years of suffering and trial, from the destructive annual invasion, the yet more destructive pestilence, and the revolt of Mytilene — but years which still left her empire unimpaired, and the promises of Pericles in fair chance of being realised. In the seventh year of the war occurred the unexpected victory at Sphacteria and the capture of the Lacedæmonian prisoners. This placed in the hands of the Athenians a capital advantage, imparting to them prodigious confidence of future success, while their enemies were in a proportional degree disheartened. It was in this temper that they first departed from the conservative precept of Pericles.

Down to the expedition against Syracuse the empire of Athens (except the possessions in Thrace) remained undiminished, and her general power nearly as great as it had ever been since 445 B.C. That expedition was the one great and fatal departure from the Periclean policy, bringing upon Athens an amount of disaster from which she never recovered; and it was doubtless an error of over-ambition.

After the Syracusan disaster, there is no longer any question about adhering to, or departing from the Periclean policy. Athens is like Patroclus



PART OF THE ANCIENT GREEK WALL AT FERENTINUM WITH SUPERIMPOSED MODERN STRUCTURE

in the *Iliad*, after Apollo has stunned him by a blow on the back and loosened his armour. Nothing but the slackness of her enemies allowed her time for a partial recovery, so as to make increased heroism a substitute for impaired force, even against doubled and tripled difficulties. And the years of struggle which she now went through are among the most glorious events in her history. These years present many misfortunes, but no serious misjudgment; not to mention one peculiarly honourable moment, after the overthrow of the Four Hundred. And after all, they were on the point of partially recovering themselves in 408 B.C., when the unexpected advent of Cyrus set the seal to their destiny.

The bloodshed after the recapture of Mytilene and Scione, and still more that which succeeded the capture of Melos, are disgraceful to the humanity of Athens, and stand in pointed contrast with the treatment of Samos when reconquered by Pericles. But they did not contribute sensibly to break down her power; though, being recollected with aversion after other incidents were forgotten, they are alluded to in later times as if they had caused the fall of the empire. Her downfall had one great cause—we may almost say, one single cause—the Sicilian expedition.¹ The empire of Athens both was, and appeared to be, in exuberant strength when that expedition was sent forth; strength more than sufficient to bear up against all moderate faults or moderate misfortunes, such as no government ever long escapes. But the catastrophe of Syracuse was something overpassing in terrific calamity all Grecian experience and all power of foresight. It was like the Russian campaign of 1812 to the Emperor Napoleon, though by no means imputable, in an equal degree, to vice in the original project. No Grecian power could bear up against such a death wound; and the prolonged struggle of Athens after it is not the least wonderful part of the whole war.

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

Nothing in the political history of Greece is so remarkable as the Athenian empire; taking it as it stood in its completeness, from about 460-413 B.C. (the date of the Syracusan catastrophe), or still more, from 460-424 B.C. (the date when Brasidas made his conquests in Thrace). After the Syracusan catastrophe, the conditions of the empire were altogether changed; it was irretrievably broken up, though Athens still continued an energetic struggle to retain some of the fragments. But if we view it as it had stood before that event, during the period of its integrity, it is a sight marvellous to contemplate, and its working must be pronounced, in my judgment, to have been highly beneficial to the Grecian world. No Grecian state except Athens could have sufficed to organise such a system,


[¹ Manso, in his *Sparta* is so far from ascribing the downfall of Athens to the Sicilian fiasco, that he sees no connection between them. Thirlwall disagrees with this though he thinks the empire was doomed to disintegration. He says, "Syracuse was their Moscow; but if it had not been so they would have found one elsewhere." He imputes the fall to internal discord. Mitford sees in the war less a civil strife than a contest between the oligarchical and democratical interests throughout the Grecian commonwealths, in every one of which was a party friendly to the public enemy. He says of the fight with Sicily, "Democracy here was opposed to democracy," and he credits the fate of Athens to "the ruin, which such a government hath an eternal tendency to bring upon itself." He rejoices that the slaves at least of the various governments had a little respite from cruelty. Cox, like Grote, sees in the crumbling of the Athenian empire, in spite of all its crimes, such a cosmic misfortune as set back the progress of the world beyond our power of estimation.]

[460-404 B.C.]

or to hold, in partial, though regulated, continuous and specific communion, so many little states, each animated with that force of political repulsion instinctive in the Grecian mind. This was a mighty task, worthy of Athens, and to which no state except Athens was competent. We have already seen in part, and we shall see still farther, how little qualified Sparta was to perform it: and we shall have occasion hereafter to notice a like fruitless essay on the part of Thebes.


As in regard to the democracy of Athens generally, so in regard to her empire—it has been customary with historians to take notice of little except the bad side. But the empire of Athens was not harsh and oppressive, as it is commonly depicted. Under the circumstances of her dominion—at a time when the whole transit and commerce of the Ægean was under one maritime system, which excluded all irregular force—when Persian ships of war were kept out of the waters, and Persian tribute-officers away from the seaboard—when the disputes inevitable among so many little communities could be peaceably redressed by the mutual right of application to the tribunals at Athens—and when these tribunals were also such as to present to sufferers a refuge against wrongs done even by individual citizens of Athens herself (to use the expression of the oligarchical Phrynichus)—the condition of the maritime Greeks was materially better than it had been before, or than it will be seen to become afterwards. Her empire, if it did not inspire attachment, certainly provoked no antipathy, among the bulk of the citizens of the subject-communities, as is shown by the party-character of the revolts against her. If in her imperial character she exacted obedience, she also fulfilled duties and insured protection—to a degree incomparably greater than was ever realised by Sparta. And even if she had been ever so much disposed to cramp the free play of mind and purpose among her subjects—a disposition which is no way proved—the very circumstances of her own democracy, with its open antithesis of political parties, universal liberty of speech, and manifold individual energy, would do much to prevent the accomplishment of such an end, and would act as a stimulus to the dependent communities even without her own intention.

Without being insensible either to the faults or to the misdeeds of imperial Athens, I believe that her empire was a great comparative benefit, and its extinction a great loss, to her own subjects. But still more do I believe it to have been a good, looked at with reference to Panhellenic interests. Its maintenance furnished the only possibility of keeping out foreign intervention, and leaving the destinies of Greece to depend upon native, spontaneous, untrammelled Grecian agencies. The downfall of the Athenian empire is the signal for the arms and corruption of Persia again to make themselves felt, and for the re-enslavement of the Asiatic Greeks under her tribute-officers. What is still worse, it leaves the Grecian world in a state incapable of repelling any energetic foreign attack, and open to the overruling march of “the man of Macedon” half a century afterwards. For such was the natural tendency of the Grecian world to political non-integration or disintegration, that the rise of the



ATHENIAN WOMAN
(After Hope)

Athenian empire, incorporating so many states into one system, is to be regarded as a most extraordinary accident. Nothing but the genius, energy, discipline, and democracy of Athens, could have brought it about; nor even she, unless favoured and pushed on by a very peculiar train of antecedent events. But having once got it, she might perfectly well have kept it; and had she done so, the Hellenic world would have remained so organised as to be able to repel foreign intervention, either from Susa or from Pella. When we reflect how infinitely superior was the Hellenic mind to that of all surrounding nations and races; how completely its creative agency was stifled as soon as it came under the Macedonian dictation; and how much more it might perhaps have achieved, if it had enjoyed another century or half-century of freedom, under the stimulating headship of the most progressive and most intellectual of all its separate communities — we shall look with double regret on the ruin of the Athenian empire, as accelerating, without remedy, the universal ruin of Grecian independence, political action, and mental grandeur.^c



GREEK CAVALRY



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[The letter ^a is reserved for Editorial Matter.]

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
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A Comprehensive Narrative
of the Rise and Development
of Nations from the Earliest
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BY

HENRY SMITH WILLIAMS, LL.D.



IN TWENTY-SEVEN VOLUMES

VOLUME IV—GREECE TO THE ROMAN CONQUEST

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THE EVOLUTION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY

WRITTEN SPECIALLY FOR THE PRESENT WORK

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Professor in the University of Berlin.

It is a primary law of development that each generation should supplant and supersede that which preceded it. The parents bring forth the child, and when the child has advanced to full maturity they themselves lapse into oblivion ; and the same fate overtakes their children and children's children.

So it is with nations. One civilisation rises above the level of the rest, then sinks, yielding place to the fresh vigour of younger nations, to which it bequeaths its heritage of culture. For a while the elder mother-nation is held in remembrance as a teacher and model ; but ultimately — when the new generation of nations has grown strong enough to maintain an independent existence — the elder vanishes to return no more.

Such a stage we ourselves seem to have reached. The peoples of the Classic Age have long passed away, but in the Renaissance the culture of their time rose again from the dead. A bevy of daughters entered upon the heritage of this mother — Italy, France, England, Germany, and many others — and added to it, each after her own fashion. Then they outgrew the imitation and mere echo of the antique, passing on to express in act an independent culture of their own ; and now the time seems to have come when the modern spirit claims absolute liberty of action in every sphere, without the slightest reference to the traditions of antiquity. For the modern technician, the modern naturalist, the modern historian, the modern artist, the modern poet, the ancient world has no message. It is dead — dead past recovery, as we may say.

There is, however, one sphere in which it is not dead, where it still imparts fresh stimulus to the minds of men from day to day, in which it is still recognised as the guide to every fresh enterprise. This sphere is philosophy.

The last and loftiest height to which thinking humanity can climb is that comprehensive vision of all things which we Germans call *Weltanschauung*, and which the Greeks called *Philosophia*. In speculation of this illimitable range we have made but little advance upon the Greeks ; nay, even those most modern of philosophers who, on the basis of biological knowledge, have built up the most modern of all conceptions of the world, are in unconscious

agreement with the rudiments of Greek natural science in the sixth century B.C. Let anyone compare the "cosmological perspective" to which Ernest Haeckel has attained in his book *Die Welträthsel* [*The Riddle of the Universe*] (1900) p. 15, "from the highest point of monistic science yet reached," with what Anaximandros taught in the reign of Cyrus, and he will perceive with amazement that modern times have hardly gone further by a single step. The eternity, infinity, and illimitability of the Cosmos; the substance thereof, with its attributes of matter and energy, which in perpetual motion occupy the boundless space; perpetual motion itself in its periodic changes of becoming and ceasing to be; the constant progress of decay and destruction in the innumerable celestial bodies which give place to fresh formations of a similar character; the process of biogenesis on our own planet, by which in the course of æons animal life was brought forth, and by which, through gradual metamorphoses, the vertebrates were evolved from its earliest forms, the mammalia from vertebrates, the primary apes from mammalia, and lastly, through progressive evolution, man was brought into being towards the end of the tertiary period—all these propositions had already been recognised and stated in germ by the Greek thinker who lived during the first generation of Greek philosophy. The sum total of the progress made in twenty-five hundred years, that what was then surmised from, rather than disclosed by, an empiric consideration of some few facts, has now been demonstrated in detail by scientific observation.

But these main propositions, which the modern scientist regards as his own gains, because he has had to win them afresh by his own toil from the errors of the ancient and mediæval world, are of no great significance when compared with the far greater residuum of questions that still remain unanswered. Du Bois-Raymond, as is well known, described these "world riddles" in the year 1880 as in part unsolved, in part insoluble. They are seven in number: (1) The nature of matter and force; (2) the origin of motion; (3) the first beginning of life; (4) the adaptation of nature to certain ends; (5) the rise of sensation and consciousness; (6) the origin of thought and speech; (7) freedom of will.

It is easy to see that, compared with these fundamental questions, which may be summed up in the great question of all, "God and the world," the whole sequence of cosmic research from Anaximander to Haeckel is merely of secondary importance. It is, as it were, the surface of the matter; and even if, with Goethe, we feel the inadequacy of the apothegm of Haller, the poet and naturalist, "Into the heart of nature no created spirit may penetrate," yet we cannot but see that as yet we poor mortals are only nibbling at the rind, and that centuries more of labour are needed to penetrate its diamond hardness.

Thus everything that has hitherto been achieved is, as it were, a mere prelude to the abstract presentment of cosmic principles, and consequently the rudimentary beginnings of study in this sphere are far less remote from its present condition than is the case in any other department of the intellectual activity of mankind. And hence, even at the present day, the consideration of Greek philosophy is not only the most interesting, but also by far the most directly profitable part of the study of antiquity. No man who has not thoroughly studied the systems of Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle can become a profound philosopher in our own time.

"The love of wisdom" was the name which, from the fifth century B.C. onwards, the Greeks bestowed on any kind of intellectual endeavour which was diverted from the practice and directed to the theory of life. The scope

of this striving naturally varied in different periods. In the infancy of Greek speculation, *i.e.*, in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., men pored with wide, childlike eyes over the marvels of nature that lay about them and tried to find in natural science the solution of the riddle of existence. Philosophy was then mainly the embodiment of scientific and mathematical research, that is to say, it was what we nowadays call "Science."

A troublous period followed, represented by the Sophists, a time of youthful storm and stress, out of which the mature philosophy of ideas developed towards the end of the fifth century. The term "philosopher" begins to acquire a professional meaning. Side by side with the Sophist, who supplied "culture" in return for money, stood the philosopher, who directed the course of education without remuneration. At first, it is true, this education was confined to morals. But in Plato it proceeded to expand into a study that comprised mathematics, logic, physics, and ethics, as well as politics, forming a pyramid built on the broadest of possible bases and culminating in the idea of Good. By that time a "philosopher" had come to mean one who is capable of grasping the eternal idea (Plato, *Rep.* VI, 484 A). Next, in the Universal Encyclopædia of Aristotle, this platonic structure is completed and made habitable within and fitted to human requirements. Under him the idea and the term "philosopher" attained its maximum extension. Thereafter both begin to narrow down. The end of the fourth century witnessed the collapse of the Greek state, to the insecure structure of which the philosophers had never been blind.

With the fall of the Hellenic municipal system and the rise of the Macedonian sovereignty a new world comes into being, in which the leaders are monarchs and no longer individual citizens. The outlook and sphere of action of the individual is restricted. Men grow to be eminent in practical affairs, experts in the art of living, less eager to solve the riddle of the universe than that of the personal Ego, by withdrawing men from the tumult of external affairs and guiding them into the imperturbable calm of philosophic conviction as into a sure haven. Hence in the systems of the Stoa and of Epicurus and Pyrrho the designation of philosopher assumes the meaning of a counsellor in the conduct of life, who, in the lack of political liberty then prevailing, held up an ideal of liberty within, which no tyrant could menace.

In proportion as the sphere of philosophy in the Hellenistic world narrowed to the consideration of the Useful and the Practicable, the sphere of its influence widened. Alexander's expedition had thrown the East open to Greek civilisation, and the assiduous and subjective temperament of the youth of the Semitic peoples was drawn to the wisdom of the Greeks. An active process of endosmosis and exosmosis set in between the countries of the West and East. During the period from the third to the first century B.C. this interchange created a new civilisation, destined to form the basis of the *Imperium Romanum* in matters temporal and the *Imperium Christi* in matters spiritual. But at this period the clear outlines of development tend to become blurred.

As the Hellenic nation expands into the Hellenistic peoples, as the national language of Greece becomes the common medium of the East, nay, of the whole civilised world, the eclecticism which had been formed out of certain elements of the old Greek philosophy under the dominant influence of the Stoa gained ground on all sides. In the time of Christ, Greek philosophy is an indispensable requisite of the higher culture, and the university of Athens, with its professors, whose appointment the state soon took upon

itself, is the one where the educated Roman and Cappadocian alike must have studied. The Greek private tutor, recommended by the head of some school or other at Athens, becomes a standing institution in Roman families of distinction, and is treated with the contempt due to such a *Græculus*, ranking first among the slaves of the household.

Times soon change, however. Under the philosopher Marcus, philosophy gained admission to courtly circles, and presently became indispensable in the conflict with the increasing might of Christianity. After the Christian conception of the world had conquered under Constantine, the university of Athens became the bulwark of Paganism. Neo-Platonism, a new philosophy bred of the enthusiastic temperament of the East, the congenial philosophy of Plato and the erudition of Aristotle, fought the last fight with the courage of despair. But though its champions were, for the most part, superior in courage, moral character, and scientific learning to the bishops whom they withstood, philosophy and the ancient world had played out their part. In the latter end of the period of antiquity the overseer of any craft (as, for example, the overseer of the quarrymen in the *Passio Sanctorum IV Coronatorum*) was called in popular parlance *philosophus* to distinguish him from the artisans. *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

I

With the term "philosophy" as our guide, we have made a rapid superficial survey of the progress of the studies it included in these eleven hundred years of development (585 B.C.—529 A.D.). We will now consider in somewhat fuller detail the three phases which cover the Greek epoch proper, *i.e.*, the first three centuries, from Thales to Pyrrho (585–270), with a special view to the study of their internal evolution.

The Greek nation is almost the last of all the civilised peoples of the ancient world to enter upon the scene of history and bulk largely in the minds of men. The long period during which the Greeks dwelt among their Aryan kindred, fruitful in intellectual progress as their language proves it to have been, has passed utterly out of the historic memory of the race. And yet the beginnings of scientific knowledge must have fallen within this period, in so far as the dim prevision of eternal and perpetual motion dawned upon men's minds from the observation of the moon (*mēnē*, from the root *mē*, to measure), from chronology, and the consequent observation of cosmic laws. Nor have any other than mythical records come down to us from the first thousand years in which the Hellenes dwelt in the Balkan peninsula, their future home, side by side with the original inhabitants and other migratory tribes; but from the buildings and monuments which the earth has yielded to Schliemann's and Evans' spades we can form some conception of the might of these rulers and the splendour of the knightly life they led.

A faint reflection of the Middle Age of Greece has been preserved in the epic poetry of Homer, the most ancient portions of which date back to the year 1000 B.C., while the latest bring us down to the time of Thales, that is to say, to the sixth century. The Homeric bards do not philosophise as the Stoics fancied they did, they look upon life with living eyes in the true artist spirit, and reproduce it "not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Only in a few later passages of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* do we catch strange notes that harmonise ill with that *joie de vivre* which is the keynote of the epics. We see that in those strenuous days, when the Greeks were

bent upon carrying their commerce to the uttermost ends of the earth and satisfying the ever increasing clamour of the populace for food and power, the nation begins to pass over from the light-hearted carelessness of the epic of chivalry to the harsher and more reflective didactic poetry of Hesiod. Indeed, in one of the later passages of the *Odyssey* (*Nekyia*) we note an evident reflex of the Orphic cosmologies, in which, under the name of a Thracian bard of remote antiquity, a mournful and pessimistic strain of poetry, dealing with sin and penitence, stands contrasted with the optimistic acceptance of the existing order of things which is characteristic of Homer.

The forces which brought philosophy, properly so called, to the birth at the beginning of the sixth century were three in number. First, the poetry then extant, which had cast into artless shape a number of speculative observations on the subject of the Cosmos—such as the conceptions of Oceanus encircling the earth, of Zeus dwelling in ether above it, of Tartarus beneath it, and so forth. Nothing but a cool head and a turn for systematisation was needed to convert these images into “ideas” and to combine the latter into a homogeneous and coherent conception. Another service was rendered by the study of geography, mathematics, and astronomy, developed as it had been by the long voyages of Milesians and Phœceans in the Mediterranean after they had supplanted the Phœnicians. A school of navigation came into being at Miletus, which city had successfully opened up the Euxine in the seventh century; and both Thales and Anaximander were trained in it. Miletus, where the trade with Egypt was started about the same time and the establishment of permanent factories like Naucratis taken in hand, likewise constituted the meeting-place of the geometry and astronomy of the Egyptians, whose learning was formerly much over estimated, with the far superior astronomical science of the Babylonians. The reports of mariners, charts, the catalogue of the stars, all combined with Oriental tradition and the unbiassed perspicacity of the Greeks to give the world the first science, *i.e.*, research built upon a basis of empiricism, tested by the methods of mathematics and logic, and aiming at a harmonious interpretation of the Cosmos. To give a name to this study the Ionians evolved the idea of *Historia*, which in the sixth century took the place of *Philosophia*; the latter not coming into use until the fifth century.

In this place I must mention the third element, although it is not in evidence in the earliest exponents of Ionian philosophy. It is the tendency to mysticism, to abstraction from the world, then beginning to develop in the Orphic school, which has left traces of its influence with ever-increasing distinctness in Anaximander, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Empedocles. It favoured the rise of a transcendental idealism which, although we do not find it matured into immaterial conceptions in these first natural philosophers, yet contains the germ of Plato’s dualistic idea of the universe. Not that the curve of development runs in smooth ascent from Thales to Plato; it exhibits the spiral windings inseparable from historic processes, since every new tendency calls forth the antagonistic principle to that which has spent its force, and thus brings about the necessity of reaction in a retrospective sense.

Thales, who enjoyed great repute in his native city of Miletus and throughout Asia Minor at the commencement of the sixth century, calls water the beginning of all things. This was no new idea. For before his time poets had spoken of Oceanus, of the origin of the gods, and of the deluge from which the world was born anew. And the infinite sea could not but lie close to the thoughts of a seafaring nation.

The novel and genuinely philosophic element in this proposition is rather the monistic endeavour to refer all phenomena to a single cause, to be sought not in heaven but on earth. For that which is taken as the beginning is not Oceanus, or, it may be, Poseidon, as in the older cosmogonies, but this palpable substance of water, out of which all things come and to which they all return. This original matter is indeed supposed to be animated by a divine spirit, but this divinity is not a person. There is no place for it on Olympus. Rather is it the expression of the immanent force which this philosopher recognised in the incomprehensible properties of the magnet, and there called "soul." This enduing of nature with a soul is characteristic of the infancy of speculation, and hence this Ionic philosophy has also been called Hylozoism (the doctrine of living matter). The monistic impulse, which would bind the world and this single and supposed divine primeval force together, is diametrically opposed to the polytheistic tendency of the popular religion of Greece. Even in the first Greek philosophers this aspiration after unity points forward to monotheism, which was preached by Xenophanes, the Ionian, at the end of this same century.

Of all the achievements of Thales his prediction of the eclipse of the sun (May 28, 585) is that which caused the greatest amazement, although its scientific significance is the most trifling of any. For, as the history of astronomy proves beyond controversy, Thales and his whole generation lacked the rudiments of knowledge necessary for the calculation of eclipses, and had not the faintest notion of how they came about. Hence he can only have employed according to a fixed method some such formula as the Chaldeans had gained from empiric observation in calculating their eclipse period of eighteen years and eleven days (*Saros*). The rule only suffices for approximate predictions. As a matter of fact, Herodotus, the earliest witness to this event, states that Thales allowed a margin of a whole year for the occurrence of the eclipse.

Thales himself left no written works, and this Ionic *Historia* first emerges into the full light of day with Anaximander of Miletus, who founded the Ionic school about a generation later. In him the three forces are strongly marked and defined — first the scientific spirit, which impelled him to give visible expression to the geographical ideas of his countrymen by means of a map of the earth's surface, and to make a systematic description of the heavens with the stationary and revolving celestial bodies. With him originated the conception of the constellations as a system of spheres rotating through and within one another, and it was his mathematical imagination that led him to assume the existence of certain fixed intervals between the revolving spheres, arbitrarily determined as to number, but expressing in their proportion the idea of harmony.

Here we have the germ of the speculations of Pythagoras, on which, as is well known, the laws of Copernicus and Kepler are founded. The vein of poetry in the Ionian character is manifest not only in this intuitive perception but in the aptness of his imagery, when he calls these spheres "chariot-wheels," from the rim of which the fiery flames of the sun, moon, etc., start out like felloes. The scientific element in his system is evident in the manner in which he follows out biologically the idea of Thales concerning water. If all things have at one time been water, then organisms cannot originally have been created as land animals. Hence man, who now comes into the world utterly helpless, has been gradually evolved from pisciform creatures — the first germ of Darwinism.

Lastly the pessimistic mysticism which had lately arisen is clearly manifest in him. When he regards the origin of all individual existences as a

wrong committed by them in separating themselves from the All-One, we can only understand him by referring to Orphic religious ideas, in which birth is looked upon as a decline and fall from the blissful seats of the gods and earthly life is represented as a vale of misery. Death is consequently the penalty which the individual pays for his presumption, whether the individual be a man or a celestial body. For the earth and all other Cosmoi are doomed to extinction in an "Infinite" which corresponds to the ancient idea of Chaos, and, like that, is not conceived of as a vacuum but as matter in an undefined form. This alternation of creation and annihilation, this perpetual motion, anticipates the eternal flux of Heraclitus of Ephesus, who at the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth, transformed the teaching of Anaximander into keener dialectics.

In comparison with this Ephesian thinker the successors of Anaximander at Miletus and whatsoever following they had down to the end of the fifth century sink into total obscurity. Before turning our attention to Heraclitus, however, we must first consider the man who transplanted the Ionic *Historia* from Ionia to Italy and there elaborated both the scientific and mystic side of it with marvellous assiduity — that is, Pythagoras.

Pythagoras left Samos about the year 530, and turned his steps towards Croton in lower Italy, where he found virgin soil for his labours. The mathematical foundation upon which the Ionic school is based attains an excessive predominance with Pythagoras. Epoch-making maxims are associated with his name, and probably not without good reason. But the speculative tendency of the Ionic mind prompted him to set up number itself as a principle; the Infinite of Anaximander being conceived of arithmetically as the Uneven, *i.e.*, that which cannot be divided by two. Since the Even and Uneven alone co-exist, the sacred Three is compounded of Unity and Duality, as is also the Four (*tetraktys*), the root of Being. By simply adding these first four numbers together the Decas ($1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$) is obtained. The cosmos is made to consist of ten celestial bodies, corresponding to this Decas, by the addition of the heaven of the fixed stars as an outermost crust, and the earth and the "anti-earth" (*antichthon*) containing the central fire, at the heart of it. The earth and other stars moved round this centre, and here we have the first glimpse of the modern conception which explains the apparent diurnal motion of the heavens by the rotation of the earth. This rudimentary idea, as elaborated by later Pythagoreans, and particularly by Aristarchus of Samos in the Alexandrine period, constitutes the first starting-point we can assign to the Copernican system of the universe.

Pythagoras made the astounding discovery that the harmonic intervals of the seven-stringed lyre can be reduced to simple rational proportions (the octave = 1:2, the fifth 2:3, the fourth 3:4, the whole tone 8:9). He then sought for a like scheme in the harmony of the spheres, and, as the geometric habit of the Greek mind converted these arithmetical relations into lines and planes, the whole process by which the universe came into existence seemed to be a sum in arithmetic.

The strong tinge of mysticism which Pythagoras had brought with him from the Orphic influences of his native land to his new home in Italy served as a wholesome corrective to this exaggerated rationalism. Every religious sect thrives better in a colony than in the mother-country, as is demonstrated in the case of William Penn and many others. The aristocratic and religious league which Pythagoras founded at Croton prospered mightily, and presently the whole of lower Italy and Sicily was covered with branches of

the order. Its religious ideas, particularly that of the transmigration of souls, were not new, although they have been claimed as peculiarly Pythagorean. Orphic mysticism had adopted in precisely the same fashion the notion of the fall of the spirit and its purification by transmigrations of all kinds into the bodies of men and animals. But the earnestness with which noble-minded men lived conformably to these ideas in matters of practice and brought them into connection with the results of scientific research strongly impressed the ancient world; and the close freemasonry which linked Pythagoreans from every quarter with one another set forth an ideal of manly friendship which served as a model for the institution of the Academy and similar philosophic societies.

But the too strongly marked political complexion of these Pythagorean societies contained the seed of their destruction. At the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth the aristocratic principle was everywhere on the decline, and in Italy itself the Pythagoreans were attacked on democratic grounds by Xenophanes of Colophon, who ridiculed the aristocratic physical sports in which even distinguished Pythagoreans (such as Milo) indulged, and vaunted the intellectual sport of his own *Sophia*. The said wisdom, it must be confessed, was of a negative rather than a positive character.

Xenophanes attacked Homer, the Bible of the ancients, in verses of fierce satire, showing the gods as there depicted to be examples of every kind of immorality. By the unparalleled vigour with which he transferred the monistic tendency of Ionic rationalism to the religious problem, he, first of all Greeks, originated the monotheistic conception of the Deity, which none of the later philosophers ventured to maintain with such unflinching boldness in face of the polytheism of the vulgar herd. To the aristocratic submission to authority in matters of belief required by the Pythagoreans this democratic philosopher opposed the prerogative of doubt, and he has consequently been lauded by the sceptics of all ages as their standard-bearer. At this stage of physical observation, indeed, doubt sets in concerning natural objects. Xenophanes discovers that the rainbow is an optical illusion. He promptly generalises in his scepticism; the sun and the other stars are nothing but fiery exhalations. This assumption will lead to further results among his Eleatic friends.

Meanwhile in the mother-country speculation advanced with huge strides. Heraclitus, a descendant of the royal dynasty of Ephesus, withdrew from his democratic fellow-citizens into haughty isolation. Instead of concerning himself with the scientific gossip which tended to make the Ionic *Historia* lose itself in detail, he laid stress upon the vast concatenation of things. He made the fundamental laws of thought his starting-point, in place of the principles of mathematics. The selection of physical propositions which he deduced poetically from his observations of nature are far more than mere natural symbolism. Fire, constantly transformed into water and earth and as constantly exhaling upwards to the celestial fire, is to him a type of the perpetual change of phenomena that veils the eternal and immutable Law (*logos*), identical in everything but name with the Harmony of the Pythagoreans, which expresses itself in numbers eternally the same. The law of man feeds, he says, upon the divine law manifesting itself in fire.

Here we have the germ of the vast scheme of law which binds God and the world, physics and morals, into a compact entity in the Pantheism of the Stoic philosophy. Since he places fire and soul upon the same footing, it follows that human physiology and psychology are explicable by the same

formula, to which he likewise ingeniously adapts the Orphic ideas. Thus Heraclitus has exercised great influence upon succeeding generations, and Hegel's system avowedly leans upon him.

Equally great is the influence of Parmenides, the Kant of the ancient world. Descended from an Ionian family of rank which had taken refuge at Elea in Italy at the time of the occupation of Phocæa (560), he carries on the tradition of the philosophic poetry of Xenophanes, whose Pantheistic Monism he defends in acute polemics against the "two-headed" Heraclitus. Being — one, eternal, indivisible, immutable, unchangeable — is alone intellectually conceivable. All beside — multiplicity, divisibility, mobility, variability — is logically inconceivable and therefore non-existent. Reason (*logos*) is consequently the measure of all things. His system is abstract and logical to absurdity, but his postulate that this monistic Being must be bounded like a globe that is equally closed in all directions reminds us that we are still in the age of physics. In him the scepticism of Xenophanes hardens into the assertion that everything which contravenes his logical postulate of the Sole Existent — such as multiplicity, colour, motion, becoming and ceasing to be — is mere illusion.

The logical and sceptical bias of the Eleatics is surpassed by the hair-splitting dialectics of Zeno, whose evidences against motion and multiplicity still perplex the thinkers of to-day. On the one hand this precise manipulation of the laws of thought which represents the culminating point of Ionic rationalism redeems the negative Sophism which was beginning to deny the actuality and perceptibility of things themselves (Protagoras, Gorgias), while on the other hand the positive result of this strict definition of the highest conception of Being was to call forth a series of systems which came into existence almost simultaneously, though subject in part to reciprocal influence, a little before the middle of the fifth century. Such was the Doctrine of the Elements taught by Empedocles of Agrigentum, who once more found the idea of the imperishable principle in the fourfold root of Being (the four elements) and brought about the Heraclitic alternation of the external world by the introduction of the two polar forces of love and hate.

The idea of the Element in endless subdivision (which could not be evaded in the world-process of Empedocles) and in endless diversity of quality was strongly brought out by Anaxagoras the Ionian in his *homoiomere*. To this chaos he opposed the thinking and directing reason (*nous*) as a distinct existence, thus definitely breaking with the idea of a hylozoistic union of matter and force, which had already threatened to go to pieces in the systems of Heraclitus and Parmenides, and setting forth the positive dualism of God and the world, *i.e.*, of the Universal Reason working towards predetermined ends and the blind chaotic mass of matter.

More important than either of these two is Leucippus of Miletus, the founder of the atomistic theory, who, as Theophrastus rightly asserts, starts from the position of Parmenides. For he finds the homogeneous, eternal, complete, and indivisible, unchangeable Existence, to which no quality can be ascribed, in the "atom," and solves the difficulties which arose for the Eleatics out of the idea of multiplicity by assuming the existence of an infinite number of such units. Hence results a mechanical interpretation of nature, which proved of all ancient systems the most serviceable for the elucidation of physical and physiological facts. By explaining sensory impressions by mechanical transmission from object to subject, he propounds the first theory of sensory perception, and since, in consequence of this as-

sumption, he regards such qualities as colour, taste, etc., as subjective sensory impressions to which atoms in different arrangements correspond objectively, he lays the foundation of a distinction between primary and secondary qualities which has not been rightly appreciated until modern days.

Generally speaking, the value of the Leucippic theory has only been recognised since the Renaissance. For although Democritus of Abdera extended his master's admirable system to fresh departments of knowledge, established it more firmly by combating the sensualism of Protagoras and other theories arising from a misunderstanding of Leucippus, and, above all, brought it to a high pitch of mathematical and notional exactitude, yet the atomistic school which continued to exist at Abdera till into the fourth century has passed almost utterly out of mind. Plato ignored it, although he adopted many of its theories indirectly; Aristotle alone made use of it, though not as regards the main points of its teachings; and Epicurus, who borrowed from it almost the whole of his theoretical science, by this very absorption played the chief part in the destruction of the Abderite writings, the greatest loss that science has ever suffered.

How can we explain this astounding disregard of atomistic philosophy? In some degree by the fact that Leucippus settled in the barbarous north, far away from Athens, which had grown since the Persian wars to be more and more the *prytaneion*, or central focus of warmth to Hellas, and drew all talent to itself from every quarter; and further, from the fact that the natural science which was dominant in the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth — and was regarded, indeed, as the only legitimate kind of scientific thought — lost its hold on men's minds towards the middle of the fifth century. We have evidence of this in Eleatism, which, with Zeno and Melissus, devoted itself to purely dialectical questions and abandoned the interpretation of nature. We have evidence of it, again, in Empedocles, who in his second series of didactic poems (*Katharmoi*) flings himself into the arms of Orphic mysticism; and in his pupil, Gorgias, who proceeded from physics to nihilism and thence to mere superficial rhetoric. We have the strongest proof of all in Democritus himself, who embraced inductive logic, æsthetics, grammar, and ethics within the range of his studies as well as the old questions of physics. Thus during the Peloponnesian War the way was prepared for the new epoch which was performed with Athens for a stage, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle for heroes.

II

Socrates, the Athenian, brought philosophy, as Cicero says, from heaven to earth; that is to say, in place of one-sided speculation upon nature he pursued an equally one-sided study of ethics. In his practical, matter-of-fact way he availed himself of what Eleatic ontology had acquired in order to settle the fundamental ideas of morality and to demonstrate the possibility of scientific proof in face of the nihilistic fallacies of sophistry which despaired of both. So much we may accept as certain from received accounts. All the details of his teaching are wrapped in doubt, for we possess no historical account of it, but merely works of an apologetic character, in which liberal and justifiable advantage is taken of the prerogatives of fiction. Neither Plato nor Xenophon (the latter of whom did not take up his pen until after a superabundant crop of Socratic literature had come into being) can be accepted as historic evidence without further ado. Never-

theless both the disciples of Socrates and his opponents, Aristophanes and Spintharus (the father of Aristoxenus), bear witness to the extraordinary personality of the man.

The rights of the individual were not recognised until the fifth century. The atomistic theory of Leucippus and Democritus sees the Eternal and Constant not in the All-One of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but in the individual. The philosophy of the Sophists breaks the bonds of authority, and in the motto "Man (the individual) is the measure of all things," Protagoras sets up the charter of subjective inclination. This charter Socrates adopts, but he opposes to the liberty of the individual will the counteracting force of obedience to the dictates of the individual conscience. But conscience, as the German and Latin name for it alike imply, means knowledge. A man should therefore act upon his own judgment, but only in so far as his action is founded upon norms scientifically determined. Thus Socrates reads a deeper meaning into the admonition of the Delphic god, "Know thyself," by recognising the independence of the will.

Inasmuch as traditional usage and the law of the state are thus tacitly set aside (and on this point Aristophanes judged more correctly in his caricature than the apologists Plato and especially Xenophon will admit) Socrates is the preacher of a new private morality which traverses the public morality of classic antiquity. His death sentence is so far intelligible, though it remains an act of crude, reactionary violence. The greatness of soul, so far beyond the ordinary level of mankind, which, according to all accounts, the philosopher displayed at the near prospect of death, wrought upon a far wider circle than that of his disciples and contemporaries. His martyrdom set the seal upon the victory of the Ideal philosophy in Athens.

Socrates himself represents a complete individuality, hence his method of education has been of service to individualities the most dissimilar. What contrasting types do we find in Xenophon, the bigoted and stupid cavalry officer; and Plato, the witty and profound thinker; the cynic Antisthenes full of the pride of beggary, and the frivolous courtier Aristippus! They all portrayed themselves rather than their master in their writings, and yet each one of them has in some way or other his part in him.

Of all these disciples of Socrates, two only have influenced the after-world, Antisthenes and Plato, Athenians both, the former a plebeian and founder of the philosophy of the proletariat, the latter, sprung from an old and noble family, an aristocrat of the purest water in all his philosophic ideas. Antisthenes carried the practical and matter-of-fact temper of his master to extremes. Virtue with him is a question of character, and therefore scorns empty words and learning. Logic and mathematics are superfluous, virtue is the only good, vice the only evil; everything else is a matter of indifference. This meagreness of theory is made good by strength of will. Force of character, freedom from the prejudices of conventional custom, conventional religion or conventional government — these are what distinguish the true freeman, the man free in soul, from the slave.

The impression produced by this king in rags in the midst of that age of decadence was striking beyond belief. He with his barking voice seemed to be the warning cry of the proletarian admonishing men to return to nature and to simplicity of life. His acute and witty writings were gladly read. His school, which can show one disciple of world-wide celebrity in the person of Diogenes, was gradually merged into the Stoa, which owes to Cynicism the popular tone of its influential system of ethics. Since the birth of Christ, the Cynic has come to life again, as of old in the guise of the mendi-

cant preacher, proclaiming the gospel of renunciation and holding up the mirror to the corruption of the age. This new Cynicism was one of the most important precursors of the Christian apostolate. It awoke once more in the age of the Renaissance, finding its wittiest exponent in Montaigne, in whose steps J. J. Rousseau afterwards trod. In him we have the best typical example of the strength and weakness of this anti-scientific movement.

Plato, the antithesis of Antisthenes, continued in a direct line the thread of Athenian philosophy. He accomplished, in the widest sense of the term, the task which Socrates had only begun — that of establishing science, now discredited by the Sophist, on a new basis.

We are but imperfectly acquainted with the life of Plato and the phases of his development, for the chronology of his dialogues has not been determined up to this time, either absolutely or relatively, and it is a matter of doubt how far their artistic intention admits of a complete exposition of his system. For Plato's true work was not his literary productions, which he himself regarded as of secondary importance and which obviously reproduce only a fraction of his researches and speculations, but his Academy, in which, from the eighties of the fourth century onwards, he gathered together the ablest scholars from amongst the youth of Greece for study and life in community. If all the transactions of this Academy had been preserved (like the information Aristotle gives us concerning the latter years), it may be that we should be able to trace distinctly the development of this wonderful man. For Plato is both the most gifted and the most complicated personality of Greek antiquity, and the depths and recesses of his nature were not wholly penetrated by his intimate friends, not even by Aristotle; how much less by us of this latter day. What we do possess is, however, amply sufficient to indicate at least his place in this summary.

If from the ranks of the Greek thinkers we have so far considered, we choose out the most eminent leaders and mark the lines of connection between them, we shall see how they all converge to Plato. He is the focus of ancient philosophy, whither all that went before him tends, and whence bright light and warmth stream forth upon posterity down to our own day.

The range of his achievements alone is enough to make this evident. Like the Ionians his grasp embraces cosmology, physics, and anthropology. Like the Pythagoreans he pursues the study of mathematics with ever-increasing devotion, presumably as the basis of his speculations. Like Xenophanes he enters the school of the ancient Orphic Mysticism, and in the *Timæus* exalts it into a theology culminating in Monotheism. Like the Eleatics he ponders the problems of ontology. Like Heraclitus he inquires into the eternal flow of genesis; he ponders on the ideals of culture and the political theories of the Sophists, he wrestles with the ideal method of Socrates, he strives with hostile philosophers of the Socratic school on this hand and on that (Aristippus, Euclides, and Antisthenes), and, lastly, he strives with himself as his speculation develops more and more along theological and mathematical lines. For, as the genuine servant of Truth, Plato regards himself up to old age as in process of growing and learning. Nothing is so hateful to him as Dogmatism. Nevertheless there are so many opinions to which he held with unwavering constancy that we are probably justified in speaking of the system of Plato.

At the centre of it lies what has crystallised in more living shape out of the dry conceptions of the Socratic method — the domain of ideas. Even as Parmenides perceived Being in the eternal All-Existent, accessible to Reason alone, so Plato sees the being of individual things in that which pertains to

them in common and as such can be grasped by the Reason. But even as the Eleatic "One" exists even apart from its recognition as an objective being, so these eternal and unchangeable archetypes (*ideai*) live in and by themselves as objective essences which exist wholly apart from the individual objects which partake of their form. These archetypes, like the Eleatic All-Existent, bear the name of unit (monad), only in Plato's scheme there are many such monads, and their unchangeableness does not exclude the idea of causation. Thus his "ideas" are the "units" of Parmenides in multiplicity and the "conceptions" of Socrates endued by metaphysics with the breath of life.

To Socrates the idea of Good and of Virtue lay at the heart of his teaching, and thus the preponderance of the idea of Good is confirmed to his pupil, and in its theological elaboration this abstract idea is converted into the Supreme Reason, the first cause of Being, which is identical with the Deity.

As to the Eleatics, the external world was an illusion of the senses, and in any case a thing irrational, so matter and the world of phenomena which occupies the middle place between matter and ideas is hard to grasp, and Plato's notion of the World-Soul which hovers between the two is as contradictory and obscure as that of the human soul. For with this gifted poet-philosopher there is much that tarries on the threshold of consciousness, and fails to struggle into clear light, a circumstance that harmonises with his own teachings, which find clearness and singleness of purport in the Eternal and Divine alone, obscurity and ambiguity in the intermediate terrestrial sphere of genesis, and utter darkness and inconceivability in the lower sphere of matter and non-existence. These three stages are repeated in his theory of the soul, which from desire rises to courage and ultimately to reason. His ethics and politics, which according to his Hellenic ideas are one and the same, are calculated for three classes of humanity — the iron, the silver, and the golden. The last two, the military and learned classes, are the only ones taken into account in the educational system of his ideal state; for the proletariat there is no need to be concerned, although Antisthenes and his successors regarded this very class as the only one capable of genuine philosophy. But Plato, like the aristocrat he was, has in view an elect type of humanity, exalted by exceptional intelligence above the brute multitude and the solid middle-class element and called by philosophy, *i.e.*, the doctrine of ideas, to the helm of the ideal state.

The teaching of the Sophists had abolished law. Plato likewise knows no law on the lofty level of his ideal state. But the constraint of law seems superfluous where each individual is trained to be the ideal man. Forced by bitter experience to moderate his demands upon human nature and the state towards the end of his life, he sketched in the *Laws*, a model state on the basis of the old established system of government. But this system, like the metaphysics of his old age, seems, as it were, a desertion of his ideals. All that Plato achieved was the education of a race of pupils in his Academy who far surpassed the common standard of learning and morals, and who, though unable to save the state, yet maintained a high standard of knowledge and an ideal of morality for mankind in the midst of a corrupt society.

The greatest of these Academicians is Aristotle of Stagira, who displayed a versatility and thoroughness of research which appears absolutely incomprehensible in our eyes. Like Plato, he steadfastly held that knowledge is never complete, but that truth is to be found by unremitting persistence in

inquiry. This is probably the reason why he gave the world some dialogues adapted to the public taste, and with the help of some of his pupils accumulated and published collections of historico-philological and scientific matter in an unpretentious form; but the systematic lectures in which he propounded to the more advanced followers of his school the results of his speculations and of his wide empirical observation, together with a critical treatment of his predecessors, were never published by him. He worked at these papers his whole life long, and many of the didactic writings which were edited by his pupils after his death, and which are all we possess of the whole body of Aristotle's works, bear evident traces of gradual growth, correction, and amplification.

In a sketch like the present it is impossible to give so much as a summary of the contents of this admirably arranged encyclopædia, which ranked as the richest storehouse of every kind of empiric and speculative science from the beginning of the Christian era down to modern times. The essential points in which his life-work makes an advance on that of Plato are as follows:

Plato never went so far as to reduce his great discoveries and intuitions in every department of science to a complete and connected whole, being averse, on scientific and ethical grounds alike, from the dogmatic definition inseparable from any systematic treatise. This Aristotle did, dividing the whole body of philosophy under three principal heads (theoretical, practical, and poetical) and distinguishing subdivisions (logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and politics, and so forth) within these divisions by strongly marked lines of demarcation and methods rigorously exact. He is a Platonist in all things and feels himself so to be. Even where he displays most independence, as in the development of syllogisms or in biology, it is impossible to overlook his indebtedness to the bold speculations of the master.

If the whole work of Plato's life and of his scholars between 388 and 348 had been preserved to us, the ultimate connection between Aristotle and the researches of the Academy would probably be even more evident than it is. Nevertheless there is a marked difference between the speculations of these two great philosophers. Plato wholly dis severed the Universal and Essential in things from the Terrestrial and placed it in a heaven beyond the earth.

Aristotle repudiates this transcendentalism all along the line. The Universal cannot exist without the archetype, the essence must be immanent in it. Hence the individual is the only true Substantive, containing Substance and Matter. This opposition of opinion concerning "Universalis" is, as is well known, the starting-point of mediæval Scholasticism (Nominalism, Realism).

The motion of passive substance towards the active form, *i.e.*, the realisation of the Possible, leads up to the idea of development, of genesis (though not, indeed, in the modern sense) on which Plato's speculations had made shipwreck, and passes over Plato's rigid Eleatism to join hands with Heraclitus, the philosopher of change, with whom Aristotle sees the ultimate cause of all motion and all things in the Deity, itself as eternal as the world, which "yearns towards It as the bridegroom towards the bride." Thus soul, too, is the pattern of the body, hence the purpose of its being. The body is but the instrument (*organon*) of the soul. Thus Aristotle first coins the name and idea of organic being and draws a sharp distinction between these animate creatures (plants, animals, and man) and inanimate nature. In ethics and politics his speculation treads in the footsteps of Plato, save that, in this

province of thought also, he mitigates the uncompromising rigourism of the master by his innate bias towards the historically-established and practically-possible, and turns it to more profitable uses. The ethico-political speculations of both are, however, adapted to the aristocratic class at that time dominant in Greece. Alexander, the pupil of Aristotle, conquered the East during his master's life-time, but the philosopher's opinion that the newly acquired continent should be governed by other laws than those of Hellas was not practically feasible. His ethics failed him utterly in face of the new political situation thus created.

III

At this juncture the cosmopolitan Cynicism, which had outgrown the narrow particularism of Hellenism as early as the time of Antisthenes, and the Stoicism which was built upon its foundation later on, proved the form best fitted to the times. Zeno, sprung of Phœnician blood and brought up in Cyprus, that is on semi-Asiatic soil, elaborated this theory of life at Athens, whither he came shortly after the death of Aristotle (about 320). After the dualism that had prevailed from Anaxagoras to Plato and Aristotle, in which God and the World were set over against one another as antagonistic principles, Zeno's theory harks back to the monistic tendency of the Ionic period. Like that, it is realistic, nay, grossly materialistic, in contrast to the Idealism of Athenian philosophy. The result is a consistent Pantheism in which soul and body represent the analogon to God and the World. Both are of the same essential nature, and only temporarily divided by transitory differentiation of manifestation. Zeno's morality is rigorous, and aims not at the moderation of the passions (like that of Plato and Aristotle) but at their extirpation. The inexorable law that holds the world and man in bonds from which there is no escape, exacts obedience, and to render it voluntarily is virtue.

Since the main object of the Stoic school is the training of the will, and since wisdom as such is only a means to an end, the dogmatic form that corresponds to Oriental modes of thought and the despotic system of contemporary government prevails throughout its teachings. Hence we can understand how this somewhat coarse, wire-drawn, as it were, but effective form of philosophy dominates the whole world from this time forward till about the second century A.D. In essentials it represents a revival of Heraclitism, just as the antithetical philosophy of Epicureanism, which prevailed for the same length of time, is in essence reminiscent of the Abderitic system.

Epicurus (born 342) was the son of an Athenian, but born at Samos. Thus he had opportunities of making himself acquainted with the philosophy of Democritus, which was more highly esteemed in Ionia than at Athens. He did not care for learning for its own sake, however, but for the sake of its practical application. In this respect, as also in his consistent materialism, he is closely akin to the Stoic school.

In dogmatic positiveness and immutability Epicurus far surpasses even the Stoic philosophy. With him the main consideration is a mode of life which induces a tranquil cheerfulness of temper by the refusal to admit all disquieting thoughts (as of death, immortality or divine punishment) and troublesome passions, and by which his followers, while here below, become partakers of the felicity of the gods. This quietist philosophy harmonised

with the ideals of life which obtained at that period, and the ardent exaltation of friendship among this free-thinking fellowship and their ideal of human freedom and dignity atone in some degree for the hollowness of their theory of life.

Finally Scepticism takes the form of a school in Greece with Pyrrho, who died in the same year as Epicurus, 270 B.C. He, too, is only solicitous for tranquillity of mind, but he does not win it by dogmatic faith in this system of doctrine or that, but in believing nothing whatever, in thinking nothing right and nothing important. This thoroughgoing scepticism is bound to doubt even itself. As a result it neutralises itself and thus marks the spontaneous dissolution of Hellenic philosophy.





THE ACROPOLIS OF ATHENS

CHAPTER XXXVII. THE REIGN OF TERROR IN ATHENS

Desolate Athens ! though thy gods are fled,
Thy temples silent, and thy glory dead,
Though all thou hast of beautiful and brave
Sleep in the tomb, or moulder in the wave,
Though power and praise forsake thee, and forget,
Desolate Athens, thou art lovely yet !

— WINTHROP MACKWORTH PRAED.

IN the capitulation on which Athens surrendered, so far as its terms are reported by Xenophon, no mention appears to have been made of any change which was to take place in its form of government ; and, if we might believe Diodorus, one article expressly provided that the Athenians should enjoy their hereditary constitution. This is probably an error ; but if such language was used in the treaty it was apparently designed rather to insult than to deceive the people ; and the framers of the article, who were also to be its expounders, had in their view not the free constitution under which the city had flourished since the time of Solon, but some ancient form of misrule, which had been long forgotten, but might still be recovered from oblivion by the industry of such antiquarians as Nicomachus. It is at least not to be doubted that the Spartan government, if it did not stipulate for the subversion of the democracy, looked forward to such a revolution as one of the most certain and important results of its victory. But it may have believed that its Athenian partisans would be strong enough to effect it without its interference. And we gather from a statement of Lysias, that Lysander, after he had seen the demolition of the walls begun, leaving his friends to complete their work, sailed away to Samos, now the only place in the Ægean where the authority of Sparta was not acknowledged.

If this was the case, he had scarcely laid siege to Samos before his presence was required at Athens. Theramenes, Critias, and their associates, wished to give a legitimate aspect to the power which they meant to usurp, and to overthrow the constitution in the name of the people. But they did not think it safe to trust to their own influence for the first step ; and though Agis was still at hand, he might not enter so cordially into their

views, and did not possess so much weight as Lysander. When therefore a day had been fixed for an assembly to consider the question of reforming the constitution, Lysander was sent for to attend the discussion. Theramenes had undertaken the principal part in the management of the business. He proposed that the supreme power should for the present be lodged with thirty persons, who should be authorised to draw up a new code of laws, which however was to be conformable to the ancient institutions, according to a model framed by Dracontides.

LYSANDER

The presence of Lysander, and the nearness of the Peloponnesian troops, deterred the friends of liberty from expressing their sentiments on this proposition. But its nature and tendency were clear, and a murmur of disapprobation ran through the assembly. Theramenes treated it with contemptuous defiance; but Lysander silenced it by a graver argument. He bade the malcontents take notice, that they were at his mercy, and were no longer protected by the treaty. The fortifications had not been demolished within the time prescribed, and therefore in strictness of right the treaty was void. Their lives were forfeited and might be in jeopardy, if they should reject the proposition of Theramenes. It was adopted without further hesitation; and a list of the Thirty, of whom ten were named by Theramenes, ten by the Athenian ephors, and ten were nominally left to the choice of the assembly, was received with equal unanimity. The names which it comprised, some of which soon became infamously notorious were: Polyarches, Critias, Melobius, Hippolochus, Euclidas, Hiero, Mnesilochus, Chremo, Theramenes, Aresias, Diocles, Phædrias, Chærilæus, Anætiæus, Piso, Sophocles (not the poet, who was now dead), Eratosthenes, Charicles, Onomacles, Theognis, Æschines, Theogenes, Cleomedes, Erasistratus, Phido, Dracontides, Eumathes, Aristoteles, Hippomachus, Mnesithides. Besides these a board of Ten was appointed — perhaps by Lysander himself — to govern Piræus. As soon as this affair was despatched, Lysander departed with his fleet to Samos, and the Peloponnesian army evacuated Attica.

The Samians, blockaded by land and by sea, were forced to capitulate before the end of the summer; they were permitted to leave the city, but not to carry away any part of their property, except the clothes they wore.

These terms might be thought lenient, had they been guilty of any ferocious outrage; but perhaps Lysander did not view their conduct in that light. He was however probably anxious to return home and to exhibit the fruits of his victory to his admiring countrymen, and may have been therefore the more willing to treat with the besieged. When they had withdrawn, he supplied their place with the exiles who had been expelled at various times in the civil feuds of the island, put them in possession of all the property of the vanquished party and appointed a council of Ten, to govern them, and secure their obedience. He then dismissed the allies to their homes, and himself with the Lacedæmonian squadron returned to Laconia.

He brought with him the Athenian galleys surrendered in Piræus, the last fragments of that maritime power which he had broken, trophies from the prizes taken at Ægospotami, and 470 talents [£94,000 or \$470,000], the remainder of the tribute which he had collected from the Asiatic cities during the absence of Cyrus. But we are inclined to conclude from a story which, though it is not mentioned by Xenophon, is related by several later writers,

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with circumstances too minute and probable to be rejected, that he had previously sent a larger sum — perhaps not much less than a thousand talents — which he is said to have entrusted to the care of Gylippus, the hero of Syracuse. Gylippus was subject to the same infirmity which had occasioned the disgrace of his father Cleandridas. He could not resist the temptation of embezzling a part of the treasure, was detected and banished, and put an end to his own life by fasting. But even the sum mentioned by Xenophon was probably the largest that had ever been carried at one time to Sparta. To this were added crowns, and various other presents, which had been bestowed upon Lysander by many cities, which were eager to testify their gratitude and admiration, or to gain the favour of the conqueror.

This influx of wealth was viewed with jealousy by several Spartans, who dreaded the effect it might produce both on their foreign policy, and their domestic institutions: the example of Gylippus, though by no means an extraordinary case, might seem to confirm their views: and it appears that a proposal was made to dedicate the whole to the Delphic god. But Lysander and his friends strenuously resisted this measure, and prevailed on the ephors or the people to let the treasure remain in the public coffers. A part was employed to commemorate the triumph of Sparta, and the merits of the individuals who had principally helped to achieve it. Lysander himself adorned one of the Spartan temples with memorials of his two victories, of Notium and Ægospotami; and the first might indeed justly be considered as having opened the way for the last. Tripods of extraordinary size were dedicated at Amyclæ; and at Delphi the statues of the tutelary twins, Zeus, Apollo, Artemis, and Poseidon, forming part of a great group, which comprised those of Lysander, who was represented receiving a crown from Poseidon, his soothsayer Abas, Hermon the Megarian, the master of his galley, and upwards of twenty-nine other persons, Spartans or natives of other cities, who had distinguished themselves at Ægospotami, long attested the gratitude of Sparta towards gods and men.


CRUELITIES OF THE THIRTY

In the meanwhile the party which had usurped the supreme authority at Athens, had been unfolding the real character of its domination. The first care of the Thirty was to provide themselves with instruments suited to their purposes; they filled all important posts with their creatures. The ephoralty seems to have merged in their own office. The council was already for the most part composed of their own partisans, and needed but few purifying changes; it was now to become the sole tribunal for state-trials.

It might be inferred from the language of Xenophon's history, that the legislative functions which they professed to assume were merely nominal; but we collect from a hint which he drops elsewhere, that they availed themselves from time to time of this branch of their authority, to promulgate laws, or regulations of police, either by way of precaution or of pretext; and that they exercised a censorial control over the occupations and conduct of their subjects. But it is probable that they never intended to publish any code, much less any constitution which might limit their power. Their main object, in which they seem to have been unanimous, was to reverse the policy of Themistocles and Pericles: to reduce Athens to the rank of a petty town, cut off from the sea, without colonies or commerce, incapable of resisting the will of Sparta, or of exciting her jealousy. It seems to have been with the design

of signifying this leading maxim of their administration in a sensible manner, that they altered their position of the bema from which the orators addressed the assembly in the Pnyx, so that it might no longer command a view of the sea and of Salamis. They still more distinctly intimated their intention, while they took a step towards carrying it into effect, by selling the materials of the magnificent arsenal, which it had cost a thousand talents to build, for three, to a contractor who undertook to demolish and clear it away. It was perhaps at a later period, and for their own security, that they destroyed the fortresses on the borders of Attica. If they had succeeded in their aims, the history of Athens might now have been said to have closed; for it would have ceased materially to affect the course of events in the rest of Greece, and could have possessed no interest but such as might belong to the internal changes or quarrels of the oligarchy.

THE SYCOPHANTS



GREEK TERRA-COTTA
(In the British Museum)

Happily for their country the diversity of their characters was too great to be reconciled even by the sense of their common interest, and proved a source of dissension which became fatal to their power. The men whose ability and energy gave them the predominance over the rest, were hurried by the violence of their passions into excesses from which their more prudent and moderate associates recoiled, but which they were unable to prevent. For some time they preserved a show of decency in their proceedings, and some of their acts were so generally acceptable, that the means, though contrary to law and justice, might to many seem to be sanctified by the end. The first prosecutions were directed chiefly against a class of men who were universally odious, and had contributed more than any others to involve the state in the evils from which they themselves now justly suffered, the informers, or sycophants as they were called at Athens, who had perverted the laws, corrupted the tribunals, and had gained an infamous livelihood by the extortion which they were thus enabled to practise on wealthy and timid citizens, but more especially on foreigners subject to Athenian jurisdiction, who were thus, more than by any other grievance, alienated from the sovereign state. The most notorious of these pests of the commonwealth were eagerly condemned by the council; and their punishment was viewed with pleasure by all honest men. Yet the satisfaction it caused must have been a little allayed in some minds by the reflection, that the form of proceeding by which they were condemned was one under which the most innocent might always be exposed to the same fate.

According to the new regulation the Thirty presided in person over trials held by the council: two tables were placed in front of the benches which they occupied, to receive the balls, or tokens, by which the councillors declared their verdict, and which instead of being dropped secretly into a box, were now to be openly deposited on the board, so that the Thirty might see

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which way every man voted. These however were not the only cases which they brought before the council, even in the early part of their reign. The persons who before the surrender of the city had been arrested on information, partly procured by bribery, and partly extorted by fear, or by the rack, charging them with a conspiracy against the state, but who had really been guilty of no offence but that of expressing their attachment to the constitution which was now abolished, were soon after brought to a mock trial, and judicially murdered.

Even such executions might be considered as among the temporary evils incident to every political revolution: and there were some of the Thirty who did not wish to multiply them more than was necessary to their safety. But the greater number, and above all Critias, did not mean to stop here: and perhaps some signs of discontent soon became visible, which gave them a pretext for insisting on the need of stronger measures, and of additional safeguards. Two of their number, Æschines and Aristoteles, were deputed by common consent to Sparta, to obtain a body of troops to garrison the citadel. The ground alleged was that there were turbulent men whom it was necessary to remove before their government could be settled on a firm basis; and they undertook to maintain the garrison as long as its presence should be required. Xenophon's language seems to imply that Lysander had by this time returned to Sparta; if so, upwards of six months had now elapsed from the surrender of the city. Lysander, whether present or absent, exerted his influence in their behalf, and induced the ephors to send the force which they desired, under the command of Callibius, who was invested with the authority of harmost. His arrival released Critias and his colleagues from all the restraints hitherto imposed on them by their fears of their fellow citizens. They courted him with an obsequiousness proportioned to the wantonness of the tyranny which they hoped to exercise with his sanction and aid.

The footing on which they stood with him is well illustrated by a single fact. An Athenian named Autolycus, of good family and condition, who in his youth had distinguished himself by a gymnastic victory, had in some way or other offended Callibius, who, according to the Spartan usage, raised his truncheon to strike him. But Autolycus, not yet inured to such discipline, prevented the blow by bringing him to the ground. Lysander, it is said, when Callibius complained of this affront, observed that he did not know how to govern freemen. He however understood the men with whom he had principally to deal; for the Thirty soon after gratified him by putting Autolycus to death.

In return for such deference he placed his troops at their disposal, to lead whom they would to prison: and now the catalogue of political offences was on a sudden terribly enlarged. The persons who were now singled out for destruction, were no longer such only as had made themselves odious by their crimes, or had distinguished themselves on former occasions by their opposition to the ruling party, but men of unblemished character, without any strong political bias, who had gained the confidence of the people by their merits or services, and might be suspected of preferring a popular government to the oligarchy under which they were living. Xenophon seems to believe that Critias was inflamed with an insatiable thirst for blood by the remembrance of his exile. But it would appear that ambition and cupidity, rather than resentment, were the mainsprings of his conduct, and that he calculated with great coolness the fruits of his nefarious deeds. Nor was it merely political jealousy that determined his choice of his victims; the immediate profit to be derived from the confiscation of their property

was at least an equally powerful inducement. It is uncertain to which of these motives we should refer the execution of Niceratus, the son of Nicias, who shared his uncle's fate, but may have been involved in it more by his wealth than by his relation to Eucrates. It was perhaps on the like account, rather than because of the services which he had rendered to the people, that Antiphon,¹ who during the war had equipped two galleys at his own expense, was now condemned to death. And it was most probably with no other object that Leon, an inhabitant of Salamis, who seems to have been universally respected, and a great number of his townsmen, were dragged from their homes and consigned to the executioner. The case of Leon is particularly remarkable for the light it throws on the policy of the oligarchs. After the arrival of the Lacedæmonian garrison they had begun to dispense with the assistance of the council; and Leon was put to death without any form of trial. But they did not think it expedient always to employ the foreign troops on their murderous errands; they often used Athenians as their ministers on such occasions, and men who did not belong to their party, for the purpose of implicating them in the guilt and odium of their proceedings. When they had resolved on the destruction of Leon, they sent for Socrates and four other persons, and ordered them to go and fetch him from Salamis. As his innocence was no less notorious than the fate which awaited him, Socrates, on leaving the presence of the Thirty, instead of obeying their commands, returned home. The rest executed their commission.

These atrocities soon began to spread general alarm; for no one could perceive any principle or maxim by which they were to be limited for the future; there was on the contrary reason to apprehend that they would be continually multiplied and aggravated. Theramenes, who was endowed with a keen tact which enabled him readily to observe the bent of public opinion, was early aware of the danger into which his colleagues were rushing; and he remonstrated with Critias on the imprudence of creating themselves enemies by putting men to death for no other reason than because they had filled eminent stations, or performed signal services, under the democracy; for it did not follow that they might not become peaceful and useful subjects of the oligarchy, since there had been a time when both Critias and himself had courted popular favour. But Critias contended that they were now in a position which they could only maintain by force and terror; and that every man who had the means of thwarting their plans, and who was not devoted to their interest, must be treated as an enemy.

This argument seems for the time to have satisfied Theramenes. But as deeds of blood followed each other with increasing rapidity, and the murmurs of all honest citizens, though stifled in public, began to find vent in private circles, Theramenes again warned his colleagues, that it would be impossible for the oligarchy to subsist long on its present narrow basis. He wished that they might be able to dispense with the foreign garrison, and foresaw that, if they persisted in their present course, they could never safely dismiss it. His advice now produced some effect on them; but they seem to have been alarmed not so much by the danger which he pointed out as by the warning itself. They knew that he was a man who had never adhered to any party which he believed to be sinking, and suspected that he might be meditating to put himself at the head of a new revolution, as in the time of the Four Hundred. And though his character was so generally understood that he had acquired a homely nickname,² which expressed the

¹ This Antiphon has been confounded with the celebrated orator.

² *Cothurnus* — a shoe which fitted either foot.

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readiness with which he shifted his side, and the dexterity with which he adapted himself to every change of circumstances, still he might again become a rallying-point for the disaffected. To guard against this danger they determined to strengthen themselves by an expedient similar to that which had been adopted by the former oligarchy. They made out a list of three thousand citizens, who were to enjoy a kind of franchise which perhaps was never exactly defined; but one of its most important privileges was, that none of them should be put to death without a trial before the council. All other Athenians were outlawed, and left to the mercy of the Thirty, who might deal as they thought fit with their lives and property.

Theramenes objected to the new constitution, both on account of the small number of the privileged body, and its arbitrary limitation, which would show that the selection did not proceed upon any ground of merit.

Since they meant to govern by force, it was impolitic, he said, to establish such a disproportion between their strength and that of the governed. His objections were overruled, but not wholly neglected. They perhaps suggested the precaution which was immediately afterwards adopted. Under pretext of a review all the citizens were deprived of their arms, except the knights, and the Three Thousand, who were thus enabled to cope with the rest. The Thirty now believed themselves completely secure, and grew more and more reckless in the indulgence of their rapacity and cruelty. In the low state to which the Athenian finances were reduced, the maintenance of the garrison was a burden which they found it difficult to support; and, among other extraordinary means of raising supplies, it appears that they resorted to the spoliation of the temples. But this was an expedient which probably required some caution and secrecy, and which could not be carried beyond certain limits. One which perhaps appeared both safer and more productive was suggested by Piso and Theognis, two of their number, who observed that several of the resident aliens were known to be ill-affected to the oligarchy, and thus afforded a pretext for plundering the whole class.

They therefore made the proposition that each of the Thirty should have one of the wealthy aliens assigned to him, should put him to death, and take possession of his property. Theramenes very truly remarked, that the sycophants who had rendered the democracy odious to many, had never done anything so iniquitous as what was now contemplated by the persons who were used to style themselves the best sort of people, for they had never taken away both money and life; and he apprehended with good reason that this measure would render the aliens generally hostile to the government. But his colleagues, after what they had already done, were not disposed to view this question on the moral side, and, having braved the hatred of their fellow-citizens, they were not afraid of provoking the aliens. The proposition was adopted; and Theramenes was invited to single out his prey with the rest: but he refused to stain his hands with this innocent blood. It was however resolved to begin by taking ten lives; and, for the sake of covering the real motive, two of the victims were to be poor men, who would therefore be supposed to have suffered for some political offence.

Men who were capable of perpetrating such actions could not long endure the presence of an associate who refused to take his full share of their guilt and odium. The colleagues of Theramenes resolved to rid themselves of a troublesome monitor who might soon prove a dangerous opponent. They first endeavoured to communicate their distrust of his designs to the members of the council in private conversation, and then concerted a plan for an open attack on him. But to insure its success they surrounded the council-

chamber with a band of the most daring of their younger followers, armed with daggers, which they did not take much pains to conceal. Critias then came forward to accuse Theramenes, who was present.

Theramenes made a defence, which, with respect to the charges of Critias, was in most points a satisfactory vindication of his conduct. A murmur of approbation, which ran through the assembly, warned Critias that he could not safely rely on its subserviency for the condemnation of Theramenes; and, after having conferred a few moments with his colleagues, he called in his armed auxiliaries, and stationed them round the railing within which the council sat. He then told the councillors, that he thought he should be wanting in the duty of his station, if he suffered his friends to be misled; and that the persons whom they now saw round them, also declared that they would not permit a man who was manifestly aiming at the ruin of the oligarchy to escape with impunity. Now by virtue of the new constitution none of the Three Thousand could be put to death except by a sentence of the council; but all who were not included in that list might be sent to execution without any form of trial by the Thirty. He therefore declared that, with the unanimous consent of his colleagues, he struck out the name of Theramenes from the list, and condemned him to death.^b

Xenophon gives a vivid picture of the scene that followed: "On hearing this, Theramenes sprang upon the altar of Vesta, and said, 'But I, gentlemen, entreat you for what is most strictly legal—that it may not be in the power of Critias to strike off me, or any of you whom he pleases; but according to the law which these men passed respecting those in the list, according to that may be the decision, both for you and for me. And of this, indeed,' said he, 'by the gods, I am not ignorant, that this altar will be no protection to me; but what I wish to show is, that these men are not only most unjust with regard to mankind, but also impious with regard to the gods. At you, however, who are good and honourable men, I am astonished if you do not come forward in your own defence; knowing moreover, as you do, that my name is not at all more easy to strike off than each of yours.' Upon this, the herald of the Thirty ordered the Eleven to come for Theramenes; and when they had entered with the officers, led by Satyrus the boldest and most shameless of their number, Critias said, 'We deliver up to you this Theramenes here, condemned according to law: do ye, Eleven, seize, and lead him off to the proper place, and do your duty with him.' When he had thus spoken, Satyrus dragged the condemned man from the altar, aided by the other officers. Theramenes, as was natural, called both on gods and men to look on what was doing. But the council kept quiet, seeing both the fellows of Satyrus at the bar, and the space before the council-house filled with guards, and, not being ignorant they had come with daggers. So they led off the man through the market-place, while he declared with a very loud voice how he was being treated. And this one expression also is told of him. When Satyrus said that he would rue it if he were not silent; he asked, 'And shall I not then rue it, if I am?'

"Moreover, when he was compelled to die, and drank the hemlock, they said that he flung out on the floor what was left of it, saying, 'Let this be for the lovely Critias.' Now I am aware that these sayings are not worth mentioning: but this I consider admirable in the man, that when death was close at hand, neither his good sense nor his pleantry deserted his soul."^c

In Theramenes we find much to condemn, and nothing to approve, except that he shrank from following his profligate associates in their career of wickedness. If he had reason to complain that they did not spare the author

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of their elevation, the other victims of their tyranny had much more cause to rejoice in his fate. He seems to have died unpitied by either of the parties whom he had alternately courted and abandoned.

His death released the Thirty — among whom it is probable that Satyrus was immediately chosen to supply his place — from the last restraints of fear or shame which had kept them within any bounds of decency ; and they now proceeded to bolder and more thorough-going measures. They emulated the ancient tyrants, who had often removed the lowest class of the commonalty, for whom it was difficult to find employment, from the capital into the country, and prohibited all Athenians who were not on the list of the Three Thousand from entering the city.


But by the oligarchs this step seems not to have been adopted so much with a view to their safety, as to increase the facility of rapine and murder. They continued to send out their emissaries to seize the persons and confiscate the property of the citizens, who were now scattered by their decree over Attica. The greater part of the outcasts took refuge in Piræus ; but when it was found that neither the populous town, nor their rural retreats, could shelter them from the inquisition of their oppressors, numbers began to seek an asylum in foreign cities ; and Argos, Megara, and Thebes, were soon crowded with Athenian exiles.

The oligarchs, notwithstanding their Lacedæmonian garrison, and their reliance on Spartan protection, began to be alarmed at the state to which they had reduced themselves, and to dread the vengeance of their exiled enemies, who were waiting so near at hand for an opportunity of attacking them ; and they applied to the Spartan government to interpose for the purpose of averting the danger. The Spartans, instigated perhaps by Lysander, issued an edict, which showed to what a degree they were intoxicated by prosperity. It empowered the Athenian rulers to arrest the exiles in every Greek city, and under a heavy penalty, forbade any one to interfere in their behalf.

But this decree was no less impolitic than inhuman ; it disclosed a domineering spirit, which could not but produce general alarm and disgust ; but its object was beyond the reach of the Spartan power. At Argos and Thebes, and probably in other cities, the injunction and the threat were disregarded ; the exiles continued to find hospitable shelter. The Thebans more particularly took pains to manifest their contempt for the Spartan proclamation by a counter decree, directing that the persecuted Athenians should be received in all the Bœotian towns ; that if any attempt should be made to force them away, every Bœotian should lend his aid to rescue them ; and that they should not be obstructed in any expedition which they might undertake against the party now in possession of Athens.

This measure, though the spirit it breathes is so different from that in which the Theban commander had voted for the extirpation of the Athenian people, was not dictated either by justice or compassion towards Athens, but by jealousy and resentment towards Sparta. Very soon after the close of the war causes had arisen to alienate the Thebans from their old ally. They were always disposed to set a high value on the services which they had rendered to the Peloponnesian cause and now conceived that they had not been properly requited. They put forward some claims relating to the spoil collected at Decelea, and likewise to the treasure carried to Sparta by Lysander, which, chiefly it seems at his instance, had been resisted or neglected. Hence they could not without great dissatisfaction see Athens in the hands of Lysander's creatures.

THE REVOLT OF THRASYBULUS



OFFICER'S HELMET

Thrasybulus, like Alcibiades, had been formally banished by the Thirty; though it is not certain that he was at Athens when their government was established. He was however at Thebes when their furious tyranny began to drive the citizens by hundreds into exile; and the temper now prevailing at Thebes encouraged him to undertake the deliverance of his country. Having obtained a small supply of arms and money from his Theban friends, he crossed the border with a band of about seventy refugees, and seized the fortress of Phyle, which stood on an eminence projecting from the side of Mount Parnes, with which it was connected by a narrow ridge with precipitous sides, twelve or thirteen miles from Athens. The fortifications had either escaped when the other Attic

strongholds were demolished by the Thirty, or were soon restored to a defensible state. The oligarchs, confident that they should soon be able to crush so feeble an enemy, marched against them with the Three Thousand and their equestrian partisans.^b

On their arrival, some of the young men, in a foolhardy spirit, immediately assaulted the place, producing, however, no effect upon it, but retiring with many wounds. When the Thirty were desirous of surrounding it with works, that they might reduce it by cutting off all supplies of provisions, there came on during the night a very heavy fall of snow, covered with which they returned the next day into the city, after losing very many of their camp followers by an attack of the men from Phyle. Knowing, however, that they would also plunder the country, if there were no watch to prevent it, they despatched to the frontiers, at the distance of fifteen furlongs from Phyle, all but a few of the Lacedæmonian guards, and two squadrons of horse. These having encamped on a rough piece of ground, proceeded to keep watch. There were by this time assembled at Phyle about seven hundred men, whom Thrasybulus took, and marched down by night; and having grounded arms about three or four stades from the party on guard, remained quietly there. When it was towards daybreak, and the enemy now began to get up and retire from their post on necessary purposes, and the grooms were making a noise in currying their horses—at this juncture the party with Thrasybulus took up their arms again, and fell upon them at a run. Some of them they despatched, and routed and pursued them all for six or seven furlongs; killing more than a hundred and twenty of the infantry; and of the cavalry, Nicostratus (surnamed The Handsome) and

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two others also, whom they surprised while yet in their beds. After returning and erecting a trophy, they packed up all the arms and baggage they had taken, and withdrew to Phyle. And now the horsemen in the city came out to the rescue, but found none of the enemy any longer on the spot; having waited, therefore, till their relatives had taken up the dead, they returned into the city.

Upon this the Thirty, no longer thinking their cause safe, wished to secure for themselves Eleusis, that they might have a place of refuge, if required. Having sent their orders to the cavalry, Critias and the rest of the Thirty came to Eleusis; and having held a review of the horse in the place, alleging that they wished to know what was their number, and how much additional garrison they would require, they ordered them all to write down their names, and as each one wrote it down in his turn, to pass out through the postern to the sea. On the beach they had posted their cavalry on both sides, and as each successively passed out, their attendants bound him. When all were arrested, they ordered Lysimachus, the commander of the cavalry, to take them to the city and deliver them up to the Eleven. The next day they summoned to the Odeum the heavy-armed in the list, and the rest of the cavalry; when Critias stood up, and said: "It is no less for your advantage, gentlemen, than for our own, that we are establishing the present form of government. As then you will share in its honours, so too you ought to share in its dangers. You must give your votes therefore against the Eleusinians here arrested, that you may have the same grounds with us both of confidence and of fear." And pointing out a certain spot, he ordered them openly to deposit their votes in it. At the same time the Lacedæmonian guard under arms occupied half of the Odeum; and these measures were approved by such of the citizens also as only cared for their own advantage.

After this, Thrasybulus took those at Phyle, who had now gathered together to the number of about a thousand, and came by night into Piræus. The Thirty, on this intelligence, immediately went out to the rescue with both the Lacedæmonians, and the cavalry, and the heavy-armed; and then advanced along the cart-way that leads to Piræus. The force from Phyle for some time attempted to stop their approach; but when the great circuit of the wall appeared to require a large body to guard it, and they were not a large one, they marched in close order into Munychia. The troops from the city drew themselves up so as to fill up the road, being not less than fifty shields deep. In this order they marched up the hill. The force from Phyle also filled up the road, but were not more than ten deep in their heavy-armed; behind whom, however, there were posted both targeteers and light dart-men, and behind them the slingers. These indeed formed a numerous body; for the inhabitants of the place had joined them. While the enemy were coming on, Thrasybulus ordered his men to ground their shields, and having grounded his own, but keeping the rest of his arms, he took his stand in the midst of them, and spoke thus:

"My fellow-citizens, I wish to inform some of you, and to remind others, that of the men who are coming against us, those on the right wing are they whom you routed and pursued five days ago; and those on the extreme left are the Thirty, who both deprived us of our country when guilty of nothing, and expelled us from our houses, and prosecuted the dearest of our relatives. But now truly they have come into a position, where they never thought of being, but we have always been praying that they might be. For we are posted against them with arms in our hands; and seeing that in former days

we were arrested both when at our meals, and asleep, and in the market-place, while others of us were banished, when, so far from being guilty of any offence, we were not even in the country ; for these reasons the gods are now clearly fighting on our side. For even in fair weather they raise a storm, when it is for our advantage ; and when we make an attack, though our enemies are many, they grant to us, who are but few, to erect trophies. And now, too, they have brought us into a position, in which our opponents can neither hurl their spears nor their darts beyond those who are posted before them, through its being up-hill ; whereas we, discharging down-hill both spears, and javelins, and stones, shall both reach them, and mortally wound many of them. And one might perhaps have thought that the first ranks, at any rate, must fight on equal terms ; but as it is, if you only discharge your weapons with spirit, as suits your character, no one will miss, since the road is filled up with them, and standing on their guard they will all the time be skulking under their shields ; so that we shall be able both to strike them when we please, like blind men, and to leap on and overturn them. But, sirs, we must act in such a way that each of us may have the consciousness of having been most instrumental towards the victory. For that (if God will) will now restore to us both country, and houses, and freedom, and honours, and children (such as have them), and wives. O blessed, then, those of us who, as victors, may see that sweetest day of all ! And happy, too, he who falls ! For no one, however rich he may be, shall enjoy so glorious a monument. I, then, when the time is come, will begin the pæan ; and when we have called on Mars to help us, then let us all with one heart avenge ourselves on these men for the insults we have suffered."

Having thus spoken, he faced about towards the enemy, and remained still. For their prophet gave them orders not to make the onset before some one on their side had either fallen, or been wounded : "When, however," said he, "that has happened, I will lead the way, and there will be victory for you who follow, but death to me, as I, at least, believe." And he spoke no falsehood ; but when they had taken up their arms, he himself, as though led by some destiny, was the first to bound forward, and falling on the enemy was killed, and is buried by the passage of the Cephissus ; but the rest were victorious, and pursued them as far as the level ground. There were slain there, of the Thirty, Critias and Hippomachus ; of the ten commanders in Piræus, Charmides, son of Glaucon ; and of the rest about seventy. The conquerors took the arms, but plundered the clothes of none of their fellow-citizens. And when this was done, and they were returning the dead under a truce, many on both sides came up and conversed together. And Cleocritus, the herald of the initiated,¹ being gifted with a very fine voice, hushed them into silence and thus addressed them :

"Fellow-citizens, why are you driving us from our country ? Why do you wish to kill us ? For we have never yet done you any harm ; but have shared with you both the most solemn rites, and the noblest sacrifices and festivals ; and have been your companions in the dance, and in the schools, and in war ; and have faced many dangers with you by land and by sea, for the common safety and liberty of both parties. In the name of our fathers' and our mothers' gods, in the name of kindred, and affinity, and fellowship (for all these things have we in common with one another), cease sinning against your country, and be not persuaded by those most impious Thirty, who, for the sake of their own gain, have killed almost more of the Athenians

[¹ That is, one of the communicants in the Eleusinian mysteries.]

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in eight months than all the Peloponnesians in ten years' warfare. And when we might live together in peace, these men inflict on us that war which of all is the most disgraceful, and grievous, and impious, and most hateful both to gods and men — war with one another. But, however, be well assured, that for some of those now slain by us, not only you, but we also, have shed many tears." Such was his speech. The rest of the enemy's commanders, from the very fact of their hearing such fresh appeals to them, led back their men into the city.

The next day the Thirty, quite dejected and solitary, sat together in council: while the Three Thousand, wherever they were severally posted, were at variance with one another. For as many as had acted in a more violent manner, and were therefore afraid, vehemently maintained that they ought not to submit to those in Piræus: while such as were confident that they had done no wrong, both reflected themselves, and were persuading the rest, that there was no necessity for these troubles: and they said that they ought not to obey the Thirty, nor suffer them to ruin the state. At last they voted for deposing them, and choosing others: and accordingly they chose ten, one from each tribe.

So the Thirty departed to Eleusis; while the Ten, together with the commanders of the cavalry, directed their attention to those in the city, who were in a state of great confusion and distrust of each other. The cavalry also bivouacked in the Odeum, with both their horse and their shields; and owing to their want of confidence, they kept going their rounds along the walls, after evening had set in, with their shields, and towards morning with their horses, being constantly afraid that some of those in Piræus might attack them. They, being now many in number, and men of all sorts, were making themselves arms, some of wood, others of wickerwork, and were whitening them over. Before ten days had elapsed, after giving pledges that whoever joined in the war, even though they were strangers, should have equal privileges, they marched out, with many heavy-armed and many light-armed. They had also about seventy horse; and making forays by day, and carrying off wood and corn, they slept again in Piræus. Of those in the city none else came out under arms, but the cavalry sometimes secured plunderers from the force in Piræus, and annoyed their phalanx.

And now the Thirty from Eleusis, and those in the list from the city, sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon, and urged them to come to their support, as the people had revolted from the Lacedæmonians. Lysander, calculating that it was possible quickly to reduce those in Piræus, when besieged both by land and by sea, if once they were cut off from all supplies, joined in getting a hundred talents lent them, and himself sent out as harmost, with his brother Libys as admiral. And having himself proceeded to Eleusis, he raised a large force of Peloponnesian heavy-armed; while the admiral kept guard that no provisions should go in for them by sea; so that those in



STATUE OF DIANA

Piræus were soon in a strait again, while those in the city, on the other hand, were elated again with confidence in Lysander.

When things were progressing in this way, Pausanias the king, filled with envy at the thought of Lysander's succeeding in these measures, and so at once winning reputation and making Athens his own, gained the consent of three of the ephors, and led out an expedition.¹ All the allies also joined him, except the Bœotians and Corinthians.

Pausanias encamped on a spot called Halipedum, near Piræus, himself occupying the right wing, and Lysander, with his mercenaries, the left. And he sent ambassadors to those in Piræus, telling them to go away to their own homes; but when they did not obey his message, he made an assault (so far, at least, as noise went), that he might not openly appear to wish them well. When he had retired with no result from the assault, the day following he took two brigades of the Lacedæmonians, and three squadrons of the Athenian cavalry, and went along to the Mute Harbour, reconnoitring in what direction Piræus was most easy to circumvallate.

On his retiring, a party of the besieged ran up and caused him trouble; annoyed at which, he ordered the horse to charge them at full speed, and such as had passed the period of youth ten years to accompany them, while he himself followed with the rest. And they slew about thirty of the light-armed, and pursued the rest to the theatre in Piræus. There all the targeteers and heavy infantry of the party in Piræus happened to be arming themselves. And now the light-armed immediately running forward began darting, throwing, shooting, slinging. The Lacedæmonians, when many were being wounded, being very hard pressed, began slowly to retreat; and upon this their opponents threw themselves on them much more vigorously. Seeing this, Thrasybulus and the rest of the heavy-armed went to the support of their men, and quickly drew themselves up in front of the others, eight deep. Pausanias, being very hard pressed, and having retired about four or five furlongs to a hill, sent orders for the Lacedæmonians and the rest of the allies to advance and join him. There having formed his phalanx very deep, he led it against the Athenians. They received his charge, but then some of them were driven into the mud at Halæ, and the rest gave way, about a hundred and fifty of them being slain. Pausanias erected a trophy, and withdrew.

Not even under these circumstances was he exasperated with them, but sent secretly, and instructed those in Piræus, with what proposals they should send ambassadors to him and the ephors who were there. They complied with his advice. He also set those in the city at variance, and advised that as many as possible should collect together and come to the Spartan officers, alleging that they did not at all want to be at war with the men in Piræus, but to be reconciled together, and both parties to be friends of the Lacedæmonians. The ephors and the committee appointed to consider the question having heard all their statements, despatched fifteen men to Athens, and ordered them, in concert with Pausanias, to effect the best reconciliation of the parties they could. So they reconciled them on condition of their making peace with one another, and returning to their several homes, with the exception of the Thirty, the Eleven, and the Ten who had commanded in

[¹This curious method of intervention for Athens' sake has been variously interpreted. Thirlwall makes quite a drama of benevolent duplicity about it. According to others, Pausanias was simply moved by a desire to nip Lysander's ambition and to put an end to further cruelties by the Thirty who were already winning general sympathy for the common people and the democratic cause of Athens.]


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Piræus. If any of those in the city should feel afraid of remaining there, it was determined that they should establish themselves at Eleusis.

These arrangements being effected, Pausanias disbanded his army, and the party from Piræus went up under arms to the Acropolis, and sacrificed to Athene. But some time afterwards, hearing that the party at Eleusis were hiring mercenaries, they took the field *en masse* against them; and when their commanders had come to a conference, they put them to death; but sent in to the others their friends and relatives, and persuaded them to a reconciliation. And having sworn not to remember past grievances, they lived together under the same government, the popular party abiding by their oaths.^c



GREEK TERRA-COTTA FIGURE
(In the British Museum)



GRECIAN BUCKLES
(In the British Museum)

CHAPTER XXXVIII. THE DEMOCRACY RESTORED

THE period intervening between the defeat of *Ægospotami* (October. 405 B.C.), and the re-establishment of the democracy as sanctioned by the convention concluded with *Pausanias* (some time in the summer of 403 B.C.), presents two years of cruel and multifarious suffering to Athens.

After such years of misery, it was an unspeakable relief to the Athenian population to regain possession of Athens and Attica; to exchange their domestic tyrants for a renovated democratical government; and to see their foreign enemies not merely evacuate the country, but even bind themselves by treaty to future friendly dealing. In respect of power, indeed, Athens was but the shadow of her former self. She had no empire, no tribute, no fleet, no fortifications at *Piræus*, no long walls, not a single fortified place in Attica except the city itself.

Of these losses, the Athenians made little account at the first epoch of their re-establishment; so intolerable was the pressure which they had just escaped, and so welcome the restitution of comfort, security, property, and independence at home. The very excess of tyranny committed by the Thirty gave a peculiar zest to the recovery of the democracy. In their hands, the oligarchical principle (to borrow an expression from *Burke*) "had produced in fact and instantly, the grossest of those evils with which it was pregnant in its nature"; realising the promise of that plain-spoken oligarchical oath, which *Aristotle* mentions as having been taken in various oligarchical cities — to contrive as much evil as possible to the people. So much the more complete was the reaction of sentiment towards the antecedent democracy, even in the minds of those who had been before discontented with it. To all men, rich and poor, citizens and metics, the comparative excellence of the democracy, in respect of all the essentials of good government, was now manifest. With the exception of those who had identified themselves with the Thirty as partners, partisans, or instruments, there was scarcely any one who did not feel that his life and property had been far more secure under the former democracy, and would become so again if that democracy were revived.

It was the first measure of *Thrasybulus* and his companions, after concluding the treaty with *Pausanias* and thus re-entering the city, to exchange solemn oaths of amnesty for the past, with those against whom they had just been at war. Similar oaths of amnesty were also exchanged with those in *Eleusis*, as soon as that town came into their power. The only persons excepted from this amnesty were the Thirty, the Eleven who had presided over the execution of all their atrocities, and the Ten who had governed in *Piræus*. Even these persons were not peremptorily banished: opportunity

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was offered to them to come in and take their trial of accountability (universal at Athens in the case of every magistrate on quitting office); so that if acquitted, they would enjoy the benefit of the amnesty as well as all others. We know that Eratosthenes, one of the Thirty, afterwards returned to Athens; since there remains a powerful harangue of Lysias invoking justice against him as having brought to death Polemarchus (the brother of Lysias).

We learn moreover from the same speech, that such was the detestation of the Thirty among several of the states surrounding Attica, as to cause formal decrees for their expulsion or for prohibiting their coming. The sons, even of such among the Thirty as did not return, were allowed to remain at Athens, and enjoy their rights as citizens unmolested; a moderation rare in Grecian political warfare.

The first public vote of the Athenians, after the conclusion of peace with Sparta and the return of the exiles, was to restore the former democracy purely and simply, to choose by lot the nine archons and the senate of Five Hundred, and to elect the generals — all as before. It appears that this restoration of the preceding constitution was partially opposed by a citizen named Phormisius, who, having served with Thrasybulus in Piræus, now moved that the political franchise should for the future be restricted to the possessors of land in Attica. His proposition was understood to be supported by the Lacedæmonians, and was recommended as calculated to make Athens march in better harmony with them. It was presented as a compromise between oligarchy and democracy, excluding both the poorer freemen and those whose property lay either in movables or in land out of Attica; so that the aggregate number of the disfranchised would have been five thousand persons. Since Athens now had lost her fleet and maritime empire, and since the importance of Piræus was much curtailed not merely by these losses, but by demolition of its separate walls and of the Long Walls — Phormisius and others conceived the opportunity favourable for striking out the maritime and trading multitude from the roll of citizens. Many of these men must have been in easy and even opulent circumstances; but the bulk of them were poor; and Phormisius had of course at his command the usual arguments, by which it is attempted to prove that poor men have no business with political judgment or action. But the proposition was rejected; the orator Lysias being among its opponents, and composing a speech against it which was either spoken, or intended to be spoken, by some eminent citizen in the assembly.

Unfortunately we have only a fragment of the speech remaining, wherein the proposition is justly criticised as mischievous and unseasonable, depriving Athens of a large portion of her legitimate strength, patriotism, and harmony, and even of substantial men competent to serve as hoplites or horsemen — at a moment when she was barely rising from absolute prostration. Never certainly was the fallacy which connects political depravity or incapacity with a poor station, and political virtue or judgment with wealth, more conspicuously unmasked than in reference to the recent experience of Athens. The remark of Thrasybulus was most true — that a greater number of atrocities, both against person and against property, had been committed in a few months by the Thirty, and abetted by the class of horsemen, all rich men, than the poor majority of the demos had sanctioned during two generations of democracy. Moreover we know, on the authority of a witness unfriendly to the democracy, that the poor Athenian citizens, who served on shipboard and elsewhere, were exact in obedience to their commanders; while the richer citizens who served as hoplites and horsemen and who laid claim to higher individual estimation, were far less orderly in the public service.

The motion of Phormisius being rejected, the antecedent democracy was restored without qualification, together with the ordinances of Draco, and the laws, measures, and weights of Solon. But on closer inspection, it was found that the latter part of the resolution was incompatible with the amnesty which had been just sworn. According to the laws of Solon and Draco, the perpetrators of enormities under the Thirty had rendered themselves guilty and were open to trial. To escape this consequence, a second psephism or decree was passed, on the proposition of Tisamenus, to review the laws of Solon and Draco, and re-enact them with such additions and amendments as might be deemed expedient. Five hundred citizens had just been chosen by the people as *nomothetæ* or law-makers, at the same time when the senate of Five Hundred was taken by lot; out of these *nomothetæ* the senate now chose a select few, whose duty it was to consider all propositions for amendment or addition to the laws of the old democracy, and post them up for public inspection before the statues of the Eponymous Heroes, within the month then running. The senate, and the entire body of five hundred *nomothetæ*, were then to be convened, in order that each might pass in review, separately, both the old laws and the new propositions; the *nomothetæ* being previously sworn to decide righteously. While this discussion was going on, every private citizen had liberty to enter the senate, and to tender his opinion with reasons for or against any law. All the laws which should thus be approved (first by the senate, afterwards by the *nomothetæ*), but no others—were to be handed to the magistrates, and inscribed on the walls of the portico called *Pœcile*, for public notoriety, as the future regulators of the city. After the laws were promulgated by such public inscription, the senate of Areopagus was enjoined to take care that they should be duly observed and enforced by the magistrates. A provisional committee of twenty citizens was named, to be generally responsible for the city during the time occupied in this revision. As soon as the laws had been revised and publicly inscribed in the *Pœcile* pursuant to the above decree, two concluding laws were enacted which completed the purpose of the citizens.

The first of these laws forbade the magistrates to act upon, or permit to be acted upon, any law not among those inscribed; and declared that no psephism, either of the senate or of the people, should overrule any law. It renewed also the old prohibition (dating from the days of Clisthenes and the first origin of the democracy), to enact a special law inflicting direct hardship upon any individual Athenian apart from the rest, unless by the votes of six thousand citizens voting secretly.

The second of the two laws prescribed, that all the legal adjudications and arbitrations which had been passed under the antecedent democracy should be held valid and unimpeached—but formally annulled all which had been passed under the Thirty. It further provided that the laws now revised and inscribed, should only take effect from the archonship of Euclides; that is, from the nominations of archons made after the recent return of Thrasylulus and the renovation of the democracy.


By these ever memorable enactments, all acts done prior to the nomination of the archon Euclides and his colleagues (in the summer of 403 B.C.) were excluded from serving as grounds for criminal process against any citizen. To insure more fully that this should be carried into effect, a special clause was added to the oath taken annually by the senators, as well as to that taken by the heliastic dicasts. The senators pledged themselves by oath not to receive any impeachment, or give effect to any arrest, founded on any fact prior to the archonship of Euclides, excepting only against the

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Thirty and the other individuals expressly shut out from the amnesty, and now in exile. To the oath annually taken by the heliasts, also, was added the clause: "I will not remember past wrongs, nor will I abet any one else who shall remember them; on the contrary, I will give my vote pursuant to the existing laws": which laws proclaimed themselves as only taking effect from the archonship of Euclides.

By additional enactments, security was taken that the proceedings of the courts of justice should be in full conformity with the amnesty recently sworn, and that, neither directly nor indirectly, should any person be molested for wrongs done anterior to Euclides. And in fact the amnesty was faithfully observed: the re-entering exiles from Piræus, and the horsemen with other partisans of the Thirty in Athens, blended again together into one harmonious and equal democracy.

Eight years prior to these incidents, we have seen the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred, for a moment successful, and afterwards overthrown; and we have had occasion to notice, in reference to that event, the wonderful absence of all reactionary violence on the part of the victorious



GREEK SEALS

people, at a moment of severe provocation for the past and extreme apprehension for the future. We noticed that Thucydides, no friend to the Athenian democracy, selected precisely that occasion—on which some manifestation of vindictive impulse might have been supposed likely and natural—to bestow the most unqualified eulogies on their moderate and gentle bearing. Had the historian lived to describe the reign of the Thirty and the restoration which followed it, we cannot doubt that his expressions would have been still warmer and more emphatic in the same sense. Few events in history, either ancient or modern, are more astonishing than the behaviour of the Athenian people, on recovering their democracy, after the overthrow of the Thirty: and when we view it in conjunction with the like phenomenon after the deposition of the Four Hundred, we see that neither the one nor the other arose from peculiar caprice or accident of the moment; both depended upon permanent attributes of the popular character. If we knew nothing else except the events of these two periods, we should be warranted in dismissing, on that evidence alone, the string of contemptuous predicates,—giddy, irascible, jealous, unjust, greedy, etc.—one or other of which have been so frequently pronounced by unsympathetic or hostile critics respecting the Athenian people. A people, whose habitual temper and morality merited these epithets, could not have acted as the Athenians acted both after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Particular acts may be found in their history which justify severe censure; but as to the permanent elements of character, both moral and intellectual, no population in history has ever afforded stronger evidence than the Athenians on these two memorable occasions.

If we follow the acts of the Thirty, we shall see that the horsemen and the privileged three thousand hoplites in the city had made themselves

partisans in every species of flagitious crime which could possibly be imagined to exasperate the feelings of the exiles. The latter on returning saw before them men who had handed in their relatives to be put to death without trial; who had seized upon and enjoyed their property; who had expelled them all from the city, and a large portion of them even from Attica; and who had held themselves in mastery not merely by the overthrow of the constitution, but also by inviting and subsidising foreign guards. Such atrocities, conceived and ordered by the Thirty, had been executed by the aid, and for the joint benefit (as Critias justly remarked) of those occupants of the city whom the exiles found on returning. Now Thrasybulus, Anytus, and the rest of these exiles, saw their property all pillaged and appropriated by others during the few months of their absence: we may presume that their lands—which had probably not been sold, but granted to individual members or partisans of the Thirty—were restored to them; but the movable property could not be reclaimed, and the losses to which they remained subject were prodigious.

The men who had caused and profited by these losses—often with great brutality towards the families of the exiles, as we know by the case of Lysias—were now at Athens, all individually well known to the sufferers. In like manner, the sons and brothers of Leon and the other victims of the Thirty, saw before them the very citizens by whose hands their innocent relatives had been consigned without trial to prison and execution. The amount of wrong suffered had been infinitely greater than in the time of the Four Hundred, and the provocation, on every ground, public and private, violent to a degree never exceeded in history. Yet with all this sting fresh in their bosoms, we find the victorious multitude, on the latter occasion as well as on the former, burying the past in an indiscriminate amnesty, and anxious only for the future harmonious march of the renovated and all-comprehensive democracy. We see the sentiment of commonwealth in the demos, twice contrasted with the sentiment of faction in an ascendant oligarchy; twice triumphant over the strongest counter-motives, over the most bitter recollections of wrongful murder and spoliation, over all that passionate rush of reactionary appetite which characterises the moment of political restoration.

“Bloody will be the reign of that king who comes back to his kingdom from exile”—says the Latin poet: bloody indeed had been the rule of Critias and those oligarchs who had just come back from exile: “harsh is a demos (observes Æschylus) which has just got clear of misery.” But the Athenian demos, on coming back from Piræus, exhibited the rare phenomenon of a restoration after cruel wrong suffered, sacrificing all the strong impulse of retaliation to a generous and deliberate regard for the future march of the commonwealth. Thucydides remarks that the moderation of political antipathy which prevailed at Athens after the victory of the people over the Four Hundred, was the main cause which revived Athens from her great public depression and danger. Much more forcibly does this remark apply to the restoration after the Thirty, when the public condition of Athens was at the lowest depth of abasement, from which nothing could have rescued her except such exemplary wisdom and patriotism on the part of her victorious demos. Nothing short of this could have enabled her to accomplish that partial resurrection—into an independent and powerful single state, though shorn of her imperial power—which will furnish material for the subsequent portion of our history.

If we wanted any further proof of their capacity for taking the largest and soundest views on a difficult political situation, we should find it in

[403-402 B.C.]

another of their measures at this critical period. The Ten who had succeeded to oligarchical presidency of Athens after the death of Critias and the expulsion of the Thirty, had borrowed from Sparta the sum of one hundred talents [£20,000 or \$100,000] for the express purpose of making war on the exiles in Piræus. After the peace, it was necessary that such sum should be repaid, and some persons proposed that recourse should be had to the property of those individuals and that party who had borrowed the money. The apparent equity of the proposition was doubtless felt with peculiar force at a time when the public treasury was in the extreme of poverty. But nevertheless both the democratical leaders and the people decidedly opposed it, resolving to recognise the debt as a public charge; in which capacity it was afterwards liquidated, after some delay arising from an un-supplied treasury.

The necessity of a fresh collection and publication (if we may use that word) of the laws, had been felt prior to the time of the Thirty. But such a project could hardly be realised without at the same time revising the laws, as a body, removing all flagrant contradictions, and rectifying what might glaringly displease the age either in substance or in style. Now the psephism of Tisamenus, one of the first measures of the renewed democracy after the Thirty, both prescribed such revision and set in motion a revising body; but an additional decree was now proposed and carried by Archinus, relative to the alphabet in which the revised laws should be drawn up. The Ionic alphabet, that is, the full Greek alphabet of twenty-four letters, as now written and printed, had been in use at Athens universally, for a considerable time—apparently for two generations; but from tenacious adherence to ancient custom, the laws had still continued to be consigned to writing in the old Attic alphabet of only sixteen or eighteen letters. It was now ordained that this scanty alphabet should be discontinued, and that the revised laws, as well as all future public acts, should be written up in the full Ionic alphabet.

Partly through this important reform, partly through the revising body, partly through the agency of Nicomachus, who was still continued as Anagrapheus ["Writer-up" of the old laws], the revision, inscription, and publication of the laws in their new alphabet was at length completed. But it seems to have taken two years to perform—or at least two years elapsed before Nicomachus went through his trial of accountability. He appears to have made various new propositions of his own, which were among those adopted by the nomothetæ: for these he was attacked, on a trial of accountability, as well as on the still graver allegation of having corruptly falsified the decisions of that body—writing up what they had not sanctioned, or suppressing that which they had sanctioned.

The archonship of Euclides, succeeding immediately to the Anarchy (as the period of the Thirty was denominated), became thus a cardinal point or epoch in Athenian history. We cannot doubt that the laws came forth out of this revision considerably modified, though unhappily we possess no particulars on the subject. We learn that the political franchise was, on the proposition of Aristophon, so far restricted for the future, that no person could be a citizen by birth except the son of citizen parents on both sides; whereas previously, it had been sufficient if the father alone was a citizen. The rhetor Lysias, by station a metic, had not only suffered great loss, narrowly escaping death from the Thirty (who actually put to death his brother Polemarchus) but had contributed a large sum to assist the armed efforts of the exiles under Thrasybulus in Piræus. As a reward and compensation

for such antecedents, the latter proposed that the franchise of citizen should be conferred upon him; but we are told that this decree, though adopted by the people, was afterwards indicted by Archinus as illegal or informal, and cancelled. Lysias, thus disappointed of the citizenship, passed the remainder of his life as an *isoteles*, or non-freeman on the best condition, exempt from the peculiar burdens upon the class of metics.

Such refusal of citizenship to an eminent man like Lysias, who had both acted and suffered in the cause of the democracy, when combined with the decree of Aristophon above noticed, implies a degree of augmented strictness which we can only partially explain. It was not merely the renewal of her democracy for which Athens had now to provide. She had also to accommodate her legislation and administration to her future march as an isolated state, without empire or foreign dependencies. For this purpose material



GREEK FIRE IRONS

(In the British Museum)

changes must have been required: among others, we know that the Board of Hellenotamiæ (originally named for the collection and management of the tribute at Delos, but attracting to themselves gradually more extended functions, until they became ultimately, immediately before the Thirty, the general paymasters of the state) was discontinued, and such among its duties as did not pass away along with the loss of the foreign empire, were transferred to two new officers—the treasurer at war, and the manager of the theoricon, or religious festival-fund.

While the Athenian empire lasted, the citizens of Athens were spread over the Ægean in every sort of capacity—as settlers, merchants, navigators, soldiers, etc., which must have tended materially to encourage inter-marriages between them and the women of other Grecian insular states. Indeed we are even told that an express permission of *connubium* with Athenians was granted to the inhabitants of Eubœa—a fact (noticed by Lysias) of some moment in illustrating the tendency of the Athenian empire to multiply family ties between Athens and the allied cities. Now, according to the law which prevailed before Euclides, the son of every such marriage was by birth an Athenian citizen; an arrangement at that time useful to Athens, as strengthening the bonds of her empire—and eminently useful in a larger point of view, among the causes of Panhellenic sympathy. But when Athens was deprived both of her empire and her fleet, and confined within the limits of Attica—there no longer remained any motive to continue such a regulation, so that the exclusive city-feeling, instinctive in the Grecian mind, again became predominant. Such is perhaps the explanation of the new restrictive law proposed by Aristophon.

[405-403 B.C.]

Thrasylulus and the gallant handful of exiles who had first seized Phyle received no larger reward than a thousand drachmæ [£40 or \$200] for a common sacrifice and votive offering, together with wreaths of olive as a token of gratitude from their countrymen. The debt which Athens owed to Thrasylulus was indeed such as could not be liquidated by money. To his individual patriotism, in great degree, we may ascribe not only the restoration of the democracy, but its good behaviour when restored. How different would have been the consequences of the restoration and the conduct of the people, had the event been brought about by a man like Alcibiades, applying great abilities principally to the furtherance of his own cupidity and power!

THE END OF ALCIBIADES

At the restoration of the democracy, Alcibiades was already no more. Shortly after the catastrophe at Ægospotami, he had sought shelter in the satrapy of Pharnabazus, no longer thinking himself safe from Lacedæmonian persecution in his forts on the Thracian Chersonesus. He carried with him a good deal of property, though he left still more behind him in these forts: how acquired we do not know. But having crossed apparently to Asia by the Bosporus, he was plundered by the Thracians in Bithynia, and incurred much loss before he could reach Pharnabazus in Phrygia. Renewing the tie of personal hospitality which he had contracted with Pharnabazus four years before, he now solicited from the satrap a safe conduct up to Susa. The Athenian envoys—whom Pharnabazus, after his former pacification with Alcibiades, 408 B.C., had engaged to escort to Susa, but had been compelled by the mandate of Cyrus to detain as prisoners—were just now released from their three years' detention, and enabled to come down to the Propontis; and Alcibiades, by whom this mission had originally been projected, tried to prevail on the satrap to perform the promise which he had originally given, but had not been able to fulfil. The hopes of the sanguine exile, reverting back to the history of Themistocles, led him to anticipate the same success at Susa as had fallen to the lot of the latter: nor was the design impracticable, to one whose ability was universally renowned, and who had already acted as minister to Tissaphernes.

The court of Susa was at this time in a peculiar position. King Darius Nothus, having recently died, had been succeeded by his eldest son Artaxerxes Mnemon; but the younger son Cyrus, whom Darius had sent for during his last illness, tried after the death of the latter to supplant Artaxerxes in the succession—or at least was suspected of so trying. Cyrus being seized and about to be slain, the queen-mother, Parysatis, prevailed upon Artaxerxes to pardon him, and send him again down to his satrapy along the coast of Ionia, where he laboured strenuously, though secretly, to acquire the means of dethroning his brother; a memorable attempt, of which we shall speak more fully hereafter. But his schemes, though carefully masked, did not escape the observation of Alcibiades, who wished to make a merit of revealing them at Susa, and to become the instrument of defeating them. He communicated his suspicions as well as his purpose to Pharnabazus; whom he tried to awaken by alarm of danger to the empire, in order that he might thus get himself forwarded to Susa as informant and auxiliary.

Pharnabazus was already jealous and unfriendly in spirit towards Lysander and the Lacedæmonians (of which we shall soon see plain evidence)—and perhaps towards Cyrus also, since such were the habitual relations of

neighbouring satraps in the Persian empire. But the Lacedæmonians and Cyrus were now all-powerful on the Asiatic coast, so that he probably did not dare to exasperate them, by identifying himself with a mission so hostile, and an enemy so dangerous, to both. Accordingly he refused compliance with the request of Alcibiades; granting him nevertheless permission to live in Phrygia, and even assigning to him a revenue. But the objects at which the exile was aiming soon became more or less fully divulged to those against whom they were intended. His restless character, enterprise, and capacity, were so well known as to raise exaggerated fears as well as exaggerated hopes. Not merely Cyrus, but the Lacedæmonians, closely allied with Cyrus, and the decarchies, whom Lysander had set up in the Asiatic Grecian cities, and who held their power only through Lacedæmonian support—all were uneasy at the prospect of seeing Alcibiades again in action and command, amidst so many unsettled elements. Nor can we doubt that the exiles whom these decarchies had banished, and the disaffected citizens who remained at home under their government in fear of banishment or death, kept up correspondence with him, and looked to him as a probable liberator. Moreover the Spartan king Agis still retained the same personal antipathy against him, which had already (some years before) procured the order to be despatched, from Sparta to Asia, to assassinate him. Here are elements enough, of hostility, vengeance, and apprehension, afloat against Alcibiades—without believing the story of Plutarch, that Critias and the Thirty sent to apprise Lysander that the oligarchy at Athens could not stand so long as Alcibiades was alive.

A special despatch (or scytale) was sent out by the Spartan authorities to Lysander in Asia, enjoining him to procure that Alcibiades should be put to death. Accordingly Lysander communicated this order to Pharnabazus, within whose satrapy Alcibiades was residing, and requested that it might be put in execution. Pharnabazus therefore despatched his brother Magæus and his uncle Sisamithres, with a band of armed men, to assassinate Alcibiades in the Phrygian village where he was residing. These men, not daring to force their way into his house, surrounded it and set it on fire. Yet Alcibiades, having contrived to extinguish the flames, rushed out upon his assailants with a dagger in his right hand, and a cloak wrapped around his left to serve as a shield. None of them dared to come near him; but they poured upon him showers of darts and arrows until he perished, undefended as he was either by shield or by armour. A female companion with whom he lived—Timandra—wrapped up his body in garments of her own, and performed towards it all the last affectionate solemnities.

Such was the deed which Cyrus and the Lacedæmonians did not scruple to enjoin, nor the uncle and brother of a Persian satrap to execute; and by which this celebrated Athenian perished before he had attained the age of fifty. Had he lived, we cannot doubt that he would again have played some conspicuous part—for neither his temper nor his abilities would have allowed him to remain in the shade—but whether to the advantage of Athens or not is more questionable. Certain it is that, taking his life throughout, the good which he did to her bore no proportion to the far greater evil. Of the disastrous Sicilian expedition, he was more the cause than any other individual; though that enterprise cannot properly be said to have been caused by any individual: it emanated rather from a national impulse. Having first, as a counsellor, contributed more than any other man to plunge the Athenians into this imprudent adventure, he next, as an exile, contributed more than any other man (except Nicias) to turn that adventure into ruin,

[404-403 B.C.]

and the consequences of it into still greater ruin. Without him, Gylippus would not have been sent to Syracuse, Decelea would not have been fortified, Chios and Miletus would not have revolted, the oligarchical conspiracy of the Four Hundred would not have been originated. Nor can it be said that his first three years of political action as Athenian leader, in a speculation peculiarly his own — the alliance with Argos, and the campaigns in Peloponnesus — proved in any way advantageous to his country. On the contrary, by playing an offensive game where he had hardly sufficient force for a defensive, he enabled the Lacedæmonians completely to recover their injured reputation and ascendancy through the important victory of Mantinea. The period of his life really serviceable to his country, and really glorious to himself, was that of three years ending with his return to Athens in 407 B.C. The results of these three years of success were frustrated by the unexpected coming down of Cyrus as satrap: but just at the moment when it behoved Alcibiades to put forth a higher measure of excellence, in order to realise his own promises in the face of this new obstacle — at that critical moment we find him spoiled by the unexpected welcome which had recently greeted him at Athens, and falling miserably short even of the former merit whereby that welcome had been earned.

If from his achievements we turn to his dispositions, his ends, and his means — there are few characters in Grecian history who present so little to esteem, whether we look at him as a public or as a private man. His ends are those of exorbitant ambition and vanity; his means rapacious as well as reckless, from his first dealing with Sparta and the Spartan envoys, down to the end of his career. The manœuvres whereby his political enemies first procured his exile were indeed base and guilty in a high degree. But we must recollect that if his enemies were more numerous and violent than those of any other politician in Athens, the generating seed was sown by his own overweening insolence and contempt of restraints, legal as well as social. On the other hand, he was never once defeated either by land or sea. In courage, in ability, in enterprise, in power of dealing with new men and new situations, he was never wanting; qualities which, combined with his high birth, wealth, and personal accomplishments, sufficed to render him for the time the first man in every successive party which he espoused — Athenian, Spartan, or Persian — oligarchical or democratical. But in none of them did he ever inspire any lasting confidence; all successively threw him off. On the whole, we shall find few men in whom eminent capacities for action and command are so thoroughly marred by an assemblage of bad moral qualities as Alcibiades.^b

LIFE AT ATHENS

The state of Athens after the expulsion of the Thirty was in some respects apparently less desolate than that in which she had been left after the battle of Plataea. It is possible indeed that the invasions of Xerxes and Mardonius may have inflicted less injury on her territory than the methodical and lingering ravages of the Peloponnesians during the Deceleian war. But in 479 the city, as well as the country, had been, for a part of two consecutive years, in the power of an irritated enemy. All that it required both for ornament and defence was to be raised afresh from the ground. Yet the treasury was empty: commerce had probably never yet yielded any considerable supplies, and it had been deeply disturbed by the war; the state pos-

sessed no dependent colonies or tributary allies, and was watched with a jealous eye by the most powerful of its confederates.

Commerce had not only been interrupted by the blockade, but had sustained still greater detriment from the tyranny of the Thirty, which had crushed or scared away the most opulent and industrious of the aliens : and the cloud which continued to hang over the prospects of the state, even after freedom and tranquillity had been restored, tended to discourage those who might have been willing to return. The public distress was such that it was with the greatest difficulty the council could provide ways and means



DRINKING HORNS

for the ordinary expenses. Even the ancient sacrifices prescribed by the sacred canons were intermitted, because the treasury could not furnish three talents [£600 or \$3000] for their celebration : and the repayment of a loan of two talents which had been advanced by the Thebans, probably in aid of the exiles, was so long delayed through the same cause, that hostilities were threatened for the purpose of recovering the debt. The navy of Athens had now sunk to a fourth of that which she had maintained before the time of Solon, and it was limited to this footing by a compact which could not be broken or eluded without imminent danger ; Piræus was again unfortified : the arsenal was in ruins : even the city walls needed repairs, which could not be undertaken for want of money ; and on all sides were enemies who rejoiced in her humiliation, and were urged both by their passions and interests to prevent her from again lifting up her head.

The corruption of the Athenian courts of justice probably began with that great extension of their business which took place when the greater part of the allies had lost their independence and were compelled to resort to Athens for the determination of all important causes. At the same time the increase of wealth and the enlargement of commerce, multiplied the occasions of litigation at home. The taste of the people began to be more and more interested in forensic proceedings, even before it was attracted towards them by any other inducement. The pay of the jurors introduced by Pericles strengthened this impulse by a fresh motive, which, when Cleon had tripled its amount, acted more powerfully, and on a larger class. A considerable number of citizens then began to look to the exercise of their judicial functions as a regular source both of pleasure and profit.

But the prevalence of this frivolous habit was not the worst fault of the Athenian courts. In the most important class of cases, the criminal prosecutions, they were seldom perfectly impartial, and their ordinary bias was against the defendant. The juror in the discharge of his office did not forget his quality of citizen, and was not indifferent to the manner in which the issue of a trial might affect the public revenue, and thus he leaned towards decisions which replenished the treasury with confiscations and pecuniary penalties, while they also served to terrify and humble the wealthy class,

[ca. 425-400 B.C.]

which he viewed with jealousy and envy. On this notorious temper of the courts was grounded the power of the infamous sycophants who lived by extortion, and generally singled out, as the objects of their attacks, the opulent citizens of timid natures and quiet habits, who were both unable to plead for themselves, and shrank from a public appearance. Such persons might indeed procure the aid of an advocate, but they commonly thought it better to purchase the silence of the informer, than to expose themselves to the risk and the certain inconvenience of a trial. The resident aliens were not exempt from this annoyance; and, though they were not objects of fear or jealousy, they were placed under many disadvantages in a contest with an Athenian prosecutor. But the noble and affluent citizens of the subject states, above all, had reason to tremble at the thought of being summoned to Athens, to meet any of the charges which it was easy to devise against them, and to connect with an imputation of hostile designs or disloyal sentiments, and were ready to stop the mouths of the orators with gold.

There is no room for doubt as to the existence of the evils and vices we have been describing, though the most copious information we possess on the subject is drawn not from purely historical sources, but from the dramatic satires of Aristophanes. But there may still be a question as to the measure of allowance to be made for comic exaggeration, or political prejudices, in the poet; and it seems probable that the colours in which he has painted his countrymen are in some respects too dark. That the mass of the people had not sunk to this degree of depravity, may we think be inferred from the grief and indignation which it is recorded to have shown on some occasions, where it had been misled into an unjust sentence, by which it stained itself with innocent blood: as Callixenus, who however was not worse than other sycophants, though he was among those who returned after the expulsion of the Thirty, and enjoyed the benefit of the amnesty, died, universally hated, of hunger.



FORTUNE

(After Hope)

ARISTOPHANES

The patriotism of Aristophanes was honest, bold, and generally wise. He was still below the age at which the law permitted a poet to contend for a dramatic prize, and was therefore compelled to use a borrowed name, when, in the year after the death of Pericles, he produced his first work, in which his chief aim seems to have been to exhibit the contrast between the ancient and the modern manners. In his next, his ridicule was pointed more at the defects or the perversion of political institutions, and perhaps at the democratical system of filling public offices by lot. In both, however, he had

probably assailed many of the most conspicuous persons of the day, and either by personal satire, or by attacks on the abuses by which the demagogues thrived, he provoked the hostility of Cleon, who endeavoured to crush him by a prosecution. Its nominal ground was, it seems, the allegation, that the poet, who in fact according to some accounts was of Dorian origin, was not legally entitled to the franchise. But the real charge was that in his



ARISTOPHANES

recent comedy he had exposed the Athenian magistracy to the derision of the foreign spectators. Cleon, however, was baffled; and though the attempt was once or twice renewed, perhaps by other enemies of Aristophanes, it failed so entirely, that he seems to have been soon left in the unmolested enjoyment of public favour; and he not only was encouraged to revenge himself on Cleon by a new piece, in which the demagogue was exhibited in person, and was represented by the poet himself, — who it is said could not find an actor to undertake the part, nor even get a suitable mask made for it, — but he at the same time ventured on an experiment which it seems had never been tried before on the comic stage.

The people had been accustomed to see the most eminent Athenian statesmen and generals brought forward there and placed in a ludicrous light; but it had never yet beheld its own image set before its eyes as in a mirror, which reflected the principal features of its character, not indeed without the exaggeration which belonged to the occasion, but yet with a truth which could not be mistaken or evaded. This was done in the same

play which exposed Cleon's impudence and rapacity; and the follies and faults of the assembled multitude, which appears under its proper name of Demos, as an old dotard, not void of cunning, though incapable of governing himself, are placed in the strongest relief by the presence of its unworthy favourite, who is introduced, not indeed by name, but so as to be immediately recognised, as a lying, thievish, greedy, fawning, Paphlagonian slave. The poet's boldness was so far successful, that instead of offending the audience he gained the first prize: but in every other respect he failed of attaining his object; for Cleon, as we have seen, maintained his influence unimpaired to the end of his life, and the people showed as little disposition to reform its habits, and change its measures, as if the portrait it had seen of itself had been no less amiable than diverting. But the issue of this attempt did not deter him from another, which, but for the applause which had crowned the first, might have appeared equally dangerous. As in the *Knights* he had levelled his satire against the sovereign assembly; in the *Wasps*, which he exhibited in the year before Cleon's death, he attacked the other stronghold of his power, the courts of justice, with still keener ridicule.

The vehicles in which Aristophanes conveyed his political lessons, strange as they appear to us, were probably judiciously chosen, as well with the view of pointing the attention of the audience more forcibly to his practical object, as of relieving the severity of his admonitions and censures. As time has spared only a few fragments of the earlier and the contemporary productions of the comic drama, it is only from the report of the ancient critics that we

[ca. 425-400 B.C.]

can form any notion of the relation in which he stood to his theatrical competitors. He is said not only to have introduced several improvements in the structure of the old political comedy, by which he brought it to its highest perfection, but to have tempered the bitterness and the grossness of his elder rival Cratinus, who is described as the comic Æschylus. It is not quite clear in what sense this account is to be understood, for it is difficult to conceive that the satire of Cratinus can have been either freer or more licentious. But the difference seems to have consisted in the inimitable grace with which Aristophanes handled every subject which he touched. We are informed, indeed, that even in this quality he was surpassed by Eupolis, who is also said to have shown more vigour of imagination in the invention of his plots. Yet another account represents Eupolis as more nearly resembling Cratinus in the violence and homeliness of his invectives; and the testimony of the philosopher Plato, who in an epitaph called the soul of Aristophanes a sanctuary of the Graces, studied his works as a model of style for the composition of his own dialogues, and honoured him with a place in one of his masterpieces, seems sufficient to prove that at least in the elegance of his taste, and the gracefulness of his humour, he had no equal.

How much Aristophanes was in earnest with his subject, how far he was from regarding it merely as an occasion for the exercise of his art, and how little he was swayed by personal prejudices, which have sometimes been imputed to him, is proved less by the keenness of his ridicule than by the warmth of his affection for Athens, which is manifest even under the comic mask. In his extant plays he nowhere intimates a wish for any change in the form of the Athenian institutions. He only deploras the corruption of the public spirit, points out its signs and causes, and assails the persons who minister to it. It is indeed the Athens of another age that he heartily loves; but that age is no remote antiquity; it is, if not within his own memory, near enough to be remembered by the elder part of his audience. He looks back indeed to the days of Miltiades and Aristides, as the period when the glory of Athens was at its height. But those of Myronides and Thucydides, the rival of Pericles, likewise belong, in his view, to the good old times, which he sighs for; and the evils of his own are of still more recent origin. He traces them to the measures of Pericles; to the position in which he had placed Athens with regard to the subject states, and above all to the war in which he had involved her.

The Peloponnesian War he treats as entirely the work of Pericles, and he chooses to ascribe it to his fears for his own safety, or to the influence of Asia; and to consider the quarrel with Megara as only the occasion or colour for it. The war he regards as the main foundation of the power of such demagogues as Cleon and Hyperbolus. If peace were only restored, he hopes that the mass of the people would return to its rural occupations and to its ancient tastes and habits; that the assembly and the courts of justice would no longer hold out the same attractions; that litigation would abate, and the trade of the sycophants decay. Cleon is reproached in the *Knights* with having caused the Spartan overtures to be rejected, because he knew that it was by the war he was enabled to plunder the subject cities, and that if the people were released from the confinement of the city walls, and once more to taste the blessings of peace and of a country life, he should no longer find it subservient to his ends. Hence we may perhaps conclude that when, at the end of the same play, Demos (the personified people) is introduced as newly risen out of a magic cauldron, restored to the vigour and comeliness of youth, in a garb and port worthy of the companion of

Aristides and Miltiades, his eyes opened to his past errors, and with the purpose of correcting them, the poet did not conceive the change thus represented as hopeless, and still less meant to intimate that it was impossible.

It was not without reason that Aristophanes, in common with all Athenians who loved and regretted the ancient times, regarded the sophistical circles with abhorrence, not only as seminaries of demagogues and sycophants, but as schools of impiety and licentiousness. That the attention of the Athenian youth should be diverted from military and athletic exercises, from the sports of the field, and from the enjoyment of that leisure which had once been esteemed the most precious privilege of a Greek freeman, to sedentary studies, which at the best only inflated them with self-conceit, and stimulated them to lay aside the diffidence which befitted their age, and come forward prematurely in public, to exhibit their new acquirements and to supplant the elder and graver citizens on the bema, or to harass them before the popular tribunals: this in itself he deemed a great evil.

In the last scene of the *Knights*, one of the resolutions which Demos adopts is that he will bar the agora and the Pnyx against the beardless youths who now pass so much of their time in places of public resort, where they amuse themselves with discussing the merits of the orators in technical language, and will force them to go a-hunting, instead of making decrees. But it was a still more alarming evil, that, by way of preparation for this pernicious result, the religious belief of the young Athenians should be unsettled, their moral sentiments perverted, their reverence for the maxims and usages of antiquity extinguished; that subjects which had never before been contemplated but at an awful distance—the being and nature of the gods, the obligations arising from domestic and civil relations—should be submitted to close and irreverent inspection. It was according to the view of Aristophanes a matter of comparatively little moment, what turn such discussions happened to take, or what was the precise nature of the sophistical theories. The mischief was already done, when things so sacred had once been treated as subjects for inquiry and argument. But he perceived the evil much more clearly than the remedy. He would fain have carried his countrymen half a century backward, and have forced them to remain stationary at the stage which they had then reached in their intellectual progress; and it seems as if he wished to see the schools of the new philosophy forcibly suppressed, and with this view attempted to direct popular indignation against them. The only case in which this attempt succeeded was one in which the poet himself, if he had been better informed, must have desired it should fail.

EURIPIDES

Aristophanes closely watched all the workings of the sophistical spirit, and was sagacious enough to perceive that they were not confined to any particular sphere, but pervaded every province of thought and action. He was naturally led to observe its influence with peculiar attention in the branches of literature or art which were most nearly allied to his own. He was able to trace it in the innovations which had taken place in music and lyrical poetry, but above all in the tragic drama: and Euripides, the last of the three tragic poets who are known to us by their works, appeared to him as one of the most dangerous sophists, and was on this account among the foremost objects of his bitterest ridicule. The earnestness with which Aristophanes

[*ca.* 425-400 B.C.]

assailed him seems to have increased with the growth of his reputation; for of the three comedies in which he is introduced, the last, which was exhibited after his death, contains by far the most severe as well as elaborate censure of his poetry. It is not however quite certain that Euripides, even in the latter part of his career, was so popular as Sophocles. In answer to a question of Socrates, in a conversation which Xenophon probably heard during the latter part of the Peloponnesian War, Sophocles is mentioned as indisputably the most admirable in his art.

It has often been observed, that the success of Euripides, if it is measured by the prizes which he is said to have gained, would not seem to have been very great: and perhaps there may be reason to suspect, that he owed much of the applause which he obtained in his life-time to the favour of a party, which was strong rather in rank and fortune than in numbers; the same which is said to have been headed by Alcibiades, and to have deprived Aristophanes of the prize.

Alcibiades employed Euripides to celebrate his Olympic victories; and his patronage was sufficient to spread the poet's fame at home and abroad. The anecdote about the celebrity which he had acquired in Sicily is perfectly consistent with this view; as is the invitation which he received a little before his death from Archelaus of Macedon, at whose court he ended his life; and the admiration from Dionysius of Syracuse expressed for him, by buying his tablets and pen at a high price, to dedicate them in the temple of the Muses.

Aristophanes was so far from being blind to the poetical merits of Euripides, that he was himself charged by his rivals with borrowing from him, and in one of his lost plays acknowledged that in his diction he had imitated the terseness of the tragic poet, but asserted that his thoughts were less vulgar. How accurately he had studied the works of the tragic drama, how vividly he perceived the genuine character of Greek tragedy, and the peculiar genius of each poet, is sufficiently proved by the mode in which he has conducted the contest which he feigns between Æschylus and Euripides. But his criticism would probably have been less severe, if he had not considered Euripides less in his poetical character than in his connection with the sophistical school. Euripides had in fact been a hearer of Anaxagoras, and probably both of Protagoras and Prodicus. In his house Protagoras was said to have read one of his works by which he incurred a charge of atheism. He was also on intimate terms with Socrates, who was therefore reported to have aided him in the composition of his tragedies, and perhaps may have done so, in the same way as Prodicus and Anaxagoras; and this connection was, as we shall see, of itself a sufficient ground with Aristophanes for suspicion and aversion. The strength of Euripides lay in passionate and moving scenes, and he sought like other poets for situations and characters which afforded the best opportunity for the display of his powers. But he was too frequently tempted to work upon the feelings of his audience by an exhibition of sufferings which were quite foreign to the heroic dignity of the persons who endured them, who were therefore degraded by the pity they excited. The misery of his heroes often consisted chiefly in bodily privations, which could only awaken the sympathy of the spectator's animal nature.

His irreligion is contrasted with the piety of Æschylus, who invokes the goddess of the Eleusinian mysteries; a hint which, after the prosecution of Alcibiades, was easily understood, as to the party to which Euripides belonged. It was probably in the same point of view that Aristophanes considered the plays which he founded on tales of criminal passion.

Euripides was undoubtedly induced to select such subjects, some of which were new to the Greek stage, chiefly by the opportunity they afforded him of displaying his peculiar dramatic talent. But in his hands they seldom failed to give occasion for a sophistical defence of conduct repugnant to Greek usages and feelings, which to Aristophanes would appear much more pernicious than the example itself. But his plays were likewise interspersed with moral paradoxes, which in more than one instance are said to have excited the indignation of the audience. A line in which the most pious of his heroes distinguishes between the oath of the tongue and that of the mind, in terms which might serve to justify any perjury, became very celebrated, and Aristophanes dwells upon it, apparently as a striking illustration of the sophistical spirit. It seems clear that these, and others of the novelties just mentioned, cannot have been designed to gain the general applause of the audience. Though we must reject a story told by some of his Greek biographers, which indeed is at variance with chronology, that the fate of his master Anaxagoras deterred him from philosophical pursuits, and led him to turn his thoughts to the drama, we might still wonder at his indiscretion, if it had not appeared probable that he aimed at gratifying the taste, not so much of the multitude, as of that class of persons which took pleasure in the new learning, and was in fact the favourite poet, not so much of the common people, as of a party, which was growing more and more powerful throughout his dramatic career.

Euripides, however, occupies only a subordinate place among the disciples and supporters of the sophistical school, whom Aristophanes attacked. The person whom he selected as its representative, and on whom he endeavoured to throw the whole weight of the charges which he brought against it, was Socrates. In the *Clouds*, a comedy exhibited in 423, a year after the *Knights* had been received with so much applause, Socrates was brought on the stage under his own name, as the arch-sophist, the master of the free-thinking school. The story is of a young spendthrift, who has involved his father in debt by his passion for horses, and having been placed under the care of Socrates is enabled by his instructions to defraud his creditors, but also learns to regard filial obedience and respect, and piety to the gods, as groundless and antiquated prejudices; and it seems hardly possible to doubt that under this character the poet meant to represent Alcibiades, whom it perfectly suits in its general outline, and who may have been suggested to the thoughts of the spectators in many ways not now perceived by the reader. It seems at first sight as if in this work Aristophanes must stand convicted either of the foulest motives or of a gross mistake. For the character of Socrates was in most points directly opposed to the principles and practice which he attributes here and elsewhere to the sophists and their followers. Yet in the *Clouds* this excellent person appears in the most odious as well as ridiculous aspect; and the play ends with the preparations made by the father of the misguided youth to consume him and his school.^c



REMAINS OF A TEMPLE AT METAPONTUM

CHAPTER XXXIX. SOCRATES AND THE SOPHISTS

It was not till the superior talents of Pericles had quieted the storms of war and faction that science, which had in the interval received great improvement among the Asian Greeks, revived at Athens with new vigour. Anaxagoras of Clazomenæ, the preceptor and friend of Pericles, bred in all the learning of the Ionian school, is said first to have introduced what might properly be called philosophy there. To him is attributed the first introduction in European Greece of the idea of one eternal, almighty, and all-good Being, or, as he is said, after Thales, to have expressed himself, a perfect mind, independent of body, as the cause or creator of all things. The gods received in Greece, of course, were low in his estimation; the sun and moon, commonly reputed divinities, he held to be mere material substances, the sun a globe of stone, the moon an earth, nearly similar to ours. A doctrine so repugnant to the system on which depended the estimation of all the festivals, processions, sacrifices, and oracles, which so fascinated the vulgar mind, was not likely to be propagated without reprehension. Even the science which enabled men to calculate an eclipse was offensive, inasmuch as it lowered the importance, and interfered with the profits, of priests, augurs, interpreters, and seers. An accusation of impiety was therefore instituted against Anaxagoras; the general voice went with the prosecutors; and all that the power and influence of Pericles could do for his valued friend, was to procure him means of escape from Attica.

But while physical and metaphysical speculation engaged men of leisure, other learning had more attraction for the ambitious and needy. Athens always was the great field for acquiring fame and profit in this line; yet those who first attained eminence in it were foreigners there, Gorgias of Leontini in Sicily, Prodicus of the little island of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. All these are said to have acquired considerable riches by their profession. Their success invited numbers to follow their example; and Greece, but far more especially Athens, shortly abounded with those who, under the name of sophists, professors of wisdom, undertook to teach every science. The scarcity and dearness of books gave high value to that learning which a man with a well-stored mind, and a ready and clear elocution could communicate. None, without eloquence, could undertake to be instructors; so that the sophists, in giving lessons of eloquence, were themselves the example. They

frequented all places of public resort, the agora, the public walks, the gymnasia, and the porticos; where they recommended themselves to notice by an ostentatious display of their abilities, in disputation among one another, or with whoever would converse with them.

The profession of sophist had not long flourished, and no Athenian had acquired fame in any branch of philosophy, when the singular talents, and singular manners and pursuits, of Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, engaged public attention. The father was a statuary, and is not mentioned as very eminent in his profession; but, as a man, he seems to have been respected among the most eminent of the commonwealth: he lived in particular intimacy with Lysimachus, son of the great Aristides. Socrates, inheriting a very scanty fortune, had a mind wholly intent upon the acquisition and communication of knowledge. The sublime principles of theology, taught by Anaxagoras, made an early impression upon his mind. They led him to consider what should be the duty owed by man to such a Being as Anaxagoras described his Creator; and it struck him that, if the providence of God interfered in the government of this world, the duty of man to man, little considered by poets or priests as any way connected with religion, and hitherto almost totally neglected by philosophers, must be a principal branch of the duty of man to God. It struck him further that, with the gross defects which he saw in the religion, the morality, and the governments of Greece, though the favourite inquiries of the philosophers, concerning the nature of the Deity, the formation of the world, the laws of the heavenly bodies, might, while they amused, perhaps also enlarge and improve the minds of a few speculative men, yet the investigation of the social duties was infinitely more important, and might be infinitely more useful, to mankind in general. Endowed by nature with a most discriminating mind, and a singularly ready eloquence, he directed his utmost attention to that investigation; and when, by reflection, assisted and proved by conversation among the sophists and other able men, he had decided an opinion, he communicated it, not in the way of precept, which the fate of Anaxagoras had shown hazardous, but by proposing a question, and, in the course of interrogatory argument, leading his hearers to the just conclusion.

We are informed by his disciple Xenophon how he passed his time. He was always in public. Early in the morning he went to the walks and the gymnasia: when the agora filled, he was there; and, in the afternoon, wherever he could find most company. Generally he was the principal speaker. The liveliness of his manner made his conversation amusing as well as instructive, and he denied its advantages to nobody. But he was nevertheless a most patient hearer; and preferred being the hearer whenever others were present able and disposed to give valuable information to the company. He did not commonly refuse invitations, frequently received, to private entertainments; but he would undertake no private instruction, nor could any solicitation induce him to relieve his poverty by accepting, like the sophists and rhetoricians, a reward for what he gave in public.

In the variety of his communication on social duties he could not easily, and perhaps he did not desire entirely to avoid either religious or political subjects; hazardous, both of them, under the jealous tyranny of democracy. It remains a question how far he was subject to superstition; but his honesty is so authenticated that it seems fairer to impute to him some weakness in credulity than any intention to deceive. If we may believe his own account, reported by his two principal disciples, he believed himself divinely impelled to the employment to which he devoted his life, inquiring and

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teaching the duty of man to man. A divine spirit, in his idea, constantly attended him; whose voice, distinctly heard, never expressly commanded what he was indisposed to do, but frequently forbade what he had intended. To unveil the nature of Deity was not among his pretensions. He only insisted on the perfect goodness and perfect wisdom of the Supreme God, the creator of all things, and the constant superintendence of his providence over the affairs of men. As included in these, he held that everything done, said, or merely wished by men, was known to the Deity, and that it was impossible he could be pleased with evil. The unity of God, though implied in many of his reported discourses, he would not in direct terms assert; rather carefully avoiding to dispute the existence of the multifarious gods acknowledged in Greece; but he strongly denied the weaknesses, vices, and crimes commonly imputed to them. Far however from proposing to innovate in forms of worship and religious ceremonies, so various in the different Grecian states, and sources of more doubt and contention than any other circumstances of the heathen religion, he held that men could not, in these matters, do wrong if they followed the laws of their own country and the institutions of their forefathers. He was therefore regular in sacrifice, both upon the public altars and in his family. He seems to have been persuaded that the Deity, by various signs, revealed the future to men; in oracles, dreams, and all the various ways usually acknowledged by those conversant in the reputed science of augury. "Where the wisdom of men cannot avail," he said, "we should endeavour to gain information from the gods; who will not refuse intelligible signs to those to whom they are propitious." Accordingly he consulted oracles himself, and he recommended the same practice to others, in every doubt on important concerns.

The circumstances of the Athenian government, in his time, could not invite a man of his disposition to offer himself for political situations. He thought he might be infinitely more useful to his country in the singular line, it might indeed be called a public line, which he had chosen for himself. Not only he would not solicit office, but he would take no part in political contest. In the several revolutions which occurred he was perfectly passive. But he would refuse nothing: on the contrary, he would be active in everything that he thought decidedly the duty of a citizen. When called upon to serve among the heavy-armed, he was exemplary in the duties of a private soldier; and as such he fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium. We find him mentioned in civil office; at one time president of the general assembly, and at another a member of the council of Five Hundred. In each situation he distinguished himself by his unbending uprightness. When president, he resisted the violence of the assembled people, who voted a decree, in substance or in manner, contrary to the constitution. Neither entreaties nor threats could move him to give it the necessary sanction of his office. As a member of the council we have already seen him, in the office of prytanis, at the trial of the six generals, persevering in resistance to the injustice of popular tyranny, rendered useless through the want of equal constancy in his colleagues, who yielded to the storm. Under the Thirty again we have seen him, not in office indeed, but daring to refuse office, unworthy and illegal office, which the tyranny of the all-powerful Critias would have put upon him.

We are not informed when Socrates first became distinguished as a sophist; for in that description of men he was in his own day reckoned. When the wit of Aristophanes was directed against him in the theatre he was already among the most eminent, but his eminence seems to have been then recent. It was about the tenth or eleventh year of the Peloponnesian

War, when he was six or seven and forty years of age, that, after the manner of the old comedy, he was offered to public derision upon the stage, by his own name, as one of the persons of the drama, in the comedy of Aristophanes, called the *Clouds*, which is yet extant. The audience, accustomed to look on defamation with carelessness, and to hold as lawful and proper whatever might amuse the multitude, applauded the wit, and even gave general approbation to the composition; but the high estimation of the character of Socrates sufficed to prevent that complete success which the poet had looked for. The crown, which rewarded him whose drama most earned the public favour, and which Aristophanes had so often won, was on this occasion refused him.

Two or three and twenty years had elapsed since the first representation of the *Clouds*; the storms of conquest suffered from a foreign enemy and from four revolutions in the civil government of the country, had passed; nearly three years had followed of that quiet which the revolution under Thrasybulus produced, and the act of amnesty should have confirmed, when a young man, named Meletus, went to the king-archon, delivered, in the usual form, an information against Socrates, and bound himself to prosecute. The information ran thus: "Meletus, son of Meletus, of the borough of Pitthos, declares these upon oath against Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, of the borough of Alopecce: Socrates is guilty of reviling the gods whom the city acknowledges, and of preaching other new gods: moreover he is guilty of corrupting the youth. Penalty, death."



GRECIAN TERRA-COTTA
(In the British Museum)

THE PROSECUTION OF SOCRATES

Xenophon begins his *Memorabilia* of his revered master with declaring his wonder how the Athenians could have been persuaded to condemn to death a man of such uncommonly clear innocence and exalted worth. Ælianus, though for authority not to be compared with Xenophon, has nevertheless, we think, given the solution. "Socrates," he says, "disliked the Athenian constitution. For he saw that democracy is tyrannical, and abounds with all the evils of absolute monarchy." But though the political circumstances of the times made it necessary for contemporary writers to speak with caution, yet both Xenophon and Plato have declared enough to show that the assertion of Ælianus was well founded; and further proof, were it wanted, may be derived from another early writer, nearly contemporary, and deeply versed in the politics of his age, the orator Æschines. Indeed, though not stated in the indictment, yet it was urged against Socrates by his prosecutors before the court, that he was disaffected to the democracy; and in proof

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they affirmed it to be notorious that he had ridiculed what the Athenian constitution prescribed, the appointment to magistracy by lot. "Thus," they said, "he taught his numerous followers, youths of the principal families of the city, to despise the established government, and to be turbulent and seditious; and his success had been seen in the conduct of two, the most eminent, Alcibiades and Critias. Even the best things he converted to these ill purposes: from the most esteemed poets, and particularly from Homer, he selected passages to enforce his anti-democratical principles."

Socrates, it appears indeed, was not inclined to deny his disapprobation of the Athenian constitution. His defence itself, as it is reported by Plato, contains matter on which to found an accusation against him of disaffection to the sovereignty of the people, such as, under the jealous tyranny of the Athenian democracy, would sometimes subject a man to the penalties of high treason. "You well know," he says, "Athenians, that, had I engaged in public business, I should long ago have perished, without procuring any advantage either to you or to myself. Let not the truth offend you: it is no peculiarity of your democracy, or of your national character; but wherever the people is sovereign, no man who shall dare honestly to oppose injustice, frequent and extravagant injustice, can avoid destruction."

Without this proof indeed we might reasonably believe that, though Socrates was a good and faithful subject of the Athenian government, and would promote no sedition, no political violence, yet he could not like the Athenian constitution. He wished for wholesome changes by gentle means; and it seems even to have been a principal object of the labours to which he dedicated himself, to infuse principles into the rising generation that might bring about the desirable change insensibly. His scholars were chiefly sons of the wealthiest citizens, whose easy circumstances afforded leisure to attend him; and some of these, zealously adopting his tenets, others merely pleased with the ingenuity of his arguments and the liveliness of his manner, and desirous to emulate his triumphs over his opponents, were forward, after his example, to engage in disputation upon all the subjects on which he was accustomed to discourse. Thus employed and thus followed, though himself avoiding office and public business, those who governed or desired to govern the commonwealth through their influence among the many, might perhaps not unreasonably consider him as one who was, or might become, a formidable adversary; nor might it be difficult to excite popular jealousy against him.

Meletus, who stood forward as his principal accuser, was, according to Plato, not a man of any great consideration. He was soon joined by Lycon, one of the most powerful speakers of his time, and the avowed patron of the rhetoricians, who, as well as the poets, thought their interest injured by the moral philosopher's doctrine. But Anytus, a man scarcely second to any in the commonwealth in rank and general estimation, who had held high command with reputation in the Peloponnesian War, and had been the principal associate of Thrasybulus in the war against the Thirty and the restoration of the democracy, declared himself a supporter of the prosecution. Nothing in the accusation could, by any known law of Athens, affect the life of the accused. In England no man would be put upon trial on so vague a charge: no grand jury would listen to it. But in Athens, if the party was strong enough, it signified little what was the law. When Lycon and Anytus came forward, Socrates saw that his condemnation was already decided.

By the course of his life, however, and by the turn of his thoughts for many years, he had so prepared himself for all events, that the probability of his condemnation, far from being alarming, was to him rather matter for

rejoicing, as, at his age, a fortunate occurrence. Xenophon says that, by condescending to a little supplication, Socrates might easily have obtained his acquittal. It was usual for accused persons, when brought before the court, to bewail their apprehended lot, with tears to supplicate favour, and by exhibiting their children upon the bema, to endeavour to excite pity. No admonition or entreaty of his friends however could persuade him to such an unworthiness. He thought it, he said, more respectful to the court, as well as more becoming himself, to omit all this; however aware that

their sentiments were likely so far to differ from his that judgment would be given in anger for it. Accordingly, when put upon his defence, he told the people that he did not plead for his own sake, but for theirs, wishing them to avoid the guilt of an unjust sentence.

Condemnation pronounced wrought no change upon him. He again addressed the court, declared his innocence of the matters laid against him, and observed that, even if every charge had been completely proved, still altogether did not, according to any known law, amount to a capital crime. "But," in conclusion he said, "it is time to depart: I to die, you to live: but which for the greater good, God only knows."

It was usual at Athens for execution very soon to follow condemnation; commonly on the morrow. But it happened that the condemnation of Socrates took place on the eve of the day appointed for the sacred ceremony of crowning the galley which carried the annual offerings to the gods worshipped at Delos: and immemorial tradition forbade all executions till the sacred vessel's return. Thus the death of Socrates was respite thirty days,



SOCRATES IN PRISON

while his friends had free access to him in the prison. During all that time he admirably supported his constancy. Means were concerted for his escape; the jailer was bribed, a vessel prepared, and a secure retreat in Thessaly provided. No arguments, no prayers could persuade him to use the opportunity. He had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not furnish an example of the breach of it. To no purpose it was urged that he had been unjustly condemned: he had always held that wrong did not justify wrong. He waited with perfect composure the return of the sacred vessel, reasoned on the immortality of the soul, the advantage of virtue, the happiness derived from having made it through life his pursuit, and, with his friends about him, took the fatal cup, and died.

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Writers who, after Xenophon and Plato, have related the death of Socrates, appear to have held themselves bound to vie with those who preceded them in giving pathos to the story. The purpose here has been rather to render it intelligible: to show its connection with the political history of Athens; to derive from it illustration of the political history. The magnanimity of Socrates, the principal factor of the pathos, surely deserves admiration; yet it is not that in which he has most outshone other men. The singular merit of Socrates lay in the purity and the usefulness of his manners and conversation; the clearness with which he saw, and the steadiness with which he practised, in a blind and corrupt age, all moral duties; the disinterestedness and the zeal with which he devoted himself to the benefit of others; and the enlarged and warm benevolence, whence his supreme and almost only pleasure seems to have consisted in doing good. The purity of Christian morality, little enough indeed seen in practice, nevertheless is become so familiar in theory that it passes almost for obvious, and even congenial to the human mind. Those only will justly estimate the merit of that near approach to it which Socrates made, who will take the pains to gather, as they may from the writings of his contemporaries and predecessors, how little conception was entertained of it before his time; how dull to a just moral sense the human mind has really been; how slow the progress in the investigation of moral duties, even where not only great pains have been taken, but the greatest abilities zealously employed; and, when discovered, how difficult it has been to establish them by proofs beyond controversy, or proofs even that should be generally admitted by the reason of men.

It is through the light which Socrates diffused by his doctrine enforced by his practice, with the advantage of having both the doctrine and the practice exhibited to highest advantage in the incomparable writings of disciples such as Plato and Xenophon, that his life forms an era in the history of Athens and of man.^b

It is our great good fortune to possess a long and sympathetic description of the closing scenes of his life in the unsurpassed prose of his disciple Plato. Though told in the form of a dialogue and much too long for quotation in full, the presentation of Socrates is so vivid and veracious that a part of it must be given.^a

PLATO'S ACCOUNT OF THE LAST HOURS OF SOCRATES

When we entered, we found Socrates just freed from his bonds, and Xantippe, you know her, holding his little boy and sitting by him. As soon as Xantippe saw us, she wept aloud and said such things as women usually do on such occasions, as "Socrates, your friends will now converse with you for the last time and you with them." But Socrates, looking towards Crito, said, "Crito, let some one take her home." Upon which some of Crito's attendants led her away, wailing and beating herself.

But Socrates sitting up in bed, drew up his leg, and rubbed it with his hand, and as he rubbed it, said: "What an unaccountable thing, my friends, that seems to be, which men call pleasure; and how wonderfully is it related towards that which appears to be its contrary, pain, in that they will not both be present to a man at the same time, yet, if any one pursues and attains the one, he is almost always compelled to receive the other, as if they were both united together from one head."

"And it seems to me," he said, "that if Æsop had observed this he would have made a fable from it, how the Deity, wishing to reconcile these warring principles, when he could not do so, united their heads together, and from hence whomsoever the one visits the other attends immediately after; as appears to be the case with me, since I suffered pain in my leg before from the chain, but now pleasure seems to have succeeded.

"A bypath, as it were, seems to lead us on in our researches undertaken by reason,' because as long as we are encumbered with the body, and our soul is contaminated with such an evil, we can never fully attain to what we desire; and this, we say, is truth. For the body subjects us to innumerable hindrances on account of its necessary support, and moreover if any diseases befall us, they impede us in our search after that which is; and it fills us with longings, desires, fears, all kinds of fancies, and a multitude of absurdities, so that, as it is said in real truth, by reason of the body it is never possible for us to make any advances in wisdom.

"For nothing else but the body and its desires occasion wars, seditions, and contests; for all wars amongst us arise on account of our desire to acquire wealth; and we are compelled to acquire wealth on account of the body, being enslaved by its service; and consequently on all these accounts we are hindered in the pursuit of philosophy. But the worst of all is, that if it leaves us any leisure, and we apply ourselves to the consideration of any subject, it constantly obtrudes itself in the midst of our researches, and occasions trouble and disturbance, and confounds us so that we are not able by reason of it to discern the truth. It has then in reality been demonstrated to us, that if we are ever to know anything purely, we must be separated from the body, and contemplate the things themselves by the mere soul. And then, as it seems, we shall obtain that which we desire, and which we profess ourselves to be lovers of, wisdom, when we are dead, as reason shows, but not while we are alive. For if it is not possible to know anything purely in conjunction with the body, one of these two things must follow, either that we can never acquire knowledge, or only after we are dead; for then the soul will subsist apart by itself, separate from the body, but not before. And while we live, we shall thus, as it seems, approach nearest to knowledge, if we hold no intercourse or communion at all with the body, except what absolute necessity requires, nor suffer ourselves to be polluted by its nature, but purify ourselves from it, until God himself shall release us. And thus being pure, and freed from the folly of the body, we shall in all likelihood be with others like ourselves, and shall of ourselves know the whole real essence, and that probably is truth; for it is not allowable for the impure to attain to the pure. Such things, I think, Simmias, all true lovers of wisdom must both think and say to one another. Does it not seem so to you?"

"Most assuredly, Socrates."

"If this, then," said Socrates, "is true, my friend, there is great hope for one who arrives where I am going; there, if anywhere, to acquire that in perfection for the sake of which we have taken so much pains during our past life; so that the journey now appointed me is set out upon with good hope, and will be so by any other man who thinks that his mind has been as it were purified."

"Certainly," said Simmias.

"But does not purification consist in this, as was said in a former part of our discourse, in separating as much as possible the soul from the body, and in accustoming it to gather and collect itself by itself on all sides apart

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from the body, and to dwell, as far as it can, both now and hereafter, alone by itself, delivered as it were from the shackles of the body?"

"Certainly," he replied.

"Is this then called death, this deliverance and separation of the soul from the body?"

"Assuredly," he answered.

"But, as we affirmed, those who pursue philosophy rightly, are especially and alone desirous to deliver it, and this is the very study of philosophers, the deliverance and separation of the soul from the body, is it not?"

"It appears so."

"Then, as I said at first, would it not be ridiculous for a man who has endeavoured throughout his life to live as near as possible to death; then, when death arrives, to grieve? Would not this be ridiculous?"

"How should it not?"

"In reality then, Simmias," he continued, "those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die; and to them of all men death is least formidable. Judge from this. Since they altogether hate the body and desire to keep the soul by itself, would it not be irrational if, when this comes to pass, they should be afraid and grieve, and not be glad to go to that place, where on their arrival they may hope to obtain that which they longed for throughout life; but they longed for wisdom; and to be freed from association with that which they hated? How many of their own accord wished to descend into Hades, on account of human objects of affection, their wives and sons, induced by this very hope of there seeing and being with those whom they have loved; and shall one who really loves wisdom, and firmly cherishes this very hope, that he shall nowhere else obtain it in a manner worthy of the name, except in Hades, be grieved at dying, and not gladly go there? We must think that he would gladly go, my friend, if he be in truth a philosopher; for he will be firmly persuaded of this, that he will nowhere else but there attain wisdom in its purity; and if this be so, would it not be very irrational, as I just now said, if such a man were to be afraid of death?"

"Very much so, by Jupiter," he replied.

"But it is right, my friends," he said, "that we should consider this, that if the soul is immortal, it requires our care not only for the present time, which we call life, but for all time; and the danger would now appear to be dreadful, if one should neglect it. For if death were a deliverance from everything, it would be a great gain for the wicked, when they die, to be delivered at the same time from the body, and from their vices together with the soul: but now, since it appears to be immortal, it can have no other refuge from evils, nor safety, except by becoming as good and wise as possible. For the soul goes to Hades, possessing nothing else but its discipline and education, which are said to be of the greatest advantage or detriment to the dead, on the very beginning of his journey thither.

"When the dead arrive at the place to which their dæmon leads them severally, first of all they are judged, as well those who have lived well and piously, as those who have not. And those who appear to have passed a middle kind of life, proceeding to Acheron, and embarking in the vessels they have, on these arrive at the lake, and there dwell, and when they are purified, and have suffered punishment for the iniquities they may have committed, they are set free, and each receives the reward of his good deeds, according to his deserts: but those who appear to be incurable, through the magnitude of their offences, either from having committed many and great

sacrileges, or many unjust and lawless murders, or other similar crimes, these a suitable destiny hurls into Tartarus, whence they never come forth. But those who appear to have been guilty of curable, yet great offences, such as those who through anger have committed any violence against father or mother, and have lived the remainder of their life in a state of penitence, or they who have become homicides in a similar manner, these must of necessity fall into Tartarus, but after they have fallen, and have been there for a year, the wave casts them forth, the homicides into Cocytus, but the parricides and matricides into Pyriphlegethon: but when, being borne along, they arrive at the Acherusian lake, there they cry out to and invoke, some those whom they slew, others those whom they injured, and invoking them, they entreat and implore them to suffer them to go out into the lake, and to receive them; and if they persuade them, they go out, and are freed from their sufferings, but if not, they are borne back to Tartarus, and thence again to the rivers, and they do not cease from suffering this until they have persuaded those whom they have injured, for this sentence was imposed on them by the judges. But those who are found to have lived an eminently holy life, these are they, who, being freed and set at large from these regions in the earth, as from a prison, arrive at the pure abode above, and dwell on the upper parts of the earth. And among these, they who have sufficiently purified themselves by philosophy shall live without bodies, throughout all future time, and shall arrive at habitations yet more beautiful than these.

"On account of these things, then, a man ought to be confident about his soul, who during this life has disregarded all the pleasures and ornaments of the body as foreign to his nature, and who, having thought that they do more harm than good, has zealously applied himself to the acquirement of knowledge, and who having adorned his soul not with a foreign but its own proper ornament, temperance, justice, fortitude, freedom, and truth, thus waits for his passage to Hades, as one who is ready to depart whenever destiny shall summon him. You then," he continued, "Simmias and Cebes, and the rest, will each of you depart at some future time; but now destiny summons me, as a tragic writer would say, and it is nearly time for me to betake myself to the bath; for it appears to me to be better to drink the poison after I have bathed myself, and not to trouble the women with washing my dead body."

When he had thus spoken, Crito said, "So be it, Socrates, but what commands have you to give to these or to me, either respecting your children, or any other matter, in attending to which we can most oblige you?"

"What I always say, Crito," he replied, "nothing new; that by taking care of yourselves you will oblige both me and mine, and yourselves, whatever you do, though you should not now promise it; but if you neglect yourselves, and will not live as it were in the footsteps of what has been now and formerly said, even though you should promise much at present, and that earnestly, you will do no good at all."

"We will endeavour then so to do," he said; "but how shall we bury you?"

"Just as you please," he said, "if only you can catch me, and I do not escape from you." And at the same time smiling gently, and looking around on us, he said; "I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodises each part of the discourse; but he thinks I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me. But that which I sometime argued at length, that when I have drunk the poison I shall no longer remain with

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you, but shall depart to some happy state of the blessed, this I seem to have urged to him in vain, though I meant at the same time to console both you and myself. Be ye then my sureties to Crito," he said, "in an obligation contrary to that which he made to the judges; for he undertook that I should remain; but do you be sureties that, when I die, I shall not remain, but shall depart, that Crito may more easily bear it, and when he sees my body either burnt or buried, may not be afflicted for me, as if I suffered some dreadful thing, nor say at my interment that Socrates is laid out, or is carried out, or is buried. For be well assured," he said, "most excellent Crito, that to speak improperly is not only culpable as to the thing itself, but likewise occasions some injury to our souls. You must have a good courage then, and say that you bury my body, and bury it in such a manner as is pleasing to you, and as you think is most agreeable to our laws."

When he had said thus he rose, and went into a chamber to bathe, and Crito followed him, but he directed us to wait for him. We waited, therefore, conversing among ourselves about what had been said, and considering it again, and sometimes speaking about our calamity, how severe it would be to us, sincerely thinking that, like those who are deprived of a father, we should pass the rest of our life as orphans. When he had bathed, and his children were brought to him, for he had two little sons and one grown up, and the women belonging to his family were come, having conversed with them in the presence of Crito, and given them such injunctions as he wished, he directed the women and children to go away, and then returned to us.

And it was now near sunset; for he spent a considerable time within. But when he came from bathing he sat down, and did not speak much afterwards; then the officer of the Eleven came in, and standing near him, said, "Socrates, I shall not have to find that fault with you that I do with others, that they are angry with me, and curse me, when, by order of the archons, I bid them drink the poison. But you, on all other occasions during the time you have been here, I have found to be the most noble, meek, and excellent man of all that ever came into this place; and, therefore, I am now well convinced that you will not be angry with me—for you know who are to blame—but with them. Now, then, for you know what I came to announce to you, farewell, and endeavour to bear what is inevitable as easily as possible." And at the same time, bursting into tears, he turned away and withdrew.

And Socrates, looking after him, said, "And thou, too, farewell; we will do as you direct." At the same time turning to us, he said, "How courteous the man is; during the whole time I have been here he has visited me, and conversed with me sometimes, and proved the worthiest of men; and now how generously he weeps for me. But come, Crito, let us obey him, and let some one bring the poison, if it is ready pounded; but if not, let the man pound it."

Then Crito said, "But I think, Socrates, that the sun is still on the mountains, and has not yet set. Besides, I know that others have drunk the poison very late, after it had been announced to them, and have supped and drunk freely, and some even have enjoyed the objects of their love. Do not hasten then, for there is yet time."

Upon this Socrates replied, "These men whom you mention, Crito, do these things with good reason, for they think they shall gain by so doing, and I too with good reason shall not do so; for I think I shall gain nothing by drinking a little later, except to become ridiculous to myself, in being so

fond of life, and sparing of it when none any longer remains. Go, then," he said, "obey, and do not resist."

Crito having heard this, nodded to the boy that stood near. And the boy having gone out, and stayed for some time, came, bringing with him the man who was to administer the poison, who brought it ready pounded in a cup.

And Socrates, on seeing the man, said, "Well, my good friend, as you are skilled in these matters, what must I do?"

"Nothing else," he replied, "than, when you have drunk it walk about, until there is a heaviness in your legs, then lie down; thus it will do its purpose."

And at the same time he held out the cup to Socrates. And he having received it very cheerfully, neither trembling, nor changing at all in colour or countenance, but, as he was wont, looking steadfastly at the man, said, "What say you of this potion, with respect to making a libation to any one, is it lawful or not?"

"We only pound so much, Socrates," he said, "as we think sufficient to drink."

"I understand you," he said, "but it is certainly both lawful and right to pray to the gods, that my departure hence thither may be happy; which therefore I pray, and so may it be." And as he said this, he drank it off readily and calmly. Thus far, most of us were with difficulty able to restrain ourselves from weeping, but when we saw him drinking, and having finished the draught, we could do so no longer; but in spite of myself the tears came in full torrent, so that, covering my face, I wept for myself, for I did not weep for him, but for my own fortune, in being deprived of such a friend. But Crito, even before me, when he could not restrain his tears, had risen up.

But Apollodorus even before this had not ceased weeping, and then bursting into an agony of grief, weeping and lamenting, he pierced the heart of every one present, except Socrates himself. But he said, "What are you doing, my admirable friends? I, indeed, for this reason chiefly, sent away the women, that they might not commit any folly of this kind. For I have heard that it is right to die with good omens. Be quiet, therefore, and bear up."

When we heard this we were ashamed, and restrained our tears. But he, having walked about, when he said that his legs were growing heavy, lay down on his back; for the man so directed him. And at the same time he who gave him the poison, taking hold of him, after a short interval examined his feet and legs; and then having pressed his foot hard, he asked if he felt it; he said that he did not. And after this he pressed his thighs; and thus going higher, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. Then Socrates touched himself, and said, that when the poison reached his heart he should then depart. But now the parts around the lower belly were almost cold; when, uncovering himself, for he had been covered over, he said, and they were his last words, "Crito, we owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay it, therefore, and do not neglect it."

"It shall be done," said Crito, "but consider whether you have anything else to say."

To this question he gave no reply; but shortly after he gave a convulsive movement, and the man covered him, and his eyes were fixed; and Crito perceiving it, closed his mouth and eyes.

This was the end of our friend, a man, as we may say, the best of all of his time that we have known, and moreover, the most wise and just.^c

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF SOCRATES



GREEK VASE

Thus perished the "*parens philosophicæ*" — the first of ethical philosophers; a man who opened to science both new matter, alike copious and valuable, and a new method, memorable not less for its originality and efficacy, than for the profound philosophical basis on which it rests. Though Greece produced great poets, orators, speculative philosophers, historians, etc., yet other countries, having the benefit of Grecian literature to begin with, have nearly equalled her in all these lines, and surpassed her in some. But where are we to look for a parallel to Socrates, either in or out of the Grecian world? The cross-examining elenchus, which he not only first struck out, but wielded with such

matchless effect, and to such noble purposes, has been mute ever since his last conversation in the prison; for even his great successor Plato was a writer and lecturer, not a colloquial dialectician. No man has ever been found strong enough to bend his bow; much less, sure enough to use it as he did. His life remains as the only evidence, but a very satisfactory evidence, how much can be done by this sort of intelligent interrogation; how powerful is the interest which it can be made to inspire, how energetic the stimulus which it can apply in awakening dormant reason and generating new mental power.

It has been often customary to exhibit Socrates as a moral preacher, in which character probably he has acquired to himself the general reverence attached to his name. This is, indeed, a true attribute, but not the characteristic or salient attribute, nor that by which he permanently worked on mankind. On the other hand, Arcesilaus, and the New Academy, a century and more afterwards, thought that they were following the example of Socrates (and Cicero seems to have thought so too) when they reasoned against everything — and when they laid it down as a system, that against every affirmative position, an equal force of negative argument might be brought up as counterpoise. Now this view of Socrates is, in my judgment, not merely partial, but incorrect. He entertained no such systematic distrust of the powers of the mind to attain certainty. He laid down a clear (though erroneous) line of distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. About physics, he was more than a sceptic; he thought that man could know nothing: the gods did not intend that man should acquire any such information, and therefore managed matters in such a way as to be beyond his ken, for all except the simplest phenomena of daily wants; moreover, not only man could not acquire such information, but ought not to labour after it. But respecting the topics which concern man and society, the views of Socrates were completely the reverse. This was the field which the gods had expressly assigned, not merely to human practice, but to human study and acquisition of knowledge; a field, wherein, with that view, they managed phenomena on principles of constant and observable sequence, so that every man who took the requisite pains might know them.

Nay, Socrates went a step further — and this forward step is the fundamental conviction upon which all his missionary impulse hinges. He thought

that every man not only might know these things, but ought to know them; that he could not possibly act well, unless he did know them; and that it was his imperious duty to learn them as he would learn a profession; otherwise, he was nothing better than a slave, unfit to be trusted as a free and accountable being. Socrates felt persuaded that no man could behave as a just, temperate, courageous, pious, patriotic agent, unless he taught himself to know correctly what justice, temperance, courage, piety, patriotism, etc., really were. He was possessed with the truly Baconian idea, that the power of steady moral action depended upon, and was limited by, the rational comprehension of moral ends and means. But when he looked at the minds around him, he perceived that few or none either had any such comprehension, or had ever studied to acquire it—yet at the same time every man felt persuaded that he did possess it, and acted confidently upon such persuasion. Here, then, Socrates found that the first outwork for him to surmount, was, that universal “conceit of knowledge without the reality,” against which he declares such emphatic war; and against which, also, though under another form of words and in reference to other subjects, Bacon declares war not less emphatically, two thousand years afterwards—“*Opinio copice inter causas inopie est.*”

If then the philosophers of the New Academy considered Socrates either as a sceptic, or as a partisan of systematic negation, they misinterpreted his character, and mistook the first stage of his process—that which Plato, Bacon, and Herschel call the purification of the intellect—for the ultimate goal. The elenchus, as Socrates used it, was animated by the truest spirit of positive science, and formed an indispensable precursor to its attainment.

Though negative in his means, Socrates is strictly positive in his ends; his attack is undertaken only with distinct view to a positive result; in order to shame them out of the illusion of knowledge, and to spur them on and arm them for the acquisition of real, assured, comprehensive, self-explanatory, knowledge—as the condition and guarantee of virtuous practice. Socrates was indeed the reverse of a sceptic; no man ever looked upon life with a more positive and practical eye; no man ever pursued his mark with a clearer perception of the road which he was travelling; no man ever combined, in like manner, the absorbing enthusiasm of a missionary, with the acuteness, the originality, the inventive resource, and the generalising comprehension, of a philosopher.

His method yet survives, as far as such method can survive, in some of the dialogues of Plato. It is a process of eternal value and of universal application. That purification of the intellect, which Bacon signalised as indispensable for rational or scientific progress, the Socratic *elenchus* affords the only known instrument for at least partially accomplishing. However little that instrument may have been applied since the death of its inventor, the necessity and use of it neither have disappeared, nor ever can disappear. There are few men whose minds are not more or less in that state of sham knowledge against which Socrates made war: there is no man whose notions have not been first got together by spontaneous, unexamined, unconscious, uncertified association—resting upon forgotten particulars, blending together *disparates* or inconsistencies, and leaving in his mind old and familiar phrases, and oracular propositions, of which he has never rendered to himself account: there is no man, who, if he be destined for vigorous and profitable scientific effort, has not found it a necessary branch of self-education, to break up, disentangle, analyse, and reconstruct, these ancient mental compounds—and who has not been driven to it by his own lame and solitary efforts, since

the giant of the colloquial elenchus no longer stands in the market-place to lend him help and stimulus.

To hear of any man, especially of so illustrious a man, being condemned to death on such accusations as that of heresy and alleged corruption of youth, inspires at the present day a sentiment of indignant reprobation, the force of which I have no desire to enfeeble. The fact stands eternally recorded as one among the thousand misdeeds of intolerance, religious and political. But the sentiment now prevalent is founded upon a conviction that such matters as heresy and heretical teaching of youth are not proper for judicial cognisance. Even in the modern world, such a conviction is of recent date; and in the fifth century B.C. it was unknown. Socrates himself would not have agreed in it; and all Grecian governments, oligarchical and democratical alike, recognised the opposite. The testimony furnished by Plato is on this point decisive. When we examine the two positive communities which he constructs, in the treatises *De Republica* and *De Legibus*, we find that there is nothing about which he is more anxious, than to establish an unresisted orthodoxy of doctrine, opinion, and education. A dissenting and free-spoken teacher, such as Socrates was at Athens, would not have been allowed to pursue his vocation for a week, in the Platonic republic. Plato would not indeed condemn him to death; but he would put him to silence, and in case of need, send him away. This, in fact, is the consistent deduction, if you assume that the state is to determine what is orthodoxy, and orthodox teaching—and to repress what contradicts its own views. Now all the Grecian states, including Athens, held this principle of interference against the dissenting teacher. In any other government of Greece, as well as in the Platonic republic, Socrates would have been quickly arrested in his career, even if not severely punished; in Athens, he was allowed to talk and teach publicly for twenty-five or thirty years, and then condemned when an old man. Of these two applications of the same mischievous principle, assuredly the latter is at once the more moderate and the less noxious.

Secondly, the force of this last consideration, as an extenuating circumstance in regard to the Athenians, is much increased, when we reflect upon the number of individual enemies whom Socrates made to himself in the prosecution of his cross-examining process. Here were a multitude of individuals, including men personally the most eminent and effective in the city, prompted by special antipathies, over and above general convictions, to call into action the dormant state-principle of intolerance against an obnoxious teacher. If, under such provocation, he was allowed to reach the age of seventy, and to talk publicly for so many years, before any real Meletus stood forward—this attests conspicuously the efficacy of the restraining dispositions among the people, which made their practical habits more liberal than their professed principles.

Thirdly, whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Socrates, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united. Not only he omitted to do all that might have been done without dishonour, to insure acquittal—but he held positive language very nearly such as Meletus himself would have sought to put in his mouth. He did this deliberately—having an exalted opinion both of himself and his own mission—and accounting the cup of hemlock, at his age, to be no calamity. It was only by such marked and offensive self-exaltation that he brought on the first vote of the dicastery, even then the narrowest majority, by which he was found guilty: it was only by a still

more aggravated manifestation of the same kind, even to the pitch of something like insult, that he brought on the second vote, which pronounced the capital sentence. Now it would be uncandid not to allow for the effect of such a proceeding on the minds of the dicastery. They were not at all disposed, of their own accord, to put in force the recognised principle of intolerance against him. But when they found that the man who stood before them charged with this offence, addressed them in a tone such as dicasts had never heard before and could hardly hear with calmness, they could not but feel disposed to credit all the worst inferences which his accusers had suggested, and to regard Socrates as a dangerous man both religiously and politically, against whom it was requisite to uphold the majesty of the court and constitution.

In appreciating this memorable incident, therefore, though the mischievous principle of intolerance cannot be denied, yet all the circumstances show that that principle was neither irritable nor predominant in the Athenian bosom; that even a large body of collateral antipathies did not readily call it forth against any individual; that the more liberal and generous dispositions, which deadened its malignity, were of steady efficacy, not easily overborne; and that the condemnation ought to count as one of the least gloomy items in an essentially gloomy catalogue.

Let us add, that as Socrates himself did not account his own condemnation and death, at his age, to be any misfortune, but rather a favourable dispensation of the gods, who removed him just in time to escape that painful consciousness of intellectual decline, which induced Democritus to prepare the poison for himself—so his friend Xenophon goes a step further, and while protesting against the verdict of guilty, extols the manner of death as a subject of triumph; as the happiest, most honourable, and most gracious way, in which the gods could set the seal upon an useful and exalted life.

It is asserted by Diodorus, and repeated with exaggerations by other later authors, that after the death of Socrates the Athenians bitterly repented of the manner in which they had treated him, and that they even went so far as to put his accusers to death without trial. I know not upon what authority this statement is made, and I disbelieve it altogether. From the tone of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, there is every reason to presume that the memory of Socrates still continued to be unpopular at Athens when that collection was composed. Plato, too, left Athens immediately after the death of his master, and remained absent for a long series of years: indirectly, I think, this affords a presumption that no such reaction took place in Athenian sentiment as that which Diodorus alleges; and the same presumption is countenanced by the manner in which the orator Æschines speaks of the condemnation, half a century afterwards. I see no reason to believe that the Athenian dicasts, who doubtless felt themselves justified, and more than justified, in condemning Socrates after his own speech, retracted that sentiment after his decease.^d



RUINS OF A TEMPLE OF ZEUS

CHAPTER XL. THE RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND

IN the latter years of the Peloponnesian War the affairs of Greece became more than formerly implicated with those of Persia; and, during the short calm which succeeded the long troubles of the former country, some events in the later will require attention. The detail will lead far from Greece; but, beside involving information of Grecian affairs not found elsewhere, it has a very important connection with Grecian history through the insight it affords into circumstances which prepared a revolution effected by Grecian arms, one of the greatest occurring in the annals of the world.

THE AFFAIRS OF PERSIA

By the event of the Peloponnesian War the Asian Greeks changed the dominion of Athens, not for that of Lacedæmon, the conquering Grecian power, but of a foreign, a barbarian master, the king of Persia, then the ally of Lacedæmon. Towards the end of the same year in which a conclusion was put to the war, by the taking of Athens, Darius, king of Persia, the second of the name, died. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Artaxerxes, also the second of his name, and, for his extraordinary memory, distinguished among the Greeks by the addition of Mnemon, "the Mindful." The old king, in his last illness, desirous to see once more his favourite son Cyrus, sent for him from his government in Lydia. The prince, in obeying his father's requisition, travelled in the usual manner of the Eastern great, with a train amounting almost to an army; and, to exhibit in his guard the new magnificence of troops so much heard of in the upper provinces, but never yet seen, he engaged by large pay the attendance of three hundred heavy-armed Greeks, under the command of Xenias of Parrhasia in Arcadia. As a friend and counsellor, he took with him Tissaphernes, satrap of Caria.

On the decease of Darius, which followed shortly, a jealousy, scarcely separable from a despotic throne, but said to have been fomented by the

unprincipled Tissaphernes, induced the new monarch to imprison his brother ; whose death, it was supposed, in course would have followed, but for the powerful intercession of the queen-mother, Parysatis. Restored, through her influence, not only to liberty but to the great command entrusted to him by his indulgent father, Cyrus nevertheless resented highly the indignity he had suffered.

He seems indeed to have owed little to his brother's kindness. Jealous of the abilities and popular character of Cyrus, apprehensive of his revenge, and perhaps not unreasonably also of his ambition, Artaxerxes practised that wretched oriental policy of exciting civil war between the commanders of his provinces, to disable them for making war against the throne. Orontes, a person related to the royal family, governor of the citadel of Sardis was encouraged by the monarch's councils to rebel against that superior officer, under whose immediate authority, by those very councils, he was placed, and ostensibly still required to act. Cyrus subdued and forgave him. A second opportunity occurring, Orontes again rebelled ; again found himself, notwithstanding the secret patronage of the court, unable to support his rebellion ; and, soliciting pardon, obtained from the generosity of Cyrus, not pardon only, but favour. But according to report, to which Xenophon gave credit, the queen-mother herself, Parysatis, whether urged by the known enmity of Artaxerxes to Cyrus, or by whatever other cause, incited her younger son to seek the throne and life of the elder. Thus much, however, appears certain, that, very soon after his return into Asia Minor, Cyrus began preparations with that criminal view. For a pretence, it must be allowed, he seems not to have been totally without what the right of self-defence might afford ; yet his principal motives evidently were ambition and revenge.

The disjointed, tottering, and crumbling state of that empire, which, under the first Darius, appeared so well compacted, and really was so powerful and flourishing, favoured his views. Egypt, whose lasting revolt had been suppressed by the first Artaxerxes, was again in rebellion, and the fidelity of other distant provinces was more than suspected. Within his own extensive vice-royalty, the large province of Paphlagonia, governed by its own tributary prince, paid but a precarious obedience to the Persian throne ; the Mysian and Pisidian mountaineers made open war upon the more peaceful subjects of the plains ; and the Lycaonians, possessing themselves of the fortified places, held even the level country in independency, and refused the accustomed tribute. A large part of Lesser Asia was thus in rebellion, more or less avowed. Hence, on one hand, the attention of the king's councils and the exertion of his troops were engaged ; on the other, an undeniable pretence was ready for Cyrus to increase the military force under his immediate authority.

Cyrus, on his first arrival in the neighbourhood of the Grecian colonies, became, as we have seen, partial to the Grecian character.

As soon as the design against his brother's throne was decided, the younger Cyrus, with increased sedulity, extended his connections among the Greeks. They alone, among the nations of that time, knew how to train armies so that thousands of men might act as one machine. Hence their heavy-armed had a power in the shock of battle that no number of more irregular troops, however brave, could resist. Through the long and extensive war lately concluded, Greece abounded with experienced officers, and with men of inferior rank, much practised in arms, and little in any peaceful way of livelihood. Opportunity was thus ready for raising a force of Grecian mer-

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cenaries, almost to any amount. What required circumspection was to avoid alarming the court of Susa; and this the defective principles and worse practice of the Persian administration made even easy. Cyrus therefore directed his Grecian commanders, in the several towns, to enlist Greeks, especially Peloponnesians, as many as they could; with the pretence of strengthening his garrisons against the apprehended attempts of Tissaphernes. In Miletus, so the popularity of his character prevailed, a conspiracy was formed for revolting to him; but before it could be carried into effect, it was discovered; and, by the satrap's order, the ringleaders were executed, and many of their adherents banished. Cyrus not only protected the fugitives, but besieged Miletus by land and sea; and this new war furnished an additional pretence for levying troops.

Notwithstanding the character of frankness, honour, and strict regard for truth which Cyrus generally supported, the candour of Xenophon, his friend and panegyrist, has not concealed from us that he could stoop to duplicity when the great interest of his ambition instigated. So far from acknowledging any purpose of disobedience to the head of the empire, he condescended to request from that brother, against whose throne and life his preparations were already directed, the royal authority for adding Ionia to his immediate government. The request was granted; at the instance, it was said, of Parysatis, who preserved much influence with her elder son, while she incited the nefarious views of the younger against him.

Among the many Greeks admitted to the conversation and to the table of Cyrus, was Clearchus, a Lacedæmonian; who, after serving in the armies of his own commonwealth, through the Peloponnesian War, found himself, at the age of fifty, still uneasy in rest. Seeking opportunity for military employment, he thought he had discovered it in the Thracian Chersonesus, where the Greek settlers were harassed by incursions of the neighbouring barbarians; and he persevered in representation and solicitation to the ephors till he obtained a commission for a command there. Hastening to his departure, at Corinth an order of recall overtook him. The disappointment was more than he could bear; he resolved to disobey the revered scytale; and proceeded, in defiance of it, to act in pursuance of his commission received. For this he was, in absence, condemned to death; a sentence operating to his banishment for life.

What fair hope now remained to Clearchus does not appear; but the need of military talents, continually and extensively occurring among the various warring commonwealths and scattered colonies of the Greeks, always offered some prospect for adventurers of any considerable military reputation; and, in the moment, a still more inviting field, possibly always in his view, appeared in the court of Cyrus. Thither he went, and, under a forbidding outside, a surly countenance, a harsh voice, and rough manners, the prince discovering in him a character he wanted, after short intercourse, made him a present of ten thousand darics, near eight thousand pounds sterling.

Clearchus did not disappoint this magnificent generosity. Employing the whole of the prince's present in raising troops, he offered, as an individual adventurer, that protection to the Chersonesites which, as a general of the Lacedæmonian forces, he had been commissioned to give, but which the Lacedæmonian government, though claiming to be the protecting power of the Grecian name, had finally refused to afford. His service was accepted; and his success against the barbarians, together with the uncommon regularity and inoffensiveness of his troops in the friendly country, so gratified, not the Chersonesites only, but all the Hellespontine Greeks, that,

while he generally found subsistence at the expense of the enemy, they provided large pay for his army by voluntary contribution. Hence, with a discipline severe sometimes to excess, he preserved the general attachment of those under him; and thus a body of troops was kept in the highest order, ready for the service of Cyrus.

The circumstances of Thessaly afforded another opportunity. Aristippus, a Thessalian of eminence, probably banished by faction, had been admitted to the prince's familiarity. Returning afterwards to his own country, and becoming head of his party, divisions were still such that civil war followed. Then Aristippus thought he might profit from that claim which the ancient doctrine of hospitality gave him upon the generosity of Cyrus. He requested levy-money for two thousand men, with pay for three months. Cyrus granted them for four thousand, and six months; only stipulating that without previous communication with him no accommodation should be concluded with the adverse party. Thus another body of troops, unnoticed, was maintained for Cyrus.

Proxenus, a Theban of the first rank and highest connections, happy in his talents, cultivated under the celebrated Gorgias, of manners to win, and character to deserve esteem, dissatisfied with the state of things in his own city, passed, at the age of towards thirty, to the court of Cyrus, with the direct purpose of seeking employment, honour, and fortune; and, in Xenophon's phrase, of so associating with men in the highest situations that he might earn the means of doing, rather than lie under the necessity of receiving favours. Recommended by such advantages, Proxenus not only obtained the notice, but won the friendship of Cyrus, who commissioned him to raise a Grecian force, pretended for a purpose which the Persian court could not disapprove, the reduction of the rebellious Pisidians.


Thus engaged in the prince's service, it became the care of Proxenus to obtain in his foreign residence the society of a friend, of disposition, acquirements, and pursuits congenial to his own. With this view he wrote to a young Athenian, with whom he had long had intimacy, Xenophon, son of Gryllus, a scholar of Socrates, warmly urging him to come and partake of the prince's favour, to which he engaged to introduce him. In the actual state of things at Athens enough might occur to disgust honest ambition. Xenophon therefore, little satisfied with any prospect there, accepted his friend's invitation; and to these circumstances we owe his beautiful narrative of the ensuing transactions, which remains, like the *Iliad*, the oldest and the model of its kind.

For a Grecian land-force Cyrus contented himself with what might be procured by negotiation with individuals and the allurements of pay. But he desired the co-operation of a Grecian fleet, which, in the existing circumstances of Greece, could be obtained only through favour of the Lacedæmonian government. By a confidential minister therefore, despatched to Lacedæmon, he claimed a friendly return for his assistance in the war with Athens. The ephors, publicly acknowledging the justness of his claim, sent orders to Samius, then commanding on the Asiatic station, to join the prince's fleet, and follow the directions of his admiral, Tamos, an Egyptian.

Preparation being completed, and the advantageous season for action approaching, all the Ionian garrisons were ordered to Sardis, and put under the command of Xenias, the Arcadian, commander of the Grecian guard which had attended Cyrus into Upper Asia. The other Grecian troops were directed to join; some at Sardis, some at places farther eastward. A very large army of Asiatics, whom the Greeks called collectively Barbarians, was

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at the same time assembled. The pretence of these great preparations was to exterminate the rebellious Pisidians; and, in the moment, it sufficed for the troops. It could, however, no longer blind Tissaphernes; who, not choosing to trust others to report what he knew or suspected, set off, with all the speed that the way of travelling of an Eastern satrap would admit, with an escort of five hundred horse, to communicate personally with the king. Meanwhile Cyrus marched from Sardis, with the forces already collected, by Colossæ to Celenæ in Phrygia, a large and populous town, where he halted thirty days. There he was joined by the last division of his Grecian forces, which now amounted to about eleven thousand heavy-armed, and two thousand targeteers. His Asiatics or barbarians were near a hundred thousand.^b



GREEK MARBLE CHAIR

XENOPHON'S ACCOUNT OF CUNAXA

Of the following famous battle-picture, Plutarch^d wrote glowingly: "Many historians have described this battle; but Xenophon has done it with such life and energy that we do not read an account of it—we see it and feel all the danger." The praise is not undeserved, and yet as an illuminating example of the mental attitude of the ancient historian with his love of long digressions, it should be noted that in the very midmost of the battle, Xenophon pauses to insert a whole chapter reviewing the life of Cyrus. This chapter is omitted here, the rest of the description being given in the antiquated translation made in 1749 by Edward Spelman.^a

From thence Cyrus proceeded through the Country of Babylon, and in three days' march made twelve Parasangs.¹ When they were arrived at the end of the third day's march, Cyrus reviewed his Forces, both Greeks and Barbarians in a Plain about Midnight (for he expected the King would appear the next Morning, at the Head of his Army, ready to give him Battle), and gave to Clearchus the Command of the right Wing, and to Menon the Thessalian that of the left, while he himself drew up his own Men. After the Review, and as soon as the Day appear'd, there came Deserters from the Great King, who brought Cyrus an account of his Army: then Cyrus, having called together the Generals and Captains of the Greeks, advis'd with them concerning the Order of Battle; when he encourag'd them by the following Persuasions:

[¹ A parasang was equal to about 3½ English miles.]

"O Greeks! it is not from any want of Barbarians, that I make use of you as my Auxiliaries, but because I look upon you as superior to great Numbers of them; for that reason I have taken you also into my Service: Shew yourselves therefore worthy of that Liberty you enjoy, in the possession of which I think you extremely happy; for be assur'd that I would prefer Liberty before all things I possess. But, that you may understand what kind of Combat you are going to engage in, I shall explain it to you: Their Numbers are great, and they come on with mighty Shouts, which if you can withstand, for the rest I am almost ashamed to think what kind of Men you will find our Country produces. But you are Soldiers; behave yourselves with Bravery, and, if any one of you desires to return home, I will take care to send him back the Envy of his Country; but I am confident that my Behaviour will engage many of you rather to follow my Fortunes, than return home."

Here Gaulites, a banish'd Samian, a Man of Fidelity to Cyrus, being present, spoke thus: "It is said by some, O Cyrus! that you promise many things now, because you are in such imminent Danger, which, upon any Success, you will not remember; and by others, that, though you should remember your Promises, and desire to perform them, it will not be in your power."

Cyrus hearing this, said: "Gentlemen! my paternal Kingdom to the South, reaches as far as those Climates that are uninhabitable through Heat, and to the North, as far as those that are so through Cold: Every thing between is under the Government of my Brother's Friends; and, if we conquer, it becomes me to put you, who are my Friends, in possession of it; so that I am under no apprehension, if we succeed, lest I should not have enough to bestow on each of my Friends; I only fear, lest I should not have Friends enow on whom to bestow it. But to each of you Greeks, besides what I have mention'd, I promise a Crown of Gold." The Officers, hearing these things, espous'd his Cause with greater Alacrity, and made their Report to the rest. After this the Greek Generals, and some of the private Men came to him to know what they had to expect, if they were victorious; all whom he sent away big with hopes: and all who were admitted, advis'd him not to engage personally, but to stand in the Rear. And then it was that Clearchus put this Question to Cyrus: "Are you of Opinion, O Cyrus! that your Brother will hazard a Battle?" "Certainly," answered Cyrus: "If he is the Son of Darius and Parysatis, and my Brother. I shall never obtain all this without a stroke."

While the Soldiers were accomplishing themselves for the Action, the number of the Greeks was found to amount to ten thousand four hundred heavy-arm'd Men, and two thousand four hundred Targeteers; and that of the Barbarians in the Service of Cyrus, to one hundred thousand Men, with about twenty Chariots armed with Scythes. The Enemy's Army was said to amount to twelve hundred thousand Men, and two hundred Chariots armed with Scythes: they had besides six thousand Horse, under the Command of Artagerses. These were drawn up before the King. The King's Army was commanded by four Generals, Commanders and Leaders, who had each the Command of three hundred thousand Men; these were Abrocomas, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, and Arbaces. But of this Number nine hundred thousand only were present at the Battle, together with one hundred and fifty Chariots arm'd with Scythes: For Abrocomas coming out of Phœnicia, arriv'd five Days after the Action. This was the Account the Deserters gave to Cyrus before the Battle, which was afterwards confirm'd by the Prisoners. From

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thence Cyrus, in one day's March, made three Parasangs, all his Forces, both Greeks and Barbarians, marching in Order of Battle; because he expected the King would fight that day: for in the middle of their March there was a Trench cut five Fathom broad, and three deep. This Trench extended twelve Parasangs upwards, traversing the Plain as far as the Wall of Media. In this Plain are the Canals deriv'd from the River Tigris; they are four in number, each one hundred Feet in breadth, and very deep, and barges laden with Corn sail in them: These Canals fall into the Euphrates; they are distant from one another one Parasang, and have Bridges over them.

Close to the Euphrates, there was a narrow Pass, between the River and the Trench, about twenty Feet in breadth. This Trench the Great King, as soon as he heard Cyrus was marching against him, caus'd to be made by way of Fortification; through this Pass Cyrus and his Army march'd, and were now within the Trench. That day the King did not engage, but many Tracks appear'd both of Horses and Men that retreated. Here Cyrus, sending for Silanus, the Soothsayer of Ambracia, gave him three thousand Darics,¹ because the eleventh Day before that, when he was offering Sacrifice, he told Cyrus that the King would not fight within ten Days: Upon which Cyrus said, "If he does not fight within ten Days, he will not fight at all: And, if what you say proves true, I'll give you ten Talents;" which Sum, the ten Days being expir'd, he then paid him. Since therefore the King had suffer'd the Army of Cyrus to march through this Pass unmolested, both Cyrus and the rest concluded that he had given over all Thoughts of fighting: so that the next Day Cyrus march'd with less Circumspection; and the third day he rode on his Car, very few marching before him in their Ranks; great part of the Soldiers observ'd no Order, many of their Arms being carried in Waggon, and upon sumpter Horses.

It was now about the time of Day, when the Market is usually crowded, the Army being near the place, where they propos'd to encamp, when Patagyas, a Persian, one of those whom Cyrus most confided in, was seen riding towards them full speed, his Horse all in a Sweat, and immediately called to every one he met, both in his own Language, and in Greek, that the King was at hand with a vast Army, marching in Order of Battle. Upon this there was great Confusion, the Greeks and all the rest expecting he would charge them, before they had put themselves in Order: and Cyrus leaping from his Car, put on his Corslet, then mounting his Horse, took his Javelins in his Hand, and order'd all the rest to arm, and every Man to take his Post: They quickly form'd themselves, Clearchus on the right Wing, close to the Euphrates, and next to him Proxenus, and after him the rest: Menon and his Men were posted upon the left of the Greek Army. Of the Barbarians a thousand Paphlagonian Horse, with the Greek Targeteers, stood next to Clearchus on the right. Upon the left Ariæus, Cyrus' Lieutenant-General, was plac'd with the rest of the Barbarians. Cyrus put himself in the Center with six hundred Horse: they had large Corslets, and Cuisses, and all of them Helmets, but Cyrus, who stood ready for the Charge, with his Head unarm'd; they say it is also customary for the rest of the Persians to expose themselves in a day of Action in the same manner: All the Horses in Cyrus' Army had both Frontlets and Breast-plates, and the Horsemen Greek Swords.

[¹ A daric, named after Darius, was a gold coin of about the weight of a sovereign, or five dollars. An Attic talent was valued at about £200 or \$1000.]

It was now the middle of the Day, and no Enemy was yet to be seen. In the Afternoon there appear'd a Dust like a white Cloud, which not long after spread itself like a Darkness over the Plain; when they drew nearer, immediately the brazen Armour flash'd, and their Spears and Ranks appear'd: The Enemy had on their left a Body of Horse arm'd in white Corslets (these were said to be commanded by Tissaphernes), next came those with Persian Bucklers, and next to them heavy-arm'd Men with wooden Shields, reaching down to their Feet (these were said to be Egyptians); then other Horse and other Archers. All these marched according to their respective Countries, each Nation being drawn up in a solid oblong Square: And before them were disposed the Chariots arm'd with Scythes, at a considerable distance from one another. These Chariots had Scythes fix'd aslant at the Axle-Trees, with others under the Body of the Chariot, pointing downwards, that so they might cut asunder every thing they encounter'd. The Design of these Chariots was to break the Ranks of the Greeks.

It now appear'd that Cyrus, when he had exhorted the Greeks to withstand the Shouts of the Barbarians, was mistaken; for they did not come on with Shouts, but as silently and quietly as possible, and in an equal and slow March. Here Cyrus, riding along the Ranks with Pigres the Interpreter, and three or four others, called to Clearchus to bring his Men over-against the Center of the Enemy, because the King was there: And if we break that, says he, our Work is done. But Clearchus observing their Center, and understanding from Cyrus that the King was beyond the left Wing of the Greek Army (for the King was so much superior in number, that, when he stood in the Center of his own Army, he was beyond the left Wing of that of Cyrus) Clearchus, I say, would not however be prevail'd on to withdraw his right from the River, fearing to be surrounded on both sides: but answer'd Cyrus, He would take care that all should go well.

Now the Parbarians came regularly on: and the Greek Army standing on the same Ground, the Ranks were form'd, as the Men came up. In the mean time Cyrus, riding at a small distance before the Ranks, survey'd both the Enemy's Army and his own: Whom Xenophon, an Athenian, observing from the Greek Army, he rode up to him, and ask'd him, whether he had any thing to command; Cyrus, stopping his Horse, order'd him to let them all know, that the Sacrifices and Victims promis'd success. While he was saying this, he heard a Noise running through the Ranks, and ask'd him what Noise it was; Xenophon answer'd, that the Word was now giving for the second time; Cyrus wonder'd who should give it, and ask'd him what the Word was; the other replied, Jupiter the Preserver, and Victory: Which Cyrus hearing, said, I accept it, let That be the Word. After he had said this, he return'd to his Post.

The two Armies being within three or four Stadia of each other, the Greeks sung the Pæan, and advanced: As this Motion occasion'd a small Fluctuation in the Line of Battle, those who were left behind, hasten'd their march, and at once they gave a general Shout, as their Custom is when they invoke the God of War, and all ran on. Some say they struck their Shields with their Pikes to frighten the Enemy's Horses. But the Barbarians, before they came within the Reach of their Darts, turn'd their Horses and fled, and the Greeks pursued them as fast as they could, calling out to one another not to run, but to follow in their Ranks. Here some of the Chariots were borne through their own People without their Charioteers, others through the Greeks, some of whom seeing them coming, divided; while others being amaz'd, like Spectators in the Hippodrome, were taken unawares; but even

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these were reported to have received no harm, neither was there any other Greek hurt in the Action, except one upon the left Wing, who was said to have been wounded by an Arrow.

Cyrus seeing the Greeks victorious on their side, and in pursuit of the Enemy, rejoic'd, and was already worshipp'd as King by those about him; however, he was not so far transported as to leave his Post, and join in the Pursuit; but, keeping his six hundred Horse in a Body, he observ'd the King's Motions; well knowing that he was in the Center of the Persian Army: for in all Barbarian Armies, the Generals ever place themselves in the Center, looking upon that Post as the safest, on each side of which their Strength is equally divided, and, if they have occasion to give out any Orders, these are receiv'd in half the time by the Army. The King therefore being at that time in the Center of his own Battle, was, however, beyond the left Wing of Cyrus; and, when he saw none oppos'd him in front, nor any Motion made to charge the Troops that were drawn up before him, he wheel'd to the left, in order to surround their Army. Upon this Cyrus, fearing he should get behind him, and cut off the Greeks, advanc'd against the King, and charging with his six hundred Horse, broke those who were drawn up before him, put the six thousand Men to flight, and, as they say, killed with his own Hand Artagerses, their Commander.

These being broken, the six hundred also belonging to Cyrus dispers'd themselves in the Pursuit, very few being left about him, and those almost all Persons who used to eat at his Table; being accompanied with these, he discovered the King, and those about him, and, unable to contain himself, immediately cried out, I see the Man; then ran furiously at him, and, striking him on the Breast, wounded him through his Corslet, as Ctesias the Physician says, who affirms that he cur'd the Wound. While he was giving the Blow, somebody threw a Javelin at him with great force, and wounded him under the Eye: and now the King and Cyrus engag'd hand to hand, and those about them, in defence of each. In this Action Ctesias (who was with the King) informs us how many fell on his side; on the other, Cyrus himself was killed, and eight the most considerable of his Friends lay dead upon him. When Artapates, who was in the greatest Trust with him of any of his scepter'd Ministers, saw Cyrus fall, they say, he leap'd from his Horse, and threw himself about him: some say, the King order'd Artapates to be slain upon the Body of Cyrus; others, that, drawing his Scimitar, he slew himself: for, he wore a golden Scimitar, a Chain, Bracelets, and other Ornaments, which are worn by the most considerable Persians; and was held in great esteem by Cyrus, both for his Affection and Fidelity.

When Cyrus was dead, his Head and right Hand were cut off upon the spot, and the King, with his Men, in the Pursuit, broke into his Camp; while those with Ariæus, no longer made a stand, but fled through their own Camp to their former Post, which was said to be four Parasangs from the Field of Battle. The King, with his Forces, among many other things, took Cyrus' Mistress, a Phocæan, who was said to be a Woman of great Sense and Beauty. The other, a Milesian, who was the younger of the two, was also taken by the King's Troops, but escap'd naked to the Quarter of the Greeks, who were left to guard the Baggage. These, forming themselves, kill'd many of those who were plundering the Camp, and lost some of their own Men; however, they did not fly, but sav'd the Milesian, with the Men and Effects, and, in general, every thing else that was in their Quarter. By this time the King and the Greeks were at the distance of about thirty Stadia from one another, these pursuing the Enemy that were

opposite to them, as if they had gain'd a complete Victory; and the King's Troops plundering the Camp of the Greeks, as if they also had been every where victorious. But, when the Greeks were inform'd, that the King, with his Men, was among their Baggage, and the King, on his side, heard from Tissaphernes, that the Greeks had put those before them to flight, and were gone forward in the Pursuit, he then rallied his Forces, and put them in order. On the other side, Clearchus consulted with Proxenus, who was nearest to him, whether they should send a Detachment, or should all march to relieve the Camp.


In the mean time the King was observ'd to move forward again, and seem'd resolved to fall upon their Rear; upon which the Greeks faced about, and put themselves in a posture to march that way, and receive him. However, the King did not advance that way; But, as before, he pass'd beyond their left Wing, so now he led his Men back the same Way, taking along with him those who had deserted to the Greeks during the Action, and also Tissaphernes with his Forces: for Tissaphernes did not fly at the first Onset, but penetrated with his Horse, where the Greek Targeteers were posted, quite as far as the River: However, in breaking through, he killed none of their Men, but the Greeks, dividing, wounded his People both with their Swords and Darts. Episthenes of Amphipolis commanded the Targeteers, and shewed great conduct upon this occasion.

Tissaphernes, therefore, sensible of his Disadvantage, departed, then; coming to the Camp of the Greeks, he found the King there, and reuniting their Forces, they advanc'd. When they came opposite to the left of the Greeks, these were afraid they should attack their Wing, and, by wheeling to the right and left, annoy them on both sides; to avoid which, they resolv'd to open that Wing, and cover the Rear with the River. While they were consulting upon this, the King marched by them, and drew up his Army opposite to theirs, in the same Order in which he first engag'd. When the Greeks saw them draw near in Order of Battle, they again sung the Pæan, and went on with much more Alacrity than before. However, the Barbarians did not stay to receive them, but fled sooner than the first time: and the Greeks pursued them to a Village. There they halted; for there was an Eminence above the Village, upon which the King's Forces fac'd about. He had no Foot with him, but the Hill was cover'd with Horse in such a manner, that it was not possible for the Greeks to see what was doing: However, they said they saw the royal Ensign there, which was a golden Eagle with its Wings extended, resting upon a Spear.

When the Greeks advanc'd towards them, the Horse quitted the Hill, some running one way, and some another: However, the Hill was clear'd of them by degrees, and at last they all left it. Clearchus did not march up the Hill with his Men, but, halting at the Foot of it, sent Lycius the Syracusan, and another, with Orders to reconnoitre the place, and make their Report; Lycius rode up the Hill, and, having view'd it, brought Word that the Enemy fled in all haste. While these things were doing, it grew near Sunset. Here the Greeks halted, and lying under their Arms, rested themselves. In the mean time they wonder'd that neither Cyrus appear'd any where, nor any one from him; for they did not know he was dead; but imagin'd, that he was either led away by the Pursuit, or had rode forward to possess himself of some Post. Hereupon they consulted among themselves, whether they should stay where they were, and send for their Baggage, or return to their Camp. At last they resolv'd to return: And arriv'd at their Tents about Supper-time: And this was the end of that

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Day. There they found the greatest part of their Baggage plunder'd, with all the Provisions, and also the Carriages full of Flour and Wine, which Cyrus had prepar'd, in order to distribute them among the Greeks, if at any time his Army should labour under the want of Necessaries. It was said these Carriages amounted to four hundred: which were then all rifled by the King's Troops, so that the greatest part of the Greeks had no Supper, neither had they eaten any Dinner; for, before the Army could halt in order to dine, the King appear'd. And in this Manner they passed the Night.^c



GREEK SEALS

THE RETREAT

When the battle of Cunaxa was over, the Greeks, whose camp meanwhile had been pillaged, rejected the Persian king's demand for unconditional surrender, and, although their numbers by this time were reduced to ten thousand, determined to fight their way through to Asia Minor, a task which involved marching through a hostile country for a distance which measured 1850 miles by the route they had taken from Ephesus to Cunaxa.

Xenophon, one of their leaders, has made this march of the Greeks, which is commonly known as the Retreat of the Ten Thousand, the subject of a separate work. It is one of the most famous military exploits of antiquity and sets the superiority of Greece in the most brilliant light, for the bold and successful enterprise of these ten thousand Greeks does not redound to their glory alone. It is the common possession of their age, their nation, and the culture which it had attained; and marks in the most striking fashion the contrast of the relative values of Persian and Greek civilisation and political institutions. A handful of Greeks bid splendid defiance to the sovereign of the enormous Persian empire, to the sheer bulk of his army, and to all the intrigues of his satraps. It was the victory of Greek subtlety and skill over the rigid and mechanical organisation of Persia, of Greek science over the intellectual poverty of the East, of Greek tactics over Persian confusion; finally, of a genuine sense of honour and patriotic pride over craft, cowardice, and servility.

The route which the Ten Thousand took was not the same by which they had marched to Cunaxa; it lay through Mesopotamia, Media, Armenia, and along the southern shore of the Black Sea to Thrace. The valiant Greeks did not know their way through these countries; they had neither maps nor any trustworthy guide; they had to march through desert and wilderness, to cross mountains and ravines, to pass through barbarous tribes and whole provinces in arms; nevertheless they succeeded in reaching the frontier of their own land with comparatively slight loss.

Soon after they had begun their march, Artaxerxes concluded a treaty with them through the mediation of the satrap Tissaphernes, who had succeeded to the satrapy of Cyrus, in virtue of which they were to be allowed to proceed home undisturbed, escorted by the latter at the head of a Persian

army, and supplied with the requisite provisions by the way. But Tissaphernes kept the Greeks waiting for more than twenty days before he returned from the king's camp, and when at length he did return and set forth with them on their way through Media, he showed himself of so suspicious a temper and fostered such constant and increasing friction between the Greek troops and his own, that at last Clearchus, the Greek commander, begged for an interview with the satrap. This was granted, and Clearchus, confiding in the honour of the hostile leader, went to the Persian camp accompanied by all the twenty-four officers who composed his military council. As soon as they reached it they were treacherously taken prisoners and their guard cut down. They were presently carried off to the royal capital and there put to death together.

The Persians hoped to throw the Greeks into confusion by this treacherous blow, and so vanquish them without much trouble; but they were not a little amazed when (in striking contrast to the spirit and organisation of their own army) a new body of generals and new subordinate officers sprang immediately and, as it were, spontaneously into being from the ranks of the Greek privates and subalterns. For in the Greek army fresh appointments to all posts were made every year; there was no regular promotion and no officer held permanent rank; on the contrary, the man who one year occupied the position of an officer frequently served as a private soldier the next. By this means almost every private soldier was qualified to step into the place of an officer, and it was an easy matter to appoint fresh leaders to the large and small divisions of the army. Xenophon, who had hitherto accompanied the march, neither in the capacity of private nor officer, but merely as a friend and comrade of one of the generals, was the first after the treacherous act of Tissaphernes to urge his countrymen not to yield to the Persian demand for submission, but to fight their way sword in hand through the enemy's country. Only one of the colonels and captains who gathered about him demurred to his proposal. This aroused the suspicions of the rest, and, marking him more narrowly, they perceived by his pierced ears that he was by birth no Greek but a Persian. He was promptly expelled, and Xenophon and four others were appointed to succeed the generals captured by the Persians.

From that day forward Xenophon was the soul of the Greek army, which owed its ultimate deliverance to him and in whom it rightly reposed absolute confidence. He was prudent enough not to command in his own name, but in that of Chirisophus of Sparta, though the latter was wholly devoid of the capacity and knowledge requisite for leading his countrymen home through the heart of the Persian empire. Xenophon's motive in this was, on the one hand, to avoid making himself obnoxious to the Spartans, who had become masters of Greece by the Peloponnesian War, and on the other, to keep his own people under stricter discipline through the terror of a Spartan leader. Directed by an admirable tactical skill, which was equal to every fresh demand of place or circumstance, the Greeks continued their march, perpetually pursued and harassed by the Persians, to the rugged and inhospitable mountain country about the Upper Tigris. Here they came in contact with the fierce and warlike tribe of the Carduchi, who, like the Kurds of to-day who may be their descendants, had never been conquered, and who rejected all overtures for permission to pass through their territory in peace. The Persians, not daring to venture farther, now gave up the pursuit of the Ten Thousand, and the latter marched into the rugged and precipitous country of the Carduchi, and in spite of the constant attacks of the inhab-

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itants succeeded by the superiority of their military discipline and experience in reaching the other side of the mountain range and the frontiers of Armenia in seven days. This march through the country of the Carduchi was the most arduous part of their journey and cost them more loss and suffering than all the attacks of the Persian army.^e We turn again to the vivid description in Xenophon's own words as Englished by Spelman.

XENOPHON'S PICTURE OF THE HARDSHIPS

In the country of the Taochians, their Provisions began to fail them : For the Taochians inhabited Fastnesses, into which they had convey'd all their Provisions. At last the army arriv'd at a strong Place, which had neither City nor Houses upon it, but where great Numbers of Men and Women with their Cattle were assembled. This Place Chrisophus order'd to be attack'd the Moment he came before it, and, when the first Company suffer'd another went up, and then another ; for the Place being surrounded with Precipices, they could not attack it on all Sides at once. When Xenophon came up with the Rear-Guard, the Targeteers and heavy-arm'd Men, Chrisophus said to him, "You come very seasonably, for this Place must be taken, otherwise the Army will be starved."

Upon this they call'd a Council of War, and Xenophon demanding, what could hinder them from carrying the Place ; Chrisophus answer'd, "there is no other Access to it but This, and, when any of our Men attempt to gain it, they roll down Stones from the impending Rock, and those they light upon are treated as you see"; pointing at the same time to some of the Men, whose Legs and Ribs were broken. "But," says Xenophon, "when they have consum'd all the Stones they have, what can hinder us then from going up ? For I can see nothing to oppose us, but a few Men, and of these not above two or three that are arm'd. The Space, you see, through which we must pass expos'd to these Stones, is about one hundred and fifty Feet in Length, of which that of one hundred Feet is cover'd with large Pines, growing in Groups, against which, if our Men place themselves, what can they suffer, either from the Stones that are thrown, or rolled down by the Enemy ? The remaining Part of this Space is not above fifty Feet, which, when the Stones cease, we must dispatch with all possible Expedition." "But," says Chrisophus, "the Moment we offer to go to the Place that is cover'd with the Trees, they will shower down Stones upon us." "That," replies Xenophon, "is the very Thing we want, for by this Means they will be consum'd the sooner. However," continues he, "let us, if we can, advance to that Place, from whence we may have but a little Way to run, and from whence we may also, if we see convenient, retreat with Ease."

Upon this, Chrisophus and Xenophon, with Callimachus of Parrhasia, one of the Captains, advanced (for the last had the command that Day of the Captains in the Rear), all the rest of the Officers standing out of Danger. Then about seventy of the Men advanc'd under the Trees, not in a Body, but one by one, each sheltering himself as well as he could : While Agasias the Stymphalian and Aristonymus of Methydria, who were also Captains belonging to the Rear, with some others, stood behind, without the Trees, for it was not safe for more than one Company to be there. Upon this Occasion Callimachus made Use of the following Stratagem. He advanc'd two or three Paces from the Tree under which he stood : but, as soon as the Stones began to fly, he quickly retir'd, and, upon every Excursion, more than

ten Cart-Loads of Stones were consum'd. When Agasias saw what Callimachus was doing, and that the Eyes of the whole Army were upon him, fearing lest he should be the first Man who enter'd the Place, he, without giving any Notice to Aristonymus, who stood next to him, or to Eurylochus, of Lusias, both of whom were his friends, or to any other Person, advanc'd alone, with a Design to get before the rest. When Callimachus saw him passing by, he laid hold of the Border of his Shield. In the mean Time Aristonymus, and, after him, Eurylochus ran by them both: For all these were Rivals in Glory, and in constant Emulation of each other. And, by contending thus, they took the Place: For, the Moment one of them had gain'd the Ascent, there were no more Stones thrown from above.

And here followed a dreadful Spectacle indeed; for the Women first threw their Children down the Precipice, and then themselves. Then Men did the same. And here Æneas the Stymphalian, a Captain, seeing one of the Barbarians, who was richly dress'd, running with a Design to throw himself down, caught hold of him, and the other drawing him after, they both fell down the Precipice together, and were dashed to Pieces. Thus we made very few Prisoners, but took a considerable Quantity of Oxen, Asses, and Sheep.

From thence the Greeks advanc'd, through the Country of the Chalybians, and, in seven Marches, made fifty Parasangs. These being the most valiant People they met with in all their March, they came to a close engagement with the Greeks. They had linen Corslets that reach'd below their Navel, and, instead of Tassels, thick Cords twisted. They had also Greaves and Helmets, and at their Girdle a short Faulchion, like those of the Lacedæmonians, with which they cut the Throats of those they over-power'd, and afterwards, cutting off their Heads, carried them away in Triumph. It was their Custom to sing and dance, whenever they thought the Enemy saw them. They had Pikes fifteen Cubits in length, with only one Point. They staid in their Cities till the Greeks march'd past them, and then followed harassing them perpetually. After that they retir'd to their strong Holds, into which they had convey'd their Provisions: So that the Greeks could supply themselves with nothing out of their Country, but liv'd upon the Cattle they had taken from the Taochians.

They now came to the River Harpasus, which was four hundred Feet broad. And from thence advanc'd through the Country of the Scythinians, and, in four Days' March, made twenty Parasangs, passing through a Plain into some Villages; in which they staid three Days, and made their Provisions. From this Place they made, in four Days' March, twenty Parasangs, to a large and rich City well inhabited: It was called Gymnias. The Governour of this Country sent a Person to the Greeks, to conduct them through the Territories of his Enemies. This Guide, coming to the Army, said he would undertake, in five Days, to carry them to a Place, from whence they should see the Sea. If not, he consented to be put to death. And, when he had conducted them into the Territories belonging to his Enemies, he desired them to lay waste the Country with Fire and Sword. By which it was evident that he came with this View, and not from any Good-will he bore to the Greeks. The fifth Day they arriv'd at the holy Mountain called Theches. As soon as the Men, who were in the Vanguard, ascended the Mountain, and saw the Sea, they gave a great Shout, which, when Xenophon and those in the Rear, heard, they concluded that some other Enemies attack'd them in Front, for the People belonging to the Country they had burn'd, follow'd their Rear, some of whom those who had Charge of it, had

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killed, and taken others Prisoners in an Ambuscade. They had also taken twenty Bucklers made of raw Ox-hides with the hair on.

The Noise still increasing as they came nearer, and the Men, as fast as they came up, running to those who still continued Shouting, their Cries swelled with their Numbers, so that Xenophon, thinking something more than ordinary had happen'd, mounted on Horse-back, and, taking with him Lycius and his Horse, rode up to their Assistance: And presently they heard the Soldiers calling out "The Sea! The Sea!" and cheering one another. At this they all set a running, the Rear-guard as well as the rest, and the Beasts of Burden, and Horses were driven forward. When they were all come up to the Top of the Mountain, they embraced one another, and also their Generals and Captains with Tears in their Eyes. And Immediately the Men, by whose Order it is not known, bringing together a great many Stones, made a large Mount, upon which they plac'd a great Quantity of Shields made of raw Ox-hides, Staves, and Bucklers taken from the Enemy. The Guide himself cut the Bucklers in Pieces, and exhorted the rest to do the same. After this the Greeks sent back their Guide, giving him Presents out of the publick Stock, these were a Horse, a silver Cup, a Persian Dress, and ten Darics. But, above all Things the Guide desir'd the Soldiers to give him some of their Rings, many of which they gave him. Having therefore shewn them a Village, where they were to Quarter, and the Road that led to the Maeronians, when the Evening came on, he departed, setting out on his Return that Night.^c

END OF THE MARCH

At length, four months after the battle of Cunaxa, they entered Trapezus, the first Greek city they came to, and celebrated their safe arrival among their kindred with sacrifices and games. From this point they continued their retreat, some by sea and some by land. But when the air of Greece breathed upon them once more and the fear of the barbarians was overpast, discord and greed crept in amongst them, and they proved such troublesome guests that even the inhabitants of the Greek colonies along the southern shore of the Black Sea tried to get rid of them as speedily as possible. Making many raids in search of booty and suffering no small loss on the way, they came through Bithynia to Byzantium, and thence proceeded to the interior of Thrace, where Seuthes, who then ruled the country, engaged the rude and bellicose adventurers into whom the remnant of the Ten Thousand had degenerated. For some months they assisted him to extend his sovereignty over various Thracian tribes. Finally they were enlisted by the Spartans, who were then at war with the Persian empire, and so went back to Asia.

The remnant of the whole force amounted to six thousand men, the distance they had traversed from the battle-field of Cunaxa to about the middle of the south coast of the Black Sea to not less than two thousand miles. This they had done in eight months. But the whole march, from Ephesus to Cunaxa and thence to this region on the Black Sea, occupied fifteen months (from February, 401, to the beginning of June, 400 B.C.), and the march from the latter place to the spot where they joined the Spartan army in Asia Minor (March, 399 B.C.) took nine months.

Xenophon, who had rendered the most conspicuous service on this memorable march, returned to Greece after he had led the remnant of the Ten Thousand to the Spartan army in Asia Minor. Some years later he took

part in the expedition against the Persians conducted by his friend the Spartan king, Agesilaus, and after the return of the latter fought at the battle of Coronea. While he was in Asia with Agesilaus he was banished from his native city by a vote of the people, because he had taken part in a war against the Persian king, who was at that time an ally of Athens, and because his aristocratic opinions and his preference for the political system of Sparta had earned him the hatred of the demagogues and the jealousy of the populace. After the battle of Coronea he accompanied Agesilaus to Sparta and remained there for a while, and then settled on a country estate in the neighbourhood of Olympia, which he had either received as a gift from the Spartans or bought with the great wealth he had amassed in Asia. Here and in Corinth he wrote some part of his works. The sentence of banishment from Athens was soon repealed, but it does not seem probable that he ever returned to his native city, though at a later time he induced his son Gryllus to take part in one of the military expeditions of the Athenians. Gryllus fell at the battle of Mantinea, and the story goes that the news of his death was brought to his aged father as he was standing by an altar, sacrificing to the gods. Xenophon was crowned with a garland, in accordance with the Greek custom of wearing wreaths upon festal occasions. He immediately took it from his head, but received the news of his son's death with the utmost composure, saying that he knew he had only begotten a mortal. When he was told that Gryllus had fought with great valour, he put the garland on again, finished his sacrifice, and added to it a prayer in which he gave thanks to the gods for his son's worthiness. Xenophon died at Corinth in (355 B.C.) the ninetieth year of his age.^e

THE MEANING OF XENOPHON'S FEAT

The world has never ceased to thrill with a sympathetic memory of that glad cry of Xenophon's Ten Thousand, "*Thalatta! Thalatta!*" (The sea! The sea!) It has a kinship with the feelings of the foot-sore and heart-sore children of Israel reaching the edge of the Promised Land. It stands out from above the usual crises of history as a temple dome above a town. It takes its place among such peaks of emotion as the view that Attila took of Rome, and the crusaders of the minarets of Jerusalem, the cry of "Land ho!" on the ships of Columbus. It finds a strangely modern parallel in the first ocean-glimpse of the American soldiers in Sherman's march to the sea.

Like all these picturesque incidents, it meant more than a merely dramatic moment to the history of mankind. It was a prelude in Greek history to the triumph of Alexander. It showed to the Greeks that their ambitions need not be confined to the small parishes they had dwelt in. It revealed the fact that the great realm of the Persian monarch, whom the Greeks always referred to as "The King," was like Dead Sea fruit: brilliant in its shell, and hollow corruption at core. The only impetus the Greeks had felt towards a Panhellenic spirit had been inspired by the imminence of the Persian danger. They had with small bands of patriots dispersed the droves of oriental subjects brought against them, and yet they could not have dreamed that their success in an offensive war would be equal to the glory of the defensive struggle.

But here was a lessening body of ten thousand Greeks, bound together by no common sentiment except a desire for money — which they did not get. And this comparative handful of mercenaries had ransacked the very

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innermost recesses of the Persian empire, and had never found an army great enough or brave enough to withstand it in open assault. The conquest of such an empire seemed to be within the grasp of any Greek commander. The first to attempt it was a second-rate Spartan king, Agesilaus, who failed. And the Persian empire resisted attack for five generations more, till the new blood of Macedonia and the unlimited ambitions of Alexander made the attempt. Until he came, the blows of the others were only so much callisthenics. When he came he was not loath to acknowledge, on the eve of the battle of Issus, the inspiration he owed to the feat of the Ten Thousand.


Meanwhile, without reference to its remote bearings, the anabasis and catabasis of Xenophon's army stand forth glorious in themselves. He himself sums up the achievement baldly at the conclusion of his work.

"The governors of The King's country, as much of it as we went through, were these : of Lydia, Artemas ; of Phrygia, Artacamas ; of Lycaonia and Cappadocia, Mithridates ; of Cilicia, Syennesis ; of Phœnicia and Arabia, Dernes ; of Syria and Assyria, Belesys ; of Babylon, Rhoparas ; of Media, Arbaces ; of the Phasiani and Hesperia, Tiribazus ; the Carduchi, the Chalybes, the Chaldeans, the Macrones, the Colchians, the Mosynœci, the Cœtæ, and the Tibareni, were independent nations ; of Paphlagonia, Corylas ; of the Bithynians, Pharnabazus ; and of the Thracians in Europe, Seuthes.

"The computation of the whole journey, the anabasis and catabasis, was 215 days' march, 1155 parasangs, 34,650 stadia. The length of time occupied in the anabasis and catabasis was one year and three months."

Reckoning the parasang at three and two-fifths miles, the total distance covered would therefore be 3927 miles in the course of fifteen months. The manuscripts do not all agree with regard to the numbers, but the total march may be accepted as nearly four thousand miles, through a country bristling with hostility and treachery, a country unmapped and unknown to the Greeks. This exploit of what might well be termed a pack of desperadoes looms high in history, both as an absolute feat of bravado and as a finger-post for Grecian ambition.^a





GREEK MEDAL

CHAPTER XLI. THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY

THERE is an inevitable bias in the minds of most people towards the brilliant and refined ideals of Athens as opposed to the obstinate and barren creed of the Spartans. We have heard, therefore, more of the Athenian side than of the Spartan in their wars together. As we approach a period of Spartan glory, it is well to make a quick review and summary of her ideals and achievements down to this period, when, as the Spartophile Müller notes, Sparta won her advancement by discarding her venerable creeds. What follows must be read with the knowledge that it is from the pen of a Spartan partisan.^a

Sparta, by the conquest of Messenia and Tegea, had obtained the first rank in the Peloponnese, which character she confirmed by the expulsion of the tyrants, and the overthrow of Argos. From about the year 580 B.C. she acted as the recognised commander, not only of the Peloponnese, but of the whole Greek name. The confederacy itself, however, was formed by the inhabitants of that peninsula alone, on fixed and regular laws; whereas the other Greeks only annexed themselves to it temporarily. The order of precedence observed by the members of this league may be taken from the inscription on the footstool of the statue of Jupiter, which was dedicated at Olympia after the Persian War, the Ionians, who were only allied for a time, being omitted. It is as follows: Lacedæmon, Corinth, Sicyon, Ægina, Megara, Epidaurus, Tegea, Orchomenos, Phlius, Trœzen, Hermione, Tiryns, Mycenæ, Lepreum, and Elis; which state was contented with the last place, on account of the small share which it had taken in the war.

The defenders of the isthmus are enumerated as follows: Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, nearly agreeing with the other list, only that the Arcadians, having been present with their whole force, and also the Eleans, occupy an earlier place; and the Megarians and Æginetans are omitted, as having had no share in the defence. This regular order of precedence is alone a proof of a firm union. The Tegeatæ, since they had joined the side of Lacedæmon, enjoyed several privileges, and especially the place of honour at the left wing of the allied army. Argos remained excluded from the nations of the Peloponnesus, as it never would submit to the command of Sparta; the Achæans, indifferent to external affairs, only joined themselves momentarily to the alliance: but the Mantineans, though latterly they followed the policy of Argos, were long attached to the Peloponnesian league; for at the end of the Persian War they sent an army, which arrived too late for the battle of Platæa: having before, together with the other Arcadians, helped to defend the isthmus; they had also been engaged in the first days

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of the action at Thermopylæ, and they were at this time still the faithful allies of the Lacedæmonians. Their subsequent defection from Sparta may be attributed partly to their endeavours to obtain the dominion of Parrhasia, which was protected by Lacedæmon, to their hostility with Tegea, which remained true to Sparta after the great war with Arcadia, which began about 470 B.C., and to the strengthening of their city, and the establishment of a democratic government, through the influence of Argos.

The supremacy of Sparta was exercised in the expeditions of the whole confederacy, and in transactions of the same nature. In the first, the Spartan king — after it had been thought proper never to send out two together — was commander-in-chief, in whose powers there were many remains of the authority of the ancient Homeric princes. Occasionally, however, Sparta was compelled to give up her privilege to other commanders, especially at sea, as, for instance, the fleet at Salamis to Eurybiades. When any expedition was contemplated, the Spartans sent round to the confederate states, to desire them to have men and stores in readiness. The highest amount which each state could be called on to supply was fixed once for all, and it was only on each particular occasion to be determined what part of that was required. In like manner the supplies in money and stores were regularly appointed; so that an army, with all its equipment, could be collected by a simple summons. But agricultural labour, festivals, and the natural slowness of the Doric race, often very much retarded the assembling of this army. The contributions, chiefly perhaps voluntary, both of states and individuals, were registered on stone: and there is still extant an inscription, found at Tegea, in which the war-supplies of the Ephesians, Melians, etc., in money and in corn, are recorded. But the Lacedæmonians never exacted from the Peloponnesian confederacy a regular annual contribution, independent of circumstances; which would have been, in fact, a tribute: a measure of this kind being once proposed to King Archidamus, he answers, "that war did not consume according to rule."

Pericles, however, properly considers it as a disadvantage to the Peloponnesians that they had no paid troops, and that they had amassed no treasure. The object of an expedition was publicly declared: occasionally, however, when secrecy was required, it was known neither to the states nor to their army. The single allied states, if necessity demanded it, could also immediately summon the army of the others; but it is not clear to what extent this call was binding upon them. The Spartan military constitution, which we will explain hereafter, extended to the whole allied army; but it was doubtless variously combined with the tactics of the several nations. To the council of war, which, moreover, only debated, and did not decide, the Spartan king summoned the leaders of the several states, together with other commanders, and generally the most distinguished persons in the army.

According to the constitution of the Peloponnesian league, every common action, such as a declaration of war, or the conclusion of a peace or treaty, was agreed on at a congress of the confederates. But, as there was no regular assembly of this kind, the several states sent envoys (*ἄγγελοι*), like the deputies (*πρόβουλοι*), of the Ionians, who generally remained together only for a short time. All the members had legally equal votes (*ισόψηφοι*); and the majority sometimes decided against a strong opposition; Sparta was often outvoted, Corinth being at all times willing to raise an opposition. We have, however, little information respecting the exact state of the confederacy; it is probable, from the aristocratic feelings of the Peloponnesians,

that, upon the whole, authority had more weight than numbers; and for great undertakings, such as the Peloponnesian War, the assent of the chief state was necessary, in addition to the agreement of the other confederates. When the congress was summoned to Sparta, the envoys often treated with a public assembly of the Spartans.

But upon the internal affairs, laws, and institutions of the allied states, the confederacy had legally no influence. It was a fundamental law that every state should, according to its ancient customs, be independent and supreme; and it is much to the credit of Sparta, that, so long as the league was in existence, she never, not even when a favourable opportunity offered, deprived any Peloponnesian state of this independence. Nor were disputes between individual states brought before the congress of the allies, which, on account of the preponderance of Sparta, would have endangered their liberty; but they were commonly either referred to the Delphian oracle, or to arbitrators chosen by both states. For disputes between citizens of different states there was an entirely free and equal intercourse of justice. The jurisdiction of the states was also absolutely exempt from foreign interference. These are the chief features of the constitution of the Peloponnesian confederacy; the only one which in the flourishing times of Greece combined extensive powers with justice, and a respect for the independence of its weaker members.

Sparta had not become the head of this league by agreement, and still less by usurpation; but by tacit acknowledgment she was the leader, not only of this, but of the whole of Greece; and she acted as such in all foreign relations from about the year 580 B.C. Her alliance was courted by Cræsus: and the Ionians, when pressed by Cyrus, had recourse to the Spartans, who, with an amusing ignorance of the state of affairs beyond the sea, thought to terrify the king of Persia by the threat of hostilities. It is a remarkable fact, that there were at that time Scythian envoys in Sparta, with whom a great plan of operations against Persia is said to have been concerted. In the year 520 B.C. the Plateans put themselves under the protection of Cleomenes, who referred them to Athens; a herald from Sparta drove the Alcæonidæ from their city: afterwards Aristagoras sought from the protector of Greece aid against the national enemy: and when the Æginetans gave the Persians earth and water, the Athenians accused them of treachery before the Spartans: and lastly, during the Persian War, Greece found in the high character of that state the only means of effecting the union so necessary for her safety and success.

In this war a new confederacy was formed, which was extended beyond the Peloponnese; the community of danger and of victory having, besides a momentary combination, also produced a union destined for some duration. It was the assembly of this league—a fixed congress at Corinth during, and at Sparta after, the war—that settled the internal differences of Greece, that invited Argos, Corecra, and Gelo to join the league, and afterwards called upon Themistocles to answer for his proceedings. So much it did for the present emergency. But at the same time Pausanias, the regent of Sparta, after the great victory of Plataea, prevailed upon the allies to conclude a further treaty. Under the auspices of the gods of the confederacy, particularly of the Eleutherian (or Grecian) Jupiter, they pledged themselves mutually to maintain the independence of all states, and to many other conditions, of which the memory has been lost. To the Plateans in particular security from danger was promised. The Ionians also, after the battle of Mycale, were received into this confederacy.

[479-465 B.C.]

The splendid victories over the Persians had for some time taken Sparta, which was fitted for a quiet and passive existence, out of her natural sphere; and her king, Pausanias, had wished to betray his country for the glitter of an Asiatic prince. But this state soon perceived her true interest, and sent no more commanders to Asia, "that her generals might not be made worse": she likewise wished to avoid any further war with the Persians, thinking that Athens was better fitted to carry it on than herself. If the speech were now extant in which Hetoëmaridas the Heraclid proved to the councillors that it was not expedient for Sparta to aim at the mastery of the sea, we should doubtless possess a profound view, on the Spartan side, of those things which we are now accustomed to look on with Athenian eyes. Nor is it true that the supremacy over the Greeks was in fact transferred at all from Sparta to Athens, if we consider the matter as Sparta considered it, however great the influence of this change may have been on the power of Athens. But Sparta continued to hold its pre-eminence in the Peloponnese, and most of the nations of the mother-country joined themselves to her: while none but the Greeks of Asia Minor and the islands, who had previously been subjects of Persia, and were then only partially liberated, perhaps



GREEK SHOVELS
(In the British Museum)

too much despised by Sparta, put themselves under the command of Athens. But the complete liberation of Asia Minor from the Persian yoke, which has been considered one of the chief exploits of Athens, was in fact never effected. The Athenian empire did not prevent the vassals and subjects of the king of Persia from ruling over the Greeks of Asia Minor, even down to the very coast. We need not go any further to prove the entire falsehood of the account commonly given by the panegyrical rhetoricians of Athens.

The Peloponnese took the less concern in these proceedings, as internal differences had arisen from some unknown cause, which led to an open war between Sparta and Arcadia. We only know that, between the battle of Plataea (in which Tegea, as also later still, showed great fidelity towards Sparta) and the war with the Helots (*i.e.* between 479 and 465 B.C.), the Lacedæmonians fought two great battles, the one against the Tegeatæ and Argives at Tegea, the other against all the Arcadians, with the exception of the Mantineans, at Dipæa (*ἐν Διπαιεύσιν*), in the Mænaliam territory. Tisamenus, an Elean, of the family of the Iamidæ, was in both battles in the Spartan army; and in both Sparta was victorious.

This war had not been brought to a termination, when, in the year 465 B.C., a tremendous earthquake destroyed Sparta, and a sudden ruin threatened to

overwhelm the chief state of Greece. For, in the hope of utterly annihilating their rulers, many helots revolted, and the war was called the Third Messenian War. Upon this the Lacedæmonians, foreseeing a tedious siege, called in the aid of their allies; and this call was answered among others by the Athenians; the Spartans, however, dismissed them, as we have seen, before the fortress was taken.

Immediately after the dismissal of the Athenians from Ithome, the injured people of Athens annulled the alliance with Sparta, which had subsisted since the Persian War. Then followed the war with the maritime towns of Argolis, in which Athens, after many reverses, at length succeeded in destroying the fleet of Ægina, and subjugating that island (457 B.C.). The inactivity of Sparta during these astonishing successes of her enemy (for when she concluded the armistice with Athens she must have partly foreseen its consequences) seems to prove that she was entirely occupied with the final capture of Ithome, and the settlement of her interests in Arcadia.

The five years' truce in 451 B.C. was only an armistice between Athens and the Peloponnesian confederacy, which left Boeotia to shake off the Athenian yoke by her own exertions. At the end of these five years Megara revolted from the Athenians, and in consequence an invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians took place, which, though it did not produce any immediate result, was soon followed by the Thirty Years' Truce, in which Athens ceded her conquests in Megaris and the Peloponnese, and on the mainland returned within her ancient boundaries.

If now we consider the events which have been briefly traced it will be perceived, that the principle on which the Lacedæmonians constantly acted was one of self-defence, of restoring what had been lost, or preserving what was threatened with danger; whereas the Athenians were always aiming at attack or conquest, or the change of existing institutions. While the Spartans during this period, even after the greatest victories, did not conquer a foot of land, subjugate one independent state, or destroy one existing institution; the Athenians, for a longer or for a shorter time, reduced large tracts of country under their dominion, extended their alliance (as it was called) on all sides, and respected no connection when it came in conflict with their plans of empire.

But the astonishing energy of the Athenians, which from one point kept the whole of Greece in constant vibration, almost paralysed Sparta; the natural slowness of that state became more and more apparent: which having been, as it were, violently transplanted into a strange region, only began by degrees to comprehend the policy of Athens. It is manifest that the maxims of the Athenian policy were directly at variance with the general feeling of justice entertained by the Greeks, and especially to the respect for affinity of blood; and this fundamental difference was the true cause of the Peloponnesian War. In the first place then, Dorians were opposed to Ionians; and hence in the well-known oracle it was called the Doric War. It was a union of the free Greeks against the evil ambition of one state: of land forces against sea forces: the fleet of the Peloponnesians was at the beginning of the war very inconsiderable. Hence it was some time before the belligerent parties even so much as encountered one another; the land was the means of communication for one party, the sea for the other: hence the states friendly to Athens were immediately compelled to build Long Walls for the purpose of connecting the chief city with the sea, and isolating it from the land. Large bodies of men practised in war fought against

[460-405 B.C.]

wealth: the Peloponnesians carried on the war with natives; whereas Athens manned her fleet — the basis of her power — chiefly with foreign seamen; so that the Corinthians said justly that the power of Athens was rather purchased than native. It was the main principle of Pericles' policy, and it is also adopted by Thucydides in the famous introduction to his *History*, that it is not the country and people, but moveable and personal property in the proper sense of the word, which make states great and powerful. The war meant the maintenance of ancient custom as opposed to the desire for novelty: the former was the chief feature of the Doric, the latter of the Ionic race. The Dorians wished to preserve their ancient dignity and power,



GRECIAN TERRA-COTTA STATUETTE

(In the British Museum)

as well as their customs and religious feelings: the Ionians were commonly in pursuit of something new. It was a union of nations and tribes against one arbitrarily formed: aristocracy was pitted against democracy: this difference was manifested in the first half of the war by Athens changing, while Sparta only restored governments; for in this instance also the power of Sparta was in strictness only employed in upholding ancient establishments, as an aristocracy may indeed be overthrown, but cannot be formed in a moment.

These obvious points of difference are sufficient to substantiate the result which we wish to arrive at. The "honesty and openness" of the Doric character, the noble simplicity of the ancient times of Greece, soon disappeared in this tumultuous age. Sparta therefore and the Peloponnesians emerge from the contest, altered, and as it were reversed; and even before its termination appear in a character of which they had before probably contained only the first seeds.

But in the second half of the war, when the Spartans gave up their great armaments by land, and began to equip fleets with hired seamen; when they had learnt to consider money as the chief instrument of warfare, and begged it at the court of Persia; when they sought less to protect the states joined to them by affinity and alliance, than to dissolve the Athenian confederacy; when they began to secure conquered states by harposts of their own, and by oligarchies forced upon the people, and found that the secret management of the political clubs was more to their interest than open negotiation with

the government; we see developed on the one hand an energy and address, which was first manifested in the enterprises of the great Brasidas, and on the other a worldly policy, as was shown in Gylippus, and afterwards more strongly in Lysander; when the descendants of Hercules found it advisable to exchange the lion's for the fox's skin. And since the enterprises conducted in the spirit of earlier times either wholly failed or else remained fruitless, this new system, though the state had inwardly declined, brought with it, by the mockery of fate, external fame and victory.^b

Whatever nobility of creed the Sparta-loving Müller has, as above, claimed for Sparta up to this time, it is certain that the sudden accession of vast and unforeseen power changed her to a mood in which, as Bury^d says, "she cynically set aside her high moral professions and yielded to a lust for oppression." Grote was no lover of Sparta and yet he substantiates well his accusations against her.^a

GROTE'S COMPARISON OF SPARTAN AND ATHENIAN RULE

The Spartan empire began with the decisive victory of Ægospotami in the Hellespont (September or October 405 B.C.). The whole power of Athens was thus annihilated, and nothing remained for the Lacedæmonians to master except the city itself and Piræus; a consummation certain to happen, and actually brought to pass in April 404 B.C., when Lysander entered Athens in triumph, dismantled Piræus, and demolished a large portion of the Long Walls. With the exception of Athens herself—whose citizens deferred the moment of subjection by an heroic, though unavailing, struggle against the horrors of famine—and of Samos, no other Grecian city offered any resistance to Lysander after the battle of Ægospotami; which in fact not only took away from Athens her whole naval force, but transferred it all over to him, and rendered him admiral of a larger Grecian fleet than had ever been seen together since the battle of Salamis.

The allies, especially Thebes and Corinth, not only relented in their hatred and fear of Athens, now that she had lost her power—but even sympathised with her suffering exiles, and became disgusted with the self-willed encroachments of Sparta; while the Spartan king Pausanias, together with some of the ephors, were also jealous of the arbitrary and oppressive conduct of Lysander.

We have learned from dark, but well-attested details, to appreciate the auspices under which that period of history called the Lacedæmonian empire was inaugurated. Such phenomena were by no means confined within the walls of Athens. On the contrary, the Year of Anarchy (using that term in the sense in which it was employed by the Athenians) arising out of the same combination of causes and agents, was common to a very large proportion of the cities throughout Greece. The Lacedæmonian admiral Lysander, during his first year of naval command, had organised in most of the allied cities factious combinations of some of the principal citizens, corresponding with himself personally. By their efforts in their respective cities he was enabled to prosecute the war vigorously, and he repaid them, partly by seconding as much as he could their injustices in their respective cities, partly by promising to strengthen their hands still further as soon as victory should be made sure.

In the greater number of cities, he established an oligarchy of ten citizens, or a decarchy, composed of his own partisans; while he at the same

[405-404 B.C.]

time planted in each a Lacedæmonian harmost or governor, with a garrison, to uphold the new oligarchy. The decarchy of ten Lysandrian partisans, with the Lacedæmonian harmost to sustain them, became the general scheme of Hellenic government throughout the Ægean, from Eubœa to the Thracian coast towns, and from Miletus to Byzantium. Lysander sailed round in person with his victorious fleet to Byzantium and Chalcedon, to the cities of Lesbos, to Thasos, and other places—while he sent Eteonicus to Thrace for the purpose of thus recasting the governments everywhere. Not merely those cities which had hitherto been on the Athenian side, but also those which had acted as allies of Sparta, were subjected to the same intestine revolution and the same foreign constraint. Everywhere the new Lysandrian decarchy superseded the previous governments, whether oligarchical or democratical.

In what spirit these new decarchies would govern, consisting as they did of picked oligarchical partisans distinguished for audacity and ambition—who, to all the unscrupulous lust of power which characterised Lysander himself, added a thirst for personal gain, from which he was exempt, and were now about to reimburse themselves for services already rendered to him—the general analogy of Grecian history would sufficiently teach us, though we are without special details. But in reference to this point, we have not merely general analogy to guide us; we have further the parallel case of the Thirty at Athens, the particulars of whose rule are well known and have already been alluded to.

Isocrates, who speaks with indignant horror of these decarchies, while he denounces those features which they had in common with the triacontarchy at Athens—extrajudicial murders, spoliations, and banishments—notices one enormity besides, which we do not find in the latter: violent outrages upon boys and women. Nothing of this kind is ascribed to Critias and his companions; and it is a considerable proof of the restraining force of Athenian manners, that men who inflicted so much evil in gratification of other violent impulses, should have stopped short here. The decemvirs named by Lysander, like the decemvir Appius Claudius at Rome, would find themselves armed with power to satiate their lusts as well as their antipathies, and would not be more likely to set bounds to the former than to the latter. Lysander, in all the overweening insolence of victory, while rewarding his most devoted partisans with an exaltation comprising every sort of licence and tyranny, stained the dependent cities with countless murders, perpetrated on private as well as on public grounds. No individual Greek had ever before wielded so prodigious a power of enriching friends or destroying enemies, as in this universal reorganisation of Greece; nor was there ever any power more deplorably abused.

Taking all these causes of evil together—the decarchies, the harmosts, and the overwhelming dictatorship of Lysander—and construing other parts of the Grecian world by the analogy of Athens under the Thirty, we shall be warranted in affirming that the first years of the Spartan empire, which followed upon the victory of Ægospotami, were years of all-pervading tyranny, and multifarious intestine calamity, such as Greece had never before endured. The hardships of war, severe in many ways, were now at an end, but they were replaced by a state of suffering not the less difficult to bear because it was called peace. And what made the suffering yet more intolerable was, that it was a bitter disappointment and a flagrant violation of promises proclaimed, repeatedly and explicitly, by the Lacedæmonians themselves.

For more than thirty years preceding—from times earlier than the commencement of the Peloponnesian War—the Spartans had professed to interfere only for the purpose of liberating Greece, and of putting down the usurped ascendancy of Athens. Like the allied sovereigns of Europe in 1813, who, requiring the most strenuous efforts on the part of the people to contend against the Emperor Napoleon, promised free constitutions, and granted nothing after the victory had been assured—the Lacedæmonians held out the most emphatic and repeated assurances of general autonomy in order to enlist allies against Athens; disavowing, even ostentatiously, any aim at empire for themselves.

The victory of Ægospotami, with its consequences, cruelly undeceived every one. The language of Brasidas, sanctioned by the solemn oaths of the Lacedæmonian ephors, in 424 B.C., and the proceedings of the Lacedæmonian Lysander in 405-404 B.C., the commencing hour of Spartan omnipotence, stand in such literal and flagrant contradiction, that we might almost imagine the former to have foreseen the possibility of such a successor, and to have tried to disgrace and disarm him beforehand. There was no present necessity for conciliating allies—still less for acting up to former engagements; so that nothing remained to oppose the naturally ambitious inspirations of the Spartan ephors, who allowed the admiral to carry out the details in his own way. But former assurances, though Sparta was in a condition to disregard them, were not forgotten by others; and the recollection of them imparted additional bitterness to the oppressions of the decemvirs and harmosts. In perfect consistency with her misrule throughout eastern Greece, too, Sparta identified herself with the energetic tyranny of Dionysius at Syracuse, assisting both to erect and to uphold it; a contradiction to her former maxims of action which would have astounded the historian Herodotus.

The empire of Sparta, thus constituted at the end of 405 B.C., maintained itself in full grandeur for somewhat above ten years, until the naval battle of Cnidus in 394 B.C. That defeat destroyed her fleet and maritime ascendancy, yet left her in undiminished power on land, which she still maintained until her defeat by the Thebans, at Leuctra in 371 B.C. Throughout all this time, it was her established system to keep up Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the dependent cities on the continent as well as in the islands. Even the Chians, who had been her most active allies during the last eight years of the war, were compelled to submit to this hardship; besides having all their fleet taken away from them. But the native decarchies, though at first established by Lysander universally throughout the maritime dependencies, did not last as a system so long as the harmosts. Composed as they were to a great degree of the personal nominees and confederates of Lysander, they suffered in part by the reactionary jealousy which in time made itself felt against his overweening ascendancy. After continuing for some time, they lost the countenance of the Spartan ephors, who proclaimed permission to the cities (we do not precisely know when) to resume their pre-existing governments. Some of the decarchies thus became dissolved, or modified in various ways, but several probably still continued to subsist, if they had force enough to maintain themselves; for it does not appear that the ephors ever systematically put them down as Lysander had systematically set them up.

Such then was the result throughout Greece when that long war, which had been undertaken in the name of universal autonomy, was terminated by the battle of Ægospotami. In place of imperial Athens was substituted, not

[405-403 B.C.]

the promised autonomy, but yet more imperial Sparta. An awful picture is given by the philo-Laconian Xenophon, in 399 B.C., of the ascendancy exercised throughout all the Grecian cities, not merely by the ephors and the public officers, but even by the private citizens, of Sparta.

We have more than one picture of the Athenian empire in speeches made by hostile orators who had every motive to work up the strongest antipathies in the bosoms of their audience against it. We have the addresses of the Corinthian envoys at Sparta when stimulating the Spartan allies to the Peloponnesian War; that of the envoys from Mytilene delivered at Olympia to the Spartan confederates, when the city had revolted from Athens and stood in pressing need of support; the discourse of Brasidas in the public assembly at Acanthus; and more than one speech also from Hermocrates, impressing upon his Sicilian countrymen hatred as well as fear of Athens. Whoever reads these discourses, will see that they dwell almost exclusively on the great political wrong inherent in the very fact of her empire, robbing so many Grecian communities of their legitimate autonomy, over and above the tribute imposed. That Athens had thus already enslaved many cities, and was only watching for opportunities to enslave many more, is the theme upon which they expatiate. But of practical grievances—of cruelty, oppression, spoliation, multiplied exiles, etc., of high-handed wrong committed by individual Athenians—not one word is spoken. Had there been the smallest pretext for introducing such inflammatory topics, how much more impressive would have been the appeal of Brasidas to the sympathies of the Acanthians! How vehement would have been the denunciations of the Mytilenean envoys, in place of the tame and almost apologetic language which we now read in Thucydides! Athens extinguished the autonomy of her subject-allies, and punished revolters with severity, sometimes even with cruelty. But as to other points of wrong, the silence of accusers, such as those just noticed, counts as a powerful exculpation.

The case is altered when we come to the period succeeding the battle of Ægospotami. Here indeed also, we find the Spartan empire complained of (as the Athenian empire had been before), in contrast with that state of autonomy to which each city laid claim, and which Sparta not merely promised to ensure, but set forth as her only ground of war. Yet this is not the prominent grievance—other topics stand more emphatically forward. The decemvirs and the harmosts (some of the latter being helots), the standing instruments of Spartan empire, are felt as more sorely painful than the empire itself; as the language held by Brasidas at Acanthus admits them to be beforehand. At the time when Athens was a subject city under Sparta, governed by the Lysandrian Thirty and by the Lacedæmonian harmost in the Acropolis—the sense of indignity arising from the fact of subjection was absorbed in the still more terrible suffering arising from the enormities of those individual rulers whom the imperial state had set up. Now Athens set up no local rulers—no native Ten or native Thirty—no resident Athenian harmosts or garrisons. This was of itself an unspeakable exemption, when compared with the condition of cities subject, not only to the Spartan empire, but also under that empire to native decemvirs like Critias, and Spartan harmosts like Aristarchus or Aristodemus. A city subject to Athens had to bear definite burdens enforced by its own government, which was liable in case of default or delinquency to be tried before the popular Athenian dicastery. But this same dicastery (as is distinctly stated by Thucydides) was the harbour of refuge to each subject city; not less against individual Athenian wrong-doers than against misconduct from other cities. In no

one point can it be shown that the substitution of Spartan empire in place of Athenian was a gain, either for the subject cities or for Greece generally ; while in many points it was a great and serious aggravation of suffering. And this abuse of power is the more deeply to be regretted, as Sparta enjoyed after the battle of Ægospotami a precious opportunity — such as Athens had never had, and such as never again recurred — of reorganising the Grecian world on wise principles, and with a view to Panhellenic stability and harmony.

She now stood without competitor as leader of the Grecian world, and might at that moment have reasonably hoped to carry the members of it along with her to any liberal and Panhellenic organisation, had she attempted it with proper earnestness. Unfortunately she took the opposite course, under the influence of Lysander ; founding a new empire far more oppressive and odious than that of Athens, with few of the advantages, and none of the excuses, attached to the latter. As she soon became even more unpopular than Athens, *her* moment of high tide, for beneficent Panhellenic combination, passed away also — never to return.^c

HARSHNESS OF THE SPARTAN HEGEMONY



GREEK URN

(In the British Museum)

The Peloponnesian War had been disastrous in its consequences to public morals. Its long duration and peculiarly bloody character, arousing everywhere mistrust, exciting passions, deifying brute force, had wrought a deterioration in the Greek nature from which it never fully recovered. There was ferocity on the battle-field, a ferocity in the party contests. "This," says Aristotle, "is the oath administered to-day in several cities by the oligarchy : 'I will be the enemy of the people and will do them all the evil I can.' " We may indeed place against this homicidal oath that taken by the heliasts of Athens after the tyranny : "I will forget all past ills and will permit no one else to remember and give them mention." But Athens even in its decadence was always Athens liberal and generous, even as its mutilated

statues remain beautiful in all their degradation.

The system of warfare had also changed. We have shown how one military revolution had already occurred ; the replacing of the aristocratic army of former times by the democratic army of the fifth and sixth centuries. And now the age of mercenaries was being ushered in by the employment, in all Greek cities, of hired soldiers to fight beside their citizen troops. But to pay these hirelings money was required, and Greece applied to Persia, who alone had money ; hence her mendicant attitude towards the Great King, and the continual intervention of Xerxes' successors in Hellenic affairs.

[405-353 B.C.]

This dependence on a foreign power and harshness of the public temper were first observed during the last years of the war; they are found again in the year after peace was concluded, the Year of Anarchy, as the Greeks called the commencement of the Spartan dominion.

Blood flowed everywhere because everywhere were established oligarchical governments. A massacre occurred at Thasos. At Miletus eight hundred citizens belonging to the popularist party were lured from their retreats by Lysander and put to death. At Byzantium, Œtœa, and the greater part of the towns of Asia Minor similar outrages were committed. At Samos the inhabitants were all banished, with the privilege of taking away but a single garment. The defection of Chios and its navy had assured Sparta's triumph; as a reward its most prominent citizens were sent into exile and all its triremes were seized. Lycophron, a Phœrean, made himself master of the province of Thessaly after desperate battles. "Thereafter," relates Xenophon, "a Lacedæmonian's lightest word was obeyed; even a citizen in private life could arrange everything to his will." Xenophon himself appears to have shared this terror, since after the retreat of the Ten Thousand he refused the title of general-in-chief that his companions wished to bestow upon him, fearing that Sparta might view with disfavour the placing of command in the hands of an Athenian. The islanders, especially those who had betrayed the cause of Athens, hoped that with the accession to power of Lacedæmonia who was an ally of the Great King the duties established by Aristides and Pericles to protect their commerce would be removed. But they found they had simply changed masters, Sparta continuing to levy the former tribute, which amounted annually to 1000 talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000].

Athens, more adroit in establishing her empire, had proceeded without cruelty, violence, or spoliation, hence had not known, even in her time of greatest misfortune, the falling-off of her supports. Sparta was not so wise in the formation of kingdoms; force was the only instrument of which she knew the use, and with her the use of it was the abuse of it. Athens had also made use of force, but had always associated with it justice. Athens had made itself the political, military, and judiciary centre of the empire, and further, it was the metropolis of arts and letters for all Hellas. Nothing great or glorious, nothing useful or full of promise, could proceed from the Lacedæmonian dominion; it threatened to topple over in the hour of its erection. A thousand causes were at work to bring about a rapid dissolution; many of these were in Sparta or Greece, the rest in other lands.

DEGENERACY OF SPARTA

The results of Lycurgus' institutions continued to be made manifest. The Spartan city diminished in population from day to day, as though worn away by the friction of its iron institutions. The narrow circle, which it had drawn round itself, never widening but always growing smaller, finally came to enclose but an insignificant number of Spartans. Great numbers had perished in the wars, others cast by poverty into the lower classes could no longer take their seats at the public tables. Aristotle says, "Whoever is without means to contribute to the expense of these tables must forfeit his political rights." The Spartans knew that they were menaced with destruction through lack of citizens; the cry that arose when the four hundred and twenty Spartan soldiers were imprisoned on the island of Spacteria, still rang in every ear. Aristotle further states: "The ter-

ritory of Sparta that is capable of providing sustenance for fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand hoplites, to-day barely supports a thousand warriors." In the assemblies of four thousand, there were scarcely to be seen forty Spartans; moreover, inequality of conditions grew as the people decreased in number.

Gold and silver currency had for a long time ceased to be proscribed and the disinterestedness of the Lacedæmonians to be extolled. Numerous examples of their venality were known; Eurybiades had been bought by Themistocles, Plistoanax and Cleandridas by Pericles, Leotychides by the Aleuadæ, the admiral and captains of the fleet by Tissaphernes. The kings, the senators, the ephors, all had repeatedly received bribes, and Gylippus, the liberator of Syracuse, who had been charged to carry to Sparta the plunder of Athens, kept back for his own use thirty talents [£6000 or \$30,000]. Hence the remark of an interlocutor in the *Alcibiades*: "There is more gold and silver in Lacedæmonia than in all the rest of Greece; money flows to it from all parts and once there remains; the country is like a lion's cave, one sees the footprints of those who enter, but of footsteps leaving there is no trace." The commanders who returned from ports in Asia brought with them great wealth, and more than that a taste for luxury and ease, in a word, corruption; every one plunged into wild extravagance and the vices engendered by the possession of riches.

After the Peloponnesian War, the ephor Epitadeus had passed a law authorising citizens to dispose of their property and land. The effects of this rhetra were so prompt to appear that Aristotle was given cause to write: "The land has passed into the hands of a few." In the time of Agis IV the entire territory was owned by a hundred Spartans. Thus the government had become more and more oligarchical. All the national affairs were carried on by the ephors and the senate, even the general assembly was rarely consulted, and in consequence the rulers, being few in number, were all the more jealous of the privileges of their station and less disposed to suffer them to be curtailed. To open their ranks, moreover, for the readmission of families that poverty had driven forth would have been to expose themselves, by relinquishing the majority, to some territorial reform tending toward a fresh division of the immense domains now concentrated in the possession of a few. Public interest might point this way but private interest decidedly opposed it, and private interest won.

There resulted from this a violent hatred between the privileged and the lower classes; the latter being formed of Spartans degraded from their ranks, enfranchised helots, Laconians to whom had been accorded certain rights, and the children of Spartan fathers of the higher order and alien mothers. These classes were given denominations that kept them separate and distinct; there was doubtless also a wide difference in conditions. Below the Equals, who formed a restricted oligarchy, were the Inferiors, or Spartans, who were excluded from the public tables, and the *neodamodes* or helots enfranchised for services rendered the state, and lastly the *periecæi*. Though they had no share in the actual government of their country these men estimated highly the value of their services to the state; and at different times many prominent figures, sons of Spartan fathers and helot mothers, such as Lysander, Gylippus, and Callicratidas had issued from this class. In a vindictive address against Lacedæmon the Thebans at Athens declared that the Spartans recruited their military governors from among men who had helot blood in their veins; and indeed many of these people had amassed competencies that gave them the ambition to leave the inferior station in

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which custom held them. When Cleomenes III promised liberty to those among the helots who could pay into the public treasury the sum of five minæ [£21 or \$108], six thousand presented themselves.

Lacedæmon's two royal houses, however, had been retained, and it should have been the function of these to maintain discipline in the state. But the newly-acquired wealth of Sparta, coupled with the growing authority of the ephors, appreciably diminished the power of the kings. Reduced to the rôle of hereditary generals these monarchs could never depart on an expedition without being accompanied by ten supervisors, who, under the name of councillors, in reality directed all the military operations. During the last years of the Peloponnesian War the decisive battles had been fought on sea, and the fleets were commanded, captives sold, cities ransomed and subsidies received from the Great King by men who were not of pure Spartan blood. Aristotle in his *Politics* calls the office of admiral among them "a second royalty."

Lysander was not obeying the dictates of ambition when, as Sparta's leading citizen, he undertook to reform for his own advantage the political system of the city. "He could not," says Plutarch, "see without regret a city whose glory he had done so much to increase governed by kings who had no more ability to rule than he, so he formed the plan of depriving the reigning houses of their dignity to make it the common appanage of all the Heraclids." The discovery of the plot of Cinadon [described later] revealed an abyss of hatred yawning beneath the social system of Sparta, and at the same time an alarming unanimity of feeling between the inferior classes, both free and slaves. A civil war could easily have resulted from the situation; but Sparta, with that vigilance which continued distrust arouses in all oligarchies, discovered and baffled all the plots that were formed against her.

Yet in spite of this hostility between the classes, in spite of many other difficulties, such as strife between the kings on the one hand and the senators and the ephors on the other, in which the kings were reduced almost to the condition of subjects, and rivalry between the kings themselves, the Spartan government, by reason of concentration of authority in a few hands, was powerful enough for action against other states. At home and abroad the ephors and the harmosts, those so-called conciliators, exercised a permanent dictatorship, maintaining garrisons at Megara, Ægina, Tanagra, Pharsalus, Heraclea in Trachinia, at the entrance of Thermopylæ; also Dionysius of Syracuse was Sparta's ally. But this power, wide-spread as it was, was scarcely more than an influence, and an influence that was already on the wane, since the nation that lacks citizens has no resources within itself.

Sparta's exactions offended those who still loved liberty and had not, to console them for its loss, the advantages offered by Athens to her subjects—extensive commerce, and the splendour of public festivals, of arts and of poetry. Sparta, equally grasping and more oppressive, robbed her subjects of everything. She levied on them an annual tribute of one thousand talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000] which vanished in Lacedæmon never to be seen again, and those who had furnished her with troops, like the Achæans and Arcadians, or with vessels, like the Corinthians, or auxiliaries, like the Thebans, received nothing in return.

The weight of this heavy Dorian rule began shortly to be felt, and many regretted the Athenian supremacy that was kindly even in its excesses. That the Greeks from the coasts of Thrace or Asia, those people who had

never known how to say "No," should tremble at sight of a Spartan mantle or wand of office, was in no way remarkable, since they had been accustomed to obey. Not that a double servitude, that of the oligarchs, friends of Lysander, and that of the Lacedæmonian harmosts was not a great burden to bear, even for them. But Sparta must not count on such docility in the mother-country. She had not hesitated to speak as sovereign in the matter of the Athenian exiles, nor to make decrees, as sole authority, for all Greece. We have seen how Thebes responded.

Thebes, a continental power, had long aspired to play in central Greece the part played by Sparta in the Peloponnesus. Between this state and Athens there might be jealousy, but not necessarily a clash of interests as in her relations with Lacedæmonia. In the intoxication of victory Sparta had believed prudence no longer necessary, and, incensed that the Thebans should have taken at Decelea the tithe belonging to Apollo, had scornfully rejected their claims to a share in the spoils and treasures brought back by Lysander, fourteen hundred and seventy talents, the remainder of the advances made by Cyrus. Corinth, no better received, made common cause with Thebes, and this formed another ground of complaint to Sparta against that state. The Argives, in a discussion relative to the fixing of boundaries, maintained their reasons to be superior to those of their adversaries. "He who is strongest with this argument," said Lysander, drawing his sword, "reasons best about boundary limits." A Megarian, in conference, spoke in a very loud voice. "My friend," said Lysander, addressing him, "your words need a city to make them good." Still more unceremoniously Sparta dealt with the Eleans, as we shall see later.

To the imperious demands of the Spartan government were added individual acts of violence, which are often more odious because a single victim, even though obscure, excites more pity than a whole people bowed under defeat; and there is less peril in attacking public liberty which is the property of all, than in endangering, by contempt of truth and right, the honour or the life of an individual.

A kind and hospitable man of Leuctra, Scedadus, received in his house one day two young Lacedæmonians, who were greatly struck with the beauty of their host's two daughters. Returning from a voyage to Delphi, whither they had gone to consult the oracle, these two Lacedæmonians found the daughters alone in the house and violated them, after which they murdered them and threw their bodies into the well. When Scedadus returned next day his daughters did not, to his surprise, come forth to meet him, and his dog, howling plaintively, ran back and forth from his master to the well. Alarmed, Scedadus looked into the well, discovered the crime, and learned from his neighbours who were its perpetrators. He departed at once for Lacedæmon. In Argolis he fell in with a man as unfortunate as himself, whose son had fallen a victim to the brutality of a Spartan. This father had believed in Lacedæmonian justice, but had had none accorded him. Nevertheless Scedadus continued on his journey, and when he arrived in Sparta, told his story to the ephors, to the kings, to all the citizens he met, but no one would give it heed. Then wishing to call the divine anger down upon Sparta he invoked all the gods of heaven and earth, especially the furies of revenge, and put an end to his life. A tomb was later erected at Leuctra to his unfortunate daughters.

As against the few facts of this nature that have come to our knowledge how many have escaped us? We realise this more fully when we reflect on the hatred Sparta everywhere inspired even in the Peloponnesus.

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The Arcadians and the Achæans served her from motives of fear alone; she was, they declared, a citadel placed upon their flank to keep guard over the whole peninsula. At Lacedæmon their sentiments were well known. On his return from an expedition in which a whole Spartan corps had been lost, in the Corinthian War which we shall treat of shortly, Agesilaus entered the towns only at night, leaving them at break of day, that his men might not witness the joy exhibited by the inhabitants at this disaster.^f



GREEK PHILOSOPHER
(After Hope)



CHAPTER XLII. SPARTA IN ASIA

WHEN the Lacedæmonians put an end to the Athenian empire, they neither claimed any dominion on the continent of Asia, nor asserted the freedom of the Grecian republics there: the allegiance of the Asian Greeks was transferred from the Athenian people to the Persian king; and, under him, to the satraps, Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes. We have seen that, among the Greeks of Asia, Cyrus was popular, and Tissaphernes unpopular; insomuch that by a kind of rebellion against the satrap, the Ionians had attached themselves to the prince. The event therefore of the expedition against the king, and the appointment of Tissaphernes to the great command which Cyrus had held, could not but be highly alarming to them. But, on the other hand, the glorious retreat of the Greeks who had accompanied the prince, and the clear evidence which their return in safety bore to the superiority of the Grecian arms, afforded ground of encouragement. If the patronage of Lacedæmon could be obtained, whose councils commanded the united arms of Greece, little, it was hoped, need be apprehended from the satrap's vengeance. Refusing therefore to acknowledge his authority, the Ionians sent ministers to Lacedæmon to solicit protection.

The Lacedæmonian government, less expecting friendship from the king and from Tissaphernes on account of their connection with Cyrus, and valuing it less as the fame of the actions of the Cyrean army taught to despise their enmity, resolved that the Ionians should be protected. Possibly circumstances at home might contribute to this determination. It might be desirable to employ a part of their people on foreign service; and for service against an enemy so famed for wealth, and so little for bravery and military skill, volunteers would be numerous among the poor commonwealths of Peloponnesus. Four thousand men were required from the allies. Only one thousand were added from Lacedæmon: and they were all of those called neodamodes, who, owing their elevation from the condition of slaves into the rank of citizens to the necessities of war, were, on the return of peace, looked upon with so invidious an eye, that occasion for sending them on foreign service would be acceptable, both to the government and to themselves. Cavalry was very desirable for war in Asia: but the utmost force that Peloponnesus could raise was very small; and the principal citizens of the wealthiest republics, who alone composed it, would not be the most willing partakers in distant adventure. Application was therefore made to Athens; where recent disorders, extreme political jealousy, and a total want of protection against any momentary caprice of the people, made the situation of

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men of rank and fortune so precarious that the offer of pay for three hundred horse found ready acceptance there. Thembron was appointed commander in chief in Asia, with the title of harmost.

From their attachment to the cause of Cyrus, and consequent dread of the king's vengeance, apparently arose the revolt of those Grecian subjects of the Persian empire, which otherwise would mark gross ingratitude to a beneficent government. For the testimony here given by Xenophon, remarkably corresponding with all remaining from Herodotus and Thucydides, strongly confirms what has been heretofore observed, that there was uncommon liberality in the despotism of the Persian empire. Public faith was kept; property was not without security; it was not then, as under the present wonderfully barbarian government of the same fine country, a crime to be rich. Large estates, given even to foreigners, passed to their late posterity; and, instead of the tyranny which now depopulates towns and provinces, and against which the remaining subjects recur to the patronage of some foreign ambassador, the Persian government so extended liberal protection to all, that Grecian cities could prefer the dominion of the Persian king to that of the Athenian or Lacedæmonian commonwealths, and flourish under it. But the Persian government, though generally mild and liberal, had been, since the reign of Xerxes, always weak, and verging to dissolution. The Lacedæmonian general Thembron, who, with comparatively a small force, had been making conquests against it, showed no considerable abilities in the field, and in camp and in quarters his discipline was very deficient. The allies suffered from the licentiousness of his army; and complaints were in consequence so urged at Lacedæmon that, on the expiration of his year, he was sentenced to banishment.

Dercyllidas, who succeeded him, was more equal to a great and difficult command. Having already served in Asia, under Lysander, he knew the characters of the two satraps, who divided between them, in almost independent sovereignty, the dominion of the western provinces. The instructions of the ephors directed him to lead the army into Caria, the hereditary government of Tissaphernes. But the desire of revenging a disgrace he had formerly incurred, when harmost of Abydos, in consequence of an accusation from Pharnabazus, assisted at least, according to the contemporary historian, his friend, in determining him to act otherwise. He negotiated with Tissaphernes; and that dastardly satrap, ill-disposed towards Pharnabazus, and always readier for negotiation than battle, instead of exerting the great power with which he was vested for the general defence of the empire, bargained for a particular peace for his own provinces, and consented that the Grecian arms should, without opposition from him, be carried into the Bithynian satrapy. Dercyllidas, having thus provided for the safety of the rich fields of Ionia, which would otherwise have been liable, in his absence, to suffer from the Persian cavalry, hastened his march northward; and, in the length of way from Caria to the borders of Æolis, he maintained an exactness of discipline that gained him the greater credit with the allies as it was contrasted with the licentiousness from which the country had suffered while Thembron commanded.

The circumstances of Æolis might reasonably have invited the attention of the general, though revenge had not instigated him. According to that liberal policy, more than once already noticed as ordinary among the Persians, Pharnabazus had appointed Zenis, a Greek of Dardanus, to be governor, or, according to Xenophon's phrase, satrap of that fine country, so interesting, in earliest history, as the kingdom of Priam, and the seat of the

Trojan War. Zenis died young, leaving a widow, Mania, also a Dardanian. This extraordinary woman solicited the succession to her late husband's command; and supported her solicitations with presents so agreeable to the satrap's fancy, and proofs so pregnant of her own talents and spirit, that she obtained her suit. Being accordingly vested with the government, she did not disappoint, but, on the contrary, far exceeded, the satrap's expectation. She not only held all in due obedience, but, raising a body of Grecian mercenaries, she reduced the maritime towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colona, which had hitherto resisted the Persian dominion. Herself attended the sieges, viewing the operations from her chariot, and by praises and presents judiciously bestowed she excited such emulation that her army acquired repute superior to any other body of mercenaries in Asia. Pharnabazus requiring troops for suppressing the incursions of the rebellious Mysians and Pisidians, she attended in person. In consequence of her able conduct and high reputation, he always treated her with great respect, and sometimes even desired her assistance in his council.

Mania was another Artemisia; and the weighty authority of Xenophon for the history of the Dardanian satrapess not a little supports the account given by Herodotus of the Halicarnassian queen. But, though Mania could govern provinces and conduct armies, yet, amid the encouragement which the gross defects, both of Grecian and Persian government, offered for daring villainy, she could not secure herself against domestic treachery. Scarcely had she passed her fortieth year when she was murdered in her palace by Midias, who had married her daughter. But a single murder would not answer the execrable villain's purpose. Her son, a most promising youth of seventeen, was cut off. The assassin had then the impudence to ask of the satrap the succession to the government held by the deceased Mania, supporting his solicitation by large presents. But he seems to have founded his hopes on a knowledge rather of the general temper and practice of the Persian great than of the particular character of Pharnabazus. He, with a generous indignation, refused the presents, and declared he would not live unless he could revenge Mania. Midias prepared to support himself by force or intrigue, as circumstances might direct. He had secured Gergis and Scepsis, fortified towns in which Mania's treasures were deposited: but the other towns of the province, with one consent, refusing to acknowledge his authority, adhered to Pharnabazus.

Dercyllidas arrived upon the borders in this critical conjuncture. The satrap was unprepared; the Lacedæmonian name was popular; and the towns of Larissa, Hamaxitus, and Colona, in one day opened their gates. A declaration was then circulated, that the purpose of Dercyllidas and the Lacedæmonian government was to give perfect independency to the Æolian cities; desiring only alliance defensive and offensive, with quarters for the army within their walls whenever it might become requisite in that service whose object was the common liberty of all Grecian people. The garrisons were composed mostly of Greeks, attached to Mania, but indifferent to the interest of Pharnabazus. The towns of Neandria, Ilium, and Cocylum acceded to the Spartan general's invitation. Hope of large reward for his fidelity induced the governor of Cebrene to adhere to the satrap; but, upon the approach of the army, the people soon compelled him to surrender.

Dercyllidas then marched towards Scepsis. The assassin Midias, fearful, at the same time, of the Spartan general, the Persian satrap, and the Scepsian citizens, conceived his best hope to lie in accommodation with the former. He proposed a conference, to which Dercyllidas consented. Acquitting

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himself then of that miscreant by restoring all his private property, with liberal allowance for all his claims, he seized the wealth of Mania, as now belonging to the satrap, the common enemy; and it was his boast, a grateful boast to the army, that he had enriched the military chest with a twelvemonth's pay for eight thousand men.

Having thus, according to Xenophon's expression, in eight days, taken nine cities, he sent proposals of truce to Pharnabazus. That generous satrap, unassisted from the capital of the empire, and deserted and betrayed by the great neighbouring officer whose more peculiar duty it was to afford him assistance, readily accepted them. Xenophon indeed says, that he was little disturbed with the loss of *Æolis*; esteeming that province, under Lacedæmonian protection, while he had himself peace with Lacedæmon, rather a useful barrier against other enemies. The meaning of this apparently is to be collected only from what follows. The Bithynians, though as tributary subjects of the empire he had assisted them against the Cyrean army, were always licentious, sometimes perhaps rebellious, and they frequently carried hostile depredation among the more peaceful and settled inhabitants of his satrapy. Among these people Dercyllidas resolved to take his winter quarters, as in a hostile territory, and Pharnabazus expressed no dissatisfaction.

Since he had been in Asia, Dercyllidas had fought no great battle, nor taken any town by assault; but, in an army which, under his predecessor, had been so lawless as to be a terror more to friends than enemies, he had restored exact discipline, and yet was the favourite of that army. With that army then he had awed the two great satraps, each commanding a province equal to a powerful kingdom, and both together acting under the mightiest empire in the world; so that, after having given independency and security to the long line of Ionian and *Æolian* colonies, he could direct his views another way for the benefit of the Grecian name.

The Thracian Chersonese, once the principality of the renowned *Miltiades*, lately, in large proportion, the property of another great and singular character, *Alciades*, and by its fertility, its many harbours, and its advantageous situation for trade, always a great object for industrious adventurers from Greece, was however always subject to dreadful incursions from the wild hordes of Thracians, who made it their glory to live by rapine. The Chersonesites, in a petition to Lacedæmon for protection, declared that, unless it were granted, they must abandon the country. Dercyllidas, informed of this, before orders could come to himself from Lacedæmon, or another could be sent with the commission, resolved to execute the service. He sent to Pharnabazus a proposal for prolonging the existing truce, which was immediately accepted; and, having so far provided tranquillity for Asia, he transported his army to the European shore. Immediately he visited the Thracian prince *Seuthes*, by whom he was very hospitably entertained; and having arranged, apparently to his satisfaction, those matters in which his commonwealth and that prince had a common concern, he marched to the Chersonese. There he employed his army, not in plunder and destruction, but in raising a rampart across the isthmus, to secure the peace of the rich country and industrious people within. Begun in spring, it was completed before autumn, and the army was reconveyed into Asia. Dercyllidas then made a progress through the Asiatic cities, to inspect the state of things, and had the satisfaction to find everywhere peace, prosperity, and general content.

Now the ephors sent orders for war to be carried into Caria; for the army under Dercyllidas to march thither; and for the fleet, then commanded by *Pharax*, to co-operate with it. The first effect of these ill-concerted

measures appears to have been to produce, or at least to hasten, a union between the two satraps, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus ; whose long variance had in no small degree contributed to those great successes which the Greeks, with a force otherwise inadequate to contention with the Persian empire, had been enabled to obtain. Pharnabazus, unsupported by the court of Susa, and basely deserted, or worse than deserted, by Tissaphernes, his immediate superior in command, had acquiesced under the loss of Æolis. But, as soon as the threatened attack of Caria afforded a probability that Tissaphernes would be disposed to change his conduct, Pharnabazus went to him, and declared his readiness to co-operate zealously in measures for driving the Greeks out of Asia. This proposal, to which the jealousy and pusillanimity of Tissaphernes otherwise would scarcely have listened, was made acceptable by the indiscreet violence of the Spartan government. The two satraps went together into Caria, and, having arranged matters for the defence of that country, returned to take the command of an army which threatened Ionia with destruction.

Dercyllidas was already marching for Caria, when information reached him that all his hitherto successful labours for the welfare of the colonies were upon the point of being rendered utterly vain. In these alarming circumstances the interested pusillanimity of Tissaphernes relieved him. Pharnabazus was desirous of engaging ; but Tissaphernes already more than half satisfied, since his property in Caria was no longer in immediate danger, would first try the effect of a conference. A herald was therefore sent to the Grecian general. The conference being held accordingly, Dercyllidas insisted on the simple proposition, "that all Grecian cities should be independent." To this the satraps consented, with the conditions, "that the Grecian army should quit the king's territory" (by which seems to have been meant Asia, including the Grecian colonies), "and that the Lacedæmonian governors should quit the Grecian towns." Upon these terms a truce was concluded, to hold till the pleasure of the king and of the Lacedæmonian government could be known.

This was the first treaty, reported on any authentic or even probable testimony, by which, since the early times of the Lydian monarchy, it was provided that the Asian Greeks should be completely emancipated from foreign dominion. All the Ionian and Æolian cities, it appears, thus gained immediate enjoyment of independency in peace : the Carian seem to have waited the confirmation of the treaty by the king of Persia and the Lacedæmonian government. But it was a quiet revolution : no great battle gave it splendour ; none of those striking events attended which invite the attention of the writer in proportion as they are fitted to impress the fancy of the reader. It forms, nevertheless, a memorable and interesting era in Grecian history ; and the fame of Dercyllidas, less brilliant, but far purer, than that of most of the great men of Greece, though, being recorded by the pen of Xenophon, it is indeed secured against perishing, yet deserves to have been more generally and more pointedly noticed, than we find it, by writers whose theme has been Grecian history, or panegyric of the Grecian character.

WAR OF LACEDÆMON AND ELIS

In that system, if it may be so called, by which the various members of the Greek nation were in some degree held together, we find a strange mixture of undefined, and sometimes repugnant claims, more or less generally

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admitted. While the Lacedæmonians presided, with authority far too little defined, over the political and military affairs of Greece, the Eleans asserted a prescriptive right to a kind of religious supremacy; also too little defined; universally allowed nevertheless, in a certain degree, but, like the Lacedæmonian supremacy, not always to the extent to which the claimants pretended. In the schism of Peloponnesus, which occurred during the Peloponnesian War, we have seen the imperial state of Lacedæmon summoned to the Elean tribunal, as a British corporation might be summoned to the courts at Westminster; a fine imposed, its citizens interdicted the common games and sacrifices of the nation, an opprobrious punishment publicly inflicted upon an aged and respectable Spartan, who, but by implication, offended against the Elean decrees; and, finally, these measures supported by avowed hostilities, and alliance with the enemies of Sparta. The necessity of the times induced the Lacedæmonians to make peace with these affronts unrevenged; but their smothered resentment had been revived and increased by what they esteemed a new indignity. Before the conclusion of the Peloponnesian War, Agis, king of Lacedæmon, had been sent, in pursuance of a supposed prophetic direction, to perform a sacrifice to Jupiter at Olympia. The Eleans forbade the ceremony, alleging that, according to ancient law, no oracle should be consulted for success in wars between Greeks and Greeks, and they would allow no prayer for victory in such a war. There is a beneficence, a liberal and extended patriotism in this idea, so consonant to the spirit with which Iphitus is said to have founded the Olympian festival, and so opposite to the tenets afterwards generally prevailing in Greece, that they seem to mark the law for ancient and genuine. The Lacedæmonians however were not the less offended with the Eleans for bringing forward, upon such an occasion, what, if those maxims only were considered which had prevailed through succeeding ages, would carry much the appearance of a complete novelty.

The judgment passed against the Lacedæmonians and the fine imposed, the interdiction of the games, the punishment of Lichas, the confederacy with Athens and Argos, the hostilities ensuing, and finally the refusal of permission for sacrifice at Olympia, are stated by the contemporary historian as the motives which disposed the Lacedæmonians to war. We gather from him however that others existed; the democratical party at this time governed Elis, and Elis held many towns of Elea in subjection. The Lacedæmonians did not absolutely require oligarchy in every state of Greece; for they had lately permitted the restoration of democracy in Athens; and even their own government had a mixture of democracy: but they always beheld, with peculiar jealousy, dominion exercised by a democratical commonwealth.

In pursuance of this resolution, ministers were sent to Elis with a declaration that "the Lacedæmonians deemed it just and proper that the towns held in subjection by the Eleans be restored to independency." The Eleans, alleging the right of conquest, refused to resign their sovereignty; and upon this the ephors ordered the king, Agis, to march into their country. The usual ravage of Grecian armies presently followed, but an earthquake, imagined



GREEK VASE

a divine admonition, alarming the aged prince and his superstitious people, they retired out of Elea,¹ and the troops were dismissed to their several homes. Whether as marking the favour of the gods or the weakness of their enemies, this conduct greatly encouraged the Eleans. In either view it improved the hope of gaining to their cause many Grecian states, known to be disaffected towards Lacedæmon. But if the Lacedæmonian sovereignty was tyrannical, theirs apparently was not less so; and while they were cherishing the hope of foreign assistance, they did not take wiser precautions than other Grecian states for securing the attachment of their subjects. In the next spring Agis again entered Elea with an army to which all the allies had contributed, excepting Corinth and Bœotia. Immediately Lepreum revolted to him; Macistus and Epitalium quickly followed the example; and these were imitated, as he advanced into the country, by Leprine, Amphidolia, and Marganeæ. In this defection of their towns, the Eleans were utterly unable to face the Lacedæmonian army in the field. Agis proceeded unopposed to Olympia and sacrificed, now unforbidden, on the altar of Jupiter. The territories of the revolting towns of course had been spared; but rapine and devastation marked the way from Olympia to Elis, whither the king next directed his march. Nor did the country suffer only from the conquering army. The opportunity of freebooting invited the neighbouring Arcadians and Achæans; and slaves and cattle and corn were carried off to such an amount that all the markets of Peloponnesus were glutted with Elean plunder. It was supposed that Agis would not, rather than that he could not, take Elis itself, which was unfortified. After destroying many fair buildings of the outskirts he proceeded to Cyllene, the principal seaport of the Eleans, and ravage was extended from the mountains to the sea.

Occasion has already frequently occurred to remark, that scarcely any misfortune could befall a Grecian state which would not bring advantage, or at least the hope of advantage, to some considerable portion of its subjects. The aristocratical party in Elis, oppressed by the demagogue Thrasydæus, looked to the present sufferings of their country as the means of relief; but with no better consideration of any political or moral principle than might have guided the wildest savages, or the most profligate among the lowest populace in civilised nations. They proposed to assassinate Thrasydæus, with a few of his confidential friends; and then, in the name of the commonwealth, to open a negotiation with Lacedæmon. The people, they trusted, deprived of their leader, and dreading the arms of the Lacedæmonians, would acquiesce; and thus the principal power in the state would of course come into their hands. The plot failed through a mistake, by which another was murdered for Thrasydæus. The people, however, supposing their favourite killed, rested in silent dejection: but, while the conspirators were arming, and stationing their party, the demagogue awoke, where drunkenness and supervening sleep had overnight checked his way. The people immediately flocked about him; a battle followed, and the conspirators, overpowered, fled to the Lacedæmonian camp.

The conduct of the war was such as we have so often seen in Greece. When plunder no longer remained to employ the Lacedæmonian army profitably, Agis marched home, leaving only a garrison in Epitalium on the Alpheus, where he established the Elean fugitives. Hence rapine was occasionally prosecuted through the autumn and winter. Elis could not, like Athens, support itself under the continual ravage of its territory. In

[¹ Elea is used here to denote the district of which the city of Elis was the capital.]

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spring therefore Thrasydæus opened a negotiation with Lacedæmon, and at once offered the independency of all the towns over which the Eleans claimed sovereignty by right of conquest; proposing only to keep Epium, whose territory they had purchased from the inhabitants for thirty talents fairly paid. The Lacedæmonians however, considering, or affecting to consider, the purchase as forced, required that Epium should be free like the rest. The disposition thus apparent in the Lacedæmonians to depress Elis encouraged the villagers of the Pisan territory to assert their claim to the superintendency of the Olympian temple, violently taken from their ancestors, as they contended, by the Eleans, when their city was destroyed. But, whatever might have been the ancient right, the Lacedæmonian administration, thinking those uneducated pretenders unfit for an office of much solemnity and dignity in the eyes of all Greece, would not interfere. Upon the condition therefore that every town of Elea should be, as a free republic, a separate member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, which was, in effect,



THE SHORES OF ELIS

to be subjects of Lacedæmon, peace was made; and Elis, according to the Lacedæmonian decree preceding the war, humbled and chastened, was itself also restored to its place in that confederacy.

The imputation of impiety, under which the Lacedæmonians began the war, perhaps urged them to a more ostentatious display of respect for the gods at the end of it. Agis himself was deputed to offer, at Delphi, the tenth of the spoil. On his return, he was taken ill at Heræa, and he died soon after his arrival at Lacedæmon. In the magnificence of his funeral the Lacedæmonians probably meant also to exhibit their own piety, as well as to testify their opinion of the deceased prince's merit. They failed however in their estimate of the prevailing prejudices of the Grecian people. Honour to the gods indeed was supposed to be best shown, and religion principally to consist, in pompous processions and expensive spectacles; but general opinion condemned the splendour of the funeral of Agis, as greater than could become the most illustrious mortal.^b

When the days for the funeral solemnities were past and it was necessary for another king to be appointed, Leotychides, who said that he was the son of Agis, and Agesilaus his brother, stood forward as competitors for the throne. Leotychides saying, "The law, Agesilaus, directs, not that the brother, but that the son of the king is to reign; though if there happen to be no son, the brother may in that case become king," Agesilaus rejoined,

"Then I must be king." "How," said Leotychides, "when I am alive?" "Because," returned Agesilaus, "he whom you call your father, said that you were not his son."¹ "But my mother, who knows much better than he, still declares that I am." "Neptune, however," said Agesilaus, "showed that what you assert is false, as he drove your father abroad by an earthquake from her chamber; and time, which is said to be the truest of witnessses, gives testimony with him to the same effect; for you were born in the tenth month after he fled from her, and was never after seen in her chamber." In this manner they disputed. But Diopithes, a man who paid great attention to oracles, supported Leotychides, and said that there was an oracle of Apollo enjoining them "to beware of a halting reign." Lysander however said in reply to him, on behalf of Agesilaus, that "he did not think the god desired them to beware lest their king should stumble and halt, but rather lest one who was not of the royal family should reign; for that the royal power would assuredly be lame whenever men not descended from Hercules should rule the state." The people, after hearing such arguments from both sides, chose Agesilaus for their king.

CINADON'S PLOT

Agesilaus had not yet been a year on the throne, when, as he was offering one of the sacrifices appointed for the city, the augur told him that the gods indicated some conspiracy of the most dangerous kind. Within five days after the conclusion of this sacrifice, somebody gave information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and said that "Cinadon was leader in the affair." Cinadon was a man of vigorous frame, and of powerful mind, but not one of the Equals. When the ephors asked the informer what account he could give of the way in which the plot would be carried into effect, he said that "Cinadon, having conducted him to the outside of the forum, desired him to count how many Spartans there were in the forum; and I," continued he, "having counted the king, the ephors, the senators, and about forty others, asked him, 'And why, Cinadon, have you told me to count them?' 'Consider these,' he replied, 'as enemies, and all the rest now in the forum, who are more than four thousand, as allies.'" He said also that Cinadon pointed out to him in the streets sometimes one, and sometimes two, that were enemies, and said that all the other people were auxiliaries, and that whatever Spartans were on their estates in the country, one, namely the master, was an enemy, while on every estate there were numbers of allies. The ephors then inquiring how many Cinadon said were privy to the plot, he replied that he told him, as to that point, that "there were not very many in concert with the principal agents, but that they were trustworthy, and declared that they were in communication with all the helots, the newly-enfranchised, the inferior citizens, and the people in the parts about the city; for whenever any mention of the Spartans was made among them, no one could forbear from showing that he would willingly eat them up alive." When the ephors further asked "whence they said they would get arms," he answered, that Cinadon had stated to him, "Those of us who are already united, say we have arms enough;" and for the multitude, he said that Cinadon, conducting him into the iron-market, had pointed out numbers of daggers, swords, spits, axes, hatchets, and scythes, and added that "all the instruments with

[¹ It was commonly believed that Alcibiades was the father of Leotychides.]

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which men cultivate the ground, or hew wood or stone, would serve as weapons, while the greater part of the artificers had sufficient tools to fight with, especially against unarmed enemies." The informer being finally interrogated "at what time the scheme was to be carried into execution," replied that "directions had been given him to be in readiness at home."

The ephors, after listening to his statement, were of opinion that he had given information of a well-concerted plot, and were greatly alarmed; nor did they summon even what was called the lesser assembly, but some of the senators, conferring together here and there, resolved to send Cinadon to Aulon, accompanied by some others of the younger men, with directions to bring back with him certain inhabitants of that place, and some helots, whose names were written on his scytale. They desired him also to bring with him a certain woman, who was said to be the handsomest in the place, and was thought to corrupt all the Lacedæmonians, old as well as young, that went thither. Cinadon had executed similar commissions for the ephors before; and they now delivered to him the scytale on which were written the names of the persons that were to be apprehended. As he asked "which of the young men he should take with him," they said to him, "Go, and desire the eldest of the *hippagretæ* to send with you six or seven of such of his men as may be at hand." They had previously taken care that the *hippagretæ* should know whom he was to send, and that those who were sent should be apprized that they were to secure Cinadon. They moreover acquainted Cinadon that they would send three carriages, that they might not bring away their prisoners on foot, concealing from him as carefully as possible that they sent them with a view to his security alone. They did not apprehend him in the city, because they were uncertain how far the plot might have spread, and wished first to hear from Cinadon himself who were his accomplices in it, before they themselves should be aware that information was given against them, lest they should make their escape. The party who took him were to keep him prisoner, and when they had learned from him the names of his accomplices, were to send them in writing to the ephors as speedily as possible. So intent indeed were the ephors on effecting their object, that they even despatched a troop of horse to support the party that was gone to Aulon.

As soon as Cinadon was secured, and a horseman arrived with the names of those whom he had put on his list, they instantly apprehended Tisamenus the soothsayer, and the other principal conspirators; and when Cinadon was brought back and examined, and had made a full confession and specified his accomplices, they at last asked him "with what object he had engaged in such a scheme." He replied, "in order that he might be inferior to no man in Lacedæmon." Soon after he was fastened, arms and neck, in a wooden collar, and scourged and pricked with lances; and in this condition he and his accomplices were led round the city. Thus they suffered the penalty of the law.^c

AGESILAUS IN ASIA

Not long after this event news was brought to Sparta by a Syracusan named Hierodes, who had just returned from Phœnicia, of preparations which he had witnessed in the Phœnician ports for a great armament, which he had learned was to consist of three hundred galleys. He had not been able to ascertain its object, but it had induced him to quicken his departure, that he might bear the tidings to Greece. The Spartan government was alarmed,

and called a congress of the allies to deliberate on preventive measures. But to Lysander the intelligence afforded a highly welcome opportunity of resuming his ambitious plans, and recovering his influence among the Asiatic Greeks. He seems however to have been aware that he was himself viewed with jealousy at home, and that a proposal coming directly from himself, and immediately tending to his own aggrandisement, would probably be ill received. He resolved therefore to make use of his friend Agesilaus, to accomplish his purpose, and easily prevailed on him to undertake, with a small force, to give such employment to the Persian arms in Asia, as would secure Greece from the threatened invasion.

Agesilaus, who was in the prime of life, was no less eager to display his military talents in such a brilliant field, than Lysander to renew his intrigues, and to replace his creatures in the posts from which they had been dislodged. He therefore offered to take the command of an expedition to Asia, for which he required no more than two thousand neodamode troops, and six thousand of the allies, and desired to be accompanied by a council of thirty Spartans—which he probably knew would, according to usage, be forced upon him—and by Lysander among them. His offer was accepted, and all his requests granted, with the addition of six months' pay for the army. Corinth, Thebes, and Athens, were called upon to contribute their forces, but they all refused.

It was the first time since the expedition of Menelaus that a king of Sparta had undertaken to invade Asia; and Agesilaus, partly perhaps for the sake of the omen, and partly for the sake of his own renown, was willing to associate his enterprise with the recollection of that heroic adventure. He therefore stopped at Aulis, to sacrifice there after the example of Agamemnon. But before he had completed the rite, the Boeotarchs sent a party of horse to enjoin him to desist, and the men did not merely deliver the message, but scattered the parts of the victim which they found on the altar. He however stifled his resentment, and embarked again for Geræstus, where he found the bulk of his armament assembled, and sailed with it to Ephesus.

Soon after his arrival he received a message from Tissaphernes, calling on him to explain the design of his coming. Agesilaus replied, that his object was to restore the Asiatic Greeks to the independence which their brethren enjoyed on the other side of the Ægean. The satrap on this proposed a truce until the king's pleasure could be taken on this demand; he engaged himself to support it with all the credit he possessed, and professed to believe that the court would comply with it. Agesilaus consented to the proposal, only requiring security for the observance of the engagement, and even this security was no more than the oath of Tissaphernes, which he pledged with due solemnity to Dercyllidas, and two other Spartan commissioners, who were sent to ratify the convention. Nothing however was farther from the mind of either party than the thought of peace. Tissaphernes, as soon as he had taken the oath, sent to the king for a reinforcement to enable him to take the field; and Agesilaus, who was well aware of his intentions, and probably would not otherwise have granted the truce, though he observed it with strict fidelity, undoubtedly did not suffer the time to be lost with regard to the progress of his own preparations.

During this interval a breach, which the characters and views of the two men rendered almost inevitable, rose between him and Lysander. The rumour of the expedition, and of the part which Lysander was to take in it, seems to have rekindled the flames of discord in the Asiatic cities, which after the expulsion of his creatures had for a time been kept tranquil by the wise forbearance of the ephors and the prudent administration of Dercyllidas.

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When he came to Ephesus, his door was immediately besieged by a crowd of petitioners, who desired a license to oppress their countrymen under his patronage. After the victory of Ægospotami, Lysander, as the man who for the time wielded the irresistible power of Sparta, had been courted with extravagant servility by the Asiatic Greeks. They did not content themselves with the ordinary honours of golden crowns and statues, but raised altars and offered sacrifices, and sang pæans, and consecrated festivals to him as a god: the first example of that grossest kind of adulation, which afterwards became common among the Greeks, and was reduced to a system by the Romans. When he now appeared again in Asia, though in the train of a Spartan king, it was still supposed that the substance of power resided with him, and that he would direct the exercise of the royal authority, as he thought fit. He did not discountenance this persuasion, for he shared it himself. He had calculated on the subserviency of Agesilaus, whom he considered as mainly indebted to his friendship, first for the throne, and then—an obligation little inferior—for the command in Asia. But his colleagues, the rest of the Thirty, felt that the homage paid to him by the allies was derogatory, not only to the royal dignity, but to their own; and they complained to Agesilaus of his presumption.

The king himself had been hurt by it, and resolved to check it, not by a friendly remonstrance, but in a way the most grating to Lysander's feelings. He rejected all applications which were made to him in reliance on Lysander's interest; and his purpose at length became so evident, that Lysander was obliged to inform his clients, that his intercession, instead of furthering, would only obstruct their suits. He had however sufficient self-command to stifle or disguise his resentment; and, after a very mild expostulation with Agesilaus on the harshness of his conduct, requested to be removed from the scene of his humiliation to some other place, where he might still be employed in the public service. The king very willingly complied, and sent him to the Hellespont, where not long after he achieved an acquisition of some moment to the Spartan arms. He prevailed on a Persian of high rank, named Spithridates, who had been offended by Pharnabazus, to revolt, and come with his family, his treasures, and two hundred horse, to Cyzicus, and thence sailed with him and his son to Ephesus, and presented them to Agesilaus, who received them with great pleasure, and took this opportunity of gaining information about the state of Pharnabazus. This incident produced an apparent reconciliation between him and Lysander; but we shall see reason to suspect that on one side, at least, it was not sincere.

Tissaphernes had no sooner received such an addition to his forces, as appeared to him sufficient to overpower Agesilaus, than he threw aside the mask, and sent a message to the Spartan king, bidding him immediately quit Asia, or prepare for war. The council and the allies were somewhat daunted by his arrogant tone, and apparent strength; but Agesilaus, who had expected this result, and desired no other, told the envoys to carry back his thanks to their master, for the advantage he had given the Greeks by his perjury. He then ordered his troops to put themselves in readiness for a long march; sent



PROWS OF GREEK GALLEYS

word to the towns which lay on the road to Caria to lay in provisions for the use of his army; and called on the cities of Ionia, Æolis, and the Hellespont, for their contingents. Agesilaus had reckoned upon this effect of the satrap's selfish fears, and, instead of seeking him in Caria, marched in the opposite direction toward the residence of Pharnabazus. As this invasion was quite unexpected, he found the towns on his road unprepared for resistance, and collected an immense booty. He penetrated nearly to Dascylium without encountering an enemy. But in that neighbourhood he fell in with a body of Persian horse, and, by the issue of a skirmish which ensued, was made to feel its superiority in equipments and training over his own. The next day when he sacrificed, observes Xenophon — as if he was relating a providential warning, not a human contrivance — the victims were found imperfect; and Agesilaus advanced no farther, but retreated towards Ephesus.

There he spent the winter in preparations for the next campaign, and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a body of cavalry, which he perceived would be indispensable to the success and the safety of his future operations. For this purpose he made a list of the most opulent men in the Greek cities, and compelled each of them, as the condition of his exemption from personal service, to furnish a trooper. In the spring he collected his forces at Ephesus, and put them into an active course of training, rousing their emulation by the prizes which he proposed for the most gallant show, and the highest degree of expertness, in every department of the service. Xenophon, as an old soldier, is delighted with the recollection of the military bustle which prevailed during this season at Ephesus; where the wrestling schools and the hippodrome were constantly enlivened by the exercises of the men, the market was abundantly supplied with horses, and arms of every kind, and all the trades subservient to war were kept in full employment. Among other devices for raising the spirits of his troops, Agesilaus borrowed a hint, it would seem, from one of Cimon's stratagems, and ordered his Persian prisoners to be exposed to sale naked, that the Greeks might contrast the delicacy of their persons with the robustness of frames hardened by the exercises of the palæstra.

Before he took the field again, a year having now elapsed from the commencement of his expedition, Lysander and his colleagues were superseded by a new body of councillors, and returned home. Agesilaus then gave public notice, that he meant to take the shortest road into the richest part of the enemy's country. The notice was designed not more for the preparation of his own troops, than for Tissaphernes, who concluded that if this had been the intention of Agesilaus, he would not have disclosed it, and that now Caria was certainly his real mark. He therefore repeated the dispositions of the preceding summer. But while he waited for the enemy with his cavalry in the vale of the Mæander, Agesilaus directed his march towards the plains of Sardis, the richest of Western Asia. During three days he traversed them without seeing an enemy; but on the fourth the Persian cavalry, which Tissaphernes seems to have sent forward as soon as he heard of the movements of Agesilaus, suddenly came up, and cut off many of the followers of the camp, as they were ranging over the country in quest of plunder.

Tissaphernes had already arrived at Sardis; and his countrymen, many of whom had probably suffered considerable loss from the invasion, bitterly censured him for leaving them unprotected, and even it seems charged him with treachery. The complaints were carried up to the court, where he had one implacable and powerful enemy in the fiendish Parysatis, who thirsted to revenge herself on him for his enmity to her favourite son. She had already

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found that Artaxerxes was weak enough to sacrifice his most faithful servants to her resentment, even when he knew that it was inflamed by the very services which they had rendered to himself ; and according to the most probable account, it was in compliance with her request that he now ordered Tissaphernes to be put to death. The execution of the sentence was committed to Tithraustes, who was appointed to succeed Tissaphernes in his satrapy, and was instructed to open a negotiation with Agesilaus. Accordingly, after executing the first part of his commission, which he did in the Turkish style by the hands of an underling, who surprised Tissaphernes in his bath, Tithraustes sent envoys to treat with the Spartan king. He affected to consider Tissaphernes as the author of the quarrel between his master and the Greeks, and, as if the end of their expedition was now answered by their enemy's death, proposed that Agesilaus should return home. As to the Asiatic Greeks, Artaxerxes was willing to acknowledge their independence, on condition that they would pay their ancient tribute. Agesilaus replied, that he had no authority to conclude peace without the sanction of the government at home : but he would transmit the Persian overtures to Sparta. In the meanwhile Tithraustes was very anxious that hostilities should be suspended in his province, and, pleading his own merits in the execution of Tissaphernes, begged Agesilaus, while he waited for an answer to the terms proposed, to turn his arms against the satrapy of Pharnabazus. To this Agesilaus consented on condition that Tithraustes would defray the expense of the march ; and he received thirty talents [£6000 or \$30,000] on that score. This was a step beyond former precedents : for even Tissaphernes, though he had not scrupled to conclude a separate truce, had not paid the enemy a subsidy for invading another part of his master's dominions.

On his march towards the territories of Pharnabazus, Agesilaus received a flattering testimony of the approbation with which his proceedings were viewed at Sparta, and of the disposition which prevailed there to support him in the prosecution of the war. By a despatch which reached him as he lay near Cyme, he learned that he had been invested with the administration of naval affairs, that he was empowered to appoint whom he would to the office of admiral, and still to regulate the operations of the fleet at his discretion. Thus to unite the supreme command of the army and of the navy in one person, was an unexampled mark of confidence, and a striking indication of the new energy which ambition had infused into the Spartan counsels. Agesilaus immediately took measures for raising a fleet ; and by a judicious distribution of the burden among the maritime allies, and his influence with wealthy individuals, collected 120 new galleys. But he was less prudent and fortunate in the choice of an admiral, and instead of seeking the highest qualifications, consulted his private affection in the appointment of his wife's brother Pisander. When this business was despatched, he continued his march to the satrapy of Pharnabazus.

PERSIAN GOLD

These preparations, combined perhaps with other tokens, convinced Tithraustes that Agesilaus had no intention of withdrawing from Asia, but was inclined rather to extend than contract his views, and cherished strong hopes of effecting the conquest of the empire. He perceived that he had only purchased a temporary relief, and bethought himself how he might employ the gold, which was his last remaining stay, to greater advantage.

The history of the contest between Greece and Persia afforded several instructive lessons, which were now peculiarly applicable. At the time when the first Artaxerxes was embarrassed by the success of the Athenians in Egypt, he sent an agent, as we have seen, with bribes to Sparta, to procure a diversion in his favour. Tithraustes now resorted to a similar expedient. He sent a Rhodian named Timocrates to Greece, with a sum of fifty talents, which he was charged to distribute, with proper precautions, among the leading persons in the states which might be most easily induced to interrupt the progress of Agesilaus by kindling a war against Sparta at home. Not only was this mission itself a notorious and unquestionable fact; but Xenophon professes an equal degree of certainty as to the names of the persons who received the money. We may at least venture to believe that, though it may have roused them to greater activity, it produced no change in their political sentiments: and we even doubt whether it gave rise to any events which would not have occurred nearly as soon without it. It was indeed natural enough for Agesilaus and his friends to attribute the disappointment of his hopes to the venality of their adversaries. But Xenophon himself observes that the Athenians, though they did not receive any share of the gold, were eager for war in the hope of recovering their independence. And it is clear from his own narrative that similar feelings of jealousy or resentment towards Sparta already prevailed at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, and were only waiting for an opportunity of displaying themselves in open hostility, but needed no corrupt influence to excite them.


The anti-Laconian party at Thebes—the same no doubt which had sheltered the Athenian exiles, and had contrived the affront offered to Agesilaus at Aulis, and which had therefore reason to dread his resentment if he should ever return to Europe as the conqueror of Asia—set the first springs of hostility in motion. The disposition to war they found already existing; a pretext only was wanting, and this they easily devised. Means were found to induce the Locrians of Opus to make an inroad upon a tract of land which had been long the subject of contention between them and their neighbours the Phocians. The Phocians retaliated by the invasion of the Opuntian Locris, and the Thebans were soon persuaded to take part with the Locrians, and invade Phocis. The Phocians, as was foreseen, applied for succour to Sparta, where, as Xenophon admits, there was the utmost readiness to lay hold on any pretence for a war with Thebes; and the present season of prosperity seemed to the Spartan government the most favourable for humbling a power which had given so many proofs of ill-will towards it.

WAR RISES IN GREECE

War therefore was decreed, and Lysander was sent into Phocis with instructions to collect all the forces he could raise there, and among the tribes seated about Mount Ceta, and to march with them to Haliartus in Boeotia, where Pausanias, with the Peloponnesian troops, was to join him on an appointed day. Lysander discharged his commission with his usual activity, and besides succeeded in inducing Orchomenos, which was subject to Thebes, to assert its independence. Pausanias, having crossed the Laconian border, waited at Tegea for the contingents which he had demanded from the allies. They seem to have come in slowly, and Corinth refused to take any part in the expedition. The Thebans, seeing themselves threatened with invasion, sent an embassy to prevail on the Athenians to make common cause with

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them against Sparta. There were many feelings to be overcome at Athens, before this resolution could be adopted: recollections of a long hereditary grudge, of the animosity displayed by Thebes during the last war, and especially at its close; the sense of weakness, and the dread of provoking a power, by which Athens had so lately been brought to the brink of destruction. The Athenians desired to recover their pre-eminence in Greece, and their readiest way to that end was to declare themselves the protectors of all who suffered under Spartan tyranny. If they were inclined to dread the enemy's power, they had only to reflect by what means their own had been overthrown. Sparta likewise now ruled over unwilling subjects, and offended allies, who only wanted a leader to encourage them to revolt from her. Indeed she had not one sincere friend left. Argos had always been hostile; Elis had just been deeply wronged. Corinth, Arcadia, and Achaia saw the services which they had rendered in the war requited with insolent ingratitude, and were subject to the control of harmosts, who were not even citi-



GREEK TERRA-COTTA LAMP

zens of Sparta, but helots; bondmen at home, masters abroad. The cities once subject to Athens, which had been tempted to revolt by the prospect of liberty, found themselves cheated of their hopes, and groaned under the double yoke of a foreign governor, and a domestic oligarchy. The Persian king, to whom Sparta mainly owed her victory, she had immediately afterwards treated as an enemy. Athens might now place herself at the head of a confederacy much more powerful than the empire which she had lost; and the Spartan dominion would be more easily overthrown than the Athenian had been, in proportion as the allies of Sparta were stronger than the subjects of Athens.

These arguments found a willing audience; they were seconded by many voices, and the assembly was unanimous in favour of the alliance with Thebes. Thasybulus, who moved the decree, reminded the Thebans that Athens was about to repay the obligation which they had laid on her when they refused to concur in riveting her chains, by active exertions, and at a great risk. For she would have to face the enmity of Sparta while Piræus remained still unfortified. Both states prepared for war.

Lysander, having collected all the forces he could raise in the north, marched to Haliartus; but he found that Pausanias had not yet arrived there. It was not in his character to remain anywhere inactive, and he was desirous of making himself master of the town. He first tried negotiation to engage it to revolt. But there were some Theban and Athenian troops in the place, whose presence overawed the disaffected; and he then resolved to venture on an assault. A battle took place close to the walls, in which Lysander was slain. It seems clear from a comparison of all accounts, that he was intercepted between the main body of the Thebans and

the garrison, which made a sally; and he was known to have fallen by the hand of a citizen of Haliartus. His troops were put to flight, and betook themselves to the hills—a branch of the range of Helicon—which rose at no great distance behind the town. The conquerors pursued with great vigour, and incautiously pressed forward up the rising ground, until the difficulties of the ground brought them to a stand, and the fugitives, perceiving their perplexity, turned upon them, assailed them with a shower of missiles, rolled down masses of rock on their heads, and finally drove them in disorder, with the loss of more than two hundred men, into the plain. The dejection caused by this disaster was relieved the next day by the discovery that the remains of Lysander's army had dispersed during the night.

But the exultation of the Thebans at this fruit of their victory was damped in the course of a few hours by the appearance of Pausanias, who had received the news of the battle on the road from Platea to Thespiæ, and had hastened his march to Haliartus. Yet, according to Diodorus, he brought with him no more than six thousand men; but so small a force could scarcely have produced the alarm described by Xenophon, who, with a slight touch of humour, exhibits the Theban camp as fluctuating between the extremes of presumption and despondency. For the next day their spirits were again raised by the arrival of Thrasybulus and an Athenian army; and their confidence was heightened when they perceived that Pausanias showed no disposition to seek an engagement. His situation was extremely embarrassing. According to Greek usage it was absolutely necessary for him to recover the bodies of the slain, who are said to have amounted to a thousand, either by force or by consent of the victors. The greater part lay so near to the town walls that the attempt to carry them away by force would be one of great difficulty and danger, even if he should gain a victory; and the enemy was so strong in cavalry, that the event of a battle would be very uncertain, especially as his own troops had engaged in the expedition with reluctance. He therefore held a council of war; and after mature deliberation the majority came to the decision—if indeed it was not unanimous—to apply for permission to carry away the dead. The Thebans however were not satisfied with this confession of their superiority, and refused to grant a truce, except on condition that the invaders should withdraw from Bœotia. These terms were gladly accepted by Pausanias and his council, though they were felt by the troops as a degradation, such as a Lacedæmonian army had never before experienced. The general dejection and ill-humour which prevailed in the retreat, were heightened by the insulting demeanour of the Thebans, who accompanied them on their march through Bœotia, and drove back all who deviated in the least from the line, with blows, into the road.

The conduct of Pausanias appears to have been in the whole of this affair perfectly blameless. He had failed indeed to reach Haliartus by the preconcerted day, but he arrived the day after; and when it is considered that he had to collect his army from many quarters, and that the allies were generally averse to the expedition, he may seem rather to have deserved praise, for bringing it up so nearly within the appointed time. The disastrous issue could only be attributed to Lysander's imprudence; and the decision of the council of war with regard to the recovery of the slain, even if it was not clearly required by the circumstances of the case, could not reasonably be imputed as a crime to Pausanias. Yet on his return to Sparta he was capitally impeached; and the nature of the charges brought against him showed that he could not expect a fair trial, but was foredoomed to be sacrificed to public prejudice or to private passion; for the accusation embraced **not**

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merely his conduct in his last expedition, but the indulgence which he had granted to the Athenian refugees in Piræus; though his measures on that occasion seem to have been viewed with general approbation at the time, and had only been proved to be impolitic by the event. But under the irritation produced by the recent shame and disappointment, the Spartan senate was no more capable of listening to reason and justice, than the Athenian assembly on some similar occasions; and it is probable that Lysander's friends did the utmost to inflame the public feelings against his old adversary. Pausanias did not appear at the trial; he was condemned to death, and was obliged to seek shelter in the venerated sanctuary of Athene Alea at Tegea, where he ended his days. His son Agesipolis succeeded to the throne.

Lysander left his family in a state of poverty, which proved that his ambition was quite pure from all sordid ingredients. But, if we may believe a story which became current after his death, and is related upon such authority, that we can scarcely suppose it to have been without foundation, he was not satisfied either with fame, or with the substance of power. He is said to have conceived the project of levelling the privileges of the two royal houses, and of making the kingly office elective, and open to all Spartans, no doubt with the hope of obtaining it for himself.^d


LYSANDER'S PLOT

The melodramatic scheme to secure the throne, which has been credited to Lysander, was discredited by Thirlwall, and Mitford, but Grote, Bury, and others accept it, and it is curious enough to deserve chronicle here:

When the Heraclidæ mixed with Dorians, and settled in Peloponnesus, there was a large and flourishing tribe of them at Sparta. The whole, however, were not entitled to the regal succession, but only two families, the Eurytionidæ and the Agidæ; while the rest had no share in the administration on account of their high birth. For as to the common rewards of virtue, they were open to all men of distinguished merit. Lysander, who was of this lineage, no sooner saw himself exalted by his great actions, and supported with friends and power, but he became uneasy to think that a city which owed its grandeur to him, should be ruled by others no better descended than himself. Hence he entertained a design to alter the settlement which confined the succession to two families only, and to lay it open to all the Heraclidæ. Some say, his intention was to extend this high honour not only to all the Heraclidæ, but to all the citizens of Sparta; that it might not so much belong to the posterity of Hercules, as to those who resembled Hercules in that virtue which numbered him with the gods. He hoped, too, that when the crown was settled in this manner, no Spartan would have better pretensions than himself.

At first he prepared to draw the citizens into his scheme, and committed to memory an oration written by Cleon of Halicarnassus for that purpose. But he soon saw that so great and difficult a reformation required bolder and more extraordinary methods to bring it to bear. And as in tragedy machinery is made use of, where more natural means will not do, so he resolved to strike the people with oracles and prophecies; well knowing that the eloquence of Cleon would avail but little, unless he first subdued their minds with divine sanctions and the terrors of superstition. Ephorus tells us, he first attempted to corrupt the priestess of Delphi, and afterwards those of Dodona by means of one Pherecles; and having no success in either

application, he went himself to the oracle of Ammon, and offered the priests large sums of gold. They too rejected his offers with indignation, and sent deputies to Sparta to accuse him of that crime. When these Libyans found he was acquitted, they took their leave of the Spartans in this manner: "We will pass better judgments, when you come to live among us in Libya." It seems there was an ancient prophecy, that the Lacedæmonians would some time or other settle in Africa. This whole scheme of Lysander was of no ordinary texture, nor took its rise from accidental circumstances, but was laid deep and conducted with uncommon art and address: so that it may be compared to a mathematical demonstration, in which, from some principles first assumed, the conclusion is deduced through a variety of abstruse and intricate steps. We shall, therefore, explain it at large, taking Ephorus, who was both an historian and philosopher, for our guide.



GREEK DOOR KEYS

There was a woman in Pontus who gave it out that she was pregnant by Apollo. Many rejected her assertion, and many believed it. So that when she was delivered of a son, several persons of the greatest eminence took particular care of his education, and for some reason or other gave him the name of Silenus. Lysander took this miraculous birth for a foundation, and raised all his building upon it. He made choice of such assistants, as might bring the story into reputation, and put it beyond suspicion. Then he got another story propagated at Delphi and spread at Sparta, that certain ancient oracles were kept in the private registers of the priests, which it was not lawful to touch or to look upon, till in some future age a person should arise, who could clearly prove himself the son of Apollo, and he was to interpret and publish these oracles. The way thus prepared, Silenus was to make his appearance, as the son of Apollo, and demand the oracles. The priests, who were in combination, were to inquire into every article, and examine him strictly as to his birth. At last they were to pretend to be convinced of his divine parentage, and to show him the books. Silenus then was to read in public all those prophecies, particularly that for which the whole design was set on foot; namely, that it would be more for the honour and interest of Sparta to set aside the present race of kings, and choose others out of the best and most worthy men in the commonwealth. But when Silenus was grown up, and came to undertake his part, Lysander had the mortification to see his piece miscarry by the cowardice of one of the actors, whose heart failed him just as the thing was going to be put in execution. However, nothing of this was discovered while Lysander lived.

Lysander's poverty, which was discovered after his death, added lustre to his virtue. It was then found, that notwithstanding the money which had passed through his hands, the authority he had exercised over so

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many cities, and indeed the great empire he had been possessed of, he had not in the least improved his family fortune. Ephorus tells us that, afterwards, upon some disputes between the confederates and the Spartans, it was thought necessary to inspect the writings of Lysander, and for that purpose Agesilaus went to his house. Among the other papers he found that political one, calculated to show how proper it would be to take the right of succession from the Eurytionidæ and Agidæ, and to elect kings from among persons of the greatest merit. He was going to produce it before the citizens, and to show what the real principles of Lysander were. But Lacratides, a man of sense, and the principal of the ephors, kept him from it, by representing how wrong it would be to dig Lysander out of his grave, when this oration, which was written in so artful and persuasive a manner, ought rather to be buried with him.

Among the other honours paid to the memory of Lysander, that which we shall mention is none of the least. Some persons who had contracted themselves to his daughters in his lifetime, when they found he died poor, fell off from their engagement. The Spartans fined them for courting the alliance while they had riches in view, and breaking off when they discovered that poverty which was the best proof of Lysander's probity and justice. It seems, at Sparta there was a law which punished, not only those who continued in a state of celibacy, or married too late, but those that married ill ; and it was levelled chiefly at persons who married into rich rather than good families.^e

AGESILAUS RECALLED

While these movements were taking place in Greece, Agesilaus was carrying on the war in Asia, with an activity and success which might well have alarmed the Persian court, and proved the wisdom of the precautions adopted by Tithraustes. On his march into the province of Pharnabazus, he was accompanied by Spithridates, who urged him to advance into Paphlagonia, and undertook to make Cotys, the king of that country, his ally. Cotys, who is elsewhere named Corylas, was one of those powerful hereditary vassals of the Persian king, whose subjection had become merely nominal, and he had lately renounced even the appearance of submission. Artaxerxes, imprudently or insidiously, had put his obedience to the test, by summoning or inviting him to court. But the Paphlagonian prince was too wary, and knew the character of the Persian government too well, to trust himself in its power, and he had openly refused to obey the royal command. It would add nothing to his offence, though something to his security, to treat with the enemies of Artaxerxes. Nothing could be more agreeable to Agesilaus than the opportunity of gaining so powerful an ally ; he gladly accepted the mediation of Spithridates, who not only fulfilled his promise, and engaged Cotys to come to the Greek camp, and conclude an alliance with Sparta in person, but prevailed on him, before his departure, to leave a reinforcement of one thousand cavalry, and two thousand targeteers, with the army of Agesilaus.

To reward Spithridates for this important service, in a manner which would strengthen the Greek interest in Asia, Agesilaus, with great address, negotiated a match between Cotys and the daughter of Spithridates, so as to lead each party to consider himself as under obligations to the other, and both to look upon him as their benefactor. As the season was too far advanced for a journey by land across the Paphlagonian mountains, the young

lady was sent by sea, under the charge of a Spartan officer, to the dominions of her intended consort; and Agesilaus returned to take up his winter quarters in the territories of Pharnabazus, and in the satrap's own residence of Dascylium. Here were parks, chases, and forests abounding in game of every kind, and round about were many large villages plentifully stocked with provisions for the ordinary supply of the princely household. The domain was skirted by the windings of a river, full of various kinds of fish. Here therefore the Greek army passed the winter in ease and plenty, making excursions, as occasion invited, into the surrounding country far and wide, while Pharnabazus was forced to range over it as a houseless fugitive, carrying with him his family and his treasures, for which he could find no place of permanent shelter, and, even in this Scythian mode of life, never free from apprehensions for his personal safety.

Sometimes, however, he hovered in the neighbourhood of the Greeks, and once surprised them in one of their marauding excursions; and though he had with him only two scythe-chariots, and about four hundred cavalry, he dispersed a body of seven hundred Greek horse with his chariots, and drove them, with the loss of one hundred men, to seek shelter from their heavy infantry. A few days after this skirmish Spithridates learned that the satrap was encamped in the village of Cava, about twenty miles off, and communicated the discovery to Herippidas. Herippidas, who loved a brilliant enterprise, was immediately fired with the hope of making himself master of the satrap's camp and person, and requested Agesilaus to grant him, for this purpose, two thousand heavy infantry, as many targeteers, the Paphlagonian cavalry, and those of Spithridates, and as many of the Greek horse as might be willing to take part in the adventure. He obtained all he asked; but at night, at the hour of departure, he found that not half of his volunteers appeared at the appointed place. Nevertheless, fearing the raillery of his colleagues, if he should desist, he persevered in his undertaking, and after marching all night, arrived at daybreak at the encampment of Pharnabazus. He overpowered a body of Mysians at the outpost; but their resistance afforded time for the escape of Pharnabazus and his family, who however left the camp, with a great treasure of drinking vessels and costly furniture, in the possession of the assailants. But Herippidas, being anxious, for the sake of his own honour, to deliver the whole booty into the hands of the officers who in the Spartan army answered to the Roman quaestors, took precautions to exclude his allies from all share in it; and he thus deprived the Spartan arms of an advantage much more important than the value of the spoil. For Spithridates and the Paphlagonians, indignant at this treatment, deserted the camp the next night, and repairing to Sardis entered the service of Ariæus, who had again revolted, and was at war with the king: Agesilaus was more deeply affected by this loss than by any mischance that he met with in the course of his expedition: and he seems to have regretted it still more on private than on public grounds.

Not long after, a prospect seemed to be opened to him of gaining a much more valuable ally. A Greek of Cyzicus, who was connected by ties of hospitality with Pharnabazus, and had recently entered into the same relation with Agesilaus, proposed to him to bring about an interview between him and the satrap. The preliminaries were arranged, and a place of meeting appointed in the open air, to which Agesilaus came accompanied by the Thirty, and they seated themselves on the grass to wait for Pharnabazus. He came attended by a train of servants, who, according to the Persian fashion, proceeded to lay down a carpet and cushions for their master. But the

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intelligent Persian, struck by the contrast of the Spartan simplicity, in a fortune at present so much more prosperous than his own, ordered these instruments of luxury to be removed, and, in his splendid attire, took his seat without ceremony on the green-sward by the side of Agesilaus.

After the forms of a friendly greeting had been interchanged, Pharnabazus opened the conference with an expostulation on the hard treatment which he had suffered. He reminded his hearers of the zeal and constancy with which he had espoused the cause of Sparta in the war with Athens. Nevertheless Spartan hostility had now reduced him to such a condition that even in his own territory he did not know how to find a meal, except such as he could collect, like a dog, from the orts and leavings of their rapine; while his fair patrimonial mansions, his pleasant woods and parks, had been all burned, and felled, and spoiled. If, he concluded, it was his ignorance that made him unable to reconcile such conduct with the obligations of justice and gratitude, he desired that the Spartans would enlighten him.

This address, Xenophon says, struck the Thirty with shame, and it was some time before Agesilaus broke the silence that ensued. Private friendship, he said, must give way to reasons of state. The Spartans, being at war with the king of Persia, were compelled to treat all his subjects as their enemies; and Pharnabazus among the rest, however glad they might be to gain him for their friend. And what they had now to propose was not that he should exchange one master for another, but that he should at once become their ally, and independent of every superior. Nor was it a poor or barren independence that they held out to him, but a rich addition to his hereditary possessions, which their aid would enable him to make at the expense of his fellow subjects, who would then be forced to own him as their master. Pharnabazus, in answer to these overtures, said that he would frankly declare his mind to them. If the king should attempt to place any other general in authority over him, he would renounce his allegiance, and ally himself to Sparta; but if his master entrusted him with the supreme command in that part of his domains, he would do his best to defend them. Agesilaus grasped his hand, and assured him of his warmest regard, and, under the excitement of a generous feeling, forgetting the excuse he had just before made for his past conduct, promised to withdraw immediately from his territories, and, though they should continue at war, to abstain from invading them, as long as there was any other quarter in which he could employ his forces. So the interview ended.

Agesilaus kept his word, and withdrew his forces from the satrapy of Pharnabazus, where indeed it is probable he would not otherwise have stayed much longer, as the spring was coming on, and he was meditating a new expedition, in which he meant to advance as far as he could into the interior. By this movement, if he gained no more decisive advantage, he expected that he should at least separate all the provinces which he left behind him from the Persian empire. With this design he proceeded to the plain of Thebe, where he encamped, and began to collect all the forces he could raise from the allied cities. He was in the midst of these preparations, when he received a message from the ephors, which was brought by a Spartan named Epicydidas, who apprised him of the new turn which affairs had taken in Greece, and summoned him to march with the utmost speed for the defence of his country. Agesilaus received this intelligence with fortitude, though it stopped him at the outset of the most brilliant career that had ever yet been opened by a Greek, and obeyed the command of the ephors with as much promptness as if he had been present in their council-room at Sparta.^d



GREEK VASES

CHAPTER XLIII. THE CORINTHIAN WAR

Two cares principally engaged Agesilaus before his departure ; to provide security for the Asian Greeks in his absence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpose, naming Euxenus to preside, with the title of harmost, he placed a body of four thousand men under his orders. With the latter view, he proposed prizes for the cities which should furnish the best troops ; and for commanders of mercenaries, horse, heavy-armed, bowmen, and targeteers, whose bands should be the best chosen, best appointed, and best disciplined. The prizes were mostly arms, elegantly wrought ; but, for higher merit, or the merit of those of higher rank, there were some golden crowns ; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large sum for the occasion, that the expense amounted to four talents, less than a thousand pounds sterling. Three Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Asiatic city, were named for judges ; but the decision, or the declaration of it, was judiciously referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Chersonesus.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian administration were, either to conduct a war against the powerful confederacy formed against them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Agesilaus seems to have been a necessary measure. The army assembled by their enemies was such as had not often been seen in wars within Greece. Argos furnished seven thousand heavy-armed ; Athens had already recovered strength to send six thousand, and add six hundred horse ; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris made the whole of the army twenty-four thousand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry ; to which was added a large body of the best light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all descriptions must have amounted to fifty thousand. The avowed purpose was to invade Laconia. "The Lacedæmonian state," said the Corinthian Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, "resembles a river, which, near the source, is easily forded, but the farther it flows, other streams joining, the depth and power of the current increases. Thus the Lacedæmonians always march from home with their own troops only ; but as they proceed, being reinforced from other cities, their army swells and grows formidable. I hold it therefore advisable to

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attack them, if possible, in Lacedæmon itself; otherwise, the nearer to Lacedæmon the better."

Against so powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the smaller Grecian cities, and none beyond Peloponnesus. Marching themselves six thousand foot and six hundred horse, and being joined by the Mantineans and Tegeans, whose numbers are not reported, they were farther reinforced by no more than seven thousand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epidaurus, Hermione, Træzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Elis. Aristodemus, of the blood royal, as regent, commanded for the king, Agesipolis, yet a boy.

Circumstances commonly occur to render confederate armies less efficacious, in proportion to their strength, than those under a single authority. A dispute about the command in chief, with some difference of opinion about their order of battle, some of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, so as to meet the enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory sacrifices there drops from Xenophon a remarkable confession, that those ceremonies were sometimes engines of policy. While the Bœotians, he says, held the left of their army, they were in no haste to engage; but, as soon as they had prevailed to have their situation in the line changed, so that the Athenians would be opposed to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves to the Achæans, then they declared that the symptoms of the victims were favourable. They saved themselves perhaps some slaughter by this disingenuous artifice. In the battle which ensued the Achæans fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to those opposed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with considerable slaughter; and the superior discipline of the Lacedæmonians so prevailed against superior numbers that, with the loss of only eight of their own body, they remained finally masters of the field; in which, if we may trust Xenophon's panegyric of Agesilaus for what he has omitted to state in his general history, no less than ten thousand of the confederate army fell.¹ Probably however, though the Lacedæmonians themselves suffered little, their allies suffered much; for the victory seems to have been little farther decisive than to prevent the invasion of Peloponnesus.

Meanwhile Agesilaus was hastening his march from Asia. He crossed the Hellespont about the middle of July. At Amphipolis he met Dercyllidas, who had been sent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. Immediately he forwarded that able and popular officer into Asia, to communicate the grateful news among the Grecian cities there, and to prepare them for his early return, of which there seemed now fair promise.

Through Thrace and Macedonia the country was friendly, or feared to avow hostility. Thessaly, inimically disposed, and powerful through population and wealth resulting from the natural productiveness of the soil, was however too ill-governed to give any systematical opposition. The defiles of the mountains against Macedonia, where a small force might efficaciously oppose a large one, seem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Larissa, Cranon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, in close alliance with the Bœotians, decided the rest, and as the Lacedæmonian army crossed the plain a body of horse, raised from the whole province, infested the march. It was singularly gratifying to Agesilaus that, with his horse,

[¹ This statement of Xenophon is, according to Grote, either a mis-reading or a wild exaggeration. Diodorus says that the Spartans lost 1100; the allies 2800.]

promiscuously collected, and entirely formed by himself, supporting it judiciously with his infantry, he defeated and dispersed the Thessalian, the most celebrated cavalry of Greece.

On the day after this success he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly quite to the border of Bœotia. But there news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and such as instantly almost to blot out his once bright prospect, which, as the historian, his friend and the companion of his march, shows, he had thus far been fondly cherishing, of conquest in Asia, and glory over the world. While the misconduct of the Lacedæmonian administration had excited a confederacy within Greece, which proposed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by superiority of land-force, and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia, a hostile navy had arisen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the sea.

The train of circumstances which had produced this event, though memorials fail for a complete investigation of it, will require some attention.

We have seen Cyprus, at a very early age, from a Phœnician, become a Grecian island; and Salamis the first Grecian city founded there. We have then observed the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Persian power. The ruin of the marine, the inertness of the court, and the distraction in the councils of Persia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other subjects of the empire, again to revolt; and the Persian interest, and the Greek, and the Phœnician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical, would be likely to fall into various contest. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things which first invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus, when the Athenian navy, rising on the ruins of the Persian, was extending dominion for Athens on all sides, under the first administration of Pericles. This view, quickly



A CORINTHIAN VASE
(In the Museum of Napoleon III)

diverted to other objects, was however, after a change in the Athenian administration, resumed; and Cimon, as we have seen, died in command in Cyprus. The policy of Athens would of course propose to hold dominion, there as elsewhere, through support given to the democratical interest. But after the death of Cimon wars so engaged the Athenian government as to prevent the extension of any considerable exertion to such a distance; and the Cyprian cities were mostly governed by their several princes or tyrants, under the paramount sovereignty of Persia.

Among the fugitive Greeks was Evagoras, a youth who claimed descent from the ancient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer. Informed of the state of things, this young man formed the bold resolution, with only about fifty fellow-sufferers in exile, devoted to his cause, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality. From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they passed to the Cyprian shore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a small gate, probably as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a severe conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people mostly kept aloof, they remained masters of the city, and Evagoras resumed the sovereignty.

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This little revolution, in a distant island, became, through a chain of events out of all human foresight, a principal source of great revolutions in Greece. An extraordinary intimacy grew between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis (for that was the title which Evagoras commonly bore among the Greeks), insomuch that the tyrant was associated among the Athenian citizens. In the ruin of Athens, impending from the defeat of Ægospotami, Conon fled thither with eight triremes, saved from the general destruction of the fleet. Conon had previous acquaintance with Evagoras; and eight triremes at his orders, equipped and ably manned, would enable him, in seeking refuge, to offer important service. The Athenian refugee became the most confidential minister of the Cyprian prince, or rather his associate in enterprise. Undertaking negotiation with Pharnabazus, he conciliated that satrap's friendship for Evagoras; which so availed him that, without resentment from the court, or opposition from other satraps, he could add several towns of the island to his dominion.

While Agesilaus was threatening the conquest of Asia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner from his generosity and mercy, a respite from the pressure upon himself, was nevertheless apprehensive that this satrapy, separated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon suggested that the progress of the Lacedæmonian arms, which seemed irresistible by land, would be most readily and efficaciously checked by a diversion by sea. A considerable fleet of Phœnician ships was at the satrap's orders: Evagoras had a fleet which might co-operate with it; the Athenian interest, still considerable in the island and Asiatic Grecian cities, would favour the purpose; and Conon himself had consideration among those cities, and especially among their seamen. Even before Agesilaus left Asia, a project, founded on these suggestions, seems to have been in forwardness. Soon after his departure, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, a fleet very superior to the Lacedæmonian was assembled; and the generous Pharnabazus formed the resolution, extraordinary for a Persian satrap, to take the nominal command in person, having the good sense apparently to leave the effective command to the superior abilities and experience of Conon.

BATTLE OF CNIDUS

Near Cnidus they met the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Pisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force against him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phœnician, forming a second line. The Grecian force alone, according to report, though Xenophon does not speak of it as certain, outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line, alarmed at the view of the enemy's great superiority, presently fled. Pisander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian shore, the crew mostly escaped; but, refusing himself to quit his ship, he was killed aboard. The victory of Conon was complete: according to Diodorus fifty ships were taken.

Such was the disastrous event, the news of which met Agesilaus on his arrival on the confines of Ætolia. The first information struck him with extreme anguish and dejection. Presently, however, the consideration occurring how disadvantageous, in the existing circumstances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himself to check all

appearance of his feelings. His army consisted mostly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no necessity, so by no very firm principle, to partake in expected distress. With such an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the most powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To support, or, if possible, raise, the confidence and zeal of his troops, though by a device of efficacy to be of short duration, might be greatly important. He therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated that Pisander, though at the expense of his life, had gained a complete victory; and, to give sanction to the story, he caused the ceremony of the evangelian sacrifice to be performed, and distributed the offered oxen among the soldiers.

Resuming then his march, in the vale of Coronea he met the confederate army, consisting of the flower of the Bœotian, Athenian, Argive, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable assemblage, he had been attentive to all opportunity for acquiring addition to his own strength. Some he had gained from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Bœotian border he was joined by the strength of Phocis, and also of the Bœotian Orchomenos, always inimical to Thebes. A Lacedæmonian mora had been sent from Peloponnesus to reinforce him, with half a mora which had been in garrison in Orchomenos. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal; but the Asiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the spirit of the institutions of Lycurgus that Agesilaus, otherwise simple, even as a Spartan, in his dress and manner, paid much attention to what our great dramatic poet has called "the pomp and circumstance of war"; aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the soldier to be satisfied with himself, and binds his fancy to the service he is engaged in. Scarlet or crimson appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Agesilaus appeared, in Xenophon's phrase, all brass and scarlet.

THE BATTLE OF CORONEA

According to the usual manner of war among the Greeks, when the armies approached a battle soon followed. On the present occasion both quitted advantageous ground; Agesilaus moving from the bank of the Cephissus, and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Perfect silence was observed by both armies till within nearly a furlong of each other, when the confederates gave the military shout, and advanced running. At a somewhat smaller distance the opposite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Agesilaus took post, instantly overthrew the Argives, their immediate opponents, who, scarcely waiting the assault, fled toward Helicon. The Cyreans supported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Asia; and were so emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellespontines, from whom less was expected, that, all coming to push of spear together, they compelled the centre of the confederate army to retreat. The victory seemed so decided that some of the Asiatics were for paying Agesilaus the usual compliment of crowning on the occasion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them.

[394 B.C.]

The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their assault, not against the whole, but a chosen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War. To such a formation their able leaders had recourse now; resolving upon the bold attempt to pierce the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praises the bravery, evidently not without meaning some reflection on the judgment, of Agesilaus; who chose to engage them, he says, front to front, when, if he had opened his line and given them passage, their flanks and rear would have been exposed to him.

A most fierce conflict ensued. Shield pressed against shield stroke was returned for stroke; amid wounds and death no clamour was heard; neither, says the historian, who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete silence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons. The perseverance, the discipline, and the skill in arms of the Thebans were such, and such the force of their solid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line, and reached the highlands of Illicon; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were mostly put to the sword. In this obstinate action Agesilaus was severely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field when a party of horse came to ask orders concerning about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful, amid his suffering, of respect due to the deity, he commanded that liberty should be granted to them to pass unhurt, whithersoever they pleased. In the philosopher-historian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied that, among the Greeks, in such circumstances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind; and, even in Agesilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity, but to superstition; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear, unless it were rather the desire of inculcating the fear, of his resentment for any want of respectful attention to himself. When pursuit ended, the victorious army anxiously employed itself in dragging the enemy's slain within its own lines: a remarkable testimony, from the same great writer, to the prevalence still, in a degree that may surprise us, of that barbarism in war, which in Homer's description is striking, though in his age less a matter for wonder.



RUINS OF ANCIENT WALL, AT CORA
(With Modern Structure Superimposed)

Next morning early the troops were ordered to parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Agesilaus himself being unable to attend, the polemarch Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raising the trophy; which was performed with all the music of the army playing, and every circumstance of pomp, that might most inspire, among the soldiery, alacrity and self-satisfaction.

Why then no measures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently should have laid open, is not shown. The Thebans sending, in usual form, for permission to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than for that purpose alone, could be wanted. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country friendly or neutral, to perform a ceremony to which Grecian superstition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the spoil collected by Agesilaus in his Asiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps something more than twenty thousand pounds.

After this second triumphal rite the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighbouring hostile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object seems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might serve the soldiers instead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheless what they best could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which, in returning into Phocis, were necessarily to be repassed, they gave such annoyance that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a select body in pursuit of them.

Entangled among the mountains, he was himself killed, and the whole party would have been cut off, had not the officers left with the command of the main body brought seasonable relief. Agesilaus, still from his wounds unfit for fatigue, passed by sea to Laconia, and the army was distributed in quarters.

If any other writer had ever given any authority for the supposition, we might suspect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coronea was written under the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, and that the victory was less complete than he has described it.¹ Yet we are not without information of circumstances which may have given occasion for the line of conduct which Agesilaus pursued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Asiatic Greece.

And thus the fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, seemingly so established by the event of the Peloponnesian War, and since so extended by the ability of the commanders in Asia, was in large proportion almost instantly overthrown.

Most of the principal officers, and many inferior men, of the numerous Asiatic troops under Agesilaus, would be deeply interested in this revolution. The principal sources of pay for all would cease; and hence the plain of Coronea seems to have been the last field of fame for the Cyreans. We find no mention of them afterwards from Xenophon: apparent proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant; not such as he could have any satisfaction in reporting. Probably they dispersed, some to their homes, some to seek new service, and never more assembled.²

[¹ On this point Bury says: "Though the battle of Coronea, like the battle of Cœnith, was a technical victory for the Spartans, history must here again offer her congratulations to the side which was superficially defeated. . . . It was a great moral encouragement to Thebes for future warfare with Lacedæmon."]

[394-392 B.C.]

LAND AFFAIRS OF THE CORINTHIAN WAR

Xenophon was no such student of the accurate arrangement of events as was Thucydides, and the history recounted hereafter is differently ordered by different historians; by some the massacre at Corinth is postponed two years, to 392 B.C. The massacre which Xenophon with his Spartan sympathies makes so cold-blooded a butchery is by sober historians credited merely to the government's anticipation of a similar step on the part of the opposition.^a

Corinth still continued to be the theatre of war. A Lacedæmonian garrison occupied Sicyon, and made frequent inroads into the Corinthian territory. The allies of Corinth were well pleased to see themselves thus exempt from the calamities of war at her expense. But the party among the Corinthians which, on political grounds, desired to renew their connection with Sparta, derived new motives from this state of things to encourage them in their designs; and they began to hold private meetings to concert measures for restoring peace. Their movements were observed by their adversaries, who determined to counteract them by one of those atrocious massacres which so frequently disfigure the pages of Greek history. We do not know what credit may be due to Xenophon, when he intimates that all the principal allies of Corinth, — the Argives, and Bœotians, and Athenians, — had an equal share in the conspiracy, or whether he is only speaking of the foreign garrison. His horror is chiefly excited by the impiety of the murderers, who selected a holiday for the deed, that they might be the more likely to find their enemies out of doors, and in the execution of their purpose paid no regard to the most sacred things and places, but stained even the altars and images of the gods with the blood of their victims.

Unhappily this was no new excess of party rage: but perhaps few scenes of this kind had been planned with more ferocious coolness, or accompanied with a greater number of shocking circumstances; though it must not be forgotten that it is Xenophon who describes it. Suspicions however had been previously entertained of the plot by Pasimelus, one of the persecuted party, and at the time of the tumult a body of the younger citizens was assembled with him in a place of exercise outside the walls. They immediately ran up to seize the Acrocorinthus, where they maintained themselves for a time against the attacks of their enemies. But an unpropitious omen, probably strengthening the consciousness of their weakness, made them resolve to withdraw, and to seek safety in exile. Yet, notwithstanding the impious treachery of their enemies, they were induced by the persuasions of their friends and relatives, and by the oaths of the leading men of the opposite party, to abandon this intention, and return to their homes.

But their fears for their personal safety had no sooner subsided, than the state of public affairs again began to appear insupportable, and they were ready to run any risk for the sake of a change. The opposite party had gone so far in their enmity to Sparta, or in their zeal for democracy, as to do their utmost towards establishing a complete unity, both of civil rights and of territory, between Corinth and Argos. The land-marks which separated the two states had been removed; so that the name either of Corinth or of Argos might be applied to the whole. But since it was Argive influence that had brought about this union, since the Argive institutions had been adopted, and the Argive franchise communicated to the Corinthians, the discontented had some reason to complain, that Corinth had lost her independence and dignity, while Argos had gained an increase of territory by the transaction. But what they bore still more impatiently, was the loss of

their own rank and influence, which were totally extinguished by the union; they no longer enjoyed any exclusive privileges, any rights which they did not share with the whole Argive-Corinthian commonalty; and this was a franchise which they valued no more than the condition of an alien. They therefore resolved on a desperate effort for restoring Corinth to her former station in Greece, and for recovering their own station in Corinth.

Pasinelus and Alcimenes took the lead in this enterprise. They obtained a secret interview with Praxitas, the Spartan commander at Sicyon, and proposed to admit him and his troops within the walls that joined Corinth with Lechæum, her port on the western gulf. He knew the men, and embraced their offer; and at an appointed hour of night came with a mora of Lacedæmonians, and a body of Sicyonians and of Corinthian exiles, to a gate where the conspirators had contrived to get themselves placed on duty. He was introduced without any opposition; but as the space between the walls was large, and he had brought but a small force with him, he threw up a slight entrenchment, to secure himself until the succours which he expected should arrive. During the next day he remained quiet, and was not attacked; though, besides the garrison of the city, there was a body of Bœotians behind him at Lechæum. But aid had been summoned from Argos, and on the day following the Argive forces arrived, and, confident in their numbers, immediately sought the enemy. They were supported by their Corinthian partisans, and by a body of mercenaries commanded by Iphicrates, an Athenian general, who in this war laid the foundation of his military renown.

The superiority of the Lacedæmonian troops over the other Greeks, and the terror they inspired even when they were greatly outnumbered, was again strikingly manifested in the engagement which ensued. The Argives forced their way through the entrenchment, and drove the handful of Sicyonians before them down to the sea. But when the Lacedæmonians came up, they took to flight, without offering any resistance, and made for the city. But, meeting with the Corinthian exiles, who had defeated the mercenaries, and were returning from the pursuit, they were driven back, and those who did not make their escape by ladders over the wall, were slaughtered by the Lacedæmonians like a flock of sheep. Lachæum was taken, and the Bœotian garrison was put to the sword. After his victory Praxitas was joined by the expected contingents of the allies, and he made use of them first to demolish the Long Walls, for a space sufficient to afford a passage for an army. Next, crossing the isthmus, he took and garrisoned the towns of Sidus and Crommyon. On his return he fortified the heights of Epieicea, which commanded one of the most important passes, and then disbanded his army, and returned to Sparta.

Two important consequences of the long series of hostilities in which all the Greek states had been engaged now became apparent. The number of persons who were thrown upon war as a means of subsistence had so much increased, that the contending powers were able to carry on the struggle with mercenary troops. Another result of the long practice of war was, that it had begun to be more and more studied as an art, and cultivated with new refinements.

Thus Iphicrates had been led to devote his attention to the improvement of a branch of the light infantry, which had hitherto been accounted of little moment in the Greek military system. He had formed a new body of targeteers, which in some degree combined the peculiar advantages of the heavy and light troops, and was equally adapted for combat and pursuit.

[392-391 B.C.]

To attain these objects, he had substituted a linen corslet for the ancient coat of mail, and had reduced the size of the shield, while he doubled the length of the spear and the sword. At the head of this corps he made frequent inroads into Peloponnesus, and in the territory of Phlius he surprised the forces of the little state in an ambuscade, and made so great a slaughter of them that the Phliasians were obliged to admit a Lacedæmonian garrison into their town. But in Arcadia such was the terror inspired by the troops of Iphicrates, that they were suffered to plunder the country with impunity, and the Arcadians did not venture to meet them in the field. On the other hand they were themselves no less in dread of the Lacedæmonians, who had taught them to keep aloof in a manner which proved the peculiar excellence of the Spartan military training.

A Lacedæmonian *mora*, stationed at Lechæum, accompanied by the Corinthian exiles, ranged the country round about Corinth without interruption. Yet it was not able to prevent the Athenians from repairing the breach which Praxitas had made in the Long Walls, which they regarded as a barrier that screened Attica from invasion. The whole serviceable population of Athens, with a company of carpenters and masons, sallied forth to the isthmus, and having restored the western wall in a few days, completed the other at their leisure. Their work, however, was destroyed in the course of the same summer by Agesilaus, on his return from an expedition which he had made into Argolis, for the purpose of letting the Argives taste the fruits of the war which they had helped to stir, and were most forward to keep up. After having carried his ravages into every part of their territory, he marched to Corinth, stormed the newly repaired walls, and recovered Lechæum. Here he met his brother Teleutias, who, through his influence, which in this case was better exerted than in that of Pisander, had been appointed to the command of the fleet, and having come with a small squadron to support his operations, made some prizes in the harbour and the docks.

But the appearance of Teleutias in the Corinthian Gulf was connected with other events, more important than any which took place in Peloponnesus after the return of Agesilaus from Asia. That we exhibit them in an uninterrupted series, together with their consequences, we shall follow Xenophon's order, and return to them after having briefly related how the war was carried on in Greece, in the campaigns which ensued down to its close.

In the spring of 392, Agesilaus made a fresh expedition for the purpose of bringing the Corinthians to terms, by cutting off one of their chief resources, the fortress of Piræum, at the foot of Mount Geranea on the western gulf. The captures and the booty were brought out, and passed in review before Agesilaus, as he sat in an adjacent building on the margin of a small lake. His triumph was heightened by the presence of envoys from various states, among the rest from Thebes, where the party which desired peace had succeeded in procuring an embassy to be sent for the purpose of ascertaining the terms which Sparta would grant. Agesilaus, the more fully to enjoy their humiliation, affected to take no notice of their presence, while Pharax, their proxenus, stood by him, waiting for an opportunity to present them. Just at this juncture a horseman came up, his horse covered with foam, and informed the king of a disaster which had just befallen the garrison of Lechæum, the loss of almost a whole *mora*, which had been intercepted and cut off by Iphicrates and his targeteers. The action was in itself so trifling, that it would scarcely have deserved mention, but for the importance attached to it at the time, and the celebrity which it retained for many generations.

After all, the whole loss of the Lacedæmonians amounted to no more than 250 men. Yet it produced a degree of consternation and dejection on the one side, and of exultation on the other, which is significant in the same proportion that the disaster appears to us slight and the exploit inconsiderable.

Nothing more clearly shows the weakness of Sparta and the power of her name than the importance attributed both by herself and by her enemies to this petty affair. Agesilaus, having accomplished the object of his expedition, now set out homeward. He took with him the remnant of the defeated mora, leaving another in its room at Lechæum. But his march through Peloponnesus was like that of the Roman army on its return from the Caudine Forks. He would only enter the towns, where he was forced to rest, as late as he could in the evening, and left them again at break of day. At Mantinea, though it was dark when he reached it, he would not stop at all, that his men might not have to endure the insulting joy of their ill-affected allies. On the other hand Iphicrates was emboldened by his success to aim at fresh advantages; and he recovered Sidus, Crommyon, and Cnœe, where Agesilaus had left a garrison.


His achievement so terrorised the Corinthian exiles at Sicyon, that they no longer ventured to repeat their marauding excursions by land, but crossed over the gulf, and landed near Corinth, where they saw opportunity of giving annoyance. Even in later times the destruction of the Lacedæmonian mora, 250 men, continued to be mentioned as the great military action of his life, and was not thought unworthy to be named in the same page with Marathon and Plataæa.

It is not improbable that this victory of Iphicrates was attended with another result, which Xenophon has not thought fit to notice. It seems not only to have prevented the Theban envoys from discharging their commission, but to have put a stop to a negotiation which was proceeding at the same time between Athens and Sparta, after it had reached a very advanced stage. Minute as these occurrences are, they are perhaps, both in themselves and for the impression they produced, the most momentous that took place in Greece before the end of the war. We should have been glad indeed to know a little more of the causes which withdrew Iphicrates from this scene of action shortly after his victory: for they would perhaps have thrown some light on the internal state of Corinth. But Xenophon only informs us that he was dismissed by the Argives, after he had put to death some Corinthians of their party; from what motive and on what pretext we do not learn, nor does it appear whether this transaction had any influence on the relations between Athens and Argos.

In the year following no military operations seem to have taken place in Peloponnesus, except the petty combats or alternate inroads between Sicyon and Corinth, which Xenophon himself does not think worth more than a general notice. But the arms of Agesilaus were turned against Acarnania, where he displayed his usual ability, and established the Spartan supremacy almost without bloodshed. An Athenian squadron was lying at Cnidiæ, to intercept him, if, as was expected, he should attempt to cross the gulf from any part of the coast immediately below Calydon. To avoid it he marched to Rhium through the heart of Ætolia, by roads along which, Xenophon observes, no army, great or small, could have passed without the consent of the Ætoliens. They permitted his passage, because they hoped to be aided by his influence in recovering Næupactus. At Rhium he crossed the straits, and returned home.

[394-390 B.C.]

The event proved the policy of the moderation which he had shown against the wish of his allies. The next spring, as he was preparing for a second invasion of Acarnania, the Acarnanians, alarmed by the prospect of again losing a harvest, on which the subsistence of the people, who were but little conversant with arts or commerce, mainly depended, sent envoys to Sparta to treat for peace, and submitted to the terms which Agesilaus had dictated. The same year his young colleague Agesipolis, who had now reached his majority, was entrusted with the command of an expedition against Argos. The expedition yielded no fruits but the plunder, with which he returned to Sparta. In the meanwhile, through the ambition of Sparta and the patriotic efforts of Conon, Athens had been enabled to take some great steps towards securing her independence, and recovering a part at least of her ancient power.^e



GREEK DOOR KEYS

THE GREAT DEEDS OF CONON

Three great battles had been fought in little more than the space of a month (July and August)—those of Corinth, Cnidus, and Coronea: the first and third on land, the second at sea. In each of the two land-battles the Lacedæmonians had gained a victory: they remained masters of the field, and were solicited by the enemy to grant the burial-truce. But if we inquire what results these victories had produced, the answer must be that both were totally barren. Even the narrative of Xenophon, deeply coloured as it is both by his sympathies and his antipathies, indicates to us that the predominant impression carried off by every one from the field of Coronea was that of the tremendous force and obstinacy of the Theban hoplites—a fore-taste of what was to come at Leuctra!

If the two land-victories of Sparta were barren of results, the case was far otherwise with her naval defeat at Cnidus. That defeat was pregnant with consequences following in rapid succession, and of the most disastrous character. As with Athens at Ægospotami—the loss of her fleet, serious as that was, served only as the signal for countless following losses. Pharnabazus and Conon, with their victorious fleet, sailed from island to island, and from one continental seaport to another, in the Ægean, to expel the Lacedæmonian harmosts, and terminate the empire of Sparta. So universal was the odium which it had inspired, that the task was found easy beyond expectation. Conscious of their unpopularity, the harmosts in almost all the towns, on both sides of the Hellespont, deserted their posts and fled, on the mere news of the battle of Cnidus. Everywhere Pharnabazus and Conon found themselves received as liberators, and welcomed with presents of hospitality. They pledged themselves not to introduce any foreign force or governor, nor to

fortify any separate citadel, but to guarantee to each city its own genuine autonomy. This policy was adopted by Pharnabazus at the urgent representation of Conon, who warned him that if he manifested any design of reducing the cities to subjection, he would find them all his enemies; that each of them severally would cost him a long siege; and that a combination would ultimately be formed against him. Such liberal and judicious ideas, when seen to be sincerely acted upon, produced a strong feeling of friendship and even of gratitude, so that the Lacedæmonian maritime empire was dissolved without a blow, by the almost spontaneous movements of the cities themselves. Though the victorious fleet presented itself in many different places, it was nowhere called upon to put down resistance, or to undertake a single siege. Cos, Nisyrus, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mytilene, Samos, all declared themselves independent, under the protection of the new conquerors. Pharnabazus presently disembarked at Ephesus and marched by land northward to his own satrapy, leaving a fleet of forty triremes under the command of Conon.

To this general burst of anti-Spartan feeling, Abydos, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, formed the solitary exception; and it happened by a fortunate accident for Sparta that the able and experienced Dercyllidas was harmost in the town at the moment of the battle of Cnidus. Dercyllidas assembled the Abydenes, heartened them up against the reigning contagion and exhorted them to earn the gratitude of Sparta by remaining faithful to her while others were falling off; assuring them that she would still be found capable of giving them protection. His exhortations were listened to with favour. Abydos remained attached to Sparta, was put in a good state of defence, and became the only harbour of safety for the fugitive harmosts out of the other cities, Asiatic and European.

Dercyllidas maintained his position effectively both at Abydos and at Sestos; defying the requisition of Pharnabazus that he should forthwith evacuate them. The satrap threatened war, and actually ravaged the lands round Arydos; but without any result. His wrath against the Lacedæmonians, already considerable, was so aggravated by disappointment when he found that he could not yet expel them from his satrapy, that he resolved to act against them with increased energy, and even to strike a blow at them near their own home. For this purpose he transmitted orders to Conon to prepare a commanding naval force for the ensuing spring, and in the meantime to keep both Abydos and Sestos under blockade.

As soon as spring arrived, Pharnabazus embarked on board a powerful fleet equipped by Conon; directing his course to Melos, the various islands among the Cyclades, and lastly to the coast of Peloponnesus. They here spent some time on the coast of Laconia and Messenia, disembarking at several points to ravage the country. They next landed on the island of Cythera, which they captured, granting safe retirement to the Lacedæmonian garrison, and leaving in the island a garrison under the Athenian Nicophemus. Quitting then the harbourless, dangerous, and ill-provided coast of Laconia, they sailed up the Saronic Gulf to the Isthmus of Corinth. Here they found the confederates—Corinthian, Bœotian, Athenian, etc.—carrying on war, with Corinth as their central post, against the Lacedæmonians at Sicyon. The line across the isthmus from Lachæum to Cenchreæ (the two ports of Corinth) was now made good by a defensive system of operations, so as to confine the Lacedæmonians within Peloponnesus: just as Athens, prior to her great losses in 446 B.C., while possessing both Megara and Pegæ, had been able to maintain the inland road midway between them

[393 B.C.]

where it crosses the high and difficult crest of Mount Geranea, thus occupying the only three roads by which a Lacedæmonian army could march from the Isthmus of Corinth into Attica or Bœotia. Pharnabazus communicated in the most friendly manner with the allies, assured them of his strenuous support against Sparta, and left with them a considerable sum of money.

The appearance of a Persian satrap with a Persian fleet, as master of the Peloponnesian Sea and the Saronic Gulf, was a phenomenon astounding to Grecian eyes. And if it was not equally offensive to Grecian sentiment, this was in itself a melancholy proof of the degree to which Panhellenic patriotism had been stifled by the Peloponnesian War and the Spartan empire. No Persian tiara had been seen near the Saronic Gulf since the battle of Salamis; nor could anything short of the intense personal wrath of Pharnabazus against the Lacedæmonians, and his desire to revenge upon them the damage inflicted by Derceyllidas and Agesilaus, have brought him now as far away from his own satrapy. It was this wrathful feeling of which Conon took advantage to procure from him a still more important boon.


Since 404 B.C., a space of eleven years, Athens had continued without any walls round her seaport town Piræus, and without any Long Walls to connect her city with Piræus. To this state she had been condemned by the sentence of her enemies, in the full knowledge that she could have little trade — few ships either armed or mercantile — poor defence even against pirates, and no defence at all against aggression from the mistress of the sea. Conon now entreated Pharnabazus, who was about to go home, to leave the fleet under his command, and to permit him to use it in rebuilding the fortifications of Piræus as well as the Long Walls of Athens. While he engaged to maintain the fleet by contributions from the islands, he assured the satrap that no blow could be inflicted upon Sparta so destructive or so mortifying, as the renovation of Athens and Piræus with their complete and connected fortifications. Sparta would thus be deprived of the most important harvest which she had reaped from the long struggle of the Peloponnesian War. Indignant as he now was against the Lacedæmonians, Pharnabazus sympathised cordially with these plans, and on departing not only left the fleet under the command of Conon, but also furnished him with a considerable sum of money towards the expense of the fortifications.

CONON REBUILDS THE LONG WALLS

Conon betook himself to the work energetically and without delay. He had quitted Athens in 407 B.C., as one of the joint admirals nominated after the disgrace of Alcibiades. He had parted with his countrymen finally at the catastrophe of Ægospotami in 405 B.C., preserving the miserable fraction of eight or nine ships out of that noble fleet which otherwise would have passed entire into the hands of Lysander. He now returned, in 393 B.C., as a second Themistocles, the deliverer of his country, and the restorer of her lost strength and independence. All hands were set to work; carpenters and masons being hired with the funds furnished by Pharnabazus, to complete the fortifications as quickly as possible. The Bœotians and other neighbours lent their aid zealously as volunteers — the same who eleven years before had danced to the sound of joyful music when the former walls were demolished; so completely had the feelings of Greece altered since that period. By such hearty co-operation, the work was finished during the course of the present summer and autumn without any opposition; and Athens enjoyed

again her fortified Piræus and harbour, with a pair of long walls, straight and parallel, joining it securely to the city. The Athenian people not only inscribed on a pillar a public vote gratefully recording the exploits of Conon, but also erected a statue to his honour.

The importance of this event in reference to the future history of Athens was unspeakable. Though it did not restore to her either her former navy, or her former empire, it reconstituted her as a city not only self-determining but even partially ascendant. It reanimated her, if not into the Athens of Pericles, at least into that of Isocrates and Demosthenes: it imparted to her a second fill of strength, dignity, and commercial importance, during the half century destined to elapse before she was finally overwhelmed by the superior



REMAINS OF A GREAT WALL AT MESSENE

military force of Macedon. Those who recollect the extraordinary stratagem whereby Themistocles had contrived (eighty-five years before) to accomplish the fortification of Athens, in spite of the base but formidable jealousy of Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies, will be aware how much the consummation of the Themistoclean project had depended upon accident. Now, also, Conon in his restoration was favoured by unusual combinations such as no one could have predicted. So strangely did events run, that the energy, by which Dercyllidas preserved Abydos, brought upon Sparta, indirectly, the greater mischief of the new Cononian walls. It would have been better for Sparta that Pharnabazus should at once have recovered Abydos as well as the rest of his satrapy; in which case he would have had no wrongs remaining unavenged to incense him, and would have kept on his own side of the Ægean; feeding Conon with a modest squadron sufficient to keep the Lacedæmonian navy from again becoming formidable on the Asiatic side, but leaving the walls of Piræus (if we may borrow an expression of Plato) "to continue asleep in the bosom of the earth."

The presence of Pharnabazus and Conon with their commanding force in the Saronic Gulf, and the liberality with which the former furnished pecuniary aid to the latter for rebuilding the full fortifications of Athens, as well as to the Corinthians for the prosecution of the war — seem to have given preponderance to the confederates over Sparta for that year. The plans

[393-390 B.C.]

of Conon were extensive. He was the first to organise, for the defence of Corinth, a mercenary force which was afterwards improved and conducted with greater efficiency by Iphicrates; and after he had finished the fortifications of Piræus with the Long Walls, he employed himself in showing his force among the islands, for the purpose of laying the foundations of renewed maritime power for Athens.^f

While this work was proceeding, the Corinthians, with the subsidy they had received, fitted out a squadron, with which their admiral Agathinus scoured the Corinthian Gulf. The Spartans sent Polemarchus with some galleys to oppose him: but their commander was soon after slain, and Pollis, who took his place, was compelled by a wound which he received in another engagement, to resign it to Herippidas. Herippidas seems to have driven the Corinthians from their station at Rhium: and Telesias, who succeeded him, recovered the complete mastery of the gulf, and was thus enabled, as we have seen, to co-operate with Agesilaus at Lechæum.

THE EMBASSY OF ANTALCIDAS

But this partial success did not diminish the alarm with which the Spartan government viewed the operations of Conon, who was proceeding to restore the Athenian dominion on the coasts and in the islands of the Ægean. It perceived that it was necessary to change its policy with regard to the court of Persia, and for the present at least to drop the design of conquest in Asia, and to confine itself to the object of counteracting the efforts of the Athenians, and establishing its own supremacy among the European Greeks. And it did not despair of making the Persian court subservient to these ends. For this purpose Antalcidas, a dexterous politician of Lysander's school, was sent to Tiribazus, who was now occupying the place of Tithraustes in Western Asia, to negotiate a peace. His mission awakened the apprehensions of the hostile confederacy; and envoys [including Conon] were sent from Athens, Bæotia, Corinth, and Argos, to defeat his attempts, and to support the interests of the allies at the satrap's court. Antalcidas however made proposals highly agreeable to Tiribazus, and accompanied them with arguments which convinced the satrap that his master's interest perfectly coincided with that of Sparta. He renounced all claim on the part of his government to the Greek cities in Asia, and was willing that they should remain subject to the king's authority. For the islands, and the other towns, he asked nothing but independence. Thus, he observed, no motive for war between Greece and Persia would be left. The king could gain nothing by it, and would have no reason to fear either Athens or Sparta, so long as the other Greek states remained independent. Tiribazus was perfectly satisfied, but had not authority to close with these overtures, at least against the will of the states which were at present in alliance with his master; and they refused to accede to a treaty on these terms.

But, though the satrap did not venture openly to enter into alliance with Sparta without his master's consent, he did not scruple privately to supply Antalcidas with money for the purpose of raising a navy to carry on the war with the states which were still acknowledged as allies of Persia: and having drawn Conon to Sardis, he threw him into prison, on the pretext that he had abused his trust, and had employed the king's forces for the aggrandisement of Athens. He then repaired to court to report his proceedings and to consult the royal pleasure. It was perhaps rather through some court

intrigue, or vague suspicion, than a deliberate purpose of adopting a line of policy opposite to that of Tiribazus, that Artaxerxes detained him at court, and sent Struthas down to fill his place. Struthas had perhaps witnessed the Asiatic campaigns of Agesilaus, and could not all at once get rid of the impression that the Spartans were his master's most formidable enemies. He therefore immediately made known his intention of siding with the Athenians and their allies.

The Spartan government, perhaps too hastily, concluding that their prospect of amicable dealings with Persia was now quite closed, determined to renew hostilities in Asia, and sent Thimbron — apparently the same officer whom we have already seen commanding there, and who had been fined on his return to Sparta for misconduct — to invade the king's territory. Struthas took advantage of his failings, and, one day that he had gone out at the head of a small party to attack some of the Persian cavalry who had been purposely thrown in his way, suddenly appeared with a superior force, slew him, and a flute-player named Thersander, the favourite companion of his convivial hours, and defeated the rest of his army, as it came up after him, with great slaughter. Diphridas was sent from Sparta to collect the scattered remains of his army, and to raise fresh troops, to defend the allied cities, and carry on the war with Struthas. Teleutias was ordered to sail to Asia with the twelve galleys which he had with him in the Corinthian Gulf, to supersede Eodicus, and to prosecute the war, in Rhodes or elsewhere, as he found opportunity. His first adventure, after he had taken the command at Cnidus, illustrates the complicated relations and the unsettled state of Greek politics at this period. Teleutias, whose force had been raised, by some additions which it received at Samos, to seven-and-twenty galleys, on his way from Cnidus to Rhodes, fell in with a squadron of ten, sent by the Athenians to aid Evagoras, who had revolted from the king of Persia, their ally, and the enemy of Sparta, whose admiral nevertheless destroyed or captured the whole.

The Athenians now thought it necessary to interpose in defence of their Rhodian friends, and sent Thrasybulus — the hero of Phyle — with forty galleys to check the operations of Teleutias. He thought that he might render more important services to the commonwealth in the north of the Ægean, and the Hellespont, where he would have no enemy to encounter on the sea. Sailing therefore first to the coast of Thrace, he composed the feud of the two Odrysian princes, Amadocus and Seuthes, and engaged them both in a treaty of alliance with Athens. He proceeded to Byzantium, and, throwing his weight into the scale of the democratical party, established its predominance, and with it that of the Athenian interest; and he was thus enabled to restore a main source of the Athenian revenue, the duty of a tenth on vessels coming out of the Euxine. Before he quitted the Bosphorus, he also brought over Chalcedon to the Athenian alliance. Thrasybulus now reduced several of the Lesbian towns, and collected much plunder from the lands of those which refused to submit. He then prepared to return to Rhodes; but first sailed eastward to levy contributions on the southern coast of Asia. Here his career was abruptly terminated. He anchored in the Eurymedon near Aspendus, where he obtained a supply of money. But the Aspendians fell upon him by night, and killed him in his tent. Xenophon's remark, that he died with the reputation of a very good man, may be admitted as sufficient proof that the great services he had rendered to his country were not his only claim to the esteem of his contemporaries, and that the suspicions excited against him were wholly unfounded.

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The flourishing condition to which Thrasybulus had restored the affairs of Athens in the Hellespont, excited uneasiness at Sparta. Anaxibius obtained three galleys, and a grant of money sufficient to raise one thousand mercenaries. On his arrival in the Hellespont he waged a successful war with the neighbouring towns, subject to Pharnabazus, or allied to Athens, and did much damage to the Athenian commerce. The Athenians were at length induced to send Iphicrates, with eight galleys and about twelve hundred targeteers, mostly those who had served under him at Corinth, to counteract the movements of Anaxibius. Anaxibius was surprised by an ambush. He bade his men seek their safety in flight; for himself, he said, his part was to die there; and, calling for his shield, fought until he fell, with a few of his Spartan companions. The rest fled in disorder to Abydos with the loss of about 250 men.

Notwithstanding the successes of the Athenians in the Hellespont the enemy found means of annoying and threatening them at home. They had hitherto maintained a peaceful intercourse with Ægina; but the Spartans now resolved to make use of the island for the purpose of infesting the coasts of Attica. Teleutias was soon after superseded by Hierax, the new Spartan admiral, and returned home. Hierax sailed to Rhodes, leaving Gorgopas, his vice-admiral, with twelve galleys at Ægina. The Athenians in the fort were soon reduced to greater straits than the Æginetans in the city; and, in the fifth month after their arrival, a strong squadron was sent out from Athens to carry them home. In the meanwhile the Spartan government had resumed its project of attaining its object by means of negotiation, and once more sent out Antalcidas, as the person whose influence with Tiribazus would open the readiest access to the Persian court, as admiral in the room of Hierax. Antalcidas was escorted to Ephesus by Gorgopas and his squadron, and on his arrival sent Gorgopas with ten galleys back to Ægina. The remainder of the fleet which joined him at Ephesus, he placed under the command of his lieutenant Nicolochus, while he himself proceeded on more important business to the court of Artaxerxes.

Gorgopas on his return fell in with the Athenian squadron under Eunomus, and was chased by him into the port of Ægina, where he arrived a little before sunset. Eunomus sailed away soon after dark, with a light in the stern of his galley, to keep his squadron together. Gorgopas, whose men in the meanwhile had landed and refreshed themselves, now embarked again, and pushed across the gulf in the enemy's wake, guided by his light, with every precaution for suppressing or weakening the usual sounds of galleys in motion. At Cape Zoster, as the Athenians were landing, the silence of the night was broken by the sound of the trumpet, and after a short engagement by moonlight, Gorgopas captured four of their galleys; the rest made their escape into Piræus. But not long after, Chabrias, having been sent with a squadron of ten galleys and eight hundred targeteers to the aid of Evagoras, landed by night on Ægina, and posted his targeteers in an ambush. The next day, according to a preconceived plan, a body of heavy-armed infantry which had come over with him under the command of Demænetus, advanced into the interior of the island. Gorgopas marched to meet them with all the forces he could muster, and passing by the ambuscade was routed and fell in the action, with some other Spartans and between three and four hundred of the other troops. By this victory the Attic commerce was for a time freed from annoyance; for though Eteonicus still remained in Ægina, he had no money to pay the seamen, and therefore could exert no authority.

In this emergency Teleutias was sent to take the command. His arrival was hailed with delight by the men, who had already served under him, and expected an immediate supply of pay. He however called them together, and informed them that he had brought no money with him, and that they had no resource to look to for the relief of their necessities, but their own activity and courage. It was best that they should not depend for subsistence upon the favour either of Greek or barbarian, but should provide for themselves at the enemy's expense. The men expressed entire confidence in his guidance, and promised to obey all his commands. That very night, after they had ended their evening meal, he ordered them to embark with a day's provision, and with twelve galleys crossed the gulf towards Piræus. When they were within about half a mile of the harbour, they rested till daybreak, and then sailed in. He gave orders to strike none but the ships of war which might be lying in the harbour, to capture as many merchant vessels as could be conveniently taken in tow, and to carry away as many prisoners as could be taken from the rest. Not only were these orders executed with alacrity and success, but some of his men, landing on the quay, seized some of the merchants and shipowners who were assembled there, and hurried them on board. While the military force of Athens marched down to the relief of Piræus, which was supposed to have been taken, he made his retreat from the harbour, sent three or four of his galleys with the prizes to Ægina, and with the rest proceeded along the coast as far as Sunium. He made the more captures on his way, as his squadron, having been seen to issue from the port of Athens, was believed to be friendly. At Sunium he found a number of vessels laden with corn, and other valuable cargoes, with which he sailed away to Ægina. The produce of this adventure yielded a month's pay to the men, raised their spirits, and increased their devotion for their commander, who continued to employ them in this predatory warfare : the only kind to which his small force was adequate.

The Athenians however still retained the ascendancy in the Hellespont, where Nicolochus, who after the departure of Antalcidas had sailed northward with five-and-twenty galleys, was blockaded at Abydos by an Athenian squadron of two and thirty, which was stationed on the opposite coast of the Chersonesus, under the command of Diotimus and Iphicrates. But the aspect of affairs was completely changed by the arrival of Antalcidas, who returned in 387 with Tiribazus from the Persian court, where he had been treated with marks of distinguished favour by Artaxerxes, and had fully succeeded in the main object of his mission, having prevailed on the king to aid Sparta in carrying on the war, until the Athenians and their allies should accept a peace to be dictated in the king's name on terms previously arranged between him and the Spartan ambassador. Being informed of the situation of Nicolochus, he proceeded by land to Abydos, and took the command of the blockaded squadron, with which he sailed out in the night. Additions raised his fleet to eighty sail, and gave him the complete command of the sea, so that he was enabled to divert the commerce of the Euxine from Athens into the ports of the allies of Sparta.

The Athenians now saw themselves not only exposed to constant annoyance from Ægina, but in danger of falling again under the power of the enemy, and losing all the benefit of Conon's victory. They were therefore heartily desirous of an honourable peace. Most of the other states were probably still more anxious for the termination of a contest from which they could expect no advantage. When therefore Tiribazus, in his master's name, summoned a congress of deputies to listen to the proposals which he was

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commissioned to announce, all the belligerents readily sent their ministers to attend it. In the presence of this assembly Tiribazus, having shown the royal seal, read his master's decree, which ran in the following imperial style:

“King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the Greek cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus, should belong to himself; but that all the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and that these should as of old belong to the Athenians. If any state refuse to accept this peace, I will make war against it, with those who consent to these terms, by land and by sea, with ships and with money.”

THE KING'S PEACE

The treaty founded on these conditions was ratified by all the parties almost without opposition. A little delay arose from the Thebans, who were reluctant to part with the sovereignty they had hitherto exercised over many of the Bœotian towns, and wished, for the sake of at least retaining their pretensions, to ratify in the name of all the other Bœotians. But Agesilaus, who was charged to receive the oath of their ministers, refused to accept it in this form, and required them strictly to conform to the Persian ordinance, and expressly to acknowledge the independence of all other states. One impediment to the general peace still remained. The governments of Corinth and Argos did not consider themselves bound by the treaty to alter the relations which had hitherto subsisted between them; and it was only when Agesilaus threatened them with war, that they consented, the one to dismiss, and the other to withdraw, the Argive garrison from Corinth. Its departure was attended by an immediate reaction in the state of the Corinthian parties. The authors of the massacre, knowing themselves to be generally odious to their fellow citizens, thought themselves no longer safe at home, and left the city. Most of them found refuge at Athens, where they met with a much more honourable reception than they deserved. The exiles of the opposite faction were recalled; and their return dissolved the union with Argos, and restored the influence of Sparta, and the oligarchical institutions.

This treaty, which was long celebrated under the name of the Peace of Antalcidas, was undoubtedly a masterpiece of policy, nor does it appear to deserve the censure which it incurred from the Attic orators and from Plutarch, and which has been repeated by some modern writers, as a breach of political morality. Sparta in her transactions with Persia during the Peloponnesian War, had more than once acknowledged the title of the Persian king to the dominion of the Asiatic Greeks; she had never pledged herself to maintain their independence; and even if she had done so, the revival of the maritime power of Athens, and its union with that of Persia, would have afforded a fair plea for receding from an engagement which she was no longer able to fulfil. The clause in favour of Athens was perhaps only designed to excite jealousy and discord between Athens and the hated Bœotians. It has been attributed to a deeper policy; it has been considered as a device, by which Sparta reserved a pretext for eluding the conditions of the treaty which she rigorously enforced in the case of other states. But it is doubtful whether the exception expressly made concerning the three islands which Athens was allowed to retain, could have been needed, or if needful could have availed, as a colour under which Sparta, while she stripped Thebes of her sovereignty in Bœotia, might keep possession of Messenia and the

subject districts of Laconia. Sparta did not permit a question to be raised on this point. She was constituted the interpreter of the treaty; she expounded it by the rule, not of reason, but of might, with the sword in hand, and the power of Persia at her back.^e

This momentous treaty, which is sometimes called the Peace of Antalcidas after its chief Grecian agent, is nowadays more commonly called the King's Peace, and wisely, since it was the king who chiefly profited by it. Thirlwall, who can always be relied upon to take an impartial view of the question, says of it: "And thus the Peace of Antalcidas, which professed to establish the independence of the Greek states, subjected them more than ever to the will of one. It was not in this respect only that appearances were contrary to the real state of things. The position of Sparta, though seemingly strong, was artificial and precarious; while the majestic attitude in which the Persian king dictated terms to Greece, disguised a profound consciousness, that his throne subsisted only by sufferance, and that its best security was the disunion of the people with whom he assumed so lordly an air." Niebuhr, to whom the Spartans were almost always hypocrites, has this to say: "Painful as this peace was to the feelings of the Greeks, who were obliged to leave the dominion over their countrymen to barbarians, yet the hypocrisy of the Spartans, who, by this peace, allowed the Persians to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, was worse."

Grote, whose history is a glowing brief for Athens, the type of democracy, as against Sparta, the type of oligarchy, cannot be expected to approve of an agreement leading to such degradation for the Athenians, as well as for all the Greek world. He says: "The peace or convention, which bears the name of Antalcidas, was an incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply which we find cited in Plutarch. 'Alas, for Hellas (observed some one to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians *medising*!' 'Nay (replied the Spartan king), say rather the Medes *laconising*.' These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan Antalcidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express ground that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king's purposes and wishes, as we learn even from the philo-Laonian Xenophon. While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no other Grecian state gained anything as the convention was originally framed."

George W. Cox, in his *General History of Greece*, recognises in the treaty a humiliation for Sparta as well as for the rest of Greece, since the peace was not drawn up in the form of an agreement, but rather forced upon Greece by the edict of Persia. It was indeed a fiat "sent down from Susa," like another royal decree to the subjects whom the Persian king looked down upon with oriental disdain. Cox writes thus fervidly:


"The Persian king chose to regard the acceptance of the peace by the Spartans as an act of submission not less significant than the offering of earth and water. In the disgrace which it involved the one was as ignominious as the other; but Sparta had now not even the poor excuse which long ago she had put forward for calling in the aid of the barbarian. She was no longer struggling for self-preservation. In short, by Sparta the Peace of Antalcidas was adopted with the settled resolution to divide and govern; and all of those of her acts, which might seem at first sight to have a different meaning, carry out in every instance this golden rule of despotism. It was the curse of the Hellenic race, and the ruin ultimately of

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Sparta itself, that this maxim flattered an instinct which they had cherished with blind obstinacy, until it became their bane. But for Sparta, the consolidation of the Athenian empire would long ago have restrained this self-isolating sentiment within its proper limits. In theory the Spartans by enforcing the Peace of Antalcidas restored to the several Greek states the absolute power of managing their own affairs, and of making war upon one another. In practice Sparta was resolved that their armies should move only at her dictation, that into her treasury should flow the tribute, the gathering of which was denounced as the worst crime of imperial Athens, and that in the government of the oligarchical factions she should have the strongest material guarantee for the absolute submission of the Greek cities. To secure this result the Hellenic states of Lesser Asia were abandoned to the tender mercies of Persian tax-gatherers, and left to feel the full bitterness of the slavery from which Athens had rescued them some ninety years ago."

An outcome which none could have foreseen from the acceptance of this humiliating title-deed to Grecian independence was the sudden and rocket-like rise of the city of Thebes, a city which had heretofore been a second- or third-rate town chiefly distinguished for being on the wrong side of Hellenic questions. Thebes is now about to break forth into flame with a fire-brand named Epaminondas, one of the noblest and most splendid names in all the glitter of Grecian history.^a





GREEK PINS AND BUCKLE
(In the British Museum)

CHAPTER XLIV. THE RISE OF THEBES

THE brilliant expansion of the power of Sparta after the King's Peace is intimately connected with the name of Agesilaus. Therefore in order rightly to understand the significance and the results of the Peace of Antalcidas, we must first form some idea of the tendencies and political position of this eminent man. Nothing but a just appreciation of his personality will suffice to keep us from tossing rudderless between the Scylla and Charybdis of diametrically opposite views of the object of the peace, and of Sparta's policy at that period.

Agesilaus was from the outset the typical representative of the Sparta of his time. All his thoughts and energies had their root in his own state alone, and to exalt this state to the position of the first power in the world, to gain for it the hegemony of Hellenic affairs, was his object, as it was the object of the whole contemporary policy of Sparta. To this end he laboured with admirable consistency through all his long life, from his first campaign in Asia to his expedition into Egypt, and all his acts, whether as a victorious monarch or an adventurous leader of mercenaries, were directed to one end — to vindicate the authority of Sparta. And when this end could not be attained by force of arms he was equal to compassing it by diplomatic moves. Hence it is certain that the Peace of Antalcidas was not concluded without his knowledge and consent, even if circumstances rendered it desirable for him to keep in the background during the negotiations in Asia.

Lacedæmon found herself incapable of maintaining by mere force of arms the position which had devolved upon her through the events of the Peloponnesian War, and if Sparta were not to abdicate the hegemony of Greece she must perforce try to conclude an advantageous peace and an alliance with Persia. This project was favoured by the ill-timed attempts of Athens to regain her maritime supremacy, and the Spartans, rightly gauging the situation, associated with these attempts their conciliatory negotiations with Persia. That this step, which closed to him henceforth his career of glory in Asia, was an easy one for Agesilaus to take, is unlikely; it was a political necessity, the inevitable consequence of the lines along which Greek policy had developed for the last thirty years.

Persia and Sparta were alike interested in preventing the revival of the sea power of Athens, and both needed peace to regain sway in their own dominions. This was the natural basis of the negotiations. The Great King was appointed supreme arbitrator in the affairs of Greece, and the possession of the Greek cities in Asia Minor was guaranteed to him. The Spartans had never indulged in Panhellenistic sentiments. Their whole

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political organisation and development made it almost impossible for the fate of their kindred in Asia to rouse any interest in their minds. When once their interests in Ionia were lost by the fortune of war, the documentary recognition of the fact could have roused no scruple in the breast of any true Spartan. And although it was these paragraphs of the peace which stirred the profoundest indignation in such men as Plato and Demosthenes, in the rest of Greece the time of national enthusiasm had gone by. Even in Athens the masses had unlearned their ancient hatred of Persia since they had been indebted to the succour of the Great King for the only bright spot in troublous times of war, and statesmen could not blind themselves to the fact that the political sins of Greece since the year 411, and the constant appeal to Persia for support and mediation which had become habitual since then, had been inexorably conducting her to this end.

The second main paragraph dealt with the internal affairs of Greece. Every state, great or small, was to become autonomous. If the first article contained an important concession to the Great King, this, which decreed the autonomy, was made primarily with a view to the advantage of Sparta. It could have no aim but one, to assert the hegemony of Sparta in Greece. This article, which had so enticing a sound in Greek ears, was the death-warrant of the growing power of the Athenian maritime confederacy, of the supremacy of Thebes in Bœotia, of the union of Argos and Corinth; it destroyed in the germ every power that might have imperilled the position of Sparta. Her own dominion in the Peloponnesus was not compromised by the proclamation of liberty, as her allies were already autonomous in name, while the authority of the hostile coalition was shattered at a blow. Thus the victor of Cnidus shared the spoils with the vanquished foe who had known so well how to avail himself of the right moment for proving an indispensable ally. As suzerain of Hellas, Artaxerxes, who could not suppress the rebels in his own country, dictates peace there, a peace which proclaimed liberty to the states but was nevertheless meant from the outset to enslave them, and Sparta lets herself be appointed to execute the compact which is to procure anew for her the supremacy of Greece. It was not the end of her projects but the beginning.

A glance at the history of the succeeding years shows how she pursued these projects. First of all, the Spartans turned their attention to the internal affairs of the Peloponnesus. The first thing they had to do was to vindicate their authority at home. During the long years of war the old ties between Sparta and her allies had grown looser; here and there the democratic element had taken the helm; there had been attempts to evade the obligation of military service; there had been open rejoicing at Sparta's ill-success. The situation called for energetic measures. We have already seen how a beginning was made with Corinth during the peace negotiations in Sparta. By a threat of armed invasion the Argive garrison was forced to withdraw and the alliance between the two states was dissolved; the Corinthian democrats left the city, the exiles were recalled, and Corinth, more closely linked with Lacedæmon than ever, again became her bulwark against enemies from without.

MANTINEA CRUSHED

The next step was to juggle the government of the other democratic states back into the hands of the oligarchy. Mantinea was the first to suffer. This city had always been an offence in the eyes of Sparta. The

*synoicismus*¹ and the fortification of Mantinea had taken place at the instigation of Argos after the Persian wars, and friendship towards Sparta was hardly likely to have been the leading motive for these proceedings. After the Peace of Nicias the city had joined the league against Sparta founded by Argos, and had taken an active part in the war. The unfavourable issue of the campaign obliged Mantinea to submit to Sparta once more and to conclude peace for thirty years, but nevertheless the democratic government remained in power, and the antagonism against Sparta persisted after, as before. The people made a parade of their animosity, treated the obligation of military service with neglect; and after the defeat of the *mora* on the isthmus Agesilaus had to pass the city under cover of fog and darkness in order to elude the scorn and malicious satisfaction of the inhabitants.


Now the day of reckoning had come. Spartan ambassadors came to Mantinea, bringing a multitude of complaints, together with the demand for the demolition of the walls about the city. This demand being met by a

refusal, Sparta declared war. Agesilaus begged to be excused from the chief command of the army, as the Mantineans had rendered his father great services during the Messenian War. Agesipolis marched against Mantinea and endeavoured to force the people into compliance by devastating their territory. When this expedient proved fruitless he laid siege to the city. The inhabitants made an obstinate defence, but they were obliged to surrender unconditionally after Agesipolis had dammed the river Ophis, which flowed through the town, and thus caused an inundation which brought about the fall of its walls of unbaked brick. By the intercession of Pausanias, who was living in exile at Tegea, the leaders of the people and the partisans of democracy, sixty in number, were allowed to withdraw in safety, a portion of the population was allowed to inhabit Mantinea as an unfortified place, and the remainder was obliged to settle in four distinct unprotected villages.

To each of these villages a Spartan *xenagos*

was appointed. Xenophon adds that the Mantineans were at first indignant at being removed, but that they afterwards expressed their satisfaction at what had been done, as under an aristocratic government they could lead a quiet life near their estates and free from troublesome demagogues. This is a reproduction of the Spartan and oligarchic view of the matter.

In both ancient and modern times the treatment meted out to Mantinea has invariably been branded as an act of most brutal and barbarous violence and arbitrary cruelty, the outcome of the policy of Agesilaus. In this general and (to a certain extent) just censure of the ruler of the Spartan state at the time, one point has been overlooked. In a democratic constitution the Spartans could see nothing but a reign of revolutionary terrorism which oppressed the peaceful and sober part of the community, their own friends



GREEK WEAPONS

[¹ That is, the organisation of a group of settlements into one city or capital.]

[385-383 B.C.]

and adherents. To help the latter, to put them in power again, they held to be the duty of the sovereign state. Spartan policy was sure of its aims, and in its consistency lies the secret of Sparta's superiority at this period. And if we are right in assuming that a Spartan must have ceased to be a Spartan before he could conceive otherwise of the state of affairs, there is no justification for heaping personal abuse and scandalous imputations upon a writer who reflects the opinions of his circle.

The punishment of Mantinea produced a profound effect upon the other Peloponnesian cities. With high hopes of an equally energetic interference on their behalf the aristocratic exiles from Phlius immediately turned to Sparta with the entreaty that the Spartans would intercede for their restoration to their homes. A bare admonition from the ephors to the municipal authorities to receive back the friends they had cast out for no sufficient reason, was enough to evoke a decree by which the sentence of banishment was repealed and the exiles were promised the restoration of their property. The spirit of resistance had been broken by the fate of Mantinea.

The Spartans next turned their attention to Boeotia. Although the Boeotian league, not being based on the principle of autonomy, had been broken up by the second paragraph of the peace, they felt the need of taking precautions against any attempt on the part of Thebes—the city which they regarded as the author of the whole ill-starred war and which had defied them to the last to re-establish its authority. Hence, as a first step, a Spartan garrison was retained in the friendly city of Orchomenos, and both Thespiæ and Tanagra were induced to throw in their lot with Sparta. But the most telling stroke at Thebes was the restoration of Plataea. For one thing, the Thebans were thereby deprived of the usufruct of Plataean territory, and for another, the newly founded city, being of course wholly dependent upon Sparta, afforded an excellent base for attack upon Thebes itself. Here again we see the relentless and energetic policy of Sparta in action.

THE OLYNTHIAN WAR

More serious complications in Greek affairs soon gave the Spartans their opportunity for showing themselves masters of Hellas. In the spring of 383 ambassadors from the cities of Apollonia and Acanthus presented themselves in Sparta to beg for support against the increasing power of the Olyntho-Chalcidian league. Their petition was seconded by deputies from Amyntas, king of Macedonia, who felt the security of his dominions imperilled by the encroachments of Olynthus. The Olynthians strove more and more vigorously to assert the authority of the league. They had succeeded in persuading nearly all the cities of the Chalcidice to join their confederacy; they had pushed forward towards Macedonia, and had even brought Pella over to their interests. The league was now in a position to hold the menace of war over any cities which refused adherence, and to meditate far-reaching enterprises. By an agreement with Athens and Thebes it hoped to secure an influence upon middle Greece. By this energetic and well-considered centralisation a federal state was created, admirably calculated to serve as a bulwark of the power of Hellas against Thrace, and as a fresh starting-point for the civilisation of the barbarous North.

As we look back at the lines along which the history of Greece developed, we are inevitably forced upon the conclusion that nothing but strict union, the formation of closely confederated states, could have checked the rapid

process of political decay. This conviction lies at the root of the liberal recognition and sympathy which the majority of modern scholars have accorded to the efforts of the Olynthian league. Whether the brilliant visions of the future which Grote, in particular, sketches for the league would ever have been realised, even if it had not fallen upon the days of Sparta's arbitrary dominion, remains an open question. Centralisation and unification were repugnant to the Greek mind, and every attempt in that direction was bound to go to wreck on the fanatical love of autonomy among the Greek states.

The appeal of Apollonia and Acanthus, which wished to retain their ancient constitution, and the simultaneous action of the oppressed Amyntas, offered Sparta the desired opportunity for attacking the Chalcidic federation. Doubtless the sea power of Olynthus and the steady expansion of the league had long since attracted general attention there, and had been the subject of anxious reflection. The possibility that this league might grow more powerful still and attain an authoritative position in middle Greece also had to be guarded against at all risks. The policy of Sparta rendered it imperative that every considerable development of power in other states should be repressed. The war against the Olynthians was determined upon, and, by the desire of the ambassadors, Eudamidas was immediately despatched with such forces as could be equipped in haste.

THE SURPRISE OF THEBES

His brother Phœbidas was to follow with the remainder of the troops destined for the campaign in Thrace as soon as the levies were completed, a process which was probably rendered more lengthy by the fact that the new military system was now brought into use for the first time. By the end of summer, 383, Phœbidas was ready to start. He took his way past Thebes. There, as Xenophon tells, party quarrels had reached an extreme point. The office of polemarch was held by Leontiades and Ismenias, who were deadly enemies, each being the leader of a distinct body of partisans. For the moment the anti-Laconian party was in the ascendant. A decree had been promulgated that no man should be allowed to enlist for the campaign against Olynthus. When Phœbidas appeared before the walls of the city, Leontiades, whose family had always maintained close relations with Sparta, endeavoured to gain his favour by every kind of service, and then persuaded the vain and ambitious general to attempt a coup-de-main against the Cadmea. By this means he was to bring the adherents of Sparta into power and secure the active assistance of Thebes in the Olynthian War.

Phœbidas fell in with the proposed plot, and the day of the feast of the Thesmophoria was appointed for its execution. On that day the women of the city celebrated by themselves a festival in the ancient temple of Demeter on the Cadmea. Phœbidas was to make a feint of striking camp and setting out on his march northwards. While the council was assembled in a hall in the market-place and the heat of noon-day kept the rest of the population indoors, Leontiades galloped after the departing general, led him unobserved up to the citadel, and opened the gates to him. He then hied to the council, announced what had taken place, and had Ismenias arrested as a seditious person. The leaders and adherents of the opposition, to the number of three hundred, were obliged to flee for their lives to Athens. The occupation of the Cadmea was a political necessity, the logical consequence of the efforts

[383-380 B.C.]

of Sparta to secure the hegemony. The experiences of the last war had not been suffered in vain.

While Agesilaus was pursuing his victorious career in Asia a coalition against Sparta had been formed in Greece at the instigation of Persia, and Thebes had shown herself most zealous in promoting this anti-Spartan combination which was so grave a menace to the existence of Lacedæmon. This time Sparta was once more undertaking a war on the confines of Greece; if fortune were adverse, if a battle were lost, she had no guarantee against the possibility — the probability even — that hostile Thebes, still barely subdued, might revolt again, bar the way of retreat against the Spartan army, and throw the most serious obstacles in the way of reinforcements. "The Cadmea was the decisive point for the security of the line of march," says Curtius. If a prolonged war were to be waged in the distant north it was essential that this position should be in friendly hands. And the only way of attaining this object was to juggle the reins of government into the hands of the oligarchical party in Thebes and to garrison the citadel with Spartan hoplites for their protection. The success of the expedient proves how well worth while it had been for Phœbidas to take the circuitous route.

This act of violence, the surprise of the Theban citadel in time of peace, called forth a storm of indignation throughout the whole of Greece. Even in Sparta itself a clamour of popular displeasure arose against Phœbidas, because (as Xenophon adds) he had acted without due warrant or command. Apparently the Spartan government found it expedient to cast the odium of the proceeding upon Phœbidas, and therefore, in spite of Xenophon's silence on the subject, there is probably some truth in the story that he was deposed from his command and condemned to pay an exorbitant fine. The wrath of Greece may well have been the reason for this mock sentence. The payment of the fine was never exacted, and in the following year he held the office of a Spartan harmost in Boœtia. For the rest, the remonstrances of Leontiades and Agesilaus, the latter of whom openly maintained that the only point to be considered in judging the case was whether the transgression of Phœbidas were profitable to the state or not, quickly persuaded the Spartans of the propriety and necessity of the coup-de-main. The citadel was not evacuated, and legal proceedings were taken against Ismenias in respect of the league. A solemn tribunal was called together in Thebes, consisting of three Spartan commissioners and a deputy from every town of the league, to pass judgment upon the crimes of Ismenias. He was condemned to death. The most repulsive feature of this judicial murder, which was merely an act of vengeance upon the whilom leader of the anti-Spartan coalition, is the farce of a tribunal which was supposed to represent national ideas and interests.

The road to Thrace was now safe, and the war against Olynthus was prosecuted with the utmost vigour.

It was probably in the spring of 382 that Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, marched against the city with a large army. He had made up the number of his forces in Thebes, and had received auxiliary contingents from Amyntas and from Dêrδας, prince of Elinœa. This was the beginning of a fierce and prolonged struggle. After some successes which allowed him to press forward to Olynthus itself, devastating the country as he went, he fell in a hotly contested battle, and his death was the signal for a general flight. His whole army was swept away and annihilated. With amazing perseverance the Spartans continued the war; in the spring of 380 another huge army was equipped and the leadership entrusted to the young king, Agesipolis. He

was fortunate in battle, but succumbed to a violent fever the same summer. It was left for Polybiades, his successor in the command, to force the starving city, cut off from access to the sea and robbed of its harvests by the prolonged and desolating war, into surrender. In the year 379 the league was dissolved and the proud city compelled to render military service to the Spartans; the mighty chief city of the Chalcidice became a humble member of the Lacedæmonian alliance.

Meanwhile the Peloponnesus itself had become the scene of a fresh struggle. It has already been mentioned that the exiled aristocrats from Phlius had been allowed to return at the request of Sparta and had been promised the restoration of their property. But here, as everywhere, the attempts at expropriation met with almost insurmountable obstacles. There may have been a lack of good will to push on the proceedings, since it is probable that in many cases the judges themselves were in possession of the estates of the exiles. But in the beginning, at least, there seems to have been no excessive difficulty or delay in giving compensation, and we hear that, in the campaign of Agesipolis, the Phliasians distinguished themselves as zealous allies of Sparta by the liberality and promptitude of their contributions. After the departure of Agesipolis, as Xenophon relates, the Phliasians hoping to be quit of Spartan intervention, neglected the settlement of the chaotic claims. The returning aristocrats, finding their demands disregarded by an unbiassed court of arbitration, turned with their grievances to Sparta. The authorities of their own city having punished them for this arbitrary proceeding, the ephors, persuaded by exiles and by Agesilaus, the fast friend of the latter, determined upon a campaign against Phlius. The Phliasians sued for peace, but naturally could not accede to the demand of Agesilaus for an unconditional surrender of their citadel.

A tedious siege then began, during which Agesilaus found himself obliged to have recourse to every kind of artifice to allay the wrath of the Lacedæmonians and their allies at making enemies of the large population of the Asopus valley for the sake of a few oligarchs. It was the first note of that discord among the Peloponnesian allies which was destined to exercise such a paralysing effect upon the future military undertakings of the Lacedæmonians. Thanks to the valiant defence of Delphion, to whom Xenophon does not refuse his due meed of praise, the city held out twice as long as had been expected. At last, in the year 379, the lack of provisions constrained the inhabitants to treat for peace, and, unwisely ignoring Agesilaus, they applied direct to Sparta. Sparta committed the sole decision to the king, and the punishment in store for Phlius was naturally not the less severe for the attempt to set Agesilaus aside. A commission was appointed, consisting of fifty oligarchs and fifty of the citizens, and they were empowered to decide the question which of the inhabitants should remain alive and which should not. The further duty of elaborating a constitution was also assigned to them. To safeguard the new order of things a Lacedæmonian garrison was left provisionally in the acropolis. Thus in Phlius, as in Olynthus, Sparta had won the victory.

At this point both Xenophon and Diodorus, with a view to providing a more striking background for subsequent events, give a summary of the expansion of the power and dominion of Sparta up to this time. And truly, from the Peace of Antalcidas to the subjugation of Olynthus the history of Greece is nothing but a history of the extension of Spartan authority. Allied with the king of Persia, the tyrant of Syracuse, and the king of Macedonia, the will of Sparta was "irresistible from the cliffs of Taygetus to

[394-380 B.C.]

Athos." The autonomy-paragraph had broken up all anti-Spartan coalitions. In Corinth, the key of the Peloponnesus, oligarchy was restored, Boeotia had become a vassal of Sparta, the menacing Olynthian league had been annihilated, and the ruins of Mantinea and the sanguinary tribunals at Phlius showed what punishment Sparta was prepared to mete out to any attempt at mutiny or disobedience. The Spartan harmosts with their garrisons commanded the citadels everywhere, and under their protection oligarchic rulers held the populace in fetters. In the time of Lysander, indeed, the Spartan dominions had been more extensive, but Sparta had never borne sway in Hellas with more authority or less restraint. Athens might strive with unflagging perseverance to establish an ascendancy at sea; she might conclude an alliance with Chios directly after the Peace of the King, an alliance which was the precursor of the maritime confederacy presently to be revived; but how insignificant were such things as opposed to the dominant position of Sparta, now at the zenith of her glory! And for the fact that her will and her word were law in Greece, Sparta was mainly indebted to the steady and consistent policy of Agesilaus.

The gray-haired monarch might well look with pride upon the object he had attained. He had reared a mighty structure: though it had been built by harshness and arbitrary power and welded together with blood and cruelty, it is none the less a moving spectacle to see how, before the eyes of its founder, stone after stone was cast down, till nothing but a vast expanse of ruins remained to bear witness to its former greatness.^b

FATE OF EVAGORAS AND THE ASIATIC GREEKS

During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Citium in his own island, and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps, or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At the time of the battle of Cnidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras not only paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian fleet placed under Conon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself serving aboard. It was in fact (if we may believe Isocrates) to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power displayed by him on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed. Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously began to manœuvre against him and forced him into the war in self-defence. Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not only worsted and humbled Amathus, Citium, and Soli, which cities, under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes, but he also equipped a large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much vigour as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover, upon some of the Cilician towns to declare against the Persians. He received powerful aid from Acoris, the native and independent king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by the Athenians. Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the

[380-374 B.C.]

Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his long protection to Conon and his energetic efforts before in the battle of Cnidus—though she thereby ran every risk of making the Persians her enemies.

The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction with Sparta, the Peace of Antalcidas, and to get together such a fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission. It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be abandoned; the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Acoris of Egypt, and even by Hecatomnus, prince of Caria, with a secret present of money. But the Peace of Antalcidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic seaboard, and were enabled to convey round to Cilicia and Cyprus not only their own fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents from these very Grecian cities.

Evagoras defended himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Acoris in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Cilicia also continued in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians were distracted, and the war

was not concluded until ten years after its commencement. It cost them on the whole (if we may believe Isocrates) 15,000 talents in money [£3,000,000 or \$15,000,000], and such severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute.

It was seemingly not very long after the peace, that a Salaminian named Nicoreon formed a conspiracy against his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident, before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight. He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care of a eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of vindictive sympathy in his master's cause, made known the beauty of the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her chamber by the eunuch: both of them were there assassinated by his hand.

Thus perished a Greek of pre-eminent vigour and intelligence, remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and forming a strong con-



STATUE OF MINERVA IN A RUINED
TEMPLE AT ATHENS

[387 B.C.]

trast in this respect with his contemporary Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and violence. Nicocles, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after him, and showed much regard, accompanied by magnificent presents, to the Athenian Isocrates; who compliments him as a pacific and well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or property which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the prosperity of the city.

We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras—interesting not less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus—to the general consequences of the Peace of Antalcidas in Central Greece. For the first time since the battle of Mycale in 479 B.C., the Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was carried so far as to raze the town altogether. And thus these cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs, were now transferred to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong-doing towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries whom the satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and beautiful women as inmates of their harems. What was taken for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress. While the Asiatic Greeks were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of Antalcidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries to strengthen the hands of the Great King against other Greeks—against Evagoras in Cyprus, and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of Asia—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc. These islands were now exposed to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbours, as that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the genius, the energy, and the Panhellenic ardour of Athens had first organised, and so long kept up, was now broken up; while Sparta, to whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks, had destroyed the security even of the islanders.^e

THE REVOLT OF THEBES

The ambition of making conquests in the East, which it now appeared impossible to retain, had deprived the Lacedæmonians of an authority, or rather dominion in Greece, acquired by the success of the Peloponnesian War, and which they might have reasonably expected to preserve and to confirm. Not only their power, but their safety, was threatened by the arms of a hostile confederacy, which had been formed and fomented by the wealth of Persia. Athens, their rival, their superior, their subject, but always their unrelenting enemy, had recovered her walls and fleet, and aspired to command

the sea. Thebes and Argos had become sensible of their natural strength, and disdained to acknowledge the pre-eminence, or to follow the standard, of any foreign republic. The inferior states of Peloponnesus were weary of obeying every idle summons to war, from which they derived not any advantage but that of gratifying the ambition of their Spartan masters. The valuable colonies in Macedonia and Thrace, and particularly the rich and populous cities of the Chalcidic region, the bloodless conquests of the virtuous Brasidas, had forsaken the interest of Sparta, when Sparta forsook the interest of justice. Scarcely any vestige appeared of the memorable trophies erected in a war of twenty-seven years. The eastern provinces (incomparably the most important of all) were irrecoverably lost; and this rapid decline of power had happened in the course of ten years, and had been chiefly occasioned by the fatal splendour of Agesilaus' victories in Asia.

During five years the Spartans maintained, in the Cadmea at Thebes, a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Protected by such a body of foreign troops, which might be reinforced on the shortest warning, the partisans of aristocracy acquired an absolute ascendancy in the affairs of the republic, which they conducted in such a manner as best suited their own interest, and the convenience of Sparta. Without pretending to describe the banishments, confiscations, and murders of which they were guilty, it is sufficient for the purpose of general history to observe, that the miserable victims of their vengeance suffered similar calamities to those which afflicted Athens under the Thirty Tyrants. The severity of the government at length drove the Thebans to despair; and both the persecuted exiles abroad, and the oppressed subjects at home, prepared to embrace any measures, however daring and hazardous, which promised them a faint hope of relief.

Among the Theban fugitives, who had taken refuge in Athens, and whose persons were now loudly demanded by Sparta, was Pelopidas, the son of Hippocleus, a youth whose distinguished advantages might have justly rendered him an object of envy, before he was involved in the misfortunes of his country. He yielded to none in birth; he surpassed all in fortune; he excelled in the manly exercises so much esteemed by the Greeks, and was unrivalled in qualities still more estimable — generosity and courage. He had an hereditary attachment to the democratic form of policy; and, previous to the late melancholy revolution, he was marked out by his numerous friends and adherents as the person most worthy of administering the government. Pelopidas had often conferred with his fellow-sufferers at Athens about the means of returning to their country, and restoring the democracy; encouraging them by the example of the patriotic Thrasybulus, who, with a handful of men, had issued from Thebes, and effected a similar, but still more difficult, enterprise. While they secretly deliberated on this important object, Mellon, one of the exiles, introduced to their nocturnal assembly his friend Phyllidas, who had lately arrived from Thebes; a man whose enterprising activity, singular address, and crafty boldness, justly entitle him to the regard of history.

Phyllidas was strongly attached to the cause of the exiles; yet, by his insinuating complaisance, and officious servility, he had acquired the entire confidence of Leontiades, Archias, and the other magistrates, or rather tyrants, of the republic. In business and in pleasure, he rendered himself alike necessary to his masters; his diligence and abilities had procured him the important office of secretary to the council; and he had lately promised to Archias and Philip, the two most licentious of the tyrants, that he would give them an entertainment, during which they might enjoy the conversation

[379 B.C.]

and the persons of the finest women in Thebes. The day was appointed for this infamous rendezvous, which these magisterial debauchés awaited with the greatest impatience; and, in the interval, Phyllidas set out for Athens, on pretence of private business.

In Athens, the time and the means were adjusted for executing the conspiracy. A body of Theban exiles assembled in the Thriasian plain, on the frontier of Attica, where seven, or twelve, of the youngest and most enterprising, voluntarily offered themselves to enter the capital, and to co-operate with Phyllidas in the destruction of the magistrates. The distance between Thebes and Athens was about thirty-five miles. The conspirators had thirteen miles to march through a hostile territory. They disguised themselves in the garb of peasants, arrived at the city towards evening with nets and hunting poles, and passed the gates without suspicion. During that night, and the succeeding day, the house of Charon, a wealthy and respectable citizen, the friend of Phyllidas and a determined enemy of the aristocracy, afforded them a secure refuge till the favourable moment summoned them to action.

The important evening approached, when the artful secretary had prepared his long-expected entertainment in the treasury. Nothing had been omitted that could flatter the senses, and lull the activity of the mind in a dream of pleasure. But a secret and obscure rumour, which had spread in the city, hung, like a drawn dagger, over the voluptuous joys of the festivity. It had been darkly reported that some unknown strangers, supposed to be a party of the exiles, had been received into the house of Charon. All the address of Phyllidas could not divert the terror of his guests. They despatched one of their lictors or attendants to demand the immediate presence of Charon. The conspirators were already buckling on their armour, in hopes of being immediately summoned to execute their purpose.

But what was their astonishment and terror, when their host and protector was sternly ordered to appear before the magistrates! The most sanguine were persuaded that their design had become public, and that they must all miserably perish, without effecting anything worthy of their courage. After a moment of dreadful reflection, they exhorted Charon to obey the mandate without delay. But that firm and patriotic Theban first went to the apartment of his wife, took his infant son, an only child, and presented him to Pelopidas and Mellon, requesting



CHARON SUMMONED BEFORE THE MAGISTRATES

them to retain in their hands this dearest pledge of his fidelity. They unanimously declared their entire confidence in his honour, and entreated him to remove from danger a helpless infant, who might become, in some future time, the avenger of his country's wrongs. But Charon was inflexible, declaring, "that his son could never aspire to a happier fortune, than that of dying honourably with his father and friends."

So saying, he addressed a short prayer to the gods, embraced his associates, and departed. Before he arrived at the treasury, he was met by Archias and Phyllidas. The former asked him, in the presence of the other magistrates, whose anxiety had brought them from table, "Who are those strangers said to have arrived the other day, and to be now entertained in your family?" Charon had composed his countenance so artfully, and retorted the question with such well-dissembled surprise, as considerably quieted the solicitude of the tyrants, which was totally removed by a whisper of Phyllidas, "that the absurd rumour had doubtless been spread for no other purpose but that of disturbing their pleasures."

They had scarcely returned to the banquet, when Fortune, as if she had taken pleasure to confound the dexterity of Phyllidas, raised up a new and most alarming danger. A courier arrived from Athens with every mark of haste and trepidation, desiring to see Archias, to whom he delivered a letter from an Athenian magistrate of the same name, his ancient friend and guest. This letter revealed the conspiracy; a secret not entrusted to the messenger, who had orders, however, to request Archias to read the despatch immediately, as containing matters of the utmost importance. But that careless voluptuary, whose thoughts were totally absorbed in the expected scene of pleasure, replied with a smile, "Business to-morrow;" deposited the letter under the pillow of the couch, on which, according to ancient custom, he lay at the entertainment; and resumed his conversation with Phyllidas.

Matters were now come to a crisis; Phyllidas retired for a moment; the conspirators were put in motion; their weapons concealed under the flowing swell of female attire, and their countenances overshadowed and hid by a load of crowns and garlands. In this disguise they were presented to the magistrates intoxicated with wine and folly. At a given signal they drew their daggers, and effected their purpose. Charon and Mellon were the principal actors in this bloody scene, which was entirely directed by Phyllidas. But a more difficult task remained. Leontiades, with other abettors of the tyranny, still lived, to avenge the murder of their associates. The conspirators, encouraged by their first success, and conducted by Phyllidas, gained admission into their houses successively, by means of the unsuspected secretary. On the appearance of disorder and tumult, Leontiades seized his sword, and boldly prepared for his defence. Pelopidas had the merit of destroying the principal author of the Theban servitude and disgrace. His associates perished without resistance; men whose names may be consigned to just oblivion, since they were distinguished by nothing memorable but their cruel and oppressive tyranny.

The measures of the conspirators were equally vigorous and prudent. Before alarming the city, they proceeded to the different prisons, which were crowded with the unfortunate victims of arbitrary power. Every door was open to Phyllidas. The captives, transported with joy and gratitude, increased the strength of their deliverers. They broke open the arsenals, and provided themselves with arms. The streets of Thebes now resounded with alarm and terror; every house and family were filled with confusion and uproar; the inhabitants were universally in motion; some providing lights,

[379 B.C.]

others running in wild disorder to the public places, and all anxiously wishing the return of day, that they might discover the unknown cause of this nocturnal tumult.

During a moment of dreadful silence, which interrupted the noise of sedition, a herald proclaimed, with a clear and loud voice, the death of the tyrants, and summoned to arms the friends of liberty and the republic. Among others who obeyed the welcome invitation was Epaminondas, the son of Polymnis, a youth of the most illustrious merit: who united the wisdom of the sage and the magnanimity of the hero, with the practice of every mild and gentle virtue; unrivalled in knowledge and in eloquence; in birth, valour, and patriotism, not inferior to Pelopidas, with whom he had contracted an early friendship. The principles of the Pythagorean philosophy, which he had diligently studied under Lysis of Tarentum, rendered Epaminondas averse to engage in the conspiracy, lest he might imbrue his hands in civil blood. But when the sword was once drawn, he appeared with ardour in defence of his friends and country; and his example was followed by many brave and generous youths who had reluctantly endured the double yoke of domestic and foreign tyranny.

The approach of morning had brought the Theban exiles, in arms, from the Thriasian plain. The partisans of the conspirators were continually increased by a confluence of new auxiliaries from every quarter of the city. Encompassed by such an invincible band of adherents, Pelopidas and his associates proceeded to the market-place; summoned a general assembly of the people; explained the necessity, the object, and the extent of the conspiracy; and, with the universal approbation of their fellow-citizens, restored the democratic form of government.

Exploits of valour and intrepidity may be discovered in the history of every nation. But the revolution of Thebes displayed not less wisdom of design, than enterprising gallantry in execution. Amidst the tumult of action, and ardour of victory, the conspirators possessed sufficient coolness and foresight to reflect that the Cadmea, or citadel, which was held by a Lacedæmonian garrison of fifteen hundred men, would be reinforced, on the first intelligence of danger, by the resentful activity of Sparta. To anticipate this alarming event, which must have rendered the consequences of the conspiracy incomplete and precarious, they commanded the messenger, whom, immediately after the destruction of the tyrants, they had despatched to their friends in the Thriasian plain, to proceed to Athens, in order to communicate the news of a revolution which could not fail to be highly agreeable to that state, and to solicit the immediate assistance of the Athenians, whose superior skill in attacking fortified places was acknowledged by Greeks and barbarians. This message was attended with the most salutary effects. The acute discernment of the Athenians eagerly seized the precious opportunity of weakening Sparta, which, if once neglected, might never return. Several thousand men were ordered to march; and no time was lost, either in the preparation, or in the journey, since they reached Thebes the day after Pelopidas had re-established the democracy.

The seasonable arrival of those auxiliaries, whose celerity exceeded the most sanguine hopes of the Thebans, increased the ardour of the latter to attack the citadel. The events of the siege are variously related. According to the most probable account, the garrison made a very feeble resistance, being intimidated by the impetuous alacrity and enthusiasm, as well as the increasing number of the assailants, who already amounted to fourteen thousand men, and received continual accessions of strength from the neighbouring

cities of Bœotia. Only a few days had elapsed, when the Lacedæmonians desired to capitulate, on condition of being allowed to depart in safety with their arms. Their proposal was readily accepted; but they seem not to have demanded, or at least not to have obtained, any terms of advantage or security for those unfortunate Thebans whose attachment to the Spartan interest strongly solicited their protection. At the first alarm of sedition, these unhappy men, with their wives and families, had taken refuge in the citadel. The greater part of them cruelly perished by the resentment of their countrymen; a remnant only was saved by the humane interposition of the Athenians. So justly had Epaminondas suspected, that the revolution could not be accomplished without the effusion of civil blood.

THE SECOND ATHENIAN LEAGUE

Politics makes strange bedfellows. The petty jealousies of the little Grecian townships, called countries, were as important and as bitter to them as the feuds of empires. Yet, of course, when any two of them fell by the ears they were always ready to accept aid from the bystanding communities, on whatsoever terms they may have recently been. We are now to see a stranger sight than the union of Athens and Sparta, and that is the re-alliance of the polished and haughty Athenians with the citizens of Thebes, although to the Attic mind the very word "Bœotian" had been from time immemorial a synonym for "swine," a by-word of treachery, of Asiatic sympathy, and of backwoods uncouthness.

The immediate effect of the theatrical revolution at Thebes was the death of three of the leading generals concerned. Sparta in disgust executed two of the defeated harmosts with short shrift of trial. The Athenians put to death one of the generals who had gone to the relief of the Thebans, and outlawed the other. They were not yet ready to take a step in renewal of the ancient wars with Sparta. The Thebans felt themselves now quite left at the mercy of the Lacedæmonians, and, indeed, it was only a Spartan who could seemingly have been of aid to them. Sphodrias, a harmost of Thespiæ, was hot-headed enough to dream of taking Athens unawares and seizing the Piræus. He was so slow on the march, however, that daylight found him only at Eleusis. Thereupon, his surprise failing, he retreated, ravaging the country through which he passed. Athens had shown her purpose to keep the peace with Sparta by her punishment of the rash officers who had gone to the relief of Thebes, and yet here was a Spartan general marching against Athens and playing havoc in the vicinity. A prompt disavowal on the part of Sparta was demanded, with the execution of Sphodrias. Sphodrias did not dare return to Sparta for trial, feeling that his doom was certain. And so it would have been had it not been for the influence of Agesilaus who was notably a tender-hearted man and could not resist the pleadings of his son who was on terms of Grecian intimacy with the son of Sphodrias. Acquittal followed, and Athens could not but feel herself insulted and forced into an open declaration for Thebes. War broke out and was busy for six years. It took the form, as usual, of a war between two leagues.

Sparta felt called upon to deal gently with her remaining confederates after she saw Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Mytilene revolt at once to Athens. Sparta divided her league into ten classes: herself the first, the Arcadian states second and third, Elis the fourth, the Achæans the fifth, Corinth and Megara the sixth, Sicyon, Phlius, and the towns of the Argolic

[379-378 B.C.]

Acte the seventh, the Acarnanians the eighth, the Phocians and Locrians the ninth, Olynthus and the other cities on the coast of Thrace the tenth.

To Athens it seemed as if destiny had forced her once more to the forefront of a league against Sparta, a league which should bring her back to her old-time mastery of the seas. This league, which is called by Busolt and others the second Athenian league, is called the third by Beloch,² who writes of it as follows :

"Meanwhile Athens had striven with zeal to erect again the twice-lost lordship of the seas. Immediately after the King's Peace the alliance with Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, and Byzantium was renewed : Rhodes also entered into treaty with Athens, as her Asia Minor league had gone to pieces at the death of Glos, about 379. The effort to resume the old relations with the Chalcidians in Thrace had been quickly foiled by the Spartan intervention ; but instead, as we have seen, Thebes had entered into alliance with Athens in the spring of 378. And now, after the breach with Sparta was definite, Athens lifted up to all Hellenes and barbarians, where they were not under Persian rule, the summons to band together in a league against the encroachment of Sparta. The provisions of the King's Peace should fashion the ground plan. The autonomy of all the states party to it was guaranteed ; the Persian king was to be recognised as lord of the continent of Asia : Athens renounced all claims on her old colonial possessions and for the future the acquisition of houses and lands anywhere in the confederacy should be forbidden to the Athenians. For the administration of affairs a congress (*syndrion*) was established which sat in Athens, and in which delegates from all the allied states had place and vote ; but Athens herself none. For the passing of measures, the consent of both the chief city [Athens] and of the syndrion was necessary. The funds for the fleet of the league were defrayed through contributions (*syntaxis*) whose amount the syndrion would fix according to current needs. The management of this fund and the leadership in war belonged to Athens.

"Athens made heavy sacrifices to lay the foundation for the erection of this new league. It was a complete breach with her political practices down to the King's Peace, a final renunciation of the re-establishment of the empire in its old form, as she had planned since Thrasybulus. And more than that : thousands of Athenian citizens lost their last hope of regaining the property outside Attica, which their fathers had lost through the catastrophe of the year 404. But these sacrifices were not made in vain. The states of Eubœa came at once into the new league, except Oreus, which was held by a Spartan garrison ; also the northern Sporades, Peparethus, Sciathus and Ieus ; Tenedos at the mouth of the Hellespont, Perinthus and Maronea in Thrace ; Paros and other neighbouring isles. Moreover, the previous confederates of Athens, Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Byzantium, Rhodes, and Thebes came back.

"Thus at one blow Athens was again the ruling power in the Ægean Sea ; she could now take again in hand the trusteeship of the temple of Delos, which she had lost for some years.

"At the same time the reorganisation of the Attic marine was begun. That was strongly needful : since in the Corinthian War the material had been rendered largely useless, and efforts at its repair had been very insufficiently made. There existed well over one hundred triremes, but most of them old and hardly seaworthy. The building of a great number of new battleships was begun and pushed so skilfully that after the lapse of twenty years (357-6) an array of 289 triremes remained in spite of the great

demands made on the Attic fleet. To cover these expenses and for the payment of the costs of the war an extraordinary tax was levied on the property in Attica."

Thus we find Athens again with an array of allies behind her. She no longer has the prestige of old. The moneys that they entrust to her are contributions (*syntaxeis*), and no longer tribute (*phoros*). So jealous are they, indeed, of Athenian ambition that no citizen of Athens may even acquire property among the allies. The very tablet on which this treaty was carved is still in existence, though broken in a score of fragments. The chief purpose of the league is, it states, to be one of defence, a combination "to compel the Spartans to leave the Greeks in peace and freedom with unviolated lands." The chief agents in the organisation of this confederacy and in the proselyting of allies were the brilliant orator Callistratus, who has been called the Aristides of the second confederacy, and the shrewd generals, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, the worthy son of the great admiral, Conon. The chief fault with the confederacy was that it bound Athens into an unnatural alliance with Thebes, its inveterate enemy, who could serve little further purpose than that of a ladder to be discarded as soon as it had been climbed over. The war, therefore, becomes mainly a war between Sparta and Athens, in which, as Holm^b notes, "Athens played always the rôle of the spectator who sits quiet, saving his strength in order to act as peace-maker over both the antagonists."

Thebes took up the war with a blazing enthusiasm. She had for a controlling spirit the coming man Epaminondas, a military genius of the very first rank, a gifted musician, a philosopher, and an orator. He had the rare qualities of modesty, of pure patriotism, of indifference to money and to partisanship. Allied with him was Pelopidas, who was in command of a new organisation which stood some chance of meeting the famous Spartan hoplite in equal combat. This *Hieros Lochos*, or Sacred Band of sworn friends, was a curious body of three hundred young men fighting in couples and bound together by Grecian ideas of friendship. They were trained to a high degree of gymnastic strength, and while chosen at first merely to serve as front-rank men, later came to be employed as a separate regiment of irresistible momentum in a charge.

Before they had learned the power of this troop the Thebans dug a ditch and built a rampart around the most fertile part of their territory against the invasions of the Spartans. Soon after the revolt of the city, in 378 B.C., the Spartan king Cleombrotus had raided the land, but without result. Later came King Agesilaus for two expeditions, equally fruitless, except for pillage. The Spartan Phœbidas made an inroad in 377 and was killed in a disastrous defeat. To relieve a famine due to the destruction of two harvests, the Thebans sent for two galleys of corn which the Spartan Alcetas captured, putting the crews in prison in the citadel in Oreus in Eubœa. The prisoners captured the fortress and took possession of the town, which now joined the league with Athens. In 376, Agesilaus, who was ill from the bursting of a blood-vessel, on his previous campaign, was compelled to keep his room, and the Spartans sent an army under Cleombrotus, who was repulsed at the passes of Cithæron. The Spartans now sent a fleet to cut off the corn supplies of Athens and put her port under blockade.

Athens, once more able to take the sea, fitted a fleet of eighty galleys which she entrusted to Chabrias. In order to decoy the Spartan fleet under Pollis away from the Piræus, he laid siege to Naxos which was wavering towards the Athenian confederacy. Pollis accepted the challenge, and,


[376-374 B.C.]

though he had only sixty galleys, gave battle between Paros and Naxos. It was a hard fight and the Spartans seem to have lost all their ships except eleven, and these would have been destroyed, says Diodorus, had it not been for the fate of the commanders in the battle of Arginusæ, who, as will be remembered, were in such haste to pursue the defeated enemy that they did not stop to pick up their own wounded and dead on the sinking wrecks of their own fleet. They had been put to death in their hour of triumph, and the lesson was not forgotten by Chabrias in his victory thirty years later.

The glory of Naxos, however, was sufficient. And while it was not so momentous a success as Conon's at the battle of Cnidus, it was more savoury to the Athenians, because it had been won by a fleet not of Asiatics merely commanded by an Athenian, but altogether by Athenian ships and men. In this battle the command of the left wing was given to Phocion, who looms large in later Athenian history. This success at Naxos in the year 376 relieved Athens of famine, re-established her prestige on the sea, and brought seventeen new cities around the Ægean Sea into the confederacy, together with a large contribution. In the same year the Athenians also punished an insurrection at Delos where the renewal of her authority was not entirely welcome. Preparations were now made for a circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus with a fleet under Pinotenus. In 375 he sailed and brought over to the Athenian alliance the islands of Corcyra and Cephallenia, a part of Acarnania, and the king of the Molossians. At Alyzia, Timotheus with his sixty galleys was attacked by the Spartan Nicolochus, with fifty-five galleys. The Athenian won this encounter, but declined a later challenge, and increased his fleet to seventy sail.

The expedition had succeeded in the purpose that had led the Thebans to suggest it, that is, it had prevented Sparta from making her usual incursion into Bœotia. Athens, however, found the fleet a very heavy and irksome expense, and each captain of a trireme was compelled to advance £28 or \$140 towards the payment of his crew. The Athenians now suggested that the Thebans make some payment towards the cost of an expedition which had been of such economy to them; but they declined the opportunity, and Athens, in a not unnatural pique, turned towards Sparta. In 374 a peace was agreed to, but was broken at once owing to the fact that Timotheus interfered at Zacynthus and brought down the wrath of Sparta. So the war went on.

Meanwhile, the year before, the Thebans had been active and growingly successful. They turned against three near-by cities in Bœotia which were old victims of Thebes and had been granted independence under the Peace of Antalcidas. These towns were Platea, Thespie, and Orchomenos. They hated Thebes from bitter memories of former oppressions and held out



GREEK WARRIOR IN TRAVELLING
COSTUME
(After Hope)

against her increasing presumption, although other Bœotian towns were brought into the league, and although they were themselves heavily assailed. It was 372 before Plataea was taken by surprise and all the inhabitants driven out of it. They took refuge in Athens, whose friendship for Plataea was of old times. Thebes also compelled Thespiæ to tear down her fortifications. These things only revived in Athens the ancient abhorrence of Thebes, but they fed the insolence of the Bœotians. It was probably in 375 B.C., that Pelopidas, at the head of his Sacred Band, unexpectedly fell in with two Spartan moras, each of them equal alone to his three hundred, and each under command of a polemarch. One of his men came flying to Pelopidas, exclaiming:

“We have fallen into the midst of the enemy.”

“Why not they into the midst of us?” answered Pelopidas. And at once he charged home.

The first onset killed the two Spartan leaders. This threw the two moras into confusion, and Pelopidas, after cutting his way through, instead of retiring, turned and successfully routed each of the moras. So far as the number engaged is concerned, it was hardly more than a serious riot, but, as we have seen before, any blow at the prestige of the Spartan soldier made all Greeks shudder, and here was a new organisation or club from the unheroic city of Thebes destroying a Spartan force of twice its strength. This was a further blow to Spartan pride and new fuel for the increase of Theban self-confidence. In 374 an expedition against Phocis was checked by Spartan troops under Cleombrotus, but about this time the Athenians seem to have regained Oropus, which the Spartans had captured in 411. This year also Lacedæmonian pride was more deeply humbled before Coreyra.^a Of this let Xenophon tell.

CORCYRA

The Lacedæmonians preparing again to send out a fleet, collected vessels to the number of sixty from Lacedæmon itself, from Corinth, Leucas, Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermion, and the Haliæns. Appointing Mnasippus admiral, they instructed him to attend to affairs in that sea in general, and to make an attempt upon Coreyra. They sent also to Dionysius, representing that it was for his interest that Coreyra should not be in the power of the Athenians.

Mnasippus, when his fleet was collected, set sail for Coreyra. He had with him, in addition to the troops from Lacedæmon, a body of mercenaries to the amount of not less than fifteen hundred. When he landed on the island, he at once became master of it, and laid waste the country, which was excellently cultivated and planted, and exhibited, throughout the fields, fine houses and well-constructed wine-vaults; so that the soldiers, they said, arrived at such a height of luxury, that they would drink no wine but such as was of a fragrant odour. Slaves and cattle in great numbers were carried off from the fields. At length he encamped with his land-forces on a hill, distant about five stadia from the city, and overlooking the country, so that if any of the Coreyraeans should come out into the fields, he might cut off their retreat; his ships he stationed on the opposite side of the city, at a point where he thought that they would observe and stop whatever vessels might approach the coast. In addition to these arrangements, he anchored galleys, when foul weather did not prevent, in front of the harbour. Thus he kept the city in a state of blockade.

[374-373 B.C.]

As the Corcyræans, in consequence, could get no supplies from their grounds, since they were overpowered by land, while nothing could be brought them by sea, because they were inferior in naval force, they suffered greatly from want of provisions, and, sending to the Athenians, entreated aid of them, and represented that "they would lose a very valuable possession if they should be deprived of Corcyra, and would greatly increase at the same time, the strength of their enemies; since from no state in Greece, except Athens, could more ships or money be raised;" they added, also, that "the island of Corcyra was favourably situated with regard to the Gulf of Corinth, and the cities lying upon it, and favourably, too, for ravaging the territory of Laconia, but most favourably of all with reference to the opposite continent, and the passage from Sicily to the Peloponnesus." The Athenians, on hearing these representations, were of opinion that they must pay careful attention to the matter, and sent out Stesicles, as general, with six hundred peltasts, requesting Alcetas to assist in conveying them over the water. These troops were accordingly landed on the coast by night, and made their way into the city of Corcyra.

The Athenians also resolved to fit out sixty additional ships, and elected Timotheus as commander of them. Timotheus, not being able to man these vessels at home, sailed about to the different islands, and endeavoured to complete his crews from thence; thinking it would be no light matter to sail round without due preparation against ships so well disciplined as those of the enemy. But the Athenians, imagining that he was wasting the whole of the season suitable for the expedition, had no patience with him, and, depriving him of his command, appointed Iphicrates in his room. Iphicrates, as soon as he was made commander, manned his vessels with the utmost expedition, and obliged the trierarchs to exert themselves. He took from the Athenians, also, whatever ships were on the coast of Attica, as well as the Paralus and Salaminian ships, observing that "if affairs at Corcyra were successful, he would send them back plenty of ships." His fleet amounted in all to about seventy.

During this time the people of Corcyra were so grievously oppressed with famine, that, in consequence of the number of deserters, Mnasippus made proclamation that "all deserters for the future should be sold as slaves." But when they continued to desert nevertheless, he at last scourged them, and sent them back. The people in the city, however, refused to receive any slaves into the town, and many, in consequence, perished without the walls. Mnasippus, observing this, imagined that he was all but in possession of the city, and began to make new arrangements as to his mercenaries, some of whom he dismissed from his service, while to those who remained he continued in debt two months' pay, though not, as it was said, for want of money, for the greater number of the towns, in consequence of the expedition being over the sea, had sent him money instead of men. But as the people in the city observed from their towers that the lines of the enemy were guarded with less strictness than before, and that the men were straggling over the country, they made a sally upon them, and took some of them prisoners and killed some.

Mnasippus, perceiving what had happened, armed himself, and hastened, with all the heavy-armed troops that he had, to the succour of his men, ordering also the captains and centurions to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the captains observing that "it was not easy for those to have their men obedient who gave them no subsistence," he struck one of them with his staff, and another with the handle of his spear. Thus they all came out without

spirit, and with feelings of hatred towards their general; a state of mind by no means favourable for fighting. However, when he had drawn up his force, he put to flight those of the enemy that were near the gates of the city, and pressed forward in pursuit of them; but the pursued, when they were close to the wall, faced about, and hurled stones and darts at him from the tombs; while others, sallying forth from the other gates, fell, in a dense body, upon the extremity of his line. Mnasippus' men there, being formed but eight deep, and thinking their wing too weak, endeavoured to wheel round, but when they began to withdraw from their position, the enemy rushed upon them as if they were going to flee, when they themselves no longer attempted to turn, and those that were nearest to them took to flight. Mnasippus, at the same time, was unable to support the party that were in difficulties, as the enemy were pressing upon him in front, and he was continually left with fewer and fewer men. At last the enemy, collecting in a body, made a general attack upon those remaining with Mnasippus, now reduced to a very small number indeed; while the people from the city, observing how things stood, sallied forth, and, after killing Mnasippus, joined in a general pursuit. The pursuers would probably have taken the camp and entrenchment, had they not observed the crowd in the market, and that of the servants and slaves, and, imagining it an efficient body of defenders, retraced their steps. The Coreyræans however erected a trophy, and restored the dead under a truce.

After this affair, the people in the city grew bolder, while those without were in extreme dejection; for it was said that Iphicrates was almost at hand; and the Coreyræans actually proceeded to fit out their vessels. But Hypermenes, who had been second in command to Mnasippus, manned all the Lacedæmonian ships that were there, and, sailing round to the encampment, loaded them every one with slaves and other effects, and sent them off. He himself, with the marines, and such of the other soldiers as survived, stayed to guard the entrenchment; but at last these also got on board in the utmost disorder and sailed away, leaving behind them a great quantity of corn and wine, and a number of slaves and sick persons; for they were extremely afraid that they would be surprised in the island by the Athenians. However, they arrived in safety at Leucas.

Iphicrates, as soon as he commenced his voyage, continued, while he pursued his way, to prepare everything necessary for an engagement. He left his large sails at home at starting, as standing out for a battle, and of his other sails, even if the wind was favourable, he made little use; but, making his passage with the oar, caused his men, by that means, to keep themselves in better condition, and his ships to pursue their course better. Frequently, too, wherever the crews were going to dine or sup, he would draw off one extremity of the fleet to a distance from the land over against the place, and, when he had turned about, and ranged his vessels in a line with their prows towards it, would start them, at a signal, to race against each other to the shore; when it was a great advantage for such as could first take their water, and whatever else they needed, and first finish their meal; while, to such as came last, it was a great punishment to have the disadvantage in all these respects, since they were all obliged to put out to sea again when he gave the signal; for it was the fortune of those that landed first to do everything at their leisure, but of those that were last, to do all with hurry.

If he landed to take a meal in the enemy's country, he not only posted sentinels, as was proper, on the shore, but also, raising the masts in his ships, kept a lookout from thence. The men stationed on the masts, indeed, saw

[373 B.C.]


much farther than those on the level ground, as they looked down from a higher position. Wherever he supped or slept, he kindled no fire in the camp at night, but kept a light burning in front of the encampment, that no one might approach undiscovered. Often, moreover, if the weather was calm, he would resume his voyage as soon as supper was over; and, if a breeze propelled the vessels, the men reposed as they ran on, but, if it was necessary to use the oar, he made them take rest by turns. In his course by day, he would sometimes, at given signals, lead his ships in a line behind one another, and sometimes in a body side by side; so that, while they pursued their voyage, they practised and acquired whatever was necessary for naval warfare, and thus arrived at the sea which they believed to be occupied by the enemy. They dined and supped, for the most part, on the enemy's territory; but, as they did nothing more there than what was necessary, Iphicrates escaped all attacks by the suddenness with which he resumed his voyage, which he soon accomplished. About the time of Mnasippus' death he was at the Sphagiae in Laconia. Advancing thence to the coast of Elis, and sailing past the mouth of the Alpheus, he came to anchor at the promontory called Iethys. Next day he proceeded from thence to Cephallenia, with his fleet so arranged, and keeping his course in such a manner, that he could, if it should be requisite, get everything needful ready for battle, and engage at once; for as to the fate of Mnasippus, he had heard no account from any eye-witness, and suspected that it might be a report intended to deceive him, and accordingly kept upon his guard. But when he arrived at Cephallenia, he received a full statement of facts, and stopped there to refresh his men.

Having reduced the towns in Cephallenia, he sailed off to Coreyra. Here the first intelligence he received was, that ten galleys were coming from Dionysius to reinforce the Lacedaemonians; and going in person therefore along the coast, and considering from what points it was possible to descry those vessels approaching, and for people making signals to render them visible at the city, he posted sentinels in those places, arranging with them what signals they should give when the enemy sailed up and cast anchor. He then selected twenty of his own captains, who were to be ready to follow him whenever he should send a messenger to them, and gave them notice, that, if any one of them should not follow him, he must not complain of any penalty imposed upon him. As soon as these ships, then, were signalled as approaching, and messengers were sent to the captains, their haste was deserving of admiration; for there was no one, of those that were going to sail, that did not embark with the utmost speed. Standing away to the point where the ships of the enemy were, he found that the men from the rest of them were gone ashore, but that Melanippus, a Rhodian captain, was exhorting the other commanders not to stay there, and, embarking his own crew, was sailing off. Melanippus, in consequence, though he met with the ships of Iphicrates, nevertheless escaped, but all the ships from Syracuse were captured, with their crews. Iphicrates, cutting off the beaks of the vessels, brought them in tow into the harbour of Coreyra, and settled a fixed sum for each of the prisoners to pay for his ransom, except Crinippus, the chief captain, whom he kept under guard, as if he would exact a vast sum from him, or sell him as a slave. He however died, through grief, by his own hands. The other prisoners Iphicrates discharged, taking security from the Coreyræans for the payment of their ransom.

He maintained his sailors, chiefly, by employing them in agriculture in the service of the Coreyræans. With the peltasts, and the heavy-armed

men from the fleet, he passed over to Acarnania, where he afforded aid to the friendly towns, if any required it, and made war upon the Thyreans, a people of great bravery, and occupying a strongly fortified place. Afterwards, fetching the fleet from Coreyra, consisting now of about ninety ships, he proceeded first to Cephallenia and raised contributions there, as well from people that were willing to give them, as from those that were unwilling. He then prepared to commit depredations on the territories of the Lacedæmonians; and, of the cities in those parts attached to the enemy, to receive into alliance such as were willing to join him, and to make war on such as rejected his advances.^c

THE TRIAL OF TIMOTHEUS



GREEK HERALD

The happy result of the Coreyræan expedition, imparting universal satisfaction at Athens; was not less beneficial to Timotheus than to Iphicrates. It was in November 373 B.C., that the former, as well as his quæstor or military treasurer, Antimachus, underwent each his trial. Callistratus, having returned home, pleaded against the quæstor, perhaps against Timotheus also, as one of the accusers; though probably in a spirit of greater gentleness and moderation, in consequence

of his recent joint success and of the general good temper prevalent in the city. And while the edge of the accusation against Timotheus was thus blunted, the defence was strengthened not merely by numerous citizen friends speaking in his favour with increased confidence, but also by the unusual phenomenon of two powerful foreign supporters. At the request of Timotheus, both Alcetas of Epirus, and Jason of Pheræ, came to Athens a little before the trial, to appear as witnesses in his favour. They were received and lodged by him in his house in the Hippodamian Agora, the principal square of the Piræus. And as he was then in some embarrassment for want of money, he found it necessary to borrow various articles of finery in order to do them honour — clothes, bedding, and two silver drinking-bowls — from Pasion, a wealthy banker near at hand. These two important witnesses would depose to the zealous service and estimable qualities of Timotheus; who

had inspired them with warm interest, and had been the means of bringing them into alliance with Athens; an alliance, which they had sealed at once by conveying Stesicles and his division across Thessaly and Epirus to Coreyra. The minds of the dicastery would be powerfully affected by seeing before them such a man as Jason of Pheræ, at that moment the most powerful individual in Greece; and we are not surprised to learn that Timotheus was acquitted. Although he was now acquitted, his reputation suffered so much by the whole affair, that in the ensuing spring he was glad to accept an invitation of the Persian satraps, who offered him the command of the

[378-373 B.C.]

Grecian mercenaries in their service for the Egyptian war; the same command from which Iphicrates had retired a little time before.

That admiral, whose naval force had been reinforced by a large number of Coreyraan triremes, was committing without opposition incursions against Acarnania, and the western coast of Peloponnesus; insomuch that the expelled Messenians, in their distant exile at Hesperides in Libya, began to conceive hopes of being restored by Athens to Naupactus, which they had occupied under her protection during the Peloponnesian War. And while the Athenians were thus masters at sea both east and west of Peloponnesus, Sparta and her confederates, discouraged by the ruinous failure of their expedition against Coreyra in the preceding year, appear to have remained inactive. With such mental predispositions, they were powerfully affected by religious alarm arising from certain frightful earthquakes and inundations with which Peloponnesus was visited during this year, and which were regarded as marks of the wrath of the god Poseidon. More of these formidable visitations occurred this year in Peloponnesus than had ever before been known; especially one, the worst of all, whereby the two towns of Helice and Bura in Achaia were destroyed, together with a large portion of their population. Ten Lacedæmonian triremes, which happened to be moored on this shore on the night when the calamity occurred, were destroyed by the rush of the waters.

Under these depressing circumstances, the Lacedæmonians had recourse to the same manœuvre which had so well served their purpose fifteen years before, in 388-387 B.C. They sent Antalcidas again as envoy to Persia, to entreat both pecuniary aid and a fresh Persian intervention enforcing anew the peace which bore his name; which peace had now been infringed (according to Lacedæmonian construction) by the reconstitution of the Bœotian confederacy under Thebes as president. And it appears that in the course of the autumn or winter, Persian envoys actually did come to Greece, requiring that the belligerents should all desist from war, and wind up their dissensions on the principles of the Peace of Antalcidas. The Persian satraps, at this time renewing their efforts against Egypt, were anxious for the cessation of hostilities in Greece, as a means of enlarging their numbers of Grecian mercenaries; of which troops Timotheus had left Athens a few months before to take the command.

Apart, however, from this prospect of Persian intervention, which doubtless was not without effect, Athens herself was becoming more and more disposed towards peace. That common fear and hatred of the Lacedæmonians, which had brought her into alliance with Thebes in 378 B.C., was now no longer predominant. She was actually at the head of a considerable maritime confederacy; and this she could hardly hope to increase by continuing the war, since the Lacedæmonian naval power had already been humbled. Moreover, the Athenians had become more and more alienated from Thebes. The ancient antipathy between these two neighbours had for a time been overlaid by common fear of Sparta. But as soon as Thebes had re-established her authority in Bœotia, the jealousies of Athens again began to arise.

During the last three or four years, Platæa, like the other towns of Bœotia, had been again brought into the confederacy under Thebes. Re-established by Sparta after the Peace of Antalcidas as a so-called autonomous town, it had been garrisoned by her as a post against Thebes, and was no longer able to maintain a real autonomy after the Spartans had been excluded from Bœotia in 376 B.C. While other Bœotian cities were glad to

find themselves emancipated from their philo-Laconian oligarchies and rejoined to the federation under Thebes, Plataea — as well as Thespiæ — submitted to the union only by constraint; awaiting any favourable opportunity for breaking off, either by means of Sparta or of Athens. Aware probably of the growing coldness between the Athenians and Thebans, the Plataeans were secretly trying to persuade Athens to accept and occupy their town, annexing Plataea to Attica; a project hazardous both to Thebes and Athens, since it would place them at open war with each other, while neither was yet at peace with Sparta.

This intrigue, coming to the knowledge of the Thebans, determined them to strike a decisive blow. The *boetarch* Neocles conducted a Theban armed force immediately from the assembly, by a circuitous route through Hysiae to Plataea; which town he found deserted by most of its male adults and unable to make resistance. The Plataeans — dispersed in the fields, finding their walls, their wives, and their families, all in possession of the victor — were under the necessity of accepting the terms proposed to them. They were allowed to depart in safety and to carry away all their movable property; but their town was destroyed and its territory again annexed to Thebes. The unhappy fugitives were constrained for the second time to seek refuge at Athens, where they were again kindly received, and restored to the same qualified right of citizenship as they had enjoyed prior to the Peace of Antalcidas.

It was not merely with Plataea, but also with Thespiæ, that Thebes was now meddling. Mistrusting the dispositions of the Thespians, she constrained them to demolish the fortifications of their town; as she had caused to be done fifty-two years before, after the victory of Delium, on suspicion of leanings favourable to Athens. Such proceedings on the part of the Thebans in *Boetia* excited strong emotion at Athens, where the Plataeans not only appeared as suppliants, with the tokens of misery conspicuously displayed, but also laid their case pathetically before the assembly, and invoked aid to regain their town, of which they had been just bereft. On a question at once so touching and so full of political consequences, many speeches were doubtless composed and delivered, one of which has fortunately reached us; composed by Isocrates, and perhaps actually delivered by a Plataean speaker before the public assembly. The hard fate of this interesting little community is here impressively set forth, including the bitterest reproaches, stated with not a little of rhetorical exaggeration, against the multiplied wrongs done by Thebes, as well towards Athens as towards Plataea.

The resolution was at length taken — first by Athens, and next, probably, by the majority of the confederates assembled at Athens — to make propositions of peace to Sparta, where it was well known that similar dispositions prevailed towards peace. Notice of this intention was given to the Thebans, who were moreover invited to send envoys to the Lacedæmonian capital, if they chose to become parties.

In the spring of 371 B.C., at the time when the members of the Lacedæmonian confederacy were assembled at Sparta, both the Athenian and Theban envoys, and those from the various members of the Athenian confederacy, arrived there. Among the Athenian envoys, two at least — Callias (the hereditary *daduch* or torchbearer of the Eleusinian ceremonies) and Autocles — were men of great family at Athens; and they were accompanied by Callistratus, the orator. From the Thebans, the only man of note was Epaminondas, then one of the *Boetarchs*.

[371 B.C.]

THE CONGRESS AT SPARTA



GREEK JAR
(In the British Museum)

Of the debates which took place at this important congress, we have very imperfect knowledge; and of the more private diplomatic conversations, not less important than the debates, we have no knowledge at all. Xenophon gives us a speech from each of the three Athenians, and from no one else. That of Callias, who announces himself as hereditary proxenus of Sparta at Athens, is boastful and empty, but eminently philo-Laconian in spirit; that of Autocles is in the opposite tone, full of severe censure on the past conduct of Sparta; that of Callistratus, delivered after the other two—while the enemies of Sparta were elate, her friends humiliated, and both parties silent, from the fresh effect of the reproaches of Autocles—is framed in a spirit of conciliation, admitting faults on both

sides, but deprecating the continuance of war, as injurious to both, and showing how much the joint interests of both pointed towards peace.

This orator, representing the Athenian diplomacy of the time, recognises distinctly the Peace of Antalcidas as the basis upon which Athens was prepared to treat, autonomy to each city, small as well as great: and in this way, coinciding with the views of the Persian king, he dismisses with indifference the menace that Antalcidas was on his way back from Persia with money to aid the Lacedæmonians in the war. Athens and Sparta were to become mutual partners and guarantees; dividing the headship of Greece by an ascertained line of demarcation, yet neither of them interfering with the principle of universal autonomy. Thebes, and her claim to the presidency of Bœotia, were thus to be set aside by mutual consent.

It was upon this basis that the peace was concluded. The armaments on both sides were to be disbanded; the harmosts and garrisons everywhere withdrawn, in order that each city might enjoy full autonomy. If any city should fail in observance of these conditions, and continue in a career of force against any other, all were at liberty to take arms for the support of the injured party; but no one who did not feel disposed, was bound so to take arms. This last stipulation exonerated the Lacedæmonian allies from one of their most vexatious chains.

To the conditions here mentioned, all parties agreed; and on the ensuing day, the oaths were exchanged. Sparta took the oath for herself and her allies; Athens took the oath for herself only—her allies afterwards took it severally, each city for itself. Why such difference was made, we are not told; for it would seem that the principle of severance applied to both confederacies alike. Next came the turn of the Thebans to swear; and here the fatal hitch was disclosed. Epaminondas, the Theban envoy, insisted on taking the oath, not for Thebes separately, but for Thebes as president of the Bœotian federation, including all the Bœotian cities. The Spartan authorities, on the other hand, and Agesilaus as the foremost of all, strenuously opposed him. They required that he should swear for Thebes alone, leaving the Bœotian cities to take the oath each for itself. Already in the course of the preliminary debates, Epaminondas had spoken out boldly against the

ascendency of Sparta. While most of the deputies stood overawed by her dignity, represented by the energetic Agesilaus as spokesman, he, like the Athenian Autocles, and with strong sympathy from many of the deputies present, had proclaimed that nothing kept alive the war except her unjust pretensions, and that no peace could be durable unless such pretensions were put aside. Accepting the conditions of peace as finally determined, he presented himself to swear to them in the name of the Bœotian federation. But Agesilaus, requiring that each of the Bœotian cities should take the oath for itself, appealed to those same principles of liberty which Epaminondas himself had just invoked, and asked him whether each of the Bœotian cities had not as good a title to autonomy as Thebes. Epaminondas might have replied by asking why Sparta had just been permitted to take the oath for her allies as well as for herself. But he took a higher ground. He contended that the presidency of Bœotia was held by Thebes on as good a title as the sovereignty of Laconia by Sparta. He would remind the assembly that when Bœotia was first conquered and settled by its present inhabitants, the other towns had all been planted out from Thebes as their chief and mother-city; that the federal union of all, administered by bœotarchs chosen by and from all, with Thebes as president, was coeval with the first settlement of the country; that the separate autonomy of each was qualified by an established institution, devolving on the bœotarchs and councils sitting at Thebes the management of the foreign relations of all jointly.

All this had been pleaded by the Theban orator before the five Spartan commissioners assembled to determine the fate of the captives after the surrender of Plataea; when he required the condemnation of the Platæans as guilty of treason to the ancestral institutions of Bœotia, and the Spartan commissioners had recognised the legitimacy of these institutions by a sweeping sentence of death against the transgressors. Moreover, at a time when the ascendency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities had been greatly impaired by her anti-Hellenic co-operation with the invading Persians, the Spartans themselves had assisted her with all their power to re-establish it, as a counter-vailing force against Athens. Epaminondas could show that the presidency of Thebes over the Bœotian cities was the keystone of the federation—a right not only of immemorial antiquity, but pointedly recognised and strenuously vindicated by the Spartans themselves. He could show further that it was as old, and as good, as their own right to govern the Laconian townships; which latter was acquired and held (as one of the best among their own warriors had boastfully proclaimed) by nothing but Spartan valour and the sharpness of the Spartan sword.

An emphatic speech of this tenor, delivered amidst the deputies assembled at Sparta, and arraighing the Spartans not merely in their supremacy over Greece, but even in their dominion at home, was as it were the shadow cast before by coming events. It opened a question such as no Greek had ever ventured to raise. It was a novelty startling to all—extravagant probably in the eyes of Callistratus and the Athenians, but to the Spartans themselves intolerably poignant and insulting. They had already a long account of antipathy to clear off with Thebes; their own wrong-doing in seizing the Cadmea; their subsequent humiliation in losing it and being unable to recover it; their recent short-comings and failures, in the last seven years of war against Athens and Thebes jointly. To aggravate this deep-seated train of hostile associations, their pride was now wounded at an unforeseen point, the tenderest of all. Agesilaus, full to overflowing of the national sentiment, which in the mind of a Spartan passed for the


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first of virtues, was stung to the quick. Had he been an Athenian orator like Callistratus, his wrath would have found vent in an animated harangue. But a king of Sparta was anxious only to close these offensive discussions with scornful abruptness, thus leaving to the presumptuous Theban no middle ground between humble retraction and acknowledged hostility. Indignantly starting from his seat, he said to Epaminondas: "Speak plainly,—will you, or will you not, leave to each of the Boeotian cities its separate autonomy?" To which the other replied, "Will you leave each of the Laconian towns autonomous?" Without saying another word, Agesilaus immediately caused the name of the Thebans to be struck out of the roll, and proclaimed them excluded from the treaty.

Such was the close of this memorable congress at Sparta in June 371 B.C. Between the Spartans and the Athenians, and their respective allies, peace was sworn. But the Thebans were excluded, and their deputies returned home, (if we may believe Xenophon) discouraged and mournful. Yet such a man as Epaminondas must have been well aware that neither his claims nor his arguments would be admitted by Sparta. If, therefore, he was disappointed with the result, this must be because he had counted upon, but did not obtain, support from the Athenians or others.

ATHENS ABANDONS THEBES

The leaning of the Athenian deputies had been adverse rather than favourable to Thebes throughout the congress. They were disinclined, from their sympathies with the Plataeans, to advocate the presidential claims of Thebes, though on the whole it was to the political interest of Athens that the Boeotian federation should be maintained, as a bulwark to herself against Sparta. Yet the relations of Athens with Thebes, after the congress as before it, were still those of friendship, nominal rather than sincere. It was only with Sparta, and her allies, that Thebes was at war, without a single ally attached to her. On the whole, Callistratus and his colleagues had managed the interests of Athens in this congress with great prudence and success. They had disengaged her from the alliance with Thebes, which had been dictated seven years before by common fear and dislike of Sparta, but which had no longer any adequate motive to countervail the cost of continuing the war; at the same time the disengagement had been accomplished without bad faith. The gains of Athens, during the last seven years of war, had been considerable. She had acquired a great naval power, and a body of maritime confederates; while her enemies the Spartans had lost their naval power in the like proportion. Athens was now the ascendant leader of maritime and insular Greece, while Sparta still continued to be the leading power on land—but only on land; and a tacit partnership was now established between the two, each recognising the other in their respective halves of the Hellenic hegemony. Moreover, Athens had the prudence to draw her stake, and quit the game, when at the maximum of acquisitions, without taking the risk of future contingencies.^e



GREEK SEALS

CHAPTER XLV. THE DAY OF EPAMINONDAS

IT was not a new enemy which Sparta had found, but rather an old one which had come to new power, in the city of Thebes. In that city an extraordinary man had come to light, and by his sole influence he raised his people to the head of Grecian affairs. This man was Epaminondas, certainly one of the greatest men — some would have it even the very greatest — that Greece ever produced.

There have been philosophical historians who have doubted the influence of the individual man in moulding the course of human events. According to one point of view it is the events always that make the man, the great man coming forward when he is needed, and because he is needed. But such cases as that of Epaminondas ill accord with this theory. Nothing seems clearer than that Thebes rose into great influence and wrested the sceptre of power from Sparta solely because the great leader Epaminondas chanced to be a Theban. For it is quite beyond dispute, that in all the previous years in which she had constantly participated in the Grecian struggles, Thebes had occupied a subordinate place, and it is equally clear that she sank back at once into relative insignificance the moment that Epaminondas was gone.

It was Epaminondas who led the Thebans in person against the Spartans, in the first engagement in which a Spartan army was ever put to flight in open combat, and the success of Epaminondas was probably due to the fact that his genius had developed a new form of tactics. The method of massing the heavy-armed soldiers in what came afterwards to be famous as the Macedonian phalanx — the weapon with which Alexander won his victories — was, it is said, really due to Epaminondas. Philip of Macedon, who was afterwards to become the master of Greece, was a captive in Thebes during his boyhood, and it is supposed that he there gained the germ of the idea, which afterwards, when put into practice, enabled his Macedonian warriors to scatter the true Greeks as easily as in an earlier day the Greeks had scattered the Persians. What else Philip may have learned through the example of Epaminondas it would be difficult to say, but in this view it is clear that the genius of the great Theban leader may have entered much more potently into the story of the final overthrow of Greece than might at first sight appear.

Such intangible associations aside, however, it is clear that the fame of Epaminondas has suffered through the relative insignificance of the epoch in which he lived. Historians, by common consent, give him a foremost place among the great Greeks; yet to the generality of readers, to whom such names as Themistocles, Pericles, and Alexander are household words, the name of Epaminondas is almost unknown. This neglect was inevitable, for the events in which this latter hero figured were the events of the

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declining years of a great nation; events which, far from telling for the up-building of Grecian power, were merely the last preparatory stages for the final overthrow. It seems strange to reflect that the period that intervened between the close of the Peloponnesian War and the final conquest of Greece by Philip of Macedon is a longer period than the entire stretch of the age of Pericles. It was an epoch separated from that golden period of Grecian culture only by the lapse of a single generation; yet how strangely different is the import that it bears to after generations. The proud Athens is now the home of a broken and dispirited people. Sparta, after a brief moment of glory, has been laid in the dust. The ascent of Thebes is no more rocket-like than its descent.

When looking on this period one feels that already Greece has ceased to exist, and yet one may well doubt whether any contemporary citizen, say of Athens, could at all have realised the enormous change that had come over the spirit and status of the Greek race. There were still great men in Athens. Perhaps it may have seemed to the Athenian of that day that great men were as numerous as they had ever been. Euripides and Sophocles had left no worthy successors, to be sure; but Aristophanes lived well on into the later period, and in the field of art Praxiteles may easily have seemed to contemporary judgment the peer of Phidias, while in the field of philosophy and science there were such names as Plato, and Aristotle, and Xenophon, and in oratory there was no name in the previous epoch to rival that of Demosthenes.

Such names as these show that Greek genius did not die out in a single hour. A nation once grown to greatness cannot be overthrown in a single generation, unless its entire population be destroyed or scattered as was that of Nineveh. Yet it is none the less certain that Athenian culture was now in its time of decay, however little patency that fact may have had to the contemporary witness. And in looking back, with all that one has learned of the seemingly fixed limits of national existence through study of other peoples, one is forced to the conclusion that perhaps it did not greatly matter that the sturdy Macedonian from the north should have swept down and stamped out the last spark of Athenian power.^a

The condition of Greece at this time shows that, during the long convulsions, all the old sentiments and associations had been lost, and that Greece had now come to a point at which most of the states could not exist without a protector. It required that fearful training which the Greeks had to submit to for nearly a whole century, before they became capable of living under a really free federal constitution like that of the Achaean League: a firm union into one whole, when the isolated existence of the separate states had become a matter of impossibility. The state of Greece was indescribably sad, and the most atrocious scenes occurred everywhere.

The Spartans might now have enjoyed peace; but they were still incorrigible. When pressed by great difficulties, they always signed the treaties; but when they were out of danger, and the treaties had to be carried into effect, they felt uneasy; they could never prevail upon themselves to exercise self-control, or to give up anything. The Thebans seemed to be ready to accede to the peace; but the Spartans still insisted upon the necessity of Thebes separating from Boeotia, although they had not undertaken the guarantee of the peace; in the Peace of Antalcidas they had done so, but this was not the case now. King Cleombrotus was stationed with an army in Phocis; that army ought now to have been disbanded, and this was the opinion of a few sensible men; but the majority thought that it should be employed in

compelling the Thebans to set the Bœotians free. The ruling party at Sparta now hoped to be able to compel Thebes, which was forsaken by all the other Greeks, without any difficulty, especially as some of the Bœotian towns, such as Orchomenos, sided with Sparta. Orchomenos was still dreaming of her ancient splendour and glory, and of the mythical times when Thebes was separated from Bœotia, when Orchomenos was the most powerful city, and Thebes paid tribute to her. These recollections were cherished by the Orchomenians with great and fond partiality; just as if Amalfi wished at present to re-establish the claims of its ancient greatness.

SPARTA INVADES BŒOTIA

Cleombrotus, therefore, full of hope, entered Bœotia, after the peace had been signed, demanding that Bœotia should carry the terms of the peace into effect, and renounce Thebes, and that every town should assert its independence. The other Bœotian towns, with the exception of Orchomenos and Thespiæ, were reasonable enough to see that their dependence on Thebes, with extensive rights, was far better than independence; and Thebes was supported by far the greater number of the Bœotians. The Thebans, joined by their Bœotian allies, now took the field.^b Cleombrotus, with a degree of military skill rare in the Spartan commanders, baffled all the Theban calculations. Instead of marching by the highway he turned south, defeated a Theban force and captured the port of Creusis with twelve Theban tiremes. He then marched north through the mountains into Thespiæ and encamped on the high ground at a place of ever-memorable name—Leuctra.^c

Fortunately for Bœotia, Epaminondas was bœotarch at this time. Pelopidas, likewise bœotarch, commanded the *Hieros Lochos* [Sacred Band], the *élite* of the citizens. If Epaminondas had been an ordinary man, he would have turned back again almost immediately after he had marched out; for the omens, to which the ancients attached so much importance, strangely accumulated to such a degree, that they might have shaken a firm mind which was not altogether proof against superstition. When the army passed out of the gate, for example, they met a herald bringing back a deserter, and uttering ominous words, "You ought not to be led out of the city." Then a high wind rose, carrying off ribbons with which they had adorned themselves for the sacrifice, and these ribbons clung round a pillar on a tomb. Hence an indescribable consternation arose, but Epaminondas recited the magnificent line from the *Iliad*:

εἰς οἶκόνδ' ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πατρός!¹

and boldly marched out. It is a pity that we have not a life of Epaminondas by Plutarch; with his Bœotian patriotism, he would certainly have produced a pleasing biography; but how, with his superstitious notions, he would have managed it, we do not know. Every one of the Thebans knew that they should have to fight a battle against the Spartans, and with heavy hearts they set out against an enemy who had never yet been conquered in the field. But the confidence of Epaminondas was unshaken. Although himself armed against all superstition, he willingly allowed his soldiers to

[¹ These are Hector's words in the *Iliad*, XII, 243. The omens having been unfavourable, Polydamas warns him not to fight, but the "crest-tossing Hector" answers scornfully as above, "The best omen of all is to defend the fatherland," and so saying he assailed the Greeks with more than common success.]

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fortify themselves with their belief in supernatural signs, and did not oppose the spreading of the rumour among his troops, that the armour of Hercules had disappeared from his temple at Thebes, the birthplace of the god, and that consequently the god himself had taken up his arms to fight for his fellow-citizens. He made his preparations in full confidence, and did what was best under the circumstances. He foresaw that the Spartans would have the belief in their favour that their tactics were superior; for it was the general opinion that their tactics of deep masses were unconquerable, just as it was believed of the drilling regulations of Frederick II after the Seven Years' War, when all the states ordered their troops to be trained according to it, imagining that thereby they could gain battles as he had done. Epaminondas, moreover, had to overcome the pride of the Spartans. Now, in order to meet their tactics and break their pride, he made an excellent disposition, employing the system of defeating masses by still greater masses.

THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA

The Spartans were drawn up together with their allies. Epaminondas advanced in an oblique line, sending forward the left wing and keeping back the right; but he then ordered the left wing gradually to withdraw to the left, and thus formed on that wing an immense mass. With this he now made a most vigorous attack upon the right wing of the enemy, where the Spartans themselves were stationed. An ordinary general would have done the contrary, directing his force against the part from which no such powerful resistance was to be expected. Pelopidas conducted the attack, and ordered the mass to advance with immense rapidity. We do not know whether the statement is true, that the Thebans advanced fifty men deep. We have only the testimony of Xenophon, but see no reason for denying it. The troops must have been excellently trained, for notwithstanding the dense mass, they advanced with an alacrity as if they had been light troops, just as at present troops advance in an attack with the bayonet, and not according to the fashion of phalangites, who otherwise advanced with deliberate solemnity. The Spartans made a skilful move: in order not to be out-flanked, they turned to the right, intending to throw their cavalry upon the right wing of the Bœotians. But the Bœotians made the attack with such precision and quickness, that being beforehand, they routed the Lacedæmonians and Spartans. There Cleombrotus fell, and the Spartans were as decidedly beaten as they well could be. The army did not indeed disperse, but it was absolutely impossible to find any pretext for saying that they had been victorious at any one point, a matter in which the Greeks were otherwise extremely inventive. It requires the partiality of a Xenophon, to leave it undecided as to whether the Spartans were defeated.¹

After the battle, they appear to have remained together for a time, but there was no one among them able to undertake the command. Meantime, as a report had reached Sparta, that the Bœotians offered resistance, another Spartan army, under Archidamus, a son of Agesilaus, had marched across the Isthmus, and was now approaching, but found the Spartans already defeated. All he could do was to collect the remains of the defeated army

[¹ Grote says: "To the discredit of Xenophon, Epaminondas is never named in his narrative of the battle, though he recognises in substance that the battle was decided by the irresistible Theban force brought to bear upon one point of the enemy's phalanx; a fact which both Plutarch and Diodorus expressly referred to the genius of the general."]

and to return with them. They seem to have effected their retreat under the protection of a truce. The only auxiliaries of the Thebans in the battle of Leuctra, had been the Thessalian troops of prince Jason of Phæræ: one of the phenomena of an age, when the old order of things has disappeared, and new institutions have been formed.

If we believe Diodorus, the battle of Leuctra was the direct punishment for perjury: for Cleombrotus, it is said, had concluded a truce with the Thebans, but on the arrival of reinforcements from Peloponnesus, he broke it. One of the narratives must be untrue, either his or that of Xenophon; if the reinforcements under Archidamus arrived before the battle, Xenophon's account must necessarily be given up. Cleombrotus may have had the peculiar misfortune, which happens to many a one who has been unsuccessful; all that is bad and disgraceful is attributed to him. What makes us still more inclined to disbelieve the account of Diodorus is, that if Archidamus had been present at the battle, it could not have been said that after the battle the Spartan army was without a commander. Diodorus probably too eagerly caught up an account which throws the blame upon the Spartans; it was invented either by Ephorus or by Callisthenes.

The loss of the Spartans in the battle is very differently stated. According to one account, it amounted to 4000 men, which would include, besides the Lacedæmonians and Spartans, all the other allies; others mention only 1000 slain, which number would comprise the Lacedæmonians only; others again estimate their number at 1700; but this last number is erroneous, as has been correctly observed by Schneider in a note on Xenophon, and arose from a hasty glance at the numbers written in the characters of the Greek alphabet. We may take it for granted that not less than 1000 Lacedæmonians fell in the battle; but whether this number also comprised the Spartans or not, is a question which cannot be answered at all. But it is a fact, that the number of the Spartans was so extremely small, that the strength of the Spartan citizens as a body was completely paralysed by the loss of this battle. At one time there had been 9000 citizens, subsequently they are said to have amounted to 8000, but at this time there cannot have been 1000 real citizens, and at a still later time there were only 700. At Leuctra several hundreds of them fell. The ancient Spartan citizens were certainly not more numerous than the *nobili* of Venice. They now had to feel the consequences of their wretched selfish policy, which had been so jealous in granting the franchise to the *periæci*, as to exclude a great many excellent men as unfit and unworthy, and had cut them off from every prospect of obtaining it.

All Greece was startled at the news of this victory; it seemed impossible that Sparta should have been beaten in the field. The Spartans themselves were quite dejected. Their allies turned their backs upon them, and in a moment all the states of Peloponnesus, which had hitherto followed their standards, threw up their connection with them, and declared themselves independent; the Phocians, Locrians, and other allies beyond the Isthmus, immediately concluded a peace and alliance with the Bœotians. Not eighteen months passed away, perhaps it was even in the very winter after the battle of Leuctra, when the Bœotians invaded Peloponnesus. The Spartans were panic stricken and retreated. The Bœotians announced themselves as the protectors of liberty, and there can be no doubt that the personal character and the eminent qualities of Epaminondas everywhere excited great confidence, while the national character of the Thebans would certainly have called forth the opposite feeling.^b

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SIGNIFICANCE OF LEUCTRA



GREEK VASE
(In the British Museum)

The battle of Leuctra was certainly one of those battles which are decisive of the fate of countries and which give history a new turn. It not only brought to the fore a leader of singular magnificence at the head of a new and zealous nation, but it saw the complete collapse of Sparta. It made possible the first invasion of that country which, being without walls, had felt itself girt about with imperishable granite in the brawn of its soldiery. The other nations of Greece for all their hatred of Sparta had never succeeded in invading her. It was considered glory enough to sail around the Peloponnesus or to establish a stronghold upon some portion of the coast. It remained for a Theban newcomer, whom Xenophon does not even mention in his account of the battle of Leuctra, to march into Sparta and prove that her granite

wall of soldiery was only a superstition that crumbled before the onslaught of that new Theban formation which modern foot-ball players have revived and called "the flying-wedge."

The battle of Leuctra is significant in showing that the course of Grecian empire was taking a northward way. In its passage, Thebes was only a stepping-stone to Macedonia. Once out of the little peninsula it had thus far dwelt in, Grecian ambition was to find itself upon an unlimited field of conquest whence it would turn, not logically to the West, where Rome was young and inglorious, but to the East, with its ancient and rotting civilisation and its hoarded opulence.

For the present, however, it is enough to realise that Sparta has fallen never to lift her head again. Remembering all the better side of the Spartan life and the Spartan philosophy, one is disposed to feel a deep sense of regret. It seems to be a moment for elegy. But to certain historians who can see in Sparta at best only a stupid mountain of conservatism, and at worst a monster of hypocrisy, of cruelty and of inertia, it seems to be a time for rejoicing that a blot has been removed from the Grecian escutcheon. No one is more severe and no one more eloquent than Cox who says in his self-defence, "I have been charged with being over-severe to Sparta. I would gladly be convinced that I have been; but until I am so convinced, I cannot modify my words." Then he launches forth into a glowing philippic from which we may quote a portion :

"So ended the fight which left Epaminondas the first general of his age, and so fell a power which had fully earned its title to stability, if grinding tyranny and law-defying oppressiveness could confer such a right. The Lysurgian discipline, which crushed all that imparted grace and beauty of

life at Athens, would indeed have been worth little if it had failed to produce the semblance of an unconcern which treated the more generous and tender instincts of humanity as the worst of vices.

"Another act in the great drama had been thus played out; and the whole Hellenic world had at length learned that the promises of freedom made by Sparta had been from beginning to end a lie—a lie scantily veiled at first by the rhetoric of Brasidas, but put forth afterward in the nakedness of unblushing effrontery. Not a single pledge had she redeemed; not a single burden had been removed, not a single abuse redressed. She had hailed the downfall of Athens as the beginning of a golden age for Hellas, and in order to realise it she had aided and abetted her victorious generals in setting up everywhere societies of murderers. Her enemies were prostrate; and she trampled on them without a touch of commiseration. Her allies were too much overpowered by the consciousness of their inferiority really to dispute her will; and she refused to share her spoils with the partners of her robberies. She had put down the Athenian empire with the courts, which, at the least, offered to the free or the subject allies the means of redress for wrongs inflicted or received; and by way of improving matters she had, with gigantic cruelty, let loose upon them a crowd of rapacious and lustful tyrants against whom she would hear no complaint.

"In short the supremacy of Sparta had been from first to last the supremacy of high-handed violence and wanton tyranny. Nor could it have been anything else but what it was. Much has been said of the golden opportunities which the course of events offered to Sparta, and which she deliberately threw away, opportunities presented first in the unlimited freedom of action which followed the seizure of the Athenian fleet at Ægospotami, and again when the return of the Cyrean Greeks placed her at the head of a splendid army in her involuntary conflict with the Persian king. But in truth it is absurd to speak of opportunities of feasting on the loveliest of landscapes, to the man who has extinguished in himself all sense of beauty, of opportunities for generous action to the man whose whole life exhibits nothing but the working of unvarying and consistent selfishness. Whether after Ægospotami, or after the return of the Ten Thousand, it was impossible for Sparta to do anything towards establishing a real Panhellenic union, in other words, a real Greek nation, without reverting in greater or less degree to the works of Athens. To go back to any such system would be for the Spartans what the changing of his skin would be to the Ethiopian, or of his spots to the leopard."

Before returning to the crescent glory of Epaminondas, it is necessary to pause to note the sudden phenomenon of a singular genius, Jason of Pheræ, who flares up and overawes Greece only to expire at once. He is a striking personage, and important as a forewarning flash of the irresistible storm rising in the North.^a

JASON OF THESSALY

Intelligence of the fatal blow at Leuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much real magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern which the institutions of Lycurgus commanded. It happened to be the last day of the festival called the Naked Games; and the chorus of men was on the stage, before the assembled people, when the officer charged with the despatches arrived. The ephors were present, as their official duty required, and to them the despatches were delivered. Without interrupting

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the entertainment they communicated the names of the slain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women should avoid that clamorous lamentation which was usual, and bear the calamity in silence. On the morrow all the relations of the slain appeared as usual in public, with a deportment of festivity and triumph, while the few kinsmen of the survivors, who showed themselves abroad, carefully marked in their appearance humiliation and dejection.

It was a large proportion of the best strength of the commonwealth that, after so great a loss in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to be calculated. Every exertion therefore was to be made to save it. Of six moras, into which for military purposes the Lacedæmonian people were divided, the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood (such was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen), had marched under Cleombrotus; those however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with those of the absent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no longer allowing exception for those in office. The command, Agesilaus being not yet sufficiently recovered to take it, was committed to his son Archidamus. Requisitions were at the same time hastened off for the assistance of the allies: and the Lacedæmonian interest, or the interest adverse to the pretensions and apprehended purposes of Thebes, prevailed so in Tegea, Mantinea, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achaean towns, that from all those places the contingent of troops was forwarded with alacrity.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to pay a compliment that might promote their interest in Athens, had hastened thither information of their splendid success. But the impression made by this communication was not favourable to their views: on the contrary, it showed that the jealousy, formerly entertained so generally among the Athenians towards Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the incessant quarrels among the Grecian republics, source indeed of lasting glory to some, brought however, with their decision, neither lasting power nor lasting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new discord, had a constant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. Relief to Lacedæmon in its pressing danger came, not from its own exertion, not from the interest which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion with which in a Lacedæmon had oppressed them, but from a power newly risen, or revived, in a corner of the country whence, for centuries, Greece had not been accustomed to apprehend anything formidable.

Jason of Phæræ in Thessaly was one of those extraordinary men in whom superior powers of mind and body sometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero had he lived with Achilles: and as a politician he could have contended with Themistocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Thessaly; and he appears to have acquired there a powerful popularity. Little informed of the early part of his life, we find him mentioned as general of the Phæreans about six years before the battle of Leuctra, and commanding a force sent to assist Neogenes, chief of Histiaæ in Eubœa. In the contests of faction in Thessaly it was become common to employ mercenary troops. Jason excelled in diligence in training such troops, in courage and skill in commanding them, and in the arts by which he attached them to his interest.

Of the state of Thessaly at this time altogether we may form some judgment from what the contemporary historian [Xenophon] has related of

Pharsalus, one of its most considerable cities. The leaders of the factions by which Pharsalus was torn, weary at length of ruinous contest, came to an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellow-citizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Thessaly for high birth, large possessions, and that splendid hospitality for which the Thessalians were distinguished, but yet more singularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharsalians committed the command of their citadel and the exclusive management of their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In so extraordinary an office Polydamas had the good fortune to succeed in everything, except in opposing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jason.

Tyrant or patriot, as you will, in his own city of Pheræ, Jason had proceeded to bring most of the Thessalian cities, some by policy, some by arms, under that kind of subjection which so commonly in Greece was entitled confederacy. The strength of Pharsalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, was exerted to protect them. But Pharsalus itself was threatened, when Jason sent a proposal for a conference with the chief, which was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his "intention to reduce Pharsalus, and the towns dependent upon Pharsalus, to dependency upon himself;" but declared that "it was his wish to effect this rather by negotiation than by violence, and with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. It was in the power of Polydamas," he said, "to persuade the Pharsalians; but that it was not in his power to defend them, the result of all his recent efforts sufficiently showed. For himself, he was resolved to hold the first situation in Greece; the second he offered to Polydamas. What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, Polydamas as well as himself could estimate.

"The cavalry of Thessaly was six thousand strong: the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thousand; the numerous inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, subjects of the Thessalian cities, were excellent targeteers. In addition to this force then he had six thousand mercenaries in his pay; a body such as, for choice of men, and perfection of discipline, no common-wealth of Greece possessed. But connection with Athens did not suit his views; for the Athenians affected to be the first maritime power of Greece, and he meant to make Thessaly the first. The three necessities to naval power were, timber, hands, and revenue. With the former, Athens was supplied from Macedonia, which lay much more conveniently for the supply of Thessaly. With the second their Penestian subjects were a resource to which Athens had nothing equal." (The Penestæ were a conquered people, reduced to a kind of vassalage under the Thessalians, for whom they performed menial and laborious offices, but were not held in a slavery so severe and degrading as the helots of Laconia, for we find them admitted to that military service, the cavalry, which was generally reckoned among the Greeks to assort only with rank above the lowest citizens.)

It had been a practice of the Thessalian republics, always acknowledging some common bonds of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occasions a common military commander, a captain-general of the Thessalian nation, with the title of Tagus. To this high rank and great command Jason aspired, and the approbation of the Pharsalian government, it appears, was necessary. But he was far from so confining his views. Even the command of all Greece did not suffice for his ambition. "That all Greece might be reduced under their dominion," he observed to Polydamas, "appeared probable from what he had already stated: but he conceived the conquest of the Persian

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empire to be a still easier achievement ; the practical proof afforded by the return of the Cyrean Greeks, and by the great progress made with a very small force by Agesilaus, leaving this no longer a matter of mere speculation."

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the justness of Jason's reasoning; but alleged his own connection with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an objection that appeared to him insuperable. Jason, commending his fidelity to his engagements, freely consented that he should go to Lacedæmon and state his circumstances; and if he could not obtain succour which might give him reasonable hope of successful resistance, then he would stand clearly excused, both to his allies and to his fellow-citizens, in accepting the proposal offered him. Polydamas, returning then into Thessaly, requested and obtained from Jason, that he should hold under his own peculiar command the citadel of Pharsalus, which had been, in a manner so honourable to him, entrusted to his charge. For security of his fidelity to his new engagements, he surrendered his children as hostages. The Pharsalians, persuaded to acquiesce, were admitted to terms of peace and friendship by Jason, who was then elected without opposition tagus of Thessaly.

The first object of Jason, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowledging him its constitutional military commander, could furnish; and it was found to amount to more than eight thousand horse, full twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers enough, in the contemporary historian's phrase, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue, which might enable him to give energy to this force. Jason was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he desired to have willing subjects. He required therefore from the dependent states around Thessaly only that tribute which had been formerly assessed under the tagus Scopas. At the time of the battle of Leuctra, Jason was already this formidable potentate, and he was then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans sent to the Athenian people an account of that splendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence also to the tagus of Thessaly; and they added a request for his co-operation towards the complete overthrow of the tyranny, so long exercised by the Lacedæmonians over the Greek nation. The circumstances were altogether such as Jason was not likely to look upon with indifference. Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himself at the head of his mercenaries, his standing army, and taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. He reached Bœotia without loss; showing, as the contemporary historian observes, how despatch may often do more than force.

Jason, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hospitality, with Lacedæmon. Pleased with the humiliation of his hosts, he was not desirous that his allies should become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp therefore, demurring to the proposal of the Theban generals for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counsellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly succeeded so far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians hastened to use the opportunity for reaching a place of safety. Jason, after having thus acted as arbiter of Greece, hastened his return to Thessaly. In his way through the hostile province of Phocis, with leisure to exercise his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted strength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whose suburbs and territory he wasted, killing many of the people. The Lacedæmonian colony of Heraclea was then to be passed. He had served Lacedæmon at Leuctra because he thought it for his interest; and he would, without scruple, or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in

its colony of Heraclea, because the prosperity of that colony would obstruct his views. Heraclea was most critically situated for commanding the only easily practicable communication between the countries northward and southward. He therefore demolished the fortifications.

Decidedly now the greatest potentate of Greece, powerful, not by his own strength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all sides his alliance was courted, Jason proposed to display his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded all the republics which owned the authority of the tagus of Thessaly to feed oxen, sheep, goats, and swine for

the sacrifices; and he proposed the reward of a golden crown for the state which should produce the finest ox to lead the herd for the god. By a very easy impost on them severally, he collected more than a thousand oxen, and ten thousand smaller cattle. He appointed a day, a little before the festival, for assembling the military force of Thessaly; and the expectation in Greece was that he would assume to himself the presidency. Apprehension arose that he might seize the treasure of Delphi; insomuch that the Delphians consulted their oracle for directions from the god on the occasion. The answer, according to report, was similar to what had been given to their forefathers when Xerxes invaded Greece, "that the care of the treasure would be the god's own concern."



GREEK ARCHER

Before the period for the splendid display arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, sitting to give audience to any who might have occasion to speak to him, was assassinated by seven youths, who approached with the pretence of stating a matter in dispute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the spot, and another as he was mounting his horse; but the rest so profited from

the confusion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumstances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their escape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage proposed from it, we are not informed. No symptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the historian; but what he mentions to have followed marks the popularity of Jason among the Thessalians, and also the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceased, Polydorus and Polyphron, were appointed jointly to succeed to the dignity of tagus: the assassins could find no refuge in Thessaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honour: proof, says the contemporary historian, how vehemently it was apprehended that Jason would succeed in his purpose of making himself sovereign of the country. Such was the unfortunate state of Greece: in the weakness of its little republics men were compelled to

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approve means the most nefarious, where other prospect failed, by which their fears were relieved, and present safety procured. Thus assassination became so generally creditable, or at least so little uncreditable, that hope of safety, through speed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.^e

VON STERN ON THE THEBAN POLICY

In Lachmann, Curtius, and others, we are confronted by the notion that Epaminondas began the War of Liberation against Sparta as a Greek, and not in the interest of Bœotia alone, and that the weal or woe of the Greek nation as a whole was the leading motive of all that he did or left undone. Since the Bœotian hegemony (regarded in this aspect as the outcome of the noblest Panhellenic aspirations) is to our historians the pole and focus of their view of the subsequent period, we can easily see the paramount importance of an acceptance or denial of such aspirations for the common good of Greece, in forming an opinion upon this portion of history. It therefore becomes a duty to examine the question more minutely.

It has never been contested that up to the time of the battle of Leuctra the Thebans had never had opportunity or occasion to turn their attention and their energies to a wider field for patriotism. What iron persistency they were compelled to exercise, what struggles they had to endure, in order to maintain their own existence and to realise the local unity for which they strove! It is not probable, not possible, that during these years of wrestling for deliverance from Spartan supremacy, during a struggle of which the issue perpetually hung in suspense, they should have cherished designs for the benefit of Greece as a whole. The deliberate purpose with which they strove straight towards the end in view, without turning aside to the right hand or to the left, proves how keen was the foresight, how determinate the programme, of the Theban leaders, and shows at the same time how little place they gave to idle dreams and illusions, which invariably involve some neglect of the needs of the moment.

The battle of Leuctra, therefore, marks the momentous turning-point in the eyes of the scholars above referred to. "The victory," says Curtius, "was to be regarded as a national act from which all Greeks were to derive benefit,"—hence the embassies sent from the battle-field to Athens and Thessaly. But can the wish to be regarded as the benefactor of all Hellas really have been the true motive of this despatch of heralds? Thebes had won the victory indeed, but the hostile army was far from being annihilated and still occupied the country in formidable numbers. Isolated and without confederates, Thebes could scarcely hope to secure the fruits of her victory unless she could now win powerful allies. The attitude of Athens was naturally of the first importance. It was essential for Thebes to frustrate a conjunction between Sparta and Athens, and, if possible, to assure herself of the support of her powerful neighbour.

The temper of Athens was not propitious to such endeavours. If the knowledge that peace was of the first necessity to themselves rendered the Athenians averse to incurring fresh hardships for the sake of Sparta, they felt even less obligation to take up the cause of Thebes. The embassy was fruitless. The mission to Thessaly was more successful, for Jason of Pheræ promptly prepared to come and render assistance. The Thebans did not dare to attack the enemy's camp before his arrival; and when he appeared in Bœotia with an army they entreated him to undertake the assault in con-

cert with them. Even then the mere mention on his part of the difficulties in the way was enough to divert the Thebans from their project and induce them to accede to his proposals for mediation. We see that they were far from feeling themselves masters of the situation; nothing short of the withdrawal of the Spartan army seemed to them to insure the security of their own position, which was the first-fruits of their victory.

Moreover, Thebes had next to overcome the last resistance to Bœotian unity within her own borders. Thespiæ and Orchomenos had to be coerced before a further advance could be thought of. The next steps were naturally taken with a view to a union amongst the states of middle Greece; and by compacts with Phocis, Locris, Ætolia, and Acarnania, which acknowledged the right of the conqueror of Leuctra to be the head and chief of the new amphictyony, Thebes strove to attain the position to which her success had given her the best title. But it seems in the highest degree improbable that in all these proceedings Thebes had the interests of the whole of Greece in view, that she cherished the idea of a national uprising against Spartan oppression, that by the extension of dominion for which she strove she desired to make good the wrong done to other Greeks in earlier days by Sparta, and that, as Curtius supposes, the project for the restoration of Messenia had already been definitely conceived. The Theban leaders could not be blind to the fact that the struggle with Sparta had by no means come to an end with the battle of Leuctra, but the political conditions of the time gave them as yet no chance of forming definite resolutions and plans as to how the end was to be brought about. Curtius undoubtedly goes too far when he assumes that at that time Epaminondas was sole master of the situation and controlled the destinies of the Greeks. The Thebans did not even venture to transfer the struggle to Peloponnesian soil and denude Bœotia of her troops, on account of the menacing attitude assumed by Jason of Phæræ in the north.

The tyrant was ostensibly the ally of the Thebans, but his ambitions and independent schemes were coming into ever greater prominence. As he retired from Bœotia after the battle of Leuctra he had surprised Heraclea and destroyed the walls of the city; he would have no one able to bar his free entry into Hellas. Now, in the summer of 370, he was equipping a magnificent army to attend the Pythian games at Delphi. His object in so doing was not merely to make a display of his kingly power. Delphi, the seat and centre of the amphictyones, had always been the connecting link between Thessaly and the other Greek states. By the splendid homage he offered to the god in his sacrificial procession, Jason intended to renew the old obsolete relations; and relying upon the fact that the Thessalian races had a majority in the ancient amphictyonic council, to usurp the guardianship of the oracle and the management of the games, and to secure for himself an influence in Greek politics proportionate to his power. The great body of troops which was to accompany him in this procession sufficiently emphasised these claims and demands. The northern Greeks were not unaware of the danger that threatened them—neither in all likelihood were the Thebans. Xenophon's narrative amply proves with what apprehension they watched his steps, and how great was the disquietude amongst the dwellers in northern Greece. Jason's sudden death was to the Hellenes the deliverance from a nightmare, and the fact that his murderers were honoured as saviours from tyranny and oppression, is an unmistakable token of the temper aroused in Greece by his last enterprise. But it was absolutely impossible for Thebes and the league of middle Greece to wage war upon Sparta

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in the Peloponnesus while Jason was planning his march to Delphi. They could not withdraw troops from Bœotia without incurring the risk that he would make use of the circumstance to give the fullest scope to his ambitious designs.

A CONGRESS AT ATHENS

The ill-humour with which the news of the battle of Leuctra was received at Athens seems to have arisen merely out of the old jealousy and animosity with which the Athenians had been used to regard their northern neighbours, and which revived as soon as the affairs of Thebes became prosperous. For in the event itself, considered with respect to their own interests, they could have seen nothing to deplore. And they proceeded without delay to take advantage of the shock which it had given to the influence of Sparta. It seems to have been the prevailing opinion throughout Greece, and not least at Sparta itself, that the Spartan power had suffered a fatal blow; and Xenophon intimates that the Athenians were surprised to find that any of the Peloponnesian states still adhered to the ancient chief of their confederacy. They believed that the time had now come when Athens might step into the place of Sparta, as guardian of the Peace of Antalcidas, and might transfer all the advantages which her rival had reaped from that title to herself. They therefore assembled a congress in their own city, to which they invited deputies not only from their old allies, but from all the states of Greece which were willing to adopt the Peace of Antalcidas as the basis of their mutual relations. It seems to have been attended by many, if not by most members of the Peloponnesian confederacy; and the resolution to which it came in the oath by which each state was to ratify the compact was thus expressed: "I will abide by the treaty sent down by the king, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies, and if an attack be made on any of the states which take this oath, I will succour it with all my might." So that Athens found herself able to obtain better security for the execution of the treaty, than had been given in the last congress held for the like purpose at Sparta, where none of the parties had been bound to enforce its observance by arms: and yet the engagement for mutual defence now involved those who entered into it in danger of a contest both with Sparta and Thebes. Elis would gladly have united herself to an association which would separate, and might protect her, from Sparta; but she would not resign her claims to the sovereignty of the Triphylian towns. The congress on the other hand determined that every town, small or great, should be alike independent, and commissioners were sent round to exact an oath to this effect from the magistrates of each state. It was taken, Xenophon says, by all but the Eleans.

MANTINEA RESTORED

We should have been glad to know which of the Peloponnesian states acceded to this confederacy. But all the information that Xenophon gives as to this point only enables us to conclude that the Mantineans at least were of the number. One of the first effects of the battle of Leuctra seems to have been a revolution which overthrew the Mantinean aristocracy; and the declaration of the congress at Athens—though it expressed the very same principle on which the Spartans had professed to act when they scattered the Mantineans over their four villages—was now interpreted by the

democratical party as a license to restore their political unity, and to rebuild their city; and the work was immediately begun. The Spartan government felt that the restoration of Mantinea would prove to all Greece that it was no longer formidable even to its nearest neighbours; but, in its anxiety to escape this humiliation, it resorted to a step which still more clearly betrayed its weakness, and showed how much it was dispirited by its recent reverse. Agesilaus, who had now recovered from his illness, was sent to use all his hereditary influence at Mantinea to stop the work; and he was instructed to undertake that, if it was only deferred for the present, he would procure the consent of the Spartan government, and even some help towards defraying the expense of the building. He was not allowed to lay this proposal before the popular assembly, but was informed that the decree of the people rendered it necessary to proceed without delay. Though he felt this repulse as a personal affront, and though it set the power of the state at defiance, it was not thought expedient at Sparta to have recourse to arms, and the treaty last concluded with Athens served as a plea for acquiescence. For it was now admitted that the independence of Mantinea had been violated, when it was dismembered for the sake of the aristocratical party. Some of the other Arcadian towns sent workmen to assist the Mantineans, and Elis contributed three talents [£600 or \$3000] to the cost of the fortification. The new city was so constructed as to be secure from such attacks as had proved fatal to that which it replaced.


Peloponnesus had for some years been violently agitated by political convulsions, and had been the scene of incessant struggles between the two leading parties, the friends of aristocratical and of democratical institutions. It seems that the principles on which the Peace of Antalcidas was professedly founded had encouraged the partisans of democracy to hope that they might establish their ascendancy, wherever they were the strongest, without any obstruction from Sparta. Her conduct towards Phlius and Mantinea must have checked these hopes; yet they seem to have revived when the new confederacy between Thebes and Athens, after the recovery of the Cadmea and the revolt of several maritime states compelled Sparta to observe more moderation towards her remaining allies. In many places the aristocratical party was overpowered, and suffered severe retaliation for the oppression it had exercised during the period of its domination. But these triumphs were only the beginning of a series of fierce and bloody contests. The exiles were continually on the watch for an opportunity of regaining what they had lost, and the attempt, whether it succeeded or failed, commonly ended in a massacre. The oligarchical exiles of Phigalea, having seized a fortress near the town, surprised it during a festival, while the multitude was assembled in the theatre, and made a great slaughter among the defenceless crowd, though they were at last forced to retreat, and take refuge in Sparta. The Corinthian exiles, who had found shelter at Argos, were baffled in a similar enterprise, and killed one another to avoid falling into the hands of the opposite party, which immediately instituted a rigorous inquiry at Corinth, and condemned numbers to death or exile on the charge of abetting the conspiracy. Like scenes took place at Megara, Sicyon, and Phlius. The confluence of democratical exiles from other cities tended to keep up a state of constant unnatural excitement at Argos; and there were demagogues who took advantage of it to instigate the multitude against the wealthier citizens into a conspiracy for self-defence.

Arrests were multiplied, until the number of the prisoners amounted to twelve hundred; and the populace, impatient of legal delays, arming itself

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with clubs, rose upon them, and massacred them all: this bloody execution became memorable under the name of the *scytalism*.¹ The demagogues who had excited the frenzy now endeavoured to restrain it from further excesses; but the attempt only turned it against themselves, and most of them shared the fate of their victims. Their blood seemed to propitiate the infernal powers: the flame, no longer supplied with fuel, expired; and tranquillity was restored. It must be considered as an indication of a remarkable superiority in the Athenian character and institutions over those of Argos, that under similar circumstances, in the affair of the Hermes busts, when religious and political fanaticism combined their influence to madden the people, no such spectacle was witnessed at Athens.

THE ARCADIAN REVOLUTION



GREEK SOLDIER WITH MACE

With a territory more extensive than any other region of Peloponnesus, peopled by a hardy race, proud of its ancient origin and immemorial possession of the land, and of its peculiar religious traditions, Arcadia—the Greek Switzerland—had never possessed any weight in the affairs of the nation; the land only served as a thoroughfare for hostile armies, and sent forth its sons to recruit the forces of foreign powers—Greek or barbarian—and to shed their blood in quarrels in which they had no concern. The battle of Leuctra opened a prospect of carrying it into effect. A Mantinean named Lycomedes, a man of large fortune and of the highest birth in his native city, seems to have been either the author or the most active mover of the project which was now formed, and which was at least partly executed in the course of the same year (371). The object was to unite the Arcadian people in one body, yet so as not to destroy the independence of the particular states; and with this view it was proposed to found a metropolis, to institute a national council which should be invested with supreme authority in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to peace and war, and to establish a military force for the protection of the public safety. And though there is no reason to doubt that Lycomedes and those who shared his views were chiefly desirous of rescuing their country from a degrading subjection to her imperious neighbour, and of elevating her to an honourable station among the Greek commonwealths, they undoubtedly did not overlook the accession of strength which would result from this event to their party, in its contest with its domestic adversaries. Their plan could not fail to be agreeable to the Thebans, just in proportion as it was alarming to Sparta; and it was very early communicated to Epaminondas. Within a few months after the battle of Leuctra, a meeting of Arcadians from all

¹ σκυταλισμός—from the weapon (σκυτάλη) a club which seems to have been principally used.]

the principal towns was held, to deliberate on the measure; and under its decree a body of colonists, collected from various quarters, proceeded to found a new city, which was to be the seat of the general government, and was called Megalepolis, or Megalopolis (the Great City).

The city was designed on a very large scale, and the magnitude of the public buildings corresponded to its extent; the theatre was the most spacious in Greece. The population was to be drawn from a great number of the most ancient Arcadian towns. Pausanias gives a list of forty which were required to contribute to it. The greater part of them appear to have been entirely deserted by their inhabitants; others retained a remnant of their population, but in the condition of villages subject to Megalopolis. Trapezus made an obstinate resistance; and its citizens who survived the struggle preferred quitting their native land to changing their abode in it, and having found means for embarking for the Euxine, were hospitably received as kinsmen in the city of the same name. Lycosura — which boasted of being the most ancient city under the sun — was spared out of respect for the sanctity of one of its temples. The districts which were thus drained of their population never recovered it, and were left in a great measure uncultivated.

The most interesting subject connected with this event, the constitution under which Arcadia was to be united, is unfortunately involved in the greatest obscurity. Megalopolis was the place appointed for the deliberation of the supreme council of the Arcadian body. But of this council we only know that it was commonly described by the name of the Ten Thousand — an appellation which raises a number of perplexing questions. For that it was a representative assembly, and was not intended to consist only of Megalopolitans, is clear both from the terms in which it is spoken of, and from the nature of the case: this would have been a privilege which the other cities would never have conceded to a colony formed out of the most insignificant townships. On the other hand, that so numerous a body should have been collected, either at stated times or as often as occasion required, from the other parts of Arcadia, is scarcely less hard to understand.

Ten commissioners were appointed to superintend the first settlement of the colony, and were honoured with the title of founders. Two of them, Lycomedes and Opeleas, were Mantineans; two, Timon and Proxenus, were leaders of the democratical party at Tegea. Of the rest, two came from Clitor, two from Mænalus, and as many from the Parrhasian cantons. As there was reason to apprehend that Sparta might attempt to interrupt the work in its beginning, Epaminondas sent Pammenes, one of his ablest officers, with one thousand choice troops, to guard and assist the colonists; and hence he also might be looked upon as one of the founders; but it does not appear that he had the foremost, much less, as was sometimes contended, an exclusive claim to that title. It was not however at Megalopolis that any opposition was offered to the undertaking; but in other places violent contests arose between the advocates and the adversaries of the new measure.

It was at Tegea, the chief seat of Spartan and aristocratical influence in Arcadia, that the hardest struggle took place. Though Proxenus and Timon had been deputed as founders of Megalopolis, Stasippus and his partisans did not cease to exert their utmost efforts to counteract the plan of the union, and to keep Tegea in its ancient state of subserviency to Sparta, — or, as Xenophon expresses it, probably in their language, in the enjoyment of its hereditary institutions. Proxenus and another democratical leader named Callibius, — conscious, though they were outvoted in the oligarchical

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councils, that the majority of the citizens was on their side,—appealed to arms. Stasippus and some of his party were overtaken. Their enemies having induced them to surrender, conveyed them bound on a wagon to Tegea, where, after a mock trial, in which the Mantineans assisted as judges, they put them all to death. Their surviving partisans, to the number of eight hundred fled to Sparta.

The safety of Sparta seemed to require that she should not passively submit to the blow thus struck at the last remains of her influence in Arcadia, and among the Tegean refugees were several private friends of Agesilaus, and probably of other leading Spartans, who solicited redress and revenge against the Mantineans and their political adversaries. The interference of Mantinea in the civil feuds of Tegea was construed as a violation of the principle which had been recognised in all the treaties concluded since the Peace of Antalcidas, and therefore afforded a fair colour for taking up arms: and war was accordingly declared against Mantinea on this ground. But the strongest motive by which the Spartan government was urged to this step, appears to have been the necessity which it felt for some effort which should restore confidence and cheerfulness at home. For notwithstanding the heroic countenance with which the news of the battle of Leuctra had been received, it had made an impression of deep despondency from which the city had not yet recovered. After the return of the defeated army, a grave question had arisen as to the manner in which the soldiers should be treated.

SPARTAN INTOLERANCE OF COWARDICE

According to the precedents of earlier times, the Spartan who saved his life by flight was subject to the loss of all civil privileges, and to marks of ignominy; and we have seen that it was thought necessary to inflict a temporary degradation on the prisoners who had surrendered—with the permission of their superiors—at Sphacteria. There were some who held that the dishonour which the Spartan arms had incurred at Leuctra could only be effaced by a rigorous enforcement of the ancient martial law. But Agesilaus, and probably most other members of the government, saw that such severity would be now very ill-timed; and according to Plutarch he was empowered to frame some new regulations on this head; but instead of any formal innovation, simply proposed that the law should be suffered to sleep for this once, without prejudice to its application on future occasions. It was, however, on this account the more desirable to divert the thoughts of the people from the recent disaster by a fresh expedition; and Agesilaus was now sufficiently recovered from his illness to take the command.

Xenophon says that he marched with one mora, probably meaning only the Spartan division of his forces. Neither side however was willing to fight: Agesilaus, because his first care was to husband the strength of Sparta; the Arcadians, because they expected soon to be joined by a Theban army, for they were informed by the Eleans that Thebes had borrowed ten talents from Elis for the purpose of the meditated expedition. Perhaps the same intelligence increased the anxiety of Agesilaus to return home. But that his retreat might not appear to be the effect of fear, he remained three days before Mantinea, and ravaged the plain; and then marched back with the utmost speed. Still the honour of Sparta had been vindicated, and the fallen spirits of his countrymen were cheered by the outcome of the events in the vicinity of Mantinea.

THE THEBANS IN THE PELOPONNESUS

The Thebans were in fact advancing with a powerful army, and not long after joined the Arcadians — who employed the interval after the retreat of Agesilaus in an inroad into the Heræan territory — at Mantinea. The victory of Leuctra had so completely changed their position, that they had now the forces of almost all northern Greece, except Attica, at their command. Even Phocis, though as hostile as ever, was compelled to aid them against her late allies. All the Eubœan towns, the Locrians both of the east and west, the Acarnanians, the Trachinian Heraclea and the Malians, contributed to the army; and Thessaly furnished cavalry and targeteers.

The whole force assembled at Mantinea amounted according to Diodorus to fifty thousand, according to Plutarch to seventy thousand men, of whom forty thousand were heavy-armed. The professed object of the expedition was to protect Mantinea, and as it now was no longer in danger, and the season — it was mid-winter — was unfavourable to military operations, several of the Theban commanders proposed to return. They expected to find all the passes, which were naturally difficult, strongly guarded, and could not at once reconcile themselves to the thought of seeking an enemy, who till lately had been deemed almost invincible, in his own country, where he would be animated by the strongest motives to extraordinary exertions. Their apprehensions were only overcome when they received invitations and assurances of support from Laconia itself, and were encouraged by some of the provincials, who came for that purpose to the camp, to expect that the appearance of their army would produce a general revolt of the subject population, which it was said had already refused to obey the orders of the government when it was summoned to the defence of Sparta. They were also informed that one of the principal passes, which led through Caryæ and Sellasia into the vale of the Eurotas, was quite unguarded; and some of the inhabitants of Caryæ offered themselves as guides, and were ready to pledge their lives for the truth of their assertions. The invasion was then unanimously resolved upon.

To distract the enemy's attention, and to accelerate their own movements, the invaders divided their forces so as to penetrate into Laconia simultaneously by different routes. Sellasia was the place of rendezvous appointed for all the four divisions. The Thebans and the Eleans appear to have met with no resistance. The Argives found the passes guarded by a body of troops consisting partly of Bœotian refugees, commanded by a Spartan named Alexander who, however, was overpowered, and fell with two hundred of his men. The pass of the Sciritis might also have been occupied, and from its natural strength it was believed that the Arcadians would never have been able to force it; but Ischolaus, a Spartan who was posted near it at the village of Ium with a garrison of neodamode troops, and about four hundred of the exiled Tegeans, instead of securing the pass, determined to make his stand in the village, where he was surrounded by the enemy, and slain with almost every one of his men. The four divisions then effected their junction without further opposition, and after having plundered and burnt Sellasia, descended to the banks of the Eurotas, and encamped in a sanctuary of Apollo at the entrance of the plain of Sparta. The next day they pursued their march along the left bank of the river, which was swollen by the winter rains, until they reached the bridge which crossed it directly over against the city. A body of armed troops which appeared on the other side deterred them from attempting the passage; and they proceeded, still

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keeping the left bank, to plunder and destroy the dwellings which were thickly scattered in the neighbourhood of the capital, and which from Xenophon's description, who says they were full of good things, seem to have been chiefly villas of the more opulent Spartans, and were probably better stored and furnished than their houses in the town.

It was the first time that fires kindled by a hostile army had ever been seen from Sparta, since it had been in the possession of the Dorian race; and the grief and consternation excited by the spectacle in the women, and the elder part of the men, were proportioned not merely to its strangeness, but to the pride and confidence with which the traditions of so many centuries had taught them to regard their soil as inviolate, and their city, though unvalled, as impregnable.

In this emergency all eyes were turned upon Agesilaus. As he was fully aware of the danger, so he clearly perceived the course which could alone afford a prospect of deliverance. To remain strictly on the defensive, and in case of an attack to take advantage of the inequalities of the ground, and of the position of the streets and buildings in the outskirts of the town, and in the meanwhile to maintain tranquillity and obedience within, was all that was left to be done; and this, with the means at his disposal, demanded all his abilities. The Spartans, when distributed over the wide range which they had to defend, made so poor a show that the government thought it necessary to resort to an expedient which had been adopted before on less urgent occasions: to arm as many of the helots as could be induced to enlist by a promise of emancipation. And notwithstanding the atrocious purpose which had been cloaked by a similar proposal in former times, more than six thousand volunteers now presented themselves. Their services were accepted with trembling, and employed with continued distrust, until the arrival of some foreign auxiliaries gave a little more security to the government. Not many days after, a small force, probably less than six thousand strong, collected from Corinth, Sicyon, Pellene, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and Halia, having been transported in succession over the Argolic Gulf to Brasiaë on the coast of Laconia, crossed the mountains, and, though the enemy was encamped only two or three miles off, made its way into the city.

In the meanwhile the invading army, having ravaged the eastern side of the plain till it came over against Anyclæ, then crossed the river, and turned its front toward Sparta. As the greatest breadth of the plain lies between the river and the foot of Taygetus, still more spoil was found here than on the other side, and this with the greater part of the allies was the single object of attention. The Theban generals alone appear to have been able to prevent their troops from ranging at large in quest of plunder, and to have taken precautions against a surprise from the city. What Epaminondas most desired was to draw the enemy into an engagement, and he is said to have tried the effect of a taunting challenge on Agesilaus, whose temper was not always proof against provocation. But on this occasion he controlled his own feelings, and calmed the general excitement by his authority and example. The Spartans had a small body of cavalry, very inferior, not only in numbers but in condition, to that of the allies; it was however drawn up on the level south of the city. Its appearance served rather to heighten than to check the confidence of the assailants. But an adjacent building, which was consecrated by tradition as the house of the tutelary twins, concealed about three hundred of the young Spartan infantry, who, when the enemy drew near, started from their ambush to support the charge which was made at the same time by their own cavalry. This unexpected attack threw the advancing

squadrons into confusion, and though they were pursued but to a short distance, they did not stop till they reached the Theban phalanx, and even a part of the infantry were so much alarmed by their flight, as to retreat.

It was perhaps on this occasion, while the allies were advancing, that a band of about two hundred men, who had for the most part been long suspected by the government, occupied the Issorium, one of the heights on the skirt of the town towards the river. As they had received no orders, it was evident that they were acting with treasonable designs; and some proposed that they should be forthwith dislodged by force. Agesilaus, however, thought it more prudent, as the extent of the conspiracy was not known, to try a milder course; and going up to the place with a single attendant, affected to believe that they had mistaken his orders, and directed them to station themselves in different quarters. They obeyed, thinking that they had escaped detection; but fifteen of them were arrested by the orders of Agesilaus, and put to death without form of trial, in the night. The suppression of this attempt may have led to the discovery of another more dangerous conspiracy, in which a number of Spartans were implicated. They were arrested in a house where they held clandestine meetings. The clearer their guilt, the more dangerous it probably appeared to bring them to trial; yet there was no power in the state which could legally put a Spartan to death without one. Even the authority of the ephors had never yet been carried so far. They determined however, after a consultation with Agesilaus, to dispense with legal forms, and the prisoners were delivered to a secret execution. The desertions which took place among the helots and the Laconian troops were carefully concealed from public knowledge; but this may not indicate their frequency, so much as the vigilance of Agesilaus.


The reports brought to the camp of the allies, as to the state of things in Sparta, did not encourage Epaminondas to repeat the attempt in which the cavalry had been repulsed, or to prolong his stay in the neighbourhood of the capital. He directed his march southward, and ravaged the whole vale of the Eurotas as far as the coast. Some unwall'd towns were committed to the flames, and an assault was made for three successive days on Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, but without success. If it was the design of Epaminondas to take advantage of the discontent which was supposed to prevail in the subject population towards the government, to effect a permanent revolution, the devastation committed by his allies, which he was probably unable to restrain, must have tended to counteract it. He was joined, Xenophon says, by some of the provincials; but the majority must have looked upon the invaders as enemies. Their stay was protracted for some weeks. At length the Peloponnesian troops began to withdraw with their booty, leaving the country almost exhausted. The growing scarcity of provisions and diminution of numbers, combined with the hardships of the season, would have admonished Epaminondas to retire, even if, as Xenophon would lead his readers to suppose, his only business, after recrossing the border, had been to march homeward. But the historian has carefully suppressed the main object which Epaminondas had in view, and which he accomplished during his stay in the peninsula.

He meditated a blow much more destructive to the power and prosperity of Sparta than the invasion of her territory. His design was to deprive her of Messenia, to collect the Messenians in the land of their forefathers, and to found a new city, where they might maintain their independence. He had already sent to the various regions in which the remains of the heroic people were scattered, to invite them to return to their ancient home.

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FOUNDING OF MESSENE

Ithome was recommended, at once by the most animating recollections, and by the advantages of its strong and central position ; and the western slope of the ridge on which the ancient stronghold stood, was selected for the new city, Messene. The foundations were laid with the utmost solemnity ; and if we may trust Pausanias, Epaminondas on this occasion did not disdain to practise a pious fraud, for the purpose of showing that the undertaking was sanctioned by the will of the gods. The name of Aristomenes was invoked with peculiar veneration, not only by the Messenians, but by the Greeks of every race who took part in the founding of the city : and the victory of Leuctra was, now perhaps for the first time, ascribed to his supernatural interposition. But though Epaminondas did not neglect the aid to be derived



GREEK TERRA-COTTA FIGURE

(In the British Museum)

from pious and patriotic enthusiasm, he at least paid equal attention to all the material means of securing the duration of his work. The most judicious use was made of the natural advantages of the site ; the most approved architects of the day were employed upon the plan, and the most skilful workmen in the execution ; and the fortifications of Messene, which some centuries later excited the admiration of Pausanias, are still found to justify his praise by the solid and beautiful masonry of the remains which are even yet in existence.

When the fortifications of Messene had been carried so far that the presence of the army was no longer needed, Epaminondas, leaving a garrison there, began his march homeward. The building of Messene is so coupled with that of Megalopolis in the accounts of Diodorus and Pausanias, that we may perhaps infer that he did not pass through Arcadia without contributing some important assistance to the latter work, on which the people of Megalopolis were still engaged.

An enemy however still awaited him at the isthmus. In their distress the Spartans had applied for succour to Athens : and their ambassadors were accompanied by envoys from the Peloponnesian states which still adhered to them, among whom those of Corinth and Phlius appear to have supported their request with the greatest earnestness. They appealed to the generosity, to the jealousy, to the fears, and the hopes of the Athenians.

There was already a general disposition among the people, if not in favour of Sparta, yet strongly adverse to Thebes. The assembly, after having

heard the ambassadors, would not listen to any arguments on the other side, but decreed that the whole force of the commonwealth should march to the relief of Sparta, and appointed Iphicrates to the command. An army was immediately raised; and the troops are described by Xenophon as so zealous in the cause, that they murmured because Iphicrates halted for a few days at Corinth. But when they resumed their march, expecting, the historian says, to be led to some glorious action, no such result ensued. It seems that Iphicrates had no wish to seek the enemy, and, perhaps having heard that Sparta was freed from immediate danger, he contented himself with attacking some places in Arcadia, either for the sake of plunder or in the hope that this diversion might hasten the enemy's retreat from Laconia. But it does not appear that his operations produced any effect on those of the Theban army. When Epaminondas began to move towards the isthmus, he posted himself there to guard the passes at the southern extremity: but through some oversight which Xenophon notices with evident surprise, as an extraordinary failure of his military skill, he left the most convenient of them—that on the side of Cenchreæ—open; and the Thebans penetrated without any opposition to the isthmus. A body of cavalry, which was sent to observe their movements, and which, Xenophon says, was larger than that purpose required, though insufficient for any other, approached so near as to be drawn into a skirmish, and lost some men in its retreat. With this little advantage over one of the greatest captains of the age, who commanded the forces of the only power which could now be considered as a rival to Thebes, Epaminondas concluded this memorable campaign.

The services which he had rendered to his country were in general duly appreciated by his fellow-citizens; but they excited, and did not disarm, the envy of some inferior minds, and the expedition itself, successful as it had been, afforded them a pretext for assailing him. The yearly term for which he held his office of *Bœotarch* had expired, it seems, soon after he entered Peloponnesus, and he and his colleagues had retained their command, without any express sanction, three or four months longer. On this ground he and Pelopidas were separately charged with a capital offence. It was merely an experiment to try the strength of their popularity; for their conduct, though perhaps it infringed the letter of the law, was manifestly in accordance with the will of the people. It is indeed somewhat surprising that their adversaries should have ventured on such an attempt, and still more that the issue, as we learn from Plutarch, was considered doubtful, because Pelopidas was first brought to trial. Epaminondas, it is said, declared himself willing to die, provided the names of Leuctra, Sparta, and Messene, and the deeds by which his own was connected with them, might be inscribed upon his tomb. Both, however, were acquitted in the most honourable manner; and Pelopidas, less magnanimous or more irritable than his philosophic friend, who would have forgiven the harmless display of malice, afterwards employed the forms of law to crush their principal accusers.^h

Niebuhr remarks that the re-establishment of Messene "is an imperishable monument to Epaminondas," but draws therefrom a somewhat disconcerting moral:

"In the restoration of Messene, Epaminondas obeyed the dictates of prudence and of his own noble heart; and he could not have acted otherwise even if he had foreseen the consequences. It must be observed that this is again one of those cases in which the accomplishment of justice was not followed by happy results. The restoration of Messene produced at a later period of Greek history, terrible consequences. The Messenians being,

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by their peculiar situation, the implacable enemies of Sparta, were obliged to seek support against her; and they preferred doing so at the greatest distance, which made them the humble servants of Macedonia, and the perpetual enemies and traitors of Greece. There was no people so devoted body and soul to King Philip, as the Messenians. The death of Philopœmen is an example of the mischief which Messenia created in Greece, an ineffaceable brand on the name of Messenia. Things which every honest man must desire, are in the end often followed by the saddest consequences." *o*

ATHENS IN LEAGUE WITH SPARTA

In the existing pressure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the states whose interest yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian cause, it was of great importance to hold, and, if possible, improve, their connection with Athens. Ministers accordingly were therefore sent thither, fully empowered to agree upon the system of command and the plan of operations for the next campaign. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time swayed apparently by wise and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponnesians, that, all circumstances considered, it would be most for the interest of the confederacy, and most equitable, that the Athenians should direct operations by sea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephisodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favour by opposing this arrangement. When the proposal of the council was laid before the general assembly (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate state of Solon's constitution, all the measures of executive government were to have their ratification), Cephisodotus persuaded the ill-judging multitude that they were imposed upon. In the Lacedæmonian squadron, he said, the trierarchs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed; but the body of the crews would be helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command scarcely any but slaves and the outcast of nations in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the best men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the sea and of the land forces must be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument; and the assembly voted that the command, both by sea and by land, should be alternately five days with the Athenians, and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this decision of the petulant crowd, singularly adapted to cripple exertion both by sea and land, the Lacedæmonians, pressed by circumstances, thought it prudent to acquiesce.

SECOND INVASION OF PELOPONNESUS

In spring an army was assembled at Corinth to prevent the passage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponnesus. But the superior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They surprised an outpost. Doubting still their means for forcing their way over the rough descent of the Onean mountains, they communicated with the Lacedæmonian polemarch commanding, and, whether through his treachery or his weakness, they obtained a truce, under favour of which they safely joined the forces of their Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans. This junction being effected, they found

themselves far superior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without opposition then they punished the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian interest by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians submitting themselves to the able direction of the Athenian general, Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulsed with some slaughter. Against so great a superiority of force however the abilities of Chabrias could not prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponnesus now seemed open to the Thebans, when the pressure of the Thessalian arms, under the tagus, Alexander of Phæræ, upon their northern allies, and apprehension of its extending to Bœotia itself, called the Thebans suddenly out of the peninsula. All the Peloponnesians of the confederacy then, assuming leave of absence, parted to their several homes.

The dissolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a most fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leisure it afforded seems to have been wanted for composing troubles within Laconia itself. Offensive operations were left to the auxiliaries sent by Dionysius, then ruling in Syracuse; a body remarkable enough, both in itself and for its actions, to deserve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greeks, so excellent that, though scarcely exceeding fifty horsemen, they had given more annoyance to the Thebans, while laying waste the Corinthian lands, than all the rest of the army. After the other troops, on both sides, were withdrawn, this transmarine force alone undertook the invasion of Sicily, defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by assault. Gratified then with glory and plunder they embarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuse.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban councils, profiting from the animosity so extensively prevailing against Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the supremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that, by any management, so many states could be long retained in patient submission to so new a superiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many instances, to a zealous, and sometimes extending to a general, loyalty towards the superior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps singular in the history of mankind. But that deference was paid to a superiority, not suddenly obtained, but growing from the extraordinary institutions under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a superior people, obviously fittest, in the divided and tumultuary state of the Greek nation, to command in war and to arbitrate in peace: whence even still, when the political power of Lacedæmon was so declining, the estimation of the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was such that at the Olympian and other national meetings a Lacedæmonian was an object of curiosity and admiration for strangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The superiority of Athens, also, though in few instances, or for a short time only, supported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon enjoyed, accruing suddenly, yet had resulted from long preparation. Legislation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary succession of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual superiority which the people of other republics saw and felt. But Thebes, without any advantage of ancient prejudice in favour of her pretensions, without any public institutions to be admired, recently emerged from political subjection, possessing indeed a large and disciplined population which might infuse some terror, was yet become so suddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and princi-

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pally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils, and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other state of the confederacy, where military force was not very inferior, a similar blaze of character should occur, that state would presently feel itself equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connection involving an admission of her superiority.

Such a character had been for some time rising among the Arcadians in Lycomedes of Mantinea, a man inferior to none of his country in birth, superior to most in property, one who had already distinguished himself in council as a principal promoter of the Arcadian union, and in arms at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already saw, what afterwards became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly subordinate to the ambition of making Thebes supreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he resolved to oppose. In the general assembly therefore of the Arcadian states, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he represented that "Peloponnesus, among all its various present inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the rest were really strangers. Nor were the Arcadians the most ancient only, they were the most powerful of the Grecian tribes; they were the most numerous, and they excelled in strength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal request. The Lacedæmonians knew their value: they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own interest, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but insist upon equality in command. They had formerly raised Lacedæmon; they were now raising Thebes; and shortly they would find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians."

Flattering thus alternately, and stimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them; and the natural consequence of the submission of the multitude's caprice to an able man's control resulted: the Arcadians were successful, and their successes were brilliant. The Argives invaded Epidauria. The renowned Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies; an assembly was held; the interest of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, against great disadvantage of ground, brought off the Argives without loss. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia; the territory of Asine was ravaged, and the Lacedæmonian polemarch Geranor, who commanded there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incursions, in the common way of Grecian warfare, followed; and when any object invited, neither night, says the contemporary historian, nor weather, nor distance, nor difficulty of way deterred; insomuch that the Arcadians acquired the reputation of being the best soldiers of their time.

Disposed as the Arcadians showed themselves no longer to admit the superiority of Thebes, their strength, their discipline, and their successful activity in arms, though exerted in the cause of the confederacy, could scarcely fail to excite some jealousy and apprehension in the Theban government. No direct breach ensued, but friendship cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppressed; always an extensive description of men, and sometimes of states, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a sovereignty over the people of several towns of Elis, and of the whole district called Triphylia,

on the border against Messenia. In a strong situation in Triphylia, called Lasion, to assist in curbing the inhabitants they had allowed some Arcadian exiles to establish themselves. They at length made common cause with their neighbouring fellow-subjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scilluntines, in opposition to the Eleian government. For support then they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia : they claimed to be Arcadians ; and by a petition addressed to the new united government they desired to be taken under its protection. At the same time the Eleans were pressing for assistance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns which the Lacedæmonians had restored to independency. The Arcadians slighted this application, and declared by a public resolution that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinsmen should be free. Elis became in consequence still more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

The growing schism in the opposing confederacy promised great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, though, through vices in their civil constitution and ill-management in their administration, the Lacedæmonians had lost the best half of their territory, their negotiations abroad still carried weight, and were conducted ably and successfully. It was at this critical time that Philiscus, a Greek of Abydos, arrived as minister from the satrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes, professedly charged to mediate in the king of Persia's name a general peace among the Grecian republics. This new interference of Persia in Grecian affairs was produced by Lacedæmonian intrigue. Philiscus proposed a congress at Delphi ; and deputies from Thebes and from the states of the Theban confederacy readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Persia, so the historian, not their friend, testifies, influenced the Thebans ; for Philiscus requiring, as an indispensable article, that Messenia should return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they positively refused peace but upon condition that Messenia should be free.

This resolution being firmly demonstrated, the negotiation quickly ended, and both sides prepared for war. Philiscus then gave ample proof of his disposition to the Lacedæmonian cause, by employing a large sum of money, entrusted to him by the satrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian service. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionysius of Syracuse, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army ; and, while the Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought under the command of Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia were defeated, with slaughter, if Diodorus may be believed, of more than ten thousand men, and, as all the historians report, without the loss of a single Spartan. After a series of calamities the intelligence of this extraordinary success made such impression at Lacedæmon that tears of joy, says the contemporary historian, beginning with Agesilaus himself, fell from the elders and ephors, and finally from the whole people. Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheless, as no tear of sorrow resulted, this action became celebrated with the title of the "Tearless Battle" of Midea.


EXPEDITION INTO THESSALY

The war with Thessaly now pressed upon Thebes. Still urging Lacedæmon by her confederates and dependents in Peloponnesus, she not only could afford protection to her northern subjects and allies against the successor of the most formidable potentate of the age, but she could aim at

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dominion, or influence which would answer the purpose of dominion, among the populous and wealthy, but ill-constituted cities of Thessaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, occasioned a necessity for measures of protection and defence, the disposition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among those over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandisement for those who might support the revolt. Accordingly Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army under a commission to act there at his discretion; for the advantage however, not of the Thessalians, who had solicited protection, but of the Bœotian people, who pretended to be common protectors: a kind of commission which it has been usual in all ages for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the most corrupt courts, from which such commissions may have issued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pelopidas penetrated to Larissa, and with the co-operation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garrison. Extending negotiations then into Macedonia, he concluded a treaty with Alexander, king of that country, who desired alliance with Thebes, the better to resist the oppression which he felt or feared from the naval power and ambitious policy of Athens, which were continually exerted to extend dominion or influence over every town on every shore of the Ægean. His younger brother, Philip, then a boy, afterwards the great Philip, father of the greater Alexander, is said to have accompanied Pelopidas in his return to Thebes; whether for advantage of education and to extend friendly connection, or, as later writers have affirmed, as a hostage to insure the performance of stipulated conditions.

Pelopidas returning to his command in Thessaly, his usual success failed him. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, venturing as voluntary negotiator for his country within the power of the profligate tagus, he was seized and imprisoned. But Polybius imputes his misfortune to positive imprudence, and an expression of Demosthenes would imply that he was made prisoner in battle. Nor were the exertions of the Theban government to avenge him fortunate. The Bœotarchs, who had ventured far into Thessaly with an army said to have been eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, not finding the support expected from the Thessalian people, were reduced to retreat before the greater force of the tagus; and, in traversing the Thessalian plain pursued by a superior cavalry, they suffered severely. It is attributed to the ability of Epaminondas, serving in an inferior station, but called forth by the voices of the soldiers to supply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not entirely cut off. Negotiation, supported



GREEK OFFICER SACRIFICING ON THE
EVE OF BATTLE

probably by arms, yet not without some concession, procured at length the release of Pelopidas, early in 367.

AN EMBASSY TO PERSIA AND A CONGRESS AT THEBES

The cordial support of Athens, the force of mercenaries to be added by Philiscus, the growing aversion among the Arcadians to the Theban cause, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the pressure of the Thessalian arms upon the Theban confederacy, together seemed likely to restore a decisive superiority to Lacedæmon, at least within her peninsula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils had observed that the first and perhaps the most powerful efficient of this change in circumstances had been negotiation with Persia; and they resolved to direct also their attention to Persia, and try if they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation still more effectually than by arms. A minister from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually resident at the Persian court. Upon this ground a congress of the confederacy was summoned, and, in pursuance of a common resolution, Pelopidas was sent to Susa on the part of Thebes, accompanied by ministers, from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the measure, sent their ministers also, Timagoras and Leon.

Pelopidas was treated by the Persian court with distinguishing honour. A Persian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a rescript from the king in which the terms of his friendship were declared. It required that "the Lacedæmonians should allow the independence of Messenia; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet; that war should be made upon them if they refused; and that, if any Grecian city denied its contingent for such war, the first hostilities should be directed against that city; that those who accepted these terms would be considered as friends of the king, those who refused them as enemies."

If we compare the style and spirit of this rescript, and the manner in which it was offered to united Greece, with the terms and circumstances of the Peace of Antalcidas, we shall hardly discover what has been the ground of distinction between them; why one has been so much reprobated, while the other, little indeed applauded, has in a manner been thrown out of observation by the imposing abundance of panegyric which the consent of ancient and modern writers has bestowed on the magnanimous patriotism of Pelopidas, and of his great associate in politics as in arms, Epaminondas. But we may perhaps be led to think that political principle has been out of view, both in the panegyric and in the reproach; that the merit of individuals has considerably swayed the general mind; yet that the great distinction has rested on party-spirit. If however, leaving the political principles of Pelopidas in that obscurity which we seem without means very satisfactorily to illuminate, we look to his political abilities, we shall see them exhibited in their fairest light, in real splendour, not by his professed panegyrists, but by the candid contemporary historian, not his friend. They are evident in the success of his Persian negotiation, to which that historian has borne full testimony; and that negotiation must unquestionably have been a business abounding with difficulties, and requiring much discernment to conduct and bring to so advantageous a conclusion.

But the Thebans appear to have been too much elated by their success, in this extraordinary and very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold

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through their political conduct; whether their able chiefs now erred, or popular presumption, owing to the badness of their constitution, to which Polybius bears testimony, was not to be restrained. They assumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their summonses for a congress of deputies from the several republics to meet in Thebes were generally obeyed. The Persian who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's rescript in his hand. This was read and interpreted to the congress, while the king's seal appendant was ostentatiously displayed. The Thebans proposed, as the condition of friendship with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies should immediately swear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their respective cities. Readily however, as the congress had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come so prepared to take the law from Thebes.

Not simply objecting to the proposed oath, Lycomedes insisted that "Thebes was not the place in which the congress should have been assembled." The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of resentment, that he was promoting discord in the confederacy, he declared his resolution to hold his seat in the congress no longer; and, the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all retired together. The result seems to have been that the congress broke up without coming to any resolution.

Disappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet resolve to abandon their project of arrogating that supremacy over the Greek nation which Lacedæmon had so long held; long indeed by the voluntary concession of a large majority of it. They sent requisitions separately to every city to accede to the terms proposed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, says the contemporary historian, would bring all severally to compliance. The Corinthians, however, setting the example of a firm refusal, with the added observation, that "they wanted no alliance, no interchange of oaths with the king," it was followed by most of the cities. And thus, continues Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans to acquire the empire of Greece finally failed.

If we refuse to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure for her first successful struggle against the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epaminondas himself with us, who would take no part in the revolution till the business of conspiracy, treachery, and assassination was over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obstinacy with which the Thebans afterwards persisted in asserting dominion over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when proposed upon a condition which might seem, on first view, all that true Grecian patriotism could desire—universal independency. For where was to be found the sanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great interest pervading the country was overborne and lost in the multitude of narrow, yet pressing interests, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No sooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been established than a revolution would have been made, or attempted in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among those towns, how long might Thebes itself have been secure against a second subjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far, then, as these considerations may apologize for the refusal of accession to the treaty of Athens, so far it may also justify the Persian embassy; though scarcely the haughtiness which success in that negotiation seems to have inspired. But what should have been the farther

conduct of Thebes to secure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of surrounding states, or how to insure quiet among those states, without the possession and the use of power to control them, is not so easy to determine. For the business of the honest statesman, amid the seldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of interested neighbours without, is not so easy and obvious as presumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to suppose, and informed knavery often, with interested purposes, to affirm. How ill prepared Greece was at this time for internal quiet, what follows will but concur with all that has preceded of its history to show.^e





CHAPTER XLVI. WHEN THEBES WAS SUPREME

JOINT WORK OF EPAMINONDAS AND PELOPIDAS.

THE Thebans had every inducement to husband their strength and guard their commonwealth against civil divisions, for the number of their adversaries increased with their good fortune. If they could look back with pride on what had been accomplished, still their future was by no means secure. They had indeed baffled the unjustifiable designs of their enemies. The Spartans, who eighteen months before had cherished the hope of decimating the divided Thebans for the benefit of the god, were now reduced to complete impotence, while they were threatened by the Thebans with almost the same fate by which the latter had themselves been confronted; the foundation of a city which offered a safe refuge to all oppressed and outlawed inhabitants of Laconia, had inflicted a mortal wound on the ruling Dorian state; the annihilation of the Peloponnesian league had permanently broken the Spartan supremacy.

But the very rapidity with which the fetters had been shaken off had created many difficulties which the Thebans had to face when they came to reunite the dismembered limbs into a new whole. The hegemony of Sparta, like that of Athens, rested on the foundation of ancient popular tradition; each had its justification in the eminent qualities of the respective states, in the exclusive military training and bravery of the Spartans, in the cultivation and democratic judicial life of the Athenians; all the Greek commonwealth had been pledged to one or the other of these states for a shorter or longer period; consequently subordination to one of them was no disgrace to any town, since the ancestors of its inhabitants had already stood in a similar relation.

The position was quite different in the case of Thebes, which neither by her historical past, nor by the greatness and importance of her intellectual and moral progress and civil institutions, seemed justified and qualified for the assumption of so eminent a position. Much as the Peloponnesians admired the bravery, the discipline, and the excellent disposition of the Theban troops, their military reputation was too recent to allow of its measuring itself in the eyes of the Hellenes with the glory of Sparta's arms and her military practice; and yet warlike courage and bodily dexterity were the only merits which the Thebans could bring forward to support their claim to supremacy in Hellas. They had neglected navigation, though the favourable situation of the country, with its extensive coast on both shores and the excellent roadsteads, especially at Aulis, offered

many advantages; they had at all times shown a disinclination and contempt for commerce and industry, and were consequently often in distress for money; in intellectual and artistic progress, they had not only remained behind Athens and the Hellenes of Asia Minor, but the Dorian states of Sparta, Corinth, Sicyon, and Ægina had also developed a richer culture; the composition of lyrics and the art of playing on the flute were the only accomplishments in which the Bœotians had attained to any skill.

The sense of justice and humanity were little cultivated; savage and cruel in their disposition, they pursued their enemies and their rivals with bloodthirsty passion, so that on his second expedition into the Peloponnesus Epaminondas only saved a number of aristocratic fugitives from Bœotia from an agonising death by denying their origin. Beside this, the inclination of the Thebans to sensual pleasures and their delight in luxurious feasts and banquets, formed a striking contrast to Athenian simplicity and moderation, and to the stern and joyless lives of the Spartans.

It has been already remarked that Epaminondas was free from all these defects and vices and did all in his power to remove them; but he stood so far above his fellow-citizens that his influence was diminished by that very fact. Judging his countrymen by himself, and assuming in them the same virtue and morality, the same enthusiasm for the glory and greatness of their native land as he felt in his own great soul, he drew them into undertakings to which neither their strength nor their capacity was equal; he entered on courses which they, with their defective political training, could not pursue with safety. Consequently it has been justly said that with the corpse of Epaminondas the glory of Thebes was also carried to the grave.

When the period of his command in the field expired, Epaminondas returned home, where he was once more to experience the ingratitude of his fellow-citizens. Not only did the people, now again roused against him, pass him over in the election of the Bœotarchs; it is related that the deluded mob appointed him overseer of roads and canals (*telearchus*), but that by his conscientious administration he gave importance to this insignificant office. Alike in the highest and in the lowest position, this magnanimous man endeavoured to work for the good of his country; his soul was free from the petty human weaknesses which so often cling, like a dark shadow, to talent and worth. This was exhibited in another scene in the year which followed.

From his expedition in Thessaly he, to save Pelopidas, returned joyfully home too late to preserve the Theban state from a disgraceful act of bloodshed. In the interval, armed mobs, stirred up by passionate demagogues, had marched against Orchomenos, where an aristocratic conspiracy was said to have been discovered, had destroyed the detested city, murdered the nobles and chief citizens, and sold the rest into servitude, together with their wives and children. Thus the ancient and famous city of Orchomenos, once the wealthy seat of the Minyæ, disappeared from the number of Greek towns. "Had I been at home," Epaminondas lamented, "this atrocity would never have been committed."

At Susa, in spite of his refusal to bend the knee, Pelopidas had won such high favour with the king, by reason of the fame of his deeds and the recollection of the ancient brotherhood in arms so long subsisting between Thebes and Persia, that the conditions of peace which Artaxerxes declared to the envoys proved to be entirely in accordance with the ideas and interests of Thebes and her skilful representative.

But this award whose fulfilment, and with it the supremacy over Hellas, was entrusted to the Thebans, provoked indignation and resistance in the

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other states. At Athens, the envoy, Timagoras, was condemned to death for his intimacy with Pelopidas; at Sparta, exception was taken to the recognition of the rebellious Messenians; in Arcadia, the people resented the recognition of the Eleian claims to suzerainty over the district of Triphylia, which had joined the Arcadian confederacy, and the deputy, Antiochus, famous as a pugilist and wrestler, vented his anger at home in ridicule of the Persians: "The king," he said, "had bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and door-keepers in large numbers, but in spite of a zealous search he had not been able to find men who should be able to stand against the Hellenes in a fight; abundance of money and wealth was a vain show; the celebrated golden plane tree could hardly give shade to a locust."

Such being the state of opinion, it is not surprising that the acceptance of the peace should have encountered insuperable difficulties. The ambassadors summoned to Thebes in the ensuing spring had refused to swear to it, and the Arcadian deputy, Lycomedes, even took exception to the place of assembly, by means of which the Thebans would have invested their town with their pre-eminence, and went away in anger. The endeavours to win the concurrence of the separate states were not more successful, so the general war resumed its course and with it sanguinary party strifes in every city, and flight and pursuit for the defeated. In vain Epaminondas, on his third Peloponnesian expedition, endeavoured to bring the principles of mildness and civil tolerance into effect in Achaia: the Theban commonwealth, stirred up by the Arcadian democrats, abolished his institutions and sent magistrates into the country, who countenanced the expulsion of the oligarchs and the erection of unrestricted popular governments, until the refugees assembled together, forcibly compelled their recall, and once more carried Achaia over to the Spartan alliance, whereupon the persecution assumed a different form.

In Sicyon, Ephron, a rich and influential citizen, supported by Arcadian and Argive auxiliaries, placed the new commonwealth under the protection of Thebes, and with the confiscated property of his expelled enemies he obtained mercenaries, with whose aid he made himself ruler of his native city in the capacity of demagogue and tyrant. By wiles and treachery, robberies and crimes, he maintained himself in the government for a long time until, having at last been overpowered and put to flight by an aristocratic army, he was slain in Thebes, whither some of his enemies had followed him, under the eyes of the council. The perpetrator of the deed managed to defend himself so skilfully that he got away unpunished; but the townspeople of Sicyon honoured Ephron, who had freed them from the yoke of the aristocrats, as the second founder of their city.

Thus throughout the Peloponnesus the most terrible party rage was the order of the day; communities and individuals, prompted by passion and revenge, perpetrated wild misdeeds and crimes. Isocrates, in his oration called *Archidamus*, thus paints the situation in the Peloponnesus:

"Every town has its adversaries about it and therefore we have devastation of the country, destruction of the towns, subversion of governments, disregard of laws. Men fear their enemies less than their own fellow-citizens. The rich would rather throw their property into the sea than give to the poor; on the other hand the poor desire nothing better than to rob the rich. The sacrifices are suspended; men slay each other at the altars. There are more exiles from a single city than formerly in the whole of Peloponnesus."

The laws had no longer any general application, since Sparta's ancient supremacy had collapsed and the pre-eminence of Thebes was not yet

established ; all common interests vanished, and in alliances and secessions nothing but the momentary advantage was kept in view. Even religious awe was extinguished in men's minds ; votive offerings and temple treasures were seized to pay hired troops. The greatest feats of arms were performed for no purpose ; valour and military spirit were squandered in adventurous combats and enterprises. Yet in spite of this distracted state of affairs, Sparta could not recover her power and consideration : the want of a free citizenship and the restoration of Messenia ceased to be spoken of. With the help of Syracusan mercenaries, whom the younger Dionysius had sent them, the generals did, indeed, succeed in bringing the town of Sellasia with the passes into Arcadia again under their power ; but on the other hand they had to permit not only the Corinthians, but the Phliasians also, the most faithful of the allies of Sparta, who had executed many brave deeds and conducted so many expeditions against the Sicyonians and Argives, to conclude a separate peace with Thebes. They themselves refused to accede



LOOKING TOWARDS CORINTH FROM ARCADIA

to it, notwithstanding the persuasions of their friends, because they could not make up their minds to the recognition of the independence of the Messenians, which was demanded.

As Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and other cities now allied themselves with Thebes, Arcadia drew up an offensive and defensive treaty with Athens, which Epaminondas, in his capacity of ambassador, vainly endeavoured to counteract by a speech against Callistratus before the national council of the Ten Thousand. But Lycomedes, the creator of this union, was not to reap the fruit of his labours. On his way home he met with a violent death at the hands of some Arcadian refugees. The dream of an Arcadian hegemony was buried with him. No other statesman had it in his power to lead that uncultivated, divided nation of soldiers and shepherds, strangers as they were to any sort of common action, to higher and patriotic aims. Petty border feuds again claimed the whole attention of the Arcadians, and the increasing estrangement between Mantinea and Tegea, and the jealousy of both in regard to Megalopolis, stood in the way of the strengthening

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and development of a united state. Soon disputes with Elis led to other complications fraught with consequences which necessitated a new military expedition on the part of the Thebans.

After the battle of Leuctra, the Eleans had again taken possession of the territory of Triphylia, which had once been wrested from them by the Spartans; but the inhabitants, dissatisfied with the rule of the Eleans, had turned to the Arcadians, and, appealing to the ancient connection between the races, had requested and obtained admission into the Arcadian confederacy. The suzerainty of Elis over Triphylia had indeed, as it seems, been recognised in the peace prescribed by Persia, but the latter's dispositions received as little acceptance here as elsewhere; both sides were therefore prepared to vindicate their claims by force of arms.

To strengthen their position the Eleans concluded an alliance with Sparta, and vacated the border town of Lasion on the western slope of Erymanthus in favour of a flock of oligarchical refugees from Arcadia. In this settlement the government of Megalopolis saw a hostile intention, for from thence the oligarchs had no difficulty in forming traitorous connections with those who thought with them, and they seized the occasion to visit the peaceful little country with a devastating war. They carried robbery and destruction up to the very capital, excited a sanguinary civil war between the popular party and the oligarchical families, and reduced the inhabitants to a state of despair. In vain the Eleans brought about an invasion of the friendly Spartans into the territory of Megalopolis; after an heroic struggle the Arcadians forced the Lacedæmonian king, Archidamus, to surrender the strong hill town of Cromnus, which he had occupied by a rapid movement, and forced him to a disastrous retreat during which a hundred Lacedæmonian citizens fell into the hands of the victors. And as it chanced that the time of the Olympic games was approaching, they took possession of the holy site and bestowed the office of judge of the contests on the Pisatans.

The Eleans, furious at this infringement of their rights, marched up with their collected forces, and on the sacred ground, before the eyes of those assembled for the festival, they delivered a sanguinary battle which was finally decided against them. The Eleans had to give place to the Arcadians and content themselves with omitting the festival from the series of Olympic years, on the grounds of its having been celebrated contrary to law and order. The confederate government of Arcadia laid hands on the temple treasure, and in spite of the protests of the Mantineans, they used it to defray the cost of the war and the pay of the national levies and *epariti*. This was the means of widening the schism and the difference of opinion which had for some time divided the Arcadian confederacy into two camps and which now developed into a breach destined to lead to serious consequences. The Mantineans, outnumbered in the federal government and national council, again turned to the Spartans, while the democrats of Tegea, who then had the upper hand in the guidance of united Arcadia, adhered to the alliance with Thebes.

THE END OF PELOPIDAS

The Thebans had taken no part in these events in the Peloponnesus, beyond keeping provincial governors (harmosts) and garrisons in Tegea, Sicyon, and other towns, for the purpose of guarding their own interests and upholding the cause of democracy. The complications in Thessaly and the

attempts to wrest the command of the sea from the Athenians claimed the whole energies of their statesmen. Soon after the retreat of Epaminondas and Pelopidas after the latter's rescue, Alexander, the cruel tyrant of Phæræ, had renewed his plans of conquest in the mountain country, had subdued the cities of the Achæans, Phthiotæ, and Magnetes, and extended his military despotism over the whole country. Then the oppressed and threatened people turned once more for help to the Thebans, who now fitted out an army of seven thousand hoplites to take stern vengeance on the disturber of the peace. But on the day fixed for its departure, an eclipse of the sun occurred and spread so much terror among the superstitious people that the march had to be put off.

Pelopidas, the Bœotarch who had been selected to conduct the enterprise, was not deterred by the agitation, and determined to carry out the project by himself at the head of two hundred horsemen, in the conviction that on his appearance the Thessalian soldiers and volunteers would join him in crowds. And his expectation was not disappointed. Even at Pharsalus he found himself in command of such forces that he ventured on storming the line of hills called the "Dogs' heads" (*Cynoscephalæ*), which Alexander held with a far superior army. The ranks of the enemy were already giving way, when Pelopidas, in the passion of victory and revenge, rushed impetuously on the flying tyrant, and, becoming separated from his own men, met his death at the spears of the bodyguard. Maddened by the fall of their brave leader, the Thebans and their companions in arms put renewed energy into the attack and won a complete victory. And as if the honour of this success belonged solely to the dead general, they piled the spoils and weapons of the slaughtered foes beside his corpse, as a monument of the victory, and abandoned themselves to the deepest grief. Many cut off their hair or their horses' manes, many spent the day in their tents without eating or lighting a fire. And as the body was being conducted to Thebes, all the towns along the route manifested their sympathy by mourning celebrations, and in his own native city the great funeral solemnities bore witness to the deep love and honour of the Thebans for the fellow-citizen who had served them so well, who from the glorious days of the Liberation had been always included in the number of the Bœotarchs, whose name was associated with the most famous deeds and the proudest memories, and who had been no less eminent for his chivalrous and magnanimous character than for his heroic spirit and pure patriotism.

The whole army now took the field to avenge his death, and, in conjunction with the Thessalian allies, they soon reduced the tyrant to such straits that he sued for peace, which the victors with more magnanimity than foresight granted him. He had to abandon the towns he had occupied, to confine his dominion to Phære and the surrounding district, and to render military service to the Thebans; a compact which neither provided satisfactory security against the repetition of similar encroachments, nor secured a powerful alliance for the Thebans. As in the Peloponnesus, so now there prevailed in Thessaly a condition of distraction and dissolution which was eventually to prepare for the northern conqueror a way into the heart of Hellas.

For seven years longer Alexander continued his nefarious practices, henceforth turning his attention to piracy and the plunder of the islands and coast towns. In the general confusion his audacity went so far that he is said to have once surprised the Piræus in an unguarded hour and carried off a rich booty. Finally, at the instigation of his wife, Thebe, who on a former

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occasion had excited the imprisoned Pelopidas against her cruel husband, he was murdered by her brothers.

The piratical expeditions with which Alexander afflicted the northern waters, were probably carried out with the knowledge and connivance of Thebes, for the purpose of annoying the Athenians. The latter, especially since their alliance with Sparta, had made the most eager efforts to re-establish their influence over the maritime states, though their means and forces were small and the mercenaries and peltasts who manned their ships little fitted to supply the place of the old citizen army. Iphicrates cruised in the northern waters for the space of three years, attempted to bring back the Greek cities in Thrace and Macedon to their old relation with Athens and made repeated attacks on Amphipolis, but without being able to win back this ancient colony; Timotheus brought Samos into subjection, and, with the help of the revolted Persian governor Ariobarzanes, acquired Sestos and Crithote on the Thracian Chersonesus, whereby the relations with Byzantium were restored, and also won a firm footing in Chalcidice and the Gulf of Thermaë by taking Potidea and Torone, as well as Methone and Pella. These successes of Athens, though small in comparison with her former dominion over the sea and coasts, and insecure as they were in face of the impossibility of permanently providing the hired troops with pay and maintenance, nevertheless awakened the jealousy of Thebes.

The keen eye of Epaminondas did not fail to perceive that his native city could only attain to the hegemony of Greece if the dominion of the sea were snatched from the Athenians, and being as bold and enterprising as he was sagacious, he endeavoured to persuade his countrymen to build a fleet. Thebes must become a sea power, in order, as he declared before the people, "to place the Propylæa of the Athenian Acropolis under the superintendence of the Cadmea"; not that he wished to accustom the powerful national forces to the seductive life on the sea and thus weaken the heavy-armed militia; the old manner of warfare, which rested on custom, education, and tradition, was to continue to prevail; but for the foundation of a secure ascendancy in Hellas a fleet was indispensable. And so influential was the voice of this great general, that in spite of the remonstrance of the popular orator Meneclidas, the Theban people immediately resolved on the building and equipment of a hundred triremes and the establishment of shipyards of their own.

He undertook the command of the fleet himself, and on his advent the islands of Chios and Rhodes and the important city of Byzantium were induced to fall away from Athens. It was the fatal destiny of Thebes and her patriotic leader, that her appearance had everywhere the effect of simply loosening such federal bonds as still existed and dissolving every force, but without enabling her to herself attain to the height of a great power. No foreign enemy could have found a means so well adapted to break up and enfeeble the Hellenic nation as was the disorganising and disintegrating policy of the Theban general.

THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA AND THE DEATH OF EPAMINONDAS

The Athenians, bitterly incensed against the Thebans by this attack on their maritime supremacy and by the occupation of the town of Oropus on the northeastern frontier, soon found an opportunity to give expression to their resentment by force of arms. In Arcadia the enmity of the supporters

of a democratic state unity, with the Tegeans at their head, against the defenders of the ancient federative organisation on oligarchical principles under the standard of the Mantineans, had reached a high pitch of excitement. This was further aggravated when the Theban governor arrested a number of citizens from Mantinea who were of Laconian sympathies, and were, at Tegea, celebrating the peace recently concluded with Elis, and intended so it was said to take advantage of the opportunity for executing a stratagem which would place the city in the hands of the Spartans: frightened by the threatening attitude of their sympathisers, the governor again set them at liberty; but on complaint being made to Thebes, the aggrieved Arcadians were not granted the desired satisfaction for this breach of the peace, but on the contrary the release of the prisoners was disapproved. On this the Mantineans allied themselves with the Lacedæmonians, Athenians, Achæans, and Eleans and prepared for a struggle against the popular party in Tegea and Megalopolis, and against the Thebans who were approaching for the protection of the latter and the preservation of the frontier against Lacedæmon.

In the spring of 362 Epaminondas and a considerable army, composed of allied Bœotians, Eubœans, Thessalians, etc., marched through Nemea without opposition to Tegea, where he collected around him the troops of the Arcadian, Argive, and Messenian allies, whilst the opposing side assembled its forces in Mantinea. When the Theban general learned that Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonian host were on the way to the meeting-place of their party, and had already reached the town of Pellana on the Arcadian and Laconian frontier, he hastily resolved to advance on Sparta by a night march, and seize the enemy's capital, thus denuded of its defenders "like an empty nest."

The plan would doubtless have succeeded, since only a small number of the citizens had remained behind, had not Agesilaus, hearing of the project from a deserter, despatched a messenger to his son Archidamus, with the command immediately to put the town in a state of defence, while he himself at once set out to return with the cavalry. Thus when Epaminondas approached the banks of the Eurotas, almost at the same time as Agesilaus, he found the town so well watched and guarded that, after a hotly contested battle, he was obliged to retreat with loss. It is true that he managed to penetrate to the market-place, but when he attempted to storm the upper parts of the town, he encountered an obstinate resistance. The inhabitants had torn down their houses and thrown up barricades to bar the approaches. Protected by these dispositions and filled with patriotic enthusiasm, the Spartan citizenhood under the guidance of the old king and his son performed prodigies of valour, and gave evidence, as Xenophon says, that no one can easily maintain his ground against despairing men. Even women and children did their part by hurling down stones, utensils, and missiles from the roofs. Isadas, the handsome son of Phœbidas, specially distinguished himself by his heroism and his bold courage. Disappointed in his expectation of surprising Sparta undefended, Epaminondas desisted from the attack, the more readily when he learned that the whole united army of the enemy had started from Mantinea and was hastening to the assistance of the beleaguered town.

He now formed a plan to make up for the failure of the undertaking against Sparta by seizing the town of Mantinea, now denuded of its troops, or at least to make spoil of the stores of grain and herds of cattle collected there. Deceiving the enemy by means of watchfires and a simulated attack, he led the army back to Tegea by a difficult night march. Here he accorded

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a brief rest to the wearied infantry, whilst the mounted troops proceeded towards Mantinea. But Epaminondas now learned that fate was against him. The Thebans had already advanced to within seven stadia [nearly a mile] of the town, when they saw the Athenian auxiliaries entering the gates from the opposite side. Hegesilaus, the leader of the Athenian cavalry, was assailed by the prayers of the Mantineans, in alarm for their property; and he at once marched against the enemy, to whom he gave battle under the walls of the town, in a sharp cavalry action, from which the Athenians eventually retired victorious. In this preliminary skirmish at Mantinea fell the brave Athenian leaders, Cephisodorus, and Gryllus, the son of Xenophon. Their memory continued to be held in honour by their fellow-citizens. Gryllus was represented by the painter Euphron in the act of slaying a Theban with his spear, and this circumstance, by a confusion of the previous encounter with the main battle, may have given rise to the story that Epaminondas was slain by Gryllus.


The whole forces of both sides now concentrated in the plain of Mantinea and Tegea, determined to settle the future destiny of Greece by a decisive battle. Epaminondas had pressing reasons for desiring this settlement. The two unsuccessful enterprises, with the strenuous and fruitless marches, were not calculated to enhance his reputation as a general; while a long delay would necessarily weaken the spirit of his soldiers, who adhered to him with such great devotion, and would undermine the prestige of Thebes. Moreover his followers were superior in number to those of the adversary. The size of his army is set down at thirty thousand heavy-armed troops and three thousand cavalry; the enemy's force was smaller by ten thousand hoplites and one thousand mounted men. Faith in Epaminondas had inspired his soldiers with the greatest enthusiasm for the conflict; they eagerly polished their helmets and shields and sharpened their swords and lances. while the Arcadian club-men assumed the Theban ensign.

In the disposition and order of his line of battle, Epaminondas followed much the same plan which had been found to answer so well at Leuctra, only that in order to deceive and make sure of the foe, he caused the troops ranged for the conflict to make a feint of retreating towards the western heights; then, when the enemy, fancying that the encounter would be delayed, began to break up their order of battle, he suddenly made a rapid and vehement attack, so that at the first onset his left wing, where the Thebans and the bravest of the allies had their place, broke the enemy's left, composed of the Spartans and Mantineans. Already the whole wing had begun to waver and plunge into a confused flight; when, at the very moment that he was about to win a complete victory, Epaminondas, pressing boldly forward, was struck in the breast by a spear thrown from the hostile ranks, and with such force that the shaft broke off and the iron remained fixed in the wound.

He was still living when he was carried out of the mêlée; but the fall of their leader shook the spirit and confidence of the troops, and produced such dismay that the advancing column stood still as if paralysed and did not take advantage of its victory. The right wing, composed of the cavalry and peltasts, was overthrown by the opposing Athenians, and thus the battle remained without any decisive issue, though the Thebans retained possession of the field and the Spartans were the first to seek the usual truce for the burial of the dead, a request always looked upon as a token of defeat. Both sides, however, set up memorials of victory. Epaminondas was sorely wounded and the physicians had declared to him that the

withdrawal of the spear would result in his death. From a wooded height he watched the battle, covering the wound with his hand, till his shield, which had been lost in the press, was brought to him and he was informed of the victory of the Thebans. Then he said, "Now it is time to die." He asked for his two brave colleagues, Daiphantus and Iolaïdas, and when he learned that they, too, had lost their lives in the battle he advised his fellow-citizens to make peace; and then with a quiet and serene countenance he drew the iron from his breast and delivered up his heroic spirit. His beloved Cephisodorus had fallen at his side and was buried by him on the field of battle. When the friends who stood round him lamented that he left no children, he is reported to have said jestingly, "Am I not leaving you two noble daughters—the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea?"^b

In the last chapter of his *Hellenics*, Xenophon does tardy justice to the genius of Epaminondas, whom he did not even name in his account of Leuctra. In this splendid and Panhellenic struggle at Mantinea, Xenophon lost a son who died bravely and was honoured with a monument by the Mantineans. The father, himself a soldier, has left a less perishable monument in his history, the conclusion of which we quote as follows:^a



SANDALS WORN BY GREEK SOLDIERS

XENOPHON'S ACCOUNT OF HOW EPAMINONDAS FOUGHT

Epaminondas now reflecting that he must quit Tegæa in a few days—as the time allotted for the expedition would soon expire—and that, if he should leave those undefended to whom he came as an ally, they would be besieged and reduced by their enemies and he himself would suffer greatly in reputation—having been repulsed at Sparta with a numerous body of heavy-armed troops, by a handful of men; having been defeated in a cavalry engagement at Mantinea, and having been the cause, by his hostile expedition into the Peloponnesus, of the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Achæans, Eleans, and Athenians, forming a union—judged it, on these accounts, impossible for him to withdraw without fighting; for he thought that, if he should conquer, he should cause all his previous failures to be forgotten, and conceived that, if he should die, his death would be glorious in the endeavour to leave the sovereignty of the Peloponnesus to his country. That he should have reasoned thus, appears to me by no means surprising, for such are the reasonings of men ambitious of honour; but that he had so disciplined his army that they sank under no toil, either by night or day, shrank from no danger, and, though they had but scanty provisions, were yet eager to obey, seems to me far more wonderful. For when at last he gave them orders to prepare for battle, the cavalry, at his word, began eagerly to polish their helmets; the heavy-armed troops of the Arcadians marked the clubs on their shields as if they were Thebans, and all the men sharpened their spears and swords, and brightened their bucklers.

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After he had led them out thus prepared, it is well to consider how he acted. First of all, as was to be expected, he drew up his forces, and in doing so appeared to give manifest indications that he was preparing for a battle. When his army however was drawn up as he wished, he did not lead it the shortest way towards the enemy, but conducted it towards the mountains on the west and over against Tegea—so as to produce a notion in the enemy that he would not fight that day; for when he came near the hills, after his main body was drawn out to its full extent, he ordered his men to file their arms at the foot of the heights, so that he appeared to be encamping. By acting in this manner, he slackened the determination for engaging which was in the hearts of most of the enemy, and caused them to quit their posts on the field. But when he had brought up to the front the companies which on the march had been in the wings, and had made the part in which he was posted strong and in the shape of a wedge, he immediately gave orders for his troops to resume their arms, and began to advance, while they followed him. As for the enemy, when they saw the Thebans advancing, contrary to what they had expected, not one of them could remain quiet, but some ran to their posts, some formed themselves in line, others bridled their horses, others put on their breastplates; yet all were more like men going to suffer some harm than to inflict any on others.

Epaninondas led on his army like a ship of war with its beak directed against the enemy, expecting that wherever he assailed and cut through their ranks he would spread disaster among their whole force; for he was prepared to settle the contest with the strongest part of his troops; the weaker he had removed to a distance, knowing that if they were defeated they would cause dismay among his own men and confidence in the enemy. The enemy, on their part, had drawn up their cavalry like a body of heavy-armed infantry, of a close depth, without any foot to support them; but Epaninondas, on the contrary, had formed of his cavalry a strong wedge-like body, and had posted companies of foot to support them, judging that when he had broken through the cavalry of the enemy, he would have defeated their whole force, since it is hard to find men that will stand when they see some of their own party in flight; and that the Athenians might not send succour from their left wing to the part of the enemy nearest them, he posted over against them, upon some high grounds, parties of horse and heavy-armed foot, wishing to inspire them with the apprehension that if they stirred to aid others his own troops would attack them in the rear.

Such was the mode in which he commenced the engagement; nor was he deceived in his expectations; for, being successful in the part on which he made his attack, he forced the whole body of the enemy to take to flight. But when he himself fell, those who survived him could make no efficient use of their victory; for though the main body of the enemy fled before them, his heavy-armed troops killed none of them, nor even advanced beyond the spot where the charge took place; and though the cavalry also retreated, his own cavalry did not pursue, or make any slaughter either of horse or foot, but, like men who had been conquered, slipped away in trepidation amidst their fleeing adversaries. The other parties of foot, indeed, and the peltasts, who had shared in the success of the cavalry, advanced up to the enemy's left wing, as if masters of the field, but there the greater part of them were put to the sword by the Athenians.

When the conflict was ended, the result of it was quite contrary to what all men had expected that it would be; for as almost the whole of Greece was assembled on the occasion, and arrayed in the field, there was no one

who did not suppose that, if a battle took place, one side would conquer and be masters, and the other be conquered and become subjects; but the divine power so ordered the event, that both parties erected trophies as being victorious, neither side hindering the other in the erection; both parties, as conquerors, restored the dead under a truce, and both parties, as defeated, received them under truce; and neither party, though each asserted the victory to be its own, was seen to gain any more, either in land, or towns, or authority, than it possessed before the battle took place. Indeed there was still greater confusion and disturbance in Greece after the conflict than there had been before it.^c

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF EPAMINONDAS

Scarcely any character in Grecian history has been judged with so much unanimity as Epaminondas. He has obtained a meed of admiration — from all, sincere and hearty; from some, enthusiastic. Cicero pronounces him to be the first man of Greece. The judgment of Polybius, though not summed up so emphatically in a single epithet, is delivered in a manner hardly less significant and laudatory. Nor was it merely historians or critics who formed this judgment. The best men of action, combining the soldier and the patriot, such as Timoleon and Philopœmen, set before them Epaminondas as their model to copy. The remark has been often made, and suggests itself whenever we speak of Epaminondas, though its full force will be felt only when we come to follow the subsequent history — that with him the dignity and commanding influence of Thebes both began and ended. His period of active political life comprehends sixteen years, from the resurrection of Thebes into a free community, by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonian harmost and garrison, and the subversion of the ruling oligarchy — to the fatal day of Mantinea, 379–362 B.C. His prominent and unparalleled ascendancy belongs to the last eight years, from the victory of Leuctra, 371 B.C. Throughout this whole period, both all that we know and all that we can reasonably divine, fully bear out the judgment of Polybius and Cicero, who had the means of knowing much more. And this too, let it be observed, though Epaminondas is tried by a severe canon; for the chief contemporary witness remaining is one decidedly hostile. Even the philo-Laconian Xenophon finds neither misdeeds nor omissions to reveal in the capital enemy of Sparta — mentions him only to record what is honourable, and manifests the perverting bias mainly by suppressing or slurring over his triumphs. The man whose eloquence bearded Agesilaus at the congress immediately preceding the battle of Leuctra — who in that battle stripped Sparta of her glory, and transferred the wreath to Thebes, who a few months afterwards, not only ravaged all the virgin territory of Laconia, but cut off the best half of it for the restitution of independent Messene, and erected the hostile Arcadian community of Megalopolis on its frontier — the author of these fatal disasters inspires in Xenophon such intolerable chagrin and antipathy, that in the first two he keeps back the name, and in the third, suppresses the thing done. But in the last campaign, preceding the battle of Mantinea, whereby Sparta incurred no positive loss, and where the death of Epaminondas softened every predisposition against him, there was no such violent pressure upon the fidelity of the historian. Accordingly, the concluding chapter of Xenophon's *Hellenica* contains a panegyric, ample and unqualified, upon the military merits of the Theban general; upon his

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daring enterprise, his comprehensive foresight, his care to avoid unnecessary exposure of soldiers, his excellent discipline, his well-combined tactics, his fertility of aggressive resource in striking at the weak points of the enemy, who content themselves with following and parrying his blows (to use a simile of Demosthenes) like an unskilful pugilist, and only succeed in doing so by signal aid from accident.

The effort of strategic genius — then for the first time devised and applied, of bringing an irresistible force of attack to bear on one point of the hostile line, while the rest of his army was kept comparatively back until the action had been thus decided — is clearly noted by Xenophon, together with its triumphant effect, at the battle of Mantinea; though the very same combination on the field of Leuctra is slurred over in his description, as if it were so commonplace as not to require any mention of the chief with whom it originated. Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus — how great is the superiority of the first — even in the narrative of Xenophon, the earnest panegyrist of the other! How manifestly are we made to see that nothing except the fatal spear-wound at Mantinea prevented him from reaping the fruit of a series of admirable arrangements, and from becoming arbiter of Peloponnesus, including Sparta herself!

The military merits alone of Epaminondas, had they merely belonged to a general of mercenaries, combined with nothing praiseworthy in other ways, would have stamped him as a man of high and original genius, above every other Greek, antecedent or contemporary. But it is the peculiar excellence of this great man that we are not compelled to borrow from one side of his character in order to compensate deficiencies in another. His splendid military capacity was never prostituted to personal ends — neither to avarice, nor ambition, nor overweening vanity. Poor at the beginning of his life, he left at the end of it not enough to pay his funeral expenses; having despised the many opportunities for enrichment which his position afforded, as well as the richest offers from foreigners. Of ambition he had so little, by natural temperament, that his friends accused him of torpor. But as soon as the perilous exposure of Thebes required it, he displayed as much energy in her defence as the most ambitious of her citizens, without any of that captious exigence, frequent in ambitious men, as to the amount of glorification or deference due to him from his countrymen. And his personal vanity was so faintly kindled, even after the prodigious success at Leuctra, that we find him serving in Thessaly as a private hoplite in the ranks, and in the city as an ædile or inferior street magistrate, under the title of *Telearchus*. An illustrious specimen of that capacity and good-will, both to command and to be commanded, which Aristotle pronounces to form in their combination the characteristic feature of the worthy citizen. He once incurred the displeasure of his fellow-citizens for his wise and moderate policy in Achaia, which they were ill-judged enough to reverse. We cannot doubt also that he was frequently attacked by political censors and enemies — the condition of eminence in every free state; but neither of these causes ruffled the dignified calmness of his political course. As he never courted popularity by unworthy arts, so he bore unpopularity without murmurs, and without any angry renunciation of patriotic duty.

The mildness of his antipathies against political opponents at home was undeviating; and, what is even more remarkable, amidst the precedents and practice of the Grecian world, his hostility against foreign enemies, Boeotian dissentients, and Theban exiles, was uniformly free from reactionary vengeance. Sufficient proofs have been adduced in the preceding pages of this

rare union of attributes in the same individual — of lofty disinterestedness, not merely as to corrupt gains, but as to the more seductive irritabilities of ambition, combined with a just measure of attachment towards partisans, and unparalleled gentleness towards enemies. His friendship with Pelopidas was never disturbed during the fifteen years of their joint political career — an absence of jealousy signal and creditable to both, though most creditable to Pelopidas, the richer, as well as the inferior man of the two. To both, and to the harmonious co-operation of both, Thebes owed her short-lived splendour and ascendancy. Yet when we compare the one with the other, we not only miss in Pelopidas the transcendent strategic genius and conspicuous eloquence, but even the constant vigilance and prudence, which never deserted his friend. If Pelopidas had had Epaminondas as his companion in Thessaly, he would hardly have trusted himself to the good faith, nor tasted the dungeon, of the Phærean Alexander; nor would he have rushed forward to certain destruction, in a transport of frenzy, at the view of that hated tyrant in the subsequent battle.

In eloquence, Epaminondas would doubtless have found superiors at Athens; but at Thebes, he had neither equal, nor predecessor, nor successor. Under the new phase into which Thebes passed by the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians out of the Cadmea, such a gift was second in importance only to the great strategic qualities; while the combination of both elevated their possessor into the envoy, the counsellor, the debater, of his country, as well as her minister at war and commander-in-chief. The shame of acknowledging Thebes as leading state in Greece, embodied in the current phrases about Boeotian stupidity, would be sensibly mitigated, when her representative in an assembled congress spoke with the flowing abundance of the Homeric Ulysses, instead of the loud, brief, and hurried bluster of Menelaus. The possession of such eloquence, amidst the uninspiring atmosphere of Thebes, implied far greater mental force than a similar accomplishment would have betokened at Athens. In Epaminondas, it was steadily associated with thought and action — that triple combination of thinking, speaking, and acting which Isocrates and other Athenian sophists set before their hearers as the stock and qualification for meritorious civic life. To the bodily training and soldier-like practice, common to all Thebans, Epaminondas added an ardent intellectual impulse and a range of discussion with the philosophical men around, peculiar to himself.

He was not floated into public life by the accident of birth or wealth, nor hoisted and propped up by oligarchical clubs, nor even determined to it originally by any spontaneous ambition of his own. But the great revolution of 379 B.C., which expelled from Thebes both the Lacedæmonian garrison and the local oligarchy who ruled by its aid, forced him forward by the strongest obligations both of duty and interest; since nothing but an energetic defence could rescue both him and every other free Theban from slavery. It was by the like necessity that the American Revolution, and the first French Revolution, thrust into the front rank the most instructed and capable men of the country, whether ambitious by temperament or not. As the pressure of the time impelled Epaminondas forward, so it also disposed his countrymen to look out for a competent leader wherever he was to be found; and in no other living man could they obtain the same union of the soldier, the general, the orator, and the patriot. Looking through all Grecian history, it is only in Pericles that we find the like many-sided excellence; for though much inferior to Epaminondas as a general, Pericles must be held superior to him as a statesman. But it is alike true of both,

[362-361 B.C.]

and their mark tends much to illustrate the sources of Grecian excellence — that neither sprang exclusively from the school of practice and experience. They both brought to that school minds exercised in the conversation of the most instructed philosophers and sophists accessible to them — trained to varied intellectual combinations and to a larger range of subjects than those that came before the public assembly, familiarised with reasonings which the scrupulous piety of Nicias forswore, and which the devoted military patriotism of Pelopidas disdained.

On one point, the policy recommended by Epaminondas to his countrymen appears of questionable wisdom — his advice to compete with Athens for transmarine and naval power. One cannot recognise in this advice the same accurate estimate of permanent causes — the same long-sighted view of the conditions of strength to Thebes and of weakness to her enemies, which dictated the foundation of Messene and Megalopolis. These two towns, when once founded, took such firm root, that Sparta could not persuade even her own allies to aid in effacing them; a clear proof of the sound reasoning on which their founder had proceeded.

What Epaminondas would have done — whether he would have followed out maxims equally prudent and penetrating, if he had survived the victory of Mantinea — is a point which we cannot pretend to divine. He would have found himself then on a pinnacle of glory, and invested with a plenitude of power, such as no Greek ever held without abusing. But all that we know of Epaminondas justifies the conjecture that he would have been found equal, more than any other Greek, even to this great trial; and that his untimely death shut him out from a future not less honourable to himself, than beneficial to Thebes and to Greece generally.^d

CONFUSION FOLLOWING EPAMINONDAS' FALL

So died Epaminondas — the ablest commander, the noblest citizen, the most stainless character, even if not the greatest statesman, of the Hellenic world. The combination of military ability with civic virtue, of physical prowess with intellectual culture and eloquence, of manly daring with humane feeling, of practical capacity with ideal aspirations, of merit with modesty, of glory with humility, of power with simplicity, has won for him the admiration of succeeding generations as of the whole ancient world. He fell a victim to a deplorable fratricidal war; and cities and citizens, instead of weeping and beating their breasts in penitence over the corpse of the high-hearted man, disputed jealously among themselves the honour of having transfixed his breast with the fatal thrust. But so great was his influence even in death that soon afterwards all the Greek states followed the counsel he had given, and concluded a peace based upon the recognition of the *status quo*. They all needed time for coming to fresh resolutions and collecting fresh forces. Sparta alone held aloof, refusing with obstinate consistency to acknowledge the political independence of Messenia.

Agésilas did not long survive his opponent. A year after the battle of Mantinea he marched to Egypt with an army of mercenaries, accompanied by thirty Spartan citizens, to fight in the service of the rebellious kings Tachus and Nectanebo against the Persians, out of revenge for Messenia's having been declared independent by Artaxerxes. But he obtained little glory. Instead of being appointed commander-in-chief of the fighting forces, as he had hoped, he had to be contented with the position of a

captain of mercenaries. The Egyptians were very much disappointed in their expectations to behold, instead of a knightly king, crowned with glory, an old man of eighty years, infirm, of small stature and poorly dressed, who, devoid of oriental royal dignity and the pomp and ceremonious state of oriental sovereigns, sat down on the grassy ground with his followers, to partake of a meagre repast. After some time he took his departure from the country of the Nile to return by way of Cyrene to his own country, having been royally rewarded by Nectanebo, but without having met the Persians in combat. He died however en route. His mourning companions took the corpse of Agesilaus to bury it in Sparta, the city of his fathers, whose highest power and decline he had witnessed. As regards generalship and magnanimity of disposition, the Spartan king stood far below the Theban citizen, but he equalled him in simplicity of habits and manner of living, in voluntary poverty, in disdain of earthly possessions, and in incorruptible rectitude and ardent patriotism. These were the last bright stars in free Hellas; but while Epaminondas shone forth to the following generations as the model of a high-hearted patriotic general, Agesilaus pointed out to his countrymen the adventurous path of foreign travel and accustomed them to the dishonourable vocation of a mercenary, to which henceforth Sparta's rude citizens abandoned themselves more and more.

The Athenians made better use of their opportunities. As long as Epaminondas lived, their enterprises on the sea were without success; so that several of their generals were condemned to death (as Leosthenes and Callisthenes), or a mulct was imposed upon them (as on Cephisodotus) because they had caused losses to the state on account of their negligence and their unsuccessful undertakings. But after the battle of Mantinea they not only succeeded in driving the Thebans completely away from the sea, but they were again successful in uniting the greatest part of the islands of the Ægean Sea (Eubœa, Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.) under their sea-hegemony; in strengthening their sovereignty in Chalcidice and Macedonia and on the Gulf of Thermæ; and, after the murder of the Thracian sovereign Cotys by two youths who had been brought up in Athens, in again bringing the Thracian Chersonesus under their power and opening the sea-route to the fertile coast of the Pontus by way of the Hellespont. As the murderers of a tyrant, the young men of Ænus, who executed this "divine" deed on the person of Cotys, were honoured by the Athenians with the rights of citizens and golden wreaths. But with the good fortune of the Athenians there also returned the old abuses. The dissolute mercenaries, poorly paid, committed acts of extortion and oppression; the sovereign assembly often violated the treaties based on equality of rights, imposed taxes and aids upon the allied cities, divided territories among Attic colonists (cleruchs) and forgot the principles of clemency and moderation which had won so many willing members to their second maritime confederation. Besides, there was a scarcity of able leaders to replace the aging generals, such as Iphicrates, Chabrias, and Timotheus, and there was also a waning of patriotic feeling. Having their own advantage more in mind than the greatness of their city, the generals tried to acquire independent possessions and dominions, an effort which was assisted by the increasing number of the mercenaries, who were taking the place of all the citizen levies. These conditions, combined with the secret intrigues of the Thebans, caused new dissatisfaction and brought about the deplorable social war, which led to the dissolution of the second Athenian maritime confederation at a time when the latter already

[360 B.C.]

comprised about seventy cities, as the disasters of the last years of the Peloponnesian War were the cause of the dissolution of the first.^b

Great changes have taken place in the history of Greece since we left the Athenian soldiers and sailors rotting in the mines of Sicily. A greater change is about to take place. Of this it is only necessary to say the word "Macedonia." Before we trace the rise of these northerners it will be well to glance briefly at the busy circumstances of Sicily.^a



E. W. Barker

GREEK TERRA-COTTA

(In the British Museum)



CHAPTER XLVII. THE TYRANTS IN SICILY

THE absence of federation which, in spite of the military superiority of the Greeks, had enabled the king of Persia to become master of Asiatic Greece and arbitrator of European Greece, was about to deliver the whole of Sicily into the hands of the Carthaginians. Segesta, constantly at war with Selinus, called them to its assistance in 410 B.C., as some years previously it had called the Athenians. Carthage was then at the height of its power; it raised an army of one hundred thousand mercenaries, and sent them into Sicily under the command of Hannibal, grandson of that Hamilcar who had been killed in the battle of Himera seventy years before this time. He began by taking possession of Segesta in the name of Carthage, then besieged Selinus, which was taken in 409, after a heroic resistance. All the inhabitants, men and women, old and young, were slain. The town was razed to the ground; the scattered ruins of its temples are still to be seen. Himera was also entirely destroyed. The greater number of the inhabitants had succeeded in escaping before the last assault; about three thousand were left, whom Hannibal put to death by torture in the very spot where his grandfather had fallen.

Two years later he again came to Sicily with Himilco, at the head of 180,000 mercenaries, Libyans, Numidians, Iberians, and Campanians, and laid siege to the large commercial town of Agrigentum, the most important in Sicily, after Syracuse. He caused the tombs to be destroyed for the construction of an embankment; the plague which spread through his army, and of which he himself died, was considered a vengeance of the gods. His colleague, Himilco, offered up children to Moloch as an expiatory sacrifice. The Syracusans, who had come to the help of Agrigentum, completely defeated a body of forty thousand Iberians and Campanians. But the town began to suffer from famine; a large convoy of corn was seized by the Carthaginians. The inhabitants of Agrigentum, spoilt by luxury and incapable of supporting the fatigues of military life, had taken mercenaries into their service; these latter betrayed them and passed over to the enemy. At the end of a siege of six months, most of the inhabitants left the town by night and escaped to Gela. Himilco immediately entered the town and gave it up to pillage, massacred all the inhabitants who were left, and destroyed the buildings which had been erected by the Carthaginian prisoners after the battle of Himera. Magnificent ruins still bear witness to the splendour of Agrigentum, the richest of the Greek cities and one of the most beautiful in the world (406).

Since her victory over the Athenian armies and fleets, Syracuse had become the capital of Sicily. A new code of laws, drawn up by Diocles, had

[410-405 B.C.]

made her constitution still more democratic; magistrates were chosen by vote. Little is known of this legislation, which is said to have been adopted by other Siceliot towns. The chief of the aristocratic party, Hermocrates, who had distinguished himself in the war against the Athenians, commanded the fleet sent by Syracuse to the help of the Peloponnesians and was defeated with them at Cyzicus. The Syracusans withdrew from a war in which they had nothing to gain and exiled Hermocrates. He tried to return to his country by armed force and perished in the attempt. Among those who had fought with him was a scribe named Dionysius, who was wounded and left for dead; this circumstance enabled him to escape the sentence of exile which was pronounced on the followers of Hermocrates.

The invasion of the Carthaginians was a cause of fresh dissensions in Syracuse; the destruction of Agrigentum awoke alarm. In the assembly of the people Dionysius accused the generals of having caused, either through incapacity or treason, the misfortunes of Sicily. He was condemned to a fine for factiousness; but a rich townsman, the historian Philistus, promised to pay all the fines laid upon him. He continued to stir up the people and persuaded them to choose a new government, of which he himself was a member. The only thing still wanting was to get rid of his colleagues. "They also are betraying the republic," he said, "and have sold themselves to the Carthaginians." He recalled the exiles in order to make partisans of them. He was sent to Gela to rescue the people from the oppression of the rich; he condemned certain of the nobles to death and distributed their wealth among his soldiers. On his return to Syracuse he saw the people coming out of the theatre: "It is thus that you are deceived," he exclaimed, "they keep you amused by entertainments while the soldiers are without the necessities of life and the enemy is at our gates. Take back the power you have confided to me; I will not share it with traitors." His friends said: "What honesty! He is the only upright man!" And he was made generalissimo of the troops, whose pay he immediately doubled. Then, as Pisistratus and so many others had done, he declared that there were plots to kill him because he loved the people. A bodyguard was given him of six hundred men; these he increased to a thousand and chose them from among the poorest of the people. He enlisted mercenaries, set the slaves free, filled all the government appointments with men who were devoted to his fortune, and settled in the isle of Ortygia where were situated the arsenals, and which commanded the great port (405).

Now that he had become tyrant through the folly of the people, Dionysius fought the Carthaginians with no more success than the generals whom he had accused of treason. He was able to save neither Gela nor Camarina, and the entire population of these two towns sought refuge in Syracuse. Displeased by these defeats, the Syracusans tried, but all too late, to rise against him. Supported by his mercenaries, he stifled the rebellion, caused some of his enemies to be put to death, drove the others from the town, and maintained his power by fear. A plague stopped the advance of the Carthaginians and induced them to make peace, but they kept all their conquests, that is to say, more than two-thirds of Sicily, in exchange for a clause of the treaty recognising Dionysius as tyrant of Syracuse. He fortified the isle of Ortygia, of which he made a citadel, after driving out the inhabitants so as to make room for his mercenaries. Then he gave the best part of the Syracusan territory to his friends and to the magistrates; the rest was distributed in equal shares between the citizens, the freed slaves and resident foreigners. This alteration of property caused a rebellion; he shut himself up in his fortress of

Ortygia and his mercenaries re-established his authority. Some days later, while the inhabitants were in the fields, busy gathering in the harvest, he had all the houses searched and all weapons removed. When he believed himself absolute master of Syracuse, he wished to extend his rule over the whole of the eastern coast of Sicily. He seized Ætna and Enna, destroyed Naxos and Catana which had been delivered to him by traitors, and sold their inhabitants in order to give their land to the Sicels of the surrounding country and to his Campanian mercenaries. The terrified Leontines opened their gates to him, and were carried to Syracuse. The Rhegians, uneasy at his advance, sent an army into Sicily; but, abandoned by the Messenians, who had at first joined them, they made peace with Dionysius and returned to Italy.

In the meanwhile Dionysius was preparing to revenge himself on the Carthaginians. Syracuse was surrounded by ramparts which made it impregnable. Workmen from all the neighbouring countries, attracted by lure of high wages, were employed to make large supplies of arms and implements of war; it was at this time that the catapult was invented to cast stones and arrows. Numerous warships were built, some of them on a new model with four or five benches of rowers. When these preparations were completed, and mercenaries collected from all sides, Dionysius declared war on the Carthaginians, and, at the head of an army of eighty thousand men, successively re-captured all the towns which they had conquered seven years previously, Gela, Camarina, Agrigentum, Selinus, and Himera, besieged their principal fortress in the isle of Motya on the western point of Sicily, and took it by means of his implements of war (397). But the following year, Himilco landed at Panormus with one hundred thousand men, regained Motya and all the conquests of Dionysius, destroyed Messana, and after a naval victory in sight of Catana, besieged Syracuse by land and sea. Dionysius was obliged to restore to the citizens the arms which he had taken from them, and soon signs of rebellion were again perceived. But once more plague broke out in the Carthaginian army. Himilco paid three hundred talents [£60,000 or \$300,000] for permission to withdraw with the Carthaginian citizens who were in his army, abandoning all his mercenaries who were taken and sold as slaves. Hostilities continued for two years longer and the Carthaginians finally made peace by giving up Tauromenium (392).

This treaty gave Dionysius the opportunity to turn his arms against Magna Græcia, the conquest of which he had long meditated. He took Caulonia, Hipponium, Seylacium, and gave their lands to the Locrians who had made an alliance with him. Croton also fell into his power in spite of a vigorous resistance. Rhegium, which he had besieged for eleven months, finally surrendered; he destroyed the town and sold all the inhabitants. The Syracusan exiles sought refuge on the Adriatic Sea and settled at Ancona (387). Dionysius then ravaged the coasts of Latium and Etruria, where he stole a thousand talents from the temple of Agylla, made alliance with the Gauls who had just taken Ronie, enlisted a large number of them among his mercenaries and sent them to the assistance of Sparta which had lately renewed its alliance with Syracuse and was now at war with the Thebans. He founded the town of Lissus in Illyria, and re-established an exiled prince in Epirus. In 383 he made a third war against the Carthaginians; after an alternation of victories and defeats, a treaty was made which fixed the limits of their possessions at the river Halycus. In a fourth war he took Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, but, his fleet being destroyed opposite Lilybæum, he did not succeed in driving them from the island, and the war again ended in a treaty.

[368-357 B.C.]

In the opinion of the ancients, Dionysius was a type of the godless, avaricious, and suspicious tyrant. In the temple of Zeus, in Syracuse, he replaced by a woollen coat the god's golden coat, which, he said, was too cold in winter and too warm in summer. He stole the gold beard of Æsculapius, saying that the son ought not to have a beard when his father, Apollo, had none. As he was returning with a favourable wind from an expedition in which he had pillaged the temples : " See," he said, " how the gods protect the ungodly."

Numerous anecdotes have been told concerning his perpetual fear: he always wore armour under his clothes; his room was surrounded by a moat which could only be crossed by a drawbridge; when he addressed the people it was from the summit of a tower; he did not dare to be shaved, and his daughters singed off his beard for him with red-hot nutshells; the prisons of the quarries were so arranged that he could hear the least sound. One of his courtiers named Damocles was vaunting the happiness of kings: Dionysius said that he would allow him to enjoy it for one hour; he let him lie on a couch of purple and gold before a well-spread table, and suddenly Damocles perceived above his head a sword suspended by a single hair. This anecdote has all the appearance of a philosophic parable. Those which have been related concerning the literary pretensions of Dionysius are scarcely more trustworthy. It is said that he sent Philoxenus, who found fault with his verses, to the quarries; some time later he had him brought back and read him other verses which he thought better; Philoxenus stood up and said, " Let them take me back to the quarries."

Dionysius had often sent tragedies to the Athenian competitions, but had had little success; however, at the time of the Theban war he had sent mercenaries to the help of the Spartans, then the allies of the Athenians; the latter, therefore, gave the prize to one of his tragedies called *Hector's Ransom*. He celebrated this success by a magnificent feast at which he drank to excess. He was seized with a fever from which he died. Some say that he was poisoned by his son. He had reigned thirty-eight years (367).

Dionysius was a bigamist; he married on the same day a Locrian and a Syracusan, the latter the daughter of one of his most active partisans. The son of the former, named like himself Dionysius, and who is called Dionysius the Younger, succeeded him without difficulty. Dion, the brother of his second wife, had no trouble in taking the direction of the government, for the new tyrant had no thought for anything but pleasure. Dion, a great admirer of Plato, had caused him to come to Sicily during the lifetime of Dionysius the Elder, who received the philosopher somewhat badly and even, it is said, had him sold as a slave. This should have taught Plato that a king's court is not the place for a philosopher; however, after the death of Dionysius and the accession of his son, he returned at the request of Dion, and was very well received by Dionysius the Younger, who took lessons in geometry, and decreased the magnificence of the table, but made no attempt to carry out Plato's communistic theories in Syracuse. After a short time, however, he imagined that Dion was only interesting him in philosophy to distract his attention from public affairs. He intercepted a letter which Dion had written to the Carthaginian generals asking them to address their communications only to himself. Dionysius showed the letter to Dion, accused him of treason, and made him embark for Italy. Plato was unable to obtain his friend's recall. Dionysius even forced his sister Arete, the wife of Dion, to

marry some one else (360). Dion returned three years later with eight hundred men whom he had recruited in Greece and appeared before Syracuse during the absence of Dionysius. The inhabitants received him enthusiastically, but he was unable to seize the citadel of Ortygia (357). Dionysius, defeated in a naval fight, retired to Locris with his riches, but his son Apollocrates remained in the citadel whose garrison held out for a long time. There were disputes in the town; an agrarian law was demanded. Dion was driven away, then recalled, and famine having forced the garrison of Ortygia to surrender, he remained master of Syracuse. Now was the time to re-establish the republic as he had promised; but his love of philosophy did not carry him to the point of renouncing power. He even caused a demagogue to be put to death for having demanded the destruction of the fortress of Ortygia which had been built for the sole purpose of protecting tyranny against the people. A short time after this, he, himself, was assassinated by the Athenian Callippus, his intimate friend (354).

After a reign of two years Callippus was overthrown by Hipparinus and Nysæus, brothers of Dionysius and nephews of Dion. They reigned successively. Then Dionysius, after ten years' absence, seized the city by surprise. But Hicetas, tyrant of the Leontines, forced him to take refuge in the isle of Ortygia. In the midst of this anarchy, and threatened, moreover, by an attack of the Carthaginians, the Syracusans implored help from Corinth, who sent one of her citizens, Timoleon, to the aid of her colony. Timoleon had previously saved the life of his brother Timophanes in a battle. Later on Timophanes had tried to usurp the tyranny at Corinth, and Timoleon joined his brother's murderers. Haunted by his mother's curse and troubled by his conscience, he was living in retirement when the Corinthians entrusted him with the mission of delivering Syracuse from tyranny. He set out with twelve hundred men, and after escaping the Carthaginian fleet, landed at Tauromenium, on the east coast of Sicily. When he reached Syracuse, Dionysius was besieged in his fortress by Hicetas; seeing that he could not defend himself against two enemies at the same time, rather than make terms with Hicetas, he offered to deliver Ortygia up to Timoleon on condition that he should be sent to Corinth with his riches. He lived there for several years, and is said to have opened a school for children, to have at least a similitude of royalty.

Timoleon occupied Ortygia; but his position was difficult, for Hicetas had called the Carthaginians to his assistance, and, under command of Mago, they filled the port with one hundred and fifty vessels and the town with six thousand men. Fortunately Timoleon received from Corinth a reinforcement of ten vessels filled with troops. Catana and other Greek towns along the coast declared for him. Mago, on learning that the Corinthian garrison had succeeded in seizing Achradina, the principal suburb of Syracuse, believed that Hicetas had betrayed him, and feared lest all the Greeks should unite against him. He embarked his soldiers and set sail for Carthage. Hicetas, left with only his own troops, could no longer resist: he returned to Leontini with his army, and Timoleon, without the loss of a single man, was master of Syracuse.


He began by doing what Dion had refused to do; he destroyed the fortress of Ortygia, built on its site courts of justice and restored to power the democratic legislation of Diocles. The town was half deserted; he recalled the exiles, and caused it to be proclaimed at the public games in Greece that Syracuse required colonists. Sixty thousand men answered this appeal. In order to relieve public poverty, he distributed the unoccupied lands to the

[343-337 B.C.]

poor, and sold the statues of the tyrants, except that of Gelo, the conqueror of the Carthaginians. He then turned his attention to the overthrow of tyranny in the other Siceliot towns, and began by forcing Hicetas to live simply as a private citizen. Leptines, tyrant of Engyum, consented to go to the Peloponnesus, as Dionysius had done, for Timoleon was anxious to show the Greeks the tyrants whom he had driven from Sicily. He also seized Apollonia and Entella and restored them their freedom. All the Greek towns sided with him, because he allowed them self-government according to their own inclination. Following their example, several Sican and Sicel towns asked to be admitted into alliance with him.

Terrified by this commencement of a league between the towns, and by the increasing prosperity of Syracuse, the Carthaginians landed seventy thousand men at Lilybæum. Timoleon, who had only succeeded in collecting an army of eleven thousand men, advanced nevertheless against the enemy, whom he surprised on the banks of the brook Crimisus on Selinuntine territory. He established himself in a strong position, attacked the Carthaginians as they were crossing the river, and killed ten thousand of them, of whom three thousand were Carthaginian citizens. He imposed no onerous conditions, for Syracuse was not in a position to carry on a prolonged war: the limits of their territory were fixed at the river Halycus, to the west of Agrigentum, and they agreed to give no more help to the tyrants (338). Timoleon overcame those who were still left; Hicetas, who had again seized the power, was put to death, as were also Mamercus, tyrant of Catana, Hippon, tyrant of Messina, and some others. Timoleon then helped in the rebuilding and repopling of the towns destroyed by the Carthaginians, Gela and Agrigentum, for instance, drove from Ætna a band of Campanians, Dionysius' former mercenaries, who had made the town into a retreat for brigands. At last, his work being complete, he abdicated the power. But he always retained the great moral authority; towards the end of his life he became blind, and whenever there was an important discussion he was carried into the market place and his advice was always followed. He died eight years after his arrival in Sicily (337), and the expenses of his funeral were paid from the public treasury. The Syracusans instituted annual games in his honour, "because," said the decree, "he drove away the tyrants, defeated the barbarians, repopled the towns, and restored to the Siceliots their laws and institutions."^b





CHAPTER XLVIII. THE RISE OF MACEDONIA

WE have seen that Greece was never a unified nation. There was even dispute, throughout the history of the Greeks as a people, as to just who were included under the caption "Greek." In particular the question rose in reference to the Macedonians when they came to power under the leadership of King Philip, father of Alexander the Great. The Macedonians spoke a dialect of the Greek language, and Philip ardently contended that he and his people were entitled to be considered as true Greeks. The claim was hotly contested so long as the people of Greece, in the narrower sense, had the power to hold out against the man whom they regarded as a usurper ; but in the end the claim of Philip received official recognition, and his subjugation of Greece was not regarded as the conquest of a foreigner, but merely as establishing the hegemony of one Greek state over the others, Macedonia now taking that leadership which had been held in turn by Athens, Sparta, and Thebes.

In the broadest view this way of regarding the Macedonians as really Greeks was, perhaps, not illogical. The question of the exact origin of the Hellenes is still much in doubt, but the more the matter is investigated, the more certain it becomes that this wonderful people was a mixed race. Throughout history everywhere, the ethnologist points out that it is the mixed race which develops the greatest potentialities ; and the case of Greece is no exception to the rule. One speaks of the Greeks as Aryans, and, therefore, naturally associates them with the Persians and Indians on the one hand and the Germanic races on the other. Yet, in point of fact, it is probably only in relation to their speech that any such close affinity exists. If the theory of the "Mediterranean race" with its central African origin be true, then the Greeks considered ethnologically were much more closely associated with the so-called Hamitic Egyptians and the so-called Semitic Hebrews, Babylonians, Assyrians and Phœnicians, than they were with the other so-called Aryan races.

All discussion of this exact point is still somewhat problematical, but it is quite clear to the most casual physical inspection that the Greek is of a physical type much more closely akin to the dark-skinned and dark-eyed Mediterranean races than to the fair-skinned, blue-eyed, Indo-Germanic tribes. Yet the language of the Greeks is unequivocally of the Indo-Germanic family. Quite possibly, the explanation of this anomaly may be found in the theory of a prehistoric invasion of Greece by a Germanic race from

the north, which mingled with the Mediterranean race already in possession of the soil, and gave to it the elements of the Indo-Germanic language, yet failed to stamp the traits of its physical personality upon the original occupants of the little peninsula. Whoever will, for a moment, consider the known history of the English people as an ethnic race contrasted with the history of the language which they speak, will at once see how very misleading may be any inferences as to racial status based solely upon the English language, were not such checked by other historical sources of information. This is but one case of many that might be given illustrating how philologists have slowly awakened to the fact that inferences based solely upon philological evidence must not be made too confidently in their application to questions of ethnology pure and simple. And so with the case of the Greeks, the fact of their Aryan speech must not blind us to the probability that, as a race, the Hellenes were not closely akin in recent times to the other races speaking Indo-Germanic languages. That the Greeks came to their favoured land from some unknown region and that they found a population there before them which gradually disappeared, presumably by intermingling with the invaders, we have already viewed as a current tradition.

But this is only one item of the evidence which makes it clear that when one uses the word "Greek" he is speaking of a mixed race with no certain proof of common lineage and often with no stronger bond than that supplied by a common language. In one sense, then, whoever spoke the Greek language as his mother tongue was a Greek, whether the place of his nativity were the little peninsula of Greece proper, or an *Ægean* island, or the coast of Asia Minor, or the island of Sicily, or southern Italy, or Macedonia.

Yet, from another point of view, it is quite clear that the Macedonians were in some respects different in temperament from the typical Greeks and, in particular, from the typical Athenians. One can hardly imagine a Philip or an Alexander as being of Athenian birth. We have learned to revere the Athenian for his culture, his love of the beautiful, his artistic instincts, and exceptionally for his abstract philosophy. But with all this one cannot escape the feeling that, in some sense, the Athenian even of the most brilliant period was a child. He was vain, arrogant, emotional, vacillating; in short, the reverse of all that usually goes to make a great leader or a great political people. The Spartan, to be sure, was more akin to the Macedonian, but rarely indeed did any Spartan show that breadth of political view which characterised Philip and Alexander, and at least the germs of which were latent in a considerable company of their associates and generals. And, indeed, in viewing the Macedonian race as a whole one is forced to the conclusion that here was a sturdier race, of firmer fibre, if also, and perhaps inevitably, of a lower æsthetic plane and a less elaborated culture.

In accordance then as one views the case from one point of view or another, it might be made to appear that Philip was right in claiming that his kingdom was a part of Greece; or that the Athenians were right in combating that claim. But, whatever the theoretical right of the matter, here, as always in the history of nations, Might made the practical or political Right, and the Might lay with Philip. He was a great soldier, and he came at a time when the power of Greece proper had been almost utterly shattered by internal dissensions. Still, it was his desire to effect a peaceful conquest; he sought to rule Greece, but to rule it by diplomacy rather than by the sword, and he well-nigh succeeded. But for the stubborn resistance of Athens, urged on by Demosthenes, he would probably have gained all that he sought without striking a single warlike

blow against the people whom he was pleased to regard as his fellow-Greeks but the hostility of Athens at last made an appeal to arms inevitable, and on the field of Chæronea Philip proved the sword to be mightier than voice or pen, and effected the utter subjugation of all Greece.

This accomplished, Philip was ready for that invasion of Persia which he had long planned. But, just as his preparations were completed, he was struck down by the hand of an assassin. His ambition was thus cut short, his life-work left unfinished. What he would have accomplished had he lived remains, of course, problematical. He was only in middle life when he fell, and he had already demonstrated that his powers were of the first order, and it is not improbable, had he been permitted to undertake the Asiatic invasion, which he planned, that he would have carried it out successfully. But all comment on such a question as this is, of course, idle. As the case stands, Philip's glory has been almost eclipsed by that of his more brilliant son, and the history of the rise of Macedon seems important to after ages not so much because it is the history of the overthrow of the Grecian independence, as because it is the history of the preparation for Alexander. The narrative of this preparation we must now view in some detail before passing on to the events of that extraordinary period which has been stamped in history for all time as the Age of Alexander the Great.^a

EARLY HISTORY OF MACEDONIA

Æschylus attributes to King Pelasgus of Argos the statement that the dwellings of his people, named Pelasgians after him, extended to the clear waters of the Strymon, enclosing in their sweep the highlands of Dodona, the district about Pindus, and the wide region of Pæonia. According to the old soldier of Marathon, the inhabitants of the lands watered by the Haliaemon and the Axius were of the same race as those ancient populations which occupied the regions extending from Olympus to the Tænarum, and to the west of Pindus. This high mountain that separates Thessaly from Epirus and the highlands of Dodona forms in its northwestern slope, as far as the Schar-Dagh of ancient Scardus, the wall that divides Macedonia and Illyria, then turns eastward to the source of the Strymon and continues at the left of the river southeastward under the name of Orbelus, till it reaches the coast, thus forming a natural boundary between Macedonia and Pæonia, and keeping off the Thracian populations in the east and north. Within this enclosed territory, crossed by the Haliaemon, the Axius with its tributaries, and the Strymon, are a second and third mountain chain which, concentric like that of Pindus-Scardus-Orbelus, enclose the inner coast lands, Pella and Thessalonica. Hemmed in this double circle of valleys, through which break three streams, those of Haliaemon and Axius making their way side by side to the sea, the inhabitants of this district are set apart by nature as forming a sort of hermit race with the lowlands of the coast as their common territorial centre.

According to Herodotus the people, called Dorians at a later period, were crowded out of Thessaly and established themselves near Pindus in the Haliaemon valley, being known there under the name of Macedonians. According to other accounts Argæus, from whom the Macedonians are supposed to descend, came from Argos in Orestis and settled in the region about the source of the Haliaemon, which explains the origin of the name, *argæad*, given to the house of the king. There are other traditions, widely


ceived at that time, which assert that three brothers, Heraclidæ of the princely Argive race that sprang from Temenus, travelled north to Illyria, then penetrated into Macedonia and settled at Edessa, close to the mighty falls which mark the entrance of the waters into the fruitful coast lands. In Edessa, also called Egæ, Perdiccas, youngest of the three brothers, founded the kingdom that was to include in its steady growth and unite in the name of Macedonia the neighbouring districts of Emathia, Mygdonia, Bottia, Pieria, and Amphaxitis.

They belonged to the same Pelasgic race that once peopled all the Hellenic land; but were looked upon by the Hellenes, to whose degree of cultivation they by no means attained, as nothing more than barbarians or semi-barbarians. The religion of the Macedonians and their customs, attest this common origin; and although on the frontiers there was some intermingling with Thracians and Illyrians, the Macedonian speech resembled strongly the older Hellenic dialects.

Up to a very late day the *hetæri* were retained in the Macedonian system of warfare. Entering the land, as they indubitably did, with the founding of the kingdom, the Macedonian Heraclidæ met the same fate as their forerunners in the Peloponnesus, who, immigrants in a foreign land, were under the necessity of establishing right and might for themselves by the complete overthrow of the native power; with the only difference that here, more than in other Doric lands, the mingling of old and new traits formed a whole, which, retaining the vigour as well as the rough moroseness of the forefathers, presented a picture of heroic times in its least poetic aspect. Certain of the customs were like those of the ancient Franks; the warrior who had never slain a foe must wear the halter about his neck; the hunter who had never brought down a wild boar on the run must sit at the banquet, not recline. At the burning of a dead body the daughter of the deceased was the one designated to extinguish the flames of the pyre after the corpse was consumed; it is also related that the trophies won by Perdiccas in his first victory over the native tribes were torn, in obedience to the will of the gods, by a lion as a sign that friends had been gained, not enemies defeated; and it ever after remained a Macedonian custom never to erect trophies on defeating a foe, whether Hellenic or barbarian, a custom observed by both Philip after Charonea, and Alexander after the conquest of the Persians and Hindus.

The throne belonged by hereditary right to the reigning race, but the succession was not always so clearly fixed as to exclude all doubt or dispute. The greater the power wielded by royalty, the greater were the wisdom and ability made necessary on the part of those in whom it was vested, and it only too frequently happened that an indolent, incapable minor had to yield the throne in favour of his able brother or cousin.

There was still another danger. Numerous examples show that to the younger sons of kings, also to aliens, portions of the land were yielded over



MEDALLION OF PHILIP II

to become hereditary possessions, under suzerainty of the king, it is true, but with such princely privileges and control that the owners were at liberty to maintain troops of their own. Arrhidæus, the younger brother of the first Alexander, had thus come into possession of the principality of Elymiotis in the upper part of the country, which descended from generation to generation of his race; and to Perdiccas' brother Philip was given an estate on the upper Axios. The kingdom could not gain in power so long as these princely lines were not under complete subjection, and so long as the Pæones, the Agrianes, and the Lyncestæ supported them by establishing independent princes on their borders. Alexander I appears to have been the first to force the Lyncestæ, the Pæones, the Orestæ, and the Tymphæi to recognise the Macedonian supremacy, but the princes of those races retained their rank and all their princely possessions.

Of the constitution and administration of Macedonia too little has been handed down to enable us to judge accurately of the extent of the king's power; but when we are told that King Archelaus, during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, brought into use an entire new set of regulations that Philip II, in order to make uniform the currency of his realm, instituted throughout an improved system of coinage and also brought about a complete reform in military affairs, we cannot but conclude that to the kingdom belonged a power both great and widespread. Certainly habit and custom had a great deal to do with establishing right and made up for the deficiencies of the constitution. It can be said of the Macedonian rule that it as little resembled that of Asiatic despotism as its people were far removed from the bondage of slavery. "Macedonians are free men," says an ancient writer. Not penestæ like the mass of the populations of Thessaly, not helots like the Spartans, they were a peasant race, holding independent and hereditary property and possessing a common system of laws and local courts, but all bound to give military service when called upon by the king of the land. Even at a later period the military forces were still held to be a union of the general population, with a place in the public assemblies, councils, and courts of law.

In this army a numerous aristocracy came prominently to the front under the name of *hetæroi*, or "companions of war," as they are called in the songs of Homer. The members of this class can scarcely be designated as nobles, since the distinguishing marks of their condition were simply large possessions, noble origin, and a close connection with the person of the king, who always rewarded their faithful service with presents and honours. Neither did the families of those princely lines that formerly held independent possessions in the upper country and retained them even after coming under the suzerainty of the more powerful Macedonian kingdom hold aloof, but with their followers submitted themselves to the conditions that prevailed in the kingdom. Large cities, in the Hellenic sense of the word, were not to be found in these lands peopled by aristocrats and peasants; the settlements of the coast were independent Hellenic colonies, in striking contrast to the settlements of the interior.

About the time of the Persian War, under the reign of the first Alexander, there began to appear unmistakable signs of an understanding between Macedonia and Greece. Already Alexander's father had given refuge to Hippias, son of Pisistratus, after his flight from Athens, and had bestowed upon him lands in the Macedonian domain. Alexander himself, being obliged to follow the Persian army into Hellas, had exerted every means in his power—notably at the battle of Platæa—to assist the Greeks; and by reason of

[479-390 B.C.]

his descent from the Teminedians of Argos, which procured him admission to the Olympian games, had been declared a Hellene.

Like him, Alexander's immediate successors applied themselves with varying energy and ability to bringing their country into the closest possible touch with the trade, the political life, and the culture of the Greeks. The proximity of the rich commercial colonies of Chalcidice, that brought them into close and frequent relations with the main powers of Hellas, who, continually at war with each other, sought or feared the Macedonian influence; the almost constant, internal strife with which Hellas herself was torn and which drove many distinguished men from home to seek peace and honour at the wealthy court of Pella—were causes which acted powerfully to promote Macedonia's advance.

Particularly rich in progress and events was the reign of Archelaus. Though the rest of Hellas was torn and distracted by the Peloponnesian War, under his able guidance Macedonia made constant strides forward. He built fortresses, which the land had previously lacked, laid out streets, and developed the organisation of the army, "accomplishing," says Thucydides, "more for the good of Macedonia than all the eight kings that had preceded him." He founded festival games patterned after those of Hellas at Dion, not far from the grave of Orpheus, at which homage was paid to Olympian Zeus and the Muses. His court, the rallying-point of poets and artists and the common centre for all the Macedonian aristocracy, was a model for the growth of the entire race, and Archelaus himself passed in the eyes of his contemporaries for the richest and most fortunate of men.

Upon the reign of Archelaus followed a period of intensified internal strife, brought about probably by a reaction against the innovations introduced by the growing royal power and directed against the new customs and culture instituted by the court. These modern tendencies found, as was natural, their chief supporters among the princely families and a portion of the *hetæri*, and were furthered by the politics of the leading Hellenic states, whereas the mass of the people, it appears, were quite indifferent to the advantages they offered.

Even in King Archelaus' time there had been an uprising led by the Lyncestian prince Arrhibæus, in concert with the Elymean Sirrhas, either to avenge the removal of the rightful heir to the throne, or to support the claim of Amyntas, the son of Arrhidæus who was grandson to the Amyntas whom Perdiccas caused to disappear. Archelaus had obtained peace by giving his elder daughter in marriage to Sirrhas, and his younger to Amyntas. He was killed, according to tradition, while on a hunting expedition. His son Orestes, who was a minor, succeeded him under the regency of Æropus, but the regent murdered Orestes, and himself became king. Æropus was undoubtedly the son of that Arrhibæus who belonged to the Bacchiadæ line of Lyncestians settled on the borders of Illyria that had so frequently aided his forefathers in their uprisings against the Macedonian kings. The conduct of Æropus and of his sons and grandsons during the next sixty years shows them to have persistently opposed the new monarchical tendencies of the royal house, and to have steadily upheld the laxer system of former times. The constant succession of revolts and the frequent changes of sovereigns that followed are proof of the struggles that were constantly being waged between the members of the royal line and the particularist party.

Æropus was well able to uphold the dignity of his rank, but at his death in 392 Amyntas took possession of the throne; he was murdered by Derdas in 391 and Æropus' son, Pausanias, became king. He was deposed in his

turn by that Amyntas, son of Arrhidæus (390-369 B.C.), in whose person the oldest line of the royal house came again into its rights.

The years of his reign were marked by internal disorders that made Macedonia ready to fall an easy prey to any attack. Summoned possibly by the Lyncestians, the Illyrians broke into the land and devastated it, defeated the army of the king, and forced the king himself to take flight beyond the borders. Argæus had been on the throne two years, whether he was Pausanias' brother or a Lyncestian remains undecided. But aided by Thessaly Amyntas returned, and regained the kingdom, which he found in wretched plight, all the cities and coast lands being in the power of the Olynthians, while even Pella had shut its doors against the king.

There followed as a result of the Peace of Antalcidas, the expedition of the Spartans against Olynthus, which was joined by Amyntas, also by Derdas, prince of Elimeia, with four hundred horsemen. But success was not so easy as had been anticipated, and Derdas was taken prisoner. When Olynthus was finally subdued (380 B.C.), Thebes rose in revolt, and Sparta was defeated at Naxos and at Leuctra. Olynthus renewed the Chalcidian alliance; and Jason of Phæræ, uniting the Thessalian powers, compelled Amyntas III to enter his alliance. On the threshold of a brilliant success Jason was assassinated (370 B.C.). The irresolute Amyntas had not succeeded in upholding his sovereignty, and a little later he died. He was succeeded by the oldest of his three sons, Alexander II, who was soon brought by his mother, the Elymean, to an untimely end. She had for long been carrying on a secret love intrigue with Ptolemæus, of uncertain lineage, who was the husband of her daughter. She persuaded him, during an absence of Alexander in Thessaly, to take up arms against Alexander on his return, and the Thebans rushed to join the movement, it being necessary to impair Macedonia's power before she could gain further victories in Thessaly. Pelopidas arranged a compromise whereby thirty of Alexander's pages were placed as hostages and Ptolemæus received a part-principality, the name of which he assumed. This compromise seemed to be effected only to hasten the downfall of the king, who was assassinated during the course of a festival dance. His mother bestowed her hand upon the murderer, also the throne, to which he acceded under the name of guardian over the two younger sons, Perdicas and Philippos (368-365 B.C.).

Summoned from Chalcidice Pausanias, called "of the kingly line," though to which branch of the royal family he belonged cannot be ascertained, commenced a vigorous campaign against the regent. His success was immediate; Eurydice fled with her two sons to Iphicrates, who was stationed with an Attic fleet in neighbouring waters, and he finally put down the revolt. Still Ptolemæus' position had not been rendered more secure; the murder of Alexander was a breach of the agreement with Thebes, and the friends of the murdered king applied to Pelopidas, who advanced with a hastily gathered army. But Ptolemæus' gold brought disaffection in the ranks, and Pelopidas was obliged to content himself with making a new agreement with the king. Ptolemæus placed his son Philoxenus and fifty hetæri as hostages for his good faith; this was perhaps the motive that brought Philippos to Thebes.

When he reached manhood Perdicas III avenged the death of his brother by causing the assassination of the usurper. To escape the influence of Thebes he devoted himself to the cause of Athens, fighting bravely against the Olynthians by the side of Timotheus. But about this time the Illyrians, doubtless at the instigation of the Lyncestians, came pouring over the borders. Perdicas made a successful stand against this invasion, but in

[360-350 B.C.]

a desperate battle he and four hundred others lost their lives. The whole country was now devastated by the Illyrians, and laid open to the invasion of the Pæonians on the north.

This was the situation when Philip, representing Perdiccas' son Amyntas, who was not yet of age, took command of the army in 359. He had been established in Macedonia since the death of Ptolemaeus, having received a part-principality in consequence of a compromise to which Perdiccas had been advised by Plato, and the troops he already had about him formed a nucleus of support. The Illyrians and the Pæonians had already entered the land, and added to them were the former pretenders to the throne, Argæus, and Pausanias from Athens, with the support of the Thracian princes, and three illegitimate sons of his father, who also advanced claims to the throne. Backed by the sympathy and support of the entire country, Philip was equal to the first great emergencies; by the exercise of foresight, skill, and resolution, he rescued the land from the invaders, the throne from its false claimants, and the royal line from fresh intrigues and disasters. And when the Athenians, who had committed the folly of turning their back on him as thanks for his recognition of their claims on Amphipolis, became alarmed at his successes and formed with Grabos the Illyrian, Lyppæus, the Pæonian, and Cetriporis, the Thracian, an offensive and defensive alliance aiming to break Macedonia's might before it became thoroughly established, Philip—having already taken Amphipolis and won over its inhabitants—proceeded rapidly to the frontiers and soon brought the barbarians, who were by no means ready for the conflict, under subjection.

About 356, the frontiers were made secure against barbarian invasion for many years to come. Not long after this all the different intriguing parties had vanished from the court. Of the Lyncestians, Ptolemaeus and Eurydice were dead; one of Æropus' sons, Alexander, later became established at court by reason of his marriage with the daughter of the faithful Antipater; the remaining two sons, Hieromenes and Arrhibæus, were received into favour by others high in station, and Arrhibæus' two sons, Neoptolemus and Amyntas, were brought up at court. The two pretenders, Argæus and Pausanias, disappear about this time from historical accounts. The rightful heir to the throne, Perdiccas' son Amyntas, in whose name Philip had at first carried on the sovereignty, was secured to Philip's cause by marriage to his daughter, Cynane.

PHILIP THE ORGANISER

Thus Macedonia, under the rule of a prince who had dexterously and systematically developed and employed her resources, had risen to the height where at last she might entertain the thought of issuing forth, and, at the head of united Greece, entering the lists against the Persian might. In the historical accounts that lie before us the forces that were actually at work to produce Philip's astonishing success seem curiously to be lost sight of. Though the writers follow, through all its cleverly planned movements, the hand that seized and drew into its owner's possession all the Greek states one after another, they leave us in the dark as to every detail concerning the personality to which that hand belonged, and to which it owed its strength and firmness. Gold which they always show the hand to dispense at exactly the right moment, seems to be about the only means of effecting his purposes that they attribute to Philip.

On looking closely into the inner life of the state two events stand forth that arising from earlier causes, were made to yield their full significance by Philip, and in reality formed the basis of his power.

"My father," said Arrian's Alexander to the mutinous Macedonians at Opis in 324, "took you under his protection when he was king, and you, destitute and clad in skins, wandered here from your mountains where you had tended your flocks of sheep that you could with difficulty protect against the Illyrians, the Thracians, and the Triballi; he gave you the chlamys of the soldiers and led you down into the plain, where he trained you to be the equal of the barbarian in the fight." Every man capable of bearing arms had always indeed come forward in time of war, but only to return to his hearth or plough when the need of his services was at an end. The dangers by which Philip was beset when he first assumed the rule, the attacks against which he had to protect a land that was menaced on all sides, gave rise to a measure that, already set on foot in Archelaus' reign, might have averted much of the subsequent internal strife, had it been brought to full development. On the basis of the duty owed by every man to his country in time of war, Philip brought into existence a standing army of native forces that, constantly increasing in size and strength, finally came to number forty thousand men.

MILITARY DISCIPLINE

Not only did Philip form this army, but he brought it up to a high standard of discipline and efficiency. It is related that, to the great displeasure of the lazy, he did away with the baggage-wagon of the foot-soldiers, and allowed but one groom to each horseman; also that he often, even in the heat of summer, organised marches of twenty-five miles or more, carrying provisions and accoutrements for several days. So severe was Philip's discipline that in the war of 338 two officers of high rank who introduced a lute player into the camp were immediately cashiered. In the service itself the strictest obedience was demanded from subordinates to superiors, and the system of advancement was based solely on the recognition of experience and merit.

The benefits of this military constitution soon became apparent. A feeling was aroused in the various provinces and dependencies of the realm that they formed part of an organic whole, and that Macedonia had risen to the dignity of a nation. Above all, in their unity and the confidence inspired by this military system, the Macedonian races had the consciousness of possessing great efficiency in war, and an ethical strength resulting from a firm social organisation at the head of which was the king himself. The peasant population of this kingdom provided the king with hardy, tractable material from which to form his soldiers, and the nobility furnished in the *hetæri* higher military officials that were distinguished for zeal and a sense of the dignity of their calling. It was natural that an army of this kind should prove vastly superior to the bodies of mercenaries, or even the citizen troops employed by the Hellenic states, and that a people of this physical freshness and vigour should possess a decided advantage over Greek populations whose powers had deteriorated through too close a study of democracy, or from the evil effects of city life. Favoured by fortune in this respect, Macedonia had been enabled to retain her earlier qualities until such time as they should be needed for some great task; and in the conflicts between the king and the aristocracy she had, contrary to the example given by Hellas



PHILIP AND HIS SOLDIERS

[380-356 B.C.]

centuries before, let the victory fall to the king. Indeed, this sovereignty over a free and powerful peasant race, this military monarchy, guided the people in the direction, and made them assume the form and power, marked out by the democrats in Hellas, who had not, however, been able to bring their plans to realisation.

MACEDONIAN CULTURE

On the other hand education, the most marked result of Hellenic civilisation, must now be made a part of the life of the Macedonian people, thus completing the work already begun by former rulers. In this endeavour the example offered by the court was of utmost importance, the nobility naturally forming the class of highest culture in the land. The demarcation thus made had no parallel elsewhere, inasmuch as the Spartans were all uncultured, and yet had supremacy over the inferior classes of their nation; the free Athenians held themselves all to be without exception of the highest culture; while other states, having given up the ruling class or the introduction of a democracy, had, by emphasising the difference between rich and poor, reduced still lower the general intellectual standard.

In the time of Epaminondas, Philip had lived in Thebes, where a pupil of Plato, Euphræus of Oreus, had exercised a potent influence over his future life. Isocrates calls Philip himself a friend of literature and education, and this esteem is proved by his appointment of Aristotle to the post of tutor to his son. He endeavoured by instructive lectures, instituted especially for the pages and young men about his court, to strengthen their attachment to his person, and to prepare them for the duties devolving upon nobles in their high position. The members of the aristocracy, first as pages, then as *hetæri*, or bodyguard of the king, and finally as commanders of the different divisions of the army, or as ambassadors to the Hellenic states, had frequent enough occasion to distinguish themselves and receive the reward due to faithful service; but a lack of that polish admired by the king and possessed by him in a high degree was everywhere noticeable. His bitterest adversary must admit that Athens herself could scarcely show his equal in social qualities; and whatever might be the tendency to perpetuate at his court the old Macedonian habits of brawling and drunkenness, the court festivals, receptions to foreign ambassadors, and celebration of national games, were all characterised by that splendour and magnificence dear to the Hellenic taste. The extent of the royal domains, the revenues from land taxes and shipping duties, the mines of Pangea, which yielded one thousand talents annually, and above all the order and economy introduced by Philip into the management of public affairs, elevated his kingdom to a position never before attained by any Hellenic state, save perhaps Athens in the time of Pericles.

Even the Attic envoys were impressed by the character of the nobility gathered at the court of Pella, and by the opulence and military splendour that prevailed. Most of the noble families, such as the Bacchiadæ of Lyncestis, or the house of Polysperchon, or of Orontes, to whom the district of Orestis seems to have belonged, were of princely origin. To Perdicas, the oldest son of Orontes, was given the command of the Orestian phalanx, which when he became hipparch passed over to his brother Alcetas. The most important of these princely houses was that of Elimeia, which was founded by Derdas in the time of the Peloponnesian War. In the year 380, a second Derdas came into possession of the land and joined Amyntas

of Macedonia and the Spartans in their attack on Olynthus; later he is mentioned as having been taken captive by the Olynthians. Philip's motive for taking Derdas' sister, Phila, to wife was either to bind Derdas' interests faster to his own or to arrange some dispute that had arisen between them. The brothers of Derdas, Machatas and Harpalus, were given high offices at court. Yet the breach between Philip and this family was never completely healed, being kept open doubtless by the king, for the purpose of keeping the different members at a distance and in uncertainty as to his favour. Scarcely could Machatas be sure of a just decision in the court presided over by the king, and Philip took advantage of a fault committed by a single member of Derdas' family to turn it to the public confusion of the rest, repulsing with considerable sharpness all Harpalus' pleas in his kinsman's favour.

Among the noble families gathered about the court of Pella, two from their prominence deserve especial mention; these were the houses of Iollas and Philotas. Philotas' son was that wise and faithful general, Parmenion, to whose command Philip repeatedly entrusted the most difficult expeditions. To him Philip owed his victory over the Dardanians in 356, and later his possession of Eubœa. Parmenion's brothers, Asander and Agathon, as also his sons, Philotas, Nicanor, and Hector, carried on the glory of his name, and his daughters contracted marriages with the highest families of the land; one with Cœnus, the leader of the Phalanx, and the other with Attaius, the uncle of a later wife of the king. That a no less honourable and influential post was assigned to Iollas' son, Antipater, or as he was called by the Macedonians, Antipas, is attested by the king's words, "I have slept in peace—Antipas was on guard." The tried fidelity of this statesman, his clear, cool judgment in military as well as political affairs, seemed to single him out as particularly qualified for the high position of viceregent he was soon to fill. He gave his daughter in marriage to the son of a noble Lyncestian family, as being the surest means of gaining their support; his sons, Cassander, Archias, and Iollas, did not attain prominence till later.


Similar to the development of the court was that of the Macedonian nation under Philip's rule; but to this statement we will add that, owing as much to the position formerly held by the state as to the power of Philip's personality, the monarchical element of necessity predominated in the political life of the country. We must first consider all the facts in their relation to each other before we can fully understand Philip's character and methods of procedure. At the centre of a mass of contradictions and disparities of the most unusual nature, a Greek in his relations to his own people, a Macedonian to the Greeks, he exceeded the latter in Hellenic craft and perfidy, and the former in directness and vigour, while he was superior to both in grasp of purpose, in the logical pursuance of his plans, in reticence, and in rapidity of execution. He was proficient in the art of embarrassing his adversaries, always presenting himself before them under a different aspect, and advancing upon them from a different direction from that expected. By nature voluptuous and pleasure-loving, he was as reckless in the indulgence of his appetites as he was inconstant, remaining withal perfect master of himself even when seeming most under the sway of passion; indeed, it is to be questioned whether it was in his virtues or his faults that his true nature was most prominently displayed. In him are united, as are the physical features of a portrait, all the different characteristics of his time—the shrewdness, the polish, the frivolity, coupled with great suppleness and versatility, and the capacity for high thoughts.

[359-336 B.C.]

OLYMPIAS, MOTHER OF ALEXANDER

In striking contrast to that of Philip was the character of Olympias, his wife. She was the daughter of Neoptolemus, the Epirot king, and having known her in his youth at Samothrace, Philip had married her with the consent of her uncle and guardian, Arymbas. Beautiful, reserved, passionate, Olympias was a devotee of the secret rites of Orpheus and Bacchus, and practised in the magical arts of Thracian women. During nocturnal orgies, it is related, she was frequently to be seen rushing through mountain paths with the thyrsus and winding serpents in her hand; and in her dreams were repeated the fantastic pictures with which her brain was filled. The night before her marriage she dreamed, according to tradition, that she was exposed to the fury of a terrific storm, during which a burning thunder-bolt fell into her lap which, flaming up ever higher and higher, finally disappeared in its own wild blaze.

When tradition further relates that among other signs given on the night of Alexander's birth the temple of Artemis in Ephesus, which, with



BRONZE MODEL OF A GRECIAN BOAT

Megabyzus and his eunuchs and the hieroduli of the Hellenes formed a striking example of true oriental heathenism, was burned to the ground; and that simultaneously with the information of the birth of his son, Philip received the news of a triple victory — it simply expresses in popular form the significance of a hero's entrance into the world, and the great thoughts associated with such an event.

Theopompus says of Philip, "Everything considered, Europe has never produced a man that could equal the son of Amyntas." Yet the work that he had set as the aim of his existence was not accomplished by the scheming, resolute, tenacious king. He may have used this aspiration, it having root in the very nature of Greece's history and culture, to bring into union the whole Greek world; but he was compelled rather by the exigencies of the situation in which he was placed than by the inherent power of the inspiration itself, and failed to follow it out to full fruition. Beyond the sea was the land wherein lay greatness and the future of Macedonia; but the glance that he strained towards this land would often become dimmed, and the solid structure of his plans be obscured under the airy figures of his desire. Philip's ambition to accomplish a great work was shared by all about him, both the aristocracy and the common people; it was the undertone that was heard through every phrase of Macedonian life, the alluring possibility that was continually beckoning out of the future. The Macedonian armies fought against the Thracians and gained victories over the Greeks; but the Orient was the real object for which they fought and conquered.^b

THE MACEDONIAN PHALANX

The Spartans had created a system of tactics, that is, a military ordinance, which was adopted by all the other Greeks. The Thebans added to it the system of compact masses, the advantage of which was demonstrated by the victory of Leuctra. Philip, formed in the school of Epaminondas, perfected this system and made of it the Macedonian phalanx, which Plutarch compared to a monstrous beast bristling with iron. It was a mass of hoplites, sixteen files deep, pressed close against each other and armed with a sort of pike seven yards long, called *sarissa*. The men in the first five ranks held this weapon in both hands, their faces turned to the enemy. The pikes of the first rank extended five yards beyond the line of battle, those of the second, four, and so on to the fifth, whose lance ends were also a yard beyond the breasts of the men next behind. The remaining ranks pressed forward against the first and prevented their retreating, holding their *sarissæ* with the points upward, resting upon the shoulders of the men in front, and this wilderness of spears effectually warded off the darts of the enemy. Irresistible on level ground, but without ability to make a quick change of front or a rapid evolution, this cumbersome body of infantry was supported in the rear and on the flanks by the light infantry of peltasts, who commenced the conflict.

Before and at the sides ran the archers and frondeurs, an irregular troop composed of strangers, who, when need came, closed in behind the wings. The cavalry of the *hetæria*, or companions of the king, armed with a javelin and a sabre and formed of young men belonging to the highest nobility, constituted, with the phalanx, the principal force of the Macedonian armies. There was further a body of light cavalry and a corps of engineers attached to the service of the siege artillery, which consisted of balists and catapults, recently invented machines for the purpose of firing darts at the enemy and boulders against the ramparts of towns. The establishment of a permanent army was Philip's most important military innovation. Under Philip's weak predecessors the multiplicity of pretenders to the throne had rendered the nobles fractious and virtually independent; but they had under them neither *penestæ* as in Thessaly, nor a *helot* as in Sparta.

Without openly abolishing the ancient privileges, Philip contrived to make them inoffensive by transferring them to the army, where there was always a military and political council. The nobles were little by little induced to leave their estates, and were held permanently at court by the attraction of pleasure and high appointments. It was held an honour among them to have their sons received in the corps of the *hetæria*, and these young members of the king's bodyguard, fulfilling domestic offices about his person, were in reality hostages delivered over into his hands. "Never," says Titus Livius, "were seen slaves so servile in the presence of the master, so arrogant elsewhere."

As regards the common people, nothing whatever was changed in their condition. They had never, as in Greece, formed a political body, and there was no Macedonian city. Apparently everything took place by popular consent, but the army was the Macedonian people. Philip frequently harangued his troops; a proceeding that offered no danger, since the soldiers of a bellicose chief never withhold from him their approbation. Macedonia was a nation of soldiers; hence its government, maintaining a permanent army and engaged in perpetual wars, could be none other than a military monarchy.

[358-357 B.C.]


THE WAXING OF PHILIP

As soon as he had made his kingdom safe from the attacks of barbarians, Philip wished to extend his dominion to the sea, access to which was closed by the Grecian colonies. Some of these had ranged themselves under the protection of Athens, others under that of Olynthus. Amphipolis was independent; Olynthus and Athens had an equal interest in preserving this independence and Philip himself had formally recognised it; nevertheless it was decided not to hold to this obligation, but to seize Amphipolis. It was necessary to prevent the Olynthians and Athenians from uniting for its defence, and in this endeavour Philip made use of wile, he possessing, even in a greater degree than Lysander, the combined qualities of the fox and the lion. He persuaded the Athenians that his only desire in taking Amphipolis was to deliver it to them in exchange for Pydna, a Macedonian town which had placed itself under their protection. At the same time he made sure of the neutrality of the Olynthians, and even obtained help from them by delivering to them Anthemus, and by promising them Potidæa, which belonged to the Athenians. The latter, over-confident of his good faith, did not respond to the appeal of Amphipolis for help. Philip took the town, and afterwards treacherously entered and took Pydna, keeping them both. The Athenians had been outdone, but they could not seek vengeance for this perfidy, as they were engaged at the time in the war of the allies, and had need of all their forces to carry it to an end. This encouraged Philip to take another step; he seized Potidæa, which was occupied by an Athenian garrison, politely sent back the garrison to Athens, and delivered the town to the Olynthians, whom he wished to place in a position of conflicting interests towards the Athenians (357).

Master of Amphipolis, Philip crossed the Strymon with the intention of possessing himself of the mining region of Mount Pangea. He founded there upon the site of the ancient Thasian city Crenides, a new town which he called Philippi, upon the money of which was imprinted the head of Hercules, ancestor of the Macedonian kings. The city of Philippi was at once a military post, the entrance to Thrace, and a centre of exploitation for the mines of Mount Pangea. These mines, far better operated than they had been by the Thasians and Athenians, furnished Philip with an annual revenue of a thousand talents, [£200,000 or \$1,000,000] out of which he made the handsome gold coins which bear his name. This source of riches which enabled him to support his army and to buy traitors in the Greek cities, contributed to his greatness at least as much as the phalanx. He declared that no city was impregnable into which could be driven a mule laden with gold pieces.^c



GREEK MASKS



FRAGMENT OF SCULPTURE, SHOWING OARSMEN IN GALLEY

CHAPTER XLIX. THE TRIUMPHS OF PHILIP

DEMOSTHENES, THE ORATOR

THE trite proverb that "the pen is mightier than the sword," like all other proverbs, expresses hardly half the truth. Never was there a more definite combat between the two sharp instruments than in the history of Greece at this period, for that history becomes hardly more than a pitched battle between a splendid organiser of armies and a splendid captain of arguments, and the parallel is the closer inasmuch as Demosthenes, though commonly thought of as an orator, was much more distinctly a writer; for he was decidedly inferior as a speaker to his great rival Æschines, and his orations are chiefly valuable for their logic and their cautious reasoning. Unlike the perishable glories of the art of oratory pure and simple, the art of Demosthenes has come down to us in considerable completeness, and forms a text-book whose eloquence is little appreciated by the students that reluctantly unravel its close-knit fabric.

As this duel between the king of Macedonia and the manufacturer's son of Athens was so nearly a combat of equals, it will be well to cast a brief look at the biography of Demosthenes, since we have given so much attention to the formation of Philip's character.^a

The father of this great orator was an Athenian by birth, and exercised the trade of an armourer, by which he acquired considerable wealth. He married the daughter of one Gylon who had settled upon the borders of the Euxine Sea and contracted an alliance with a rich heiress of the country.¹ At the age of seven Demosthenes was deprived of his father, who left him a fortune which entitled him to rank with the wealthiest citizens. Though guardians had been appointed to manage his estate and direct his education, they seem to have dilapidated the one, and neglected the other. Left at an early age entirely to himself, he launched out into expenses with all the extravagance and vanity of youth, acted as choregus or president of theatrical entertainments, and equipped a ship of war for the service of the republic. He spent the first part of his life without any fixed purpose or aim, indulging

[¹ This made Demosthenes part Scythian.]

in such a state of indolence and effeminacy, as to have his name stigmatised by a term of reproach [*Batalos*]. But the seeds of genius, being either allowed to shoot up in wild luxuriance or to lie dormant through neglect, were soon to spring up with amazing vigour. He determined thenceforth to devote himself wholly to the study of eloquence. At that time learning of all kinds, but particularly philosophy and the art of rhetoric, was cultivated with great eagerness by the Athenian youth. Plato had established his school in the Academy, and was attended by a vast concourse. Demosthenes attended it with great assiduity, as well as that of *Isæus* the rhetorician. After these preparatory studies, he tried his strength against his guardians, whom he obliged to refund a part of his property. Emboldened by this success, he mounted the tribunal to harangue the people upon the state of affairs, but was heard with very little attention, and no signs of approbation. Not discouraged by this unfavourable reception, he made a second attempt and was equally unsuccessful.

As he retired, exceedingly depressed by his ill-success, and determined in his mind to relinquish a pursuit for which nature seemed to have rendered him unfit, by denying him the free use of the organs of speech, and a sufficient quantity of breath to articulate distinctly a sentence of moderate length, he was met by one of his friends, a comedian, who exhorted him to conquer the natural and acquired defects under which he laboured. He instantly set about correcting, with the greatest perseverance and most extraordinary means, his rapid and inarticulate pronunciation, ungraceful and awkward gestures in declaiming, and several natural defects under which he laboured.

The anecdotes of Demosthenes' struggle with his defects are remembered by many people to whom the very name of King Philip is obscure. These anecdotes rest upon the orator's own authority. The reader need hardly be reminded of the hours he spent talking with his mouth full of pebbles, shouting against the roar of the stormy ocean, practising his gestures before a mirror, expanding his lungs by running and by declaiming as he climbed the steep hills of which Greece is made, shaving half his head to compel himself to keep indoors at his studies, and shutting himself up for months at a time in an underground room where he copied all *Thucydides* eight times, and polished his own phrases to incandescence.

Thus prepared, he undertook a losing battle in defence of that system of municipal isolation and jealousy which he thought of as freedom, but which had brought on Greece innumerable crimes and sorrows and kept the little peninsula always under the shadow of complete disaster before a larger foe. In a sense, Demosthenes may be compared with the advocates of States' Rights in the United States before the Civil War, except that the Americans never dreamed of carrying their theories to such an extent. To put the two instances on a par, it would be necessary to imagine the Southerners of America demanding not merely that the states have no federation whatsoever, but that even the smallest town of each state should go its own petty way.

ÆSCHINES, THE RIVAL OF DEMOSTHENES

Heroic as the figure of Demosthenes is in many respects one must not forget to do justice to the opposition he met, not only from Macedonia but from within his own city. Posterity is likely to generalise too vigorously, and *Æschines* has suffered more than his due from the fact that he happened to be the opponent of Demosthenes. It is customary to think of *Æschines*

as a traitor, a hypocrite, and the paid attorney of Philip in Athens. Yet it might be well to remember that if his advice had been taken and the Macedonians treated with welcome instead of warfare as preached by Demosthenes, the result would have been exactly the same except that much bloodshed would have been saved and a loathsome amount of intrigue and villainy avoided. When Demosthenes is praised for his determination and persistence in his one idea, Æschines must be praised for the same to the same degree. When sympathy is felt for Demosthenes in the enmity he met, it must be remembered that Æschines suffered exile and suffered it with dignity. Æschines was never proved guilty of accepting money from Macedonia, while Demosthenes gloated over the poverty of Æschines and boasted of his own riches. On the other hand it is known that Demosthenes accepted money from Persia. And, if one may be permitted to distinguish between degrees of guilt in bribery, one might feel that Persian money was far dirtier for a Grecian to handle than the semi-Grecian gold of Macedonia, coming from the hand of a king whose great ambition was to organise Greece into a federated monarchy and lead her against Persia.

Æschines claimed to have been of distinguished blood, and, while Demosthenes declared him to be of the lowest possible origin, and that dishonest, he certainly represented the aristocratic party. His friendship for Philip's cause cannot be imputed to a cowardly desire for peace at any price, since he proved himself a brave soldier, while Demosthenes threw away his shield and fled from the very battle-ground of Chæronea to which his eloquence had summoned the Greeks. Æschines was a writer of great skill and the three of his orations still extant are rated almost as high as those of Demosthenes. Æschines seems to have had a far better voice and presence than the effeminate student whom posterity thinks of as a majestic thunderer. The good and ill in the character of the latter have been nowhere more briskly summarised than by Prévost-Paradol²:

THE UNPOPULARITY OF DEMOSTHENES

“Demosthenes was never entirely popular. He had nothing grand in him but his eloquence and will. Dignity of character was wanting. Is it to be said that the highest virtues were necessary in Athens for the popularity of a political man? By no means. Virtue was a title, but the contrary of virtue had also its influence when it was joined to elegance. For Demosthenes, who owed a ridiculous surname [Batalos] to hidden debauches, and who devoted the rest of his youth to an ungrateful work, had neither the graces of vice nor the dignity of virtue. He was neither Aristides nor Alcibiades. Nor had he the easy levity of Cleon and many other demagogues. He was a man of anxiety and toil. He had not the good-natured and happy insolence of a popular orator, who plays with the people and himself, and enlivens the tribune: neither did he possess that which was the contrary, that is to say, natural dignity, the majestic calm which made Pericles the organ of divine reason, a kind of medium between Athens and its destiny, between the people and the spirit of the republic. Demosthenes was violent and laborious. His discourses smelt of oil, but smoothness was absent from them. It was premeditated vehemence, the result of art as much as of inspiration. In short, the people had seen this orator raise himself slowly from mediocrity, and buy his power with long night studies; he inoculated himself patiently with genius. They had hissed at Demosthenes and had seen him

come back stronger; they had hissed again and he had returned all-powerful. The mob is wrong in rarely pardoning such marvels. The mob, with eternal injustice, more willingly gives its approbation to the idleness of genius than to the fertile preparation of work; it adds its partiality in favour of destiny, and the glory which gives itself is more brilliant in its eyes than that which must be conquered. The conduct of Demosthenes, as haughty as his eloquence, would often have irritated a less suspicious democracy. This energetic spirit, nourished by contests, which struggle and effort had alone rendered fruitful, never distrusted its natural impetuosity. Demosthenes applied to political difficulties the same violence he had so happily used against his natural difficulties; he treated his adversaries like the obstacles which had prevented his becoming eloquent. One day an accomplice of Philip, Antiphon, arraigned before the assembly of the people, was sent away acquitted. Demosthenes snatched away the benefit of the popular sentence, arraigned him before the Areopagus, and never rested until he was condemned to death. When has a democracy patiently allowed itself to be thus defended against itself and its judgments broken?

“Demosthenes was of the aristocracy; the aristocracy of money, it is true, but it is sufficient to read Aristophanes to feel that this aristocracy was the heaviest to bear, when one had the misfortune to belong to it. Demosthenes was rich, the son of riches, and he boasted about it with perilous intemperance. In the *Discourse on the Crown* he opposed his fortune to the poverty of Æschines, with a disgust and hardness contrary to the Athenian spirit.

“Add to so many causes of unpopularity, the natural inconsistency of the people, the sacrifices Demosthenes claimed from them, the dangers and the reverses of his politics, and one will be surprised at the lasting power of this great man. The explanation thereof is entirely in the strength and clearness of his wonderful genius. Every day he showed his prodigious eloquence, which consisted in raising his audience above its ordinary intelligence, communicated for a moment to the crowd the generosity of a great soul and the divination of a superior mind. He made the people capable of feeling what was noble in politics, and understanding what was necessary. He showed them in this policy the natural result of the Athenian destiny. He identified his work with the work of that superior power against which all complaint is useless and all anger ridiculous, the work of Necessity.”

But perhaps the most satisfactory claim Demosthenes has on the memory of all time is to be found in that inevitable beauty which surrounds a losing battle fought to the end. Professor Jebb^e has said, “As a statesman, Demosthenes needs no epitaph but his own words in the speech *On the Crown*: ‘I say that, if the event had been manifest to the whole world beforehand, not even then ought Athens to have forsaken this course, if Athens had any regard for her glory, or for her past, or for the ages to come.’”

PHILIP'S BETTER SIDE

But finally, while we are endeavouring to be judicial, it is appropriate to think of the better side of King Philip. He, too, had obstacles to overcome, and he suffers from the pathetic consequences of success; for we forgive the weaknesses and vices and the underhand measures of the one who fails, but we are prone to impute the success of the man who succeeds, purely to the evil of his ways. Once more we may quote Prévost-Paradol^d:

"Philip had closely observed Greece, with its incurable and daily augmenting weaknesses, and he had foreseen, as a magnificent future, the reunion of these powerless and divided people, under his sovereign authority. He had understood that the Grecian empire, defended by mercenaries and void of citizens, belonged to those who could put in the ranks the greatest number of trained soldiers, and that patriotism had no longer any part to play in this supreme struggle. The instinct and passion of craftiness, patience, the art of bribery, made him eminently suitable for those corrupting and lying manœuvres, which divide the enemy and prepare victory. And to these precious gifts were added an unrestrained ambition, sufficiently strong so as not to draw back in the face of any danger, sufficiently enlightened



RUINS OF THE GATE OF THE PROPYLEA OF ATHENS

only to seek opportune contests, and to become great only through success. It is because Philip always saw ahead of his actions, and hoped for great things, that they were always appropriate and useful, and that he did them with such terrible activity. He gave himself up entirely to intrigues, to battles, to the formation of his army, to the subjection of Greece, and to vast hopes.

"It is with a sort of terror that Demosthenes saw and described him as being consumed by desires always greater, and carried away by a hidden strength from enterprise to enterprise. 'I saw Philip with one eye put out, one shoulder broken, a crippled hand, a wounded thigh, abandon to fortune without ceremony or hesitation all that it wished to take of his body, provided the rest remained powerful and honoured.' Who does not see that his unchecked activity followed a more elevated aim than the submission of Greece and that this great man, in a hurry to have finished, was afraid of seeing life suddenly fail his ambition? What could Greece do to such a genius, sustained by such a character?"

Professor Bury^f is even more direct in Philip's praise and in blame for Demosthenes: "To none of the world's great rulers has history done less justice than to Philip. The overwhelming greatness of a son greater than himself has overshadowed him and drawn men's eyes to achievements which could never have been wrought but for Philip's life of toil." He also notes that we have no information of Philip's stupendous conquest of Thrace, and that what we know of him at all has come through Athenian mouths and

[359-351 B.C.]

chiefly from "the malignant eloquence" of Demosthenes, on which account the Greek history of Philip's time has often been regarded "as little more than a biography of Demosthenes," whose policy Professor Bury finds retrograde and retarding, unrelieved by any new ideas. The time needed an Athenian statesman of adaptability and judgment. In the end, Æschines proved himself more nearly that man than Demosthenes.^a

THE SACRED WAR

Alexander, the tyrant of Pheræ, was assassinated in 359 by his brothers-in-law, at the instigation of his wife, Thebe, she having taken care to deprive him of his sword while he slept and to remove the dogs which guarded the entrance to his chamber. She then introduced her brothers, and on their hesitating to deal the blow she threatened to awake her husband. The murderers assumed Alexander's tyranny, and one of them, Lycophron, was on the throne when Philip was summoned to oppose him by the powerful family of the Aleuada of Larissa, who, like the Macedonian kings, pretended to descend from Hercules. Philip was then besieging Methone, the only city of the Thermaic Gulf which still formed part of the Athenian federation. After having received a wound which cost him one eye, he took the city, razed it to the ground, and seized the occasion which then offered to enter Thessaly. Lycophron having made an alliance with the Phocians, Phayllus, brother of Onomarchus, came to his aid with seven thousand men. Philip defeated Phayllus, but was himself defeated by Onomarchus, who forced him back into Macedonia while he, Onomarchus, returned to Boeotia to gain possession of Coronea. But Philip reappeared shortly with a new army: his forces united to those of Thessaly amounted to twenty thousand men and three thousand horses. Against the Phocians, who had stolen the treasure of the temple of Delphi, he appeared as an avenger of Apollo, and all his soldiers wore crowns made of laurel leaves from Tempe.

The encounter took place near the Gulf of Pagasæ, where was stationed an Athenian fleet. Philip obtained a complete victory, due principally to the Thessalian cavalry. The Phocians lost six thousand men; of those made prisoners three thousand were cast into the sea as being sacrilegious, but many of them were able to reach the Athenian vessels by swimming. Onomarchus had been killed in battle, and his body crucified. Lycophron obtained by bribes permission to retire to the Peloponnesus with his troops, delivering the city of Pheræ over to Philip, who seized the port of Pagasæ and the fleet constructed by Alexander. Philip caused to be paid over to him by his Thessalian allies, as war indemnity, a large part of the revenues of the country. He wished to penetrate farther, and under pretext of entering Phocia marched towards Thermopylæ in order to take up his position on a spot that was the key to all Greece. But an Athenian corps commanded by Diophantus occupied the pass, and Philip was obliged to turn back (352).

THE FIRST PHILIPPIC

It was at this epoch that Demosthenes pronounced, before the people of Athens, his first Philippic. So absorbed had been the Greeks by their private rivalries that they had paid no heed to the rapid and increasing

progress made by the Macedonian monarchy. One man alone saw the danger; he had no other arms than his patriotism and his eloquence, but with these he fought valiantly, and though he could not preserve to his country liberty, he at least preserved its honour. The unequal conflict which was about to take place between Demosthenes and Philip was not alone a duel between the ablest of politicians and the greatest of orators; it was a duel to the death between two principles, monarchism and republi-



DEMOSTHENES

canism. These two principles had once before, in the reign of Xerxes, been arrayed against each other; but at that time the Greeks were able to forget their private differences in the common danger, and to superiority of numbers they had opposed, not alone heroism, which does not always suffice to conquer, but military tactics. Now conditions were different; Philip had borrowed of the Greeks their tactics, which he brought to perfection, and he managed to turn to his own advantage the condition of the land, now more than ever divided. It was never again to have that unity of military command so necessary in the face of the enemy. The hegemony of Sparta which Athens nobly accepted in the Median War was forever destroyed, and Sparta, which struggled vainly under its double burden, Megalopolis and Messene, took no notice of the progress of Philip. Thebes, which had broken Sparta's power, was not strong enough to take its place, and foolishly inviting the approach of the enemy, repented too late and died in expiation of its fault. Athens remained, but how fallen from its former condition of active energy. In vain Demosthenes tried to awaken it; it asked but to sleep the long sleep of worn-out races. "When, Athenians," cried the great demagogue, "will you rouse and do your duty? What new event, what pressing need, do you await? What contingency more urgent for free men than the danger of dishonour? Will you always assemble in the public

squares to ask each other, 'Well, what is new?' What can be newer than a man from Macedonia making himself victor of Athens and master over all Greece? Is Philip dead? No, he is only ailing. But what matter to you if he be sick or dead; if heaven were to deliver you from him to-day, to-morrow you would cause another Philip to arise, for his victorious advance is far less a result of his own power than of your inertia."

The war of the allies had exhausted Athens' principal source of revenue, and, as frequently happens in the case of spendthrifts who are obliged to economise, the city preferred to do without necessities rather than deny itself the superfluous; the sovereign people refused absolutely to curtail its civil list. Pericles in instituting the public funds could not foresee that the day was to come when the Athenians would prefer amusement to the preservation of the nation's safety. "Why be surprised at Philip's success," asks Demosthenes, "when all the sums formerly allotted to defray the cost of war are now squandered in useless festivity, a decree, furthermore, menacing

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with pain of death any one who undertakes to restore them to their former purpose?" He reverts frequently to this incurable propensity of Athenian dilettantism, citing the extreme punctuality with which public feast days were observed as against the tardiness of the administration in all that concerned marine matters, or war. "Tell me why your pompous feasts of Panathenæa or of Dionysia, which cost more than the armament of a fleet, are always celebrated on the day set, while your fleets, as at Methone, Pagasa, and Potidæa, arrive too late? In the observance of your feasts all has been regulated by law; each of you knows in advance the choregus, the gymnasiarch of his tribe; he knows just what he is to receive and the exact moment when he is to receive it; nothing is uncertain, unexpected, neglected. In time of war, with all the preparations war demands, there is no order, no foresight, nothing but confusion on all sides. At the first alarm trierarchs are named, exchanges are made, subsidies are demanded. Then, to the ships are summoned first the metœci, then the freedmen, then the citizens, then — but pending all this work of preparation, that which our fleet should save has perished. All this, citizens, is doubtless very disagreeable to hear, but if in leaving out of a discourse all that offends we exclude the matter itself, what need to speak save for the mere pleasure of your ears?" And this was virtually true; the people listened to Demosthenes because he spoke well, then went to hear the orators of the opposite side, and in the enjoyment of this fine oratorical display were as royally amused as though they had visited the theatre or the Odeum.

PHILIP AND ATHENS

Philip endeavoured by apparent inaction to make the Athenians forget the attack on Thermopylæ by which he justified Demosthenes' fears. But his time was not wasted; he employed it in making partisans, even drawing around himself certain of the pillagers of the Delphic temple. He received their money in trust, thus attaching them firmly to his interests. He had established or was maintaining tyrants in the island of Eubœa, two of whom, feigning treachery to him, called the Athenians to their aid, only to betray them as soon as they had responded to this appeal; it was with difficulty that Phocion could save the Athenian army from destruction. To obtain possession of Amphipolis, Philip had caused the Olynthians to withdraw from the Athenian alliance by ceding to them Potidæa; they, however, regretted this step as soon as they saw their independence menaced. Philip accused them of having given refuge to Macedonian conspirators, and took successively several cities of the Olynthian federation, Apollonia, Stagira, Mœcyberna, Torone. The Olynthians asked help of Athens, and Demosthenes, in support of their appeal, delivered three of his most celebrated discourses called the *Olynthiacs*. The first showed the Athenians the danger they were in, since if Philip were to become master of Olynthus he would not fail to fall upon Athens with all his forces. He then indicated the remedy: a better use of public moneys. Unable to attack the Theorica directly, he evaded the difficulty by demanding a reform in the laws governing its use.

"Be not surprised, Athenians, if I speak contrary to the opinion of the majority. Establish nomothetes, not to create new laws, but to abolish such as work you harm, and these I will designate clearly. They are the laws regulating the theatre and military service. One set sacrifices to the

idlers of the town the funds set apart for war, the other assures impunity to cowards. We stood formerly without a rival, rulers at home, arbiters in foreign lands. Sparta was crushed, Thebes occupied abroad, confronting us was no power that could dispute our empire. What have we done? We have lost our provinces, and uselessly dissipated fifteen hundred talents. War restored to us our allies; in time of peace wise counsellors caused us to lose them, and our enemy has waxed great and powerful. Can any one deny that it is through us that Philip has risen? Undoubtedly you will reply, things on the outside are not favourable to us, but within, what marvels have been accomplished! Name them! Walls restored, roads repaired, fountains rebuilt, and a hundred other trifling matters. Look upon the authors of these splendid works; formerly poor, they are now rich, and in proportion to the rise in their fortunes has been the decline of the state's. The power to pardon is in their hands, nothing is accomplished save through them; and you, Athenians, suffer everything to be taken from you, allies as well as money. Great in numbers, you are treated like menials, happy when your masters throw you your daily pittance, the price of admission to the theatre. The shame of such a condition! They give you your own, and you render thanks as though for a mercy shown you! I know well that it may cost me dear to place your disgrace so clearly before you; but dearer still will it cost those who have brought that disgrace about."

Only in a democracy could a ruler be found who would accept reproaches so severe. The Athenians knew that Demosthenes was right, but to give up the theatre—that was very hard; to reform the administration of the finances—that would take a long, long time! The most urgent need was attended to first: two armies were sent to succour the Olynthians, who were struggling bravely in their own defence. But these armies were formed of mercenaries, commanded by Chares, an indifferent general who was in the pay of every land. The presence of such troops had for effect to create disturbance among the besieged without rendering them the slightest aid. It was finally decided to send an army of citizens; but it was already too late; two traitors had delivered over the city to the enemy (347).

There was stupefaction in Athens and in all Greece when it was learned that Philip had destroyed Olynthus and sold its inhabitants. But pity was of short duration: "Each people," says Demosthenes, "seemed to look upon as gained the time spent by Philip in destroying another." Nevertheless the possession of Chalcidice made him master over the Ægean Sea and brought him nearer to the Thracian Chersonesus, ceded to the Athenians by the king, Cersobleptes. His fleet, already greater than that of Athens, threatened Imbros, Seyros, Lemnos, and Eubœa, made a descent on Attica, carried off the Paralian galley, and tore down the trophies at Marathon. The Athenians, tired of carrying on the struggle alone, tried to form against Philip a general alliance, but his liberality had created for him a numerous faction. Even at Athens little was spoken of but the good intentions of the king. Among those who upheld him were many who had been bought over, notably the orator Demades, possibly also Æschines; but some of the dupes were honest, among them the rhetorician Isocrates, who was dazzled by Philip's success, and many resembling Phocion, who always looked on the dark side, preaching peace because he believed victory impossible, although he was the best general Athens possessed. "Have military greatness," he advised the Athenians, "or make those who have it your friends." When Demosthenes saw this man arise to reply to him, "There," he said, "is the axe of my discourse."

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The Sacred War still continued. After the death of Onomarchus his brother Phayllus succeeded him in command. With the aid of the Delphic treasure he got together a large army of mercenaries. The Spartans furnished him one thousand men, the Achæans two thousand, the Athenians five thousand and four hundred horses; thus Sparta and Athens participated indirectly in the pillage, Phayllus paying for the maintenance of the troops sent to him. He invaded Boeotia and took the greater part of the cities of Epimenidian Locris; but falling ill he died and his place was taken by Phalæcus, son of Onomarchus. The command of this army of bandits came to be a sort of hereditary royalty. Phalæcus being still very young a tutor was given him in the person of Mnaseas, who was shortly after killed. Phalæcus continued the war; but ten thousand talents, the last of the treasure of Delphi, had been expended and the Phocians were clamouring for a reckoning. The Thebans were also at the end of their resources, in spite of the three hundred talents they had obtained from the king of Persia. They called on Philip for assistance, but he not being willing to risk again finding the pass of Thermopylæ guarded by Athenians, they were obliged to drop out of the contest. The Athenians were in reality glad to discontinue a war which had lasted ten years without bringing them any profit, and desired a reconciliation with the Thebans.

It even seemed possible to establish a general peace among the Grecian states, for all were equally tired of the long and fruitless war. Philip indirectly gave the Athenians to understand that he was disposed to treat for peace. It being difficult to divine their motive these advances were looked upon as suspicious. Still at Philocrates' proposal it was voted to send off ten ambassadors, among whom was Philocrates himself, the rival orators, Demosthenes and Æschines, and the actor Aristodemus. Æschines later reproached Demosthenes with having failed in eloquence before Philip, a fact which had in it nothing extraordinary, since only Alcibiades or Lysander could compete with Philip in guile, and Demosthenes was used to speaking his thoughts openly to a free people. He was at least, contrary to many of his colleagues, proof against fine speeches, banquets, and gifts.

A TREATY OF PEACE

The ambassadors returned without having obtained anything from Philip save a vague promise to respect the Athenian possessions in Thrace. Three Macedonian envoys followed them; the terms of a treaty of peace were decided upon and another embassy, similar probably to the first, was charged to obtain Philip's signature. Contrary to the advice of Demosthenes, this embassy travelled by short stages on land, and waited a month for Philip at Pella, giving him time to wage war upon the king of Thrace, Athens' ally. He at last returned and persuaded the ambassadors to accompany him as far as Pheræ, under the pretext of desiring their mediation between two Thessalian cities. At Pheræ he signed the treaty but refused to inscribe upon it the name of the Phocians. The ambassadors having left he marched rapidly upon Thermopylæ and took possession of the pass which this time he found unguarded. This had been the aim of all his hesitation and delay. The Athenians were outwitted, and their ambassadors either dupes or accomplices; later Demosthenes even accused Æschines of having sold himself to Philip.

Phalæcus' treason is still more apparent. Before peace was concluded he had refused the assistance first of the Athenians, then of the Spartans, who

offered to occupy the fortresses. The Phocians were left to their fate. Philip presented himself and the fortresses were delivered up to him on the sole condition that Phalæcus be permitted to retire to Peloponnesus with ten thousand mercenaries. In such fashion this chieftain of a robber band, finding nothing more to steal at Delphi, abandoned without a struggle his country to the enemy. The Phocians were at the mercy of Philip who delivered them over to the hatred of the Thebans.^b

The king occupied the country without striking a blow and then summoned the Amphietyonic council to Delphi, that he might hold a trial of the Phocians and their allies and re-order the affairs of the national sanctuary.

PUNISHMENT OF THE PHOCIANS

The sentence was sufficiently severe. The court, attended only by representatives of the peoples which, like the Thebans, Locrians, and Thessalians, had taken part in the Sacred War, followed the dictates of revenge and passion. The Phocians, as being accursed, were expelled from the Amphietyonic league and the two votes which they had hitherto possessed were transferred to Philip and his successors; all the towns, twenty-two in number, were (with the exception of Abæ) to be destroyed and the inhabitants to settle in villages of not more than fifty inhabitants. The fugitives were to be accursed and outlawed wherever they were encountered; those who remained were to pay Apollo a yearly tribute of fifty talents [£10,000 or \$50,000] and to be despoiled of their arms and horses until the stolen treasure should be made up. Philip was in future to preside at the Pythian games. The desire for vengeance went so far that the Ceteans even made a suggestion that the whole male population, exclusive of the boys and the old men, should be thrown down from the rock as temple robbers: an inhuman proposal which Philip rejected with anger. In contrast with such unbridled fury the Macedonian king, who had little mercy for his own enemies, appeared as a mild ruler.

The execution of the sentence was undertaken with relentless severity; ancient towns like Hyampolis, Panopeus, Daulis, Lilæa disappear henceforth from history; their former inhabitants either wandered homeless in foreign countries or lived out their days in mournful servitude. Many joined the bands of mercenaries which Timoleon the Corinthian conducted to Syracuse in the following year; others passed over with Phalæcus into Crete, where some time afterwards the leader met his death at the siege of Cydonia. All the Phocians who had taken part in the robbing of the temple met with a fearful end, but the lot of those who remained behind was not more enviable. Some years later, when Demosthenes went to Delphi, he beheld a picture of misery: "houses torn down, walls in ruins, the country emptied of men of vigorous age, and a few mourning women and children and old people; such wretchedness as admits of no description in words."

THE ATTITUDE OF THE ATHENIANS

The tidings of these events fell on the betrayed Athenians like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. Relying on the royal grace and mercy, they had delivered the Phocians to their enemies with their hands tied, and how had that trust been rewarded! In Athens consequently, no one joined in the songs of rejoicing which pealed through Delphi when the Amphietyonic

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council and the Greek envoys who hailed Philip as the protector of the venerable sanctuary were entertained by him at a banquet and sacrifices, and libations and prayers were offered in favour of Apollo; on the contrary there was great excitement among the citizens and a mingled feeling of sorrow, indignation, and fear. Men fancied that they already saw the Macedonian king in Attica. On the suggestion of Callisthenes they decided to bring the women and children into the city from the country, to hide their possessions and make preparations for defence. In defiance of the Amphictyonic ban the fugitive Phocians were assured of welcome and protection.

Still when Philip, by an embassy of his own, unfolded his peaceful intentions, but at the same time remained in the neighbourhood with his army in readiness, the position began to be considered more calmly. Nevertheless in the first assembly the people clamoured so that the orators could not make themselves heard, and Æschines called out to Philip's messengers: "The criers are many, the fighters few." But when in view of the pressure of circumstances, even Demosthenes raised his voice "for the peace," and warned the general assembly against inconsiderate action, since it would after all be "foolish and sheer nonsense" to engage in a general war over the "shadow at Delphi," they submitted to the inevitable and recognised the *fait accompli*. A new embassy, with Æschines at its head, carried to the Macedonian ruler the consent of Athens to the decision of the Amphictyons and to her own entrance into the temple union. Satisfied with this result, the king now arranged for the Pythian games with unusual magnificence, and then returned to Macedonia, leaving a garrison behind him in Phocis.

THE MACEDONIAN PARTY

During the years which followed while Philip made his hereditary kingdom more compact and extended its borders by successful contest with the Illyrians and Triballians, with the Epirots and Molossians, and with the eastern Thracians, and while the land of Hellas lay ruined and broken, the Athenians made use of the time to revive their trade, strengthen and equip their fleet, and erect new and magnificent buildings for public purposes. But the civil breach became more and more clearly apparent, and prevented the lasting healing and cure of the sick commonwealth from the severe wounds of the past years. Since the fraudulent embassy the Macedonian faction which adhered to Æschines and Philocrates and the patriots who honoured Demosthenes, Lysurgus, and Hyperides as their leaders had occupied a hostile position towards one another.

If Æschines had at first placed himself on Philip's side from a natural inclination because he was dazzled by the royal personality, and he was able to deceive himself concerning his intentions, he was now on personal grounds the warmest supporter of the king, since the latter had called him his friend and enriched him with presents. He who had once made so poor and modest an appearance, now carried his head proudly, walked about in long flowing garments, and showed by his liberal expenditures the alteration in the means at his disposal. The man of practical wisdom had long since recognised the Macedonian's deceitful game, but he continued to "tread the bridge for him."

Philocrates flaunted his dishonour still more shamelessly. He openly acknowledged that Philip had royally rewarded him, and his prodigality, his dissolute life, and the careless fashion in which he abandoned himself to

sensual pleasures and vices were evidence of the great gifts of his wealthy patron. But among all the partisans of Macedon the greatest zeal was shown by Demades, the son of a poor mariner whose rough wit and popular style of eloquence still revealed the ex-sailor. Round these men, to whom must be added the clever but unprincipled Pytheas, swarmed the mass of people who desired peace at any price that they might enjoy life in ease and comfort and such base spirits as set gold and pleasures above honour and their native country.

THE PATRIOTIC PARTY

This party had its roots and its support in the selfish and pleasure-loving nature of the multitude, and in proportion as it gained in power and adherents the greater was the merit of the men whom no favours and no profit could shake in their fidelity to their country, who looked with suspicious eyes on all Philip's undertakings and intrigues and recognised the preservation of the liberty they had received from their fathers as the worthy aim of all struggle and effort. Amongst these men, besides Demosthenes, who in these years developed a marvellous activity, sought to thwart Philip's plans in every direction, and in especial endeavoured to prevent the intriguing interference of Macedonia in the Peloponnesus by pacification and reconciliation, the noble orator Lysurgus was distinguished in the first rank of the patriots by his unassuming simplicity and austerity. Like Socrates and Phocion an enemy to all sensual pleasures and effeminacy, he effected more through his worth and noble disposition than through his somewhat awkward eloquence. Hyperides was a frank and energetic defender of the interests of his country, but also much addicted to the joys of this world, the pleasures of the table, and fair women. His love affair with the charming courtesan Phryne was notorious. Talented, sprightly, and cultivated, he enchained his listeners by the fresh and natural charm of his oratory. Moreover the "curly-headed" Hegesippus and Timarchus belonged to the patriotic party, but they damaged it in the eyes of the people by their ill repute.

The position of parties was first revealed in the action against Timarchus who in union with Demosthenes had brought before the court of auditors (*logistæ*) an accusation against Æschines on the subject of the fraudulent embassy (344). To defeat this accusation Æschines endeavoured to represent that Timarchus was absolutely disqualified from taking such proceedings by his shameless life and notorious character, and he demonstrated this so effectually that his adversary was punished with the loss of civil rights while his own integrity was shown in a most favourable light. If Æschines had taken up arms in moral indignation at his opponent's vicious conduct, we could only approve his action; but far from appearing as a defender of virtue he treats vice and the prevailing immorality with the greatest leniency and only lifts the veil as much as may serve his party aims. A more successful accusation was that which Hyperides brought in the next year against Philocrates. Conscious of his guilt, the accused went into exile even before judgment was pronounced. Demosthenes might feel encouraged by this result to launch a second documentary accusation against Æschines respecting the treachery and bribery in connection with the fraudulent embassy; but thanks to the skilful defence of the accused and the support of the peace-party, this famous contest also ended with the acquittal of the orator (343).

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PHILIP'S INTRIGUES AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Philip employed the deceitful peace to form alliances for himself by means of bribery and intrigues in all the Hellenic states; and to acquire partisans and supporters and nourish the civil divisions. He took especial pains to make his own profit out of the internal dissensions in the Peloponnesian states and the irreconcilable hatred of Arcadians, Messenians, and Argeians against Sparta; to win a reputation for himself as the protector of the common weal and gradually to bring the power of chief arbitrator into his own hands. The fact that these intrigues were not completely successful and that the Athenians, forewarned and filled with distrust, rendered the task of the Macedonian negotiators much more difficult, may be considered as an effect of the *Second Philippic* of Demosthenes. Philip's ill will was consequently especially directed against the Athenians, in whom he recognised the sole opponents of his thirst for dominion, and he sought to damage them in every way without directly violating the peace.

He expelled the pirates from the Attic island of Halonesus and retained the isle as his own property, and when the Athenians complained, he offered it to them as his personal gift; with his newly created naval power he injured Athenian trade and also brought the dominion of the sea more and more into his own hands, and instead of his restoring Eubœa to the Athenians, as had once been hoped, he strengthened his own power by maintaining a secret understanding with his partisans to secure them the supremacy in Eretria and Oreus; in Thessaly he abolished the office of tagus, or chief of the confederation, and set over the four districts four tetrarchs on whom he could rely, a government which was calculated "to break all efforts at union and make the divided forces of the country completely subservient to his aims."

Above all a great stir was created among the Athenians when Philip again turned his arms against the princes Cersobleptes and Teres, with whom they were on friendly terms. In this it was evidently his intention to secure himself a passage into Asia by the subjection of the Thracian coast lands and at the same time to cut the main arteries of Athenian maritime trade, namely the entrance to the Pontus. A royal document with some conciliatory proposals and the offer to lay the disputed points before an impartial tribunal, was designed to divert the attention of the Athenians from their possessions on the Chersonesus, but its suggestions and demands were opposed by Demosthenes or, as the newer criticism has convincingly shown, by Hegesippus, in the *Speech On Halonesus*. And in order to cover their Thracian possessions with the old and new cleruchs, the Athenians sent the general Diopceithes with a squadron and mercenary troops. By two successful campaigns Philip now overcame the Thracians in several encounters after a brave resistance and dethroned their princes; he took one town after another on the Middle Hebrus where his soldiers wintered in earth-holes (in "mud-pits"), and secured his new dominions by planting several colonies (Philippopolis, Berea, Cabyle, etc.); meantime Diopceithes cruised in the Pontic waters, compelled the cities to purchase a safe voyage for their merchant vessels either by a tribute or, as the commander of the fleet expressed it, of good will, and undertook a military expedition in the Macedonian coasts along the Propontis.

When Philip lodged complaints at Athens at this breach of the peace, and threatened reprisals, the Macedonian party was of opinion that they ought to endeavour to conciliate the king by the recall and punishment of

the general. Then Demosthenes demonstrated, in the sublime speech *The Affairs of the Chersonesus*, that the peace had actually been broken long ago by Philip himself, and that the Athenians, instead of punishing their bold leader, as the corrupt servants of the king and the cowardly advocates of peace demanded, ought to supply him with new troops and munitions of war before Philip could bring all his plans to maturity and fall upon Athens herself.

THE THIRD PHILIPPIC



GREEK MIRROR
(In the British Museum)

After this "act in words," which had the desired effect, Demosthenes in the *Third Philippic*, made clear to the Athenians the necessity of concluding an alliance with the rest of the Hellenic towns for the furnishing of mutual aid so that a check might be given to the insolent and mischievous disposition of the Macedonian, who was perpetrating acts of war and violence under cover of a pretended peace.

"In former days, when any Hellenes abused their power for the oppression of others," so ran this remarkable, wise, and energetic speech, "all Hellas rose to guard the right, and now we permit a 'good-for-nothing Macedonian,' a 'barbarian of the most abandoned character,' to destroy Greek cities and hold the Pythian games, or cause them to be held by his servants. The Hellenes look on this and do nothing, 'as a man regards a shower of hail, praying it may not hit him'; his power is allowed to continue growing, no step being taken against it, each reckoning the moment at which another is shipwrecked to his own gain instead of thinking how to save the existence of Hellas and being active in its cause, though none can help knowing that the evil will attain even the most remote. Once the man who allowed himself to be corrupted by the ambitious and malevolent enemies of his country, fell a victim to the general hate, and was visited with the severest punishment as a grievous criminal; now all this is as it were done away and in its stead is introduced that of which

Greece lies sick unto death, jealousy of him to whom aught has been given, laughter when he confesses to it, hatred of whoever shall rebuke."

In the *Third Philippic* Demosthenes rebukes the indolence and degeneracy of the people with more cutting sarcasm; and although all faith had not disappeared from his soul, yet it is not without reason that the piece has been called "a study in shadows, in whose gloomy colours is revealed a saddened spirit and far from joyful anticipations, whilst through the speech on the Chersonesus, which was written under the influence of bright hopes, there breathes a fresher air."

The tempestuous eloquence of the *Third Philippic* made a powerful impression. Now at the eleventh hour the assembly was roused to decisive action; it placed the conduct of business for a time chiefly in the hands of

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the patriotic party and made energetic preparations for defence. Whilst Hyperides brought the islands of Chios and Rhodes over to the side of Athens, Demosthenes went himself to the scene of the war, persuaded Byzantium, abandoning her ancient jealousy, to reconcile herself with Athens and conclude an offensive and defensive alliance (341), and acquired Abydos and with it the undisturbed navigation of the Hellespont. Meanwhile the Persian governors, who for a long time past had looked with anxiety and uneasiness on the rise and extension of the Macedonian kingdom, were requested to give assistance, and several states in the Peloponnesus were induced to join in "the Hellenic alliance against Philip." This was a free confederation under the leadership of Athens, with fixed contributions in money and men. Eubœa was also won over to the alliance after the Macedonian governors in Eretria and Oreus had been, the one killed, the other expelled by Phocion. In recognition of these services a golden wreath was awarded to Demosthenes and set on his head in the theatre at the Dionysia.

To make the members of the alliance more ready for sacrifices Athens herself set a magnanimous example of patriotic devotion. It was not only that, on Demosthenes' suggestion, a change had been effected in the organisation of the trierarchy and thus the less wealthy were secured from oppressive tradition and the rich constrained to make greater efforts in proportion to their resources; the people also agreed that the sums which it had hitherto been customary to apply to festival expenses, entertainments, and dramatic representations should be utilised for military operations. "The people," says Niebuhr, "whose poverty was dominant in the assembly and refused the gifts by which alone they obtained the luxury of eating meat on certain festival days since all the rest of the year they ate only olives, cabbages, and onions with dry bread and salt fish,—they who made this sacrifice to provide for the honour of their country; this people has my whole heart and my deepest veneration."

PHILIP RETURNS TO THE FRAY

The warlike impulse in Athens did not long remain unknown to the Macedonian king. He concealed his anger so long as the Thracian War was still in progress; but when he had destroyed the once powerful Odrysian kingdom and secured the Thracian districts by means of colonies and garrisons, when he had led his army across the Hæmus to the Getæ and had won over the colonies on the western shore of the Pontus by conciliation or force, he proceeded to send the Athenians a defiant letter, full of complaints and accusations, and added to them such insults by marching into their possessions on the Chersonesus and seizing Athenian merchantmen, that the assembly of the people declared the peace to have been violated, threw down the peace column, and took measures to furnish substantial aid to the Byzantines whom Philip was even then threatening with a siege.

There was no delusion in Athens as to the importance of the step. When Hegesippus recommended the refusal of Philip's last proposals, there was a cry "Thou art bringing war upon us," whereupon he answered: "Not war alone, but early death and mourning garments and public burials and funeral orations if ye will give yourselves in earnest to free the Hellenes and win back the hegemony which your fathers maintained."

Thus ended the hollow Peace of Philocrates which had lasted seven years, and although from the aspect of affairs and the previous course of

events there could be no hope of a successful struggle of divided Hellas against the advancing power of the Macedonian kingdom, now in the youthful vigour of its military strength; yet we cannot but feel the deepest respect for the manly impulse, the resolution which defied death, and preferred to fall gloriously and honourably under the feet of hostile armies, rather than be any longer a prey to the deceitful trickery of the king and his purchased satellites, or hover any longer in the undignified and ruinous state between war and peace. It was not a question of preserving "a piece of finery which had grown old-fashioned," but of saving liberty and the popular government handed down from their forefathers, of passing on unimpaired to their successors the institutions and political forms for which former generations had staked their property and their blood, and of avoiding the break with the great historical past as long as possible.

SIEGE OF PERINTHUS AND BYZANTIUM

And that there was still strength and courage in the Greek people, Philip to his great chagrin soon received sensible evidence before Perinthus, a maritime city, built in terrace fashion on the high ridge of a tongue of land on the Propontis, with rows of houses crowded thickly together and which he failed to take after a long siege by land and sea. Supported by the Byzantines and the Persian governor, the brave citizens repelled storm and attack with spirit. And now encouraged by the example of the Perinthians, and with the co-operation of the Athenians who sent first Chares, then Phocion, with ships and men to the aid of their hard-pressed ally, the Byzantines offered a manful resistance; so that here too Philip had to raise the siege and it was only by a stratagem that he succeeded in bringing off his fleet from the Black Sea through the Bosphorus and the Hellespont.

The feeble Byzantines would hardly have held out so long against the siege which Philip conducted in similar fashion with battering-rams, machines for flinging projectiles and saps, but Chares, the Athenian, and his squadron drove the Macedonian fleet to the Pontus in a victorious combat, and from his advantageous position at Chrysopolis protected the entrance to the sea, while the valiant Phocion did his utmost to aid in the defensive measures of the Byzantine commander Leon, whom he had previously known in Plato's school. So here too Philip failed to attain his object, in spite of the skill of his engineers and the bravery of his troops, who once even won an entrance into the town on a rainy, moonless night, but were beaten back in a hot fight by the citizens, who ran up hastily, considerably aided by the appearance of an aurora borealis.

DECLINE OF PHILIP'S PRESTIGE; THE SCYTHIAN EXPEDITION

The golden wreath and votes of gratitude with which the rescued Perinthians and Byzantines and the Attic cleruchs on the Chersonesus expressed their thanks to the Athenian state, were especially due to the orator Demosthenes, who by his disinterested and patriotic activity had been mainly instrumental in bringing about this revival of energy. On the news of Philip's failures at Perinthus and Byzantium, the national party reared its head more proudly. Relying on Athens — whose ships again ruled the Pontus as far as Thessaly, barred the coasts and impeded Macedonian trade

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and maritime commerce — the patriotic party, in which the spirit of independence, freedom, and national honour was not yet extinct, again bestirred itself in all the Hellenic cities. Even at Thebes evidences appeared which showed how great was the indignation and suspicion against Philip. The partisans of Macedon and the supporters of the peace were thrust into the background; the Hellenic alliance received new members and adherents. Philip's consideration was manifestly on the wane, the more as during this time he was with his army in the distant regions of the Danube. For in order to compensate his troops for their fruitless toil by means of a raiding expedition and restore his military reputation by a brilliant feat, Philip led his army from Byzantium against the Scythians on the Lower Danube. Here he did indeed win the victory in a great pitched battle, took many prisoners, and made spoil of a number of valuable horses and live stock; but on the return march through the country of the Triballi the greater part of this booty was lost; it was only with great difficulty, and when he himself had been sorely wounded, that he led back the army through the pass of Hæmus to his own country.

THE CRUSADE AGAINST AMPHISSA

Nothing but a brilliant feat of arms could restore Philip his declining prestige in Hellas, and to this his partisans paved the way. They contrived to kindle fresh dissensions amongst the Hellenes and managed so skilfully that Philip was afforded an excuse for the invasion of Greece and could hide his personal objects under an honourable pretext. He was able to appear a second time as the protection of the Pythian sanctuary and to overthrow his adversaries.


The Locrians of Amphissa had utilised considerable portions of that accursed "Crissæan plain" as corn and meadow land, had set up brick kilns and farmyards and in the walled haven had erected a toll house where pilgrims journeying to the place of the holy oracle had to pay an impost for shelter and guidance. The Delphians had left the Amphissians in peace to do as they would, especially as the latter paid the usual tithe for the ground they occupied, as well as a ground rent. After the Phocian War, in which the Locrians exhibited so much zeal for the honour of the temple, they would not be likely to become more neglectful in the fulfilment of their tasks; and probably also, as a suitable reward for their services, they acquired new tracts of land which they cultivated. But the sanctuary itself probably now stood in a different position as regards the Hellenic people, since a foreign king had assumed the office of its protector and the Pythia was credited with "philippising."

Æschines, as assistant Athenian deputy (Pylagoras), was at Delphi for the spring meeting of the Amphictyonic council. He had a grudge against the Amphissians because they sided with the patriotic party and he now made use of their position to bring an accusation against them. Pointing, from the height on which the sitting was held, at the harbour and cultivated ground, he made a solemn address to the assembly, and threw it into such a state of excitement by reciting the ancient statutes and oaths, that the envoys, seized with an extravagant religious zeal, marched next morning into the Crissæan plain, accompanied by the citizens and slaves of Delphi, destroyed the harbour, set fire to the houses, and demolished the works. Furious at a proceeding so sudden and carried into effect without any inquiry, the

Amphissians fell on the "crusaders" with arms in their hands, and wounded some while others saved themselves by a hasty flight to Delphi.

Here a meeting of the council and the citizens, under the presidency of Cottyphus of Pharsalus, passed a resolution that at the next regular meeting to be held at Pylæ the punishment of the Amphissians for their crime against the god and the sacred plain should be determined on, and for this purpose the deputies were to obtain special powers from their states.

When Æschines made his report to the Athenian people, Demosthenes cried out to him: "Thou bringest war into Attica — an Amphictyonic war"; and his warning words were of force enough to restrain the Athenians from sending delegates to the appointed tribunal. The Thebans also held aloof, although Timolaus, "the greatest slave of his pleasures" and others of Philip's partisans zealously bestirred themselves. However, the assembly was held, a heavy money-fine was imposed on the Amphissians and when



GREEK WAR CHARIOT

they refused payment it was resolved to make war against them. But the small army which Cottyphus himself led against them effected nothing; there was so little zeal that several tribes did not send their contingents, and the others went to work very sluggishly. Consequently at the next autumn meeting the leaders of the Macedonian party were able to make use of the opportunity to elect the Macedonian king as commander in the Sacred War.

Philip had returned from the Scythian expedition only a short time before, but he did not long delay. With an army which gradually increased to thirty thousand foot and twenty thousand horsemen, he broke into Phocis through the pass of Thermopylæ, won possession by a stratagem of the defiles at Parnassus which had been occupied by the generals Chares and Proxenus, and, after some brief contests with the mercenaries, took Amphissa. The city was razed to the ground, the inhabitants expelled, and the consecrated land restored to the Delphian sanctuary. When Philip had further conquered Naupactus and handed it over to the Ætolians, he went back across the mountains, occupied the Phocian frontier town of Elatea in the fertile plain of the Cephissus valley which, commanding the entrance to Locris and Bœotia, offered an excellent base for further operations. When Elatea had been hastily fortified by a stockade and provided with a strong garrison, it became a military camp which threatened immediate danger to Bœotia and Attica.

Demosthenes has painted in lively colours the impression made on the council and citizens of Athens by the news of the occupation of Elatea:

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"It was evening when a messenger came to the prytanes with the announcement that Elatea was taken. They immediately rose from table; some drove the market people from their booths and lighted the trellis work in order by this fiery signal to summon the people from the country to the town; others sent to the generals and had the alarm sounded: and the city was in the greatest excitement. At daybreak the next morning the prytanes summoned the great council to the council house; the citizens gathered in the popular assembly, and before the council had consulted and come to a decision the whole community was assembled on the Pnyx. And when the council appeared and the prytanes repeated the news received and had introduced the messenger and the latter had communicated his report, the herald asked: 'Who will speak?' but no one came forward: and as often as the herald repeated the question none rose although all the strategi were present and all the public orators."

Then Demosthenes arose and first opposed the idea that Philip was acting in accordance with an understanding with Thebes:

"Whoever indulges in an exaggerated anxiety as though Philip were sure of the Thebans, mistakes the position, for I am convinced that if it were so we should not hear that he is at Elatea but on our frontiers. But it is quite true that in taking this step he had the design of winning Thebes for himself. He has already brought many over to his side by money and craft, but those who have withstood him from the beginning he will not now be able to win. In what intention has he now occupied Elatea? In order that by displaying his power in the neighbourhood and by the threatening aspect of his weapons he may encourage his friends to a bold stroke and intimidate his enemies, so that they will yield from fear or be coerced by the rest. If then we now remember our former quarrels with the Thebans and then distrust them, we shall first of all accomplish Philip's dearest wish and then drive those who have hitherto been his adversaries over to his side, and there will be a general attack on Attica in conjunction with him."

To avoid this Demosthenes made the following suggestions to his fellow-citizens: first to banish this present terror, and next to fear for the Thebans, since they were much nearer the object of dread and it was to them that the danger was most threatening; then they should march to Eleusis with their whole forces and with the cavalry, to show that they were themselves under arms, and by this means the party of liberty in Thebes would be encouraged to make a stand for the right, as those sold to Philip had a supporter at Elatea; finally they might choose ten envoys who in conjunction with the strategi should make the necessary arrangements for the march, and then going to Thebes declare there that the Athenians were ready with assistance if the Thebans wished and demanded it.

"If they accept the offer and join us we shall have attained our end without compromising the dignity of our state; if we are not successful the Thebans will have only themselves to blame if they meet with misfortune, but we shall have done nothing shameful or base."

ALLIANCE BETWEEN ATHENS AND THEBES

The words of the patriot were a ray of light in the gloom of confusion and uncertainty. His suggestions were adopted without a dissentient word and himself placed at the head of an embassy which was to negotiate

the alliance with the Thebans and arrange with the generals as to the measures needed for the war. Demosthenes and his companions set out immediately whilst the army took up its post at Eleusis. When the envoys reached Thebes they immediately encountered those of Philip and his Thessalian allies who, aided by the Macedonian party, were zealously endeavouring by the most seductive promises to persuade the Thebans to conclude a military alliance with the king, or at least to remain neutral and allow his troops a passage to Attica. The witty, eloquent Python of Byzantium showed much skill in enumerating all the acts of benevolence which the king had performed for their city, and in exhibiting the advantages to Thebes which a united attack on Attica would bring in its train, and reminding the people of all the injuries and acts of hostility which Athens had ever inflicted upon them and for which they might now take vengeance. Nor did he forget the participation in the spoils of victory in case of their joining their arms with Macedon and the sufferings and horrors of the war if they stood by Athens. The Theban assembly wavered. But when Demosthenes implored the meeting to forget for the moment all former dissensions and injuries, and only think of saving their native Hellas and preserving liberty and honour; when he made it clear to them that the common danger could only be averted by their firm cohesion — then all doubts vanished before his fiery words. In the enthusiasm with which his speech filled them, they forgot self interest, fear, and favour; they determined to renounce the king and to make an offensive and defensive alliance with Athens. It was the last flicker of the fire which had shone so bravely in the days of the Persian War. At this time Demosthenes' opinion was decisive, not less in the newly erected confederate council at Thebes than before the popular assembly at Athens.

The provisions of the treaty are not positively known. Thebes was recognised as the head of Bœotia, each side secured in its possessions, and the restoration of the Phocian commonwealths determined on. Two-thirds of the cost of the war was to be borne by Athens, one-third by Thebes. On the other hand the assertion of Æschines that Thebes was to have the sole command by land, and by sea was to share it with Athens, lies under justifiable suspicion.

The newly awakened military spirit and the union of the arms of the two most powerful Hellenic states, by no means promised well for Philip's enterprises. He therefore again had recourse to negotiation. His friends and ambassadors protested that he had no hostile intentions against Greece, he had only come to fulfil the decrees of the Amphictyons. Even in Thebes and Athens there were notable men whose voices counselled peace, appealing to the evil signs and presages which were forthcoming in great numbers.

"The Pythia announced heavy misfortunes and old Sibylline utterances were in circulation which pointed to unfortunate battles and bloody fields of corpses, a prey to ravens and vultures: the vanquished weeps, ruin strikes the victor."

It required all the energy and decision of Demosthenes to overcome these impressions. He went himself to Thebes and confirmed the Bœotarchs and the assembly of the people in their resolution; in Athens, where even Phocion spoke against the war, he is said to have threatened, to "drag into a cell by the hair of his head the first man who suggested peace with Philip." Demosthenes carried his point. His popularity ran so high that the Athenians honoured him with the award of a golden crown twice in one year.

In the first days of spring the citizen army of Athens set out for Thebes and encamped before the city; but the Thebans brought them in and enter-

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tained them in their houses until the two allied armies marched together into the Phocian country. The two first encounters with the Macedonian troop at the Cephissus and in the "wintry" mountain country were favourable to the Hellenes. In Thebes and Athens thanks were rendered to the gods with sacrifices and solemn processions for the successful "river and winter battles." The Athenian army had especially distinguished itself by its discipline, equipment, and military ardour. Such men in Phocis as were capable of bearing arms joined the allies who now occupied the defiles leading into Boeotia. In order to drive them from this advantageous position and open a passage for himself, Philip again had recourse to a stratagem. He sent a division of his army into Boeotia by another mountain road and caused the villages and hamlets to be set on fire. This determined the Boeotian leaders to leave their position and protect their own country. Philip had been waiting for this; he quickly recalled that division and then marched through the passes with his whole army on Chæronea in the plain of the Cephissus, where the wide level offered a favourable battle-field.


THE ARMIES IN THE PLAIN OF CHÆRONEA

Here he was met by the army of the Hellenic allies. To the Thebans and Athenians who formed the kernel, the Eubœans, Megarians, Corinthians, Achæans, and Coreyrians had added their manhood, so that on the whole the Greeks had perhaps the advantage in numbers over their opponent. On the other hand they were far behind him in everything else. Their hastily summoned troops, composed of various nationalities, were no match either in training and discipline or in the use of weapons and military experience for the well-equipped and seasoned hosts of the Macedonians—who had lately been through the Thracian War, crossed the Hæmus and fought with the Scythians and Triballi in the steppes of the Danube—or for the Thessalian horsemen, who were renowned and feared throughout antiquity. And this efficient, practised force was guided by a single will of acknowledged mastery, and led into the battle by experienced generals like Antipater and others; whilst on the side of the Greeks there was no commander of name and consideration. The Athenian Stratocles and the Theban Theagenes were brave and conscientious, but in no way distinguished leaders; and the two other Athenian generals, Lysicles and Chares, the profligate and little regarded captain of mercenaries, could not in any way be compared with Philip.

Under these circumstances it was to be expected that the battle of Chæronea end in a defeat of the Greeks. But they fought and fell with honour. It was the last test of the strength of the Hellenic people; only a few hired soldiers were to be found in the ranks, the great majority consisting of citizen levies. The heavy infantry of the Thebans, amongst whom the "Sacred Band" of the Three Hundred occupied the place of honour, maintained the reputation for bravery and discipline which they had borne since the days of Epaminondas; and the Athenians, in whose ranks Demosthenes served with the hoplites as a common soldier, were no unworthy members of the league. They formed the left wing whilst the Thebans fought on the right; the rest of the Hellenes and the mercenaries filled the centre. Philip, recognising the importance of the battle, made his dispositions with great wariness. He himself took command of the wing opposite to the Athenians; the other he entrusted to his son Alexander, a youth of

eighteen, who, surrounded by the most experienced warriors, was consumed with eagerness to begin his heroic career of fame and victory in this decisive battle. The oak-tree on the left bank of the Cephissus where his tent stood was still pointed out in Plutarch's time.ⁿ

It is among the accusations urged by Æschines against Demosthenes, that in levying mercenary troops he wrongfully took the public money to pay men who never appeared; and further, that he placed at the disposal of the Amphissians a large body of ten thousand mercenary troops, thus withdrawing them from the main Athenian and Boeotian army; whereby Philip was enabled to cut to pieces the mercenaries separately, while the entire force, if kept together, could never have been defeated. Æschines affirms that he himself strenuously opposed this separation of forces, the consequences of which were disastrous and discouraging to the whole cause.



GREEK CATAPULT

It was in August, 338 B.C., that the allied Grecian army met Philip near Chæronea, the last Boeotian town on the frontiers of Phocis. He seems to have been now strong enough to attempt to force his way into Boeotia, and is said to have drawn down the allies from a strong position into the plain by laying waste the neighbouring fields. His numbers are stated by Diodorus at thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse; he doubtless had with him Thessalians and other allies from northern Greece, but not a single ally from Peloponnesus. Of the united Greeks opposed to him, the total is not known. We can therefore make no comparison as to numbers, though the superiority of the Macedonian army in organisation is incontestable. The largest Grecian contingents were those of Athens, under Lysicles and Chares, and of Thebes, commanded by Theagenes; there were, besides, Phocians, Achæans, and Corinthians — probably also Eubœans and Megarians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleans, and Argives, took no part in the war. All of them had doubtless been solicited on both sides, by Demosthenes as well as by the partisans of Philip. But their jealousy and the fear of Sparta led the last four states rather to look towards Philip as a protector against her, though on this occasion they took no positive part.

The command of the army was shared between the Athenians and the Thebans, and its movements were determined by the joint decision of their statesmen and generals. As to statesmen, the presence of Demosthenes at least insured to them sound and patriotic counsel powerfully set forth; as to generals, not one of the three was fit for an emergency so grave and terrible.

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It was the misfortune of Greece that, at this crisis of her liberty, when everything was staked on the issue of the campaign, neither an Epaminondas nor an Iphicrates was at hand. Phocion was absent as commander of the Athenian fleet in the Hellespont or the Ægean. Portents were said to have occurred, oracles and prophecies were in circulation, calculated to discourage the Greeks; but Demosthenes, animated by the sight of so numerous an army, hearty and combined in defence of Grecian independence, treated all such stories with the same indifference as Epaminondas had shown before the battle of Leuctra, and accused the Delphian priestess of philippising. Nay, so confident was he in the result (according to the statement of Æschines), that when Philip, himself apprehensive, was prepared to offer terms of peace, and the Boeotarchs inclined to accept them, Demosthenes alone stood out, denouncing as a traitor anyone who should broach the proposition of peace, and boasting that if the Thebans were afraid, his countrymen the Athenians desired nothing better than a free passage through Boeotia to attack Philip single-handed.

THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA

In the field of battle near Chæronea, Philip himself commanded a chosen body of troops on the wing opposed to the Athenians; while his youthful son Alexander, aided by experienced officers, commanded against the Thebans on the other wing. Respecting the course of the battle, we are scarcely permitted to know anything.¹ It is said to have been so obstinately contested that for some time the result was doubtful. The Sacred Band of Thebes, who charged in one portion of the Theban phalanx, exhausted all their strength and energy in an unavailing attempt to bear down the stronger phalanx and multiplied pikes opposed to them. The youthful Alexander here first displayed his great military energy and ability. After a long and murderous struggle, the Theban Sacred Band were all overpowered and perished in their ranks, while the Theban phalanx was broken and pushed back. Philip on his side was still engaged in undecided conflict with the Athenians, whose first onset is said to have been so impetuous, as to put to flight some of the troops in his army; insomuch that the Athenian general exclaimed in triumph, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia." It is farther said that Philip on his side simulated a retreat, for the purpose of inducing them to pursue and to break their order. We read another statement — more likely to be true; that the Athenian hoplites, though full of energy at the first shock, could not endure fatigue and prolonged struggle like the trained veterans in the opposite ranks. Having steadily repelled them for a considerable time, Philip became emulous on witnessing the success of his son, and redoubled his efforts: so as to break and disperse them. The whole Grecian army was thus put to flight with severe loss.

The Macedonian phalanx, as armed and organised by Philip, was sixteen deep; less deep than that of the Thebans either at Delium or at Leuctra. It had veteran soldiers of great strength and complete training in its front ranks; yet probably soldiers hardly superior to the Sacred Band, who formed the Theban front rank. But its great superiority was in the length of the

[¹Niebuhr, commenting on our scant information, says, "It is as if the muse of Greece had grown dumb on the death-day of Greek liberty, and had thrown her veil over the death blow." Later he notes the remarkable coincidence that the battle of Chæronea was fought in the same year in which Rome conquered the Volscians and Latins "and laid the foundation of her sovereignty over all Italy."]

Macedonian pike or sarissa, in the number of these weapons which projected in front of the foremost soldiers, and the long practice of the men to manage this impenetrable array of pikes in an efficient manner. The value of Philip's improved phalanx was attested by his victory at Chæronea.

But the victory was not gained by the phalanx alone. The military organisation of Philip comprised an aggregate of many sorts of troops besides the phalanx — the bodyguards, horse as well as foot; the hypaspistæ, or light hoplites; the light cavalry, bowmen, slingers, etc.

One thousand Athenian citizens perished in this disastrous field; two thousand more fell into the hands of Philip as prisoners. The Theban loss is said also to have been terrible, as well as the Achaean. But we do not know the numbers; nor have we any statement of the Macedonian loss. Demosthenes, himself present in the ranks of the hoplites, shared in the flight of his defeated countrymen. He is accused by his political enemies of having behaved with extreme and disgraceful cowardice; but we see plainly from the continued confidence and respect shown to him by the general body of his countrymen, that they cannot have credited the imputation. The two Athenian generals, Chares and Lysicles, both escaped from the field. The latter was afterwards publicly accused at Athens by the orator Lysurgus. Lysicles was condemned to death by the dicastery. What there was to distinguish his conduct from that of his colleague Chares — who certainly was not condemned, and is not even stated to have been accused — we do not know.

Unspeakable was the agony at Athens on the report of this disaster, with a multitude of citizens as yet unknown left on the field or prisoners, and a victorious enemy within three or four days' march of the city. The whole population, even old men, women, and children, were spread about the streets in all the violence of grief and terror, interchanging effusions of distress and sympathy, and questioning every fugitive as he arrived about the safety of their relatives in the battle. The flower of the citizens of military age had been engaged; and before the extent of loss had been ascertained, it was feared that none except the elders would be left to defend the city. At length the definite loss became known: severe indeed and terrible — yet not a total shipwreck, like that of the army of Nicias in Sicily.

As on that trying occasion, so now: amidst all the distress and alarm, it was not in the Athenian character to despair. The mass of citizens hastened unbidden to form a public assembly, wherein the most energetic resolutions were taken for defence. Decrees were passed enjoining every one to carry his family and property out of the open country of Attica into the various strongholds; directing the body of the senators, who by general rule were exempt from military service, to march down in arms to Piræus, and put that harbour in condition to stand a siege; placing every man without exception at the disposal of the generals, as a soldier for defence, and imposing the penalties of treason on every one who fled; enfranchising all slaves fit for bearing arms, granting the citizenship to metics under the same circumstances, and restoring to the full privilege of citizens those who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence. This last-mentioned decree was proposed by Hyperides; but several others were moved by Demosthenes, who, notwithstanding the late misfortune of the Athenian arms, was listened to with undiminished respect and confidence. Not only he, but also most of the conspicuous citizens and habitual speakers in the assembly, came forward with large private contributions to meet the pressing wants of the moment. Every man in the city lent a hand to make good the defective points in the

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fortification. Materials were obtained by felling the trees near the city, and even by taking stones from the adjacent sepulchres—as had been done after the Persian War when the walls were built under the contrivance of Themistocles. The temples were stripped of the arms suspended within them, for the purpose of equipping unarmed citizens. By such earnest and unanimous efforts, the defences of the city and of Piræus were soon materially improved. At sea Athens had nothing to fear. Her powerful naval force was untouched, and her superiority to Philip on that element incontestable. Envoys were sent to Trœzen, Epidaurus, Andros, Ceos, and other places, to solicit aid and collect money; in one or other of which embassies Demosthenes served, after he had provided for the immediate exigences of defence.

PHILIP TAKES THEBES

Such were the precautions taken at Athens after this fatal day. But Athens lay at a distance of three or four days' march from the field of Chæronea; while Thebes, being much nearer, bore the first attack of Philip. Of the behaviour of that prince after his victory, we have contradictory statements. According to one account, he indulged in the most insulting and licentious exultation on the field of battle, jesting especially on the oratory and motions of Demosthenes; a temper from which he was brought round by the courageous reproof of Demades, then his prisoner as one of the Athenian hoplites.¹ At first he even refused to grant permission to inter the slain, when the herald came from Lebadea to make the customary demand. According to another account, the demeanour of Philip towards the defeated Athenians was gentle and forbearing. However the fact may have stood as to his first manifestations, it is certain that his positive measures were harsh towards Thebes and lenient towards Athens. He sold the Theban captives into slavery; he is said also to have exacted a price for the liberty granted to bury the Theban slain—which liberty, according to Grecian custom, was never refused, and certainly never sold, by the victor. Whether Thebes made any further resistance, or stood a siege, we do not know. But presently the city fell into Philip's power, who put to death several of the leading citizens, banished others, and confiscated the property of both. A council of Three Hundred—composed of philippising Thebans, for the most part just recalled from exile—was invested with the government of the city, and with powers of life and death over every one. The state of Thebes became much the same as it had been when the Spartan Phœbidas, in concert with the Theban party headed by Leontiades, surprised the Cadmea. A Macedonian garrison was now placed in the Cadmea, as a Spartan garrison had been placed then. Supported by this garrison, the philippising Thebans were uncontrolled masters of the city; with full power, and no reluctance, to gratify their political antipathies. At the same time, Philip restored the minor Bœotian towns—Orchomenos, and Platea, probably also Thespie and Coronea—to the condition of free communities instead of subjection to Thebes.

At Athens also, the philippising orators raised their voices loudly and confidently, denouncing Demosthenes and his policy. New speakers, who

[¹ According to Diodorus, he said, "Since Fortune, O King, has represented thee like Agamemnon, art thou not ashamed to act the part of Thersites?" With this sharp reproof Philip was so startled, they say, that he wholly changed his former course, and with admiration released the man that had reprehended him and advanced him to places of honour.]

would hardly have come forward before, were now put up against him. The accusations however altogether failed; the people continued to trust him, omitting no measure of defence which he suggested. Æschines, who had before disclaimed all connection with Philip, now altered his tone, and made boast of the ties of friendship and hospitality subsisting between that prince and himself. He tendered his services to go as envoy to the Macedonian camp; whither he appears to have been sent, doubtless with others, perhaps with Xenocrates and Phocion. Among them was Demades also, having been just released from his captivity. Either by the persuasions of Demades, or by a change in his own dispositions, Philip had now become inclined to treat with Athens on favourable terms. The bodies of the slain Athenians were burned by the victors, and their ashes collected to be carried to Athens; though the formal application of the herald, to the same effect, had been previously refused. Æschines (according to the assertion of Demosthenes) took part as a sympathising guest in the banquet and festivities whereby Philip celebrated his triumph over Grecian liberty. At length Demades with the other envoys returned to Athens, reporting the consent of Philip to conclude peace, to give back the numerous prisoners in his hands, and also to transfer Oropus from the Thebans to Athens.

PEACE OF DEMADES

Demades proposed the conclusion of peace to the Athenian assembly, by whom it was readily decreed. To escape invasion and siege by the Macedonian army was doubtless an unspeakable relief; while the recovery of the two thousand prisoners without ransom was an acquisition of great importance, not merely to the city collectively but to the sympathies of numerous relatives. Lastly, to regain Oropus—a possession which they had once enjoyed, and for which they had long wrangled with the Thebans—was a further cause of satisfaction. Such conditions were doubtless acceptable at Athens. But there was a submission to be made on the other side, which to the contemporaries of Pericles would have seemed intolerable, even as the price of averted invasion or recovered captives. The Athenians were required to acknowledge the exaltation of Philip to the headship of the Grecian world, and to promote the like acknowledgment by all other Greeks, in a congress to be speedily convened. They were to renounce all pretensions to headship, not only for themselves, but for every other Grecian state; to recognise not Sparta nor Thebes, but the king of Macedon, as Panhellenic chief; to acquiesce in the transition of Greece from the position of a free, self-determining, political aggregate, into a provincial dependency of the kings of Pella and Ægæ. It is not easy to conceive a more terrible shock to that traditional sentiment of pride and patriotism, inherited from forefathers who, after repelling and worsting the Persians, had first organised the maritime Greeks into a confederacy running parallel with and supplementary to the non-maritime Greeks allied with Sparta; thus keeping out foreign dominion and casting the Grecian world into a system founded on native sympathies and free government. Such traditional sentiment, though it no longer governed the character of the Athenians nor impressed upon them motives of action, had still a strong hold upon their imagination and memory, where it had been constantly kept alive by the eloquence of Demosthenes and others. The Peace of Demades, recognising Philip as chief of Greece, was a renunciation of all this proud historical past, and the ac-

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ceptance of a new and degraded position, for Athens as well as for Greece generally.

If Philip had not purchased the recognition of Athens, he might have failed in trying to extort it by force. For though, being master of the field, he could lay waste Attica with impunity, and even establish a permanent fortress in it like Decelea — yet the fleet of Athens was as strong as ever, and her preponderance at sea irresistible. Under these circumstances, Athens and Piræus might have been defended against him, as Byzantium and Perinthus had been, two years before; the Athenian fleet might have obstructed his operations in many ways; and the siege of Athens might have called forth a burst of Hellenic sympathy, such as to embarrass his further progress. We may see therefore that, with such difficulties before him if he pushed the Athenians to despair, Philip acted wisely in employing his victory and his prisoners to procure her recognition of his headship. His political game was well played, now as always; but to the praise of generosity bestowed by Polybius he has little claim.

Besides the recognition of Philip as chief of Greece, the Athenians, on the motion of Demades, passed various honorary and complimentary votes in his favour; of what precise nature we do not know. Immediate relief from danger, with the restoration of two thousand captive citizens, was sufficient to render the peace generally popular at the first moment; moreover, the Athenians, as if conscious of failing resolution and strength, were now entering upon that career of flattery to powerful kings which we shall hereafter find them pushing to disgraceful extravagance. It was probably during the prevalence of this sentiment, which did not long continue, that the youthful Alexander of Macedon, accompanied by Antipater, paid a visit to Athens. Meanwhile the respect enjoyed by Demosthenes among his countrymen was noway lessened. Though his political opponents thought the season favourable for bringing many impeachments against him, none of them proved successful.



GREEK MARBLE CHAIR

PHILIP IN PELOPONNESUS

Having thus subjugated and garrisoned Thebes, having reconstituted the anti-Theban cities in Bœotia, having constrained Athens to submission and dependent alliance, and having established a garrison in Ambracia, at the same time mastering Acarnania, and banishing the leading Acarnanians who were opposed to him, Philip next proceeded to carry his arms into Peloponnesus. He found little positive resistance anywhere, except in the territory of

Sparta. The Corinthians, Argives, Messenians, Eleans, and many Arcadians, all submitted to his dominion; some even courted his alliance, from fear and antipathy against Sparta. Philip invaded Laconia with an army too powerful for the Spartans to resist in the field. He laid waste the country, and took some detached posts; but he did not take, nor do we know that he even attacked, Sparta itself. The Spartans could not resist; yet would they neither submit nor ask for peace. It appears that Philip cut down their territory and narrowed their boundaries on all the three sides; towards Argos, Messene, and Megalopolis. We have no precise account of the details of his proceedings; but it is clear that he did just what seemed to him good, and that the governments of all the Peloponnesian cities came into the hands of his partisans. Sparta was the only city which stood out against him; maintaining her ancient freedom and dignity, under circumstances of feebleness and humiliation, with more unshaken resolution than Athens.

POLITICAL SCHEMES; FAMILY BROILS

Philip next proceeded to convene a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth. He here announced himself as resolved on an expedition against the Persian king, for the purpose both of liberating the Asiatic Greeks and avenging the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. The general vote of the congress nominated him leader of the united Greeks for this purpose, and decreed a Grecian force to join him, to be formed of contingents furnished by the various cities. The total of the force promised is stated only by Justin, who gives it at two hundred thousand foot, and fifteen thousand horse; an army which Greece certainly could not have furnished, and which we can hardly believe to have been even promised. The Spartans stood aloof from the congress, continuing to refuse all recognition of the headship of Philip. The Athenians attended and concurred in the vote; which was in fact the next step to carry out the peace made by Demades. They were required to furnish a well-equipped fleet to serve under Philip; and they were at the same time divested of their dignity of chiefs of a maritime confederacy, the islands being enrolled as maritime dependencies of Philip, instead of continuing to send deputies to a synod meeting at Athens. For several years afterwards, the naval force in the dockyards of Athens still continued large and powerful; but her maritime ascendancy henceforward disappears.

This scheme—the invasion of Persia—had now ceased to be an object of genuine aspiration throughout the Grecian world. The Great King, no longer inspiring terror to Greece collectively, might now be regarded as likely to lend protection against Macedonian oppression. To emancipate the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion would be in itself an enterprise grateful to Grecian feeling, though all such wishes must have been gradually dying out since the Peace of Antalcidas. But emancipation, accomplished by Philip, would be only a transfer of the Asiatic Greeks from Persian dominion to his. The synod of Corinth served no purpose except to harness the Greeks to his car, for a distant enterprise lucrative to his soldiers and suited to his insatiable ambition.

It was in 337 B.C. that this Persian expedition was concerted and resolved. During that year preparations were made of sufficient magnitude to exhaust the finances of Philip; who was at the same time engaged in military operations, and fought a severe battle against the Illyrian king Pleurias. In the spring of 336 B.C., a portion of the Macedonian army

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under Parmenion and Attalus, was sent across to Asia to commence military operations; Philip himself intending speedily to follow.

Such however was not the fate reserved for him. Not long before, he had taken the resolution of repudiating, on the allegation of infidelity, his wife Olympias; who is said to have become repugnant to him, from the furious and savage impulses of her character. He had successively married several wives, the last of whom was Cleopatra, niece of the Macedonian Attalus. It was at her instance that he is said to have repudiated Olympias; who retired to her brother, Alexander of Epirus. This step provoked violent dissensions among the partisans of the two queen, and even between Philip and his son Alexander, who expressed a strong resentment at the repudiation of his mother. Amidst the intoxication of the marriage banquet, Attalus proposed a toast and prayer, that there might speedily appear a legitimate son, from Philip and Cleopatra, to succeed to the Macedonian throne. Upon which Alexander exclaimed in wrath, "Do you then proclaim me as a bastard?"—at the same time hurling a goblet at him. Incensed at this proceeding, Philip started up, drew his sword, and made furiously at his son; but fell to the ground from passion and intoxication. This accident alone preserved the life of Alexander, who retorted, "Here is a man, preparing to cross from Europe into Asia, who yet cannot step surely from one couch to another." After this violent quarrel the father and son separated. Alexander conducted his mother into Epirus, and then went himself to the Illyrian king. Some months afterwards, at the instance of the Corinthian Demaratus, Philip sent for him back, and became reconciled to him; but another cause of displeasure soon arose, because Alexander had opened a negotiation for marriage with the daughter of the satrap of Caria. Rejecting such an alliance as unworthy, Philip sharply reproved his son, and banished from Macedonia several courtiers whom he suspected as intimate with Alexander; while the friends of Attalus stood high in favour.

THE DEATH OF PHILIP

Such were the animosities distracting the court and family of Philip. A son had just been born to him from his new wife Cleopatra. His expedition against Persia, resolved and prepared during the preceding year, had been actually commenced. But Philip foresaw that during his absence danger might arise from the furious Olympias, bitterly exasperated by the recent events, and instigating her brother Alexander, king of Epirus, with whom she was now residing. He now deemed it essential to conciliate him still further, by a special tie of alliance; giving to him in marriage Cleopatra, his daughter by Olympias. For this marriage, celebrated at *Ægæ* in Macedonia in August 336 B.C., Philip provided festivals of the utmost cost and splendour, commemorating at the same time the recent birth of his son by Cleopatra. Banquets, munificent presents, gymnastic and musical matches, tragic exhibitions—among which Neoptolemus the actor performed in the tragedy of *Cinyras*, etc., with every species of attraction known to the age—were accumulated, in order to reconcile the dissentient parties in Macedonia, and to render the effect imposing on the minds of the Greeks; who, from every city, sent deputies for congratulation. Statues of the twelve great gods, admirably executed, were carried in solemn procession into the theatre; immediately after them, the statue of Philip himself as a thirteenth god.

Amidst this festive multitude, however, there were not wanting discontented partisans of Olympias and Alexander, to both of whom the young queen with her new-born child threatened a formidable rivalry. There was also a malcontent yet more dangerous — Pausanias, one of the royal body-guards, a noble youth born in the district called Orestis in upper Macedonia, who, from causes of offence peculiar to himself, nourished a deadly hatred against Philip. The provocation which he had received is one which we can neither conveniently transcribe, nor indeed accurately make out, amidst discrepancies of statement. It was Attalus, the uncle of the new queen Cleopatra, who had given the provocation, by inflicting upon Pausanias an outrage of the most brutal and revolting character. Even for so monstrous an act, no regular justice could be had in Macedonia against a powerful man. Pausanias complained to Philip in person. According to one account, Philip put aside the complaint with evasions, and even treated it with ridicule; according to another account, he expressed his displeasure at the act, and tried to console Pausanias by pecuniary presents. But he granted neither redress nor satisfaction to the sentiment of an outraged man. Accordingly Pausanias determined to take revenge for himself. Instead of revenging himself on Attalus — who indeed was out of his reach, being at the head of the Macedonian troops in Asia — his wrath fixed upon Philip himself, by whom the demand for redress had been refused. That the vindictive Olympias would positively spur on Pausanias to assassinate Philip, is highly probable. Respecting Alexander, though he also was accused, there is no sufficient evidence to warrant a similar assertion¹; but that some among his partisans — men eager to consult his feelings and to insure his succession — lent their encouragements, appears tolerably well established.

Unconscious of the plot, Philip was about to enter the theatre, already crowded with spectators. As he approached the door, clothed in a white robe, he felt so exalted with impressions of his own dignity, and so confident in the admiring sympathy of the surrounding multitude, that he advanced both unarmed and unprotected, directing his guards to hold back. At this moment Pausanias, standing near with a Gallic sword concealed under his garment, rushed upon him, thrust the weapon through his body, and killed him. Having accomplished his purpose, the assassin immediately ran off, and tried to reach the gates, where he had previously caused horses to be stationed. Being strong and active, he might have succeeded in effecting his escape — like most of the assassins of Jason of Pheræ under circumstances very similar — had not his foot stumbled amidst some vine-stocks. The guards and friends of Philip were at first paralysed with astonishment and consternation. At length, however, some hastened to assist the dying king, while others rushed in pursuit of Pausanias. Leonnatus and Perdiccas overtook him and slew him immediately.

In what way, or to what extent, the accomplices of Pausanias lent him aid, we are not permitted to know. It is possible that they may have posted themselves artfully so as to obstruct pursuit, and favour his chance of escape; which would appear extremely small, after a deed of such unmeasured audacity. Three only of the reputed accomplices are known to us by name — three brothers from the Lyncestian district of upper Macedonia, Alexander, Heromenes, and Arrhibæus, sons of Æropus; but it seems that there were others besides. The Lyncestian Alexander whose father-in-law, Antipater,

[¹ But Niebuhr^h is less negative. He exclaims, “Alexander was no doubt deeply implicated in this murder. A jury would have condemned him as an accomplice. But he was prudent enough to make away with the participators in the conspiracy, who might have betrayed him.”]

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was one of the most conspicuous and confidential officers in the service of Philip, belonged to a good family in Macedonia, perhaps even descendants from the ancient family of the princes of Lyncestis. It was he who, immediately after Pausanias had assassinated Philip, hastened to salute the prince Alexander as king, helped him to put on his armour, and marched as one of his guards to take possession of the regal palace.⁹

A SUMMING UP OF PHILIP'S CHARACTER

His character was always to be without character in disposition and action; his principles, to have no principles and everywhere to dissemble his aims; his habits, to accustom himself to nothing, but solely to follow the inspirations of the moment; his strength, to remain master of himself in every condition and proceeding, and, in a thousand other causes and consequences of weakness, to follow his chief plan unchanged, and to lead everything around him, whilst to the short-sighted he appeared to be led by all.

He possessed wit, sagacity, and eloquence, and made use of them. He was insinuating and condescending when it was a question of winning or deluding; merciful when he hated; irritating when he loved; compassionate when he himself had dealt the wounds; ready to comfort, when he had decided to strike the heart more deeply; poor, so as to soften the rage of the plundered rich, so as to reward his helpers; liberal with promises when he saw the people were credulous; full of respect for the gods only when he had a mind to; unconcerned as to the lawfulness of the means, provided they led to the end.

"Philip," says Pausanias, "accomplished the greatest deeds of all the Macedonian kings who reigned before and after him, and also broke more oaths and violated more covenants."

The new politics which Philip established, arose entirely out of his genius, and the master understood his work and knew how to use it. When Philip as a statesman formed something new with cleverness and vigour, the old must therefore have succumbed to it. The old methods were no longer suitable; the means failed the end, the roads no longer led to the goal; danger then took another form, and was threatened on another side. That which could have saved the Greeks from imitating the new methods of the opponent, and of seizing the spirit of them, and throwing themselves quickly into another kind of transaction, they were no longer capable of. By the side of politics he placed an improved war department, but one spirit drifted into both. Philip possessed the talents especially required by a general. In the greatest danger, full of presence of mind, he never doubted his safety; his most terrible deliberation in the field was quiet deliberation and stratagem. The Boeotians learned this when they had cut him off and already thought him caught, and the Chalcidians whose cleverly contrived perfidy was wrecked by his cunning. He anticipated all his enemies; they admitted that on this account he always had advantage over them.

Demosthenes says to the Athenians: "You wage war with Philip in the same way as the barbarians carry on a boxing match; when some one is hit he tries to protect the place, and if he is struck on another part his hands go to it; but to prevent the blow or to foresee it, they cannot and will not. It is thus with you; when you hear Philip is in Chæronea, you decide to send an army there, when in Pydna, also there, so that he is truly your commanding

officer." He maintained a standing army and was therefore always ready to strike; this gave him a great superiority, because as monarch he could at once use his fighting forces, without losing time in consultation.

When he attacked the Greeks, his army had already been trained through fighting the surrounding barbarians; it had to learn how useful and necessary it was, and realise to what purpose he made them persevere in peace. He often made them march three hundred stadia encumbered with their weapons, with helmet, shield, and splints, and in addition to this, food and clothing and utensils. They had to observe the strictest discipline. A distinguished Tarentine was dismissed from the service because he had helped himself to a warm bath; Æropus and Damasippus were dismissed because they brought singers into the camp. In the same manner as Epaminondas, in whose school Philip had learned, beat the Lacedæmonian mora by a new formation of the army and deprived them of the efficiency of their firm, quiet movements — so Philip formed the Macedonian phalanx.

Even Æmilius Paulus acknowledged that nothing ever terrified them. They stood the test at Chæronea, where the sacred troops of the Thebans were defeated, and the Athenians, also in the last fight for their freedom, did not prevail against them.^j

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF PHILIP

Thus perished the destroyer of freedom and independence in the Hellenic world, at the age of forty-six or forty-seven, after a reign of twenty-three years. Our information about him is signally defective. Neither his means, nor his plans, nor the difficulties which he overcame, nor his interior government, are known to us with exactness or upon contemporary historical authority. But the great results of his reign, and the main lines of his character, stand out incontestably. At his accession, the Macedonian kingdom was a narrow territory round Pella, excluded partially, by independent and powerful Grecian cities, even from the neighbouring sea coast. At his death Macedonian ascendancy was established from the coasts of the Propontis to those of the Ionian Sea, and the Ambracian, Messenian, and Saronic gulfs. Within these boundaries, all the cities recognised the supremacy of Philip; except only Sparta, and mountaineers like the Ætolians and others defended by a rugged home.

Good fortune had waited on Philip's steps; but it was good fortune crowning the efforts of a rare talent. Indeed the restless ambition, the indefatigable personal activity and endurance, and the adventurous courage of Philip were such as, in a king, suffice almost of themselves to guarantee success, even with abilities much inferior to his. That among the causes of Philip's conquests, one was corruption, employed abundantly to foment discord and purchase partisans among neighbours and enemies; that with winning and agreeable manners, he combined recklessness in false promises, deceit and extortion even towards allies, and unscrupulous perjury when it suited his purpose — this we find affirmed, and there is no reason for disbelieving it. Such dissolving forces smoothed the way for an efficient and admirable army, organised, and usually commanded, by himself. Its organisation adopted and enlarged the best processes of scientific warfare employed by Epaminondas and Iphicrates. Begun as well as completed by Philip, and bequeathed as an engine ready-made for the conquests of Alexander, it constitutes an epoch in military history. But the more we extol the genius of Philip as a conqueror, formed for successful encroachment

and aggrandisement at the expense of all his neighbours — the less can we find room for that mildness and moderation which some authors discover in his character. If, on some occasions of his life, such attributes may fairly be recognised, we have to set against them the destruction of the thirty-two Greek cities in Chalcidice, and the wholesale transportation of reluctant and miserable families from one inhabitancy to another.

Besides his skill as a general and politician, Philip was no mean proficient in the Grecian accomplishments of rhetoric and letters. Isocrates addresses him as a friend of letters and philosophy; a reputation which his choice of Aristotle as instructor of his son Alexander tends to bear out. Yet in Philip, as in the two Dionysii of Syracuse and other despots, these tastes were not found inconsistent either with the crimes of ambition or the licenses of inordinate appetite. The contemporary historian Theopompus, a warm admirer of Philip's genius, stigmatises not only the perfidy of his public dealings, but also the drunkenness, gambling, and excesses of all kinds in which he indulged — encouraging the like in those around him. His Macedonian and Grecian bodyguard, eight hundred in number, was a troop in which no decent man could live; distinguished indeed for military bravery and aptitude, but sated with plunder, and stained with such shameless treachery, sanguinary rapacity, and unbridled lust, as befitted only centaurs and Læstrygons. The number of Philip's mistresses and wives was almost on an oriental scale; and the innumerable dissensions thus introduced into his court through his offspring by different mothers, were fraught with mischievous consequences.

In appreciating the genius of Philip, we have to appreciate also the parties to whom he stood opposed. His good fortune was nowhere more conspicuous than in the fact, that he fell upon those days of disunion and backwardness in Greece (indicated in the last sentence of Xenophon's *Hellenics*) when there was neither leading city prepared to keep watch, nor leading general to take command, nor citizen-soldiers willing and ready to endure the hardships of steady service. Philip combated no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphicrates. How different might have been his career, had Epaminondas survived the victory of Mantinea, gained only two years before Philip's accession! To oppose Philip, there needed a man like himself, competent not only to advise and project, but to command in person, to stimulate the zeal of citizen-soldiers, and to set the example of braving danger and fatigue. Unfortunately for Greece, no such leader stood forward. In counsel and speech Demosthenes sufficed for the emergency. Twice before the battle of Chæronea — at Byzantium and at Thebes — did he signally frustrate Philip's combinations. But he was not formed to take the lead in action, nor was there any one near him to supply the defect. In the field, Philip encountered only that "public inefficiency," at Athens and elsewhere in Greece, of which even Æschines complains; and to this decay of Grecian energy, not less than to his own distinguished attributes, the unparalleled success of his reign was owing. We shall find during the reign of his son Alexander the like genius and vigour exhibited on a still larger scale, and achieving still more wonderful results; while the once stirring politics of Greece, after one feeble effort, sink yet lower, into the nullity of a subject province. 9



CHAPTER L. ALEXANDER THE GREAT

THE world has seen many great conquerors, but certainly not more than two or three who have stamped their names so indelibly upon the pages of history and appealed to the imagination of so wide an audience as the hero of Macedonia. The young soldier's meteoric career, which Appian, the great Roman historian, justly likened to a flash of lightning, had all the elements of dramatic picturesqueness. Alexander was the wonder of the age in which he lived, and no less a wonder to each succeeding generation. A myth soon grew up about his name, but the myth was scarcely more wonderful than the bald facts of his history. The main outlines of that history are familiar to every school-boy, yet it is a curious fact that no contemporary record of the achievements of Alexander has come down to us. We have the account of the Persian Wars written by Herodotus who was born before their close. We have the record of the Peloponnesian War written by Thucydides who participated in it, and by Xenophon who must have known personally many of its greatest actors. Xenophon has also left us a biography of Agesilaus, who so nearly anticipated Alexander in an Asiatic conquest, and, in so doing, he writes not merely as a contemporary but as a personal friend. But the oldest extant writings that give us an account of the deeds of Alexander were not penned until some three centuries after that hero lived and died. It is true that contemporary records of the history of Alexander were written in numbers, but by some curious chance no copy of any one of these records has been preserved.

Fortunately, however, the histories of Alexander that have come down to us are all based more or less on the contemporary records that are lost. There are five of these important histories, all written, perhaps, almost in the same century—the works namely of Diodorus, Justin, Plutarch, Curtius, and Arrian. The most ancient of these is the history of Diodorus, which dates from somewhere about the age of Julius Cæsar; the latest, that of Arrian, was written probably about the time of the reign of Adrian. There are, of course, numerous other classical authors who make reference to Alexander, but these five are the only ones who have given us anything like a complete history of his doings.

Of these histories, by common consent, the most authoritative is that of Arrian.ⁱ This work is based upon the writings of two of Alexander's

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generals, Ptolemy and Aristobulus. The point of view from which the work is written cannot be better described than in the author's own words:

"I have admitted into my narrative as strictly authentic all the statements relating to Alexander and Philip which Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and Aristobulus, son of Aristobulus, agree in making; and from those statements which differ I have selected that which appears to me the more credible, and at the same time the more deserving of record. Different authors have given different accounts of Alexander's actions; and there is no one about whom more have written, or more at variance with each other; but in my opinion the narratives of Ptolemy and Aristobulus are more worthy of credit than the rest—Aristobulus, because he served under King Alexander in his expedition, and Ptolemy's, not only because he accompanied Alexander in his expedition, but also because, being a king himself, the falsification of the facts would have been more disgraceful to him than to any other man. Moreover they are both more worthy of credit, because they compiled their histories after Alexander's death, when neither compulsion was used nor reward offered to them to write anything different from what really occurred. Some statements also made by other writers I have incorporated in my narrative, because they seemed to me worthy of mention and not altogether improbable; but I have given them merely as reports of Alexander's proceedings. And if any man wonders why, after so many other men have written of Alexander, the compilation of this history came into my mind, after perusing the narratives of all the rest, let him read this of mine, and then wonder—if he can."

When one reflects on the library of volumes that have been written in recent times on Alexander and his doings, it is curious to consider how meagre are the original materials on which all this elaboration is based. The entire accounts of Diodorus, Justin, Plutarch, Curtius, and Arrian if printed together in full would make but a comparatively small volume. Nor can it be said that any recent discoveries have greatly altered the point of view from which the history of Alexander is to be regarded, or largely added to our knowledge of the subject. The reader who has mastered these five classical authorities has learned practically all that is specifically known regarding the deeds of Alexander, and every modern historian who treats of the subject must bear these original authorities constantly in mind.^a

Before taking up Alexander's deeds in detail, it may be well to quote, by way of transition from father to son, the epigrammatic comparison made by Justin, between Philip and Alexander, using Brown's translation of 1712:

PHILIP AND ALEXANDER COMPARED BY JUSTIN

"Philip was killed in the Forty-Seventh Year of his Age, after he had Reigned Twenty-Five Years. He had a Son by an Actress of Larissa, whose Name was Aridæus, who reign'd after Alexander. He had, as 'tis usual with Princes, several other Sons by several Wives, some of whom died a Natural, and others fell by a violent Death. He was a Prince that took more Delight in Arms than in Feasting. His greatest Riches consisted in his Military Stores. He was more dexterous at getting Money than at keeping of it, which was the Reason that he was everlastingly Poor and Necessitous, amidst all his Rapines and Plunders. He was naturally inclined neither to Mercy nor Pity, but used both indifferently, as his Affairs required.

"He thought no Way dishonourable to overcome an Enemy. In his Discourse he was Free and Courteous, but always designing. He would promise

infinitely more than he intended to perform. He was equally excellent at Railery and serious Discourse. He measured Friendship not by Fidelity, but the Advantages it brought. His principal Talents were to pretend Love where he hated most, to excite Animosities and Distrusts between Friends, and at the same time to curry Favour with both. Among his other Qualities, Eloquence was none of the least, his Conversation was sprightly and subtle and neither did the Easiness of it exclude its Elegance, nor its Elegance Adulterate the Beauty of its Easiness.

"He was succeeded by his Son Alexander, who surpassed his Father both in his Virtues and his Vices. Their Methods of Conquering were extremely different. The Son carried on his Wars by open Force, the Father by Artifice and Stratagem. One loved to trick an Enemy underhand, the Other to defeat them gallantly in the Field by Bravery. One was more subtle in Council, the Other more Magnificent in his Temper.

"The Father could dissemble, and for the most part overcome his Anger. The Son, when he was thoroughly inflamed, neither knew how to allay, nor Moderate his Revenge. Both of them were over-greedy of Wine, but the Vices of their Drunkenness were different. The Father would run from an Entertainment to go and engage with an Enemy and rashly expose himself to Danger. The Son quarrelled with his friends in his Wine, and treated them like Enemies. Thus we find that Philip has frequently returned from Battels Wounded, and Alexander came from a Banquet stained with the Blood of his Friends. One would rule in Conjunction with his Friends, the Other would reign over them. The Father rather chose to make himself beloved, the Son to be fear'd. Both of 'em were equal Encouragers and Lovers of Learning. The Father had more Cunning, the Son more Honour. Philip was more moderate in his Conversation, Alexander in his Actions, which he show'd by being more Merciful and Generous to the Conquer'd. The Father loved Frugality, the Son was more inclined to Luxury. With these Qualifications the Father laid a Foundation for the Conquest of the World, which the Son most Gloriously accomplished."^d

ALEXANDER'S YOUTH ACCORDING TO QUINTUS CURTIUS

The kings of Macedon derived their pedigree from Hercules; and Olym-pias, Alexander's mother, reckoned the origin of her family from Achilles. From his very infancy he wanted neither allurements or examples to excite him in the pursuit of glory, nor masters to teach him virtue, nor exercise to accustom him to it. For his father, Philip, did by his continual wars raise the reputation of the Macedonians, who, till then were accounted despicable, and by his conquest of Greece, made them formidable everywhere. In fine, he not only laid the foundations of the great things which were done after his death, but even a little before his decease, having resolved to carry the war into Persia, he had levied men, gathered provisions, raised money, and, in short, had an army ready for that expedition; and had actually opened a passage into Asia, by the means of Parmenion.

But in this very juncture he was taken away, as if to leave to his son so great forces to carry on the war, and reap the full glory of it, when it was finished; which seems to have been the contrivance of fortune, who always yielded entire obedience to Alexander alone. This prince was so much in the admiration of all men, not only after he had done so great things, but even at his first setting out, that it was a question whether it were not more

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reasonable to ascribe the divine original of so great a man immediately to Jupiter himself, rather than mediately to the same god by the *Eacidae* and *Hercules*.

When he went himself to visit the temple of Ammon in Libya, nothing less would content him than to be called his son, as we shall shew in the sequel. Moreover, it was the opinion of many that Alexander was the off-spring of a serpent which had been seen in his mother's bed-chamber, and into which Jupiter had transformed himself; that the credit of his divine pedigree was advanced by dreams and prophecies; and that when Philip sent to Delphi to consult about it, he was admonished by the oracle, to pay the greatest reverence to Ammon. On the other hand, there are those who affirm, "That all this is mere fiction; and that there was reason to suspect Alexander's mother was guilty of adultery: for that Nectanebus, king of Egypt, who was driven from his kingdom, did not go to Ethiopia, as was commonly believed, but went to Macedonia, in hopes of receiving succours from Philip against the power of the Persians. That he deceived Olympias by the force of magical enchantments, and defiled his landlord's bed. That from that time Philip had a jealousy of her, and that it afterwards appeared this was the chief cause of their divorce. That the very day that Philip brought Cleopatra into his house, Attalus, his wife's uncle, took the liberty to reproach Alexander with the baseness of his birth, while the king himself disowned him for his son. In fine, that the constant rumour of Olympias' adultery was entertained not only in that part of the world, but even among the nations which he conquered. That the fiction of the serpent was derived from ancient fables, on purpose to conceal the ignominy of that princess. That the Messenians had formerly given out the same story concerning Aristomenes, and the Sicyonians concerning Aristodemus."

In reality the same report was spread abroad concerning Scipio, who was the first that ruined Carthage; and the birth of Augustus was in like manner thought to have had something divine in it. For as to Romulus, the founder of Rome, there is no occasion to say anything of him; since there is no nation so contemptible, but derives its origin either from some god, or the off-spring of a god. After all, the flight of Nectanebus does not agree with those times; for Alexander was six years of age, when that prince was vanquished by Ochus, and lost his kingdom and inheritance; but for all this, the tale which is reported of Jupiter, is not the less likely to be false. It is affirmed, that Olympias herself, having nothing to fear after her husband's death, laughed at the vanity of her son, who would needs have it believed that he was sprung from Jupiter; and begged him in a letter, "not to expose her to June's indignation, seeing that she had been guilty of nothing that deserved that punishment." However, before that time, she is thought to have been the person that took the most pains to gain credit to this fable, and is said to have admonished Alexander upon his expedition into Asia, "To be mindful of his origin, and do nothing that was unworthy of so great a father."

But it is generally agreed, that between the conception and birth of that prince, it was signified both by prodigies and divers presages, how considerable a person should be born. Philip saw in his sleep the womb of Olympias sealed up with a ring, on which the picture of a lion was engraved; the memory whereof was preserved by the city of Alexandria in Egypt, which was for a long time called Leontopolis. Aristander, the ablest diviner of that time, who afterwards accompanied Alexander, and was his chief priest, interpreted the dream, and said it signified the magnanimity and courage of the infant. The same night that Olympias was brought to bed, the temple of Diana in

Ephesus, the most famous of all Asia, was burnt to ashes. This was done by a profligate villain, who being apprehended and put to the torture, confessed he had no other view in doing it, but to preserve his memory by some great and memorable act of impiety. Wherefore the Magi, who were then at Ephesus, not reckoning so great a misfortune from the loss of the temple alone, but looking upon it as a presage of greater destruction, filled the whole city with mournful exclamations; "That there was a torch kindled somewhere, which, on the like account, and from the same motive, should one day consume all the East."

Philip being blessed with a son, of whom so many happy omens made him conceive the highest hopes, turned all his thoughts towards his education. For being a wise man, and a lover of his country, he easily perceived that all his endeavours would be to no purpose, if he should leave an ignorant and slothful prince behind him, to govern Macedonia, while things were in an unsettled state everywhere: and that his glory could not be long-lived, if the great things he had begun should be lost and ruined by the weakness or negligence of a successor. Among his letters, that discreet and elegant one which he wrote to Aristotle, who was then at Athens with Plato, is yet extant, and is conceived in words much to this purpose:

"Philip to Aristotle wisheth Health.

"I am to acquaint you, that a son is born to me; nor do I thank the gods so much for his birth, as for his being born in your time. I hope that when he shall have been educated and instructed by you, he shall be worthy of us, and fit to succeed to so great a kingdom. For I think it much better to be without children, than to beget them for a punishment, and educate them to the shame and dishonour of their ancestors."

Nor was Philip mistaken; for having been long under the direction of Aristotle, the effect was, that the instructions he received from that great master, laid a foundation for, and enabled him to perform all the great exploits which he executed from that time.

When he grew up, there appeared a perfect symmetry in his members, his joints were strong and firm; and being but of a middle stature, he was really stronger than he appeared to be. His skin was white, only his cheeks and his breast were dyed with an agreeable red; his hair was yellow, and went into a gentle curl; his nose was aquiline, and his eyes of different colours: for his left eye is said to have been blue, and his right very black. There was a certain secret virtue in them; insomuch that nobody could look on his countenance without veneration and fear. He could run with wonderful swiftness, which he often practised, even when he was king, as esteeming it of great use in expeditions; and he was often seen to run for a prize with the swiftest persons about him. He bore fatigue with a patience and firmness that even passes belief; and by this one virtue he oftentimes saved both himself and his armies in the greatest extremities. By frequent exercises, and a very warm constitution, he did so purge off any bad humours which commonly lodge under the skin, that not only his breath, but also what he perspired through the pores of his body were sweet, and his very clothes had a fragrant smell; and this was the cause, as some think, why he was so much inclined to wine and passion. Pictures and statues of him are yet to be seen, which were the performances of the best artists. For lest the comeliness of his face should suffer any thing from the unskilfulness of vulgar sculptors or painters, he strictly forbade any to draw his picture without his order, and threatened to punish any one that should disobey it. In consequence whereof, though there was abundance of good workmen, yet Apelles

[356-336 B.C.]

was the only person who had his consent to draw his picture ; Pyrgoteles to grave him on precious stones, and Lysippus and Polyclitus to represent him in medals.


His governor Leonidas is said to have walked too fast, which Alexander learnt of him ; and never was able to help it afterwards by all his endeavours. I am not ignorant that very much is owing to education, but I am inclined to impute this rather to the temper of that young prince, than to his accustoming himself to it ; for it was impossible for one of his ardour and impetuosity of spirit, not to have the motions of his body answerable to it. And this hastiness of his was so far from being accounted an imperfection by his successors, that they studiously affected it, and imitated him therein ; as they did in his wry neck, which leaned to his left shoulder, in his piercing look and high voice, being incapable to copy the virtues of his mind. In reality, there were many of them whose long lives had scarce anything in them that deserved to be compared to his childhood. Nor did he ever say or act anything that was mean or base, but all his words and actions were equal to, or even surpassed, his fortune. For though he was most ambitious of praise, yet he did not affect to draw it indifferently from every thing, but would have it arise from things that were most praise-worthy ; being sensible that the praise which arises from mean actions is inglorious and dishonourable, and that that victory which is gained over the meanest enemy, is so much the more noble and illustrious. Therefore when some persons told him, "that seeing he was an excellent runner, he ought to list himself among those who were to contend for the prize at the Olympic games, after the example of a king of his name ; and that thereby he should acquire a great fame all over Greece" : he answered, "I would certainly do so, if I were to run against kings."

As often as Philip obtained any signal victory, or reduced any rich and strong place, he could not conceal his grief, amidst the rejoicing of others ; and he was heard to complain amongst boys of his own age, "that his father would leave nothing for him and them to do when they came to be men." For he looked upon every accession of power and riches to be a diminution to his glory, and had a stronger passion for honour than for wealth. He was naturally disposed to sleep but little, and increased his watchfulness by art. If anything happened to him that required serious thought, he put his arm out of the bed, holding a silver ball in his hand, which by its fall into a basin might make a noise, and so disperse that heaviness which was inclining him to slumber. From his very infancy he loved to worship the gods splendidly ; and one day as they were sacrificing, he flung so much incense into the fire, that Leonidas, who was a severe and parsimonious man, not being able to bear that profusion, cried out, "You may burn incense in this manner when you conquer the countries where it grows." Remembering this saying afterwards, when he settled the affairs of Arabia, which produces incense, he sent Leonidas a vast quantity of this perfume, ordering him withal, "to be more liberal for the future, in paying honour to the gods, since he was now convinced that they did plentifully repay the gifts that had been cheerfully made them."

Aristotle as His Teacher

That he understood the more sublime sciences, is evident from his letter to Aristotle, wherein he complains, "That he had profaned their dignity by divulging their principles." Upon which, Aristotle excused himself by

answering, "That those books were published in such a manner, as that they might be reckoned not published; for that no body would be able to understand the meaning of them, but such as had already been instructed in the principles which they contained." When Alexander demanded his books of rhetoric, he strictly forbade him to let them come to the hands of any other; for he was no less desirous to excel others in arts and sciences, than in power and greatness; nor could he endure that men of the lowest rank should share that glory with him. Besides, it appears from his letters that he



ARISTOTLE

studied physic under one Aristotle, who was the son of a physician, of the race of *Æsculapius*. But he studied that part of philosophy so well, which teaches a man to command both himself and others, that he is thought to have undertaken the supervision of that vast weight and power of the Persian empire, rather by his magnanimity, prudence, temperance, and fortitude, than by his arms and riches. He frankly owned, "That he owed more to Aristotle than to Philip; for that he was indebted to the one for his life; to the other for that life's being formed upon the principles of honour and virtue." Nevertheless, it has been believed by some, not without ground, that his mind, which was so fired with ambition, was yet more inflamed by the too great value which Aristotle set upon honour and glory, which he placed in the rank of things that may be called goods; so that he not only multiplied wars upon wars, in order to extend his dominions, but would needs be looked upon as a god.

Of all the monuments of antiquity, he had the greatest esteem for Homer, who, he thought, was the only person that had perfectly described that wisdom by which empires subsist; and such a passion for him, that he was called Homer's Lover. He was wont to carry his books always along with him; and even when he went to bed, he put them

and his sword under his pillow, calling them "his military viaticum, and the elements of warlike virtue." He esteemed Achilles to have been happy in finding so great a man to celebrate his virtues.

Having found a most curious casket, both for matter and workmanship, amongst the plunder of Damascus, and his friends having asked him "What use it was most proper for?" he answered, "We will dedicate it to Homer, since it is but reasonable that the most precious monument of human wit should be preserved in the finest piece of workmanship." From hence the most correct edition of that poet, which Alexander was at much pains to get, was called the "edition of the casket"; because in that casket the Persians had used to keep odours and perfumes. One day as a certain messenger of good news ran towards him, in all haste stretching out his right hand, with the highest marks of joy on his countenance; "What news can you tell me," says he, "that's worthy of so much joy, unless that Homer is alive again?" He was then arrived to such a degree of happiness, that he thought there wanted nothing to complete his glory, but one capable to trumpet his praise. By frequent reading of him, he had got almost all by heart; so that no person could quote him more readily or familiarly, or judge of him more justly.

[356-336 B.C.]

Bucephalus

He showed an extraordinary courage and dexterity, to the great astonishment of his father and others, in managing the horse Bucephalus, which name was given him from his being marked with the figure of an ox's head. Thessaly was very much famed at that time for fine horses, and great numbers of them were bred in that country, but none of them was to be compared to Bucephalus either for mettle or beautifulness; for which reason Philonicus a Pharsalian, thinking him worthy of the greatest prince in those parts, brought him to Philip, and proposed to sell him for sixteen talents. But when they came to try his speed and management, by riding him out into the fields, there was none of the king's friends or attendants that durst venture to manage him; for he rose upon them, and frightened all that essayed to mount him, by his fierceness: so that he was now looked upon as unmanageable and useless, upon the account of his wildness: at which Alexander sighing said, "What a fine horse those people lose through their ignorance and cowardice." After having repeated these words over and over, his father chid him "for finding fault with horsemen that were both older and more skillful than himself, as if he could manage that horse better than they." To which he answered, "I will manage him better than they, father, if you will give me leave." Upon this, the father asked him, "What he would forfeit if he could not execute what he had undertaken?" "I will forfeit the price of the horse," replied he. At this every body smiled, and agreed, "That if he won, his father should buy the horse for him; but if he lost, he should lay down the money himself." Then Alexander, taking the horse by the bridle, turned him directly to the sun, that so he might not see his shadow; for he had observed, that this frightened him, and made him more untractable. Finding his fury not much abated notwithstanding this, he stroked his mane, laid his cloak aside gently, and jumped upon him at once, though he was foaming with rage. Then Bucephalus, that was not used to obey, began to fling with his heels, and throw about his head, and very obstinately refused to be guided by the bridle; then he essayed to get loose, and run away full speed. He was then in a spacious plain that was fit for riding in: wherefore Alexander, giving him the rein, and setting his spurs to his sides, rode shouting with all the vigour and fury imaginable. And after he had traversed a vast space of ground, till he was weary, and willing to stop, he spurred him on till such time as his mettle was exhausted, and he became tame; after which he brought him back very gentle and tractable. When Alexander alighted, his father embraced him with tears of joy, and kissing him, said, "He must seek out a larger empire for himself, for that the kingdom of Macedon was too small for so vast a spirit." Afterwards Bucephalus continued the same fierceness towards others, while he obeyed Alexander alone with a wonderful submission; and after he had been his companion in many labours and dangers, he was at last killed in a battle against Porus.^e

ALEXANDER'S FIRST DEEDS

From the remotest ages of Pelasgian antiquity down to the time of the Roman empire, the holy island of Samothrace, the seat of an awfully mysterious worship, was accounted equal to Delphi in sanctity. Here it is said Philip first saw Olympias, when they partook at the same time in the Cabirian mysteries, and resolved to seek her hand. Olympias loved the fanatical

orgies celebrated by the Thracian and Macedonian women in honour of their Dionysus ; and is even said to have introduced some of the symbols of this frantic worship,—the huge tame snakes, which the Bacchanals wreathed round their necks and arms.—into her husband's palace. It is a stroke which agrees well with the other features of her wild, impetuous character. Who can estimate the degree in which this irritable, uncontrollable nature may have contributed one element towards that combination of ardent enthusiasm with the soberest forethought which distinguishes Alexander, perhaps above every man that ever filled a like station ?

The anecdotes related of Alexander's boyhood are chiefly remarkable as indicating what may be fitly called a kingly spirit, which not only felt conscious that it was born to command, and was impatient of all opposition to its will, but also studied how it might subject all things and persons around it to its own higher purposes. This inborn royalty of soul could hardly have failed to find its way to fame, had it even been originally lodged in an obscure corner. But the prince, who was destined to effect so great a change in the state of the world, was to be committed to the care of the man whose spirit was not less active and ambitious, who also in the range of his intellectual conquests had never been equalled, and who founded a much more lasting empire in the sphere of thought. Never, before or since, have two persons so great in the historical sense of the word, been brought together—above all in the same relation—as Alexander and Aristotle.

Alexander was but thirteen years old when he became the philosopher's pupil. This relation appears to have subsisted between them for no more than three successive years. Alexander was only sixteen when Philip set out on his expedition to Thrace, from which he only returned in the autumn of 339, and he was entrusted with the regency of the kingdom—probably under the direction of a council—during his father's absence. He was then of course occupied with affairs of state ; and in the course of this time, a revolt of one of the conquered tribes, probably on the Illyrian frontier, afforded an occasion for his first essay in the art of war. He reduced the insurgents, took their chief city, expelled its inhabitants, and planted a new colony there, to which he gave the name of Alexandropolis. In the interval between the battle of Charonea and his father's death, he was engaged in transactions quite alien from philosophical or literary pursuits. It is very doubtful whether he saw Aristotle again before he came to the throne. Their personal intercourse must at least have been confined to occasional interviews.

It is pleasing to find it recorded that still he wrote a book on the office of a king expressly for Alexander. Nevertheless we have unquestionable proof that even on this head the force of nature was stronger than that of education. Aristotle's national prejudices led him into extravagant notions as to the superiority of the Hellenic race over the rest of mankind : as if the distinction between Greek and barbarian was nearly the same as between man and brute, person and thing : hence slavery appeared to him not a result of injustice and cruelty, but an unalterable law of nature, a relation necessary to the welfare of society.

Hence too he deduced a practical maxim, which he endeavoured to inculcate upon the future conqueror of Asia, that he should treat the Greeks as his subjects, the barbarians as his slaves. The advice was contrary to Alexander's views and sentiments : it did not suit the position which his consciousness of his own destiny led him to assume. He acted, we know, on a directly opposite principle.

[356-336 B.C.]

We have at least reason to believe that Alexander, though he was but twenty years old at his father's death, had learned, thought, seen, and done more to fit him for the place he was to fill, than many sovereigns in the full maturity of their age and experience. Like his father, he found himself, on his accession to the throne, in a situation which called forth all the powers of his mind and all the energies of his character. Macedonia, though nominally at peace with all its European neighbours, was surrounded by enemies, who might be expected eagerly to seize the opportunity, which seemed to offer itself now that the crown had devolved on a stripling, to shake off a yoke which they had endured with ill-disguised impatience. In the kingdom itself there were powerful families, which had not forgotten the times when they aspired to independence, if not to the possession of the throne. Amyntas, too, the son of Perdiccas, was still living, and might be tempted to assert his claim. It was known that the court of Persia was on the watch.


The young king's first object was to secure himself at home : the next to overawe his hostile neighbours, and to extort from them such an acknowledgment of his superiority, as would place him in the position which his father was occupying at the time of his death. In Macedonia, though there might be some ambitious and disaffected nobles, the mass of the people both recognised his title and were attached to his person. Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, was put to death on a charge of a plot against Alexander's life. After the last honours had been paid to his father, the king showed himself in a general assembly of his people, and declared his intention of prosecuting his predecessor's undertakings with like vigour, and, it is said, granted a general immunity from all burdens except military service.

The news of Philip's death had excited a general ferment throughout Greece. The gloomy prospect which, since the battle of Charonea, must have saddened so many hearts—the thought that the flower of the Grecian youth were henceforth to shed their blood for the execution of projects which threatened their country with perpetual subjection—was suddenly exchanged for the liveliest hopes of deliverance from the foreigner's power. In all the principal states language was heard, and preparations were seen, denoting a disposition to take advantage of the unexpected opportunity. Ambracia expelled the Macedonian garrison, and re-established its democratical institutions. The Acarnanian exiles who had taken refuge in Ætolia prepared to return, and the Ætolians in their congress voted succours to reinstate them. Athens took the lead in these movements, and indeed seems to have been the centre from which they proceeded.

DEMOSTHENES RIDICULES ALEXANDER

Among the Athenian envoys who had been sent to congratulate Philip was Charidemus; being at Ægæ at the time of Philip's death, he lost no time in despatching a courier, who was directed to carry the news to Demosthenes before he communicated it to any one else. It happened that the orator was at this juncture mourning the loss of an only daughter, who had died but seven days before; but his private sorrow gave way to public cares. He immediately laid aside his weeds, came out dressed in white, with a festive wreath on his head, and a joyful countenance, and was seen performing a solemn sacrifice at one of the public altars. In order to give greater effect to the momentous tidings, the orator appears to have resorted to a stratagem

which proves that he knew his countrymen to be still superstitious, and credulous. He appeared before the council of Five Hundred, and declared that it had been revealed to him in a dream by Zeus and Athene, that some great good was about to happen to the commonwealth. Messengers soon after arrived with the news which fulfilled the divine announcement. It was apparently the object of Demosthenes, by this artifice, to impress the people with his own view of the change which Philip's death had made in the situation and prospects of Athens. It was at least as harmless an imposture as was ever practised; and, if fraud could ever be pious, might deserve that epithet.¹ He now moved moreover that religious honours should be decreed to the memory of Pausanias.



BUST OF ALEXANDER

(In the Capitoline Museum, Rome)

This conduct of Demosthenes was strongly censured by his contemporaries on various grounds; though not on those which render it most repugnant to the maxims and feelings of civilised society in modern times. Yet we know that even under the better light which we enjoy, not only the massacre of the Huguenots was celebrated with public rejoicings and thanksgivings in the capital of Christian Europe, but the assassination of the prince of Orange, and that of Henry III of France, were openly applauded, and Balthasar Gérard and Clément treated as heroes.

Phocion objected to the proposed demonstrations of joy on two accounts: first, because such exultation over an enemy's death was dastardly, and then, because the force which had won the day at Chæronea had only been diminished by the loss of a single life. That the loss which Macedonia had sustained by

Philip's death, was only to be reckoned as that of a single soldier, was manifestly false; and the best excuse that can be offered for Demosthenes is, that he wished to place the event in a different light—one which he might well believe to be the true one. We cannot indeed be sure that he entertained so low an opinion of Alexander's abilities as he thought it expedient to profess; though it appears that the impression made on him by the young prince when he saw him at his father's court was not favourable, and on his return from his embassy he turned his boyish performance into ridicule. It was true that Alexander had at least acted the part of a man better than himself at Chæronea; but his real character, and the promise of greatness which he held out, could not yet be known at Athens. Perhaps some report of his multifarious studies and attainments had been heard there, which afforded a handle for Demosthenes to compare him with Margites, the hero of a burlesque poem attributed to Homer, who knew many things, but none well; and the orator now ventured to assure the Athenians, that they had nothing to fear from the young king, who would never stir from Macedonia, but would remain at Pella, dividing his time between his peaceful studies and the inspection of victims, which would never permit him to undertake any dangerous expedition.

[¹ It is a bishop and a doctor of divinity, Thirlwall, who justifies this mummary. If it is "excusable" and almost "pious," the trickeries of Philip merit the same tender consideration.]

[336 B.C.]

There were beside engines which the orator was able to set at work against him, which were known only to himself, and which he was obliged to keep secret, but which might reasonably strengthen his confidence. He was in correspondence with the Persian court, and had, it seems, already received sums of money from it to be distributed at his discretion for the purpose of thwarting Philip's enterprise against Asia. The conduct of Demosthenes in this transaction — if we consider that he was carrying on a clandestine negotiation with a foreign state against which his own had declared war, to injure a prince who was the ally of Athens — cannot be vindicated on the principles which regulate the intercourse of civilised nations in modern times. But how little were such scruples heeded when Napoleon's disasters opened a prospect for restoring the independence of Germany!

The people, however, seem to have retained too lively a recollection of the consternation which had followed the battle of Chæronea, to pledge themselves hastily to a renewal of the contest with Macedonia. The language of Æschines inclines us to believe that they did not adopt the motion of Demosthenes with respect to Pausanias. But he prevailed on them to send envoys to many of the Greek states, with secret instructions. The Persian gold, or the promise of subsidies, may have overcome many obstacles. There was another quarter in which the Athenian emissaries might still more safely reckon on a friendly reception. Attalus, Alexander's personal enemy, was commanding a body of troops in Asia. A negotiation was opened with him by means of a letter from Demosthenes, and nothing probably but want of time prevented its success.

ALEXANDER DASHES THROUGH GREECE

But all these plans and preparations were disconcerted and suppressed by the rapidity of Alexander's movements. It seems as if his elder counsellors, who had been long used to Philip's cautious policy, advised him to leave the Greeks for the present to themselves, and not to make any attempt to force them to obedience, until he had established a good understanding with the barbarian tribes on his northern frontier, which after Philip's death had begun to assume a threatening aspect. Alexander, however, saw that, if he should adopt such a course, the work of his father's reign might be undone in a few months: he saw that his presence was immediately necessary in Greece, and he set his forces in motion without delay. In his passage through Thessaly, he endeavoured to conciliate the ruling families by promises. All the concessions that had been made to Philip were renewed to him: their revenues and troops were placed at his disposal. At Thermopylæ he assembled the Amphictyonic council, perhaps before the ordinary time of the autumnal meeting with a view to secure the adherence of the northern tribes which had votes in it; and from them it seems he received the title [Leader of the Greeks] which had been conferred on his father in the Sacred War. He then advanced by rapid marches to Thebes, where, as no preparations had yet been made to execute the resolution which had been precipitately adopted, his presence awed the disaffected into entire submission.

His approach produced a like effect at Athens. The people hastened to appease him by an embassy, which they sent to apologise for their late proceedings, and to offer him all the honours they had conferred on Philip. Demosthenes himself was appointed one of the envoys — perhaps through the

intrigues of his adversaries; and he even proceeded as far as Cithæron, on his way to the Macedonian camp. We do not know whether it was his own reflections on the dangers of his mission, or some hints which he received as to Alexander's intentions, that induced him to find some excuse for turning back. The rest of the ambassadors, however, found the king ready to accept their excuses and promises, perhaps were led to believe that he had never suspected the commonwealth of any hostile designs. He despatched a trusty officer, named Hecataeus, over to Asia, with orders either to arrest Attalus and convey him to Macedonia, or to put him to death. It seems that Attalus had so won the affections of his troops, that Hecataeus thought it safest to have him secretly killed.

Alexander had sent envoys before him to summon a fresh congress at Corinth. He found this assembly as obsequious as that which had been called by his father; and was invested by it with the same title and authority for the prosecution of the war with Persia, as had been bestowed on Philip. Sparta alone either refused to send deputies to the congress, or instructed them to disavow its proceedings. She had been used—such was still her language—herself to take the lead among the Greeks, and would not resign her hereditary rank to another. Alexander perhaps smiled at these pretensions of a state which was hardly able to protect itself, but did not think it worth while to put its resolution to the test, by an invasion of its territory. So too the revolt of Ambracia did not appear to him important enough to detain him so long as would have been necessary to crush it. He even condescended to assure the Ambracians that they had only forestalled his intentions: that he should of his own accord have restored their democratical institutions. It was a concession which his commanding posture enabled him to make with dignity, and therefore without danger. Having thus in the course of a few weeks settled the affairs of Greece, he returned to Macedonia, with the hope that in the following spring he might be able to embark for Asia.

ALEXANDER WINNOWS THE NORTH

But when the season for military operations drew near in 335, reports were heard of movements among the Thracian tribes and the Triballians, which seemed to render it necessary, for the security of his kingdom during his absence, that he should spread the terror of his arms in that quarter, before he began an expedition which would carry him so far away from it. Early in the spring Alexander set out on his march toward the Danube. A small squadron of ships of war was ordered to be fitted out at Byzantium, and to sail up the river to meet the army. In ten days, having crossed the Hebrus at Philippopolis, it reached the foot of the Balkan. Here the Thracians had collected their forces to guard the defiles, and were seen entrenched behind their wagons on the summit of the pass. As the road which led up to it was extremely steep, they had formed the plan of rolling their wagons down on the enemy as they advanced, and then falling on their broken ranks. Alexander perceived the object of their preparations, and provided against the danger. The heavy infantry were ordered, where the ground permitted, to open their files and make way for the wagons: where this was not practicable, to throw themselves forward on the ground, and link their shields together over their heads, so that the descending masses might bound over them. The shock came and passed in a few

[335 B.C.]

moments, leaving the men unhurt; they closed their ranks, and rose from the ground with heightened courage. The enemy were soon dislodged from their position by a skilful and vigorous charge, leaving fifteen hundred slain: the fugitives easily escaped; the camp, in which were their wives and children, fell into the hands of the victors.

Having crossed the mountains without further interruption, Alexander now resumed his march, and in three days reached the right bank of the Danube, where he found the galleys which he expected from Byzantium. Under favour of night they crossed over unmolested, and landed in fields of standing corn. This the phalanx levelled, as it marched through, with its spears, the cavalry following until they reached the open ground, where the enemy, astonished and dismayed by their unexpected appearance, did not even wait for the first charge of the horse, but took refuge in their town which lay but a few miles off. Even this—for it was poorly fortified—they abandoned at Alexander's approach, and taking as many as they could of the women and children on their horses, retreated into the wilderness. The town was sacked and razed to the ground, and Alexander having sacrificed on the right bank of the Danube to the gods who had granted him a safe passage, returned to his camp on the other side. Here he received embassies, with submissive or at least pacific overtures, from Syrmus, and from many of the independent nations bordering on the river. His chief object was attained in the proof thus afforded of the terror inspired by his arms.

He now turned his march westward, to reach the borders of Illyria, through the country of the Agrianians and Pæonians, on the western side of the mountains which contain the springs of the Hebrus and the Nestus. The king however was enabled to pursue his march without obstruction up the valley of the Erigon, towards the fortress of Pelium. It stood on high ground in the midst of lofty wooded hills, which were also guarded by Illyrian troops, so as to command all the approaches of the place; and the barbarians had sought an additional safeguard against the assaults of the Macedonians, in a sacrifice, which they celebrated on the hill tops, of three boys, three girls, and as many black rams. Yet all these precautions proved fruitless; and Alexander, after he made himself master of the adjacent hills—where he found the victims of those horrid rites—was proceeding to invest Pelium itself, when the arrival of Glaucias with a numerous army compelled him to retire, that he might provide for his own safety. We shall not dwell on the evolutions by which he extricated himself from a most perilous position. It is sufficient to mention that he first penetrated through a difficult defile, and crossed a river in the presence of an enemy greatly superior in numbers; and three days afterwards, having suddenly returned, fell upon the allies, whose camp was carelessly guarded, in the night, and broke up their host. Glaucias fled towards his home, and was pursued by Alexander with great slaughter as far as the mountains which protected his territories. Clitus at first took shelter in Pelium; but soon despairing of his own resources, set fire to the fortress, and retreated into the dominions of Glaucias.

THE REVOLT OF THEBES

The accounts which reached Greece of Alexander's operations in these wild and distant regions, were, it may be supposed, very imperfect and confused; and at length, during an interval in which no news was heard of

nim, a report of his death sprang up, or was studiously set afloat. The report seems to have encouraged a party of Theban exiles to enter the city by night, and attempt a revolution. They began in an unhappy spirit with the massacre of two officers of the Macedonian garrison. They then summoned an assembly, and prevailed on the people to rise in open insurrection, and lay siege to the Cadmea. The citizens who were still in exile were recalled, the slaves enfranchised, the aliens won by new privileges. Demosthenes furnished them with a subsidy which enabled them to procure arms, and induced the Athenians to enter into an alliance with them, and emboldened the people to decree an expedition in aid of the Thebans. This decree, however, was not carried into effect. Elis, too, openly espoused the cause of the Thebans so far as even to send their forces as far as the isthmus, where they were joined by those of some Arcadian states. But here their generals were induced to halt, by the tidings which reached them of Alexander's return.

He was still at Pelium when he heard of the revolt of Thebes. He knew that unless it was crushed in time it would probably spread, and he was anxious about the garrison of the Cadmea. He therefore set out immediately for Bœotia. In seven days, having traversed the upper provinces of Macedonia and crossed the Cambunian range towards its junction with Pindus, he reached Pelinna in Thessaly. Six days more brought him into Bœotia. So rapid were his movements that, before the Thebans had heard that he had passed Thermopylæ, he had arrived at Onchestus. The authors of the insurrection would not at first listen to the news of his approach; they gave out that it was Antipater who commanded the Macedonian army: and then that Alexander, the son of Æropus, had been taken for his royal namesake. But when the truth was ascertained, they found the people still willing to persevere in the struggle which had now become so hopeless.

Alexander, on the other hand, wishing to give them time for better counsels, now moved slowly against the city; and even when he had encamped near the foot of the Cadmea, which they had encompassed with a double line of circumvallation, waited some time for proposals of peace, which he was ready to grant on very lenient terms. There was a strong party within which was willing to submit to his pleasure, and urged the people to cast themselves on his mercy: but the leaders of the revolt, who could expect none for themselves, resisted every such motion; and as beside their personal influence they filled most places in the government, they unhappily prevailed. It was their object to draw matters to extremities. When Alexander sent to demand Phœnix and Prothyas, two of their chiefs, they demanded Philotas and Antipater in return; and when he proclaimed an offer of pardon to all who should surrender themselves to him and share the common peace, they made a counter proclamation from the top of a tower, inviting all who desired the independence of Greece to take part with them against the tyrant. These insults, and especially the animosity and distrust which they implied, put an end to all thoughts of peace, and Alexander reluctantly prepared for an assault.

The fate of Thebes seems after all to have been decided more by accident than by design. Perdicas, who was stationed with his division in front of the camp, not far from the Theban entrenchments, without waiting for the signal, began the attack, and forced his way into the space between the enemy's lines, and was followed by Amyntas son of Andromenes, who commanded the next division. Alexander was thus induced to bring up the

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rest of his forces. Yet at first he only sent in some light troops to the support of the two divisions which were engaged with the enemy. When however Perdiccas had fallen, severely wounded, as he led his men within the second line of entrenchments, and the Thebans, who at first had given way, rallied and in their turn put the Macedonians to flight, he himself advanced to the scene of combat with the phalanx, and fell upon them in the midst of the disorder caused by the pursuit. They were instantly routed, and made for the nearest gates of the city, in such confusion that the enemy entered with them, and being soon joined by the garrison of the Cadmea, made themselves masters of the adjacent part of the city. The besieged made a short stand in the market-place; but, when they saw themselves threatened on all sides, the cavalry took to flight through the opposite gates, and the rest as they could find a passage. But few of the foot combatants effected their escape; and the conquerors glutted their rage with unresisted slaughter.

It was not however so much from the Macedonians, as from some of their auxiliaries, that the Thebans suffered the utmost excesses of hostile cruelty. Alexander had brought with him a body of Thracians among his light troops, and he had been reinforced by the Phocians and by all the Boeotian towns hostile to Thebes — more especially by Orchomenos, Thespie, and Platea. The Thracians, impelled by their habitual ferocity, of which they had shown so fearful a specimen many years before, at the capture of Mycalessus; the Boeotians, eager to revenge the wrongs they had endured from Thebes in the day of her prosperity — revelled in the usual license of carnage, plunder, and wanton outrages on those whose age and sex left them most defenceless. The bloodshed, however, was restrained by cupidity, that the most valuable part of the spoil might not be lost. The number of the slain was estimated at six thousand; that of the prisoners at thirty thousand. The Macedonians lost about five hundred men.

THE FATE OF THEBES

It only remained to fix the final doom of the conquered city. Alexander, who had probably made up his mind on it, referred it to a council of his allies, in which the representatives of the Boeotian towns took a leading part. The issue of their deliberation might be easily foreseen, and did not want plausible reasons to justify it. There was a sentence which had been hanging over Thebes ever since the Persian War in which she had so recklessly betrayed the cause of Grecian liberty. It had never been forgotten, and calls had been heard from time to time for its execution. And the city which had so long been permitted by the indulgence of the Greeks to retain a forfeited existence, had nevertheless been distinguished by her merciless treatment of her conquered enemies. In the case of Platea she had not only instigated the Spartans to a cold-blooded slaughter, forbidden by the usages of Greek warfare, but she had destroyed a city which by its heroic patriotism had earned the gratitude of the whole nation, and was itself a monument of the national triumph. Nor was it forgotten that when Athens was at the mercy of its enemies she alone had proposed to sweep it from the face of Greece.

It seems that these old offences were placed in the foreground, while little notice was taken of the later acts of violence and oppression towards the Boeotian towns, which were the real grounds of their implacable resentment.

The decree of the council was that the Cadmea should be left standing, to be occupied by a Macedonian garrison; that the lower city should be levelled with the ground, and the territory, except the part which belonged to the temples, divided among the allies: the men, women, and children, sold as slaves, all but the priests and priestesses, and some citizens who stood in a relation of hospitality to Philip or Alexander, or held the office of proxenus to the state of Macedonia. Under this head were probably included most of the conqueror's political adherents. He made one other exception, which was honourable rather to his taste than his humanity. He bade spare the house of Pindar, and as many as were to be found of his descendants. The council likewise decreed that Orchomenos and Plataea should be rebuilt. The demolished buildings of Thebes may have furnished materials for the restoration of Plataea.



RUINS OF THE GREAT-GATE IN THE WALLS OF MESSENE

It can hardly be doubted that policy had a large share in this rigorous measure, and that Thebes was destroyed chiefly because it would not have been safe to leave it standing, and that the example of its fate might strike the rest of Greece with a wholesome awe. Alexander himself in his subsequent treatment of individual Thebans tacitly acknowledged that his severity had been carried to an extreme which bordered upon cruelty. But the harshness which he displayed in this case enabled him to assume the appearance of magnanimity and gentleness in others. All the Greek states which had betrayed their hostility towards him, now vied with one another in apologies, recantations, and offers of submission. A reaction immediately took place at Elis in favour of the Macedonian party; and in the Arcadian towns which had sent succours for the Thebans, the authors of this imprudent step were condemned to death. The Ætolians too who had shown some symptoms of disaffection sent an embassy to deprecate the king's displeasure.


Athens, however, had most reason to dread his anger, and strove to avert it by a servile homage, which at once marks the character of the man who proposed it and the depth to which the people had fallen since the battle of Chæronea. When the first fugitives arrived from Thebes, the Athenians were celebrating their great Eleusinian mysteries. All fled in consternation to the city, and removed their property out of the country within the walls. An assembly was immediately called, in which, on the motion of Demades, it was decreed that ten envoys, the most acceptable that could be found,

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
should be sent to congratulate Alexander on his safe return from his northern expedition, and on the chastisement which he had inflicted on Thebes. The king discovered no displeasure at this piece of impudent obsequiousness, but in reply sent a letter to the people demanding nine of the leading anti-Macedonian orators and generals — Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hyperides, Polyeuctus, Chares, Charidemus, Ephialtes, Diotimus, and Mærocles, whom he charged both with the transactions which had led to the battle of Charonea, and with all the hostile measures that had since been adopted at Athens towards his father and himself, particularly with the principal share in the revolt of Thebes.

In the assembly which was held to consider this requisition, Phocion, it is said, both counselled the people to surrender the objects of the conqueror's resentment or apprehensions, and exhorted the elected victims to devote themselves spontaneously for the public weal. Demosthenes is reported to have quoted the fable of the wolf who called on the sheep to give up their dogs. The people wavered between fear and reluctance, till Demades stepped in to remove the difficulty. He undertook — it was commonly believed for a fee of five talents — to appease Alexander, and save the threatened lives. He found the king satiated with the punishment of the Thebans, and disposed for an exercise of mercy which might soften the impression it had produced on the minds of the Greeks. He remitted his demand with respect to all except Charidemus, who perhaps had incurred his peculiar displeasure by his conduct at Ægæ after Philip's death, and who now embarked for Asia, and proceeded to the Persian court.

The conqueror celebrated his return to Macedonia with an Olympic festival at Ægæ, and with games in honour of the Muses at Dium in Pieria. The inhabitants of Dium held the memory of Orpheus in great reverence, and boasted of the possession of his bones. At the time of the games it was reported that a statue of the ancient bard, which perhaps adorned his monument near the town, had been seen bathed in sweat. Alexander's Lycian soothsayer, Aristander of Telmessus, bade him hail the omen: it signified that the masters of epic and lyric poetry should be wearied by the tale of his achievements. These achievements will now for some time claim our undivided attention.^h



GREEK HARVESTING



APOLLO AND MERCURY

CHAPTER LI. ALEXANDER INVADES ASIA

SCHEMES OF CONQUEST

A YEAR and some months had sufficed for Alexander to make a first display of his energy and military skill, destined for achievements yet greater; and to crush the growing aspirations for freedom among Greeks on the south, as well as among Thracians on the north, of Macedonia. The ensuing winter was employed in completing his preparations; so that early in the spring of 334 B.C., his army destined for the conquest of Asia was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to lend support.

The whole of Alexander's remaining life—from his crossing the Hellespont in March or April 334 B.C., to his death at Babylon in June 323 B.C., eleven years and two or three months—was passed in Asia, amidst unceasing military operations, and ever-multiplied conquests. He never lived to revisit Macedonia; but his achievements were on so transcendent a scale, his acquisitions of territory so unmeasured, and his thirst for further aggrandisement still so insatiate, that Macedonia sinks into insignificance in the list of his possessions. Much more do the Grecian cities dwindle into outlying appendages of a newly grown oriental empire. During all these eleven years, the history of Greece is almost a blank, except here and there a few scattered events. It is only at the death of Alexander that the Grecian cities again awaken into active movement.

The Asiatic conquests of Alexander do not belong directly and literally to the province of an historian of Greece. They were achieved by armies of which the general, the principal officers, and most part of the soldiers, were Macedonian. The Greeks who served with him were only auxiliaries, along with the Thracians and Pæonians. Though more numerous than all the other auxiliaries, they did not constitute, like the Ten Thousand Greeks in the army of the younger Cyrus, the force on which he mainly relied for victory. His chief secretary, Eumenes of Cardia, was a Greek, and probably most of the civil and intellectual functions connected with the service were also performed by Greeks. Many Greeks also served in the army of Persia against him, and composed indeed a larger proportion of the real force (disregarding mere numbers) in the army of Darius than in that of Alexander. Hence the expedition becomes indirectly incorporated with the stream of Grecian history by the powerful auxiliary agency of Greeks on both sides—and still more, by its connection with previous projects, dreams, and legends, long antecedent to the aggrandisement of Macedon—as well as by the character

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which Alexander thought fit to assume. To take revenge on Persia for the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and to liberate the Asiatic Greeks, had been the scheme of the Spartan Agesilaus and of the Pheræan Jason; with hopes grounded on the memorable expedition and safe return of the Ten Thousand. It had been recommended by the rhetor Isocrates, first to the combined force of Greece, while yet Grecian cities were free, under the joint headship of Athens and Sparta; next, to Philip of Macedon as the chief of united Greece, when his victorious arms had extorted a recognition of headship, setting aside both Athens and Sparta. The enterprising ambition of Philip was well pleased to be nominated chief of Greece for the execution of this project. From him it passed to his yet more ambitious son.

Though really a scheme of Macedonian appetite and for Macedonian aggrandisement, the expedition against Asia thus becomes thrust into the series of Grecian events, under the Panhellenic pretence of retaliation for the long-past insults of Xerxes. We call it a pretence, because it had ceased to be a real Hellenic feeling, and served now two different purposes: first, to ennoble the undertaking in the eyes of Alexander himself, whose mind was very accessible to religious and legendary sentiment, and who willingly identified himself with Agamemnon or Achilles, immortalised as executors of the collective vengeance of Greece for Asiatic insult; next, to assist in keeping the Greeks quiet during his absence. He was himself aware that the real sympathies of the Greeks were rather adverse than favourable to his success.

Apart from this body of extinct sentiment, ostentatiously rekindled for Alexander's purposes, the position of the Greeks in reference to his Asiatic conquests was very much the same as that of the German contingents, especially those of the confederation of the Rhine, who served in the grand army with which the emperor Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812. They had no public interest in the victory of the invader, which could end only by reducing them to still greater prostration. They were likely to adhere to their leader as long as his power continued unimpaired, but no longer. Yet Napoleon thought himself entitled to reckon upon them as if they had been Frenchmen, and to denounce the Germans in the service of Russia as traitors who had forfeited the allegiance which they owed to him. We find him drawing the same pointed distinction between the Russian and the German prisoners taken, as Alexander made between Asiatic and Grecian prisoners. These Grecian prisoners the Macedonian prince reproached as guilty of treason against the proclaimed statute of collective Hellas, whereby he had been declared General and the Persian king a public enemy.

Hellas, as a political aggregate, has now ceased to exist, except in so far as Alexander employs the name for his own purposes. Its component members are annexed as appendages, doubtless of considerable value, to the Macedonian kingdom. Fourteen years before Alexander's accession, Demosthenes, while instigating the Athenians to uphold Olynthus against Philip, had told them: "The Macedonian power, considered as an appendage, is of no mean value; but by itself, it is weak and full of embarrassments." Inverting the position of the parties, these words represent exactly what Greece herself had become, in reference to Macedonia and Persia, at the time of Alexander's accession. Had the Persians played their game with tolerable prudence and vigour, his success would have been measured by the degree to which he could appropriate Grecian force to himself, and withhold it from his enemy.

Alexander's memorable and illustrious manifestations, on which we are now entering, are those, not of the ruler or politician, but of the general

and the soldier. In this character his appearance forms a sort of historical epoch. It is not merely in soldier-like qualities—in the most forward and even adventurous bravery, in indefatigable personal activity, and in endurance as to hardship and fatigue—that he stands pre-eminent; though these qualities alone, when found in a king, act so powerfully on those under his command, that they suffice to produce great achievements, even when combined with generalship not surpassing the average of his age. But in generalship, Alexander was yet more above the level of his contemporaries. His strategic combinations, his employment of different descriptions of force conspiring towards one end, his long-sighted plans for the prosecution of campaigns, his constant foresight and resource against new difficulties, together with rapidity of movement even in the worst country—all on a scale of prodigious magnitude—are without parallel in ancient history. They carry the art of systematic and scientific warfare to a degree of efficiency, such as even successors trained in his school were unable to keep up unimpaired.^b

THE PROBLEM AND THE TROOPS

At a first glance Alexander's projects appear to bear no slight disproportion to the resources at his disposal. In superficial extension his kingdom (even inclusive of Greece) was barely equal to one-fiftieth of the Persian empire, and the numerical proportion of his fighting power to that of Persia by sea and land was even less in his favour. If we add that at Philip's death the Macedonian treasury was exhausted, that the greater part of the royal domain had been given away; that most of the imposts and tributes had been remitted; and finally that, while enormous stores of gold and silver lay amassed in the treasuries of the Persian empire, Alexander, on the completion of his armaments, which cost him eight hundred talents [about £160,000 or \$800,000] had no more than seventy talents [£14,000 or \$70,000] left to begin the war with Asia—the enterprise does in truth appear foolhardy and almost chimerical.

But a closer study of the circumstances shows that Alexander's projects, though certainly bold, were not rash, but came within the compass of the forces and expedients at his command. To realise the possibility and necessity of their success, to understand the organisation of his army and the character of its operations, we must forget the analogies of modern campaigns, since war—as little dependent as anything else in history on normal laws and conditions—changes its theory and purpose with the change of the local and historical conditions involved. The armies which conquered the East were unable to withstand the legions of Rome.

With reference to the financial considerations we must first bear in mind that Alexander invaded an enemy's country, where he might reasonably expect to find treasure and stores of all sorts. When once his host was armed and provided with money and food enough to last till they encountered the foe, he had no further need of a large war-fund; the wars of his time not being rendered costly by expensive ammunition and elaborate transport. Thus the lack of money did not hamper Alexander, while the vaunted treasures of the Great King and the Persian satraps made them all the more welcome as adversaries to the Macedonian soldiery.

The disproportion of the Macedonian sea-power seems a more serious matter. The Persian king could command four hundred sail, his fleet was that of the Phœnicians, the best seamen of the ancient world, and, in their



STATUE OF ALEXANDER

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last sea-fight at least, they had defeated the Hellenes. The Macedonian sea-power, founded by Philip but never yet put to the test, was insignificant, and the fleet which was to sail against the Persians consisted mainly of the triremes of the Greek confederacy, from whom an extreme devotion was naturally not to be expected. Alexander's plans were based entirely upon the excellence of his land forces, and the only use of the fleet was to insure the safety of these in their first movements. When this object had been achieved it became a burden, and Alexander therefore soon took the opportunity of dismissing it.

Lastly, to turn to the Macedonian army, we cannot but recognise in its organisation a rare combination of fortunate circumstance and great military talent. The moral superiority of the Greek army, as opposed to the material superiority of the Persians, had been more and more gloriously proven in almost every war for the last two centuries. The more highly the art of war was developed among the Greeks by civil and foreign strife, the more formidable did they become to the troops of the Persian empire; Alexander's army, full of martial ardour and proud memories, skilled in all the technicalities of the military profession, and notable by reason of its thoroughly practical organisation as the first strategic body known to history, bore in itself the certainty of victory.

The armies of Asia have always been characterised by the vehemence of their onslaught, their overwhelming numbers, and their wild rushes hither and thither, which make them formidable even in flight. In addition to this there were many thousands of Greeks in Persian pay, so that Alexander could not reckon on having to wage war merely on barbarians, but had to look for Hellenic arms, courage, and military skill, on the part of the enemy. Finally, in accordance with the natural scope of his great enterprise, the mobility necessary for taking the offensive, and the stability essential to military occupation, had to be considered in the constitution of his army.

THE SIZE OF THE ARMY

In Philip's time the Macedonian forces had consisted of thirty thousand infantry and from three to four thousand horsemen. Alexander had led about the same number of troops against Thebes. On his departure for Asia he left twelve thousand foot-soldiers and fifteen hundred mounted men in Macedonia under the command of Antipater, and their place was taken by eighteen hundred Thessalian knights, five thousand Greek mercenaries, and seven thousand heavy-armed troops furnished by the Greek states. Besides these he had in his following five thousand Triballians, Odrysians, Illyrians, etc., from one to two thousand archers and Agrianian light infantry, Greek cavalry to the number of six hundred, Thracian and Pæonian to the number of nine hundred. The sum total of his troops therefore amounted to not much over 30,000 infantry and a little more than 5,000 horse. This, with slight divergencies suggested by the details of the narrative, is the estimate of Diodorus. Ptolemy Lagi gives the same figures in his *Memorabilia*, and Arrian repeats them after him. When Anaximenes reckons thirty-four thousand men on foot and five thousand five hundred on horseback he perhaps includes the corps which had already been despatched to Asia by Philip. The estimate of Callisthenes, 40,000 infantry, is obviously too high.

The whole body of infantry and cavalry was not divided into legions or brigades, but into troops bearing the same weapons and, to some extent,

recruited from the same district. The very advantages of a Macedonian army rendered necessary an arrangement which would be unsatisfactory under present conditions; the phalanx would have been no phalanx if it had fought with cavalry, light infantry, and Thracian slingers all combined into a complete army in miniature. It is the general use of small fighting units which has made it necessary for the parts of an army to be self sufficient, and to repeat on a small scale the organisation of the whole. Against such an enemy as the Asiatic hordes—collected together for a pitched battle without previous discipline or training, giving up all for lost after a single defeat, and gaining nothing but renewed danger by a victory over organised troops—against such an enemy, solid and homogeneous masses have the advantage of simplicity, weight, and internal stability, and in the same region where Alexander's phalanx overpowered the army of Darius the Roman legions succumbed to the vehement onslaught of the Parthians. On the whole, Alexander's army was well adapted for such pitched battles, and hence the bulk of it consisted of his phalanxes and heavy cavalry.

THE PHALANX AND THE CAVALRY



A SOLDIER OF ALEXANDER'S
PHALANX

The peculiar character of the phalanx was due to the weapons and co-ordination of the individual members. They were heavily armed according to Greek ideas, equipped with helmets, armour, and a shield which protected the whole body, and their chief weapons were the Macedonian sarissa, a lance more than twenty feet long, and the short Greek sword. Intended solely for close fighting in the mass, they had to be so arranged as to be able, on the one hand, calmly to await the fiercest onset of the enemy, and on the other, to be sure of breaking through the opposing ranks with a rush. They therefore usually stood sixteen deep, the lances of the first five files projecting beyond the front, an impenetrable and indeed unassailable barrier to the advancing enemy; the hinder files laid their sarissa on the shoulders of those in front, so that the charge of the phalanx was irresistible from the double force of weight and motion. Nothing but the thorough gymnastic training of the individual members of the phalanx rendered possible the unity, precision, and rapidity necessary for the very difficult evolutions of a body of men crowded into so small a space. Alexander had about eighteen thousand of these heavy-armed soldiers, the so-called foot-guards, and at the beginning of the campaign they were divided into six divisions under the generals Perdicas, Coenus, Craterus, Amyntas the

son of Andromenes, Meleager, and Philip the son of Amyntas. The nucleus of these troops at least was Macedonian, and the divisions were named after the Macedonian districts from which they were recruited;

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thus the division under Cenus came from Elimea, that under Perdiceas from Orestis and Lyncestis, that of Philip (afterwards led by Polysperchon) from Stymphæa, etc.

What the phalanx was among the infantry, the Macedonian and Thessalian *ilai* were among the cavalry. Both were composed of heavy armed soldiers and consisted of the nobility of Macedonia and Thessaly; equal in arms, in birth, and in fame, they vied with each other in distinguishing themselves in the eyes of the king, who usually fought at their head. The importance of this arm to Alexander's enterprise was proved in almost every fight; terrible alike in single combat and in charges in the mass, their discipline and armour rendered them superior to the light Asiatic cavalry, however great their numbers, and their onslaught on the enemy's foot was generally decisive. According to the estimate of Diodorus, the knighthood of Macedonia and Thessaly each consisted of five hundred knights; but he, like Callisthenes, sets the cavalry of the Macedonian army at no more than four thousand five hundred men, while the best authorities place it at over five thousand. The two bodies of knights were armed alike — Calas, the son of Harpalus, had command of the Thessalians; Philotas, the son of Parmenion, of the Macedonians.

The latter naturally took the highest rank of the whole Macedonian army, and bore the name of the "guards" or the "king's guards." It consisted of eight *ilai* or squadrons, which were called indifferently by the names of their districts or of their *ilarchoi* (colonels). That under Clitus called the royal *ile*, held the first rank among the Macedonian knighthood and formed the *agema* or royal guard. Besides these knights from Macedonia and Thessaly, there were six hundred more Greek horsemen in the army; they were usually attached to the Thessalian squadron, and seemed to have been similarly armed and drilled. They were commanded by Philip, the son of Menelaus.

Next in rank comes that peculiarly Macedonian body, the hypaspists. The Athenians under Iphicrates had already instituted, under the name of peltasts, a corps with linen corslets, and lighter shields and longer swords than those carried by the hoplites, in order to have a force swifter in attack than the latter and heavier than the light-armed troops. This new kind of corps was received with great approval in Macedonia; the soldier of the phalanx was too heavily armed for service about the person of the king, the light armed soldier was neither dignified nor serviceable enough. This intermediate force was selected for the purpose, and received the name of hypaspists from the long shield, the aspis, as it was called, which they had adopted from the phalanx. This force was of enormous value in a war against Asiatic tribes, for the lie of the land hampered only too often the full use of the phalanx, and it was often essential to attempt surprises, quick marches, and strokes of all sorts for which the phalanx was not sufficiently mobile nor the light troops sufficiently steady. For occupying heights, forcing the passage of rivers, and supporting and following up cavalry charges, these hypaspists were admirably adapted. Their numbers amounted to six thousand men. The whole corps was led by Nicanor, whose brother, Philotas, commanded the knights of the guard, and whose father, Parmenion, is described as general of the phalanxes. The first chiliarchy was that of Seleucus; it bore the title of "royal hypaspists," and in its ranks the sons of noble families saw their first military service as pages of the king. The second bore the title of "royal escort of hypaspists," and kept guard over the king's tent.

THE LIGHT TROOPS

The light troops of the Macedonian army were of peculiar importance. They came from the countries of the Odrysians, Triballians, Illyrians, Agrianians, and from upper Macedonia; they were armed with their national weapons of offence and defence, and exercised by the hunting and raiding to which they were accustomed at home and the countless petty wars of their chieftains, they were of extreme value in skirmishing, covering the line of march, and for all the purposes served by Pandours, Croats, and Highlanders in modern warfare. The most famous among them are the Agrian chasseurs and the Macedonian archers, who may have formed together a corps of about two thousand men. There is hardly a battle in which they do not play a prominent part, and the devotion with which they fought is testified by the circumstance that the post of toxarch had to be filled afresh three times in one year. At the opening of the campaign it was held by Clearchus, Attalus being in command of the Agrianians. The strength of the other light troops, usually known by the general designation of Thracians, was five thousand men, under the command of the Thracian prince Sitalces.

It is obvious that in these troops Alexander brought into use a strategic element hitherto practically non-existent. At all events, the light troops of the Greek armies before his time had been of no great importance, either by numbers or by the uses which they served; nor had they escaped a certain amount of contempt—a natural result of the Greek preference for sword-play, rendered more natural by the fact that their light infantry was composed partly of the off-scouring of the people and partly of barbarian mercenaries. There now appeared on the scene light troops whose national characteristics proved advantageous in this particular kind of fighting, and whose strength and glory lay in those arts of surprise, alarm, and retreat in apparent confusion, which seemed purposeless and questionable to Greek warriors. The famous Spartan general Brasidas himself confessed that the onset of these tribes—with their loud war-cries and the menacing waving of their weapons—had in it something alarming; their capricious transition from attack to flight, and from disorder to pursuit something terrible, against which nothing but the strict discipline of a Hellenic regiment could make it proof. As a matter of fact, these bands were able to fulfil their object to perfection because, being light troops by nature, they needed, when combined with the serried masses of the army, to be used for no purpose except that for which they were naturally fit.

The fundamental principle of the battle array of the Macedonian army was as follows. The army formed two wings, the left under Parmenion, and the right (which usually made the main attack) under Alexander. The infantry of both wings, four divisions of the phalanxes on the right and two, with the corps of hypaspists, on the left, formed the main line, to which were attached the light and heavy cavalry and the light infantry; the invariable order being that the Macedonian guards were on the right, with the Pæonian cavalry and skirmishers, the Agrianian chasseurs and the archers; and the Thessalian guards on the left, with the Greek cavalry, Agathon's Odrysian Thracians, and, lastly, the light infantry, which was often detached from the fighting-line to protect the camp and baggage. In the closest formation, when the phalanx was covered by its shields and stood sixteen deep, and the cavalry eight deep, the line of battle required a plain of at least half a mile in breadth to deploy in, as a rule the phalanxes alone forming a line nearly five thousand paces long.

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Such was the army with which Alexander proposed to conquer the East. Though relatively small in numbers it had every prospect of success by reason of its organisation, the excellent discipline of the several corps, the moral force of all, and finally, the personal character of the king and his generals. The Persian empire was not in a position to offer resistance; in its extent, the condition of its subject races, and the inefficiency of its government it contained the elements of its inevitable ruin.

THE CONDITION OF THE PERSIAN EMPIRE

If we consider the condition of the Persian empire at the time Darius Codomannus ascended the throne, we see plainly how completely it was disintegrated and ripe for dissolution. The cause did not lie in the moral corruption of the court, of the ruling race, and of the peoples it ruled. This corruption, the invariable accompaniment of despotism, is never prejudicial to despotic power; and the greatest empire of modern times gives proof that in the midst of the most shocking profligacy at court, of constant cabals and scandals among the nobles, violent changes of dynasty and unnatural cruelty to the party all-powerful up to the moment of change, despotism enlarges its borders more and more. Persia's misfortune was to have a succession of weak rulers, who were unable to hold the reins of power as firmly as was essential in the interests of the cohesion of the empire; and the consequence was that the people lost the slavish fear, the satraps the blind obedience, the whole empire the only unity which held it together. Thence there grew in the subject peoples, all of whom retained their old religion, laws, and customs, and some their native princes, the longing for independence; in the satraps, too, powerful vicegerents of large and remote districts, the lust of independent power; in the ruling race—which had forgotten in the possession and habit of command the very conditions of its establishment and continuance—indifference to the Great King and the stock of the Achæmenides. In the hundred years of almost complete inaction which followed Xerxes' invasion of Europe, a singular development of the art of war had taken place, and Asia had lost the capacity for coping with it; Greek weapons seemed more powerful than the immense hordes of Persia the satraps trusted to in their rebellions and King Ochus in his campaign to suppress the revolt in Egypt; so that the empire founded by the victories of Persian arms was forced to protect itself by the help of Greek mercenaries.

It is true that Ochus had succeeded in restoring the external unity of the empire and in asserting his power with the fanatical severity proper to despotism; but it was too late. He sank into inaction and impotence, the satraps retained their too lofty station, and in the revival of oppression the subject peoples, particularly those of the western satrapies, did not forget that they had all but thrown it off.

Finally, after fresh and frightful complications, Darius came to the throne. To save the empire he should have been energetic rather than virtuous, cruel rather than mild, arbitrary rather than honourable. He gained the respect of the Persians, all the satraps were devoted to him; but that could not save Persia. He was not feared but loved, and time was soon to show that the nobles of the empire preferred their own advantage to the favour or the service of a master in whom they could admire all but his imperial qualities.

The empire of Darius extended from the Indus to the Hellenic Sea, from the Jaxartes to the Libyan desert. His rule, or rather, the rule of his satraps, did not vary with the character of the various races they ruled; it was nowhere a national form of government, nor had it anywhere the guarantee of a dependent organisation; their power was limited to the satisfaction of arbitrary caprice, the exaction of perpetual impositions, and a kind of hereditary tenure which had grown customary under weak princes. Thus the Great King had hardly any authority over them except the force of arms or such as they chose to recognise for personal reasons. The conditions which existed everywhere within the Persian empire merely rendered the mouldering colossus less capable of rising in its own defence.

The tribes of Iran, Turania, and Ariana were indeed warlike, and happy under any rule which led them to battle and plunder, and horsemen from

Hyrkania, Bactria, and Sogdiana formed the standing army of the satraps in most provinces, but there was no great attachment to the Persian empire to be found among them, and terrible as their onslaught had been in the armies of Cyrus and Cambyzes, they were wholly incapable of a serious and prolonged defence, especially when opposed to Greek prowess and military skill.

And as for the western tribes, which were held in subjection only by force, and often with difficulty, they were certain to abandon the Persian cause if a victorious enemy approached their borders.

The Greeks on the coast of Asia Minor were barely kept in subjection by tyrants who depended for their existence on the empire and its satraps, and the inland tribes of the peninsula, after two centuries of stern oppression, had neither the power nor the will to rise in the cause of Persia. They had not even taken part in the previous rebellions of the satrapies of Asia Minor, they were dull, indolent, and forgetful of their past. The same held good of the two Syrias on either side of



A GREEK GENERAL
(After Hope)

the water; long centuries of slavery had reduced the inhabitants to the lowest stage of enervation, and with repulsive indifference they submitted to whatever fate overtook them. On the coast of Phœnicia alone the old versatile life survived, and with it more danger than devotion to Persia; and nothing but private interest and jealousy of Sidon kept Tyre faithful to the Persians. Lastly, Egypt had never relaxed or disguised her hatred of the foreigners, and the devastations of Ochus might cripple but could never subdue her. All the countries conquered to its own perdition by the Persian empire were to all intents and purposes lost at the first attack from the West.

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THE ENTRY INTO ASIA, ACCORDING TO ARRIAN

In the spring of 334 B.C., Alexander completed his preparations and moved towards the Hellespont (leaving the administration of the affairs in Greece in Antipater's hands), and carried an army of foot, consisting of archers and light-armed soldiers, about thirty thousand, and a little above five thousand horse. He first directed his march to Amphipolis, by way of the lake Cercynites, and thence to the mouths of the river Strymon, which having crossed, he passed by Mount Pangea, along the road leading to Abdera and Maronea, maritime cities of Greece. Thence he marched to the river Hebrus, which being easily forded, he proceeded through the country of Plætis to the river Melas, and thence, on the twentieth day after his departure from Macedon, he arrived at Sestos, whence marching to Elaüs, he sacrificed upon the tomb of Protesilaus, because he, of all the Greeks who accompanied Agamemnon to the siege of Troy, set his foot first on the Asiatic shore.

The design of this sacrifice was, that his descent into Asia might be more successful to him, than the former was to Protesilaus. Then having committed to Parmenion the care of conveying the greatest part both of the horse and foot from Sestos to Abydos, they were accordingly transported in 160 trireme galleys, besides many other vessels of burden. Several authors report, that Alexander sailed from Elæus, another port in Greece, himself commanding the flag-ship; and also, that when he was in the middle of the Hellespont, he offered a bull to Neptune and the Nereids; and poured forth a libation into the sea from a golden cup. He is moreover said first of all to have stepped on shore in Asia completely armed, and to have erected altars to Jupiter Descensor, and to Pallas and Hercules. When he came to Ilium, he sacrificed to Pallas Iliaca, and having fixed the arms he then wore in her temple, he took down from thence some consecrated armour, which had remained there from the time of the Trojan War. This armour, some targeteers were always wont to bear before him, in his expedition. He is also said to have sacrificed to Priam upon the altar of Jupiter Hecceios, that he might thereby avert the wrath of his manes from the progeny of Pyrrhus, whence he deduced his pedigree.

When he arrived at Ilium, Menetius, the governor, crowned him with a crown of gold; the same did Chares the Athenian, who came for that purpose from Sigeum; and several others, as well Greeks as Asiatics, followed their example. He then encircled the sepulchre of Achilles with a garland (as Hephæstion did that of Patroclus) and pronounced him happy, who had such a herald as Homer to perpetuate his name; and indeed he was deservedly so styled, because that single accident had raised him to the highest pitch of human glory. As to his



GREEK WINE JUG
(Bardon)

actions, none had hitherto described them in a suitable manner, either in prose or verse, neither had any attempted them in a lyric strain, as the poets had, heretofore, done those of Hiero, Gelo, Theron, and many more, whose exploits were no ways comparable to his; for which reason his greatest acts are less known than the least and most inconsiderable of many ancient generals.^e

THE BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS

The army, when reviewed on the Asiatic shore after its crossing, presented a total of thirty thousand infantry, and forty-five hundred cavalry, thus distributed:

INFANTRY

Macedonian phalanx and hypaspists	12,000
Allies	7,000
Mercenaries	5,000
Under the command of Parmenion	24,000
Odrysians, Triballi (both Thracians), and Illyrians	5,000
Agrianes and archers	1,000
Total infantry	30,000

CAVALRY

Macedonian heavy — under Philotas son of Parmenion	1,500
Thessalian (also heavy) — under Calas	1,500
Miscellaneous Grecian — under Erigyius	600
Thracian and Pæonian (light) — under Cassander	900
Total cavalry	4,500

Such seems the most trustworthy enumeration of Alexander's first invading army. There were, however, other accounts, the highest of which stated as much as forty-three thousand infantry with four thousand cavalry. Besides these troops, also, there must have been an effective train of projectile machines and engines, for battles and sieges, which we shall soon find in operation. As to money, the military chest of Alexander, exhausted in part by profuse donatives to his Macedonian officers, was as poorly furnished as that of Napoleon Bonaparte on first entering Italy for his brilliant campaign of 1796. According to Aristobulus, he had with him only seventy talents [£14,000 or \$70,000]; according to another authority, no more than the means of maintaining his army for thirty days.

Previously the Macedonian generals Parmenion and Calas had crossed into Asia with bodies of troops. Parmenion, acting in Æolis, took Grynia, but was compelled by Memnon to raise the siege of Pitane; while Calas, in the Troad, was attacked, defeated, and compelled to retire to Rhœteum.

We thus see that during the season preceding the landing of Alexander, the Persians were in considerable force, and Memnon both active and successful even against the Macedonian generals, on the region northeast of the Ægean. This may help to explain that fatal imprudence, whereby the Persians permitted Alexander to carry over without opposition his grand army into Asia, in the spring of 334 B.C. They possessed ample means of guarding the Hellespont, had they chosen to bring up their fleet, which, comprising as it did the force of the Phœnician towns, was decidedly superior to any naval armament at the disposal of Alexander. The Persian fleet actually came into the Ægean a few weeks afterwards. Now Alexander's designs, preparations, and even intended time of march, must have been well

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known not merely to Memnon, but to the Persian satraps in Asia Minor, who had got together troops to oppose him. These satraps unfortunately supposed themselves to be a match for him in the field, disregarding the pronounced opinion of Memnon to the contrary, and even overruling his prudent advice by mistrustful and calumnious imputations.

At the time of Alexander's landing, a powerful Persian force was already assembled near Zelia in the Hellespontine Phrygia, under command of Arsites the Phrygian satrap, supported by several other leading Persians, Spithridates (satrap of Lydia and Ionia), Pharnaces, Atizyes, Mithridates, Rheomithres, Niphates, Petines, etc. Forty of these men were of high rank (denominated kinsmen of Darius), and distinguished for personal valour. The greater number of the army consisted of cavalry, including Medes, Bactrians, Hyrcanians, Cappadocians, Paphlagonians, etc. In cavalry they greatly outnumbered Alexander; but their infantry was much inferior in number, composed, however, in large proportion, of Grecian mercenaries. The Persian total is given by Arrian as twenty thousand cavalry, and nearly twenty thousand mercenary foot; by Diodorus as ten thousand cavalry, and one hundred thousand infantry; by Justin even at six hundred thousand. The numbers of Arrian are the more credible; in those of Diodorus the total of infantry is certainly much above the truth — that of cavalry probably below it.

Memnon, who was present with his sons and with his own division, earnestly dissuaded the Persian leaders from hazarding a battle. Reminding them that the Macedonians were not only much superior in infantry, but also encouraged by the leadership of Alexander, he enforced the necessity of employing their numerous cavalry to destroy the forage and provisions, — and if necessary, even towns themselves, — in order to render any considerable advance of the invading force impracticable. While keeping strictly on the defensive in Asia, he recommended that aggressive war should be carried into Macedonia; that the fleet should be brought up, a powerful land-force put aboard, and strenuous efforts made, not only to attack the vulnerable points of Alexander at home, but also to encourage active hostility against him from the Greeks and other neighbours.

Had his plan been energetically executed by Persian arms and money, we can hardly doubt that Antipater in Macedonia would speedily have found himself pressed by serious dangers and embarrassments, and that Alexander would have been forced to come back and protect his own dominions; perhaps prevented by the Persian fleet from bringing back his whole army. At any rate, his schemes of Asiatic invasion must for the time have been suspended. But he was rescued from this dilemma by the ignorance, pride, and pecuniary interests of the Persian leaders. Unable to appreciate Alexander's military superiority, and conscious at the same time of their own personal bravery, they repudiated the proposition of retreat as dishonourable, insinuating that Memnon desired to prolong the war in order to exalt his own importance in the eyes of Darius. This sentiment of military dignity was further strengthened by the fact, that the Persian military leaders, deriving all their revenues from the land, would have been impoverished by destroying the landed produce. Arsites, in whose territory the army stood, and upon whom the scheme would first take effect, haughtily announced that he would not permit a single house in it to be burned. Occupying the same satrapy as Pharnabazus had possessed sixty years before, he felt that he would be reduced to the same straits as Pharnabazus under the pressure of Agesilaus — "of not being able to procure a dinner in his own

country." The proposition of Memnon was rejected, and it was resolved to await the arrival of Alexander on the banks of the river Granicus.

This unimportant stream, commemorated in the *Iliad*, and immortalised by its association with the name of Alexander, takes its rise from one of the heights of Mount Ida near Scepsis, and flows northward into the Propontis, which it reaches at a point somewhat east of the Greek town of Parium. It is of no great depth : near the point where the Persians encamped, it seems to have been fordable in many places ; but its right bank was somewhat high and steep, thus offering obstruction to an enemy's attack. The Persians, marching forward from Zelia, took up a position near the eastern side of the Granicus, where the last declivities of Mount Ida descend into the plain of Adrastea, a Greek city, situated between Priapus and Parium.

Meanwhile Alexander marched onward towards this position, from Arisbe (where he had reviewed his army) — on the first day to Percote, on the second to the river Practius, on the third to Hermotus ; receiving on his way the spontaneous surrender of the town of Priapus. Aware that the enemy was not far distant, he threw out in advance a body of scouts under Amyntas, consisting of four squadrons of light cavalry and one of the heavy Macedonian (companion) cavalry. From Hermotus (the fourth day from Arisbe) he marched towards the Granicus, in careful order, with his main phalanx in double files, his cavalry on each wing, and the baggage in the rear. On approaching the river, he made his dispositions for immediate attack, though Parmenion advised waiting until the next morning. Knowing well, like Memnon on the other side, that the chances of a pitched battle were all against the Persians, he resolved to leave them no opportunity of decamping during the night.

Alexander himself took the command of the right, giving that of the left to Parmenion ; by right and left are meant the two halves of the army, each of them including three *taxeis* or divisions of the phalanx with the cavalry on its flank — for there was no recognised centre under a distinct command. On the other side of the Granicus, the Persian cavalry lined the bank. The Medes and Bactrians were on their right, under Rheomithres — the Paphlagonians and Hyrcanians in the centre, under Arsites and Spithridates — on the left were Memnon and Arsamenes with their divisions. The Persian infantry, both Asiatic and Grecian, were kept back in reserve ; the cavalry alone being relied upon to dispute the passage of the river.

In this array, both parties remained for some time, watching each other in anxious silence. There being no firing or smoke, as with modern armies, all the details on each side were clearly visible to the other ; so that the Persians easily recognised Alexander himself on the Macedonian right from the splendour of his armour and military costume, as well as from the respectful demeanour of those around him. Their principal leaders accordingly thronged to their own left, which they reinforced with the main strength of their cavalry, in order to oppose him personally. Presently he addressed a few words of encouragement to the troops, and gave the order for advance. He directed the first attack to be made by the squadron of companion-cavalry whose turn it was on that day to take the lead (the squadrons of Apollonia, of which Socrates was captain, commanded on this day by Ptolemæus son of Philippos), supported by the light horse or Lancers, the Pæonian darters (infantry), and one division of regularly armed infantry, seemingly hypaspists. He then himself entered the river, at the head of the right half of the army, cavalry and infantry, which advanced under sound of trumpets and with the usual war-shouts. As the occasional

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depths of water prevented a straightforward march with one uniform line, the Macedonians slanted their course suitably to the fordable spaces ; keeping their front extended so as to approach the opposite bank as much as possible in line, and not in separate columns with flanks exposed to the Persian cavalry. Not merely the right under Alexander, but also the left under Parmenion, advanced and crossed in the same movement and under the like precautions.

The foremost detachment under Ptolemy and Amyntas, on reaching the opposite bank, encountered a strenuous resistance, concentrated as it was here upon one point. They found Memnon and his sons with the best of the Persian cavalry immediately in their front ; some on the summit of the bank, from whence they hurled down their javelins — others down at the water's edge, so as to come to closer quarters. The Macedonians tried every effort to make good their landing, and push their way by main force through the Persian horse, but in vain. Having both lower ground and insecure footing, they could make no impression, but were thrust back with some loss, and retired upon the main body which Alexander was now bringing across. On his approaching the shore, the same struggle was renewed around his person with increased fervour on both sides. He was himself among the foremost, and all near him were animated by his example. The horsemen on both sides became jammed together, and the contest was one of physical force and pressure by man and horse ; but the Macedonians had a great advantage in being accustomed to the use of the strong close-fighting pike, while the Persian weapon was the missile javelin. At length the resistance was surmounted, and Alexander, with those around him, gradually thrusting back the defenders, made good their way up the high bank to the level ground. At other points the resistance was not equally vigorous. The left and centre of the Macedonians, crossing at the same time on all practicable spaces along the whole line, overpowered the Persians stationed on the slope, and got up to the level ground with comparative facility. Indeed no cavalry could possibly stand on the bank to offer opposition to the phalanx with its array of long pikes, wherever this could reach the ascent in any continuous front. The easy crossing of the Macedonians at other points helped to constrain those Persians, who were contending with Alexander himself on the slope, to recede to the level ground above.

Courage and Danger of Alexander

Here again, as at the water's edge, Alexander was foremost in personal conflict. His pike having been broken, he turned to a soldier near him — Aretis, one of the horse-guards who generally aided him in mounting his horse — and asked for another. But this man, having broken his pike also, showed the fragment to Alexander, requesting him to ask some one else ; upon which the Corinthian Demaratus, one of the companion-cavalry close at hand, gave him his weapon instead. Thus armed anew, Alexander spurred his horse forward against Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius), who was bringing up a column of cavalry to attack him, but was himself considerably in advance of it. Alexander thrust his pike into the face of Mithridates, and laid him prostrate on the ground : he then turned to another of the Persian leaders, Rhesaces, who struck him a blow on the head with his scimitar, knocked off a portion of his helmet, but did not penetrate beyond. Alexander avenged this blow by thrusting Rhesaces through the body with his pike. Meanwhile a third Persian leader, Spithridates, was actually close behind

Alexander, with hand and scimitar uplifted to cut him down. At this critical moment, Clitus son of Dropides — one of the ancient officers of Philip, high in the Macedonian service — struck with full force at the uplifted arm of Spithridates and severed it from the body, thus preserving Alexander's life. Other leading Persians, kinsmen of Spithridates, rushed desperately on Alexander, who received many blows on his armour, and was in much danger. But the efforts of his companions near were redoubled, both to defend his person and to second his adventurous daring. It was on that point that the Persian cavalry was first broken. On the left of the Macedonian line, the Thessalian cavalry also fought with vigour and success; and the light-armed foot, intermingled with Alexander's cavalry generally, did great damage to the enemy. The rout of the Persian cavalry, once begun, speedily became general. They fled in all directions, pursued by the Macedonians.

But Alexander and his officers soon checked this ardour of pursuit, calling back their cavalry to complete his victory. The Persian infantry, Asiatics as well as Greeks, had remained without movement or orders, looking on the cavalry battle which had just disastrously terminated. To them Alexander immediately turned his attention. He brought up his phalanx and hypaspists to attack them in front, while his cavalry assailed on all sides their unprotected flanks and rear; he himself charged with the cavalry, and had a horse killed under him. His infantry alone was more numerous than they, so that against such odds the result could hardly be doubtful. The greater part of these mercenaries, after a valiant resistance, were cut to pieces on the field. We are told that none escaped, except two thousand made prisoners, and some who remained concealed in the field among the dead bodies.

In this complete and signal defeat, the loss of the Persian cavalry was not very serious in mere number, for only one thousand of them were slain. But the slaughter of the leading Persians, who had exposed themselves with extreme bravery in the personal conflict against Alexander, was terrible. There were slain not only Mithridates, Rhœsaces, Spithridates, whose names have been already mentioned, but also Pharnaces, brother-in-law of Darius, Mithrobarzanes satrap of Cappadocia, Atizyes, Niphates, Petines, and others; all Persians of rank and consequence. Arsites, the satrap of Phrygia, whose rashness had mainly caused the rejection of Memnon's advice, escaped from the field, but died shortly afterwards by his own hand, from anguish and humiliation. The Persian or Perso-Grecian infantry, though probably more of them individually escaped than is implied in Arrian's account, was as a body irretrievably ruined. No force was either left in the field, or could be afterwards reassembled in Asia Minor.

The loss on the side of Alexander is said to have been very small. Twenty-five of the companion-cavalry, belonging to the division under Ptolemy and Amyntas, were slain in the first unsuccessful attempt to pass the river. Of the other cavalry, sixty in all were slain; of the infantry, thirty. This is given to us as the entire loss on the side of Alexander. It is only the number of killed; that of the wounded is not stated; but assuming it to be ten times the number of killed, the total of both together will be 1265. If this be correct, the resistance of the Persian cavalry, except near that point where Alexander himself and the Persian chiefs came into conflict, cannot have been either serious or long protracted. But when we add farther the contest with the infantry, the smallness of the total assigned for Macedonian killed and wounded will appear still more surprising. The total of the Persian infantry is stated at nearly twenty thousand, most part of them Greek mercenaries.

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Of these only two thousand were made prisoners; nearly all the rest (according to Arrian) were slain. Now the Greek mercenaries were well armed, and not likely to let themselves be slain with impunity; moreover Plutarch expressly affirms that they resisted with desperate valour, and that most of the Macedonian loss was incurred in the conflict against them. It is not easy therefore to comprehend how the total number of slain can be brought within the statement of Arrian.

After the victory, Alexander manifested the greatest solicitude for his wounded soldiers, whom he visited and consoled in person. Of the twenty-five companions slain, he caused brazen statues, by Lysippus, to be erected at Diium in Macedonia, where they were still standing in the time of Arrian. To the surviving relatives of all the slain he also granted immunity from taxation and from personal service. The dead bodies were honourably buried, those of the enemy as well as of his own soldiers. The two thousand Greeks in the Persian service who had become his prisoners, were put in chains, and transported to Macedonia there to work as slaves; to which treatment Alexander condemned them on the ground that they had taken arms on behalf of the foreigner against Greece, in contravention of the general vote passed by the synod at Corinth. At the same time, he sent to Athens three hundred panoplies selected from the spoil, to be dedicated to Athene in the Acropolis with this inscription, "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Lacedæmonians (*present these offerings*), out of the spoils of the foreigners inhabiting Asia." Though the vote to which Alexander appealed represented no existing Grecian aspiration, and granted only a sanction which could not be safely refused, yet he found satisfaction in clothing his own self-aggrandising impulse under the name of a supposed Panhellenic purpose: which was at the same time useful as strengthening his hold upon the Greeks, who were the only persons competent, either as officers or soldiers, to uphold the Persian empire against him. His conquests were the extinction of genuine Hellenism, though they diffused an exterior varnish of it, and especially the Greek language, over much of the oriental world. "True Grecian interests," says Grote, "lay more on the side of Darius than of Alexander."

EFFECTS OF ALEXANDER'S VICTORY

No victory could be more decisive or terror-striking than that of Alexander. There remained no force in the field to oppose him. The impression made by so great a public catastrophe was enhanced by two accompanying circumstances: first, by the number of Persian grandees who perished, realising almost the wailings of Atossa, Xerxes, and the Chorus, in the *Persæ* of Æschylus, after the battle of Salamis; next, by the chivalrous and successful prowess of Alexander himself, who, emulating the Homeric Achilles, not only rushed foremost into the mêlée, but killed two of these grandees with his own hand. Such exploits, impressive even when we read of them now, must at the moment when they occurred have acted most powerfully upon the imagination of the contemporaries.^f



BATTLE-FIELD OF ISSUS

CHAPTER LII. ISSUS AND TYRE

ARSITES had fled after the battle into Phrygia; but there, it was said, overpowered by grief and shame by the disaster, which he attributed to his own counsels, laid violent hands on himself. Alexander bestowed his satrapy on Calas; encouraged the barbarians, who had fled to the mountains, to return to their homes; and ordered the tribute to remain on its ancient footing. Parmenion was detached to take possession of the satrap's residence Dascylium. The king himself, bending his march southward, advanced towards Sardis. The news of his victory produced such an effect in the capital of Lydia, that when he had come within eight or nine miles of it, Mithrines, the commander of the garrison, accompanied by the principal inhabitants, met him, with a peaceable surrender of the city, the citadel, and the treasure. He retained Mithrines on an honourable footing near his person, and committed the command of the citadel to Pausanias, an officer of his guard. To conciliate the Lydians, he restored their ancient laws; that is, abolished the restraints which the policy of the Persian government had imposed on them, when it crushed their rebellion after the first conquest: while, perhaps to make them more familiar with Greek usages, he ordered a temple to be built on the citadel to Olympian Zeus. A body of cavalry and light troops and the Argive contingent were left as a garrison.

Four days after, Alexander arrived at Ephesus. There too, as soon as the tidings of the battle arrived, a body of mercenaries who had been stationed there by Memnon took ship with Amyntas, son of Antiochus, a Macedonian emigrant, who had fled his country to avoid the effects of the king's displeasure, or because he was conscious of a share in some of the plots formed against him. Ephesus was divided between an oligarchical and a democratical faction, which seem nearly to have balanced each other. The oligarchy had been sustained by the power of Persia: their adversaries therefore looked forward with hope to the impending invasion, and had probably received promises of support from Philip. Violent tumults had taken place, in which the oligarchs, aided by Memnon's troops, had prevailed, forced many of their opponents to leave the city, threw down a statue of Philip which stood in the temple, committed other acts of sacrilege there, and broke open the tomb of Heropythes, a great popular leader, who had been buried in the market place. A complete reaction ensued on Alexander's

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arrival: democracy was formally restored, the exiles returned to their homes, and the triumphant party became eager for revenge on their vanquished oppressors. Alexander interfered to prevent bloodshed, and forbade any proceedings to be instituted for the punishment of political offences. The city was permitted to expend the tribute which it had before paid to the Persian government on its new temple, which was not yet finished. At a later period he offered to defray the whole expense of the building, on condition that his own name should be inscribed on it as its founder—an offer which the Ephesians declined with ingenious flattery. Before his departure he celebrated a great sacrifice to the goddess, with a solemn procession of his whole army in battle array. By like measures, especially by the establishment of democracy, and remission of tribute, he endeavoured to gain the goodwill of all the other Greek cities on the coast, which was of great importance to him at this juncture, while the naval power of Persia was still formidable.

In the meanwhile he had received offers of submission from Magnesia and Tralles, in the vale of the Meander, and had sent Parmenion forward to take possession of them. He had also at first reason to hope that Miletus would be as quietly surrendered to him; for Hegesistratus, who commanded the garrison, had made him like offers by letter. But the approach of a Persian armament, which was on its way from Phœnicia, encouraged Hegesistratus to change his intention, and defend his post. Nicanor, however, Alexander's admiral, got the start of the barbarians, and arrived with his fleet of 160 galleys at Lade, before they appeared: and Alexander forthwith secured the island, which commanded the entrance to the port of Miletus, with a detachment of four thousand men. The Persians, finding themselves shut out, came to anchor at Mycale. Their fleet amounted to four hundred sail. Yet, notwithstanding this great inequality, Parmenion advised the king to hazard a sea-fight. A victory, he thought, would be attended with the greatest advantages, while defeat would not make the state of his naval affairs much worse—since, as it was, the enemy were masters of the sea. An omen too, which he had observed, confirmed him in his opinion. Alexander pointed out to him that it might be otherwise interpreted, and that his arguments were not sounder than his rules of divination. The Macedonian fleet was inferior, not only in number, but in nautical skill and training to the Phœnician and Cyprian galleys. It would be mere foolhardiness to seek a battle under such disadvantages; and a defeat, far from leaving him in nearly the same condition as he now stood in, might involve consequences no less important and disastrous than a general insurrection in Greece. The eagle which had been seen to perch on the beach behind the royal galley, signified that he was destined to overcome the Persian navy by his operations on land.

Miletus was divided into two distinct cities by an inner wall, which appears to have been much stronger than the outer one; if indeed what was called the outer city was not a mere open suburb. Alexander had taken it by assault on his first arrival, and then prepared to besiege the other. The townsmen came to a compromise with the garrison, and by mutual consent they deputed one of the most eminent citizens to the king, with an offer of neutrality, which he rejected, bidding them prepare to sustain an immediate attack. His engineers soon made a breach in the wall, which his troops mounted before the eyes of the Persians, who were unable to relieve their friends; for, to cut off all chance of succour, Nicanor had moved up to the mouth of the inner harbour, and laid some galleys across it side by side, so as effectually to bar entrance or escape. The citizens and the garrison, when the besiegers began to pour in through the breach, fled toward the sea; some

put off in boats, but found the harbour's mouth closed before they reached it: about three hundred of the mercenaries swam to a rocky islet within the harbour, and prepared to defend themselves there, until Alexander, admiring their courage, permitted them to purchase their lives by entering into his service. The Persian fleet continued for some time moored at Mycale, in the hope of drawing the enemy into an action; but as it was forced to fetch its water from the mouth of the Mæander, Alexander ordered Philotas to proceed to the place, with a body of infantry and cavalry, and to hinder the crews from landing. The fleet was consequently obliged to go over to Samos for provisions: it returned shortly after, and attempted to surprise the Macedonians in the harbour; but having been foiled in this attempt, withdrew from the coast of Miletus.

Alexander now perceived that his fleet would be of little service to him, while the state of his finances was such that he could ill bear the cost of it. On the other hand, he hoped to shut out the Persians from all the ports of Asia, and thus to disable them from continuing their naval operations. He therefore resolved to dismiss his fleet, retaining only a small squadron, which included the Athenian galleys, for the transport of his besieging machines, and to confine his attention to the prosecution of the war on the southern coast.

HALICARNASSUS

His first object was the reduction of Halicarnassus, where the enemy had now collected almost all the strength which he had remaining in this quarter. Memnon, who after the battle of the Granicus sent his wife and children as pledges of his fidelity to Darius, and had been invested by him with supreme authority in the west of Asia, and with the command of all his naval forces, had been long making preparations for the defence of the place, where he himself, with the Persian Orontobates, satrap of Caria, a numerous garrison of Greeks and barbarians, awaited the invader's approach. They were animated by the presence of two Athenians, Ephialtes and Thrasylus, who had come to offer their services against the common enemy. The fleet too, lying at the mouth of the harbour, was capable of rendering good service during a siege. The city, built on heights which rise abruptly in the form of a theatre from the sea, was naturally strong, and had been elaborately fortified, both with walls and a ditch forty-five feet in width, and about half as many in depth. Alexander, on his march from Miletus, made himself master of all the towns that lay between that city and Halicarnassus; and on his entrance into Caria, he was met by Ada, the widow of Idrieus, who surrendered her fortress of Alinda to him, begged leave to adopt him as her son, and placed herself under his protection. He then advanced towards Halicarnassus, and encamped at about half a mile from the walls.

He began by filling up the ditch, so as to enable his engines and wooden towers to approach the walls. The besieged made many vigorous sallies for the purpose of setting fire to the machines, but were always repulsed, and sometimes with great loss. Once a mad attempt of two Macedonian soldiers, who, having challenged one another over their cups to a trial of valour, undertook to storm the citadel on the land side alone, brought on an engagement, which was near becoming general, and might have ended in the capture of the city. For two towers and the intervening wall had been battered down by the engines; but before advantage was taken of the breach, the besieged built another brick wall in the form of a crescent behind it. Twice they

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made a desperate attempt to destroy the engines which Alexander brought to play on this new wall—the second time, at the instigation of Ephialtes, with their whole force; but they were defeated with great slaughter, in which Ephialtes himself fell, and it was believed that Alexander might then have stormed the place, but was induced to spare it by the hope that it would soon surrender. In fact, Memnon and Orontobates now despaired of defending it much longer, and resolved to abandon it. In the dead of the night they set fire to a wooden tower, and to some of the houses and magazines near the wall, and while the conflagration spread, made their escape, and crossed over to Cos, where it seems they had previously deposited their treasures. The garrison took refuge, some in the citadels, some in Arconessus. Alexander immediately entered the city, and checked the progress of the flames. But as soon as he had become master of it, he razed it to the ground. He did not, however, think it worth while to stay, until he had dislodged the enemy from their remaining strongholds; but having committed the province to Ada, he left her, with about three thousand foot and two hundred horse, under a Macedonian officer, to reduce them. He himself pursued his march along the south coast of Asia Minor, to make himself master of the ports which might harbour the Persian fleet.

But as winter was now approaching, he determined, before he left Caria, to send a part of his troops, who had lately married when he set out on his expedition, back to Macedonia, to pass the winter at home. He gave the command of them to three of his generals, who were themselves in the same case; directing them on their return to bring with them as many fresh troops as they could raise. The measure was politic, as well as gracious; for his army had been much weakened to supply so many garrisons as were required for the conquered cities; and nothing was more likely to promote the levies in Macedonia than the presence of the victorious warriors, whose return attested at once his success and his liberality. Another officer was sent to collect all the troops he could in Peloponnesus. Parmenion was ordered to proceed with the greater part of the cavalry and the baggage to Sardis, and thence into Phrygia, where he himself, after he should have traversed the coast of Lycia and Pamphylia, designed to meet him in the spring.

In his march through Caria he met with a short resistance from the garrison of the strong fortress Hyppara; and turned aside to punish the insolence of the inhabitants of Marmora in Peræa. After he had crossed the Xanthus, he received the submission of most of the Lycian towns. Phaselis even presented him with a golden crown; and the motive which led it to pay him this honour may help to account for the ready submission of the other Lycians. The people of Phaselis had suffered much from the incursions of their neighbours, the Pisidian mountaineers, who had even taken up a fortified position in their territory, for the purpose of continual molestation. They hoped that Alexander would deliver them from this annoyance, and they were not disappointed.

He was still in the neighborhood of Phaselis, when he was apprised of a plot which had been formed against his life, by his namesake, the son of Æropus, whom he had appointed to command the Thessalian cavalry in the place of Calas, the new satrap of the Hellespontine Phrygia. It appears that, notwithstanding this favour, the Lyncestian either could not forgive the king for the execution of his two brothers, or could not forget the ancient pretensions of his family to royal dignity. He had entered into a negotiation with the Persian court through the fugitive Amyntas, and Darius had sent down an agent named Asisines, to obtain a secret interview with

him, and to offer, if he killed his sovereign, to raise him to the throne of Macedonia, or at least to aid him in the attempt to secure it, with a thousand talents. The Persian emissary had fallen into the hands of Parmenion, and revealed his business; and Parmenion had sent him to the king. Alexander held a council on the subject, and by its advice despatched orders to Parmenion to arrest the Lyncestian and keep him in custody.

Between Phaselis and the maritime plains of Pamphylia, the mountains which form the southern branch of Taurus descend abruptly on the coast,



A PERSIAN NOBLE
(After Bardon)

leaving only a narrow passage along the beach, and this never open but in calm weather, or during the prevalence of a northerly wind. The promontory was called Mount Climax. At the time when Alexander was about to resume his march eastward, the wind was blowing from the south, and the waves washed the foot of the cliffs. He therefore sent the main body of his army over the mountains to Perga, by a circuitous and difficult road, which however he had ordered to be previously cleared by his Thracian pioneers. But for himself he determined with a few followers to try the passage along the shore; danger and difficulty had a charm for him which he could scarcely resist. Perhaps the wind had already subsided; soon after it shifted to the north—a change in which he recognised a special interposition of the gods. Yet, according to Strabo's authors, he found the water still nearly breast high, and had to wade through it for a whole day. As he advanced from Perga, he was met by an embassy from the neighbouring town of Aspendus, which lay a little further eastward near the mouth of the Eurymedon, offering to acknowledge his authority, but praying that they might not be compelled to receive a Macedonian garrison. This request he granted, requiring one hundred talents and

yearly tribute, and exacting hostages for their performance. Then he began his march towards Phrygia.

His road led through the heart of Pisidia, where he was the more desirous of striking terror, as its fierce and lawless inhabitants, secure in their mountain barriers and almost impregnable fortresses, had constantly defied the power of the Persian government. Yet he could not spare the time which would have been necessary to reduce all its strongholds. Termessus, situated on a steep rock, commanding a narrow pass which led from Pisidia into Phrygia, appeared to him too strong to be attempted, though he had dislodged the barbarians from the position which they had taken up without the walls, and made himself master of the pass. But the resistance of Termessus procured for him offers of alliance from its enemy Selge, another of the principal cities, which proved very useful to him. He stormed Sagalassus, though besides its natural strength its inhabitants were accounted the most warlike of the Pisidians; and this success was followed by the submission of most of the smaller towns. He then advanced by the lake Ascania

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to Celenæ, where the citadel, on an almost inaccessible rock, was guarded by a garrison of one thousand Carians, and one hundred Greeks, placed there by the satrap of Phrygia. It however offered to surrender unless it should be relieved within sixty days; and Alexander thought it best to accept these conditions; and having left a body of fifteen hundred men to observe it, and appointed Antigonus, son of Philip, to the important satrapy of central Phrygia, he prosecuted his march to Gordium, where he had ordered Parmenion to meet him.

GORDIUM

Arrian does not expressly state the object of this movement, which, as Alexander designed next to make for the coast of Syria, involved an enormous circuit. It is hardly credible that he was deterred from advancing directly into Cilicia by the difficulty of passing through the mountain region (the Rugged Cilicia), which immediately follows Pamphylia. He probably thought it necessary to establish his authority in the central provinces, so far at least as to break off their relations with the Persian government, and thus to secure the Greek cities on the western coast from the attacks which might have been made on them from this quarter, if the peninsula, east of Lydia, had remained subject to Darius. The central situation of Gordium also afforded means of easier communication with Macedonia, which the movements of the Persian fleet in the *Ægean* rendered very desirable, while it enabled him to negotiate on a more advantageous footing with the satraps of the provinces on the Euxine, who, when they saw him so near, might apprehend an immediate invasion. Accordingly, it seems to have been from Gordium that he sent Hegelochus to the coast, with orders to equip another fleet to protect the islands which were threatened by the Persians.

Here he was rejoined by the troops he had sent to winter by their own hearths, accompanied by the new levies, 3000 Macedonian infantry and 650 horse, 300 from Macedonia, 200 from Thessaly, the rest from Elis. Here also he received an embassy from Athens, which came to request that he would release the Athenian prisoners who had been taken among the mercenaries in the battle of the Granicus, and had been sent to Macedonia. Alexander did not think it prudent, while he was on the eve of a decisive contest with Darius, to relax his severity towards the Greeks who took part with the barbarians, but he gave the Athenians leave to renew their application at a more seasonable juncture.

Gordium had been in very early times the seat of the Phrygian kings, and was supposed to have derived its name from Gordius, the father of the more celebrated Midas. In the citadel was preserved with religious veneration a wagon, in which, according to the tradition of the country, Midas with his father and mother entered the town, at a time when the people, who were distracted by civil discord, were holding an assembly. They had been informed by an oracle that a wagon should bring them a king who should compose their strife. The sudden appearance of Midas convinced them that he was the king destined for them; and when he had mounted the throne, he dedicated the wagon in the citadel, as a thank-offering to the king of the gods, who, before his birth, had sent an eagle to alight upon its yoke, while Gordius was ploughing, as a sign of the honour reserved for his race.

This legend had given rise to a prophecy that whoever untied the knot of bark by which the yoke was fastened to the pole, must become lord of Asia. Alexander did not leave Gordium before he had proved that this

prophecy related to himself. He went up to the citadel, and separated the yoke from the pole. Whether he loosened the knot by drawing out a peg,¹ or cut it with his sword, his own followers were not agreed. But all the spectators were convinced that he had legitimately fulfilled the prophecy, and a storm of thunder and lightning which took place the same night, removed every shadow of doubt on the subject (333).

He now resumed his march eastward, and at Ancyra received an embassy from Paphlagonia, promising obedience on the somewhat ambiguous condition that he should abstain from entering their country. The subjugation of this extensive and very mountainous region would have detained him much too long from the more important objects which he had in view, and he therefore contented himself with this show of submission, which at least heightened, while it proved, the terror inspired by his name, and annexed Paphlagonia to the satrapy of Calas. As he advanced through Cappadocia towards the passes of Taurus, he met with no resistance; and his authority was at least nominally acknowledged to a great distance beyond the Halys, so that he could appoint a satrap of Cappadocia. On his way he received tidings from Tarsus, that the satrap Arsames, having heard that he had passed the Gates, was about to quit the city, which at first he meant to defend, and, it was feared, would plunder it before his departure. Hereupon Alexander pushed forward with his cavalry and the lightest part of the infantry at full speed for Tarsus, and Arsames, whatever his intention may have been, fled, leaving the city unhurt, to join the army of Darius.

Alexander, on his arrival at Tarsus, while his blood was still violently heated by these extraordinary exertions, had been tempted to plunge into the clear and limpid waters of the Cydnus, which flowed through the city. This imprudence was generally supposed to have been the cause of a fever which seized him immediately after, and which soon became so threatening in its symptoms that most of his physicians despaired of his life. One however, an Acarnanian named Philippus, who stood high in his confidence, undertook to prepare a medicine which would relieve him. In the meanwhile, a letter was brought to the king from Parmenion, informing him of a report that Philippus had been bribed by Darius to poison him. Alexander, it is said, had the letter in his hand, when the physician came in with the draught, and, giving it to him, drank while he read — a theatrical scene, as Plutarch unsuspectingly observes, but one which would not have been invented but for such a character, and which Arrian was therefore induced, though doubtfully, to record. The remedy, or Alexander's excellent constitution, prevailed over the disease; but it was long before he had regained sufficient strength to resume his march.

In the meanwhile, he sent Parmenion forward with about a third of the army, to occupy the nearest of the maritime passes leading out of Cilicia into Syria. He himself, when sufficiently recovered, proceeded westward with the rest of his forces to Anchialus, where he beheld the statue of its reputed founder Sardanapalus, the voluptuous king, who judged so differently from himself — as the Assyrian inscription on his monument and the figure itself attested — of the value and use of life. At Soli, where he arrived next, he found a strong leaning to the Persian interest, which induced him to place a garrison there, and afforded him a fair ground for demanding a con-

¹ As Aristobulus related, according to Arrian. Droysen observes that the other version is much more appropriate to the character and destiny of the conqueror, and would have been more readily believed by the army. But, critically considered, this is a reason for preferring the account of Aristobulus, whom Droysen elsewhere, as if in dispraise, styles "the sober."

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tribution of two hundred talents. Yet it seems to have been only an oligarchical party that had favoured the Persians, and perhaps the penalty was levied on them alone; for he established a democratical government, and the garrison may have been needed for its security. Before he returned to Tarsus, he made an inroad with a division of his forces into the mountains of the rugged Cilicia, and in the course of seven days reduced their wild inhabitants by force or terror to submission. On his return to Soli, he received the agreeable intelligence that Orontobates had been defeated in a hard-fought battle by Ptolemy and Asander, and that the citadel of Halicarnassus, and the other places which he had retained on the coast of Caria, had fallen.

Darius had previously suffered a much greater loss in the death of Memnon, who was carried off by a sudden illness while engaged in the siege of Mytilene, which, after having made himself master of Chios through treachery, and of the rest of Lesbos, he had invested closely by sea and land. Alexander, before he left Soli, celebrated the victory of his generals and at the same time testified his gratitude for his own convalescence by a solemn sacrifice to *Æsculapius*, with a military procession, a torch race, and musical and gymnastic contests.

He then marched back to Tarsus, and, sending Philotas forward with the bulk of cavalry across the Aleian plain, himself took a more circuitous route along the coast through Magarsus to Mallus, a town which claimed the Argive hero *Amphilochus*, as its founder. On this ground, as himself descended from the *Heraclids* of Argos, he both healed its intestine disorders, and exempted it from the tribute which it had paid to the Persian government. At Mallus for the first time he heard of the approach of the great Persian army commanded by Darius in person.^b

DARIUS MUSTERS A NEW HOST



PHRYGIAN WEAPONS AND HELMET

If Alexander was a gainer in respect to his own operations by the death of the eminent Rhodian [*Memnon*], he was yet more a gainer by the change of policy which that event induced Darius to adopt. The Persian king resolved to renounce the defensive schemes of *Memnon*, and to take the offensive against the *Macedonians* on land. His troops, already summoned from the various parts of the empire, had partially arrived, and were still coming in. Their numbers became greater and greater, amounting at length to a vast and multitudinous host, the total of which is given by some as six hundred thousand men; by others as four hundred thousand infantry and one hundred thousand cavalry.

The spectacle of this showy and imposing mass, in every variety of arms, costume, and language, filled the mind of Darius with confidence; especially as there were among them between twenty thousand and thirty thousand Grecian mercenaries. The Persian courtiers, themselves elate and sanguine, stimulated and exaggerated the same feeling in the king himself, who became confirmed in his persuasion that his enemies could never resist him.

From Sogdiana, Bactria, and India, the contingents had not yet had time to arrive; but most of those between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea had come in — Persians, Medes, Armenians, Derbices, Barcanians, Hyrcanians, Cardaces, etc.; all of whom, mustered in the plains of Mesopotamia, are said to have been counted, like the troops of Xerxes in the plain of Doriscus, by piling off a space capable of containing exactly ten thousand men, and passing all the soldiers through it in succession. Neither Darius himself, nor any of those around him, had ever before seen so overwhelming a manifestation of the Persian imperial force. To an oriental eye, incapable of appreciating the real conditions of military preponderance — accustomed only to the gross and visible computation of numbers and physical strength — the king who marched forth at the head of such an army appeared like a god on earth, certain to trample down all before him just as most Greeks had conceived respecting Xerxes, and by stronger reason Xerxes respecting himself, a century and a half before. Because all this turned out a ruinous mistake the description of the feeling, given in Curtius and Diodorus, is often mistrusted as baseless rhetoric. Yet it is in reality the self-suggested illusion of untaught men, as opposed to trained and scientific judgment.

But though such was the persuasion of orientals, it found no response in the bosom of an intelligent Athenian. Among the Greeks now near Darius, was the Athenian exile Charidemus; who having incurred the implacable enmity of Alexander, had been forced to quit Athens after the Macedonian capture of Thebes, and had fled together with Ephialtes to the Persians. Darius, elate with the apparent omnipotence of his army under review, and hearing but one voice of devoted concurrence from the courtiers around him, asked the opinion of Charidemus, in full expectation of receiving an affirmative reply. So completely were the hopes of Charidemus bound up with the success of Darius, that he would not suppress his convictions, however unpalatable, at a moment when there was yet a possibility that they might prove useful. He replied (with the same frankness as Demaratus had once employed towards Xerxes), that the vast multitude now before him were unfit to cope with the comparatively small number of the invaders. He advised Darius to place no reliance on Asiatics, but to employ his immense treasures in subsidising an increased army of Grecian mercenaries. He tendered his own hearty services either to assist or to command. To Darius, what he said was alike surprising and offensive; in the Persian courtiers, it provoked intolerant wrath. Intoxicated as they all were with the spectacle of their immense muster, it seemed to them a combination of insult with absurdity, to pronounce Asiatics worthless as compared with Macedonians, and to teach the king that his empire could be defended by none but Greeks. They denounced Charidemus as a traitor who wished to acquire the king's confidence in order to betray him to Alexander. Darius himself, stung with the reply, and still further exasperated by the clamours of his courtiers, seized with his own hands the girdle of Charidemus, and consigned him to the guards for execution. "You will discover too late," exclaimed the Athenian, "the truth of what I have said. My avenger will soon be upon you."

Filled as he now was with certain anticipations of success and glory, Darius resolved to assume in person the command of his army, and march down to overwhelm Alexander. From this moment, his land-army became the really important and aggressive force, with which he himself was to act. Herein we note his distinct abandonment of the plans of Memnon — the turning-point of his future fortune. He abandoned them, too, at the pre-

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cise moment when they might have been most safely and completely executed. In the first place, there was the line of Mount Taurus, barring the entrance of Alexander into Cilicia; a line of defence nearly inexpugnable. Next, even if Alexander had succeeded in forcing this line and mastering Cilicia, there would yet remain the narrow road between Mount Amanus and the sea, called the Amanian Gates, and the Gates of Cilicia and Assyria—and after that, the passes over Mount Amanus itself—all indispensable for Alexander to pass through, and capable of being held, with proper precautions, against the strongest force of attack. A better opportunity, for executing the defensive part of Memnon's scheme, could not present itself; and he himself must doubtless have reckoned that such advantages would not be thrown away.

The momentous change of policy, on the part of the Persian king, was manifested by the order which he sent to the fleet after receiving intelligence of the death of Memnon. Confirming the appointment of Pharnabazus (made provisionally by the dying Memnon) as admiral, he at the same time despatched Thymodes (son of Mentor and nephew of Memnon) to bring away from the fleet the Grecian mercenaries who served aboard, to be incorporated with the main Persian army. Here was a clear proof that the main stress of offensive operations was henceforward to be transferred from the sea to the land.

It is the more important to note such desertion of policy, on the part of Darius, as the critical turning-point in the Greco-Persian drama—because Arrian and the other historians leave it out of sight, and set before us little except secondary points in the case. Thus, for example, they condemn the imprudence of Darius, for coming to fight Alexander within the narrow space near Issus, instead of waiting for him on the spacious plains beyond Mount Amanus. Now, unquestionably, granting that a general battle was inevitable, this step augmented the chances in favour of the Macedonians. But it was a step upon which no material consequences turned; for the Persian army under Darius was hardly less unfit for a pitched battle in the open plain; as was afterwards proved at Arbela. The real imprudence—the neglect of the Memnonian warning—consisted in fighting the battle at all. Mountains and defiles were the real strength of the Persians, to be held as posts of defence against the invader.

DARIUS AT ISSUS

Darius had marched out of the interior his vast and miscellaneous host, stated at six hundred thousand men. His mother, his wife, his harem, his children, his personal attendants of every description, accompanied him, to witness what was anticipated as a certain triumph. All the apparatus of ostentation and luxury was provided in abundance, for the king and for his Persian grandees. The baggage was enormous: of gold and silver alone, we are told that there was enough to furnish load for six hundred mules and three hundred camels. A temporary bridge being thrown over the Euphrates, five days were required to enable the whole army to cross. Much of the treasure and baggage, however, was not allowed to follow the army to the vicinity of Mount Amanus, but was sent under a guard to Damascus in Syria.

At the head of such an overwhelming host, Darius was eager to bring on at once a general battle. It was not sufficient for him simply to keep back

an enemy, whom, when once in presence, he calculated on crushing altogether. Accordingly, he had given no orders (as we have just seen) to defend the line of the Taurus; he had admitted Alexander unopposed into Cilicia, and he intended to let him enter in like manner through the remaining strong passes — first, the Gates of Cilicia and Syria, between Mount Amanus and the sea — next, the pass, now called Beylan, across Amanus itself. He both expected and wished that his enemy should come into the plain to fight, there to be trodden down by the countless horsemen of Persia.

But such anticipation was not at once realised. The movements of Alexander, hitherto so rapid and unremitting, seemed suspended. We have already noticed the dangerous fever which threatened his life, occasioning not only a long halt, but much uneasiness among the Macedonian army. All was doubtless reported to the Persians, with abundant exaggerations; and when Alexander, immediately after recovery, instead of marching forward towards them, turned away from them to subdue the western portion of Cilicia, this again was construed by Darius as an evidence of hesitation and fear. It is even asserted that Parmenion wished to await the attack of the Persians in Cilicia, and that Alexander at first consented to do so. At any rate, Darius, after a certain interval, contracted the persuasion, and was assured by his Asiatic councillors and courtiers, that the Macedonians, though audacious and triumphant against frontier satraps, now hung back intimidated by the approaching majesty and full muster of the empire, and that they would not stand to resist his attack. Under this impression Darius resolved upon an advance into Cilicia with all his army.

Thymodes indeed, and other Grecian advisers — together with the Macedonian exile Amyntas — deprecated his new resolution, entreating him to persevere in his original purpose. They pledged themselves that Alexander would come forth to attack him wherever he was, and that, too, speedily. They dwelt on the imprudence of fighting in the narrow defiles of Cilicia, where his numbers, and especially his vast cavalry, would be useless. Their advice, however, was not only disregarded by Darius, but denounced by the Persian councillors as traitorous. Even some of the Greeks in the camp shared, and transmitted in their letters to Athens, the blind confidence of the monarch. The order was forthwith given for the whole army to quit the plains of Syria and march across Mount Amanus into Cilicia. To cross, by any pass, over such a range as that of Mount Amanus, with a numerous army, heavy baggage, and ostentatious train (including all the suite necessary for the regal family), must have been a work of no inconsiderable time; and the only two passes over this mountain were, both of them, narrow and easily defensible. Darius followed the northernmost of the two, which brought him into the rear of the enemy.

Thus at the same time that the Macedonians were marching southward to cross Mount Amanus by the southern pass, and attack Darius in the plain, Darius was coming over into Cilicia by the northern pass to drive them before him back into Macedonia. Reaching Issus, seemingly about two days after they had left it, he became master of their sick and wounded left in the town. With odious brutality, his grandees impelled him to inflict upon these poor men either death or amputation of hands and arms. He then marched forward, along the same road by the shore of the gulf which had already been followed by Alexander, and encamped on the banks of the river Pinarus.

The fugitives from Issus hastened to inform Alexander, whom they overtook at Myriandrus. So astonished was he, that he refused to believe the news, until it had been confirmed by some officers whom he sent north-

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ward along the coast of the gulf in a small galley, and to whom the vast Persian multitude on the shore was distinctly visible. Then, assembling the chief officers, he communicated to them the near approach of the enemy, expatiating on the favourable auspices under which a battle would now take place. His address was hailed with acclamation by his hearers, who demanded only to be led against the enemy.

PREPARING FOR BATTLE

His distance from the Persian position may have been about eighteen miles. By an evening march, after supper, he reached at midnight the narrow defile (between Mount Amanus and the sea) called the Gates of Cilicia and Syria, through which he had marched two days before. Again master of that important position, he rested there the last portion of the night, and advanced forward at daybreak northward towards Darius. On approaching near to the river Pinarus (which flowed across the pass), he adopted his order of battle. On the extreme right he placed the hypaspists, or light division of hoplites; next (reckoning from right to left), five *taxeis* or divisions of the phalanx, under Cenus, Perdicas, Meleager, Ptolemy, and Amyntas. The breadth of plain between the mountains on the right, and the sea on the left, is said to have been not more than fourteen stadia, or somewhat more than one English mile and a half. From fear of being outflanked by the superior numbers of the Persians, he gave strict orders to Parmenion to keep close to the sea. His Macedonian cavalry, the companions, together with the Thessalians, were placed on his right flank; as were also the Agrianians, and the principal portion of the light infantry. The Peloponnesian and allied cavalry, with the Thracian and Cretan light infantry, were sent on the left flank to Parmenion.

Darius, informed that Alexander was approaching, resolved to fight where he was encamped, behind the river Pinarus. He, however, threw across the river a force of thirty thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand infantry, to insure the undisturbed formation of his main force behind the river. He composed his phalanx, or main line of battle, of ninety thousand hoplites; thirty thousand Greek hoplites in the centre, and thirty thousand Asiatics armed as hoplites (called Cardaces), on each side of these Greeks. These men—not distributed into separate divisions, but grouped in one body or multitude—filled the breadth between the mountains and the sea. On the mountains to his left, he placed a body of twenty thousand men, intended to act against the right flank and rear of Alexander. But for the great numerical mass of his vast host, he could find no room to act; accordingly they remained useless in the rear of his Greek and Asiatic hoplites; yet not formed into any body of reserve, or kept disposable for assisting in case of need. When his line was thoroughly formed, he recalled to the right bank of the Pinarus the thirty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, which he had sent across as a protecting force. A part of this cavalry were sent to his extreme left wing, but the mountain ground was found unsuitable for action, so that they were forced to cross to the right wing, where accordingly the great mass of the Persian cavalry became assembled. Darius himself in his chariot was in the centre of the line, behind the Grecian hoplites. In the front of his whole line ran the river or rivulet Pinarus; the banks of which, in many parts naturally steep, he obstructed in some places by embankments.


THE BATTLE OF ISSUS

As soon as Alexander, by the retirement of the Persian covering detachment, was enabled to perceive the final dispositions of Darius, he made some alteration in his own, transferring his Thessalian cavalry by a rear movement from his right to his left wing, and bringing forward the lancer-cavalry or sarrissophori, as well as the light infantry, Pæonians and archers, to the front of his right. The Agrianians, together with some cavalry and another body of archers, were detached from the general line to form an oblique front against the twenty thousand Persians posted on the hill to outflank him. As these twenty thousand men came near enough to threaten his flank, Alexander directed the Agrianians to attack them, and to drive them farther away on the hills.

Having thus formed his array, after giving the troops a certain halt after their march, he advanced at a very slow pace, anxious to maintain his own front even, and anticipating that the enemy might cross the Pinarus to meet him. But as they did not move, he continued his advance, preserving the uniformity of the front, until he arrived within bowshot, when he himself, at the head of his cavalry, hypaspists, and divisions of the phalanx on the right, accelerated his pace, crossed the river at a quick step, and fell upon the Cardaces or Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left. Unprepared for the suddenness and vehemence of this attack, these Cardaces scarcely resisted a moment, but gave way as soon as they came to close quarters, and fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, who was in his chariot in the centre, perceived that this untoward desertion exposed his person from the left flank. Seized with panic, he caused his chariot to be turned round, and fled with all speed among the foremost fugitives. He kept to his chariot as long as the ground permitted, but quitted it on reaching some

rugged ravines, and mounted on horseback to make sure of escape; in such terror that he cast away his bow, his shield, and his regal mantle. He does not seem to have given a single order, nor to have made the smallest effort to repair a first misfortune. The flight of the king was the signal for all who observed it to flee also; so that the vast host in the rear were quickly to be seen trampling one another down, in their efforts to get through the difficult ground out of the reach of the enemy. Darius was himself not merely the centre of union for all the miscellaneous contingents composing the army, but also the sole commander; so that after his flight there was no one left to give any general order.

This great battle—we might rather say, that which ought to have been a great battle—was thus lost, through the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the Persian left, and the immediate flight of Darius within a



PHRYGIAN WEAPONS AND HELMET

few minutes after its commencement. But the centre and right of the Persians, not yet apprised of these misfortunes, behaved with gallantry. When Alexander made his rapid dash forward with the right, under his own immediate command, the phalanx in his left centre (which was under

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(Craterus and Parmenon) either did not receive the same accelerating order, or found itself both retarded and disordered by greater steepness in the banks of the Pinarus. Here it was charged by the Grecian mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service. The combat which took place was obstinate, and the Macedonian loss not inconsiderable; the general of division, Ptolemy, son of Seleucus, with 120 of the front-rank men or choice phalangites, being slain. But presently Alexander, having completed the rout on the enemy's left, brought back his victorious troops from the pursuit, attacked the Grecian mercenaries in flank, and gave decisive superiority to their enemies. These Grecian mercenaries were beaten and forced to retire. On finding that Darius himself had fled, they got away from the field as well as they could, yet seemingly in good order. There is even reason to suppose that a part of them forced their way up the mountains or through the Macedonian line, and made their escape southward.

Meanwhile on the Persian right, towards the sea, the heavy-armed Persian cavalry had shown much bravery. They were bold enough to cross the Pinarus and vigorously to charge the Thessalians; with whom they maintained a close contest, until the news spread that Darius had disappeared, and that the left of the army was routed. They then turned their backs and fled, sustaining terrible damage from their enemies in the retreat.

The rout of the Persians being completed, Alexander began a vigorous pursuit. The destruction and slaughter of the fugitives were prodigious. Amidst so small a breadth of practicable ground, narrowed sometimes into a defile and broken by frequent watercourses, their vast numbers found no room, and trod one another down. As many perished in this way as by the sword of the conquerors; inasmuch that Ptolemy (afterwards king of Egypt, the companion and historian of Alexander) recounts that he himself in the pursuit came to a ravine choked up with dead bodies, of which he made a bridge to pass over it. The pursuit was continued as long as the light of a November day allowed; but the battle had not begun till a late hour. The camp of Darius was taken, together with his mother, his wife, his sister, his infant son, and two daughters. His chariot, his shield, and his bow also fell into the power of the conquerors; and a sum of three thousand talents [£600,000 or \$3,000,000] in money was found, though much of the treasure had been sent to Damascus. The total loss of the Persians is said to have amounted to ten thousand horse and one hundred thousand foot; among the slain moreover were several eminent Persian grandees: Arsames, Rheomithres, and Atizyes, who had commanded at the Granicus, and Sabaces, satrap of Egypt. Of the Macedonians we are told that 300 foot and 150 horse were killed. Alexander himself was slightly wounded in the thigh by a sword.

Flight of Darius

When Alexander returned at night from the pursuit, he found the Persian regal tent reserved for him. In an inner compartment of it he heard the tears and wailings of women. He was informed that the mourners were the mother and wife of Darius, who had learned that the bow and shield of Darius had been taken, and were giving loose to their grief under the belief that Darius himself was killed. Alexander immediately sent Leonatus to assure them that Darius was still living, and to promise further that they should be allowed to preserve the regal title and state—his war against Darius being undertaken not from any feelings of hatred, but as a

fair contest for the empire of Asia. Besides this anecdote, which depends on good authority, many others, uncertified or untrue, were recounted about his kind behaviour to these princesses ; and Alexander himself, shortly after the battle, seems to have heard fictions about it, which he thought himself obliged to contradict in a letter. It is certain (from the extract now remaining of this letter) that he never saw, nor ever entertained the idea of seeing, the captive wife of Darius, said to be the most beautiful woman in Asia ; moreover he even declined to hear encomiums upon her beauty.

How the vast host of fugitives got out of the narrow limits of Cilicia, or how many of them quitted that country by the same pass over Mount Amanus as that by which they had entered it — we cannot make out. It is probable that many, and Darius himself among the number, made their escape across the mountain by various subordinate roads and bypaths ; which, though unfit for a regular army with baggage, would be found a welcome resource by scattered companies. Darius managed to get together four thousand of the fugitives, with whom he hastened to Thapsacus, and there recrossed the Euphrates. The only remnant of force, still in a position of defence after the battle, consisted of eight thousand of the Grecian mercenaries under Amyntas and Thymodes. These men, fighting their way out of Cilicia (seemingly towards the south, by or near Myriandrus), marched to Tripolis on the coast of Phœnicia, where they still found the same vessels in which they had themselves been brought from the armament of Lesbos. Seizing sufficient means of transport, and destroying the rest to prevent pursuit, they immediately crossed over to Cyprus, and from thence to Egypt.

With this exception, the enormous Persian host disappears with the battle of Issus. We hear of no attempt to rally or re-form, nor of any fresh Persian force afoot until two years afterwards. The booty acquired by the victors was immense, not merely in gold and silver, but also in captives for the slave-merchant. On the morrow of the battle, Alexander offered a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, with three altars erected on the banks of the Pinarus ; while he at the same time buried the dead, consoled the wounded, and rewarded or complimented all who had distinguished themselves.

No victory recorded in history was ever more complete in itself, or more far-stretching in its consequences, than that of Issus. Not only was the Persian force destroyed or dispersed, but the efforts of Darius for recovery were paralysed by the capture of his family. Portions of the dissipated army of Issus may be traced, reappearing in different places for operations of detail, but we shall find no further resistance to Alexander, during almost two years, except from the brave freemen of two fortified cities. Everywhere an overwhelming sentiment of admiration and terror was spread abroad, towards the force, skill, or good fortune of Alexander, by whichever name it might be called — together with contempt for the real value of a Persian army, in spite of so much imposing pomp and numerical show ; a contempt not new to intelligent Greeks, but now communicated even to vulgar minds by the recent unparalleled catastrophe.

Both as general and as soldier, indeed, the consummate excellence of Alexander stood conspicuous, not less than the signal deficiency of Darius. The fault in the latter was that of fighting the battle, not in an open plain, but in a narrow valley, whereby his superiority of number was rendered unprofitable. But this (as we have already observed) was only one among many mistakes, and by no means the most serious. The result would have been the same, had the battle been fought in the plains to the eastward of Mount Amanus. Superior numbers are of little avail on any

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ground, unless there be a general who knows how to make use of them ; unless they be distributed into separate divisions ready to combine for offensive action on many points at once, or at any rate to lend support to each other in defence, so that a defeat of one fraction is not a defeat of the whole. The faith of Darius in simple multitude was altogether blind and childish ; nay, that faith, though overweening beforehand, disappeared at once when he found his enemies did not run away, but faced him boldly — as was seen by his attitude on the banks of the Pinarus, where he stood to be attacked instead of executing his threat of treading down the handful opposed to him. But it was not merely as a general that Darius acted in such a manner as to render the loss of the battle certain. Had his dispositions been ever so skilful, his personal cowardice in quitting the field and thinking only of his own safety, would have sufficed to nullify their effect. Though the Persian grandees are generally conspicuous for personal courage, yet we shall find Darius hereafter again exhibiting the like melancholy timidity, and the like incompetence for using numbers with effect, at the battle of Arbela, though fought in a spacious plain chosen by himself.

FROM ISSUS TO TYRE

Happy was it for Memnon that he did not live to see the renunciation of his schemes, and the ruin consequent upon it ! The fleet in the *Ægean*, which had been transferred at his death to Pharnabazus, though weakened by the loss of those mercenaries whom Darius had recalled to Issus, and disheartened by a serious defeat which the Persian Orontobates had received from the Macedonians in Caria, was nevertheless not inactive in trying to organise an anti-Macedonian manifestation in Greece. While Pharnabazus was at the island of Siphnos with his one hundred triremes, he was visited by the Lacedæmonian king Agis, who pressed him to embark for Peloponnesus as large a force as he could spare, to second a movement projected by the Spartans. But such aggressive plans were at once crushed by the terror-striking news of the battle of Issus. Apprehending a revolt in the island of Chios, as a result of this news, Pharnabazus immediately sailed thither with a large detachment. Agis, obtaining nothing more than a subsidy of thirty talents and a squadron of ten triremes, was obliged to renounce his projects in Peloponnesus, and to content himself with directing some operations in Crete, to be conducted by his brother Agesilaus ; while he himself remained among the islands, and ultimately accompanied the Persian Autophradates to Halicarnassus. It appears, however, that he afterwards went to conduct the operations in Crete, and that he had considerable success in that island, bringing several Cretan towns to join the Persians.^e

The spoil of Damascus was not the most important advantage which Alexander reaped from the battle of Issus. It averted a danger which, notwithstanding Memnon's death, had continued to give him occasion for much uneasiness ; for he was still threatened with a diversion in his rear — a general rising of the Greeks and an invasion of Macedonia — which might have interrupted, even if it did not finally defeat, his enterprise.

Thus then Alexander had nothing more to fear on this side for the present. But it was not the less his foremost object to guard against the recurrence of this danger, and to deprive the Persian government of all means of aiding the Greeks in their attempts for the recovery of their independence. He saw that if he once made himself master of Phœnicia and Egypt, the

Persians would be deserted by the best part of their galleys, which were furnished by the Phœnician cities, and would be unable to repair the loss. His authority would then be undisputed in all the provinces of the empire west of the Euphrates.

Darius had continued his flight without intermission until he had crossed the river at Thapsacus, where he arrived with about four thousand fugitives, who had successively joined his train; and then first felt himself out of immediate peril. Amyntas [the Greek mercenary general who had escaped from Issus], it seems, conceived the bold project of making himself master of Egypt. Sabaces, the satrap of Egypt, had fallen in the battle; and Amyntas, pretending that he had a commission from Darius, gained admittance at Pelusium. He then dropped the mask, and calling on the Egyptians to shake off the hated yoke of Persia, marched against Memphis. Mazaces, the Persian commander of Memphis, was defeated, and forced to take shelter behind the walls. But the victors suffered themselves to be surprised by Mazaces, and Amyntas was slain, with almost all his men.

Darius indeed had the force of the greater part of his empire still entire, and at his command. The troops of the eastern satrapies, including some of the most warlike in his dominions, had already been summoned to the royal standard; and he might expect, in the course of a few months, to see himself at the head of a still more numerous host than he had commanded at Issus. It was perhaps partly with the view of gaining time, that he no sooner reached a place of safety, than he began to sound Alexander's temper by overtures of negotiation. He sent two envoys to Alexander. He assumed the tone of remonstrance, as one who had suffered an unprovoked aggression. He was now reduced, by the chance of war, to make a request: such however as one king might becomingly address to another — that Alexander would restore his mother, wife, and children. He himself was willing to become Alexander's friend and ally, and desired that he would send ministers with the two Persian envoys, to treat with him.

The Persian envoys had been instructed to urge the request contained in their master's letter by word of mouth. Alexander sent Thersippus along with them, charged with a letter to Darius, but with orders to abstain from oral communications on the subject. The letter was a kind of manifesto, in which he vindicated the justice of his proceedings by various reasons, as good, at least, as the strong are usually able to find for attacking the weak. He began like the wolf in the fable. The ancestors of Darius had invaded Macedonia and Greece, and he had been appointed by the Greeks their general, and had come over to Asia, to avenge their wrongs and his own. Ochus had furnished succours to Perinthus and the Thracians against Philip. It was through the machinations of the Persian court that Philip had been murdered; and his death had been made a subject of boastful exultation in its public letters. Darius himself had been the accomplice of Bagoas in the murder of Arses, and had usurped the throne of Persia: he had endeavoured to excite the Greeks to war against Macedonia, and had offered subsidies to Sparta, and to other states, which indeed had been accepted only by Sparta; but his agents had succeeded in corrupting many private persons, and had been incessantly labouring to disturb the tranquillity of Greece. His invasion therefore had been undertaken on just grounds. But since the gods had crowned his arms with victory, none of those who had trusted themselves to his clemency had found reason to regret their choice. He therefore invited Darius himself to come to him, as to the lord of Asia. He might beforehand receive pledges of his personal safety, and might then

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ask with confidence for his mother, wife, and children, and for whatever else he could desire. In future, he must address Alexander as the King of Asia, in the style, not of an equal, but of a subject, or must expect to be treated as an enemy. If, however, he disputed his claim to sovereignty, let him wait for his coming, and try the event of another contest. He might rest assured that Alexander would seek him, wherever he might be found.

On his road to Phœnicia, Alexander had been met by Straton, son of the king of Aradus, Gerostratus, whose territory included Marathus and several other towns on the main. Gerostratus himself, with all the other Phœnician and Cypriote princes, was serving in the Persian fleet, under Autophradates. Yet Strato brought a golden crown to the conqueror, and surrendered all the cities in his father's dominions into his hands. As he advanced from Marathus, Byblus capitulated to him, and Sidon, where every heart burned with hatred of Persia, hailed him as her deliverer. Thus he proceeded without resistance towards Tyre. And even from this great city he received a deputation on his way, composed of the most illustrious citizens, among whom was the king's son, bringing a golden crown, and a present of provisions for the army, and announcing that the Tyrians had resolved to obey all his commands.

THE SIEGE OF TYRE

It seems that the language in which this message was conveyed intimated something as to the limits of that obedience which the Tyrians were willing to pay. It was not meant that it should extend so far as totally to resign their independence. This Alexander probably understood, and nothing could satisfy him short of absolute submission, and full possession of so important a place. But he met the offers of the Tyrians, as if they had been made in the sense which he required; and bade the envoys apprise their fellow-citizens that it was his intention to cross over to their island, and offer a sacrifice to Melkarth, the Phœnician Hercules, whom he chose to consider as one with the hero of Argos and Thebes. This was perhaps the least offensive way of bringing the matter to an issue; and it obliged the Tyrians to speak their mind more plainly. They now informed him that in all other points he should find them ready to submit to his pleasure, but that they would not admit either a Persian or a Macedonian within their walls; and they begged that he would celebrate the sacrifice which he wished to offer in Old Tyre, which lay on the coast opposite to their island city, where their god had another, and probably a much more ancient, sanctuary.

Alexander indignantly dismissed their ambassadors, and called a council of his officers, in which he declared his intention of besieging Tyre, and explained the reasons which rendered this undertaking necessary, arduous as it was. He observed that it would be unsafe to invade Egypt, so long as the Persians commanded the sea, and that to advance into the interior against Darius, while Tyre remained neutral or vacillating, and while Cyprus and Egypt were in the enemy's hands, would be to let the war be transferred to Greece, where Sparta was openly hostile, and Athens only withheld from the avowal of her enmity by fear. On the other hand the reduction of Tyre would be attended with the submission of all Phœnicia; and the Phœnician fleet, the strength of the Persian navy, would soon pass over to the power which possessed the cities by which it had been equipped, and to which the crews belonged. Cyprus would then speedily fall, and there would be no further obstacle to the conquest of Egypt. They might then set out

for Babylon, leaving all secure on the side of Greece, and with the proud consciousness that they had already severed all the provinces west of the Euphrates from the Persian empire.

The motives which induced Alexander to undertake the siege of Tyre are more evident than those which led the Tyrians to defy his power, after so many of the other Phœnician cities had submitted to him. The main ground of their conduct seems to have been more in the nature of a commercial calculation of expediency. The issue of the contest between Alexander and Darius was still doubtful; notwithstanding his past success the Macedonian conqueror might meet the fate of the younger Cyrus in some future field of battle. In any case the Tyrians believed their city to be impregnable so long as they were superior at sea. It was thought necessary, either for the purpose of detaining the god, or of quieting the popular uneasiness, to adopt an expedient similar to that which many years before had been employed by the Ephesians in a like emergency—to fasten the statue of Apollo, who was denounced as a friend of Alexander, by a golden chain to the altar of Melkarth. On the other hand Alexander seems to have thought it prudent to raise the spirits of his troops by assurances of divine assistance, in an enterprise which appeared to surpass human ability. He too related that he had seen Hercules in a dream taking him by the hand, and leading him within the walls of his city—a sign, as Aristander interpreted it, of success, though in a Herculean labour.

An ordinary conqueror might indeed himself have needed such assurances to encourage him, when he was about to attack a place so prepared for defence as Tyre at this time was, both by nature and art. The island on which the city stood was separated from the main by a channel half a mile broad, through which, in rough weather, the sea rushed with great violence. This strait was indeed shallow on the side of the Phœnician coast, but near the island became three fathoms deep. The walls, which rose from the edge of the cliffs, were 150 feet high on the land side, and composed of huge blocks of stone, cemented with mortar. The city was abundantly stocked with provisions and military stores, contained a number of copious springs; was filled with an industrious and intelligent population, expert in all the arts of naval warfare, and possessed mechanics and engineers, not inferior, it seems, to any that were to be found in the Macedonian camp. Though the greater part of the Tyrian fleet was absent in the Persian service, there still remained a sufficient number of galleys of war, and of smaller craft, both for the defence of the harbours—for there were two, one on the north, the other on the south side of the island—and for the annoyance of the enemy.

Alexander had no naval force which he could immediately oppose to this. His plan was soon formed: he resolved to carry a causeway through the channel, and when it had reached the foot of the walls, to batter them from it with his engines. The real difficulty of the undertaking was not perceived until the dam had been carried halfway across the water. But as the depth increased, while the work itself became more and more laborious and difficult, it now came within reach of the missiles discharged from the top of the walls; and the Tyrian galleys, taking their station at a short distance, incessantly annoyed the workmen, who were not armed to sustain these attacks. Alexander however ordered two wooden towers erected both to shelter the workmen and repel the assailants.

The Tyrians now prepared a more formidable mode of attack. A horse transport was filled with dry twigs and other combustibles, over which they poured pitch and brimstone. In the forepart an additional space was


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enclosed, so as to form a huge basket for the reception of these materials, in the midst of which were fixed two masts, which at the ends of their yard-arms supported two cauldrons filled with an inflammable liquid. The stem was raised high above the water by means of ballast heaped near the stern. The besieged, having waited for a favourable breeze, towed the ship behind two galleys towards the mole, and when it came near set it on fire, and, seconded by the wind, ran it on the end of the mole between the towers. The flames soon caught them; but the conflagration did not reach its full height, until the masts gave way and discharged the contents of the cauldrons on the blazing pile. To render it the more effectual, the men on board the galleys from a convenient distance plied the towers with their arrows, so as to defeat every attempt that was made to extinguish the fire.

A shoal of boats now came off from the harbours filled with people, who soon tore up the piles, and set fire to all the machines which had not been overtaken by the flames of the burning ship. The ruin of the work which had cost so much time and labour was completed in a few hours. Alexander, however, was not disheartened; he gave orders that a new mole should be begun, of greater breadth, so as to be capable

of receiving more towers, and that new engines should be constructed. But as he now became aware that, without some naval force to oppose to the Tyrians, he should find the difficulties of the siege insurmountable, he repaired at once in person to Sidon, with a detachment of light troops, to collect as many galleys as he could.

Gerostratus, king of Aradus, and Enylus of Byblus, as soon as they heard that he had become master of their cities, quitted the Persian fleet, with their squadrons, and with a part of the Sidonian galleys; so that Alexander was joined at Sidon by eighty sail of Phœnician ships. About the same time came in ten from Rhodes, as many from Lycia, three from Soli and Mallus, and his own victorious captain, Proteas, from Macedonia. And these were followed not long after by the Cypriote princes with 120 galleys. He had now an armament of nearly 250 sail at his orders. While it went through a course of training for a sea-fight, and while the machines were in preparation, he made an excursion, with some squadrons of horse and a



GREEK BATTERING RAM

body of light troops, into the range of Anti-Libanus, and having reduced the mountaineers to submission, within eleven days returned to Sidon, where he found a reinforcement of four thousand Greek soldiers, who had been brought by Cleander from Peloponnesus. He then set sail for Tyre in line of battle, himself, as on shore, commanding the right wing, and Craterus the left. The Tyrians, it seems, expected his approach and were prepared to meet him; when they saw the numbers which he brought with him, they gave up all thoughts of resistance, and only used their galleys to block up the mouths of their harbours. Alexander, when he came up, found the northern harbour too well secured to be attacked, though he sank three of the enemy's galleys which were moored on the outside, and captured one which was consecrated to the tutelary god. The next day he stationed the Cypriotes under the command of Andromachus near the entrance of this harbour, and the Phœnicians near the other, in the same quarter where his own tent was pitched.

In the meanwhile the mole had been restored, and was actively carried forward; mechanics had been collected in great numbers from Phœnicia and Cyprus, and had constructed abundance of engines, which were planted, some on the mole, others on transports and on the heavier galleys. These vessels at first found the approach very much impeded by a bed of stones which the besieged had carried out into the sea from the foot of the cliffs; and the attempts which the Macedonians made to remove this obstacle were for some time thwarted by the dexterity and boldness of the Tyrian divers, who cut the cables of the ships which were anchored for the purpose of drawing up the stones. Chain cables were at length substituted, and the passage was then rapidly cleared by machines, which raised the stones out of their bed, and hurled them into the deep water. The walls were now assailed by the engines on every side, and the contest grew closer and hotter than it had ever been. Every contrivance that ingenuity quickened by fear could suggest was tried by the besieged to ward off these attacks.

Very famous in particular was one, which is not the less credible because Arrian's authors seem to have passed it over in silence: the invention of shields filled with heated sand, which they were made to discharge on the assailants, and which, penetrating between their armour and their skin, inflicted indescribable tortures. Still the means of attack kept growing on the resources of defence. Dejection began to spread within the walls; and there were some who proposed to renew a horrid rite, which had long fallen into disuse—the sacrifice of a boy of good family to Moloch. It does honour to the Tyrian government, that it did not either humour this bloody superstition, or give way to despair; it was policy perhaps to check all thoughts of capitulation rather than ferocity that induced it to execute its Macedonian prisoners on the top of the walls, and to cast their bodies, in the sight of the besiegers, into the sea; but it directed the energy of the people to better expedients. It made a vigorous attempt to surprise the Cypriote squadron stationed near the northern harbour, and would have gained a complete victory over it; but Alexander, having received timely notice of the sally, sailed round unobserved, turned the fortune of the day, and sunk or took most of the enemy's ships. All hopes from offensive measures were crushed by this blow; the safety of the city now rested chiefly in the strength of its walls.

Even these, after several fruitless attempts had been made in other quarters, began to give way on the south side; and a breach was opened, which Alexander tried, but did not find immediately practicable. Three days after,

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however, when a calm favoured the approach of the vessels, he gave orders for a general attack. It was to be made on all sides at once, to distract the attention of the besieged; and the fleet was at the same time to sail up to both the harbours, in the hope that in the midst of the tumult it might force an entrance into one of them. But the main assault was to be directed against the breach that had been already formed. The vessels which bore the engines were first brought up to play upon it; and when it had been sufficiently widened, were followed by two galleys, with landing boards and the men who were to mount it. One was commanded by Admetus, and was filled with troops of the guard, and in this Alexander himself embarked. Admetus and his men were the first to effect a landing, animated by the immediate presence of their king, who, after he had paused awhile to observe and animate the exertions of his warriors, himself mounted the breach.

When the Macedonian had once gained a firm footing, the issue of the conflict did not long remain doubtful. Admetus indeed, who led the way, was slain; but Alexander soon made himself master of two towers and the intervening curtain, through which the troops from the other vessel poured in after him, and he then advanced along the walls to the royal palace, which stood on the highest ground, that he might descend from it with the greater ease into the heart of the city. The Tyrians, seeing the wall taken, abandoned their fortifications, and collected their forces in one of the public places, where they gallantly made head against their assailants. But in the meanwhile both the harbours had been forced, their ships sunk or driven ashore, and the besiegers landed to join their comrades in the city. It soon became a scene of unresisted carnage and plunder. The Macedonians, exasperated by the length and labours of the siege, which had lasted seven months, and by the execution of their comrades, spared none that fell into their hands. The king — whom the Greeks call Azemileus — with the principal inhabitants, and some Carthaginian envoys who had been sent with the usual offerings to Melkarth, took refuge in his sanctuary: and these alone, according to Arrian, were exempted from the common lot of death or slavery. It was an act of clemency, by which the conqueror at the same time displayed his piety to the god. Of the rest, eight thousand perished in the first slaughter, and thirty thousand, including a number of foreign residents, were sold as slaves. But if we may believe Curtius, fifteen thousand were rescued by the Sidonians, who first hid them in their galleys, and afterwards transported them to Sidon — not, it must be presumed, without Alexander's connivance or consent. It seems incredible, that he should have ordered two thousand of the prisoners to be crucified; though he might have inflicted such a punishment on those who had taken the leading part in the butchery of the Macedonians. But, after the king and the principal citizens had been spared, it is not easy to understand why any others should have suffered on this account.

So fell Tyre, the rich, and beautiful, and proud, in arts and arms the queen of merchant cities. The conqueror celebrated his victory with a solemn military and naval procession, sacrifice, and games, in honour of the tutelary god who had thus fulfilled his promise and, though after the labour of so many months, had at length brought him into his city. He dedicated the engine which had first shattered the wall, and the sacred galley, in the sanctuary of Melkarth.^b



CHAPTER LIII. FROM GAZA TO ARBELA

WHILE Alexander was yet besieging Tyre, ambassadors arrived from Darius, telling him that Darius would bestow upon him ten thousand talents of silver, if he would set his mother, his wife, and children at liberty; as also all the country between the Euphrates and the Hellespont; and if he would take his daughter in marriage, he should be styled his friend and confederate. Which embassy being debated in council, Parmenion is said to have told him that if he were Alexander, he would accept the terms, and, when the end of war was gained, no longer tempt the hazard thereof. To which the other is said to have replied, "So would I if I were Parmenion; but as I am Alexander, I must act worthily of Alexander." He therefore answered the ambassador that he neither wanted Darius' money, nor would accept of part of his empire, instead of the whole—since all the treasure, and the country, were his; that he would marry his daughter, if he pleased, without his consent: but if Darius had a mind to try his humanity, let him come to him.

This answer being carried to Darius, he, despairing of peace, made fresh preparations for war. Alexander then resolved upon an expedition into Egypt, all the cities of that part of Syria called Palestine being surrendered peaceably into his hands, except Gaza, which was kept by a certain eunuch, named Batis, who, foreseeing this, had already hired many troops of Arabians, and laid up vast stores of provisions, to serve for a long siege. He also entirely trusted to the strength of the place, which he looked upon as impregnable; for which reason, he was resolved that, whenever Alexander approached, he should be denied entrance.

THE SIEGE OF GAZA ACCORDING TO ARRIAN

Gaza is only twenty furlongs distant from the seashore, and exceeding difficult of access, because of the depth of the sand, and the neighbouring sea, which is, everywhere, shallow. The city itself is large and populous, seated on a high hill, and surrounded with a strong wall. It is also the last inhabited place which travellers meet with in their way from Phœnicia to Egypt, and borders upon a vast desert. Alexander, immediately after his arrival there, encamped over against that part of the wall which seemed most subject to an assault, and ordered his engines to be brought thither; and notwithstanding the opinion of some of his engineers, that the wall was not possible to be taken by force, by reason of the height of the bulwarks,

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he thought fit to declare his sentiments to the contrary ; and that the more difficult the attempt was, the more necessary it was to be undertaken ; for that the very suddenness and briskness of their assault would strike their enemies with no small terror. He added that, if he were unable to reduce the city, it would abundantly redound to his dishonour, when the news should be carried to Greece, as well as to Darius.

He therefore ordered a rampart to be run round it, of such a height that the engines placed thereupon might be upon a level with the top of the wall, which rampart he then built over against the south part of the wall, because it seemed, there, the least difficult to be assaulted. And when the work was now brought to its full height, the Macedonian engines were immediately placed thereon. About this time, as Alexander was sacrificing, with a crown of gold upon his head, according to the custom of Greece, and just entering upon the office, a certain bird of prey hovered over the altar and let fall a stone from his claws upon his head. Alexander immediately sent to consult Aristander, the soothsayer, what this prodigy could portend. He returned answer : "Thou shalt indeed take the city, O King ; but beware of danger from thence, on the day it is taken." He, hearing this, retired out of the reach of their darts to the engines on the rampart.

But when Alexander saw the Arabians make a furious sally out of the city, and set fire to the engines, and, having the advantage of the higher station, gull the Macedonians below and beat them from the rampart which they had built — then, either forgetful of the divine warning, or moved with the danger of his soldiers, he called his targeteers together and hastened to succour the Macedonians where they were most exposed, and by his presence kept them from betaking themselves to flight and abandoning the rampart : but while he was thus pushing forward, an arrow from an engine pierced his shield and breastplate and wounded him in the shoulder ; which, when he perceived, and thereby knew that Aristander's prediction was true, he rejoiced, because, by the same prediction, he was to take the city.

In the meantime other engines, which had been used at the siege of Tyre, arriving by sea, he ordered the rampart to be run quite round the city, two stadia in breadth, and 250 feet in height. The engines then being prepared, and planted thereupon, the wall was vehemently shaken, and the miners in many places, working privately underneath the foundations thereof and conveying the rubbish away, it fell down. The besiegers then plying the citizens with their darts, beat them out of their towers ; yet thrice they sustained the Macedonian shocks, with the loss of abundance, slain and wounded. But at the fourth attack, when Alexander had called his men thither, he so levelled the wall, which had been undermined in some places, and widened the breaches made by the engines in others, that it seemed then a matter of no difficulty to the Macedonians to fix their ladders to the ruins thereof and storm the city. As soon as the ladders were fixed there arose a great emulation among the besiegers who should first mount the breach. This honour was gained by Neoptolemus of the race of the *Æacidæ*, one of his friends ; and after him, other captains and others still entered with their forces ; and when many of the Macedonians were now within the walls, they forced open the gates, one after another, and gave entrance to the whole army. The citizens, notwithstanding they saw the place thus taken by storm, were resolved to fight to the last ; and gathering together in a body, every one lost his life where he stood, after a brave resistance. Alexander sold the wives and children for slaves ; and a colony being drawn thither from the neighbourhood, the city was afterwards made use of as a garrison.^b

The following incidents, not mentioned by Arrian, are characteristic enough to be quoted from Quintus Curtius, IV. 6. The treatment of Batis, who was in command at Gaza, if correctly reported, — which, however, is by no means certain, — is one of those spasms of barbarity which now and then marred a career otherwise full of dignity.^a

INCIDENTS FROM QUINTUS CURTIUS

“A certain Arabian, one of Darius’ soldiers, ventured upon an action above his fortune, and covering his sword with his buckler, fell upon his knees before the king, as if he had deserted to him; whereupon the king bid him rise, and ordered him to be received into his service; but the barbarian, taking his sword courageously into his right hand, made at the king’s head; who having declined the blow, at the same time cut off the disappointed hand of the barbarian, and flattered himself that he was now cleared of the danger of the day. However, fate, as I take it, is unavoidable, for as he was fighting gallantly among the foremost he was wounded with an arrow, which passed through his armour, and struck in his shoulder, from whence Philip, his physician, drew it. Now the blood began to run in a great quantity, and all that stood by were frightened, never having known an arrow penetrate so deep through armour before.

“As for Alexander, he did not so much as change his countenance, but bid them stop the bleeding, and tie up the wound. Thus he remained some time at the head of the army, either dissembling or overcoming the pain; but when the blood that had been stopped by an application began to run afresh in a larger quantity, and the wound (which by reason of its newness did not at first pain him) upon the cooling of the blood began to swell, then he fainted and fell on his knees. They that were next to him took him up, and carried him into his tent, and Batis concluding him dead, returned into the town in a triumphing manner; but the king, impatient of delay (before his wound was cured), gave orders for a terrace to be raised as high as the city walls, which he commanded to be undermined.

“The besieged, on their part, were not idle, for they had erected a new fortification of equal height with the old wall, but that, however, did not come upon the level with the towers which were planted on the terrace, so that the inward parts of the town were exposed to the enemies’ darts; and to complete their hard fate, the walls were now overthrown by the mines, and gave the Macedonians an opportunity of entering the city at the breaches. The king was at the head of the foremost, and while he carelessly entered the place, his leg was hurt with a stone; notwithstanding which, leaning on his weapon, he fought among the first, though his old wound was not yet healed; his resentment was the greater on account of his having received two wounds in the siege.

“Batis, having behaved himself gallantly, and received several wounds, was at last forsaken by his men, yet this did not hinder him from fighting on, though his arms were grown slippery with his own and his enemies’ blood: but being attacked on all sides, he was taken alive, and being brought before the king, who was overjoyed that he had him in his power, insomuch that he used to admire virtue, even in an enemy, giving way this time to revenge, told him:

“‘Thou shalt not, Batis, die as thou wouldst, but expect to undergo whatever torments ingenuity can invent.’

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"At which threats Batis, without making any reply, gave the king not only an undaunted, but an insolent look; whereupon Alexander said, 'Do you take notice of this obstinate silence? Has he either offered to kneel down, or made the least submission? However, I'll overcome his taciturnity, if by no other means, at least by groans.' This said, his anger turned to rage, his fortune having already corrupted his manners, so that he ordered cords to be run through Batis' heels and tied to the hinder part of a cart, and in that manner had him dragged alive round the city, valuing himself for having imitated Achilles (from whom he descended) in punishing his enemy."^c

ALEXANDER IN EGYPT

The sieges of Tyre and Gaza, occupying together nine months, were, says Grote, the hardest fighting that Alexander ever encountered.¹

The siege of Gaza had occupied, it seems, three or four months; and it was perhaps not before December 332, that Alexander began his expedition to Egypt. Here he might safely reckon not merely on an easy conquest, but on an ardent reception, from a people who burned to shake off the Persian tyranny, and had even welcomed and supported the adventurer Amyntas. Mazaces himself, as soon as he heard of the battle of Issus, became aware that all resistance to Alexander would be useless, and met him with a voluntary submission. At Pelusium he found the fleet, and having left a garrison in the fortress, ordered it to proceed up the Nile as far as Memphis, while he marched across the desert. Near Heliopolis he crossed the river, and joined the fleet at Memphis. Here he conciliated the Egyptians by the honours which he paid to all their gods, especially to Apis, who had been so cruelly insulted by the Persian invaders; but at the same time he exhibited a new spectacle to the natives—a musical and gymnastic contest, for which he had collected the most celebrated artists from all parts of Greece. He then embarked, and dropt down the western or Canopic arm of the river to Canopus, to survey the extremity of the Delta on that side; and having sailed round the lake Mareotis, landed on the narrow belt of low ground which parts it from the sea, and is sheltered from the violence of the northern gales, which would otherwise desolate and overwhelm it, by a long ridge of rock, then separated from the main land by a channel, nearly a mile (seven stadia) broad, and forming the isle of Pharos. On this site stood the village of Racotis, where the ancient kings of Egypt had stationed a permanent guard to protect this entrance of their dominions from adventurers, especially Greeks, who might visit it for the sake either of plunder or commerce; while for greater security they granted the adjacent district to a pastoral tribe, which regarded all strangers as enemies.

Alexander's keen eye was immediately struck by the advantages of this position for a city, which should become a great emporium of commerce, and a link between the East and the West—one of the great objects which already occupied his mind—while it secured the possession of Egypt to his empire, and transmitted the name of its founder to distant ages. He immediately gave orders for the beginning of the work, himself traced the outline, which was suggested by the natural features of the ground itself,² and

[¹ Somewhere about this period belongs a picturesque tradition which Grote, Bury, Holm, and others do not mention at all, even to deny; and that is, Alexander's reception in Palestine as described by Josephus. While it is disbelieved, even by such Jewish historians as Ewald and Milman, it is not entirely impossible. Thirlwall, unlike Mitford, found it credible.]

[² "The city was, in form, like unto a soldier's coat," says Diodorus.]

marked the sites of some of the principal buildings, squares, palaces, and temples. The two main streets, which intersected each other at right angles in a great public place, one traversing the whole length of the city, and forming a series of magnificent edifices, provided for health and enjoyment by a free current of air; and the inundations of the Nile secured it from the pernicious effects which would otherwise have arisen from the vicinity of the lake. A causeway connected the island — on which it is said Alexander at first thought of building the city — with the main, and divided the intervening basin into two harbours, which were only joined together by a canal near either end. By the continual accumulation of sand, this isthmus has been so enlarged that it now forms the site of the modern Alexandria. Still there were two defects to counterbalance so many advantages of situation. The harbour was on both sides difficult of entrance, and there was no

other within a great distance either on the east or the west. This inconvenience could never be wholly remedied, though the danger of the approach from the sea was afterwards much lessened by the erection of a magnificent beacon-tower, on a rock, near the eastern point of Pharos, which threw out its light to the distance, it is said, of nearly forty miles. The other defect was the want of water; and for this ample provision was made by a new canal, branching from the Nile, which brought a constant supply into the cisterns over which the houses were built. Yet Alexandria was thus placed at the mercy of every enemy who could make himself master of the canal and deprive it of a main necessary of life. It was a part of Alexander's plan to people the city with a mixed colony of Greeks and Egyptians, in which the prejudices of the two races might be effaced by habitual intercourse, though Grecian arts and manners were to give their character to the whole; and therefore, among the temples of the Grecian gods, he ordered one to be founded for the worship of Isis.



GREEK JUG

A favourable omen is said to have afforded a presage of the prosperity which awaited the new city. When he was about to trace the course of the walls, no chalk was at hand for the purpose, and it was found necessary instead to make use of flour, which soon attracted a large flock of birds from all sides to devour it. Aristander — who was never at a loss — construed this incident as a sign of the abundance which the city should enjoy and diffuse. That indeed probably far exceeded its founder's most sanguine hopes; but still less could he have foreseen or calculated all the elements of a new intellectual life, which were to be there combined, and the influence which it was to exert over the opinions and condition of a great part of the world.

He was still thus engaged when Hegelochus arrived with the news that the Persians had been dislodged from the last holds of their power in the Ægean. Tenedos had revolted from them, as soon as it became sure of Macedonian protection. At Chios the democratical party had risen against the government established by the Persian satraps, and had taken Pharnabazus himself prisoner: and soon after Aristonicus, the tyrant of Methymna, having sailed into the harbour, before he had heard of the recent revolution,

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with some pirate ships, fell into their hands. The crews were all put to death; he himself, together with the oligarchical leaders, who had betrayed the city to the Persians, was sent to Alexander to receive his sentence. Mytilene, too, where Chares, the Athenian general, commanded the garrison, had been forced to capitulate, and the whole of Lesbos had been recovered. Hegelochus had likewise left his colleague Amphoterus in possession of Cos, which the islanders had freely surrendered. There Pharnabazus had made his escape; but he had brought the other prisoners with him, among whom, beside Aristonicus, were several tyrants who had ruled under Persian patronage. These Alexander abandoned to the mercy of the cities which they had governed, and they all suffered a cruel death; the Chians, as both enemies and traitors, he sent under a strong guard to a wretched exile in the stifling island prison of Elephantine.

He was now on the confines of Egypt and Libya. In the region which lay not many days' march to the west, as some Greek legends told, Hercules and Perseus had pursued their marvellous adventures: both, it was believed, had consulted the oracle of Ammon in the heart of the Libyan wilderness. Alexander may have been desirous of emulating the achievements of his two heroic ancestors; or, if he had not heard of them, might still have been attracted by the celebrity of the oracle, and by the difficulty of reaching it. That he was impelled by curiosity about its answers, is very doubtful; but it is highly probable that he did not overlook the advantage which he might derive from them, however they might run, and the mysterious dignity with which the expedition itself might invest him in the eyes of his subjects. If however to these motives for the enterprise it should be thought necessary to add any others of a more intelligible policy, it might be conjectured that he also wished to impress Cyrene with respect for his power, and to show that even her secluded situation did not place her beyond the reach of his arms. On his march to Paratonium he was met at about midway by envoys from Cyrene, who brought a crown and other magnificent presents. After a march of about two hundred miles along the coast — perhaps nearly as far as the eastern frontier of the territory of Tripoli — he appears to have taken the direction toward the southeast, which leads, in five or six days for a private caravan, to the oasis.

THE VISIT TO AMMON

It was now for the first time that the Macedonians became acquainted with the face of the Libyan desert — its pathless sands, naked rocks, burning sky, and delusive images. That the journey should have furnished numberless stories for the entertainment of the camp, may easily be supposed. It is more difficult to understand how Alexander could have been at a loss for guides well acquainted with the way, as both Ptolemy and Aristobulus represented — though the one related that the perplexity of the wanderers was relieved by two great serpents, which pointed out the track, and were heard even when they could not be seen; the others described two ravens as performing the same office. Whether these are mere fictions of an idle fancy, or cover some fact which we are not able to ascertain, it is hardly worth while to inquire.¹ That the army was refreshed with the extraordinary occurrence of a shower of rain, in which it saw a manifest interposition

¹ As to the ravens, there is no reason to doubt the literal fact. It appears that these birds are looked upon as indicating the vicinity of a well in the African desert. Two ravens met Belzoni, as he was approaching the oasis El Wak. Ritter, *Afrika*, p. 969.

of the gods, cannot reasonably be doubted. At length it descended safely into the green, well-watered, and richly cultivated valley, where, embosomed in thick woods, stood, within the same enclosure, the palace of the ancient priestly kings, and close by the temple of Ammon.

It was a visit such as Ammon had probably never before received, and the priests no doubt did their utmost, both to welcome the royal pilgrim with due honours, and to impress him with the highest veneration for their oracle. It was not, it seems, always in the temple itself that answers were given. The god chose the place of his revelations for himself. His visible symbol, a round disc formed of precious stones, was placed in a golden ship, from which, on each side, hung sacred vessels of silver; and borne on the shoulders of eighty priests, attended by a train of virgins and matrons, who accompanied the procession with sacred chants, in which they implored a propitious and certain answer, according to the secret impulse of the deity which directed their steps. By such a procession Alexander seems to have been met, as he approached at the head of his army, and to have been conducted into the temple, where his questions were answered by the chief priest. What these questions and answers were, was perhaps never known to any but the interlocutors. It is indeed in itself by no means improbable that the priest saluted him as a hero of divine origin, and promised him the empire of the world: the address would not have been more flattering, nor the prophecy bolder, than those which the Greek oracles, less safe from exposure, had sometimes ventured on. But it is well attested that Alexander did not, at least at the time, disclose what he had heard; but merely declared to his followers that he had received such answers as he had desired, and showed his satisfaction by his offerings and donations.

ALEXANDER LEAVES EGYPT

Aristobulus perhaps only expressed himself carelessly when he said that the army returned by the same route: we cannot hesitate to prefer Ptolemy's statement, that it took the direct road to Memphis; unless indeed we should adopt a supposition which might render the two accounts more consistent—that Alexander struck across the desert in a third direction, which leads directly to the lake Mareotis. At Memphis he received reinforcements which had been sent to him by Antipater, and embassies to present congratulations or petitions from several states of Greece: among them, it seems, one which brought a golden crown, that had been decreed by a congress assembled at the isthmus on the occasion of the Isthmian games. It now only remained for him to settle the mode of administration by which Egypt was to be governed in his absence. It was his object at once to gain the good-will of the Egyptians, and to secure a province so important, and so easily defended, from the ambition of his own officers. The system which he established served in some points as a model for the policy of Rome under the emperors. He retained the ancient distribution of the country into the districts called nomes, and not only permitted them to be still governed by the native magistrates, the nomarchs, but placed them all under the authority of two Egyptians. Garrisons were stationed at Memphis and Pelusium. The country on the western side of the Delta was committed to the care of Apollonius; that on the east, towards Arabia, to Cleomenes, an Egyptian Greek of Naucratis, who afterwards became unhappily celebrated for his rapacity and financial stratagems. An army was left under the command of

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Peucestas and Balaerus, and a fleet under that of Polemon. The mutual jealousy of these officers was a sufficient pledge for their loyalty.

In the spring of 331 he set out from Memphis on his return to Phœnicia. At Tyre he found his fleet arrived, and celebrated another sacrifice to Melkarth, and received an embassy which had been brought over from Athens in the *Paralus*. Its chief object was to obtain the release of the Athenian prisoners taken at the battle of the Granicus; and this Alexander now granted, with several other requests which were urged by the crew of the *Paralus*, who accompanied the envoys in a body. The accounts which came from Peloponnesus indicated that it was threatened with a commotion through the restlessness of Sparta; and Amphoterus was ordered to lead a squadron to the aid of the Peloponnesians, who were well affected towards the Macedonian interest and the war with Persia, and to recover Crete from the Spartans. A new fleet of one hundred sail was ordered to be fitted out in the ports of Phœnicia and Cyprus to follow and reinforce Amphoterus. Whether on this occasion Alexander visited Jerusalem is doubtful; but it seems that he made an expedition into Samaria, to punish the Samaritans, who—goaded perhaps by ill-treatment—had revolted against Andromachus, had taken him prisoner, and burnt him alive. On Alexander's approach, the authors of this atrocity were delivered up to him, and tranquillity was restored. He then began his march towards the Euphrates, and before the end of August arrived at Thapsacus.

A body of troops had been sent forward to throw a bridge across the river. When he had crossed, Alexander did not follow the route which Cyrus had taken through the Mesopotamian desert, but directed his march towards the northeast, through a country which afforded a more abundant supply of food, and where the army had less to suffer from the heat. On the road some Persian scouts fell into his hands, from whom he learnt that Darius, with an army far greater than he had before brought into the field, lay on the left bank of the Tigris, prepared to guard the passage against him. He now advanced at full speed towards the Tigris: but when he reached it found neither Darius himself nor any hostile force, and met with no other obstacle than the rapidity of the stream. On the left bank he gave his troops a few days' rest after their forced march, during which there occurred an éclipse of the moon. Aristander expounded it as a sign that, during that month, the Persian monarchy was destined to lose its power and glory; and when Alexander sacrificed to the moon, the sun, and the earth, as the powers which concurred to produce the portent, the victims were found to announce a victory. He then marched southward along the river, and four days after his reconnoitring parties brought word that a body of cavalry was in sight. They fled at his approach, but some were overtaken, and slain or made prisoners. From these he learned that Darius with his whole army was encamped at no great distance.



COSTUME OF A PERSIAN
MAGISTRATE
(After Bardon)

The Persian king had employed the long interval allowed him by Alexander's operations after the battle of Issus, to collect the remaining strength of his empire; and he had assembled a host with which, if superiority of numbers could have ensured success, he might reasonably have hoped to crush his adversary. It was also composed for the most part of more warlike troops. The division which was most formidable, both for numbers and martial qualities, consisted of the hardy tribes which inhabited the plains on the eastern side of the Caspian, and the valleys above Cabul on the borders of India. They were led by Bessus, the powerful satrap of Bactria; and he was also followed by a body of horse-bowmen, furnished by the Sacæ, who wandered in the valleys east of Transoxiana, and though they did not acknowledge his authority, willingly joined him as allies for the sake of pay and plunder. All the provinces between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and from Syria and Cappadocia to the mountains west of the Indus, had poured forth their choicest warriors.

The whole amount was stated by some authors at a million of foot and forty thousand horse; this may be a great exaggeration, but it was probably reduced as much too low by those who reckoned no more than two hundred thousand infantry. There were beside two hundred scythed chariots, and fifteen elephants brought from the west of India. With this host Darius had encamped in one of the wide plains between the Tigris and the mountains of Kurdistan, near the Bumadus, a tributary of the Lycus, and a village named Gaugamela (the camel's house), which should have given its name to the battle fought near it, but was forced, through a caprice of which we have many examples, to surrender this distinction to the town of Arbela, which lay more than twenty miles off, where Darius had left his baggage and his treasure. He had been persuaded by his courtiers that his defeat at Issus was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground, and he had therefore chosen a field on which he might fully display his forces, and where the enemy would have neither sea nor mountains to cover his flanks; and he had ordered a large tract of the plain to be cleared and levelled for the evolutions of his cavalry and chariots.^d

THE BATTLE OF ARBELA

The position of the Persian king near Mesopotamia was chosen with great military skill. It was certain that Alexander on his return from Egypt must march northward along the Syrian coast, before he attacked the central provinces of the Persian empire. A direct eastward march from the lower part of Palestine across the great Syrian desert was then, as now, utterly impracticable. Marching eastward from Syria, Alexander would, on crossing the Euphrates, arrive at the vast Mesopotamian plains. The wealthy capitals of the empire, Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis, would then lie to his south; and if he marched down through Mesopotamia to attack them, Darius might reasonably hope to follow the Macedonians with his immense force of cavalry, and, without even risking a pitched battle, to harass and finally overwhelm them. We may remember that three centuries afterwards a Roman army under Crassus was thus actually destroyed by the oriental archers and horsemen in these very plains; and that the ancestors of the Parthians who thus vanquished the Roman legions, served by thousands under King Darius. If, on the contrary, Alexander should defer his march against Babylon, and first seek an encounter with

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the Persian army, the country on each side of the Tigris in this latitude was highly advantageous for such an army as Darius commanded; and he had close in his rear the mountainous districts of northern Media, where he himself had in early life been satrap, where he had acquired reputation as a soldier and a general, and where he justly expected to find loyalty to his person, and a safe refuge in case of defeat.

His great antagonist came on across the Euphrates against him, at the head of an army which Arrian, copying from the journals of Macedonian officers, states to have consisted of forty thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. In studying the campaigns of Alexander, we possess the peculiar advantage of deriving our information from two of Alexander's generals of division, who bore an important part in all his enterprises. In fact, in reading Arrian, we read General Aristobulus and General Ptolemy on the campaigns of the Macedonians; and it is like reading General Jomini or General Foy on the campaigns of the French.

The estimate which we find in Arrian of the strength of Alexander's army, seems reasonable when we take into account both the losses which he had sustained, and the reinforcements which he had received since he left Europe. Indeed, to Englishmen, who know with what mere handfuls of men their own generals have, at Plassy, at Assaye, at Meeanee, and other Indian battles, routed large hosts of Asiatics, the disparity of numbers that we read of in the victories won by the Macedonians over the Persians presents nothing incredible. The army which Alexander now led, was wholly composed of veteran troops in the highest possible state of equipment and discipline, enthusiastically devoted to their leader, and full of confidence in his military genius and his victorious destiny.

The celebrated Macedonian phalanx formed the main strength of his infantry. His men were veterans; and he could obtain from them an accuracy of movement and steadiness of evolution, such as probably the recruits of his father would only have floundered in attempting, and such as certainly were impracticable in the phalanx when handled by his successors: especially as under them it ceased to be a standing force, and became only a militia. The main strength of his cavalry consisted in two chosen corps of cuirassiers, one Macedonian, and one Thessalian, each of which was about fifteen hundred strong. They were provided with long lances and heavy swords, and horse as well as man was fully equipped with defensive armour. Other regiments of regular cavalry were less heavily armed, and there were several bodies of light horsemen, whom Alexander's conquests in Egypt and Syria had enabled him to mount superbly.

The Persian king availed himself to the utmost of every advantage in his power. He caused a large space of ground to be carefully levelled for the operation of his scythe-armed chariots; and he deposited his military stores in the strong town of Arbela, about twenty miles in his rear. The rhetoricians of after ages have loved to describe Darius Codomannus as a second Xerxes in ostentation and imbecility; but a fair examination of his generalship in this his last campaign, shows that he was worthy of bearing the same name as his great predecessor, the royal son of Hystaspes.

On learning that Darius was with a large army on the left of the Tigris, Alexander hurried forward and crossed that river without opposition. He was at first unable to procure any certain intelligence of the precise position of the enemy, and after giving his army a short interval of rest, he marched for four days down the left bank of the river. A moralist may pause upon the fact, that Alexander must in this march have passed

within a few miles of the remains of Nineveh, the great city of the primeval conquerors of the human race. Neither the Macedonian king nor any of his followers knew what those vast mounds had once been. They had already become nameless masses of grass-grown ruins; and it is only within the last century that the intellectual energy of Layard has rescued Nineveh from its long centuries of oblivion.

On the fourth day of Alexander's southward march, his advanced guard reported that a body of the enemy's cavalry was in sight. He instantly formed his army in order for battle, and directing them to advance steadily, he rode forward at the head of some squadrons of cavalry, and charged the Persian horse whom he found before him. This was a mere reconnoitring party, and they broke and fled immediately; but the Macedonians made



GREEK SOLDIER, TIME OF ALEXANDER
THE GREAT

some prisoners, and from them Alexander found that Darius was posted only a few miles off, and learned the strength of the army that he had with him. On receiving this news, Alexander halted, and gave his men repose for four days, so that they should go into action fresh and vigorous. He also fortified his camp, and deposited in it all his military stores, and all his sick and disabled soldiers; intending to advance upon the enemy with the serviceable part of his army perfectly unencumbered. After this halt, he moved forward, while it was yet dark, with the intention of reaching the enemy, and attacking them at break of day. About halfway between the camps there were some undulations of the ground, which concealed the two armies from each other's view. But, on Alexander arriving at their summit, he saw by the early light the Persian host arrayed before him; and he probably also observed traces of some engineering operation having been carried on along part of the ground in front of them. Not knowing that these marks had been caused by the Persians having levelled the ground for the free use of their war-chariots, Alexander suspected that hidden pitfalls had been prepared with a view of disordering the approach of his cavalry. He summoned a council of war forthwith. Some of the officers were for attacking instantly at all hazards, but the more prudent opinion of Parmenion prevailed, and it was determined not to advance farther till the battle-ground had been carefully surveyed.

Alexander halted his army on the heights; and taking with him some light-armed infantry and some cavalry, he passed part of the day in reconnoitring the enemy, and observing the nature of the ground which he had to fight on. Darius wisely refrained from moving from his position to attack the Macedonians on the eminences which they occupied, and the two armies

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remained until night without molesting each other. On Alexander's return to his headquarters, he summoned his generals and superior officers together, and telling them that he well knew that their zeal wanted no exhortation, he besought them to do their utmost in encouraging and instructing those whom each commanded, to do their best in the next day's battle. They were to remind them that they were now not going to fight for a province, as they had hitherto fought, but they were about to decide by their swords the dominion of all Asia. Each officer ought to impress this upon his subalterns, and they should urge it on their men. Their natural courage required no long words to excite its ardour; but they should be reminded of the paramount importance of steadiness in action. The silence in the ranks must be unbroken as long as silence was proper; but when the time came for the charge, the shout and the cheer must be full of terror for the foe. The officers were to be alert in receiving and communicating orders; and every one was to act as if he felt that the whole result of the battle depended on his own single good conduct.

Having thus briefly instructed his generals, Alexander ordered that the army should sup, and take their rest for the night. Darkness had closed over the tents of the Macedonians, when Alexander's veteran general, Parmenion, came to him, and proposed that they should make a night attack on the Persians. The king is said to have answered, that he scorned to fileh a victory, and that Alexander must conquer openly and fairly. Arrian justly remarks that Alexander's resolution was as wise as it was spirited. Besides the confusion and uncertainty which are inseparable from night engagements, the value of Alexander's victory would have been impaired, if gained under circumstances which might supply the enemy with any excuse for his defeat, and encourage him to renew the contest. It was necessary for Alexander not only to beat Darius, but to gain such a victory as should leave his rival without apology for defeat, and without hope of recovery.

The Persians, in fact, expected, and were prepared to meet, a night attack. Such was the apprehension that Darius entertained of it, that he formed his troops at evening in order of battle, and kept them under arms all night. The effect of this was, that the morning found them jaded and dispirited, while it brought their adversaries all fresh and vigorous against them.

The written order of battle, which Darius himself caused to be drawn up, fell into the hands of the Macedonians after the engagement, and Aristobulus copied it into his journal. We thus possess, through Arrian, unusually authentic information as to the composition and arrangement of the Persian army. On the extreme left were the Bactrian, Dahean, and Arachosian cavalry. Next to these Darius placed the troops from Persia proper, both horse and foot. Then came the Susians, and next to these the Cadusians. These forces made up the left wing. Darius' own station was in the centre. This was composed of the Indians, the Carians, the Mardian archers, and the division of Persians who were distinguished by the golden apples that formed knobs of their spears. Here also were stationed the bodyguard of the Persian nobility. Besides these, there were in the centre, formed in deep order, the Uxian and Babylonian troops, and the soldiers from the Red Sea. The brigade of Greek mercenaries, whom Darius had in his service, and who were alone considered fit to stand in the charge of the Macedonian phalanx, was drawn up on either side of the royal chariot. The right wing was composed of the Cœlo-Syrians and Mesopotamians, the Medes, the Parthians, the Sacians, the Tapurians, Hyrcanians, Albanians, and Sacasinæ.

In advance of the line on the left wing were placed the Scythian cavalry, with a thousand of the Bactrian horse, and a hundred scythe-armed chariots. The elephants and the fifty scythe-armed chariots were ranged in front of the centre; and fifty more chariots, with the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry, were drawn up in advance of the right wing.

Thus arrayed, the great host of King Darius passed the night, that to many thousands of them was the last of their existence. The morning of the first of October dawned slowly to their wearied watching, and they could hear the note of the Macedonian trumpet sounding to arms, and could see King Alexander's forces descend from their tents on the heights, and form in order of battle on the plain.

There was deep need of skill, as well as of valour, on Alexander's side; and few battle-fields have witnessed more consummate generalship than was now displayed by the Macedonian king.¹ There were no natural barriers by which he could protect his flanks; and not only was he certain to be overlapped on either wing by the vast lines of the Persian army, but there was imminent risk of their circling round him and charging him in the rear, while he advanced against their centre. He formed, therefore, a second or reserve line, which was to wheel round, if required, or to detach troops to either flank, as the enemy's movements might necessitate: and thus with their whole army ready at any moment to be thrown into one vast hollow square, the Macedonians advanced in two lines against the enemy, Alexander himself leading on the right wing, and the renowned phalanx forming the centre, while Parmenion commanded on the left.

Such was the general nature of the disposition which Alexander made of his army. But we have in Arrian the details of the position of each brigade and regiment; and as we know that these details were taken from the journals of Macedonian generals, it is interesting to examine them, and to read the names and stations of King Alexander's generals and colonels in this the greatest of his battles.

The eight troops of the royal horse-guards formed the right of Alexander's line. Their captains were Clitus (whose regiment was on the extreme right, the post of peculiar danger), Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis, Heraclides, Demetrias, Meleager, and Hagelochus. Philotas was general of the whole division. Then came the shield-bearing infantry; Nicanor was their general. Then came the phalanx, in six brigades. Coenus' brigade was on the right, and nearest to the shield-bearers; next to this stood the brigade of Perdicas, then Meleager's, then Polysperchon's; and then the brigade of Amyntas, but which was now commanded by Simmias, as Amyntas had been sent to Macedonia to levy recruits. Then came the infantry of the left wing, under the command of Craterus. Next to Craterus' infantry was placed the cavalry regiments of the allies, with Erigyius for their general. The Thessalian cavalry, commanded by Philippus, were next, and held the extreme left of the whole army. The whole left wing was entrusted to the command of Parmenion, who had round his person the Pharsalian troop of cavalry, which was the strongest and best amid all the Thessalian horse-regiments.

The centre of the second line was occupied by a body of Phalangite infantry, formed of companies, which were drafted for this purpose from each of the brigades of their phalanx. The officers in command of this corps were

[¹ "In so far as we can follow the dispositions of Alexander they appear the most signal example recorded in integrity of military genius and sagacious combination," says Grote.^b "He had really as great an available force as his enemy, because every company in his army was turned to account."]

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ordered to be ready to face about, if the enemy should succeed in gaining the rear of the army. On the right of this reserve of infantry, in the second line, behind the royal horse-guards, Alexander placed half the Agrianian light-armed infantry under Attalus, and with them Brison's body of Macedonian archers, and Cleander's regiment of foot. He also placed in this part of his army Menidas' squadron of cavalry, and Aretes' and Ariston's light horse. Menidas was ordered to watch if the enemy's cavalry tried to turn the flank, and if they did so, to charge them before they wheeled completely round, and so take them in flank themselves. A similar force was arranged on the left of the second line for the same purpose. The Thracian infantry of Sitalces was placed there, and Coranus' regiment of the cavalry of the Greek allies, and Agathon's troops of the Odrysian irregular horse. The extreme left of the second line in this quarter was held by Andromachus' cavalry. A division of Thracian infantry was left in guard of the camp. In advance of the right wing and centre was scattered a number of light-armed troops, of javelin-men and bowmen, with the intention of warding off the charge of the armed chariots.¹

Conspicuous by the brilliancy of his armour, and by the chosen band of officers who were round his person, Alexander took his own station, as his custom was, in the right wing, at the head of his cavalry; and when all the arrangements for the battle were complete, and his generals were fully instructed how to act in each probable emergency, he began to lead his men towards the enemy.

It was ever his custom to expose his life freely in battle, and to emulate the personal prowess of his great ancestor, Achilles. Perhaps in the bold enterprise of conquering Persia, it was politic for Alexander to raise his army's daring to the utmost by the example of his own heroic valour; and, in his subsequent campaigns, the love of the excitement, of "the rapture of the strife," may have made him, like Murat, continue from choice a custom which he commenced from duty. But he never suffered the ardour of the soldier to make him lose the coolness of the general; and at Arbela, in particular, he showed that he could act up to his favourite Homeric maxim of being

*Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.*²

Great reliance had been placed by the Persian king on the effects of the scythe-bearing chariots. It was designed to launch these against the Macedonian phalanx, and to follow them up by a heavy charge of cavalry, which it was hoped would find the ranks of the spearmen disordered by the rush of the chariots, and easily destroy this most formidable part of Alexander's force. In front, therefore, of the Persian centre, where Darius took his station, and which it was supposed the phalanx would attack, the ground had been carefully levelled and smoothed, so as to allow the chariots to charge over it with their full sweep and speed. As the Macedonian army approached the Persian, Alexander found that the front of his whole line barely equalled the front of the Persian centre, so that he was outflanked on his right by the entire left wing of the enemy, and by their entire right wing on his left. His tactics were to assail some one point of the hostile army, and gain a decisive advantage, while he refused, as far as possible, the encounter along

¹ Kleber's arrangement of his troops at the battle of Heliopolis, where, with ten thousand Europeans, he had to encounter eighty thousand Asiatics in an open plain, is worth comparing with Alexander's tactics at Arbela. See Thiers' *Histoire du Consulat*, etc., vol. ii. book v.

[² "Both a good king and a valiant warrior."]

the rest of the line. He therefore inclined his order of march to the right, so as to enable his right wing and centre to come into collision with the enemy on as favourable terms as possible, though the manœuvre might in some respects compromise his left.

The effect of this oblique movement was to bring the phalanx and his own wing nearly beyond the limits of the ground which the Persians had prepared for the operations of the chariots; and Darius, fearing to lose the benefit of this arm against the most important parts of the Macedonian force, ordered the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry, who were drawn up on his extreme left, to charge upon Alexander's right wing, and check its further lateral progress. Against these assailants Alexander sent from his second line Menidas' cavalry. As these proved too few to make head against the enemy, he ordered Ariston also from the second line with his light horse, and Cleander with his foot, in support of Menidas. The Bactrians and Scythians now began to give way, but Darius reinforced them by the mass of Bactrian cavalry from his main line, and an obstinate cavalry fight now took place. The Bactrians and Scythians were numerous, and were better armed than the horsemen under Menidas and Ariston; and the loss at first was heaviest on the Macedonian side. But still the European cavalry stood the charge of the Asiatics, and at last, by their superior discipline, and by acting in squadrons that supported each other instead of fighting in a confused mass like the barbarians, the Macedonians broke their adversaries, and drove them off the field.



SCYTHE-BEARING CHARIOT

(Showing the Attachment of the Scythe to the Axle)

formidable vehicles were accordingly sent rattling across the plain, against the Macedonian line. When we remember the alarm which the war-chariots of the Britons created among Cæsar's legions, we shall not be prone to deride this arm of ancient warfare as always useless. The object of the chariots was to create unsteadiness in the ranks against which they were driven, and squadrons of cavalry followed close upon them, to profit by such disorder. But the Asiatic chariots were rendered ineffective at Arbela by the light-armed troops whom Alexander had specially appointed for the service, and who, wounding the horses and drivers with their missile weapons, and running alongside so as to cut the traces or seize the reins, marred the intended charge; and the few chariots that reached the phalanx passed harmlessly through the intervals which the spearmen opened for them, and were easily captured in the rear.

Darius now directed the scythe-armed chariots to be driven against Alexander's horse-guards and the phalanx; and these

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A mass of the Asiatic cavalry was now, for the second time, collected against Alexander's extreme right, and moved round it, with the view of gaining the flank of his army. At the critical moment, Aretes, with his horsemen from Alexander's second line, dashed on the Persian squadrons when their own flanks were exposed by this evolution. While Alexander thus met and baffled all the flanking attacks of the enemy with troops brought up from his second line, he kept his own horse-guards and the rest of the front line of his wing fresh, and ready to take advantage of the first opportunity for striking a decisive blow. This soon came. A large body of horse, who were posted on the Persian left wing nearest to the centre, quitted their station, and rode off to help their comrades in the cavalry fight that still was going on at the extreme right of Alexander's wing against the detachments from his second line. This made a huge gap in the Persian array, and into this space Alexander instantly dashed with his guard; and then pressing towards his left, he soon began to make havoc in the left flank of the Persian centre. The shield-bearing infantry now charged also among the reeling masses of the Asiatics; and five of the brigades of the phalanx, with the irresistible might of their sarissas, bore down the Greek mercenaries of Darius, and dug their way through the Persian centre. In the early part of the battle, Darius had shown skill and energy; and he now for some time encouraged his men, by voice and example, to keep firm. But the lances of Alexander's cavalry and the pikes of the phalanx now gleamed nearer and nearer to him. His charioteer was struck down by a javelin at his side; and at last Darius' nerve failed him; and, descending from his chariot, he mounted on a fleet horse and galloped from the plain, regardless of the state of the battle in other parts of the field, where matters were going on much more favourably for his cause.


Alexander's operations with his right and centre had exposed his left to an immensely preponderating force of the enemy. Parmenion kept out of action as long as possible; but Mazæus, who commanded the Persian right wing, advanced against him, completely outflanked him, and pressed him severely with reiterated charges by superior numbers. Seeing the distress of Parmenion's wing, Simmias, who commanded the sixth brigade of the phalanx, which was next to the left wing, did not advance with the other brigades in the great charge upon the Persian centre, but kept back to cover Parmenion's troops on their right flank; as otherwise they would have been completely surrounded and cut off from the rest of the Macedonian army. By so doing, Simmias had unavoidably opened a gap in the Macedonian left centre; and a large column of Indian and Persian horse, from the Persian right centre, had galloped forward through this interval, and right through the troops of the Macedonian second line. Instead of then wheeling round upon Parmenion, or upon the rear of Alexander's conquering wing, the Indian and Persian cavalry rode straight on to the Macedonian camp, overpowered the Thracians who were left in charge of it, and began to plunder. This was stopped by the phalangite troops of the second line, who, after the enemy's horsemen had rushed by them, faced about, countermarched upon the camp, killed many of the Indians and Persians in the act of plundering, and forced the rest to ride off again. Just at this crisis, Alexander had been recalled from his pursuit of Darius, by tidings of the distress of Parmenion, and of his inability to bear up any longer against the hot attacks of Mazæus. Taking his horse-guards with him, Alexander rode towards the part of the field where his left wing was fighting; but on his way thither he encountered the Persian and Indian cavalry on their return from his camp.

These men now saw that their only chance of safety was to cut their way through ; and in one huge column they charged desperately upon the Macedonians. There was here a close hand-to-hand fight, which lasted some time, and sixty of the royal horse-guards fell, and three generals, who fought close to Alexander's side, were wounded. At length the Macedonian discipline and valour again prevailed, and a large number of the Persian and Indian horsemen were cut down ; some few only succeeded in breaking through and riding away. Relieved of these obstinate enemies, Alexander again formed his horse-guards, and led them towards Parmenion ; but by this time that general also was victorious. Probably the news of Darius' flight had reached Mazæus, and had damped the ardour of the Persian right wing ; while the tidings of their comrades' success must have proportionally encouraged the Macedonian forces under Parmenion. His Thessalian cavalry particularly distinguished themselves by their gallantry and persevering good conduct ; and by the time that Alexander had ridden up to Parmenion, the whole Persian army was in full flight from the field.¹

It was of the deepest importance to Alexander to secure the person of Darius, and he now urged on the pursuit. The Upper Zab was between the field of battle and the city of Arbela, whither the fugitives directed their course, and the passage of this river was even more destructive to the Persians than the swords and spears of the Macedonians had been in the engagement. The narrow bridge was soon choked up by the flying thousands who rushed towards it, and vast numbers of the Persians threw themselves, or were hurried by others, into the rapid stream, and perished in its waters. Darius had crossed it, and had ridden on through Arbela without halting. Alexander reached that city on the next day, and made himself master of all Darius' treasure and stores ; but the Persian king had fled too fast for his conqueror.

A few days after the battle Alexander entered Babylon, "the oldest seat of earthly empire" then in existence, as its acknowledged lord and master. There were yet some campaigns of his brief and bright career to be accomplished. Central Asia was yet to witness the march of his phalanx. He was yet to effect that conquest of Afghanistan in which England since has failed. His generalship, as well as his valour, were yet to be signalised on the banks of the Hydaspes, and the field of Chillianwallah ; and he was yet to precede the queen of England in annexing the Punjab to the dominions of a European sovereign. But the crisis of his career was reached ; the great object of his mission was accomplished ; and the ancient Persian empire, which once menaced all the nations of the earth with subjection, was irreparably crushed, when Alexander had won his crowning victory at Arbela.^j

[¹ The Persian dead were 300,000 according to Arrian, 90,000 according to Diodorus ; 40,000 according to Curtius. Arrian says the Macedonians lost 100 ; Curtius, 300 ; Diodorus, 500.]



CHAPTER LIV. THE FALL OF PERSIA

THE ENTRY INTO BABYLON DESCRIBED BY QUINTUS CURTIUS

As Alexander was continuing his march towards Babylon, Mazæus (who had fled thither from the battle) came with his children that were at the age of maturity, and surrendered himself and the town to the king. His submission was very acceptable to the king, by reason that the siege of so strong a place must of necessity have been tedious. Besides this, his quality and bravery were very considerable, and he had but lately distinguished himself in the last great action, and his example might be a great inducement to others to imitate him. The king therefore received him and his children very graciously; however, he formed his army, which he led in person, into a square, and commanded them to enter the town in that order, as if they had been going to an engagement.

In Babylon the walls were filled with Babylonians who flocked thither, eager to behold their new sovereign; but the greatest part went out to meet him. Among these were Bagophanes, governor of the castle and the keeper of the king's treasure, who was unwilling to be outdone in zeal by Mazæus. The road he had strewed all over with flowers and garlands, and was adorned on each side with silver altars, which were filled, not only with frankincense, but all manner of perfumes. He was followed by the presents he designed for the king, viz., droves of cattle and horses, with lions and leopards in strong cages for that purpose. These were followed by the Magi singing hymns after the manner of the country. After these came the Chaldeans, and not only the Babylonian prophets, but also the musicians with their respective instruments. These were closed by the Babylonian cavalry, whose rich clothing and furniture, for themselves and their horses, denoted luxury rather than magnificence.

The king commanded the multitude of townspeople to follow in the rear of his foot, and being encompassed by his guards, entered the city in a chariot, and repaired to the palace. The next day he took a view of Darius' furniture, and all his treasure. The beauty and antiquity of the place attracted not only Alexander's eyes, but likewise those of all that beheld it.

"The king resided longer here," Curtius continues, "than he had done anywhere; nor could any place be more destructive of discipline. Nothing

can be more corrupt than the manners of this city,¹ nor better provided with all the requisites to stir up and promote all sorts of debauchery and lewdness: for parents and husbands suffer their children and wives to prostitute themselves to their guests, if they are but paid for the crime. The kings and noblemen of Persia take great delight in licentious entertainments: and the Babylonians are very much addicted to wine, and the consequences of drunkenness. The women, in the beginning of their feasts, are modestly clad; then after some time, they lay aside their upper garment, and violate their modesty by degrees; at last (without offence be it spoken) they fling away even their lower apparel: nor is this the infamous practice of the courtesans only, but likewise of the matrons and their daughters, who look upon this vile prostitution of their bodies as an act of complaisance.

"It is reasonable to think, that that victorious army, which had conquered Asia, having wallowed thirty-four days in all kinds of lewdness and debauchery, would have found itself much weakened, for any following engagements, if an enemy had presented itself; but that the damage might be less sensible, it was from time to time as it were renewed with fresh recruits, for Amyntas, the son of Andromenes, brought from Antipater 6000 Macedonian foot, and 500 horse of the same nation; and with these 600 Thracian horse, and 3500 foot of that country. There came also from Peloponnesus 4000 mercenary foot, and 380 horse. The said Amyntas likewise brought him 50 young gentlemen of the nobility of Macedonia, to serve as guards of his person."

The king having appointed Agathon governor of the castle of Babylon, assigning him seven hundred Macedonians and three hundred mercenaries for that purpose, left the government of the territory and city to Menes and Apollodorus, allotting them a garrison of two thousand foot, and one thousand talents, commanding both to make new levies to recruit the army. He gave to Mazæus who came over to him, the superintendency of Babylon, and ordered Bagophanes, who had surrendered the castle to him, to follow him. He gave the government of Armenia to Mithrenes, who had yielded up Sardis. Out of the money found in Babylon, he ordered every Macedonian trooper six hundred denarii [about £20 or \$100], and five hundred to every foreign trooper, and to every foot soldier two hundred.

Alexander having settled things after this manner, marched into the country called Satrapene.

As the king was on his march to Susa, Abulites, who was governor of that province, sent his son to meet him on the road, and assure him he was ready to surrender the town. It is uncertain whether he did this of his own accord, or by Darius' order, thereby to amuse Alexander with the booty. Having entered the town, Alexander took out of the treasury a prodigious sum, viz., fifty thousand talents of silver, not coined, but in the wedge and bar.² Several kings had been a long time heaping up these vast treasures, as they thought, for their children, and posterity, but one single hour put them all into the hands of a foreign prince.

He then seated himself in the regal throne, which, being much too high for his stature, his feet could not reach the ground; one of his pages therefore brought a table and set it under his feet. Hereupon one of Darius'

[¹ Curtius is obviously speaking of the Babylon of his own day (the early part of the first century A.D.), and assuming, no doubt correctly, that the venerable city had not greatly changed since the time of Alexander. The reader will recall the tales of Babylon quoted from Herodotus in our first volume.]

[² Grote values this at £11,500,000 which amounts to about \$55,000,000. Reckoned as Æginetan talents the sum would be far greater. Grote says it would seem incredible were it not that the treasures of Persepolis were found far greater.]

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eunuchs sighed, which the king observing, enquired into the cause of his grief. Then the eunuch told him, "That Darius was used to eat upon that table; and that he could not behold, without shedding tears, the table, which was consecrated to his master's use, applied in a manner so insulting and contemptuous." At these words, the king began to be ashamed to violate the gods of hospitality, and commanded it to be taken away: but Philotas entreated him by no means to do so, but on the contrary to take it as a good omen, that that table, off of which his enemy used to eat, was now become his footstool.

Alexander designing now to pass into Persia, gave the government of Susa to Archelaus, leaving him a garrison of three thousand men; Xenophilus had the charge of the castle, having with him for garrison the superannuated Macedonians. The care of the treasury was committed to Callicrates, and the lieutenancy of the county of Susa was restored to Abulites. Darius' mother and children were likewise left here.

Alexander having passed the river with nine thousand foot, the Agrianes, mercenary Greeks, and three thousand Thracians, came into the country of the Uxians; it borders upon the territory of Susa, and extends itself as far as the frontier of Persia. He afterwards united the Uxian nation to the government of Susa; then having divided his army with Parmenion, he commanded him to march through the flat country, while he, with the light-armed forces, took his way along the mountains, which run in a perpetual ridge into Persia.

AT THE BORDER OF PERSIA

Having ravaged all this country, he arrived the third day on the borders of Persia, and on the fifth he entered the straits Pylæ Susidæ. Ariobarzanes, with twenty-five thousand foot, had taken possession of these rocks, which were on all sides steep and craggy, on the tops whereof the barbarians kept themselves, being there out of the cast of the darts. Here they remained quiet on purpose, and seemed to be afraid till the army was advanced within the narrowest part of the straits; but when they perceived them to continue their march, as it were in contempt of them, they rolled down stones of a prodigious bigness upon them, which rebounding often from the lower rocks, fell with the greater force, and not only crushed single persons, but even whole companies.

They likewise plied their slings and bows from all parts; even this did not seem a hardship to these brave men, save that they were forced to perish unrevenged, like beasts taken in a pitfall: upon this, their anger turning into rage, they caught hold of the rocks, and helping one another up, did all they could to get to the enemy; but the parts they laid hold on giving way to the strength of so many hands, fell upon those that loosened them. In these sad circumstances they could neither stand still nor go forward, nor protect themselves with their bucklers, by reason of the great size of the stones the barbarians pushed upon them. The king was not only grieved, but ashamed he had so rashly brought his army into these straits. Till this day he had been invincible, having never attempted anything in vain. He had entered the straits of Cilicia without damage, and had opened himself a new way by sea into Pamphylia; but here that happiness which had always attended him, seemed to be at a stand, and there was no other remedy but to return the same way he came. Having there-

fore given the signal for a retreat, he commanded the soldiers to march in close order, and to join their bucklers over their heads, and so retire out of these straits, after they had advanced thirty furlongs within them.

A SHEPHERD GUIDE

The king, at his return from the straits, having pitched his camp in a plain open ground, not only held a council on the present juncture of affairs, but also was so superstitious as to consult the prophets concerning what was the most advisable to be done: but what, in such a case, could Aristander (who was then in greatest esteem) pretend to foretell? Laying aside therefore the unseasonable sacrifices, he gave orders to bring to him such men as were well acquainted with the country; these men told him of a way through Media, which was safe and open, but the king was ashamed to leave his soldiers unburied, for there was no custom more religiously observed amongst the Macedonians, than that of burying their dead: he therefore commanded the prisoners he had lately taken to be brought before him; among these, there was one who was skilled in both the Greek and Persian languages; this man told him, it was in vain for him to think of leading his army into Persia, over the tops of the mountains; that the narrow ways lay all among woods, and were hardly passable to single persons; that he had been a shepherd, and knew all those byways perfectly well: and that he had been twice taken prisoner; once by the Persians in Lycia, and now by himself.

This answer put the king in mind of the oracle that had told him, "a Lycian should be his guide into Persia;" having therefore made him large promises, suitable to the present necessity, and the prisoner's condition, he ordered him "to be armed after the Macedonian manner, and in the name of fortune to lead the way." Then having committed the guard of the camp to Craterus, with the foot which he commanded, and the forces under Meleager, and a thousand horse archers, he ordered him "to observe the same form of encampment, and to keep a great many fires, that the barbarians might by that think the king was there in person; but if he found Ariobarzanes got intelligence of his march through the winding narrow ways, and thereupon made detachments to oppose his passage; that then Craterus should use his utmost efforts to terrify him, and oblige him to keep his troops together to oppose the present danger; but if he (the king) deceived the enemy, and gained the wood, that then, upon the alarm among the enemies endeavouring to pursue the king, he should boldly enter the straits they had been repulsed in the day before, since he might be sure they were undefended, and the enemy turned upon himself."

At the third watch, he broke up in great silence, without so much as the signal from the trumpet, and followed his guide towards the narrow way. Every light-armed soldier had orders to carry with him three days' provision. But besides the steepness of the rocks, and the slipperiness of the stone that often deceived their feet, the driven snow very much incommoded them; for it sometimes swallowed them up as if they had fallen into pits; and when their fellow-soldiers endeavoured to help them out, they themselves were pulled down into the same pits. Moreover, the night, and unknown country, besides the uncertainty whether the guide was faithful or not, very much increased their fear: for if he deceived the guards, and made his escape, they were liable to be taken like wild beasts: so that the king's

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and their safety depended on the fidelity and life of one prisoner. At length they gained the top of the mountain.

Having there refreshed his men both with food and sleep, at the second watch he continued his march, without any great difficulty. However, by reason of the declivity of the mountains towards the plain, there was a great gulf (occasioned by the meeting of several torrents that had worn away the earth) which stopped their further progress. Besides, the branches of the trees were so entangled one within the other, and joined so close, that it opposed their passage like a thick hedge. This cast them into the utmost despair, and they had much ado, to retain their tears: the darkness of the night also increased their terror, for if any stars appeared, they were intercepted by the close contexture of the boughs. The very use of their ears was also taken away; for the wind was high, and by blowing against the interfering branches of the trees, its noise was greatly increased. At last, the long-expected light lessened the terrors which the night had enhanced; for by fetching a small compass, they avoided the gulf: and now every one began to be a guide to himself. Having therefore gained the top of a hill, from whence they could discover the enemy's out-guards, they resolutely showed themselves at the back of the enemy, who mistrusted no such thing. Those few who dared engage, were killed; and the groans of those that were dying, together with the dismal appearance of those that fled to their main body, struck such a terror amongst them, that they took to their heels without so much as trying their fortune.

The noise having reached Craterus' camp, he presently advanced to take possession of those straits where they had been baffled the day before. At the same time, Philotas with Polysperchon, Amyntas, and Cœnus, who had been ordered to march another way, gave a fresh surprise to the barbarians, who were now surrounded on all sides by the Macedonians; notwithstanding which, they behaved themselves gallantly. Oftentimes despair is the cause of hope: for naked as they were, they closed in with those that were armed, and by the bulk of their bodies, brought them down to the ground, and then stuck several of them with their own weapons. However, Ariobarzanes with forty horse, and about five thousand foot, broke through the Macedonian army (a great many falling on both sides) and endeavoured to possess himself of Persepolis, the chief city of the country. But being denied entrance by the garrison, and the enemy pursuing him closely, he renewed the fight, and was slain with all his men. By this time Craterus marching with the utmost expedition, also joined the king.

The king fortified his camp in the same place where he had defeated the enemy: for notwithstanding that he had gained a complete victory, yet the large and deep ditches in many places retarded his march, and so he thought it more advisable to proceed leisurely; not suspecting so much any attempt from the barbarians, as the treachery of the ground.



PERSIAN NOBLE IN CIVIL
COSTUME

In his march he received letters from Tiridates (keeper of the royal treasure at Persepolis) notifying him, "that upon advice of his approach, the inhabitants would have rifled the treasury; wherefore he desired him to hasten his march, and come and take possession of it; that the way was safe, although the river Araxes ran across." No other virtue of Alexander's is so admirable as his expedition in all actions. Leaving therefore his foot behind, he marched all night with his cavalry, notwithstanding their late fatigues, and arrived by break of day at the Araxes. There were several villages in the neighbourhood, which having pillaged and demolished, he made a bridge of the materials.

THE RELEASED CAPTIVES; SACKING PERSEPOLIS

The king was not far from Persepolis, when so sad a spectacle presented itself to his eyes, as can hardly be paralleled in history. It consisted of four thousand Greek captives, whom the Persians had mangled after a miserable manner. For some had their feet cut off, others their hands and ears, and all their bodies were burnt with barbarous characters, and thus reserved for the cruel diversion of their inhuman enemies; who now finding themselves under foreign subjection, did not oppose their desire to go out and meet Alexander. They resembled some strange figures more than men, being only distinguishable as such by their voice. They drew more tears from their spectators, than they shed themselves; for in so great a variety of calamities, notwithstanding they were all sufferers, yet their punishment was so diversified, that it was a difficult matter to determine which of them was most miserable. But when they cried out, that at last Jupiter the revenger of Greece had opened his eyes, all the beholders were so moved with compassion, that they thought their sufferings their own. Alexander having dried his eyes (for he could not forbear weeping at so sad an object) bade them "have a good heart," and assured them, "they should see their native country, and their wives again."

Some few accepted, but the remainder were overcome by a long habit, which is stronger than nature; they agreed therefore "to desire the king to assign them some place for their habitation"; and chose a hundred out of their body, to prefer their petition. Alexander, thinking they would ask what he himself intended for them, told them, he had "ordered every one of them a horse, and a thousand denarii [£34 or \$170]; and that when they should come to Greece, he would so provide for them that (except for the calamities they had experienced in their captivity) none should be happier than they." At these words, they fell to weeping, and being dejected, could neither look up, nor speak; which made the king inquire into the cause of their sadness. Then Euthymon made an answer suitable to what he had said to his companions. Hereupon the king, moved with their misfortune and resolution, ordered three thousand denarii [£102 or \$510] to be distributed to every one of them, besides ten suits of clothes, with cattle, sheep, and such a quantity of corn, as was sufficient to cultivate the land that was assigned them.

The next day, having called together all his generals, he represented to them, "that no city had been more mischievous to the Greeks than this seat of the ancient kings of Persia: from hence came all those vast armies: from hence Darius first, and then Xerxes, made their impious wars upon Europe: it was therefore necessary to raze it, to appease the Manes of their

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ancestors." The inhabitants had abandoned it, and were fled some one way, and some another; so that the king led the phalanx into it without further delay. He had before this made himself master of many towns of regal wealth and magnificence, some by force, and some by composition, but the riches of this exceeded all the rest. Hither the Persians had brought all their substance; gold and silver lay here in heaps: of clothes there was a prodigious quantity; the furniture of the houses seemed not only designed for use, but for luxury and ostentation. This gave occasion to the conquerors to fight among themselves, each taking for an enemy his companion that had got the richest spoils: and as they could not carry off all they found, they were now no longer employed in taking, but in picking and choosing.

They tore the royal garments, every one being willing to have his share of them: with axes they cut in pieces vessels of exquisite art; in fine, nothing was left untouched, nor carried away entire; the images of gold and silver were broken in pieces, according as every one could lay hold on them. Avarice did not only rage here, but cruelty likewise; for being loaded with gold and silver, they would not be troubled to guard their prisoners, but inhumanly killed them, and now barbarously murdered those they had at first shown mercy to in hopes of gain. This occasioned a great many to give themselves over to a voluntary death, so that putting on their richest apparel, they cast themselves headlong from the walls, with their wives and children; some set fire to their houses (which they thought the enemy would do) and perished, with their families, in the flames. At last the king gave orders, not to injure the persons of the women, nor meddle with their apparel.

CURTIUS TELLS OF THE ENORMOUS LOOT

The immense treasures taken here exceeded all belief: but we must either doubt of all the rest, or believe that in the exchequer of this place was found 120,000 talents,¹ which the king, designing for the use of the war, caused "horses and camels to be brought from Susa to Babylon, to carry it off for that purpose." This sum was afterwards increased, by taking Pasargada, wherein were found six thousand talents. Cyrus had built this city; and Gobares, who was governor thereof, surrendered it to Alexander.

The king made Nicarchides governor of the castle of Persepolis, leaving with him a garrison of three thousand Macedonians; he also continued Tiridates (who had delivered up the treasure) in the same honours he had enjoyed under Darius.

Alexander left here the greatest part of his army, with the baggage, under the command of Parmenion and Craterus; and taking with him a thousand horse, and part of the light-armed foot, penetrated farther into the country of Persia about the beginning of winter. On his way he was very much incommoded with storms of rain, and tempests that seemed intolerable; notwithstanding which, he pursued his intended progress. He was now in a country covered over with snow and ice: the sad view of the

[¹ This sum, which Grote reckons at £27,600,000 or \$138,000,000, need not be considered impossible, viewing the extent and the extortion of Persian despotism; the soldiers were paid by the provinces that contributed them; the servants of the government had no salaries in cash from above; and the royal disbursements for necessary expenses were accordingly small. Grote notes that when Nadia-Shah took Delhi in 1739, he found a treasure stated as £32,000,000—even more than Alexander's loot. A pride, too, was taken in vast hoards of precious metal by the oriental despots. Prof. Bury^d notes how the sudden circulation of such an amount would "perturb the markets of the world."]


place, and the impassable wastes and solitudes, struck the tired soldier with horror; he now began to think he was at the end of the world. They beheld with astonishment the frightful solitudes, which had not the least signs of human culture; they therefore required him to return, "before the very light and heavens failed them." The king forebore chastising them in the amazement they were in, but leaping from his horse, marched on foot before them through the snow and ice. They were ashamed not to follow him; therefore first his friends, then the captains, and at last the soldiers marched after him.

The king was the first that with a pickaxe broke the ice, and made himself a passage; then the rest imitated his example. At length, having made their way through woods almost impassable, they began to discover here and there some tokens that the place was inhabited, as also flocks of sheep wandering up and down. The inhabitants lived in cottages, and thought themselves sufficiently secured by the impracticableness of the country. At the sight of the enemy, they presently killed those who could not follow them, and fled to the remotest mountains, which were covered with snow; but after some conferences with the prisoners, their fright abated, and they surrendered themselves to the king, who was no way severe to them.

CURTIVS DESCRIBES AN ORGY AND THE BURNING OF PERSEPOLIS

Alexander having ravaged the country of Persia, and reduced several towns under his obedience, came at last into the country of the Mardians, who were a warlike nation, and very different from the rest of the Persians in their manner of living. "They dig themselves caves in the mountains,"

says Curtius, "where they dwell, feeding on their flocks, or wild beasts. The women are not of a softer nature than the men; they have bushy hair, and their garments hardly reach their knees. They bind their forehead with a sling, which serves them both for ornament and weapon." However, the same torrent of fortune bore down this nation, as it had done the rest: so that on the thirtieth day after he departed from Persepolis, he returned thither again.



RUINS OF PERSEPOLIS

Then he made presents to his friends, and to the rest according to their respective merit, distributing amongst them almost all that had been taken in the town.

But the excellent endowments of his mind, that noble disposition whereby he surpassed all kings, that manly constancy in surmounting dangers, that unparalleled celerity in undertaking and executing the greatest designs, his inviolable faith to those who submitted to him, his wonderful clemency

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towards the prisoners, and his temperance in allowable and usual pleasures, were all sullied by his excessive love of wine: for notwithstanding his enemy and rival, for the empire was at this very instant making the greatest preparations to renew the war, and the late conquered nations were yet uneasy under his new government, yet he would spend the day-time in revelling and feasting; to which entertainments the women were also admitted; not such whom it was a crime to violate, but such as were common, and whose conversation was a disgrace to a man in arms. One of these, whose name was Thais, being heated with wine, told him, he could not do anything that would more oblige all the Greeks, than if he burnt the palace of the kings of Persia; that they expected this by way of reprisal for those towns of theirs the barbarians had destroyed. This drunken harlot had no sooner spoken her opinion in a matter of so great a consequence, but presently some of the company (who were also loaded with wine) applauded the proposal: and the king not only heard it with patience, but, eager to put it in execution, said:

“Why do we not revenge Greece? Why do we delay setting fire to the town?” They were all heated with wine, and in that drunken condition immediately rose to burn that city they had spared when armed. The king showed them the example, and was the first that set fire to the palace, after which his guests, servants, and concubines did the same. There being a great deal of cedar in this noble structure, it presently took fire, and communicated the flames. The army, which was encamped not far from the town, perceived the conflagration, and imagining it to be casual, ran to help to quench it; but being come to the entrance of the palace, and seeing the king himself carrying fresh flambeaux to increase the fire, they flung down the water they had brought, and fed the flames with dry materials.

This was the end of the noblest city of the East, from whence so many nations received their laws; which had been the birth-place of so many kings; formerly the chief terror of Greece; had fitted out a fleet of a thousand sail of ships, and sent out armies, which, like an inundation, almost covered all Europe, had laid bridges over the sea, and hollowed mountains to make the sea a passage; and in so long a time as has elapsed since its destruction, never was rebuilt: for the Macedonian kings made choice of other towns for their residence, which are now in the possession of the Parthians. The ruin of this city was so complete, that were it not for the river Araxes, we should hardly know where it stood. This river ran at no great distance from the walls of this town, which (as the neighbouring inhabitants rather conjecture than certainly know) was situate about twenty furlongs from it.

The Macedonians were ashamed so famous a city should be destroyed by their king in a drunken humour. They therefore made a serious matter of it, and persuaded themselves, “it was expedient it should be consumed this way.” But as for Alexander, as soon as rest had restored him to himself, it is certain he repented of what he had done; and he said, the Persians “would have made more ample satisfaction to Greece had they been necessitated to behold him sitting in Xerxes’ throne in his royal city.”

The next day he ordered thirty talents to be given to the Lycian who had been his guide into Persia. From hence he passed into the country of Media, where he was met by new recruits from Cilicia. They consisted of five thousand foot, and one thousand horse, both the one and the other were under the command of Plato the Athenian. Having received this reinforcement, he resolved to pursue Darius ^b

THE NEW MEANING OF THE CONQUEST

From this time (330 B.C.) forward to the close of Alexander's life, a period of about seven years, his time was spent in conquering the eastern half of the Persian empire, together with various independent tribes lying beyond its extreme boundary. But neither Greece, nor Asia Minor, nor any of his previous western acquisitions, was he ever destined to see again.

Now in regard to the history of Greece, the first portion of Alexander's Asiatic campaigns (from his crossing the Hellespont to the conquest of Persia, a period of four years, March 334 B.C. to March 330 B.C.), though not of direct bearing, is yet of material importance. Having in his first year completed the subjugation of the Hellenic world, he had by these subsequent campaigns absorbed it as a small fraction into the vast Persian empire, renovated under his imperial sceptre. He had accomplished a result substantially the same as would have been brought about if the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, destined, a century and half before, to incorporate Greece with the Persian monarchy, had succeeded instead of failing. Towards the kings of Macedonia alone, the subjugation of Greece would never have become complete, so long as she could receive help from the native Persian kings, who were perfectly adequate as a countervailing and tutelary force, had they known how to play their game. But all hope for Greece from without was extinguished, when Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis became subject to the same ruler as Pella and Amphipolis—and that ruler too, the ablest general, and most insatiate aggressor, of his age, to whose name was attached the prestige of success almost superhuman. Still, against even this overwhelming power, some of the bravest of the Greeks at home tried to achieve their liberation with the sword: we shall see presently how sadly the attempt miscarried.

But though the first four years of Alexander's Asiatic expedition, in which he conquered the western half of the Persian empire, had thus an important effect on the condition and destinies of the Grecian cities, his last seven years, on which we are now about to enter, employed chiefly in conquering the eastern half, scarcely touched these cities in any way. The stupendous marches to the rivers Jaxartes, Indus, and Hyphasis, which carried his victorious armies over so wide a space of Central Asia, not only added nothing to his power over the Greeks, but even withdrew him from all dealings with them, and placed him almost beyond their cognisance. To the historian of Greece, therefore, these latter campaigns can hardly be regarded as included within the range of his subject. They deserve to be told as examples of military skill and energy, and as illustrating the character of the most illustrious general of antiquity—one who, though not a Greek, had become the master of all Greeks.

THE PURSUIT OF DARIUS

About six or seven months had elapsed from the battle of Arbela to the time when Alexander prepared to quit his most recent conquest—Persia proper. During all this time, Darius had remained at Ecbatana, the chief city of Media, clinging to the hope, that Alexander, when possessed of the three southern capitals and the best part of the Persian empire, might have reached the point of satiation, and might leave him unmolested in the more barren East. As soon as he learned that Alexander was in movement towards

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him, he sent forward his harem and his baggage to Hyrcania, on the south-eastern border of the Caspian Sea. Himself, with the small force around him, followed in the same direction, carrying off the treasure in the city, 7000 talents [£1,400,000 or \$7,000,000] in amount, and passed through the Caspian Gates into the territory of Parthyene. His only chance was to escape to Bactria at the eastern extremity of the empire, ruining the country in his way for the purpose of retarding pursuers. But this chance diminished every day, from desertion among his few followers, and angry disgust among many who remained.

Eight days after Darius had quitted Ecbatana, Alexander entered it. How many days had been occupied in his march from Persepolis, we cannot say : in itself a long march, it had been further prolonged, partly by necessity of subduing the intervening mountaineers called Parætacene, partly by rumours exaggerating the Persian force at Ecbatana, and inducing him to advance with precaution and regular array. Possessed of Ecbatana, the last capital stronghold of the Persian kings and their ordinary residence during the summer months, he halted to rest his troops, and establish a new base of operations for his future proceedings eastward. He made Ecbatana his principal depot; depositing in the citadel, under the care of Harpalus as treasurer, with a garrison of six thousand or seven thousand Macedonians, the accumulated treasures of his past conquests, out of Susa and Persepolis; amounting we are told, to the enormous sum of 180,000 talents [£36,000,000 sterling \$180,000,000]. Parmenion was invested with the chief command of this important post, and of the military force left in Media; of which territory Oxodates, a Persian who had been imprisoned at Susa by Darius, was named satrap.

At Ecbatana, Alexander was joined by a fresh force of six thousand Grecian mercenaries, who had marched from Cilicia into the interior, probably crossing the Euphrates and Tigris at the same points as Alexander himself had crossed. Hence he was enabled the better to dismiss his Thessalian cavalry, with other Greeks who had been serving during his four years of Asiatic war, and who now wished to go home. He distributed among them the sum of two thousand talents [£400,000 or \$2,000,000] in addition to their full pay, and gave them the price of their horses, which they sold before departure. The operations which he was now about to commence against the eastern territories of Persia were not against regular armies, but against flying corps and distinct native tribes, relying for defence chiefly on the difficulties which mountains, deserts, privation, or mere distance, would throw in the way of an assailant. For these purposes he required an increased number of light troops, and was obliged to impose even upon his heavy-armed cavalry the most rapid and fatiguing marches, such as none but his Macedonian companions would have been contented to execute; moreover he was called upon to act less with large masses, and more with small and broken divisions. He now therefore for the first time established a regular taxis, or division of horse-bowmen.

Remaining at Ecbatana no longer than was sufficient for these new arrangements, Alexander recommenced his pursuit of Darius. He hoped to get before Darius to the Caspian Gates, at the north-eastern extremity of Media; by which gates was understood a mountain pass, or rather a road of many hours' march, including several difficult passes stretching eastward along the southern side of the great range of Taurus towards Parthia. He marched to Rhagæ, about fifty miles north of the Caspian Gates; which town he reached in eleven days, by exertions so severe that many men as

well as horses were disabled on the road. But in spite of all speed, he learned that Darius had already passed through the Caspian Gates. After five days of halt at Rhagæ, indispensable for his army, Alexander passed them also. A day's march on the other side of them, he was joined by two eminent Persians, Bagistanes and Antibelus, who informed him that Darius was already dethroned and in imminent danger of losing his life.

The conspirators by whom this had been done were: Bessus, satrap of Bactria; Barsaentes, satrap of Drangiana and Arachosia; and Nabarzanes, general of the regal guards. The small force of Darius having been thinned by daily desertion, most of those who remained were the contingents of the still unconquered territories, Bactria, Arachosia, and Drangiana, under the orders of their respective satraps. The Grecian mercenaries, fifteen hundred in number, and Artabazus, with a band under his special command, adhered inflexibly to Darius, but the soldiers of Eastern Asia followed their own satraps. Bessus and his colleagues intended to make their peace with Alexander by surrendering Darius, should Alexander pursue so vigorously as to leave them no hope of escape; but if they could obtain time to reach Bactria and Sogdiana, they resolved to organise an energetic resistance, under their own joint command, for the defence of those eastern provinces—the most warlike population of the empire. Under the desperate circumstances of the case, this plan was perhaps the least unpromising that could be proposed. The chance of resisting Alexander, small as it was at the best, became absolutely nothing under the command of Darius, who had twice set the example of flight from the field of battle, betraying both his friends and his empire, even when surrounded by the full force of Persia. For brave and energetic Persians, unless they were prepared at once to submit to the invader, there was no choice but to set aside Darius; nor does it appear that the conspirators intended at first anything worse. At a village called Thara in Parthia, they bound him in chains of gold, placed him in a covered chariot surrounded by the Bactrian troops, and thus carried him onward, retreating as fast as they could; Bessus assuming the command. Artabazus, with the Grecian mercenaries, too feeble to prevent the proceeding, quitted the army in disgust, and sought refuge among the mountains of the Tapyri bordering on Hyrcania towards the Caspian Sea.

On hearing this intelligence, Alexander strained every nerve to overtake the fugitives and get possession of the person of Darius. At the head of his companion cavalry, his light horse, and a body of infantry picked out for their strength and activity, he put himself in instant march, with nothing but arms and two days' provisions for each man; leaving Craterus to bring on the main body by easier journeys. A forced march of two nights and one day, interrupted only by a short midday repose (it was now the month of July), brought him at daybreak to the Persian camp which his informant, Bagistanes, had quitted. But Bessus and his troops were already beyond it, having made considerable advance in their flight; upon which Alexander, notwithstanding the exhaustion both of men and horses, pushed on with increased speed through all the night to the ensuing day at noon. He there found himself in the village where Bessus had encamped on the preceding day. Yet learning from deserters that his enemies had resolved to hasten their retreat by night marches, he despaired of overtaking them unless he could find some shorter road. He was informed that there was another shorter, but leading through a waterless desert. Setting out by this road with his cavalry, he got over no less than forty-five miles during the night, so as to come on Bessus by complete surprise.

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The Persians, marching in disorder without arms, and having no expectation of an enemy, were so panic-stricken at the sudden appearance of their indefatigable conqueror, that they dispersed and fled without any attempt to resist. In this critical moment, Bessus and Barsaentes urged Darius to leave his chariot, mount his horse, and accompany them in their flight. But he refused to comply. They were determined however that he should not fall alive into the hands of Alexander, whereby his name would have been employed against them, and would have materially lessened their chance of defending the eastern provinces; they were moreover incensed by his refusal, and had contracted a feeling of hatred and contempt to which they were glad to give effect. Casting their javelins at him, they left him mortally wounded, and then pursued their flight. His chariot, not distinguished by any visible mark, nor known even to the Persian soldiers themselves, was for some time not detected by the pursuers. At length a Macedonian soldier named Polystratus found him expiring, and is said to have received his last words; wherein he expressed thanks to Alexander for the kind treatment of his captive female relatives, and satisfaction that the Persian throne, lost to himself, was about to pass to so generous a conqueror. It is at least certain that he never lived to see Alexander himself.

Alexander had made the prodigious and indefatigable marches of the last four days, not without destruction to many men and horses, for the express purpose of taking Darius alive. It would have been a gratification to his vanity to exhibit the Great King as a helpless captive, rescued from his own servants by the sword of his enemy, and spared to occupy some subordinate command as a token of ostentatious indulgence. Moreover, apart from such feelings, it would have been a point of real advantage to seize the person of Darius, by means of whose name Alexander would have been enabled to stifle all further resistance in the extensive and imperfectly known regions eastward of the Caspian Gates. The satraps of these regions had now gone thither with their hands free, to kindle as much Asiatic sentiment and levy as large a force as they could, against the Macedonian conqueror; who was obliged to follow them, if he wished to complete the subjugation of the empire. We can understand therefore that Alexander was deeply mortified in deriving no result from this ruinously fatiguing march, and can the better explain that savage wrath which we shall hereafter find him manifesting against the satrap Bessus.

Alexander caused the body of Darius to be buried, with full pomp and ceremonial, in the regal sepulchres of Persis. The last days of this unfortunate prince have been described with almost tragic pathos by historians; and there are few subjects in history better calculated to excite such a feeling, if we regard simply the magnitude of his fall, from the highest pitch of power and splendour to defeat, degradation, and assassination. But an impartial review will not allow us to forget that the main cause of such ruin was his own blindness—his long apathy after the battle of Issus, and abandonment of Tyre and Gaza, in the fond hope of repurchasing queens



HEAD-DRESSES, ANCIENT PERSIA
(After Bardon)

whom he had himself exposed to captivity — lastly, what is still less pardonable, his personal cowardice in both the two decisive battles deliberately brought about by himself. If we follow his conduct throughout the struggle, we shall find little of that which renders a defeated prince either respectable or interesting. Those who had the greatest reason to denounce and despise him, were his friends and countrymen, whom he possessed ample means of defending, yet threw those means away. On the other hand, no one had better grounds for indulgence towards him than his conqueror; for whom he had kept unused the countless treasures of the three capitals, and for whom he had lightened in every way the difficulties of a conquest, in itself hardly less than impracticable.

The recent forced march, undertaken by Alexander for the purpose of securing Darius as a captive, had been distressing in the extreme to his soldiers, who required a certain period of repose and compensation. This was granted to them at the town of Hecatompylos in Parthia, where the whole army was again united. Alexander now began to feel and act manifestly as successor of Darius on the Persian throne; to disdain the comparative simplicity of Macedonian habits, and to assume the pomp, the ostentatious apparatus of luxuries, and even the dress, of a Persian king.

To many of Alexander's soldiers, the conquest of Persia appeared to be consummated and the war finished, by the death of Darius. They were reluctant to exchange the repose and enjoyments of Hecatompylos for fresh fatigues; but Alexander, assembling the select regiments, addressed to them an emphatic appeal which revived the ardour of all. His first march was across one of the passes into Hyrcania, the region bordering the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea. Here he found no resistance. Alexander undertook an expedition into the mountains of the Mardi, and reduced the remnant of the half-destroyed tribes to sue for peace.

After repose and festivity at Zeudracarta, the chief town of Hyrcania, Alexander marched eastward with his united army through Parthia into Aria. A few days enabled him to crush the Arians. He then marched southward into the territory of the Drangi, or Drangiana (the modern Seistan), where he found no resistance.

CONSPIRACIES AGAINST ALEXANDER

In the chief town of Drangiana occurred the revolting tragedy, of which Philotas was the first victim, and his father Parmenion the second. Parmenion, now seventy years of age, and therefore little qualified for the fatigue inseparable from the invasion of the eastern satrapies, had been left in the important post of commanding the great depot and treasure at Ecbatana. His long military experience, and confidential position even under Philip, rendered him the second person in the Macedonian army, next to Alexander himself. His three sons were all soldiers. The youngest of them, Hector, had been accidentally drowned in the Nile, while in the suite of Alexander in Egypt; the second, Nicanor, had commanded the hypaspists or light infantry, but had died of illness, fortunately for himself, a short time before; the eldest, Philotas, occupied the high rank of general of the companion cavalry, in daily communication with Alexander, from whom he received personal orders.

A revelation came to Philotas, that a soldier named Dimnus had made boast to Nicomachus, his intimate friend or beloved person, under vows of

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secrecy, of an intended conspiracy against Alexander, inviting him to become an accomplice. Nicomachus, at first struck with abhorrence, at length simulated compliance, asked who were the accomplices of Dimnus, and received intimation of a few names; all of which he presently communicated to his brother Cebalinus, for the purpose of being divulged. Cebalinus told the facts to Philotas, entreating him to mention them to Alexander. But Philotas, though every day in communication with the king, neglected to do this for two days; upon which Cebalinus began to suspect him of connivance, and caused the revelation to be made to Alexander through one of the pages named Metron. Dimnus was immediately arrested, but ran himself through with his sword, and expired without making any declaration.

Of this conspiracy, real or pretended, everything rested on the testimony of Nicomachus. Alexander indignantly sent for Philotas, demanding why he had omitted for two days to communicate what he had heard. Philotas replied that the source from which it came was too contemptible to deserve notice—that it would have been ridiculous to attach importance to the simple declarations of such a youth as Nicomachus, recounting the foolish boasts addressed to him by a lover. Alexander received, or affected to receive, the explanation, gave his hand to Philotas, invited him to supper, and talked to him with his usual familiarity.

But it soon appeared that advantage was to be taken of this incident for the disgrace and ruin of Philotas, whose free-spoken criticisms on the pretended divine paternity—coupled with boasts, that he and his father Parmenion had been chief agents in the conquest of Asia—had neither been forgotten nor forgiven.

Some of the generals around Alexander, especially Craterus the first suborner of Antigone, fomented these suspicions from jealousy of the great ascendancy of Parmenion and his family. There was not a tittle of evidence against him, except the fact that the deposition had been made known to him, and that he had seen Alexander twice without communicating it. Upon this single fact, however, Craterus and the other enemies of Philotas worked so effectually as to inflame the suspicions and the pre-existing ill-will of Alexander into fierce rancour. He resolved on the disgrace, torture, and death of Philotas—and on the death of Parmenion besides.

To accomplish this, however, against the two highest officers in the Macedonian service, one of them enjoying a separate and distant command, required management. Alexander was obliged to carry the feelings of the soldiers along with him, and to obtain a condemnation from the army, according to an ancient Macedonian custom, in regard to capital crimes, though, as it seems, not uniformly practised. He not only kept the resolution secret, but is even said to have invited Philotas to supper with the other officers, conversing with him just as usual. In the middle of the night, Philotas was arrested while asleep in his bed, put in chains, and clothed in an ignoble garb. A military assembly was convened at daybreak, before which Alexander appeared with the chief officers in his confidence. Addressing the soldiers in a vehement tone of mingled sorrow and anger, he proclaimed to them that his life had just been providentially rescued from a dangerous conspiracy organised by two men hitherto trusted as his best friends—Philotas and Parmenion—through the intended agency of a soldier named Dimnus, who had slain himself when arrested. The dead body of Dimnus was then exhibited to the meeting, while Nicomachus and Cebalinus were brought forward to tell their story. A letter from Parmenion to his sons Philotas and Nicanor, found among the papers seized on the arrest, was

read to the meeting. Its terms were altogether vague and unmeaning ; but Alexander chose to construe them as it suited his purpose.

We may easily conceive the impression produced upon these assembled soldiers by such denunciations from Alexander himself — revelations of his own personal danger, and reproaches against treacherous friends. Amyntas, and even Cœnus, the brother-in-law of Philotas, were yet more unmeasured in their invectives against the accused. They, as well as the other officers with whom the arrest had been concerted, set the example of violent manifestation against him, and ardent sympathy with the king's danger. Philotas was heard in his defence, which, though strenuously denying the charge, is said to have been feeble. It was indeed sure to be so, coming from one seized thus suddenly, and overwhelmed with disadvantages ; while a degree of courage, absolutely heroic, would have been required for any one else to rise and presume to criticise the proofs. The royal pages began the cry, echoed by all around, that they would with their own hands tear the paricide in pieces.

It would have been fortunate for Philotas if their wrath had been sufficiently ungovernable to instigate the execution of such a sentence on the spot. But this did not suit the purpose of his enemies. Aware that he had been condemned upon the regal word, with nothing better than the faintest negative ground of suspicion, they determined to extort from him a confession such as would justify their own purposes, not only against him, but against his father Parmenion — whom there was as yet nothing to implicate. Accordingly, during the ensuing night, Philotas was put to the torture. Hephæstion, Craterus, and Cœnus — the last of the three being brother-in-law of Philotas — themselves superintended the ministers of physical suffering. Alexander himself, too, was at hand, but concealed by a curtain. It is said that Philotas manifested little firmness under torture, and that Alexander, an unseen witness, indulged in sneers against the cowardice of one who had fought by his side in so many battles. All who stood by were enemies, and likely to describe the conduct of Philotas in such manner as to justify their own hatred. The tortures inflicted, cruel in the extreme and long continued, wrung from him at last a confession, implicating his father along with himself. He was put to death ; and at the same time, all those whose names had been indicated by Nicomachus, were slain also — apparently by being stoned, without preliminary torture. Philotas had serving in the army a numerous kindred, all of whom were struck with consternation at the news of his being tortured. It was the Macedonian law that all kinsmen of a man guilty of treason were doomed to death along with him. Accordingly, some of these men slew themselves, others fled from the camp, seeking refuge wherever they could. Such was the terror and tumult in the camp, that Alexander was obliged to proclaim a suspension of this sanguinary law for the occasion.

It now remained to kill Parmenion, who could not be safely left alive after the atrocities used towards Philotas ; and to kill him, moreover, before he could have time to hear of them, since he was not only the oldest, most respected, and most influential of all Macedonian officers, but also in separate command of the great depot at Ecbatana. Alexander summoned to his presence one of the companions named Polydamas ; a particular friend, comrade, or *aide-de-camp*, of Parmenion. Every friend of Philotas felt at this moment that his life hung by a thread ; so that Polydamas entered the king's presence in extreme terror, as he was ordered to bring with him his two younger brothers. Alexander addressed him, denouncing Parmenion

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as a traitor, and intimating that Polydamas would be required to carry a swift and confidential message to Ecbatana, ordering his execution. Polydamas was selected as the attached friend of Parmenion, and therefore as best calculated to deceive him. Two letters were placed in his hands, addressed to Parmenion; one from Alexander himself, conveying ostensibly military communications and orders; the other, signed with the seal-ring of the deceased Philotas, and purporting to be addressed by the son to the father. Together with these, Polydamas received the real and important despatch, addressed by Alexander to Cleander and Menidas, the officers immediately subordinate to Parmenion at Ecbatana; proclaiming Parmenion guilty of high treason, and directing them to kill him at once. Large rewards were offered to Polydamas if he performed this commission with success, while his two brothers were retained as hostages against scruples or compunction. He promised even more than was demanded — too happy to purchase this reprieve from what had seemed impending death. Furnished with native guides and with swift dromedaries, he struck by the straightest road across the desert of Khorasan, and arrived at Ecbatana on the eleventh day — a distance usually requiring more than thirty days to traverse. Entering the camp by night, without the knowledge of Parmenion, he delivered his despatch to Cleander, with whom he concerted measures. On the morrow he was admitted to Parmenion, while walking in his garden with Cleander and the other officers marked out by Alexander's order as his executioners. Polydamas ran to embrace his old friend, and was heartily welcomed by the unsuspecting veteran, to whom he presented the letters professedly coming from Alexander and Philotas. While Parmenion was absorbed in perusal, he was suddenly assailed by a mortal stab from the hand and sword of Cleander. Other wounds were heaped upon him as he fell, by the remaining officers — the last even after life had departed.

The soldiers in Ecbatana, on hearing of this bloody deed, burst into furious mutiny, surrounded the garden wall, and threatened to break in for the purpose of avenging their general, unless Polydamas and the other murderers should be delivered to them. But Cleander, admitting a few of the ringleaders, exhibited to them Alexander's written orders, to which the soldiers yielded, not without murmurs of reluctance and indignation. Most of them dispersed, yet a few remained, entreating permission to bury Parmenion's body. Even this was long refused by Cleander, from dread of the king's displeasure. At last, however, thinking it prudent to comply in part, he cut off the head, delivering to them the trunk alone for burial. The head was sent to Alexander.

Among the many tragical deeds recounted throughout the course of this history, there is none more revolting than the fate of these two generals. Alexander, violent in all his impulses, displayed on this occasion a personal rancour worthy of his ferocious mother Olympias, exasperated rather than softened by the magnitude of past services. When we see the greatest officers of the Macedonian army directing in person, and under the eye of Alexander, the laceration and burning of the naked body of their colleague Philotas, and assassinating with their own hands the veteran Parmenion, we feel how much we have passed out of the region of Greek civic feeling into that of the more savage Illyrian warrior, partially orientalised. It is not surprising to read, that Antipater, viceroy of Macedonia, who had shared with Parmenion the favour and confidence of Philip as well as of Alexander, should tremble when informed of such proceedings, and cast about for a refuge against the like possibilities to himself. Many other officers were

alike alarmed and disgusted with the transactions. Hence Alexander, opening and examining the letters sent home from his army to Macedonia, detected such strong expressions of indignation, that he thought it prudent to transfer many pronounced malcontents into a division by themselves, parting them off from the remaining army. Instead of appointing any substitute for Philotas in the command of the companion cavalry, he cast that body into two divisions, nominating Hephæstion to the command of one, and Clitus to that of the other.

CAPTURE OF BESSUS

The autumn and winter (330-329 B.C.) were spent by Alexander in reducing Drangiana, Gedrosia, Arachosia, and the Paropamisadæ, the modern Seistan, Afghanistan, and the western part of Kabul, lying between Ghazna



NORTH PERSIAN WARRIOR

(After Bardon)

on the north, Kandahar or Kelar on the south, and Furrah in the west. He experienced no combined resistance, but his troops suffered severely from cold and privation. Near the southern termination of one of the passes of the Hindu-Kush (apparently northeast of the town of Kabul) he founded a new city, called Alexandria ad Caucasum, where he planted seven thousand old soldiers, Macedonians, and others as colonists. Towards the

close of winter he crossed over the mighty range of the Hindu-Kush; a march of fifteen days through regions of snow, and fraught with hardship to his army. On reaching the north side of these mountains, he found himself in Bactria.

The Bactrian leader Bessus, who had assumed the title of king, could muster no more than a small force, with which he laid waste the country, and then retired across the river Oxus into Sogdiana, destroying all the boats. Alexander overran Bactria with scarcely any resistance; the chief places, Bactra (Balkh) and Aornus, surrendering to him on the first demonstration of attack. Having named Artabazus satrap of Bactria, and placed Archelaus with a garrison in Aornus, he marched northward towards the river Oxus, the boundary between Bactria and Sogdiana. It was a march of extreme hardship; reaching for two or three days across a sandy desert destitute of water, and under very hot weather. The Oxus, six furlongs in breadth, deep, and rapid, was the most formidable river that the Macedonians had yet seen. Alexander transported his army across it on the

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tent-skins inflated and stuffed with straw. It seems surprising that Bessus did not avail himself of this favourable opportunity for resisting a passage in itself so difficult; he had however been abandoned by his Bactrian cavalry at the moment when he quitted their territory. Some of his companions, Spitamenes and others, terrified at the news that Alexander had crossed the Oxus, were anxious to make their own peace by betraying their leader. They sent a proposition to this effect; upon which Ptolemy with a light division was sent forward by Alexander, and was enabled, by extreme celerity of movements, to surprise and seize Bessus in a village. Alexander ordered that he should be held in chains, naked, and with a collar round his neck, at the side of the road along which the army were marching. On reaching the spot, Alexander stopped his chariot, and sternly demanded from Bessus, on what pretence he had, first arrested, and afterwards slain, his king and benefactor Darius. Bessus replied, that he had not done this single-handed; others were concerned in it along with him, to procure for themselves lenient treatment from Alexander. The king said no more, but ordered Bessus to be scourged, and then sent back as prisoner to Bactra.¹

In his onward march, Alexander approached a small town, inhabited by the Branchidæ; descendants of those Branchidæ near Miletus on the coast of Ionia, who had administered the great temple and oracle of Apollo on Cape Posidium, and who had yielded up the treasures of that temple to the Persian king Xerxes, 150 years before. This surrender had brought upon them so much odium, that when the dominion of Xerxes was overthrown on the coast, they retired with him into the interior of Asia. Delighted to find themselves once more in commerce with Greeks, they poured forth to meet and welcome the army, tendering all that they possessed. Alexander, when he heard who they were and what was their parentage, gave orders to massacre the entire population—men, women, and children. They were slain without arms or attempt at resistance, resorting to nothing but prayers and suppliant manifestations. Alexander next commanded the walls to be levelled, and the sacred groves cut down, so that no habitable site might remain, nor anything except solitude and sterility. Such was the revenge taken upon these unhappy victims for the deeds of their ancestors in the fourth or fifth generation before. Alexander doubtless considered himself to be executing the wrath of Apollo against an accursed race who had robbed the temple of the god. The Macedonian expedition had been proclaimed to be undertaken originally for the purpose of revenging upon the contemporary Persians the ancient wrongs done to Greece by Xerxes; so that Alexander would follow out the same sentiment in revenging upon the contemporary Branchidæ the acts of their ancestors—yet more guilty than Xerxes, in his belief. The massacre of this unfortunate population was in fact an example of human sacrifice on the largest scale, offered to the gods by the religious impulses of Alexander, and worthy to be compared to that of the Carthaginian general Hannibal, when he sacrificed three thousand Grecian prisoners on the field of Himera, where his grandfather Hamilcar had been slain seventy years before.

[¹ Later he was brought forth and Alexander had his nose and ears cut off. Mutilation was abhorrent to the Greeks, and even Arrian (IV, 7) rebukes his hero for this atrocity. Bessus was then turned over to the Medes and Persians who, according to Diodorus, / XVII, 9, ‘‘after they had put him to all manner of torments, and used him with all the despite and disgrace imaginable, cut his body into small pieces and hurled every part here and there away out of their slings.’’ Plutarch, however, says that two straight trees were bent together, and one of Bessus’ legs fastened to each so that when they were released and sprang apart, his body was torn asunder.]

LIMIT OF ALEXANDER'S PROGRESS NORTHWARD

Alexander then continued his onward progress, first to Maracanda (Samarcand), the chief town of Sogdiana—next to the river Jaxartes, which he and his companions, in their imperfect geographical notions, believed to be the Tanaïs, the boundary between Asia and Europe. In his march, he left garrisons in various towns, but experienced no resistance, though detached bodies of the natives hovered on his flanks.

Here, on the river Jaxartes, Alexander projected the foundation of a new city to bear his name; intended as a protection against incursions from the Scythian nomads on the other side of the river. He planted in it some Macedonian veterans and Grecian mercenaries, together with volunteer settlers from the natives around. An army of Scythian nomads, showing themselves on the other side of the river, piqued his vanity to cross over and attack them. Carrying over a division of his army on inflated skins, he defeated them with little difficulty, pursuing them briskly into the desert. But the weather was intensely hot, and the army suffered much from thirst; while the little water to be found was so bad, that it brought upon Alexander a diarrhœa which endangered his life. This chase of a few miles on the right bank of the Jaxartes (seemingly in the present Khanat of Khokand), marked the utmost limit of Alexander's progress northward.

Shortly afterwards, a Macedonian detachment, unskilfully conducted, was destroyed in Sogdiana by Spitamenes and the Scythians: a rare misfortune, which Alexander avenged by overrunning the region near the river Polytimetus (the Kohik), and putting to the sword the inhabitants of all the towns which he took. He then recrossed the Oxus, to rest during the extreme season of winter at Zariaspa in Bactria, from whence his communications with the West and with Macedonia were more easy, and where he received various reinforcements of Greek troops.

Alexander, distributing his army into five divisions, traversed the country and put down all resistance, while he also took measures for establishing several military posts, or new towns, in convenient places. After some time the whole army was reunited at the chief place of Sogdiana, Maracanda, where some halt and repose was given.

ALEXANDER MURDERS HIS FRIEND

During this halt at Maracanda (Samarcand), 328-327 B.C., the memorable banquet occurred wherein Alexander murdered Clitus. Clitus had saved his life at the battle of the Granicus, by cutting off the sword arm of the Persian Spithridates, when already uplifted to strike him from behind. Since the death of Philotas, the important function of general of the companion cavalry had been divided between Hephæstion and Clitus. Moreover, the family of Clitus had been attached to Philip, by ties so ancient, that his sister, Lanice, had been selected as the nurse of Alexander himself when a child. Two of her sons had already perished in the Asiatic battles. If, therefore, there were any man who stood high in the service, or was privileged to speak his mind freely to Alexander, it was Clitus.

In this banquet at Maracanda, when wine, according to the Macedonian habit, had been abundantly drunk, and when Alexander, Clitus, and most of the other guests were already nearly intoxicated, enthusiasts or flatterers heaped immoderate eulogies upon the king's previous achievements. They

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exalted him above all the most venerated legendary heroes; they proclaimed that his superhuman deeds proved his divine paternity, and that he had earned an apotheosis like Hercules, which nothing but envy could withhold from him even during his life. Alexander himself joined in these boasts, and even took credit for the later victories of the reign of his father, whose abilities and glory he depreciated. To the old Macedonian officers, such an insult cast on the memory of Philip was deeply offensive. But among them all, none had been more indignant than Clitus, with the growing insolence of Alexander — his assumed filiation from Zeus Ammon, which put aside Philip as unworthy — his preference for Persian attendants, who granted or refused admittance to his person — his extending to Macedonian soldiers the contemptuous treatment habitually endured by Asiatics, and even allowing them to be scourged by Persian hands and Persian rods. The pride of a Macedonian general in the stupendous successes of the last five years, was effaced by his mortification, when he saw that they tended only to merge his countrymen amidst a crowd of servile Asiatics, and to inflame the prince with high-flown aspirations transmitted from Xerxes or Ochus. But whatever might be the internal thoughts of Macedonian officers, they held their peace before Alexander, whose formidable character and exorbitant self-estimation would tolerate no criticism.

At the banquet of Maracanda, this long-suppressed repugnance found an issue, accidental, indeed, and unpremeditated, but for that very reason all the more violent and unmeasured. The wine, which made Alexander more boastful, and his flatterers fulsome to excess, overpowered altogether the reserve of Clitus. He rebuked the impiety of those who degraded the ancient heroes in order to make a pedestal for Alexander. He protested against the injustice of disparaging the exalted and legitimate fame of Philip, whose achievements he loudly extolled, pronouncing them to be equal, and even superior, to those of his son. For the exploits of Alexander, splendid as they were, had been accomplished, not by himself alone, but by that unconquerable Macedonian force which he had found ready made to his hands; whereas those of Philip had been his own — since he had found Macedonia prostrate and disorganised, and had to create for himself both soldiers and a military system. The great instruments of Alexander's victories had been Philip's old soldiers, whom he now despised, and among them Parmenion, whom he had put to death.

Remarks such as these, poured forth in the coarse language of a half-intoxicated Macedonian veteran, provoked loud contradiction from many, and gave poignant offence to Alexander; who now for the first time heard the open outburst of disapprobation, before concealed and known to him only by surmise. But wrath and contradiction, both from him and from others, only made Clitus more reckless in the outpouring of his own feelings, now discharged with delight after having been so long pent up. He passed from the old Macedonian soldiers to himself individually. Stretching forth his right hand towards Alexander, he exclaimed, "Recollect that you owe your life to me; this hand preserved you at the Granicus. Listen to the outspoken language of truth, or else abstain from asking freemen to supper, and confine yourself to the society of barbaric slaves." All these reproaches stung Alexander to the quick. But nothing was so intolerable to him as the respectful sympathy for Parmenion, which brought to his memory one of the blackest deeds of his life — and the reminiscence of his preservation at the Granicus, which lowered him into the position of a debtor towards the very censor under whose reproof he was now smarting.

At length wrath and intoxication together drove him into uncontrollable fury. He started from his couch, and felt for his dagger to spring at Clitus; but the dagger had been put out of reach by one of his attendants. In a loud voice and with the Macedonian word of command, he summoned the bodyguards and ordered the trumpeter to sound an alarm. But no one obeyed so grave an order, given in his condition of drunkenness. His principal officers, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, and others, clung round him, held his arms and body, and besought him to abstain from violence; others at the same time tried to silence Clitus and hurry him out of the hall, which had now become a scene of tumult and consternation. But Clitus was not in a humour to confess himself in the wrong by retiring; while Alexander, furious at the opposition now, for the first time, offered to his will, exclaimed that his officers held him in chains as Bessus had held Darius, and left him nothing but the name of a king. Though anxious to restrain his movements, they doubtless did not dare to employ much physical force; so that his great personal strength, and continued efforts, presently set him free. He then snatched a pike from one of the soldiers, rushed upon Clitus, and thrust him through on the spot, exclaiming, "Go now to Philip and Parmenion."

REMORSE OF ALEXANDER

No sooner was the deed perpetrated than the feelings of Alexander underwent an entire revolution. The spectacle of Clitus, a bleeding corpse on the floor—the marks of stupefaction and horror evident in all the spectators, and the reaction from a furious impulse instantaneously satiated—plunged him at once into the opposite extreme of remorse and self-condemnation. Hastening out of the hall, and retiring to bed, he passed three days in an agony of distress, without food or drink. He burst into tears and multiplied exclamations on his own mad act; he dwelt upon the names of Clitus and Lanice with the debt of gratitude which he owed to each, and denounced himself as unworthy to live after having requited such services with a foul murder. His friends at length prevailed on him to take food, and return to activity. All joined in trying to restore his self-satisfaction. The Macedonian army passed a public vote that Clitus had been justly slain, and that his body should remain unburied; which afforded opportunity to Alexander to reverse the vote, and to direct that it should be buried by his own order. The prophets comforted him by the assurance that his murderous impulse had arisen, not from his own natural mind, but from a maddening perversion intentionally brought on by the god Dionysus, to avenge the omission of a sacrifice due to him on the day of the banquet, but withheld. Lastly, the Greek sophist or philosopher, Anaxarchus of Abdera, revived Alexander's spirits by well-timed flattery, treating his sensibility as nothing better than generous weakness; reminding him that in his exalted position of conqueror and Great King, he was entitled to prescribe what was right and just, instead of submitting himself to laws dictated from without. Callisthenes the philosopher was also summoned, along with Anaxarchus, to the king's presence, for the same purpose of offering consolatory reflections. But he is said to have adopted a tone of discourse altogether different, and to have given offence rather than satisfaction to Alexander.

To such remedial influences, and probably still more to the absolute necessity for action, Alexander's remorse at length yielded. Like the other emotions of his fiery soul, it was violent and overpowering while it lasted.

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But it cannot be shown to have left any durable trace on his character, nor any effects justifying the unbounded admiration of Arrian; who has little but blame to bestow on the murdered Clitus, while he expresses the strongest sympathy for the mental suffering of the murderer.

After ten days, Alexander again put his army in motion, to complete the subjugation of Sogdiana. He found no enemy capable of meeting him in pitched battle; yet Spitamenes, with the Sogdians and some Scythian allies, raised much hostility of detail, which it cost another year to put down. Alexander underwent the greatest fatigue and hardships in his marches through the mountainous parts of this wide, rugged, and poorly supplied country, with rocky positions, strong by nature, which his enemies sought to defend. One of these fastnesses, held by a native chief named Sisymithres, seemed almost unattackable, and was indeed taken rather by intimidation than by actual force. The Scythians, after a partial success over a small Macedonian detachment, were at length so thoroughly beaten and overawed, that they slew Spitamenes, and sent his head to the conqueror as a propitiatory offering.



GREEK URN

After a short rest at Nautaca during the extreme winter, Alexander resumed operations, by attacking a strong post called the Sogdian Rock, whither a large number of fugitives had assembled, with an ample supply of provision. It was a precipice supposed to be inexpugnable; and would seemingly have proved so, in spite of the energy and abilities of Alexander, had not the occupants altogether neglected their guard, and yielded at the mere sight of a handful of Macedonians who had scrambled up the precipice. Among the captives taken by Alexander on this rock, were the wife and family of the Bactrian chief Oxyartes; one of whose daughters, named Roxane, so captivated Alexander by her beauty that he resolved to make her his wife. He then passed out of Sogdiana into the neighbouring territory Parætacene, where there was another inexpugnable site called the Rock of Choriene, which he was also fortunate enough to reduce.

From hence Alexander went to Bactra. Sending Craterus with a division to put the last hand to the reduction of Parætacene, he himself remained at Bactra, preparing for his expedition across the Hindu Kush to the conquest of India. As a security for tranquillity of Bactria and Sogdiana during his absence, he levied thirty thousand young soldiers from those countries to accompany him.

It was at Bactra that Alexander celebrated his marriage with the captive Roxane, in the spring of 327 B.C. Amidst the repose and festivities connected with that event, the oriental temper which he was acquiring displayed itself more forcibly than ever. He could no longer be satisfied without obtaining prostration, or worship, from Greeks and Macedonians as well as from Persians; a public and unanimous recognition of his divine origin and superhuman dignity. Some Greeks and Macedonians had already rendered to him this homage. Nevertheless to the greater number, in spite of their extreme deference and admiration for him, it was repugnant and degrading. Even the imperious Alexander shrank from issuing public and formal orders

on such a subject; but a manœuvre was concerted, with his privity, by the Persians and certain compliant Greek sophists or philosophers, for the purpose of carrying the point by surprise.

During a banquet at Bactra, the philosopher Anaxarchus, addressing the assembly in a prepared harangue, extolled Alexander's exploits as greatly surpassing those of Dionysus and Hercules. He proclaimed that Alexander had already done more than enough to establish a title to divine honours from the Macedonians; who, he said, would assuredly worship Alexander after his death, and ought in justice to worship him during his life, forthwith.

This harangue was applauded, and similar sentiments were enforced, by others favourable to the plan; who proceeded to set the example of immediate compliance, and were themselves the first to tender worship. Most of the Macedonian officers sat unmoved, disgusted at the speech. But though disgusted, they said nothing. To reply to a speech doubtless well-turned and flowing, required some powers of oratory; moreover, it was well known that whoever dared to reply stood marked out for the antipathy of Alexander. The fate of Clitus, who had arraigned the same sentiments in the banqueting hall of Maracanda, was fresh in the recollection of every one. The repugnance which many felt, but none ventured to express, at length found an organ in Callisthenes of Olynthus.

This philosopher, whose melancholy fate imparts a peculiar interest to his name, was nephew of Aristotle, and had enjoyed through his uncle an early acquaintance with Alexander during the boyhood of the latter. At the recommendation of Aristotle, Callisthenes had accompanied Alexander in his Asiatic expedition.

On occasion of the demonstration incited by Anaxarchus at the banquet, Callisthenes had been invited by Hephæstion to join in the worship intended to be proposed towards Alexander; and Hephæstion afterwards alleged, that he had promised to comply. But his actual conduct affords reasonable ground for believing that he made no such promise; for he not only thought it his duty to refuse the act of worship, but also to state publicly his reasons for disapproving it; the more so, as he perceived that most of the Macedonians present felt like himself. He contended that the distinction between gods and men was one which could not be confounded without impiety and wrong. Alexander had amply earned — as a man, a general, and a king — the highest honours compatible with humanity; but to exalt him into a god would be both an injury to him and an offence to the gods. Anaxarchus, he said, was the last person from whom such a proposition ought to come, because he was one of those whose only title to Alexander's society was founded upon his capacity to give instructive and wholesome counsel.

Callisthenes spoke out what numbers of his hearers felt. The speech was so warmly applauded by the Macedonians present, especially the older officers, that Alexander thought it prudent to forbid all further discussion upon this delicate subject. Presently the Persians present, according to Asiatic custom, approached him and performed their prostration; after which Alexander pledged, in successive goblets of wine, those Greeks and Macedonians with whom he had held previous concert. To each of them the goblet was handed, and each, after drinking to answer the pledge, approached the king, made his prostration, and then received a salute. Lastly, Alexander sent the pledge to Callisthenes, who, after drinking like the rest, approached him for the purpose of receiving the salute but without any prostration. Of this omission Alexander was expressly informed by one of the companions; upon which he declined to admit Callisthenes

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to a salute. The latter retired, observing, "Then I shall go away, worse off than others as far as the salute goes."

Callisthenes certainly would have done well to withdraw earlier (if indeed he could have withdrawn without offence) from the camp of Alexander, in which no lettered Greek could now associate without abnegating his freedom of speech and sentiment, and emulating the servility of Anaxarchus. But being present, as Callisthenes was, in the hall at Bactra when the proposition of Anaxarchus was made, and when silence would have been assent—his protest against it was both seasonable and dignified for being fraught with danger to himself.

Callisthenes knew that danger well, and was quickly enabled to recognise it in the altered demeanour of Alexander towards him. He was, from that day, a marked man in two senses: first, to Alexander himself, as well as to the rival sophists and all promoters of the intended deification—for hatred, and for getting up some accusatory pretence such as might serve to ruin him; next, to the more free-spirited Macedonians, indignant witnesses of Alexander's increased insolence, and admirers of the courageous Greek who had protested against the motion of Anaxarchus. By such men he was doubtless much extolled; which praises aggravated his danger, as they were sure to be reported to Alexander. The pretext for his ruin was not long wanting.

CONSPIRACY OF THE ROYAL PAGES

Among those who admired and sought the conversation of Callisthenes, was Hermolaus, one of the royal pages—the band, selected from noble Macedonian families, who did duty about the person of the king. It had happened that this young man, one of Alexander's companions in the chase, on seeing a wild boar rushing up to attack the king, darted his javelin, and slew the animal. Alexander, angry to be anticipated in killing the boar, ordered Hermolaus to be scourged before all the other pages and deprived him of his horse. Thus humiliated and outraged—for an act not merely innocent, but the omission of which, if Alexander had sustained any injury from the boar, might have been held punishable—Hermolaus became resolutely bent on revenge. He enlisted in the project his intimate friend Sostratus, with several others among the pages; and it was agreed among them to kill Alexander in his chamber, on the first night when they were all on guard together. The appointed night arrived, without any divulgation of their secret; yet the scheme was frustrated by the accident, that Alexander continued till daybreak drinking with his officers, and never retired to bed. On the morrow, one of the conspirators, becoming alarmed or repentant, divulged the scheme to his friend Charicles, with the names of those concerned. Eurylochus, brother to Charicles, apprised by him of what he had heard, immediately informed Ptolemy, through whom it was conveyed to Alexander. By Alexander's order, the persons indicated were arrested and put to the torture; under which they confessed that they had themselves conspired to kill him, but named no other accomplices, and even denied that anyone else was privy to the scheme. In this denial they persisted, though extreme suffering was applied to extort the revelation of new names. They were then brought up and arraigned as conspirators before the assembled Macedonian soldiers. There the confession was repeated. It is even said that Hermolaus, in repeating

it, boasted of the enterprise as both legitimate and glorious; denouncing the tyranny and cruelty of Alexander as having become insupportable to a freeman. Whether such boast was actually made or not, the persons brought up were pronounced guilty, and stoned to death forthwith by the soldiers.

The pages thus executed were young men of good Macedonian families, for whose condemnation accordingly Alexander had thought it necessary to invoke — what he was sure of obtaining against any one — the sentence of the soldiers. To satisfy his hatred against Callisthenes — not a Macedonian, but only a Greek citizen, one of the remnants of the subverted city of Olynthus — no such formality was required. In his case, therefore, as in that of Philotas before, it was necessary to pick up matter of suspicious tendency from his reported remarks and conversations. He was alleged to have addressed dangerous and inflammatory language to the pages, holding up Alexander to odium, instigating them to conspiracy, and pointing out Athens as a place of refuge; he was moreover well known to have been often in conversation with Hermolaus. For a man of the violent temper and omnipotent authority of Alexander, such indications were quite sufficient as grounds of action against one whom he hated.

On this occasion, we have the state of Alexander's mind disclosed by himself, in one of the references to his letters given by Plutarch. Writing to Craterus and to others immediately afterwards, Alexander distinctly stated that the pages throughout all their torture had deposed against no one but themselves. Nevertheless, in another letter addressed to Antipater in Macedonia, he used these expressions: "The pages were stoned to death by the Macedonians; but I myself shall punish the sophist, as well as those who sent him out here, and those who harbour in their cities conspirators against me." The sophist Callisthenes had been sent out by Aristotle, who is here designated; and probably the Athenians after him. Fortunately for Aristotle, he was not at Bactra, but at Athens. That he could have had any concern in the conspiracy of the pages, was impossible. In this savage outburst of menace against his absent preceptor, Alexander discloses the real state of feeling which prompted him to the destruction of Callisthenes — hatred towards that spirit of citizenship and free speech, which Callisthenes not only cherished, in common with Aristotle and most other literary Greeks, but had courageously manifested in his protest against the motion for worshipping a mortal.

Callisthenes was first put to the torture and then hanged. His tragical fate excited a profound sentiment of sympathy and indignation among the philosophers of antiquity.

The halts of Alexander were formidable to friends and companions; his marches, to the unconquered natives whom he chose to treat as enemies.^c

CHAPTER LV. THE CONQUEST OF INDIA

AFTER the conquest of the Bactrian satrapy, there remained only one province of the Persian empire into which Alexander had not yet carried his arms. Already, indeed, before he crossed the Paropamisus, he had made himself master of a great part of the country which the Persians called India, and perhaps had very nearly reached the utmost limits within which the authority of the Great King was acknowledged in the latter years of the monarchy. But the power of the first Darius had certainly been extended much farther eastward. At the battle of Arbela the Greeks for the first time saw elephants, which they heard had been brought from the banks of the Indus. To Alexander and his companions India appeared from a distance as a new world, of indefinite extent, and abounding in wonders and riches. Even without any other inducement, he must eagerly have desired to explore and subdue it.

The king of Taxila [or Takshasila] had offered his alliance to Alexander, and sought aid from him against a powerful neighbour; and thus Alexander ascertained that the state of things in this part of India was highly favourable to his projected invasion. Through some revolutions, no record of which has been preserved, a great part of it had in Alexander's time fallen under the dominion of three princes, Taxiles and two who were kinsmen and bore the name of Porus. The most powerful of these was the immediate neighbour of Taxiles; his territories lay to the east of the Hydaspes. It was against him that the king of Taxila sought to strengthen himself by an alliance with the Macedonian conqueror.

Alexander marched into India at the head of 120,000 foot and 15,000 horse. We must suppose that at least 70,000 of these were Asiatic troops. The summer of 327 had scarcely begun, when he crossed the mountains and advanced to the banks of the Cophen, the river formed by the confluence of the Kabul river with the Panjshir, a larger stream, which meets it from the northwest. Here, in conformity to his summons, he was met by Taxiles, and by several chiefs from the country west of the Indus, bringing presents, such as were accounted the most honourable; and as he expressed a wish for elephants, they promised all they possessed, which however amounted to no more than five-and-twenty.



Alexander now divided his forces. He sent Hephæstion and Perdiccas, with a strong division, accompanied by the Indian chiefs, down the vale of the Cophen to the Indus, to prepare a bridge for the passage of the army, while he himself directed his march into the mountains north of the Cophen, and included between it and the Indus. Here lay the territories of three warlike tribes—the Aspasians or Hippasians, Guræans, and Assacenians. The operations of this campaign, which occupied the rest of the year, do not require to be related here with all the military details. He ascended the rugged vale of the Choes; and gathered a vast booty, including forty thousand captives, and between three and four hundred thousand head of cattle, from which he selected some of the finest to be sent into Macedonia. He then, with some difficulty, effected the passage of the deep and rapid Guræus, and entered the territory of the Assacenians. Alexander accepted the surrender of Massaga, the capital, on the condition that the mercenaries should join his army. But they discovered a degree of patriotism which he had not looked for. They were so averse from the thought of turning their arms against their countrymen, that, having marched out, and encamped on a hill by themselves, they meditated making their escape in the night. Alexander was apprised of their design, and, though they had not begun to execute it, with less generosity than might have been expected from him, even if mercy was out of the question, surrounded the hill with his troops, and cut them all to pieces. Then, holding the capitulation to have been broken, he stormed the defenceless city, where the chief's mother and daughter fell into his hands.

The inhabitants of Bazira fled to a place of refuge, which was deemed impregnable, and soon became crowded with fugitives from all parts of the country. This was a hill fort on the right bank of the Indus, not far above its junction with the Cophen. Its Indian name seems to have been slightly distorted by the Greeks, according to their usual practice, into that of Aornus, which answered to its extraordinary height, as above the flight of a bird. It was precipitous on all sides, and accessible only by a single path cut in the rock, though in one direction it was connected with a range of hills. But its summit was an extensive plain of fruitful soil, partly clothed with wood, and containing copious springs. The traditions of the country concerning its insurmountable strength seem to have given occasion to the fable, which spread through the Macedonian camp, that Hercules himself had assailed it without success. Alexander did not need this inducement to excite him to the undertaking. It had been a principle, to which he owed most of his conquests, to show that he was not to be deterred by any natural difficulties; and he resolved to make the Aornus his own.

He had not long arrived at it, before he received information of a rugged and difficult track that led up to the top of a hill, separated by a hollow of no great depth, though of considerable width, from the rock. By this path he sent Ptolemy, with a body of light troops, who reached the summit before he was noticed by the garrison, and immediately, as he had been ordered, threw up an entrenchment, and by a fire-signal announced his success to the camp below. The Indians attempted in vain to dislodge him from his position: and the next day Alexander, by a hard struggle, notwithstanding their vigorous resistance, joined him there with the rest of the army. He now availed himself of his superior numbers, and began to carry a mound across the hollow. He took part in the work with his own hands, and the whole army, animated by his example and exhortations, prosecuted it with restless assiduity. But the Indians, astonished at the intrepidity with which

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a handful of men had seized this vantage-ground, and alarmed by the progress of the work, began to despair of resistance, and to meditate flight. But while they were stealing out of the place, Alexander scaled the deserted wall with a part of his guard, entered the fortress, and chased the fugitives with great slaughter into the plains below. The capture of the rock which had baffled the assaults of Hercules was celebrated with solemn sacrifices, and supplied a fresh theme for the eloquence of Agis and Anaxarchus.

It was in the course of the campaign in the highlands between the Cophen and the Indus, and, it seems, in the territory of the Gureans, that the Macedonians were struck with some appearances in the productions of the soil, and the manners of the natives, and probably also by the sound of some names which reminded them of the legends of Dionysus, whose fabulous conquests were now so often mentioned by Alexander's flatterers, for the purpose of exalting the living hero, whom they proposed to deify, above the god. And so we read that Alexander came to a city called Nysa, which boasted of Dionysus as its founder, and, as evidence of the fact, showed the ivy and laurel which he had planted—a sight new to the Macedonians, since they had left their native land. Alexander, Arrian observes, was gratified by their story, and wished it to be believed that he was then treading in the steps of Dionysus; for he hoped that the Macedonians, roused by emulation, would be the more willing to bear the fatigues of the expedition in which he purposed to pass the utmost distance that had been reached by the divine conqueror. If we may depend on this observation, it would prove that he had not yet thought of any limit to his own progress, within the farthest bounds of the eastern world.

It cannot have been later than March 326 when he crossed the Indus, probably a little above its junction with the Cophen. He celebrated his arrival on the eastern bank by a solemn sacrifice, and soon after met Taxiles, who had come out, with his army and his elephants, to greet him, and conduct him to his capital, with professions of the most entire devotion. It seems to have been during his stay at Taxila, that Alexander was first enabled to gratify his curiosity concerning the doctrines and practices of the Indian ascetics. He had already witnessed something similar at Corinth, where he found Diogenes living in habits of simplicity not unworthy of the Eastern gymnosophists—as the Greeks called the sages who exposed themselves almost naked to the inclemency of the Indian sky. He is reported to have said that, had he not been Alexander, he would have been Diogenes. The independence of a man who had nothing to ask of his royal visitor but that he would not stand between him and the sun, struck him as only less desirable than the conquest of the world; and he conceived a like admiration for the Indian quietists, who manifested a kindred spirit. He was desirous of carrying away with him some of the Indian sophists as companions of Anaxarchus.

After solemn sacrifices and games, Alexander resumed his march. He was informed that Porus had collected his forces on the left bank of the Hydaspes, to defend the passage; and he therefore sent Cœnus back to the Indus, with orders to have the vessels in which the army had crossed sawed each into two or three pieces, and transported to the Hydaspes. He left all his invalids at Taxila, and strengthened his army with five thousand Indians, who were commanded by Taxiles in person. Having arrived on the right bank of the Hydaspes, he beheld the whole army of Porus, with between two hundred and three hundred elephants, drawn up on the other side.

To distract the attention of Porus, he divided his army into several columns, with which he made frequent excursions in various directions, as if uncertain where he should attempt a passage.

THE WAR WITH PORUS

At the distance of a day's march above the camp, at a bend of the river towards the west, where the projecting right bank was covered with wood, an island, also thickly wooded, parted the stream. This was the spot which Alexander fixed upon for his attempt. He ordered the vessels brought in pieces from the Indus to be carried to it—the shelter of the wood enabled the workmen to put them together again unobserved. Skins also were provided to be stuffed with straw. Night after night he sallied forth with his cavalry, as noisily as possible, and pushed up or down the river, as if to attempt a passage. Porus at first drew out his elephants, and moved towards the quarter from which the clamour proceeded. But when the feint had been often repeated, he ceased to attend to it, and did not stir his elephants for any noise that he might hear on the other side.

Alexander himself set out with the flower of his Macedonian cavalry, and the Bactrian, Sogdian, and Scythian auxiliaries, in all about five thousand, and a select division of heavy and light infantry, which included the hypaspists and the brigades of Clitus and Cœnus. He directed his march at a sufficient distance from the river to be concealed from the enemy's view, and about sunset arrived over against the island. During the night a violent fall of rain, accompanied by a terrible thunderstorm, a little impeded the labours of the men; but the noise also served to drown the clatter of the axes and hammers, and all the din of preparation, which might otherwise have reached the post on the opposite bank.

With the return of light the rain had ceased, and the storm was hushed: and the troops were immediately embarked. The king himself, with Ptolemy, Perdicas, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, the founder of the Syrian dynasty, went on board a small galley, with a part of the hypaspists. The woody island concealed their movements, until, having passed it, they were within a short distance of the left bank. Then first they were perceived by the Indians stationed there; who immediately rode off at full speed to carry the tidings. Porus was not of a spirit to be so easily overpowered. His first thought, when he received the intelligence, was that there might still be time to come up with the enemy, before they had completed their landing; and he immediately sent one of his sons, with two thousand cavalry, and 120 chariots, towards the place. Alexander charged with all his cavalry. The Indians scarcely waited for the shock of this greatly superior force. Four hundred of them were slain, and among them the prince himself.

Even this disaster did not bow the courage of Porus; leaving a part of his elephants to check Craterus, he advanced to the decisive conflict, with two hundred of them, the whole of his cavalry (about four thousand), three hundred chariots, and the bulk of his thirty thousand men.

Alexander, when he came in sight of the enemy, made his cavalry halt, to allow time for the infantry to come up, and recover breath, after their long and quick march, while he himself, observing the disposition of the hostile army, decided on his plan of attack. He posted himself, as usual, in the right wing, with the main body of the cavalry; but stationed Cœnus, with two squadrons, on the left. With his wonted sagacity he anticipated that

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an attack on the enemy's left wing would draw out the cavalry on the right to protect it; and he ordered Cornus in this case to fall on their rear. The horse-bowmen were first ordered to advance, and threw the enemy into some disorder by a shower of arrows. Alexander then led up the rest of his cavalry to the charge. The Indian cavalry of the right wing was brought up to the relief of their left, and was at the same time taken in the rear by Cornus, and charged by Alexander in front. The whole body, in disorder, sought

shelter in the line of the elephants, and the Macedonian phalanx then advanced to take advantage of the confusion, and to support their cavalry. Yet the shock of the huge animals, as long as they were under control, made havoc even in the ranks of the phalanx, and afforded time for the Indian cavalry to rally. But

when they were driven in by a second charge of the Macedonian horse, and the engagement was crowded within a nar-

rower space, the elephants, pressed on all sides, began to grow unmanageable; many lost their drivers, and, maddened by wounds, turned their fury indiscriminately against friend and foe. The phalanx then

opened a large space for them and eluded their onset, while the light troops plied them with their missiles, or mutilated their trunks, and drove them back upon their own


ranks, where, as long as their strength lasted, they spread havoc and confusion. At length, when many

of them were killed, and the rest, spent with wounds and toil, ceased to be formidable, Alexander ordered another general charge

of horse and foot; and the Indians, routed at all points, betook themselves to flight. By this time Craterus, and the divisions on the right bank, had effected their passage; and engaging in the pursuit with all the vigour of fresh troops, made dreadful slaughter among the fugitives.

The number of the slain on the side of the Indians amounted, according to the more moderate account in Diodorus, to about twelve thousand. Among them were two other sons of Porus, and the greater part of his principal officers. Nine thousand prisoners were taken, and eighty elephants. The loss of the Macedonians is estimated, as usual, at only a few hundreds.

Porus himself, mounted on an elephant, had both directed the movements of his forces, and gallantly taken part in the action. He had received a wound in his shoulder — his body was protected by a corselet of curious workmanship, which was proof against all missiles — yet, unlike Darius, as long



INDIAN SOLDIERS

as any of his troops kept their ground he would not retire from the field. When, however, he saw all dispersed, he too turned his elephant for flight. He was a conspicuous object, and easily overtaken. All he would ask of Alexander, was to be treated as a king; and when Alexander observed that this was no more than a king must do for his own sake, and bade him make some request for himself, his reply was still that all was included in this. His expectations could scarcely have equalled the conqueror's munificence. He was not only reinstated in his royal dignity, but received a large addition of territory. Yet it was certainly not pure magnanimity, or admiration for his character, that determined Alexander to this proceeding. He was conscious that his forces were not sufficient to enable him to displace the native princes east of the Indus, and to annex their territories, in the form of a satrapy, to his empire. Hence the generosity he had shown to Taxiles. But Taxiles himself might have become formidable without a rival; and the only way to secure the Macedonian ascendancy in the Punjab, was to trim the balance of power.

Alexander, after he had buried his slain, and solemnised his victory with his usual magnificence, allowed the main body of his army a month's rest, perhaps in the capital of Porus. The continuance of the rains was probably the chief motive for this delay. But before he quitted the scene of his triumph, he founded two cities near the Hydaspes—one, which he named Nicaea, near the field of battle, the other near the place where he had crossed the river; this he named Bucephala, after his gallant steed, which had sunk either under fatigue or wounds in the hour of victory.

THE EASTERN LIMIT

Before he resumed his march eastward, Alexander ordered a great quantity of ship timber to be felled in the forests on the upper course of the Hydaspes, which abound in fir and cedar, and floated down the stream to his new cities, and a fleet to be built for the navigation of the Indus. Alexander, on his march up the river Hydraotes, received or extorted the submission of some other smaller tribes. As he approached Sangala, he found the Cathæans strongly entrenched on an insulated hill near the city, behind a triple barrier of wagons. A bloody carnage ensued; for the besieged made a vigorous resistance, and more than twelve hundred of the besiegers, including several general officers, were wounded. In revenge seventeen thousand of the barbarians were massacred; seventy thousand were made prisoners. Alexander then continued his march towards the southeast and arrived on the banks of the Hyphasis, or rather of the stream formed by the junction of the Hyphasis (Bias) with the Hesidrus (Sutlej).

Here he had at length reached the fated term of his progress towards the east. Alexander had, no doubt, long been undeceived as to the narrow limits which, according to the geography of his day, he had at first assigned to India, and to the eastern side of the earth. The ocean, which he had once imagined to be separated by no very vast tract from the banks of the Indus, had receded, as he advanced, to an immeasurable distance. He had discovered that, beyond the Hyphasis, a desert more extensive than any he had yet crossed parted the plains of the Five Streams from the region watered by the tributaries of the Ganges, a river mightier than the Indus: that the country east of the Ganges was the seat of a great monarchy, far more powerful than that of Porus, the land of the Gangarides and Prasians,

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whose king could bring into the field two hundred thousand foot, twenty thousand horse, and several thousands of elephants. That this information rather served to inflame Alexander's curiosity and ambition than to deter him, could scarcely be doubted by any one who has fully entered into his character, even if it had not been expressly stated by the ancients.

But the accounts which kindled his ardour, plunged the Macedonians into sullen dejection, which at length broke out into open murmurs. It is possible that, if they had seen any distinct and certain goal before them, they would not have shrunk from the dangers and difficulties of a last enterprise, however arduous. But to set out from a region which had once appeared to them as the verge of the habitable world on a new series of conquests, to which they could foresee no termination, was enough to appal the most adventurous spirits.¹ Their thoughts began to revert with uncontrollable force to their homes in the distant west, as they had reason to fear that they were on the point of being torn from them forever. For even of those who might escape the manifold dangers of a fresh campaign, how many might be doomed to sit down as colonists, and to spend the rest of their lives in that strange land! India was a still more hopeless place of exile than Bactria and Sogdiana, where the Greeks, who had been planted by violence, were only detained by terror. The wish to return became universal, and was soon transformed into a firm resolution not to proceed.

It is difficult to guess how far the arguments by which Alexander endeavoured to overcome the repugnance of his troops, and to animate them with his own spirit, resembled any of those which are attributed to him by Arrian and Curtius. The threat which Curtius puts into his mouth, that, if the Macedonians would not follow him, he would throw himself on his Bactrian and Scythian auxiliaries and make the expedition with them alone, most likely misrepresents the tone which he assumed. But it may easily be supposed that he expressed his wishes, and urged the army to compliance, with passionate eloquence. Not only, however, the feelings of the troops, but the judgment of his officers was adverse to the proposed enterprise; and Cœnus, in a speech which has either been better written or more faithfully reported than the king's, exhorted him to abandon his design. Alexander retired to his tent in displeasure.

The next day he again assembled the army, and made another attempt to overpower their reluctance, declaring that he would force no Macedonian to accompany him; he was sure that there would be volunteers enough among them for his purpose; the rest might return home and say that they had left their king in the midst of his enemies. But even this appeal produced no effect. For three days he kept within his tent, where not even his chief officers were admitted to his presence, waiting for a change in the disposition of the men. But the stillness which prevailed in the camp convinced him, more strongly than words could have done, that their determination was fixed. He then felt that it was time to yield—not perhaps without some pride in the reflection that there was not a man in the army who was capable of his own contempt for difficulties and dangers. He had however gone too far, it seems, to recede without some other pretext. The sacrifices easily supplied one. When they were found unpropitious to the passage of the river, he called his council and declared his resolution to retreat.

It was received with tears of joy and grateful shouts by the army. Before he quitted the Hyphasis, he ordered twelve colossal altars to be built

[¹ "Their very horses' hoofs were worn away by their continual marches," says Diodorus *ad* xvii.]

on its banks, and dedicated to the gods who had led him thus far victorious; then, after a solemn sacrifice and games, he began to retrace his steps. On the Acesines he found the city, which Hephæstion had been ordered to build, ready to receive a colony; and there he left the disabled mercenaries, and as many natives of the neighbouring districts, as were willing to settle there.

The fleet on the Hydaspes was now nearly ready, but the two new cities had suffered so much from the rains that the army was for some time employed in restoring them. In the meanwhile, Alexander made his final arrangement of the affairs of the northern Punjab, by which Porus gained a fresh addition of territory, so that his dominions included, it is said, seven nations and above two thousand cities, with, it seems, a title which established his superiority over all the chiefs east of the Indus.

THE MARCH TO THE WEST

The fleet, which was probably for the most part collected from the natives, numbered, according to Ptolemy, nearly two thousand vessels of various kinds, including eighty galleys of war. The command of the whole fleet was entrusted to Nearchus. Alexander divided his forces into four corps. The main body, with about two hundred elephants, was to advance along the eastern bank under the command of Hephæstion. Craterus was to lead a smaller division of infantry and cavalry on the opposite side of the river. Philippus, with the troops of his satrapy, was ordered to take a circuitous route towards the point where the two other generals were to wait for the fleet, in which the king himself was to embark with the hypaspists, the bowmen, and a division of his horseguard—in all, eight thousand men. On the morning of the embarkation, Alexander himself, under the direction of his soothsayers, offered the libations and prayers which were deemed fittest to propitiate the powers of the Indian streams, Hydaspes and the impetuous Acesines, which was soon to join it, and the mighty Indus, which was afterwards to receive their united waters. Among the gods of the west, Hercules and Ammon were invoked with especial devotion; then, at the sound of the trumpet, the fleet began to drop down the river.

It was a spectacle such as the bosom of the Hydaspes had never before witnessed, nor has it since. Its high banks were crowded with the natives, who flocked from all quarters with eager curiosity to gaze, and accompanied the armament in its progress to some distance before they could be satiated with the sight of the stately galleys, the horses, the men, the mighty mass of vessels gliding down in unbroken order; and as the adjacent woods rang with the signals of the boatswains, the measured shouts of the rowers, and the plash of numberless oars, keeping time with perfect exactness, the Indians too testified their delight in strains of their national music.

Alexander, as he proceeded, landed his troops wherever he found a display of force necessary to extort submission from the neighbouring tribes, though it was with reluctance that he spent any time in these incursions; he was anxious, as soon as possible, to reach the frontiers of the Malli, a warlike race, from whom he expected a vigorous resistance, and whom he therefore wished to surprise before they had completed their preparations and had been joined by their allies, particularly their southern neighbours the Oxydracæ or Sudracæ. In five days he arrived at the second place of rendezvous, the confluence of the Hydaspes and the Acesines. His Indian pilots had warned him of the danger which the fleet would have to encounter

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at this point; yet it did not escape. The united rivers were at that time pent into a narrow space, where their conflicting waters roared and chafed in eddies and waves. Several of the long galleys lost a great part of their oars, and were much shattered; two were dashed against each other, and entirely wrecked, and many of the crews perished. According to some accounts, Alexander himself at one time thought his own galley so much in danger, that he was on the point of jumping overboard. As the stream widened, and spent its violence, a headland on the right bank afforded shelter to the fleet.

While it was undergoing the necessary repairs, Alexander made an expedition inland against the Sibas, or Sivaïtes, so called undoubtedly from the Indian deity, who was the chief object of their worship. On his return to the fleet, he was rejoined by his three generals, and immediately made his dispositions for the subjugation of the Malli.

There can be little doubt that the name of this people has been preserved in that of the modern city of Multan. The united forces of the Malli and the Sudracæ are estimated in the accounts of Diodorus and Curtius, on the most moderate calculation, at eighty thousand foot, ten thousand horse, and seven hundred chariots; and from the manner in which they are coupled together, we are led to presume that in this respect there was no inequality between them. But the two races were composed of widely different elements: for the name of the one appears to have been derived from that of the Sudra caste; and it is certain that the Brahmans were predominant in the other. As it was on the side of the desert that they might be expected to feel most secure, Alexander resolved to strike across it himself with one division of his army, into the heart of their country, while two other corps traversed it in other directions, to intercept the retreat of those whom he might drive before him.^b

It was with a wonderful ease and enthusiasm that Alexander and his troops captured citadel after citadel and routed horde after horde, slaying ruthlessly those who fought and those who fled. But it is not with equal ease and enthusiasm that the modern reader peruses a catalogue of victories so long as to grow monotonous. We therefore omit the accounts of the various successes of the Macedonians, and hasten to the picturesque climax before the chief Mallian city as told by Arrian.^a

THE BRAVE MALLIANS

When the defendants were unable to endure the violence of his assault they retired into the castle. Alexander with his forces, having burst open one of the gates of the city, entered, and took possession thereof, a long time before the rest. Perdicas and his party no sooner mounted the walls (for many of them had not yet recovered their ladders) than they perceived the city taken, because the walls were left defenceless.

However, the besieged, entering the castle, and being resolutely bent to hold it, some of the Macedonians endeavoured to undermine the walls, others to scale them, and accordingly busied themselves in fixing their ladders, wherever they could, with design to storm the place. But Alexander, not brooking their slow proceedings, snatched a ladder out of the hands of one of the soldiers, and applying it to the wall, immediately mounted, having guarded his body with his shield. Peucestas followed his steps, bearing the consecrated shield, which Alexander had taken from the temple of the Trojan

Pallas, and had ordered to be borne before him in all his battles; after him, Leonnatus ascended by the same ladder, and Abreas (one who received a double stipend, on account of former services) by another. And now Alexander, having gained the top of the battlements, and fixed his shield for defence, drove some of the defendants headlong down into the castle, and slew others with his sword, clearing the place where he stood.

But the royal targeteers being solicitous and endeavouring to ascend in too great numbers, broke the ladders, and thereby not only fell down themselves, but hindered others from mounting. Alexander, in the meantime, stood as a mark for all the Indians, who were in the adjacent towers, for none of them durst venture to come so near him as to fight hand to hand; and those within the castle also cast their darts at him, but at some distance (for the Indians had thrown up a rampart there within the wall, where they stood, and they easily perceived who he was, both by the brightness of his armour, and the greatness of his courage). However, he resolved, rather than to continue exposed in that station, where nothing was to be done worthy notice, to cast himself directly into the castle, imagining that such an action would strike a terror into the besieged, or at least it would add greatly to his glory, and if he died there, he should gain the admiration and applause of posterity; upon which he immediately leaped down into the castle, where, fixing himself against the wall, some of the enemy who rushed forwards upon him he slew with his sword, and among the rest, the Indian general. Others, as they advanced towards him, he smote with stones, and beat them back; but upon their second, and higher approach, he slew them also with his sword, so that the barbarians durst now no more attempt to come within his reach, but gathering about him, at some distance, threw their darts, and such other weapons, at him, as they had, or could find, from that station.

Peucestas, Abreas, and Leonnatus were the only three persons of the whole Macedonian army who mounted the castle wall before the ladders broke, and they leaped down on the inside and valiantly fought to save their king. Abreas was wounded in the face with an arrow, and fell down dead. Alexander's breastplate was pierced through with an arrow, whereby he received a wound in the breast, which Ptolemy says, was so dangerous that, by the vast effusion of blood, his life was despaired of: nevertheless, so long as he was hot, he retained his innate courage, and defended himself valiantly; but the blood streaming from him, and his spirits sinking, he was seized with a dizziness in his head, and a chillness throughout his limbs, whereupon he fell forward upon his shield. Peucestas then, with the sacred shield of Pallas, stood by the king, and protected him from the enemies' darts on the one side, as did Leonnatus on the other; but they were also sore wounded, and Alexander was very nigh losing his blood and life together.

The Macedonians without were in the utmost anxiety to decide how they should ascend the walls, and get to the inside of the castle, fearing lest their king, who had rashly exposed himself by scaling the walls, and leaping down among the enemy, should be in danger; and their ladders being broken, they used all their skill to contrive other ways to mount: whereupon some of them drove large iron pins into the wall (which was built with brick), and taking hold of those, hoisted themselves up with great difficulty; others mounted upon the shoulders of their companions, and so gained the top; however, he who ascended first leaped down on the other side, and saw the king lying prostrate; and afterward, others following, with dreadful

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shouts and lamentations, a sharp battle ensued, they endeavouring with all their might to save their king, by covering him with their shields. In the meanwhile, others having torn off the bars, and forced open a gate between two towers, made way for their companions to enter, and a part of the wall giving way to the violent shocks of some others, opened a new passage into the castle.

ALEXANDER'S SEVERE WOUND AND THE ARMY'S GRIEF

A mighty slaughter of the Indians then ensued, every individual found being cut off, and not so much as the women or children spared. The Macedonians then turned their thoughts on their king, whom they bore away upon his shield, not knowing whether he would die or live. Some authors relate that Critodemus, a physician of Cos, laid open his wound and drew out the arrow; others, that Perdicas performed that task, no physician being present and the case urgent: for Alexander commanded that the wound should be opened, though with a sword, and the dart drawn out of his body. However, he lost abundance of blood in the operation, and again fainted away.

While the king lay there, to wait for the healing of his wound, news was carried to the camp, from whence he set out on that expedition, that he was dead; upon which a sudden cry run throughout the camp, as the report spread from one to another: and when they came a little to themselves, and began to set bounds to their grief, they were strangely perplexed, and in great doubt, who should be chosen to head the army (for many seemed to have equal pretence to that dignity, by their merit, not only in Alexander's opinion, but also in that of the Macedonians), and how they should be led safe into their own country, being surrounded with so many fierce and warlike nations; some whereof, whom they had not yet visited, would, in all probability, fight stoutly for their liberty, and others, whom they had, would revolt, when they were freed from the fear of Alexander. Besides, when they begun to consider how many vast rivers were between them and their country, which they were in no ways able to pass over, they were almost driven to despair; and indeed everything seemed terrible to them, when they wanted their king: and even when the former accounts were contradicted, and news came of his being still alive, the messenger could hardly find credit, for they had before heard that there were but small hopes of his life—nay, when letters arrived signifying that he would return to the camp in a short while, the news seemed incredible to many; for they supposed that the letters had been no more than a contrivance of his bodyguards and the generals of his army.



AN INDIAN PRINCE, TIME OF ALEXANDER

When Alexander came to the knowledge of this, he began to fear that an insurrection might happen, for which reason, as soon as his health would admit, he ordered himself to be conveyed to the banks of the river Hydraotes, and from thence, down the stream, to the camp, which was nigh the confluence of the Hydraotes and Acesines, where Hephæstion had the command of the army, and Nearchus of the navy. When the ship, which had the king on board, approached in view of the camp, he ordered the cover of his royal pavilion to be hoisted upon the poop thereof, to be seen by the whole army. But neither yet did many believe him to be alive, thinking the ship was bringing his dead body, until at last he drew near the shore, and stretched out his right hand to the multitude.

Then a loud shout was raised for joy, some holding up their hands to heaven, others to their king; and many, who despaired of his life, melting into tears, by such a sudden and unexpected joy. And when, upon his coming on shore, they brought the bed or litter, whereon he had been carried before, he refused it, and ordered his horse to be made ready, which having mounted, he again received the joyful acclamations of the whole army; the banks and neighbouring woods, echoing with the sound. When he approached his tent, he leaped from his horse, and showed himself also to his army on foot, to give them the greater certainty of his health. Then arose a general emulation among them, and they strove which should approach nighest to him, and some were ambitious to touch his hands, others, his knees, others aspired no nigher than his garment; and some were even satisfied with the sight of him, and with wishing him health and happiness; some brought garlands, and others, flowers such as the country produced to strew in his way; and when some of his friends reproved him for exposing himself to such dangers for the army, and told him, it was not the business of a general, but of a common soldier, Nearchus tells us he took their reproofs ill, and the reason why he was offended at the liberty they used, seems to be, because their reproofs were just, and he was conscious he deserved them. However, his fortitude in battle, and his thirst after glory, hurried him so far, that he could not contain himself, nor keep out of the midst of danger.^e

While Alexander was convalescent from his grievous wound, such of the Malli and Sudracæ as remained alive sent ambassadors and made submission with what tattered pride they could muster. They were banqueted and then attached to the satrapy of Philippos, and a thousand of their best troops required to follow Alexander down the river. At the juncture of the Acesines with the Indus he bade Philippos build a city. His father-in-law Oxyartes, bringing news of the misconduct of Tyriaspes the satrap of Paropamisus, was given the satrapy for his own. Craterus was sent westward into Carmania with the bulk of the land-forces. The opulent principedom of Musicanus submitted gracefully, but later revolted, and Musicanus was hanged upon a cross as an example. The prince of Pattala surrendered without struggle and Alexander sailed on to the ocean. Here the Macedonians first saw a real oceanic tide, and many of their vessels, after being stranded, were later shattered by the swift reflux of that coast, till the frightened troops as Quintus Curtius says "neither dared trust themselves on the land, nor remain on board," and there followed the usual result of panic, for as old John Digby in 1747 quaintly translated Curtius "in all tumultuary assemblies, haste is of pernicious consequence."

Nearchus, the admiral, was now left to conduct the fleet from the Indus to the Tigris by way of the Persian Gulf, a marvellous feat of seafaring in

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that early day. Alexander about August moved westward by land, soon striking the desert of Gedrosia, where the horrors of the march deserve fuller description.^a

THE DESERT MARCH

He himself then marched forward to Pura, the capital city of the Gedrosi, where he arrived the sixtieth day, after his departure from the country of the Oritæ. Many of the writers of Alexander's life tell us that all the hardships which his army endured in his expedition through Asia were not to be compared with those they underwent in that march. And Nearchus assures us that though he could not possibly be ignorant of the difficulties they must struggle with in such a country, yet nevertheless he was resolved to go forwards.

He tells us the inhabitants informed him that no general was ever able to conduct an army safe through these deserts; that Semiramis entering them with great numbers of men in her flight from India, carried no more than twenty through out of her whole army: and that Cyrus, the son of Cambyses, who also attempted to invade India, but miscarried, lost the greatest part of his forces in those dangerous wastes, himself and seven of his followers only escaping; that these stories being told to Alexander were so far from damping his resolutions that he was thereupon the rather excited to attempt to conduct his army through these parts, where both Cyrus and Semiramis had failed of success, to show that no country was impassable to such soldiers, led on by such a general.


For these reasons, as also that he might be nigh the seacoast to provide necessities for his fleet, he chose to return that way. However, the heats were so vehement and their want of water so much, that many of his men and most of their beasts of burden died—some by being smothered in the deep scorching sands, but the greatest part of thirst; for they found many little tumuli or hillocks of sand which they were obliged to ascend, and where no firm footing could be had, but they sank deep into it, as they would into clay or new-fallen snow; and their horses and mules were no less harassed and wearied out by the excessive heats and intolerable fatigues of such a march than the men. The great distance of their resting-places was one occasion of the army's hardship, for their want of water caused them oftentimes to continue their march much farther than otherwise they would. Then the length of the march, with the excessive heats and raging thirsts they endured, despatched many of them.

The soldiers then began to slay many beasts of burden for their own use; for when provisions failed they consulted together, and killed both horses and mules, and ate their flesh, and afterwards excused themselves, by pretending that they died of heat or thirst, and there was none who took the pains to inquire thoroughly into the affair: even Alexander himself, it is said, was not ignorant of it; but as their necessities pleaded in their behalf, he deemed it prudence rather to conceal his knowledge thereof, than to seem to authorise it, by suffering the guilty persons to escape punishment. And now, to such straits were they reduced, that neither the sick, nor those who were weary with travel, could be drawn any further, partly for want of beasts, and partly for want of carriages—which the soldiers themselves, because they could not easily drag them through the sands, broke in pieces. Many also broke their wagons, before they began this march, through fear that they should be forced to leave the shorter

and nearer path, and take that which was farther about, only because it was more convenient for carriages.

On this account, many were left behind — some by reason of sickness — some of heat and weariness, and others of thirst; and none took care, either to restore them to health again, or to help them forwards; for the army moved apace, and the whole was so much in danger that they were obliged to neglect the care of particular persons. If any chanced to fall asleep, by reason of the vast fatigues of a hard night's march, when they awaked, if they had strength they followed the army by the track of their footsteps, though few of them ever came up with it, the far greatest part sinking into the sands, like sailors into the ocean, and so perishing.

Another accident also happened, which equally affected man and beast; for the Gedrosian country, like the Indies, is subject to rains while the Etesian winds blow; but these rains fall not in the plains, but among the mountains, where the clouds, not reaching their tops, are, as it were, pent up by the winds and dissolved into showers. When the army therefore, encamped nigh a small brook, for the sake of the water, the same, about the second watch of the night (being swelled with sudden rains, which none of them perceived), poured down such a dreadful inundation, that many women and children, who followed the camp, with the royal furniture, and the baggage mules, which were left alive, were swept away. Nay, so furious was the deluge, that the soldiers were hardly able to save themselves, many of them losing their arms, and some few their lives; many also, who had long endured the utmost extremities of heat and thirst, finding plenty of water, at their first coming here, drank to excess, and died. And hence it was, that Alexander would never, after that time, suffer them to encamp near a torrent, but at the distance of twenty furlongs, at least, to hinder his men from rushing too violently forwards, and drinking too large draughts, to their own destruction; he also took care, that those who came first should not run into the water with their feet, and thereby render it unwholesome to the rest of the army.



GREEK TRIPOD AND BUST

While the army laboured under the most dreadful inconveniences of heat and thirst in this desert, Alexander performed one gallant act, which we can by no means pass over in silence, though some authors affirm it was not done here, but in the desert of Paropamisus. As the forces continued their march through these sands, which reflected the burning rays of the sun upon them, it was necessary that they should send out parties daily to seek for water; the king, though ready to faint away with thirst, marched on foot, at the head of his troops, that his officers and soldiers (as is usual in such cases) might the more patiently endure those hardships which their general shared in common with them. In the meanwhile, some light-armed soldiers, who were despatched to search for water, found a small quantity, not far from the army, in the channel of a brook, almost dried up, but it was very muddy; however, they

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drew it up, and bringing it in a shield, presented it to the king, as a choice gift.

He received it, and returning due thanks to those who brought it, poured it immediately upon the ground, in presence of the army. This action of his encouraged the soldiers, as much as if every man had drunk a share of that water which he refused to taste; and his extraordinary self-denial is no less praiseworthy, than the noble example he showed of a wise and consummate general.

Another accident happened here, which, if it had not been speedily remedied, might have occasioned the loss of the whole army; for the sands being moved to and fro, by the winds, and all the surface reduced to a level, their guides themselves were at a loss how to conduct the army any further: for no sign of any track appeared to point out the path; nor was there so much as a tree, nor a shrub, nor any certain hillock, to be seen to direct them. Besides, they were unacquainted with the manner of observing the motions of the sun by day, and the stars by night, to regulate their march, as mariners at sea to their course by the two Bears, the Phœnicians by the Lesser, but most other nations by the Greater. In this difficulty, Alexander was forced to proceed as chance directed him. However, he ordered his army to turn to the left, and himself, with a few choice horse, went before to point out the road; but their horses, quite spent with heat, were most of them left behind — insomuch, that only he, with five of his followers, passed through the sands, to the seashore, safe on horseback. However, on their arrival there, they dug nigh the coast, and found plenty of water, sweet, and clear; whereupon he ordered the army thither, and, after that travelled seven days along the seacoast, and always found plenty of water. Then, his guides assuring him they knew the way again, they left the sea and led the army into the inland parts again.^e

EXCESSES AND CRUELITIES DESCRIBED BY CURTIUS

By these means the army came at last upon the frontiers of the Gedrosians, whose territory was very fruitful. Here he stayed some time to refresh his harassed troops; in the interim he received letters from Leonnatus, importing “that he had fought and overcome eight thousand foot, and five hundred horse of the Oritæ.” Craterus likewise sent him advice “that he had seized and put into custody Ozines and Zariaspes, two noblemen of Persia, who were contriving a rebellion.” The king afterwards appointed Siburtius governor of that province, in the room of Memnon, who was lately dead, and then marched into Carmania. Aspastes had the government of this nation, and was suspected to aim at innovations during the king’s abode in India; but as he came to meet the king, his majesty thought fit to dissemble his resentment, and kept him in the same station till he could get a clearer information of the crimes he was accused of.

The governor of India having sent him by this time (according to his orders) a great number of horses and draught cattle out of the respective countries subject to his empire, he remounted, and gave fresh equipages to those who wanted. He also restored their arms to their former splendour, for they were not now far from Persia, which was not only in a profound peace, but vastly rich.

As therefore he not only rivalled the glory Bacchus had gained by the conquest of these countries, but also his fame, he resolved (his mind being

elevated above mortal grandeur) to imitate him in his manner of triumph, though it be uncertain whether it was at first intended by Bacchus as a triumph, or only the sport and pastime of the drunken crew. Hereupon he caused all the streets through which he was to pass to be strewed with flowers and garlands, and large vessels and cups filled with wine to be placed before the doors of the houses. Then he ordered wagons to be made of a sufficient largeness to contain a great many, which were adorned like tents, some with white coverings, and some with precious furniture.

The king's friends and the royal band went first, wearing on their heads chaplets made of variety of flowers, in some places the flutes and hautboys were heard, in others the harmonious sound of the harp and lute ; all the army followed, eating and drinking after a dissolute manner, everyone setting off his wagon according to his ability, their arms (which were extraordinarily fine) hanging round about the same. The king, with the companions of his debauchery, was carried in a magnificent chariot laden with gold cups, and other large vessels of the same metal. After this manner did this army of bacchanals march for seven days together, a noble as well as certain prey to those they had conquered, if they had had but courage enough to fall upon them in this drunken condition : nay, it had been an easy matter for a thousand men (provided they were but sober) to have made themselves masters of this riotous army, in the midst of its triumph, as it lay plunged in the surfeits and excesses of a seven days' debauch ; but fortune, that sets the price and credit of things, turned this military scandal into glory. The then present age and posterity since have with reason admired, how they could, in that drunken condition, with safety pass through nations hardly yet sufficiently subdued ; but the barbarians interpreted the rankest temerity imaginable for a well-grounded assurance. However, all this pomp and splendour had the executioner at its heels, for the satrap Aspastes, of whom we before made mention, was ordered to be put to death. Thus we see that luxury is no obstacle to cruelty, nor cruelty to luxury.

About this time Cleander and Sitalces, with Agathon and Heracon (who had killed Parmenion by the king's orders), came to him, having with them five thousand foot and one thousand horse ; but they were followed by their accusers out of the respective provinces of which they had had the prefecture ; and indeed it was impossible for them to atone for so many enormous crimes which they had committed, though they had been instruments in an execution altogether grateful to the king ; for they were not contented to pillage the public, but even plundered the temples, and left the virgins and chief matrons to bewail the violation of their honour. In fine, by their avarice and lust, they had rendered the very name of the Macedonians odious to the barbarians ; but Cleander's fury exceeded all the rest, for he was not contented to defile a noble virgin, but gave her afterwards to his slave for a concubine.

The major part of Alexander's friends did not so much regard the grievousness of the crimes that were now publicly laid to their charge, as the memory of Parmenion, who had been killed by their hands, which perhaps might secretly plead for them in the king's breast ; and they were overjoyed to see those ministers of his anger experience the dire effects of it themselves, and "that no power that is injuriously acquired can be of long duration."

The king having heard their accusation, said "that their adversaries had forgot one thing, and the greatest of all their crimes, which was their despairing of his safety ; for they would never have dared to be guilty of such villainies, if they had either hoped or believed he should have returned

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safe from India." He therefore committed them to custody, and ordered "six hundred soldiers who had been the instruments of their cruelty to be put to death." The same days also the authors of the Persian revolt (whom Craterus had brought along with him) were executed.^f

Still cruelty, in the most odious sense of the word, wanton injustice, was always foreign to his nature; nor have we any proof that his temper had become in other respects harsher, or less even, than before his Indian expedition.

THE RETURN OF NEARCHUS

In the meanwhile he was in painful uncertainty, and was giving way more and more to gloomy thoughts, as to the fate of Nearchus and the fleet. They were at length dispelled by tidings that Nearchus had landed on the coast of Carmania, within a few days' march of the camp. The bearer of the news was the governor of the maritime district in which the event had occurred. Some of the men belonging to the fleet, in an excursion up the country, had fallen in with one of Alexander's soldiers, and learned from him that the king was encamped only five days' march from the sea; by him Nearchus was brought to the governor, who hastened to the camp with the joyful tidings. Alexander sent party after party with means of conveyance for Nearchus. Some of his messengers proceeded but a short distance, and returned without intelligence. Others went further, but lost the road. He began to suspect that he had been deceived, and ordered the governor to be arrested. Meanwhile Nearchus had hauled up his vessels on shore, and had fortified a naval camp, where he left the greater part of his men, and set out, with Archias, his second in command, and five or six companions, to seek the king. On their way they met one of the parties which had been sent with horses and carriages in search of them. But so great was the change made in their appearance by the hardships of the voyage, that, even when they inquired the road to the camp, they were not recognised by their countrymen, until, on the suggestion of Archias, they made themselves known. Some now hastened to inform Alexander of their approach. When he heard of the smallness of their number, he concluded that the fleet was lost, and that they were the only survivors. But their arrival cleared up all mistakes, and diffused universal joy.

The details of the voyage would be foreign to our purpose. Nearchus had been forced to begin it, before the winds had become favourable, by the hostility of the Indians at Pattala; and though he waited four-and-twenty days on the Arabite coast, he afterwards lost three of his vessels in the adverse monsoon. On the coast of Oritis he met Leonnatus, who, after Alexander's departure, had been obliged to defend himself against the combined forces of the natives and their allies. He had gained a great victory with the loss of few men; the satrap Apollophanes was among the slain. From Leonnatus, according to the king's orders, Nearchus received a supply of corn sufficient for ten days, and exchanged some of his least active sailors for better men from the camp; but it does not appear that he lighted upon any of the magazines destined by Alexander for his use. After manifold hardships and perils, from the monsters of the deep, the barrenness of the coast, the hostility of the barbarians, and from the timidity and despondency of his own crews, he at length, with the aid of a Gedrosian pilot, reached the mouth of the Persian Gulf. When they came in sight of Arabia, Onesicritus — with what view is not perfectly clear — urged the admiral

to strike across, and steer to the south. Nearchus however prudently refused to deviate from the king's instructions, and finally landed near the mouth of the river Anamis (Ibrahim), not far to the east of the isle of Ormuz.^b

Now Alexander, having conceived vast designs, had resolved after he had conquered all the eastern coast, to pass out of Syria into Africa, being very much incensed against the Carthaginians, and from thence marching through the deserts of Numidia, to direct his course towards Cadiz; for it was generally reported that Hercules had there planted his pillars. From hence he proposed to march through Spain, which the Greeks call Iberia, from the river Iberus; and having passed the Alps to come to the coast of Italy, from whence it was but a short cut to Epirus. He therefore gave orders to his governors in Mesopotamia "to cut down timber in Mount Libanus, and convey it to Thapsacus, a town in Syria, where it was to be employed to build large vessels, which were afterwards to be conducted to Babylon. The kings of Cyprus were also commanded to supply them with copper, hemp and sails."

While he was doing these things he received letters from the kings Porus and Taxiles, to acquaint him with the death of Abisares by sickness, and that Philip his lieutenant was dead of his wounds; as also that the persons concerned in that action had been punished. Hereupon he substituted Eudæmon (who was commander of the Thracians) in the room of Philip, and gave Abisares' kingdom to his son. From thence he came to Pasargada, which is a city of Persia, and whose satrap's name was Orxines, who in nobility and riches far exceeded all the barbarians; he derived his pedigree from Cyrus, formerly king of Persia; his predecessors had left him a great deal of wealth, which he had very much increased by the long enjoyment of his authority. This nobleman came to meet the king, with all sorts of presents, as well for himself as for his friends; he had with him whole studs of horses ready broke, chariots adorned with gold and silver, rich furniture, jewels, gold plate to a great value, purple garments, and four thousand talents of coined silver. However, this excessive liberality proved the cause of his death; for having presented all the king's friends with gifts far beyond their expectation, he took no notice of Bagoas the eunuch, who had endeared Alexander to him by his abominable compliance; and being informed by some who wished him well, that he was very much in Alexander's favour, he made answer, "that he honoured the king's friends, but not his eunuchs, it not being the custom of the Persians." The eunuch was no sooner acquainted with this answer, than he employed all the power and interest he had so shamefully procured himself to ruin this innocent nobleman.

It happened that Alexander caused Cyrus' tomb to be opened, in order to pay his ashes the funeral rites; and whereas he believed it to be full of gold and silver, according to the general opinion of the Persians, there was nothing found in it but a rotten buckler, two Scythian bows and a scimitar. However, the king placed a crown of gold upon his coffin, and covered it with the cloak he used to wear himself, and seemed to wonder "that so great a prince, who abounded in riches, was not more sumptuously interred than if he had been a private person." Hereupon Bagoas, who stood next to the king, turning to him said: "What wonder is it to find the royal tombs empty, when the satrap's houses are not able to contain the treasures they have taken from thence? As for my own part, I must confess, I never saw this tomb before, but I remember I have heard Darius say that there were three thousand talents buried with Cyrus. From hence

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proceeds Orxines' liberality to you, that what he knew he could not keep with impunity might produce him your favour, when he presented you with it."

Having thus stirred up the king's anger, those whom Bagoas had entrusted with the same affair came in, so that he on one side, and the suborned witnesses on the other so possessed the king's ears, that Orxines found himself in chains before he had the least suspicion of his being accused. This vile eunuch was not satisfied with the death of this innocent prince, but had the impudence to strike him as he was going to be executed; whereupon Orxines looking at him said: "I had heard indeed, that formerly women reigned in Asia, but it is altogether new, that a eunuch should be a king." This was the end of the chiefest nobleman of Persia, who was not only innocent, but had likewise been profusely liberal to the king.¹ At that time Phradates was put to death, being suspected to aim at the regal dignity. "Now," says Curtius, "Alexander began to be too apt to give credit to false informations; from whence it is plain that prosperity is able to change the best nature, it being a rarity to find anyone sufficiently cautious against good fortune. Thus he who a little before could not find in his heart to condemn Lyncestes Alexander, though accused by two witnesses; and who had suffered several prisoners of a mean condition to be acquitted, even contrary to his own inclination, only because they seemed innocent to the rest, and had restored kingdoms to his conquered enemies, at last so degenerated from himself as even against his own sentiment to bestow kingdoms on some at the pleasure of an infamous catimite, and deprive others of their lives."



GREEK WINE JUG

Much about the same time he received letters from Cœnus concerning the transactions in Europe and Asia, whilst he was subduing India — viz., that Zopirio his governor of Thrace, in his expedition against the Getæ, had been surprised with a sudden storm, and perished therein with the whole army; and that Scæuthes being informed thereof had solicited the Odrysians his countrymen to revolt, whereby Thrace was almost lost, and Greece itself in danger; for Alexander having punished the insolence of some of the satraps (who during his wars in India, had exercised all manner of crimes in their respective provinces) had thereby terrified others, who being guilty of the same foul practices, expected to be rewarded after the same manner, and therefore took refuge with the mercenary troops, designing to make use of their hands in their defence, if they were called to execution; others, getting together what money they could, fled. The king being advised hereof, despatched letters to all the governors throughout Asia, whereby they were commanded upon sight to disband all the foreign troops within their respective provinces.

Harpalus was one of these offenders; Alexander had always a great confidence in him, because he had upon his account formerly been banished by Philip, and therefore when Mazæus died, he conferred upon him the satrapship of Babylon, and the guard of the treasures. This man having, by the extravagance of his crimes, lost all the confidence he had in the king's favour, took five thousand talents out of the treasury, and having hired six thousand mercenaries, returned into Europe. He had for a considerable time followed the bent of his lust and luxury, so that despairing of the

[¹ Arriane says, however, that Orxines was proved clearly guilty of defacing and plundering the tomb of Cyrus and of other acts of sacrilege.]

king's mercy, he began to look about for foreign means to secure himself against his anger; and as he had all along cultivated the friendship of the Athenians — whose power was no way contemptible, and whose authority he knew was very great with the other Greeks, as well as their private hatred to the Macedonians — he flattered those of his party that, as soon as the Athenians should be informed of his arrival, and behold the troops and treasure he brought with him, they would immediately join their arms and counsels to his; for he thought that by the means of wicked instruments whose avarice set everything to sale, he might by presents and bribes compass his ends with an ignorant and wavering people.

The king being informed of these things, was equally incensed against Harpalus and the Athenians, and immediately ordered a fleet to be got ready, resolving to repair immediately to Athens; but while he was taken up with these thoughts he received letters of advice that Harpalus had indeed entered Athens, and by large sums gained the chief citizens; notwithstanding which, in an assembly of the people, he had been commanded to leave the town, whereupon he retired to the Greek soldiers, who seized him, and that he was afterwards treacherously killed by a certain traveller.¹ Being pleased with this account, he laid aside his thoughts of passing into Europe; however, he ordered all the cities of Greece to receive their respective exiles, excepting such who had defiled their hands with the blood of their fellow-citizens.

The Greeks not daring to disobey his commands (although they looked upon them as a beginning of the subversion of their laws), not only recalled them, but also restored to them all their effects that were in being. The Athenians were the only people who on this occasion asserted both their own and the public liberty; for, looking upon it as an insupportable grievance (as not being used to monarchical government, but to their own laws and customs of their country), they forbade the exiles entering their territories, being resolved to suffer anything rather than grant admittance to those former dregs of their own town, and now the refuse of the places of their exile.^f

[¹ For a fuller account of the affairs of Harpalus and the exile decree, see Chapter LVIII.]





RUINS OF THE THEATRE OF ATTICUS, ATHENS

CHAPTER LVI. THE END OF ALEXANDER

HIS PROJECTS

ALEXANDER might now be said to have returned into the heart of his dominions; since the Indus, the Jaxartes, and the Nile, had become Macedonian rivers. It was a question at that time of great importance to the whole civilised world, what were the plans now floating in the imagination of the youthful conqueror, if not yet reduced to a settled purpose.

It was believed by many that he designed to circumnavigate Arabia to the head of the Red Sea, and afterwards Africa; then entering the Mediterranean by the Pillars of Hercules, to spread the terror of his arms along its western shores, and finally to explore the northern extremity of the Lake Mæotis, and, if possible, discover a passage into the Caspian Sea. These reports were not altogether without a visible foundation. They seem to have arisen out of the simple fact that Alexander, on his return from India, prepared to equip a fleet on the Euphrates, and sent orders to Phœnicia for vessels to be built there and transported to Thapsacus: thence to sail down the river to Babylon, where a harbour was to be formed, capable of containing one thousand galleys of war.

That a great armament therefore was to be collected, for some operations which were to begin in the Persian Gulf, was sufficiently certain; and Alexander also gave proofs that his views were directed toward Arabia, for he sent three expeditions to survey its coasts: first, a vessel under the command of Archias, the companion of Nearchus, who, however, did not even venture to cross over to the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, but stopped short at one of the islands. Androsthenes, who was afterwards sent out with another vessel, did a little more — he sailed for a short distance along the coast. The boldest of the adventurers was a Cilician, named Hiero, who advanced much farther in the same direction; but his courage and perseverance were at length overcome by the vast range of the coast, which exceeded all his expectations, and on his return he reported that Arabia was nearly as large as India. Yet it would seem, from Arrian's account, that even he had not doubted the age seen by Nearchus.

It can hardly be supposed that Alexander had resolved to attempt the conquest of Arabia, while he was conscious that he knew so little about the nature and extent of the country, especially as the information which he might obtain as to the interior cannot have been encouraging. But it is not the less probable that discovery and conquest in this quarter were the objects which, henceforth to his death, chiefly occupied his thoughts; for the spirit of discovery was here stimulated by a clear prospect of great advantages to be derived from a maritime communication between Egypt and India. To ascertain whether it was possible to open one, and to secure it, if not by conquests at least by colonies planted on the Arabian coast, was a design certainly suited to Alexander's genius, and worthy of his ambition; and this appears to have been the first destination of the new armament. On any other projects which he may have entertained, it would be still more idle to speculate.

For some time after his return, his attention was engrossed by different cares. From every side he continued to receive fresh complaints of the excesses committed by his satraps and other officers, during his absence, and fresh proofs that many of them aimed at establishing an independent authority. The indignation of the people was especially provoked by the spoliation of the sacred buildings. It is probable, that in almost every case such outrages on the national feelings proceeded from the reckless cupidity of the Macedonians, though the native governors may have abused their powers as grossly in other matters. Not unfrequently perhaps they had connived at the misconduct of the Macedonian officers under their command, we may suspect to have been the case with Orxines and Polymachus. So Abulites, the satrap of Susa, and his son Oxathres, were put to death, it is said, for neglect of duty—it would seem too hastily, for Alexander ran Oxathres through the body with his own sarissa; but it was the Macedonian Heracon who had plundered the temple at Susa. Such proceedings may have been the main cause of an insurrection which had broken out in Media, but was suppressed by the satrap Atropates, who brought its author, a Median named Baryaxes, and several of his partisans, to Pasargadæ, where they suffered death. Baryaxes had assumed the erect cidaris, and the title of king of the Medes and Persians, a step to which he was probably encouraged by the popular discontent which had been excited by the extortion and insolence of the strangers.

But such precautions as these were barely sufficient to maintain tranquillity for the present; much more was needed for the future. All that he had observed since his return appears to have strengthened his previous conviction that his empire, to be permanent, must be established on a new basis. And at Susa he began a series of measures, tending, in their remote consequences, to unite the conquerors with the conquered, so as to form a new people out of both, and, in their immediate effects, to raise a new force, independent alike of Macedonian and of Persian prejudices, and entirely subservient to his ends. The first of these measures was a great festival, in which he at the same time celebrated his own nuptials with Statira, the eldest daughter of Darius (who now, it seems, took the name of Arsinoë) and those of his principal officers with Persian and Median ladies of the noblest families. We find an intimation that some address was needed, before the preliminaries could be arranged; and this, from the known temper and views of the Macedonian generals we can easily believe. The king's example had no doubt the greatest weight in overcoming the aversion which they must have felt to such an alliance. The liberality with

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which he portioned their brides out of his treasure also had its effect; and their pride was flattered by the condescension with which he placed them on a level with himself in the ceremony.

THE MARRIAGE OF GREECE WITH PERSIA

Hephæstion received the hand of Drypetis, Statira's sister; it was Alexander's express wish that his friend's children should be related to his own. Craterus was wedded to Amastris, a niece of Darius; Perdicas to a daughter of the satrap Atropates; Ptolemy and Eumenes, to two daughters of Artabazus. For Nearchus, Alexander chose the daughter of Mentor by Barsine, a mark of distinguished favour, since he himself had admitted the mother to his bed, and already had a son by her, on whom he had bestowed the name of Heracles, and who afterwards became a competitor for the throne. To Seleucus he gave a daughter of the Bactrian chief Spitamenes. These are the only names recorded by Arrian, but the whole number of the officers who followed the king's example amounted to nearly a hundred. It was not less important for his object that above ten thousand of the private Macedonians had either already formed a connection, or were now induced to enter into one, with Asiatic women. To render it solemn and binding, a list was taken of their names, and a marriage portion was granted to each.

The wealth of Asia and the arts of Greece were combined to adorn the spectacle with a splendour and beauty worthy of the occasion. A gorgeous pavilion was erected, probably on a plain near the city, capable of containing not only the bridal party but the guests whom the king had invited to the banquet. It was supported by pillars sixty feet high, glittering with gold, silver, and precious stones, and was hung and spread with the richest tissues. Ninety-two chambers, magnificently furnished, were annexed to the building: and an outer court appears to have been enclosed by a partition, likewise hung with costly tapestry, for the reception of the ten thousand newly-married soldiers, each of whom received a golden vessel for his libation; and of the strangers who had been drawn by business or curiosity to the court. In the foreground without, tables were spread for the rest of the immense multitude. The nuptials were solemnised according to Persian usage. A separate seat was assigned to each pair: all were ranged in a semicircle, to the right and left of the royal throne. When the last libation had been announced by a flourish of trumpets to the multitude without, the brides entered the banquet hall, and took their places. The king first gave his hand to Statira, and saluted her as his consort; and his example was followed by the rest. This, it seems, completed the nuptial ceremony. The festivities lasted five days, which were filled up with a variety of entertainments; among the rest, musical and dramatic performances of Greek artists, and feats of Indian jugglers. Alexander's subjects from all parts of the empire vied with each other in the magnificence of their offerings to the king, and the value of the crowns which he received on this occasion is said to have amounted to fifteen thousand talents [£3,000,000 or \$15,000,000].

The nuptial festival was a concession gained from the Macedonians in favour of the ancient masters of Asia. Notwithstanding the king's liberality and condescension, murmurs were excited by the preference which had been given to the Persian ceremonial. Alexander now endeavoured to conciliate them by another act of royal munificence, and by the distribution of rewards

to those who had distinguished themselves in the late expeditions. He declared his intention to pay the debts of every Macedonian in the army; and directed that all who wished to share his bounty should give in their names to be registered. The offer was at first very coldly received, and awakened a suspicion, which indicated an unsound state of feeling, though it arose in part from a reproving conscience, and might also be considered as occasioned by the incredible amount of the proffered donative. It was generally believed that the king's object was chiefly to gain information as to the state of their private affairs, and, from the debts which they had contracted, to form a judgment which could not fail to be often unfavourable on the habits and character of each. Few therefore presented themselves to enter their names.

Alexander, as soon as he discovered the cause of this general backwardness, reproved them for their unworthy distrust, with the remark that it was no more fit that subjects should suspect their king of falsehood, than that he should practise it; and immediately ordered tables to be set in the camp, with heaps of gold, where each might receive the amount of his debts without registering his name. This generous confidence removed all doubts; men of all ranks flocked in with their claims, and the secrecy was felt as a greater favour than the relief.

The sum expended on this largess is said to have been no less than twenty thousand talents. Other rewards were conferred on a great number of persons in proportion to their rank and services. But the popularity which the king gained by these measures was soon to be subjected to a hard trial. For it was not long after that the satraps, who had the charge of the Asiatic youth, selected some years before to be taught the Greek language, and to be trained to war according to the Macedonian system, came to Susa, with a body of thirty thousand young soldiers formed in these schools, equipped and armed in the Macedonian fashion. Alexander himself was delighted with their fine persons and martial bearing, and with the manner in which they executed their manœuvres, and immediately proceeded to incorporate them with his army. The infantry, it seems, was for the present kept distinct from the Macedonian troops; but the cavalry, which was drawn from Bactria and Sogdiana, and other eastern provinces, was admitted into the same ranks with the flower of the Macedonian nobility. A fifth division of horse was formed to receive them; and, at the same time, several of the young Asiatic nobles were enrolled in the escort, a body hitherto selected from the first families of Macedonia.

These changes roused the jealousy and resentment of the old troops, in a much higher degree than any of the king's previous acts. His adoption of the dress and usages of the conquered people had displeased them, because it indicated a purpose which they disliked; the late alliances created perhaps still greater discontent, because they still more clearly and directly tended to the same point. But the new organisation of the army was more than a tendency—it was not a mere indication, but the first step in the execution of the purpose which had alarmed them; it was a beginning of destruction to all the privileges they most valued. Alexander, it was plain, wished to be considered only as their sovereign, no longer as their countryman.

The murmurs of the camp probably did not escape his notice, and may have induced him to set out the earlier from Susa, on a march which, by the new occupation it afforded, would perhaps make the army forget its supposed grievances. He therefore ordered Hephæstion to lead the main body down to the coast, while he himself embarked on board the fleet.^b

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THE MUTINY

When he arrived at Opis, he called his forces together, and issued a declaration, that "all of them, who by age, infirmity, or loss of limbs, found themselves unable to undergo the fatigues of war, should be freely discharged, and at full liberty to return home. But whoever were inclined to stay with him, should taste so largely of his royal bounty as to become the envy of those who tarried at home, and excite other Macedonians freely to share their toils and dangers with them."


This declaration was made by Alexander with a design to please the Macedonians, but it had a contrary effect; for they interpreting it as if they were despised, or deemed useless in any further warlike enterprise, were vehemently enraged, and took that discourse as levelled against them, which was designed for the army in general. Howbeit, upon this occasion, all their former complaints were renewed — namely, his compliance with the Persians in their habit; his allowing the Macedonian habit to be worn by youths who were barbarians, and styling them their successors; and his admission of strange horse into the auxiliary forces; wherefore they were no longer able to contain themselves, but all of them entreated to be absolved from their military oath. Nay, some proceeded so far as to insult him, by telling him that he and his father Ammon, might, for the future, join their forces and wage war against their enemies. Alexander no sooner heard these words (for he was now much more subject to wrath than heretofore) but leaping instantly from his seat where his captains surrounded him, he commanded the chief of those who endeavoured to excite the multitude to sedition, to be seized, and pointed with his hand to his targeteers, to show them whom they should seize. These were thirteen in number, all whom he commanded immediately to be put to death; whereat, while the rest stood amazed, and kept silence, he again mounted his tribunal, and spoke to this effect.

"Far be it from me, O my Macedonians, to endeavour to divert you from your desires of returning home (you having a free liberty to go whenever you think convenient), but I will, that you understand before your departure, how much you are changed from what once you were. And first to begin, as I ought, with my father Philip: he received you into his protection, a poor, wandering, and unsettled people; many of you clothed with skins, and feeding small flocks of sheep, upon the mountains, which yet you could not keep without continual skirmishes with the Illyrians, Triballi, and Thracians, your neighbours, in which you were often unsuccessful. For shepherds' coats of skins, my father arrayed you in the choicest garments; from the barren mountains, he led you down into the fruitful plains, and instructed you in military discipline, so that you had no more occasion to place your safety in rough and inaccessible mountains, but in your own valour.

"He gave you cities to dwell in, and excellent laws and statutes to be governed by. He gained you also the sovereignty over those barbarians who, aforesaid, continually harassed and insulted you, and from a state of slavery, made you free. He added a great part of Thrace to Macedonia, and by reducing the towns upon the seacoast, set open the gate to commerce. He it was that subdued the Thessalians, who were formerly so terrible to you, and made them your servants; and having overcome the Phocians, opened a wide and convenient entrance for you into Greece, instead of one narrow and difficult. The Athenians and Thebans, who had joined in confederacy against you, he so humbled (myself being present to assist him) that whereas we were, before that time, tributaries to the former, and slaves to the latter.

on the contrary, now, both these cities are under our protection. He entered Peloponnesus, and composing matters there, was constituted general of all the Grecian forces, in the intended expedition against the Persians, and thereby acquired, not only glory to himself, but also to the Macedonian name and nation.

“Those were my father’s bounties to you—great ones indeed, if considered by themselves, but small if compared with mine. For when I succeeded to my father’s kingdom I found some golden and silver cups indeed, but scarce sixty talents in his treasury, though I was charged with a debt of his, of five hundred. However, not discouraged by this, I contracted a fresh debt



THE DYING ALEXANDER

(From the bust in the Uffizi gallery)

of eight hundred talents. I marched out of Macedonia, which was scarce able to sustain you, and led you safe over the Hellespont, though the Persians then held the sovereignty of the sea. Then having beaten Darius’ generals in battle, I thereby added Ionia, Æolis, both Phrygias, and Lydia, to the Macedonian empire. I afterwards took Miletus by assault, and received the voluntary homage of many other people and nations, who submitted themselves, and consented to become tributaries. The treasures of Egypt and Cyrene, which we obtained without blows, helped to fill your coffers; Cœle-

Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, are in your possession. Babylon, Bactria, and Susa, are in your power. The wealth of Lydia, the treasure of Persia, the riches of India, and the ocean, are yours. You are constituted deputies of provinces. You are made captains, princes, and generals of armies.

“What, I beseech you, have I reserved to myself, for all the toils I have undergone, except this purple robe and diadem? I have withheld nothing from you; neither can any mortal show a treasure in my custody, besides what is either yours or preserved for your use. I have no private desires to gratify, that I should hoard up wealth on that account, for I observe the same diet with yourselves, and am satisfied with the same portion of rest. Nay, I have been contented with coarser food than many among you, who live deliciously; and I have often watched for you, that you might sleep in ease and safety.

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"Some may, perhaps, insinuate that all these were acquired by your own toils and dangers, in which I, your general, bore no part ; but who dares affirm that he has run greater hazards for me, than I have for him ?

"See, which of you has received wounds, let him open his bosom and show the scars, and I will show mine, for there is none of the forepart of my body free ; nor is there any kind of weapon which is either thrust forwards by hand, or darted, the marks whereof are not plainly to be traced upon this breast of mine ; for I have been wounded with swords in close fight, and with darts and arrows at a distance ; besides, I have been beat to the ground with stones from the enemies' engines ; and notwithstanding I have suffered so much for your sakes, by stones, and clubs, and swords, and missive weapons, yet have I led you victorious through all lands, over all seas, rivers, hills, and plain countries. I solemnised your nuptials with my own, that your children might claim affinity with mine.

"The debts of my whole army I freely discharged, without examining too strictly how they were contracted ; and notwithstanding the vast stipends you then received, you made no small advantage of the plunder of such cities as you took by storm. Add to this, that I bestowed crowns of gold on many of you, as eternal monuments of your valour, and my esteem for you ; and whoever chanced to fall in battle, valiantly fighting, he, over and above the glory which he then acquired by death, was usually honoured with a sumptuous monument. Nay, brazen statues are erected, as testimonies of the valour of some of them in Macedonia, and honours decreed their parents, with a full immunity from all public taxes and impositions ; for none of you, fighting under my banner, had ever any occasion to turn his back upon an enemy.

"And now I had determined to release such of you as are unable any longer to endure the fatigues of war, and send you home, so laden with honours and rewards that your countrymen and fellow citizens should deem you, above measure, fortunate and happy. But since ye are all one mind, and since the same notion of returning has possessed all of you, go all, and report at home that your king Alexander, who had subdued the Persians, Medes, Bactrians, and Sacæ ; who had tamed the Uxii, Arachoti, and Drangæ ; who had reduced the Parthians, Chorasmians, and Hyrcanians, and penetrated as far as the Caspian Sea ; who had forced his way over Mount Caucasus, and through the Caspian Straits ; who had passed the rivers Oxus, and Tanais, and Indus (which last was never passed before, unless by Bæcehus) ; who had ferried over the rivers Hydaspes, Acesines, and Hydrotas ; and had also led you beyond the Hyphasis, if you had not refused to follow him ; who entered the ocean by both the mouths of the river Indus, and afterwards, marching through the barren and sandy country of the Gedrosi (where none ever carried an army safe before) subdued the Carmanians and Oritæ ; who lastly, having conveyed his fleet from the coasts of India, to the Persian Sea, brought you safe and victorious to Susa — tell your countrymen, I say, that after all these great and glorious acts, done for you, you have forsaken him, departed from him, and left him in the hands and under the care of the barbarians, whom he had conquered. When you shall have told all these things, your glory among men, and the notion of your piety towards the gods, will receive a mighty betterment."

Having thus spoke, he leaped suddenly from his seat, and retiring into the palace, neither put on his royal robes, nor admitted any of his friends to see him that day, nor the next ; and on the third having called the Persian nobility round him, he distributed the command of the several troops among them, and as many of them as he had made his relations, he suffered to kiss

him. But the Macedonians, moved with their king's speech, stood before the tribunal, like people astonished, and kept a profound silence; nor did one of their number offer to accompany the king when he retired to his palace, except his friends and bodyguards, who surrounded him. However, many stood still before the tribunal, and refused to depart, though they neither knew what they should do, nor say, there.

But when they came to understand what he had bestowed upon the Medes and Persians — namely, the several commands of the army; and that the barbarians were distributed into several ranks and orders; that the Persian agema was to be called by a Macedonian name; and the troops of auxiliary foot, and others, to be made up of Persians; that the companions, and all the royal cohort of horse, were to consist of Persians; and that the regiment of Persians was to be nominated the royal regiment — they were no longer able to contain themselves, but running straight, in a body, to the palace, they laid down their arms before the gate, as a sign of submission and repentance: then standing without, they begged to be admitted into the king's presence, promising that they would deliver up the authors of the late tumult, and those who had stirred them to sedition; and withal protesting that they would never stir from his gate, day nor night, unless they could move him to take compassion upon them.

When Alexander came to understand this, he immediately came forth to them, and perceiving them humble and dejected, was so much moved with their sorrow and lamentation, that he wept, and stood some time, as though he would have spoke; but they remained in the same suppliant posture. However, at last, Callines, belonging to the auxiliary troop of horse, a man of much esteem, as well for his age as the command he bore, spoke to this effect:

"Thy Macedonians, O king, are grieved and discontented, because thou hast made some of the Persians thy relations, honoured them with the title of thy kindred, and sufferest them to kiss thee; when, at the same time, they are excluded." Then Alexander interrupting him, replied, "I now make you all my kindred, and shall, henceforth, style you so." With that Callines stepped forward and kissed him, and such others, as pleased, followed his example. Whereupon they again took up their arms, and with shouts of joy, and songs, returned to the camp. After this, he sacrificed to the gods, according to the custom of his country, and prepared a royal banquet, which he graced with his presence, where the Macedonians were placed nearest his person; next these the Persians, and then those of all other nations, according to their dignity, or the post they held in the army.

Then the king, and all his guests, drank out of the same cup; the Grecian augurs, as well as the Persian magi, pronouncing their decrees, wishing prosperity to the king and the army, and praying for eternal concord and unanimity between the Macedonians and Persians, for the common benefit of both nations. Nine thousand guests are said to have been present at this entertainment, who all drank out of the same cup, and all joined in the same songs, for the peace and safety of the army.

Then such of the Macedonians as were unable to follow the army, by reason of age, or loss of limbs, were freely discharged, to the number of about ten thousand, who were not only paid their full stipends, according to the time they had served, but each had a talent [£200 or \$1000] given him to defray the expenses of his journey. Those among them who had married Asiatic wives, and had children by them, were ordered to leave their sons

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behind, lest they should be the cause of a sedition in Macedonia, if both the sons and their mothers were sent together. However, he took care to instruct them in the Macedonian manners, and to teach them their military discipline, that so, when they arrived at manhood, he might bring them home, and deliver them, thus accomplished, to their parents.

These uncertain and precarious things he promised them at their departure; but he added one sure and undoubted mark of his good will towards them, by appointing Craterus (whom he found ever faithful to him, and whom he loved as his life) to be their captain, to conduct them safe into their own country; wherefore, wishing them all health and happiness, and weeping to behold them weep, he dismissed them, ordering Craterus, when he had finished his task of conducting them safe home, to take upon him the government of Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly, and preside over the liberties of Greece. He moreover ordered Antipater to come to him, and bring with him other Macedonians, young and vigorous, instead of those who were dismissed. He dispatched Polysperchon away with Craterus, and gave him the next command under him, for fear any accident should happen to Craterus by the way (he being somewhat indisposed at his setting forward) and they should be destitute of a leader.

It was said that Alexander, overcome with the calumnies wherewith his mother had loaded Antipater, was willing to remove him from Macedonia. But perhaps this call of Antipater was not designed for his disgrace; but rather to prevent any mischief arising from their quarrels, which he might not be able to compose. Many letters had been carried to the king, wherein Antipater accused Olympias of arrogance, cruelty, and meddling with what did not become the mother of Alexander; insomuch, that the king is said to have complained, that he was forced to pay her very dear for the ten months she carried him in her womb. Olympias, on the other hand, exclaimed against Antipater, as insolent, by reason of the command he bore, and the people's obedience to him; that he began to be altogether unmindful from whence he received his authority, and judged himself fit for the sovereignty over Macedonia, and all Greece, where he ought only to act as deputy.

Thus was the king continually wearied out with these complaints insomuch, that at last he began to incline to the opinion of those who were for disgracing Antipater, as one who was more to be feared than the other, if the report were just. However, he neither by word nor action, gave the least intimation that his affections were any way estranged.^c

THE LAST EXPEDITION

After the departure of Craterus, Alexander set out for Ecbatana. The state of the treasure, and the country, which had been so long in such hands as those of Cleander and Sitalces, demanded his attention. It was also a point where he might collect information, and concert measures, with regard to the regions which bounded his dominions on the north along the coasts of the Caspian Sea, concerning which his knowledge was hitherto very imperfect. But no doubt one of his main objects was to gratify the Medians by a residence of some months in their splendid capital, one of the proudest cities of the ancient world, where his Persian predecessors had been used to hold their court during a part of the year. Alexander's presence was everywhere felt as a blessing. In his progress through Media he viewed the pastures

celebrated—it seems, under the name of the Nisæan plain—for the number and excellence of the horses bred in them. The number had amounted to 150,000; but, through a series of depredations, which mark the disordered state of the province, it had been reduced by nearly two-thirds. Here he was met by Atropates, the satrap of the northwest part of Media, who, it seems, entertained him with a masquerade of a hundred women, mounted, and equipped with hatchets and short bucklers, according to the popular notion of the Amazons. Such is Arrian's conjecture. The fact, whatever it may have been, gave rise to a story, that Alexander here received an embassy from the queen of the Amazons, and promised to pay her a visit. There were several other objects on this road to attract his attention in a leisurely march: a Boeotian colony planted by Xerxes, which still retained a partial use of the Greek language, and the garden and monuments of Baghistane, which tradition ascribed to Semiramis.

At Ecbatana, after he had despatched the most important business which awaited him there, he solemnised the autumnal festival of Dionysus with extraordinary magnificence. The city was crowded with strangers, who came to witness the spectacle; and three thousand artists are said to have been assembled from Greece, to bear a part in it. The satrap Atropates feasted the whole army; and the Macedonian officers seem to have vied with each other in courtly arts. They put proclamations into the mouths of the heralds, breathing, it is said, a strain of flattery, such as had scarcely been heard by the Persian kings. One of these, which was preserved as a specimen of insolent servility, but is more remarkable as an indication of Alexander's sentiments, was made by Gorgus, the master of the armoury, who presented him with a crown worth three thousand gold pieces, and undertook to furnish ten thousand complete suits of armour, and as many missiles of every sort proper for the attack of a town, whenever he should lay siege to Athens.

GRIEF FOR HEPHÆSTION

Among the theatrical exhibitions there was one which, through the singularity of the subject, has been in part preserved from the oblivion, in which the rest, with numberless better things, have been lost. It was a little drama of the satirical class, entitled *Agên*, the work, as was generally believed, of one Python, possibly the Byzantian, Philip's secretary; but there was also a singular report, that it was written by Alexander himself. If he did not even suggest the subject, or any of the scenes, the passages which have been preserved were certainly designed to gratify his feelings. They allude to the flight of Harpalus, who is mentioned both by his own name, and by a nickname significant of his most notorious vice; to the monument which he had erected at Babylon in honour of Pythionice, and to the largess of corn by which he had obtained the Athenian franchise. The wretched state of Athens, as if it needed such benefactions, is described in a tone of bitter sarcasm, which passes into that of earnest hostility, when one of the speakers observes, that the corn was Glycera's, but might perhaps prove a fatal pledge of friendship to those who had received it. There can be no doubt that in these words the poet meant to speak Alexander's mind.

But the festival was interrupted by an event, which Alexander felt as the greatest calamity of his life. Hephæstion had been attacked some days before by a fever, which at first did not show any alarming symptoms. Trusting to his youth and strong constitution, he had, it appears, neglected

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the directions of his physician, and by his imprudence so inflamed the disease, that it carried him suddenly off. It was a day which was to have been devoted to the gymnastic exercises of the boys. Alexander was witnessing a footrace, when a message was brought to him that Hephæstion was worse. He instantly hurried to his friend's bedside, but before he arrived Hephæstion had expired.

Alexander's grief, though not embittered by self-reproach, was passionate and violent, as that which he showed at the death of Clitus. There is no evidence that Hephæstion possessed any qualities that deserved the preference with which Alexander distinguished him : and indeed there are intimations that, even in Alexander's judgment, his chief merit was the devotion and obsequiousness with which he requited his master's partiality. Perhaps if the attachment had been more considerably formed, the loss would have been less keenly felt. After the first transports of anguish had subsided, Alexander sought consolation in the extravagant honours which he paid to his departed favourite, and in the vain semblance of grief, which he forced all persons and things around him to put on.

We may refuse, with Arrian, to believe that he was so barbarous and frantic, as to put the innocent physician to death, and to pull down the temple of Æsculapius, if there was one, at Ecbatana. But there is no reason why we should question Plutarch's statement, that he ordered the horses and mules to be shorn, and the town walls to be dismantled of their battlements.¹ These were probably among the customary signs of a general mourning on the death of the Persian kings : and it is certain that he directed one to be observed throughout his Asiatic dominions. He also commanded that, as was usual on the same occasions, the sacred fire should be quenched in all the Persian sanctuaries until the funeral was over. For this, preparations were made on a scale of more than royal magnificence. He ordered Perdicas to convey the corpse to Babylon, where a pile was to be built at the expense of ten thousand talents [£2,000,000 or \$10,000,000], and funeral games were to be celebrated with a splendour never before witnessed : for which purpose all the artists assembled at Ecbatana were to repair to the capital. The courtiers, especially those who might be suspected to entertain very different feelings, endeavoured to prove their sympathy with the king by extraordinary tokens of veneration for the departed favourite. Eumenes, who had lately had a violent quarrel with him, which was only composed by the royal authority, dexterously set the example, and dedicated himself and his arms to the deceased ; perhaps anticipating Alexander's wish, that Hephæstion should receive sacred honours. He was anxious that this should be done under the sanction of religious authority, and therefore sent to consult the oracle of Ammon on the question, whether Hephæstion should be worshipped as a hero or a god. In the meanwhile, it is said, he ordered the sound of music to cease in the camp. The division of the cavalry which had been commanded by Hephæstion, was to retain his name, and the officer to whom it was committed was to be regarded only as his lieutenant.

These fantastic cares, however, served but to cherish his melancholy, and his officers endeavoured to divert him by some fitter occupation, which might draw him from Ecbatana, where he was constantly reminded of his bereave-

¹ Droysen^d rejects these reports with the utmost contempt ; perhaps forgetting what Herodotus (IX, 24) relates of the mourning for Masistius, in which the Persians shaved themselves, and the horses, and the beasts of burden : a precedent, which at least proves that there is nothing absurd or incredible in Plutarch's account ; if it does not render it certain that the same marks of grief were a necessary part of the general mourning ordered by Alexander.

ment. He at length began to rouse himself, and complied with their wishes. An object opportunely presented itself, which called him again into action, and in the manner most suited to the present temper of his soul. The Kossæans, who inhabited the highlands on the confines of Media and Persia, were still unsubdued; and, relying on their mountain strongholds, continued from time to time to make predatory inroads on their neighbours. Though it was now the depth of winter, Alexander set out to punish and quell them. He divided his forces into two columns, and gave the command of one to Ptolemy. The obstacles opposed by the country and the season were such as he was used to overcome: the barbarians could do little to bar his progress. They were hunted like wild beasts into their lairs, and every man taken capable of bearing arms was put to the sword. It was a sacrifice to the shade of Hephæstion, in which Alexander might see another resemblance to Achilles. He then crossed the mountains, and, coming down upon the Tigris, took the direct road to Babylon.

TO BABYLON



GREEK URN

At the distance of some days' march from the city, he was met by presages of impending calamity. A deputation of the Chaldean priests came to the camp, and requested a private audience, in which they informed him that their god Belus had revealed to them that some danger threatened him, if he should at that time enter Babylon. Alexander is said to have replied with a verse of Euripides, expressing disbelief in divination. But it is certain that the warning sank deep into his mind. The state of his feelings was apt for gloomy forebodings: and there was a strange harmony between the words of the Chaldeans, and an intimation which he had lately received from a Greek soothsayer, named Peithagoras.

Still the priests found that they could not induce the king to give up his intention of visiting the capital of his empire, where many important affairs were to be transacted, and

embassies from remote parts of the world were awaiting his arrival. They then urged him at least not to enter the city by the eastern gate, so as to have his face turned towards the dark west. This mysterious advice struck Alexander's fancy; he altered the course of his march, and proceeded some distance along the bank of the Euphrates. But he then found that the lakes and morasses formed by the inundations of the river to the west of Babylon would prove an insurmountable obstacle. He was still reluctant to neglect the warning of the Chaldeans, but yet not now indisposed to listen to Anaxarchus, and the other philosophical Greeks about him, who treated the occult science, and especially its Babylonian professors, with contempt. There was however another motive for distrust, a suspicion that his priestly counsellors were less concerned about his safety than their own. Alexander, before he left Babylon, had ordered the great temple, which Xerxes had demolished, to be rebuilt under the superintendence of the

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priests. The revenues which had been assigned by the Assyrian kings, for the maintenance of the temple-worship, were also managed by the priests, and, while the temple lay in ruins, had been applied by them to their own use. They knew that Alexander's presence would soon put an end to such abuses.

Thus then he at length entered Babylon, not without a secret misgiving, by the ominous quarter.¹ The Great City had probably never before witnessed so stirring a scene as was exhibited by the crowds now assembled for various purposes within its walls. Nearchus had brought in the fleet from Opis: the vessels transported over land from Phœnicia had come down from Thapsacus: the harbour was in progress, and other ships were on the stocks in the arsenals of Babylon itself. Another crowd of workmen and artists were busied with Hephæstion's funeral pile, and with the preparations for his obsequies. And never before had Alexander's imperial greatness been so conspicuously displayed as in the embassies from foreign states, which were now in attendance at his court.² It seems indeed that there was a disposition among some of his historians to exaggerate the number and variety of those embassies. We must perhaps pass over as doubtful those which are said to have come—surprising the Macedonians and the Greeks by the novelty and strangeness of their names and garb—from the European Scythians, from Celtic and Iberian tribes, from Ethiopia, from Carthage, from Libya, and from at least three of the Italian nations, the Bruttians, Lucanians, and Tyrrhenians.

The object of the Italian embassies is not mentioned: those of the Bruttians and Lucanians may be easily accounted for, since, only six or seven years before, the conqueror's kinsman and namesake, Alexander of Epirus, had perished in war with them. We are prepared to accept the testimony that they were met at Babylon by envoys from Rome, and though the scene may appear to us so memorable as to have afforded temptation for fiction, the fact was recorded before the greatness of the Roman name could have suggested the thought. Strabo mentions an occasion which might have led to this embassy. Alexander—we know not precisely when—had sent remonstrances to the Romans on account of injuries which his subjects had suffered from the pirates of Antium, which was subject to Rome. Alexander would probably have been satisfied with such a supremacy in Italy as he had acquired in Greece: that no general confederacy would have been formed against him by the Italian states: and Rome, single-handed, could not long have withstood such an army as he could have brought against her, backed by the forces and treasure of Greece, Asia, and Africa.

Among the embassies were several from Greek cities. He gave precedence according to the dignity of their temples. So Elis took the lead, and was followed by Delphi and Corinth: but the shrine of Ammon was recognised as second to Olympia. The Epidaurians received an offering for their god, though Alexander added the remark, that Æsculapius might have treated him better, than to suffer him to lose his dearest friend.

The honours designed for Hephæstion continued to share his earnest attention with graver business. The funeral pile was at length completed, and was a marvel of splendour, such as the gorgeous East had never beheld.

¹ That Alexander's return to Babylon took place early in 323, may now be considered as sufficiently certain.

² Niebuhr compares this period with Napoleon's stay in Dresden before he made his fatal march to Moscow. He was similarly surrounded by embassies in crowds.]

A part of the wall of Babylon, to the length of about a mile, was thrown down to furnish materials for the basement, and the shell of the building. It was a square tower, and each side, at least at the foot, measured a stade in breadth: the height was about two hundred feet, divided into thirty stories, roofed with the trunks of palm trees. The whole of the outside was covered with groups of colossal figures, and other ornaments, all of gold, ivory, and other precious materials, and it was surmounted by statues of sirens, so contrived as to emit a plaintive melody. All who courted the king's favour contributed their offerings to the work, or to the obsequies. As to the magnificence of the concluding ceremony, of the funeral games and banquet, nothing more need be said than that it corresponded to the richness of this astonishing work of art, which was raised at an expense about ten times exceeding that of the Parthenon, merely to be devoured by the flames.

Alexander was not of a character to continue long brooding over melancholy thoughts.¹ He appears now to have resumed his great plans with his wonted energy. It was about this time, that he sent out three expeditions to explore the coast of Arabia. He was impressed with the belief, that the Caspian Sea was connected by some outlet at its northern extremity with the ocean which girded the earth, and perhaps hoped that a passage might be found through this channel to the coast of India. With this view he sent Heraclides, with a party of shipwrights, to the shores of the Caspian, to build a fleet, which might survey its coasts, and ascertain its limits. In the meanwhile, he undertook an excursion from Babylon on the Euphrates, to inspect the canal called the Pallacopas, which branched from it to the south-west. He then sailed down the Pallacopas into the lakes which received its waters, and examined the channels by which they were connected with each other. On a part of the shore his eye was struck by a point, which seemed to him well adapted for the site of a city, and he ordered one to be built there, which he afterwards peopled with a colony of Greek mercenaries. The circuit was large, and the passages so intricate, that he was once separated for some time from the main body of the squadron. On his return through this maze of waters, an accident occurred, trifling in itself, but sufficiently ominous, it seems, to revive the uneasy feelings with which he had entered Babylon, and which had subsided when he saw himself once more out of it, and the prediction of the Chaldeans apparently belied. As the royal galley, which Alexander steered himself, passed over the lake, a sudden gust of wind carried away his *causia* into the water, and lodged the light diadem which circled it on one of the reeds that grew out of a tomb. One of the sailors immediately swam off to recover it, and, to keep it dry, placed it on his own head. Alexander rewarded him with a talent, but at the same time ordered him to be flogged, for the thoughtlessness with which he had assumed the ensign of royalty. The diviners, it is said, took the matter more seriously, and advised the king to avert the omen by the infliction of death on the offender.

On his return he found all the preparations for his intended expedition nearly complete. Fresh troops had arrived from the western provinces, and Peucestas had brought an army of twenty thousand Persians, and a body of mountaineers from the Kossæan and Tapurian highlands. The Persians Alexander incorporated with his Macedonian infantry; so as in every file of sixteen to combine twelve Persians, armed with bows or javelins, with four

[¹ Here again, Droysen's *d* picture of Alexander's dejection: "With Hephæstion his youth had sunk into the grave: and, though scarcely beyond the threshold of manhood, he began fast to grow old," seems violently overcharged.]

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heavy-armed Macedonians. And now the envoys whom he had sent to the oracle of Ammon returned with the answer, that Hephestion was to be worshipped as a hero. This was probably as much as Alexander had desired. He immediately proceeded to give effect to the injunction, and sent orders to his satrap Cleomenes, to erect two temples to the new hero, one in Alexandria, the other on the isle of Pharos.

Fresh envoys had also arrived from Greece—from what states we are not informed—to render him the divine honours which he had demanded. They came crowned, according to the custom of persons sent on a sacred mission to a temple, offered golden crowns to him, and saluted him with the title of a god. But, Arrian observes with emphatic simplicity, he was now



RUINS OF GREEK WALL AT ALATRIUM

not far from his end. It seemed to be announced by another sinister omen. The king had been busied with the enrolment of the newly-arrived troops, in council with his officers, who were seated on each side of the throne. Feeling thirst, he withdrew to refresh himself; the council rose for a time, and none were left in the hall but the attendant eunuchs. Before he returned, a man entered the apartment, mounted the steps of the throne, and seated himself on it. The slaves had probably been kept motionless by amazement, when they should have prevented him: but when the deed was done, the etiquette of the Persian court forbade them to lay their hands on one who occupied the seat of royalty, and they rent their clothes and beat their breasts in helpless consternation. The man was examined, and put to the torture, by Alexander's orders, who suspected a treasonable design. According to some accounts, he was a Messenian, named Dionysius, who had been a long time in prison, and had just made his escape. We may infer, that he was out of his senses. He could give no explanation of his act, but that it had come into his mind. Hence it seemed the more manifest to the soothsayers, that it must be viewed as a sign of impending evil. Alexander himself probably so considered it, and it was the more alarming, as it followed so many others: That he was haunted by his gloomy forebodings, and superstitious fancies, to the degree which Plutarch describes, is hardly credible, unless he was already unconsciously affected by the disorder which

proved fatal to him: as on the other hand it seems probable that its secret germs may have been cherished by the dejected state of his spirits.

From the presence of the disease, before its symptoms had become manifest, we may perhaps best explain the behaviour which Plutarch attributes to him in the interview which he had with Antipater's son, Cassander, shortly before his death; a scene which appears to have been attended with very important consequences. Alexander confronted Cassander with Antipater's accusers: and when Cassander treated their charges as groundless calumnies, sternly interrupted him, and asked whether men who had suffered no wrong would have travelled so far to prefer a calumnious charge. Cassander pleaded, that the greater the distance from the scene of the alleged injury, the safer was the calumny. But the king indignantly replied that Cassander showed how well he had studied Aristotle's sophistry, by which every argument might be turned two opposite ways, but that it should avail nothing, if the complaints proved to be in any degree well-founded. So far indeed we only see a proof that Alexander retained the full vigour of his mind and character. Plutarch however adds, what is more difficult to believe, that because Cassander, at his first audience, could not keep his countenance at the sight of the Persian ceremonial, which was entirely new to him, Alexander seized him by the hair, and dashed his head against the wall. This may be a gross exaggeration; but that Cassander's reception was so harsh and violent as to leave an indelible impression of fear and hatred on his soul, is confirmed, as strongly as such a fact can be, by his subsequent conduct.

LAST ILLNESS

The preparations for the projected campaign were now so far advanced, that Alexander celebrated a solemn sacrifice for its success. He at the same time entertained his principal officers at a banquet, and continued drinking with them to a late hour of the evening. As he was retiring to rest, he was invited by Medius—who it seems had of late been admitted to an intimacy with him something like Iiephæstion's—to a revel, which was to be followed by a fresh drinking-bout. He complied, and the greater part of the night seems to have been thus spent. The next evening he again banqueted at the house of Medius, and again the carousal was prolonged.

It was at the close of this banquet, after he had refreshed himself with a bath, that he felt the symptoms of fever so strongly as to be induced to sleep there. The grasp of death was on him, though his robust frame yielded only after a hard struggle to the gradual prevalence of the malady.

We have a minute and seemingly complete account of his last illness, in an official diary which Arrian transcribed. Nevertheless various reports, which it does not sanction, were current in ancient times, and one of them, which ascribed his death to gross intemperance, has always been very generally believed. Another, which has been as generally rejected, attributed it to a dose of poison,¹ contrived by Aristotle, conveyed by Cassander, and administered by Iollas, another of Antipater's sons, who filled the office of cup-bearer to the king. As this report was undoubtedly invented by Cassander's enemies, so the other may have been first circulated by him and his partisans. It represents Alexander as having drained an enormous

[¹ Niebuhr thinks that Alexander could hardly have been poisoned as the poisons of that day always acted within twenty-four hours. This is, however, by no means certain. Aratus, the hero of the Achæan League, died of slow poisoning, according to the high authority of Polybius.]

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cup, a bowl of Hercules, as it was called, and as having instantly sunk as from a sudden blow. This incident certainly would not have appeared on the face of the journal; but neither does it seem quite consistent with Alexander's habits, who, according to Aristobulus, drank chiefly for the sake of prolonging conversation, nor with other details which have been preserved concerning the banquet. If he had been in his usual state of health, the debauch described in the journal would probably have produced no effect on him. It may however both have hastened the outbreak of the fever, and have rendered it fatal. Aristobulus related another fact, which the journal passed over in silence; that in a paroxysm of the fever, the patient quenched his thirst with a large draught of wine.^b

THE DEATH-BED OF ALEXANDER

On the morning of the first of June Alexander awoke very ill. The varied emotions of the last few days, with the rapid succession of banquets, had made him only too susceptible to illness, and the fever took strong hold on him. He had to be carried in his bed to the altar for the morning sacrifice which he was wont to offer daily. He then lay on a couch in the great hall, receiving his generals and giving them the necessary orders for the start: the army was to set out on the fourth of June; the fleet, with which he was going in person, on the following day. He was then carried on his couch to the Euphrates, got into a ship and crossed to the gardens on the farther side, where he took a bath and passed the night shivering with chill. After the bath and sacrifice the next morning, he went into his private apartment and lay on a couch there all day. Medius was there and tried to cheer him by conversation. The king commanded the leaders to appear before him next morning, and having taken a little supper he went to bed.

The fever increased, his condition grew worse, and he passed the whole night without sleep. After the bath and sacrifice next morning Nearchus and the other leaders of the fleet were admitted; the king informed them that their departure must be postponed for a day on account of his illness, but that he hoped to be sufficiently recovered by that time to embark on the sixth. He remained in the bathroom; Nearchus was commanded to sit by his bed and tell him of his voyage. Alexander listened with great pleasure, rejoicing that he too should presently experience similar perils. Meanwhile his condition changed for the worse, the fever was higher every night. Nevertheless on the morning of the fourth of June he called the officers of the fleet together after the bath and morning sacrifice, and commanded them to have everything in readiness for his reception and for the sailing of the fleet on the sixth. After the evening bath the fever set in more violently than ever, the king's strength diminished visibly, and a night of sleepless torment ensued.

Next morning he was carried in a high fever to the great reservoir and offered sacrifice with difficulty; he then gave audience to the officers, issued some orders concerning the sailing of the fleet, discussed the appointments to certain posts with his generals, and left the selections of the officers to be promoted, to them, with the admonition to make a strict examination. The sixth came, the king was prostrated by sickness, nevertheless he had himself carried to the altar, offered sacrifices and prayers, and gave orders for the departure of the fleet to be postponed. A melancholy night followed, and the next morning the king was hardly able to offer sacrifice. He commanded

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the generals to assemble in the anteroom of the palace and the captains and officers to keep together in the courtyard. He had himself carried back from the gardens to the palace. He grew weaker every moment ; when the leaders were admitted he recognised them but was not able to speak. The fever continued through the night, and through the following day and night the king lay speechless.

The impression produced by the king's illness in both the army and the city was beyond description ; the Macedonians thronged round the palace, they begged to see their king, they feared that he was dead already and that his death was kept secret ; they did not cease their lamentations, threats, and entreaties until the doors were opened to them. Then they filed past their king's bed, and Alexander raised his head slightly, gave his hand to each and looked his silent farewell to his veterans. On the following day (it was the tenth of June) Pithon, Peucestas, Seleucus, and others went to the temple of Serapis and inquired of the god whether the king would be better if he were carried into his temple and prayed to him. The answer was "Bring him not, if he remains where he is he will soon be better." And on the day after, towards the evening of the eleventh of June, Alexander died.^d





CHAPTER LVII. VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF ALEXANDER

Now that we have compassed the so great deeds of a life so short, it is inevitable that the sum total of the man's varied activity should be reckoned up into a brief statement of the value of his career to civilisation. The sums arrived at in Alexander's case have been as various as the minds that have made them up. A brief collection of them is full of contrast and illumination.^a

HIS VICES AND VIRTUES (ARRIAN)

His body was beautiful, and well proportion'd ; his Mind brisk and Active ; his Courage wonderful. He was strong enough to undergo Hardships, and willing to meet Dangers ; ever ambitious of Glory, and a strict observer of Religious Duties. As to those Pleasures which regarded the Body, he shewed himself indifferent ; as to the Desires of the Mind, insatiable. In his Counsels he was sharp-sighted, and cunning ; and pierc'd deep into doubtful Matters, by the Force of his natural Sagacity. In marshalling, arming, and governing an Army, he was thoroughly skill'd ; and famous for exciting his Soldiers with Courage, and animating them with Hopes of Success, as also in dispelling their private Fears, by his own Example of Magnanimity. He always enter'd upon desperate Attempts with the utmost Resolution and Vigour, and was ever diligent in taking any Advantage of his Enemies' Delay, and falling upon him unawares. He was a most strict observer of his Treaties ; notwithstanding which he was never taken at a Disadvantage, by any Craft or Perfidy of his Enemies. He was sparing in his Expenses, for his own Private Pleasures, but in the distribution of his Bounty to his Friends, Liberal and Magnificent.

If anything can be laid to Alexander's Charge, as committed in the heat and violence of Wrath, or if he may be said to have imitated the Barbarian Pride a little too much, and bore himself too haughtily, I cannot think them such vast Crimes ; and especially when one calmly considers his green Years, and uninterrupted Series of Success, it will appear no great Wonder if Court

Sycophants, who always flatter Princes to their Detriment, sometimes led him away. But this must be said, in his behalf, that all Antiquity has not produced an Example of such sincere Repentance, in a King, as he has shewed us. I cannot condemn Alexander for endeavouring to draw his Subjects into the Belief of his Divine Original, because 'tis reasonable to imagine he intended no more by it, than to procure the greater Authority among his Soldiers. Neither was he less famous than Minos, or Æacus, or Rhadamanthus, who, all of them challeng'd Kindred with Jove; and none of the ancients condemn'd them for it; nor were his glorious Actions any way inferior to those of Theseus, or Ion, tho' the former claim'd Neptune, and the latter Apollo, for his Father. His assuming and wearing the Persian Habit, seems to have been done with a political View, that he might appear not altogether to despise the Barbarians, and that he might also have some Curb to the Arrogance and Insolence of his Macedonians. And for this Cause, I am of Opinion, he plac'd the Persian Melophori among his Macedonian Troops, and Squadrons of Horse, and allow'd them the same share of Honour. Long Banquets, and deep Drinking, Aristobulus assures us, were none of his Delights; neither did he prepare Entertainments for the sake of the Wine (which he did not greatly love, and seldom drank much of) but to Rub up a mutual Amity among his Friends.

Whoever therefore attempts to condemn, or calumniate Alexander, does not so much ground his Accusation upon those Acts of his, which really deserve Reproof, but gathers all his Actions as into one huge Mass, and forms his Judgment thereupon: But let any Man consider seriously who he was, what Success he always had, and to what a pitch of Glory he arrived; who, without Controversy, reigned King of both Continents, and whose Name has spread through all Parts of the habitable World; and he will easily conclude, that in comparison of his great and laudable Acts, his Vices and Failings are few and trifling, and which, in so prodigious a Run of Prosperity, if they could be avoided, (considering his Repentance and Abhorrence of them afterwards) may easily be overlooked, and are not of Weight sufficient to cast a Shade upon his Reign.

I am persuaded there was no Nation, City, nor People then in being whither his Name did not reach, for which Reason, whatever Origin he might boast of or claim to himself, there seems to me to have been some Divine Hand presiding both over his Birth and Actions, insomuch, that no mortal upon Earth either excel'd or equal'd him.^b

HIS FAVOUR WITH FORTUNE (ÆLIANUS)

Commendable and renowned be the actes of Alexander which he dyd at Granicus and Issus. His foughten field at Arbeles, the taking of Darius, the subduing of the Persians to the Macedonians, the conquering of al Asia, the bringyng of the Indians under his owne dominion, etc. Lawdible be his feats of armes donne at Tyrus, and Oxydacris: But what meane we to comprehend in a skantlyng of lynes the puisaunce of so incomparable a Prince? let it be as some envyous varlets and backbiting tonges woulde have it, that the prosperous successe of his adventures is to be attributed to Fortune, what of that? yet is he notable and praiseworthy notwithstanding, insomuch as his fortune never fainted nor fayled, and in that hee was lulled in the lappe of so loving a Lady that she never withdrew her favour from him.^c

IF ALEXANDER HAD ATTEMPTED ROME (LIVY)

[When the historian of Rome, old Livy, was writing of the comparatively obscure general, Papirius Cursor, the fact that he was contemporary with Alexander and would have had to meet him had he come against Italy, led Livy to breathe so Roman a defiance to the world-conqueror that we must needs quote it here, preferably in the old-fashioned garb of the anonymous translation of 1686.]

Without doubt in that Age, which yielded as great plenty of gallant Captains as any, there was not a Person on whom the State of Rome did more rely and depend, insomuch, as some Writers have concluded, that he [Papirius Cursor] would have been an equal match to the Great Alexander, if after the Conquest of Asia, he had bent his Arms against Europe.

Now although from the beginning of this Work it may sufficiently appear, that I have sought nothing less than Digressions from the just order and series of the Story; nor have at all endeavored, by extravagant Varieties, to garnish it, or with pleasant Sallies to divert the Reader and refresh myself; yet happening upon the mention of so great a King, and so renowned a Captain, I could not but be moved to disclose and set down those thoughts which have oft occur'd to my mind, and inquire a little, What event would probably have succeeded to the Roman Affairs, had they happened to have been engaged with this Illustrious Conqueror. As the Roman State bore up against other Kings and Nations, so it might have prov'd to him also Invincible. To begin with ballancing the Commanders one against another, I do not deny but Alexander was an excellent Leader, but that which enhanc'd his Fame, was, That he was a sole and Sovereign Commander; a young Man, his Sails always full blown with prosperous Gales, and one who dyed before ever he had labored under any of the frowns of Fortune. For to omit other glorious Princes and renowned Captains, illustrious Examples of the uncertainty of Humane Grandeur: What was it that exposed Cyrus (whom the Greeks so highly magnifie) or our great Pompey of late, to the turning Wheel of Fortune, but only this, That they lived long? On the other side, Let us take a review of the Roman Commanders, I mean not through all Ages, but such as being Consuls or Dictators about those times, Alexander must have engaged with, if he had spread his Ensigns this way; there were M. Valerius Corvinus, C. Marcius Rutilus, C. Sulpicius, T. Manlius Torquatus, Q. Publilius Philo, L. Papirius Cursor, Q. Fabius Maximus, the two Decii, L. Volumnius, Manlius Curius, besides abundance of prodigious Warriors that succeeded afterwards; if he had first set upon the Carthaginians, (as he was resolv'd to have done, if he had not been prevented by Death) and so had arriv'd in Italy when well stricken in years. Each one of these was master of as good Parts and natural Abilities, as Alexander, and had the advantage of being train'd up in an incomparable Military Discipline, which having been delivered from hand to hand ever since the foundation of their City, was now by continual Precepts arriv'd to the perfection of an Art. And whereas, Alexander often hazarded his Person, and underwent all Military toils and dangers (which was one thing that not a little added to his Glory :) can it be thought, that if Manlius Torquatus, or Valerius Corvinus, had chanc'd to meet him at the head of his Troops, either of them would not have prov'd a Match for him, who were both of them famous for stout Soldiers before ever they had Commands? Would the Decii, that rush'd with devoted Bodies into the midst of the Enemy, have been afraid of him? Would Papirius Cursor, that mighty Man both for strength of Body and gallantry of Mind, have declined to cope

with him? Was it likely that a single young Gentleman should out-wit or manage his Affairs with greater prudence than that Senate which he only, whoever he was, had a right Idea of, that said, "It consisted altogether of Kings"?

Here, forsooth, was the danger, lest he should more advantageously choose his Ground to Encamp on, provide Victuals more carefully, prevent Surprizes and Stratagems more warily, know better when to venture a Battel, range his Army more Soldier-like, or strengthen it with Reserves and Recruits, better than any of those whom I have named knew how to do: Alas! in all these matters, he would have confess'd he had not to deal with a Darius, over whom, being attended with a vast Train of Women and Eunuchs, softened with wearing gold and Purple, and clogg'd with the superfluous Furniture of his luxurious Fortune, he did indeed obtain an unbloody Victory, meeting rather with a Booty than an Enemy, and had only this to boast of, That he durst handsomely condemn such an abundance of Vanity.

He would have had another kind of prospect in Italy than in India, through which he march'd at his ease with a drunken Army, Feasting and Revelling all the way: But here he must have met with the thick woody Forrest, and almost unpassable Streights of Apulia; the lofty Mountains of Lucania, and fresh Tokens of a late Defeat that happen'd to his own Name and Family, where his Uncle Alexander, King of the Epirotes, was hewn to pieces.

We speak hitherto of Alexander, not yet debauch'd with excess of good Fortune, wherein never any Man had less command of himself than he: But if we consider him in his new Habit, and that new Nature, (if I may call it so) which he took up after he had a while been flush'd with Victories, we may avow he would have come into Italy, more like a Darius than an Alexander, and brought with him a bastard Army, altogether degenerated from the Macedonian courage and manners, into the debauches and effeminacies of the Persians. I am asham'd, in so great a Monarch as he was, to relate his proud humors of changing so oft his Garb; his excessive vain-glory, in expecting that Men should adore him by casting themselves prostrate at his feet, when-ever they approached him; his barbarous Cruelties and Butcheries of his nearest Friends amongst his Cups and Banquets, and that ridiculous Vanity of forging a Divine Pedigree, and boasting himself the Son of Jupiter. Nay more, since his Drunkenness and Greediness of wine, his savage Passions and cholerick Phrensies did every day increase (I report nothing but what all Authors agree in), shall we not think that his Abilities, as a General, must quickly have decayed and been wonderfully impaired?

But here perhaps was the danger (which some little trifling Greeks who would cry up the glory even of the Parthians, to depress the Roman name, are often wont to alledge) That the People of Rome would never have been able to endure the very Majesty and dread of Alexanders Name (whom indeed I am apt to think they then scarce ever heard of:) Let us conceit as magnificently as may be of this Prince, yet still it will be but the Grandeur of one Man, acquir'd in little more than twelve Years continued Felicity; and whereas some extol it highly on his Account, That the Romans, though never worsted in any War, have yet been defeated in divers Battels, whereas Fortune was never wanting to Alexander in any one encounter, they do not consider that they are comparing the Exploits of one particular Man, and he too but a Youth, with the achievements of a People that have now been involv'd in Wars eight hundred years.

You ought rather to compare Man with Man, Captain with Captain, than

the Fortune of one with the other. How many Roman Generals may I name, that never suffer'd a Repulse in their days? We can run over whole Pages in the Annals of our Magistrates, full of Consuls and Dictators, whose Success as well as Virtue, was such, as they never gave the Common-wealth so much as one days grief or discontentment. And that which makes them yet to be more admired than Alexander, or any other King in the World; some of them held their Office of Dictator not above ten or twenty days, and none the Consulship beyond a year: Their Levies were often obstructed by the Tribunes of the Commons, so that they set forth too late; and sometimes for holding the Court for Elections, they were sent for home too soon: In the hurry of Affairs the Year was apt to be wheel'd about, and then they must leave all to new Instruments; now the rashness, another time the dishonesty of a Colleague, was either a great hindrance to their Success, or perhaps occasion'd a mischief. Many times they succeeded after the defeat of their Predecessors, or receiv'd a raw and undisciplin'd Army: From all which inconveniences Kings are not only free, but absolute Masters both of their Enterprizes, and the times and means they will take to accomplish them, leading all things by their Councils, and not following them. Had therefore this unconquered Alexander been engaged against these unconquered Captains, he would have hazarded all those past pleasures of Fortunes favor; nay, in this the danger would have been greater, that the Macedonians had but one Alexander, and he not only obnoxious to many Casualties, but voluntarily exposing himself to frequent Dangers. But the Romans had many that were Alexanders equals, both for Glory and the grandeur of their Atchievements, each of whom, might according to his peculiar Fate, either live or dye, without at all endangering the Publick.

It remains now to ballance the Forces on each side, and that neither in respect of numbers, quality of the Soldiers, or the multitude of their Allies and Auxiliaries. There were numbered of Romans in the Surveys taken by the Censors of that Age, two hundred and fifty thousand Polls; and therefore in all the revolts of the Latines, they were able to levy Ten Legions, and that too almost wholly in the City; and frequently in those times, four or five distinct Armies were kept on foot at once, which maintained Wars in Etruria, in Umbria, with the Gauls (Confederates with the Enemy) in Samnium and in Lucania: On the other side, he must have cross'd the Sea, having of old Macedonian Bands not above Thirty thousand Foot, and four thousand Horse, and those most of them Thesalians; for this was the total of his Force when he appeared most formidable. If he should have added to these, Persians, Indians, or others out of his



GRECIAN COSTUME
(After Hope)

new Conquests, they would but more encumber rather than assist him. Then the Romans had Supplies at hand to reinforce them presently from home upon any accident; whereas Alexander (as it happened afterwards to Annibal), Warring in a remote foreign Country, his Army would have mouldered away apace, and could not readily have Recruits. The Macedonians had for their Arms, a Shield and a Spear like a Pike; the Romans, a large Target that skreen'd almost the whole Body, and a Javelin, a Weapon not a little more serviceable than the Spear, both to strike and push with, near hand, and also to be lanced at a distance. The Soldiers of each side were wont to stand firm, and keep their Ranks; the Macedonian Phalanx was immovable and uniform; but the Roman Battalions more distinct, and consisting of several Divisions, more ready to separate and close again upon any occasion.

A Patriotic Estimate of Rome's Greatness

To speak now of labour and travel, What Soldier is comparable to the Roman? Who better able to hold out and endure all the fatigues of War? Alexander, worsted in one Battel, had been utterly undone: But what Power could have broken the Roman courage, whom neither the shameful disgrace at Caudium nor the fatal defeat at Cannæ, could in the least daunt or dispirit? Undoubtedly Alexander, although his first attempt should have prov'd prosperous, would often here have missed his Persians and his Indians; he would have wish'd to have been dealing again with the soft and cowardly Nations of Asia and confest, That before he only fought with Women, as King Alexander of Epirus is reported to have said, when he had here received his Death wound, reflecting upon those easie Occurents of War, which this young Prince (his Nephew) met with in Asia, in respect to those difficulties he himself had to struggle with in Italy.

And truly, when I consider that the Engagements at Sea between the Romans and Carthaginians in the first Punick War, took up no less than four and twenty years' space, I am inclinable to conjecture, that the whole age of Alexander would not have been enough to have finish'd a War with either a one of those States. And since by antient Leagues they were then at Amity and in Alliance with each other, 'tis probable an equal apprehension of danger might have united them against the common Enemy: And what less could he then expect but to have been utterly overwhelm'd and crush'd by the joint Arms of two the most potent Republicks in the World? The Romans, though not indeed in the days of Alexander, or when the Macedonian Power was at heighth, have yet since try'd the courage of the Macedonians, under the conduct of Antiochus, Philip, and Perses, and came off not only without loss, but even without any danger or hazard.

It may seem a proud word, but without arrogance it is spoken, Let there be no Civil Wars amongst us; never can we be distressed by any Enemy, Horse or Foot; never in set Battel, never in plain equal ground, or places disadvantageous, outdone in Courage or Resolution. The Soldier I confess in heavy Armour, may be apprehensive of the Enemies Cavalry in a Champion Country, or be incommoded with Arrows shot from a distance, or embarrass'd in unpassable Woods, or Quarters, where provisions cannot be brought to them; but still let there be a thousand Armies greater and stronger than that of Alexander and his Macedonians, so long as we hold together, and continue that love of Peace, and prudent care of civil Concord, wherein we live at this day, we are able, and ever shall be, to rout and put them all to flight.^d

HIS INVINCIBILITY (GROTE)

[Against Livy's confidence in the Roman bulwark must be placed Grote's trust in Alexander's genius.]

Exalted to this prodigious grandeur, Alexander was at the time of his death little more than thirty-two years old — the age at which a citizen of Athens was growing into important commands; ten years less than the age for a consul at Rome; two years younger than the age at which Timur first acquired the crown, and began his foreign conquests. His extraordinary bodily powers were unabated; he had acquired a large stock of military experience; and what was still more important, his appetite for further conquest was as voracious, and his readiness to purchase it at the largest cost of toil or danger, as complete, as it had been when he first crossed the Hellespont. Great as his past career had been, his future achievements, with such increased means and experience, were likely to be yet greater. His ambition would have been satisfied with nothing less than the conquest of the whole habitable world as then known; and if his life had been prolonged, he would probably have accomplished it. Nowhere (so far as our knowledge reaches) did there reside any military power capable of making head against him; nor were his soldiers, when he commanded them, daunted or baffled by any extremity of cold, heat, or fatigue.

The patriotic feelings of Livy dispose him to maintain that Alexander, had he invaded Italy would have failed and perished like his relative, Alexander of Epirus. But this conclusion cannot be accepted. If we grant the courage and discipline of the Roman infantry to have been equal to the best infantry of Alexander's army, the same cannot be said of the Roman cavalry as compared with the Macedonian companions. Still less is it likely that a Roman consul, annually changed, would have been found a match for Alexander in military genius and combinations; nor, even if personally equal, would he have possessed the same variety of troops and arms, each effective in its separate way, and all conspiring to one common purpose; nor the same unbounded influence over their minds in stimulating them to full effort. I do not think that even the Romans could have successfully resisted Alexander the Great; though it is certain that he never throughout all his long marches encountered such enemies as they, nor even such as Samnites and Lucanians — combining courage, patriotism, discipline, with effective arms both for defence and for close combat.

Among all the qualities which go to constitute the highest military excellence, either as a general or as a soldier, none was wanting in the character of Alexander. Together with his own chivalrous courage — sometimes indeed both excessive and unseasonable, so as to form the only military defect which can be fairly imputed to him — we trace in all his operations the most careful dispositions taken beforehand, vigilant precaution in guarding against possible reverse, and abundant resource in adapting himself to new contingencies. Amidst constant success, these precautionary combinations were never discontinued. His achievements are the earliest recorded evidence of scientific military organisation on a large scale, and of its overwhelming effects. Alexander overawes the imagination more than any other personage of antiquity, by the matchless development of all that constitutes effective force — as an individual warrior, and as organiser and leader of armed masses; not merely the blind impetuosity ascribed by Homer to Ares, but also the intelligent, methodised, and all-subduing compression which he personifies in Athene. But all his great qualities were fit for use only against

enemies ; in which category indeed were numbered all mankind, known and unknown, except those who chose to submit to him. In his Indian campaigns, amidst tribes of utter strangers, we perceive that not only those who stand on their defence, but also those who abandon their property and flee to the mountains, are alike pursued and slaughtered.

Apart from the transcendent merits of Alexander as a soldier and a general, some authors give him credit for grand and beneficent views on the subject of imperial government, and for intentions highly favourable to the improvement of mankind. I see no ground for adopting this opinion. As far as we can venture to anticipate what would have been Alexander's future, we see nothing in prospect except years of ever-repeated aggression and conquest, not to be concluded until he had traversed and subjugated all the inhabited globe. The acquisition of universal dominion — conceived not metaphorically, but literally, and conceived with greater facility in consequence of the imperfect geographical knowledge of the time — was the master passion of his soul.

The Persian empire was a miscellaneous aggregate, with no strong feeling of nationality. The Macedonian conqueror who seized its throne was still more indifferent to national sentiment. He was neither Macedonian nor Greek. Though the absence of this prejudice has sometimes been counted to him as a virtue, it only made room, in my opinion, for prejudices yet worse. The substitute for it was an exorbitant personality and self-estimation, manifested even in his earliest years, and inflamed by extraordinary success into the belief in divine parentage ; which, while setting him above the idea of communion with any special nationality, made him conceive all mankind as subjects under one common sceptre to be wielded by himself. To this universal empire the Persian king made the nearest approach, according to the opinions then prevalent. Accordingly Alexander, when victorious, accepted the position and pretensions of the overthrown Persian court as approaching most nearly to his full due. He became more Persian than either Macedonian or Greek. While himself adopting, as far as he could safely venture, the personal habits of the Persian court, he took studied pains to transform his Macedonian officers into Persian grandees, encouraging and even forcing intermarriages with Persian women according to Persian rites. At the time of Alexander's death, there was comprised, in his written orders given to Craterus, a plan for the wholesale transportation of inhabitants both out of Europe into Asia, and out of Asia into Europe, in order to fuse these populations into one by multiplying intermarriages and intercourse. Such reciprocal translation of peoples would have been felt as eminently odious, and could not have been accomplished without coercive authority. It is rash to speculate upon unexecuted purposes ; but, as far as we can judge, such compulsory mingling of the different races promises nothing favourable to the happiness of any of them, though it might serve as an imposing novelty and memento of imperial omnipotence.

In respect of intelligence and combining genius, Alexander was Hellenic to the full ; in respect of disposition and purpose, no one could be less Hellenic. Instead of hellenizing Asia, he was tending to asiaticise Macedonia and Hellas. His temper and character, as modified by a few years of conquest, rendered him quite unfit to follow the course recommended by Aristotle towards the Greeks — quite as unfit as any of the Persian kings, or as the French Emperor Napoleon, to endure that partial frustration, compromise, and smart from free criticism, which is inseparable from the position of a limited chief.

Cox^J in his *General History of Greece* sees a degeneration already set in foreshadowing his future, had he lived, and agrees with Grote^e as to his asiatic tendency. "It may almost be said that the results which he had achieved were precisely those which would have followed if Xerxes had been the conqueror at Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale."

HIS MEANNESS (MÉNARD AND ROLLIN)

"So ended he," says Ménard, "whom they call Alexander the Great. Let the name stand; but he owed his greatness not to his personal qualities, to his own efforts, or to his genius, but, as Plutarch admitted, to Fortune. Never was there an example of a prosperity so infallible and so little deserved. But Fame is feminine; she measures merit by success. Alexander created a school; his personality encumbers history and usurps an enormous space. The decadence of Greece and the Roman decadence are filled up with pastiches and caricatures of him; even in modern times he has remained the type and the ideal of all warrior tyrants down to Louis XIV and Napoleon.

"The literature that makes his fame is for the most part of poor stuff. The Greeks of the imperial epoch, in order to console themselves for the grandeur of Rome, did their best to inflate the glory of Alexander. This theatrical hero is worth more to the rhetorician than a legislator like Solon or a statesman like Pericles. Men of letters of all countries and times have been overwhelmed by him and found in him the god of monarchic idolatry. Thanks are due to Rollin for having made some reservations. He who lived in the sunlight of royalty was not afraid to say that it was a poor compliment for a king to be compared to Alexander, 'the least estimable of Plutarch's great men.' We hardly read Rollin nowadays and his judgments have little authority; they say that he lacked the power of historic criticism. Perhaps he did, but he had a right conscience, which is worth still more. He made history a school of moral instruction, and it is thus that later generations are formed strong and sane. Our grandfathers, who learned their history from Rollin, achieved the French Revolution." *g*

It is interesting to refer directly to the pages of Rollin alluded to by Ménard. Rollin divides Alexander's life into two distinct halves, the former all beautiful and brilliant; the latter in hideous contrast. We quote from his resumé of the latter and uglier half.^a

His uninterrupted felicity, that never experienced adverse fortune, intoxicated and changed him to such a degree, that he no longer appeared the same man; and I do not remember that ever the poison of prosperity had a more sudden or more forcible effect than upon him.

Was ever enterprise more wild and extravagant, than that of crossing the sandy deserts of Libya; of exposing his army to the danger of perishing with thirst and fatigue; of interrupting the course of his victories, and giving his enemy time to raise a new army, merely for the sake of marching so far, in order to get himself named the son of Jupiter Ammon; and purchase, at so dear a rate, a title which could only render him contemptible?

It appears to me that to the battle of Issus and the siege of Tyre inclusive, it cannot be denied, but that Alexander was a great warrior and an illustrious general. But I much doubt, whether, during these his first exploits, he ought to be set above his father; whose actions, though not so dazzling, are however as much applauded by good judges, and those of the military profession. Philip, at his accession to the throne, found all things unsettled. He himself was obliged to lay the foundations of his own fortune, and was not supported by the least foreign assistance. He alone raised himself to the power and grandeur to which he afterwards attained. He was obliged to train up, not only his soldiers, but his officers; to instruct them in all the military exercises; to inure them to the fatigues of war; and to his care and abilities alone, Macedonia owed the rise of the celebrated phalanx, that is, of the best troops the world had then ever seen, and to which Alexander owed all his conquests. How many obstacles stood in Philip's way before he could possess himself of the power which Athens, Sparta, and Thebes had successively exercised over Greece! The Greeks,

who were the bravest people in the universe, would not acknowledge him for their chief, till he acquired that title by wading through seas of blood, and by gaining numberless conquests over them. Thus we see, that the way was prepared for Alexander's executing his great design; the plan whereof, and most excellent instructions relative to it, had been laid down for him by his father. Now, will it not appear a much easier task to subdue Asia with Grecian armies, than to subject the Greeks who had so often triumphed over Asia?

It must be confessed, that the actions of this prince diffuse a splendour that dazzles and astonishes the imagination, which is ever fond of the great



MERCURY
(From a vase)

and marvellous. His enthusiastic courage raises and transports all who read his history, as it transported himself. But ought we to give the name of bravery and valour to a boldness that is equally blind, rash, and impetuous; a boldness void of all rule, that will never listen to the voice of reason, and has no other guide than a senseless ardour for false glory, and a wild desire of distinguishing itself at any price? This character suits only a military robber, who has no attendants; whose own life is alone exposed; and who, for that reason, may be employed in some desperate action; but the case is far otherwise with regard to a king, who owes his life to all his army and his whole kingdom. True valour is not desirous of displaying itself, is no ways anxious about its own reputation, but is solely intent on preserving the army.

Do any of these characteristics suit Alexander? When we peruse his history and follow him to sieges and battles, we are perpetually alarmed for his safety, and that of his army; and conclude every moment that they

are upon the point of being destroyed. Here we see a rapid flood, which is going to draw in and swallow up this conqueror: there we behold a craggy rock, which he climbs, and perceives round him soldiers, either transfixed by the enemy's darts, or thrown headlong by huge stones from precipices. We tremble when we perceive in a battle the axe just ready to cleave his head; and much more when we behold him alone in a fortress, whither his rashness had drawn him, exposed to all the javelins of the enemy. Alexander was ever persuaded, that miracles would be wrought in his favour, than which nothing could be more unreasonable, as Plutarch observes; miracles do not always happen; and the gods at last are weary of guiding and preserving rash mortals, who abuse the assistance they afford them.

Alexander seems possessed of such qualities only as are of the second rank, I mean those of war, and these are all extravagant; are carried to the rashest

and most odious excess, and to the extremes of folly and fury; whilst his kingdom is left a prey to the rapine and exactions of Antipater; and all the conquered provinces abandoned to the insatiable avarice of the governors, who carried their oppressions so far, that Alexander was forced to put them to death.

Nor do his soldiers appear to be better regulated; for these, having plundered the wealth of the East, after the prince had given them the highest marks of his beneficence, grew so licentious, so disorderly, so debauched and abandoned to vices of every kind, that he was forced to pay their debts by a largess of £1,500,000.

What strange men were these! how depraved their school! how pernicious the fruit of their victories!^h

HIS EVIL INFLUENCE (NIEBUHR)

Alexander is for the East, what Charlemagne is for the West; and, next to Rustan, he is the chief hero of the Persian fairy tales and romances. To us also he is a man of extraordinary importance, inasmuch as he gave a new appearance to the whole world. He began what will now be completed, in spite of all obstacles—the dominion of Europe over Asia; he was the first that led the victorious Europeans to the East. Asia had played its part in history, and was destined to become the slave of Europe. He has also become the national hero of the Greeks, although he was as foreign to them as Napoleon was to the French, notwithstanding that he traced his family to the mythical heroes of Greece.

But his personal character will appear to us in a different light. Many a rhetorician, even in antiquity, formed a correct judgment of him. Who does not know the story of the pirate, who was condemned to death by Alexander, and, on being brought before him, said, that there was no difference between them! The Orientals still call him, "Alexander the robber." I will not judge of him from this point of view, for the whole history of the world turns upon war and conquest; I speak only of his personal character. But, without agreeing with the declamations which have so often been made about him, I unhesitatingly declare, that I have formed a very unfavourable opinion of him. When I behold a young man, who, in his twentieth year, ascends the throne, after having conspired against his father—who then displays in his policy a cruelty like that of the house of the Medici in the sixteenth century, like Cosmo de Medici and his two sons—who not only sacrifices his step-mother to Olympias, but causes the innocent infant of the unhappy Cleopatra, as well as several other near relatives, to be murdered (we do not know their names, as Arrian skilfully evades mentioning them)—who despatched all that knew anything of his complicity, as well as those who had previously offended him—such a young man is condemned for all time to come.

Plutarch shows a foolish and unfounded partiality towards him, and such was universally the case among the Greeks. His drunkenness cannot be denied, and with it they excuse his murders, as, for example, that of Clitus; and, in order poetically to complete the indescribable folly committed by later Greeks, they compare him with Dionysus. But his drunkenness does not account for all he did. He caused the most innocent and most faithful servant, the best general of his father, to be maliciously assassinated in a truly oriental manner; the man had been frank and open, and knew that

Alexander was what he was through him. The murder of his friend Clitus, who told him the truth, was a fearful act. I do not comprehend how persons can excuse Alexander by saying, that he was an unusually great man; if he was so, was he not then responsible for his unusually great powers? All his actions, which are praised as generous, are of a theatrical nature and mere ostentation. His friendship for Aristotle did not save Callisthenes. His attachment to Hephestion was not friendship, but a disgrace. His generosity towards the captive Persian princesses is nothing extraordinary; if it be not ostentation, it is something quite natural, and of everyday occurrence; but it is mere ostentation.

It must, indeed, be acknowledged that Alexander is a most remarkable phenomenon; but the praise bestowed on him can apply only to his great intelligence and his talents. He was altogether an extraordinary man, with the vision of a prophet, a power for which Napoleon also was greatly distinguished; when he came to a place, he immediately perceived its capability and its destination; he had the eye which makes the practical man. If we had no other example of the keenness of his judgment, the fact that he built



WRAPPING THE DEAD IN INFLAMMABLE SHEETS

Alexandria would alone furnish sufficient evidence; he discovered the point which was destined, for fifteen hundred years, to form the link between Egypt, Europe, and Asia. It is impossible not to concede to him the praise of a great general. Nay, a most competent judge, Hannibal, declared him to be the greatest general. It must not, however, be forgotten, that he had most excellent instruments—distinguished generals, and a splendid army. If he had had to create his army, his undertaking would not have succeeded so well. Parmenion, Philotas, Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Antigonos were all distinguished captains, all proceeded from the school of his father, and had acquired great reputation even under him; and, if we except the single Eumenes, we may assert, that no great commander was trained under Alexander. In like manner, King Frederick II inherited an army already trained by his father; and most of his generals had served in the army before his time.

Alexander undertook the Asiatic expedition as a true adventurer. He himself adopted the most contemptible pomp of eastern despotism, and took pleasure in the vanities and follies of the Persians; the Orientals, who were accustomed to prostrate themselves before him, were his darlings. He forgot the respect due to his old soldiers, and demanded of them, who were free men, the prostration of the Persians.

His worthless friend Hephæstion died; and Alexander celebrated his burial in a manner which showed utter senselessness and absurdity, in his prodigality and in his perpetration of oriental horrors. In order to offer to the deceased a worthy sacrifice, he undertook an expedition against a free people of mountaineers, and extirpated the whole nation; and according to a truly eastern fashion, he slaughtered all the prisoners in honour of his deceased friend. All that is related of this period is disgraceful; insensible to all that is good, and dissatisfied with himself, he abandoned himself more and more to frightful drunkenness. He offered prizes for the best drinkers, and an *ἀγὼν πολυποσίας* ended with some thirty persons drinking themselves to death: a proceeding which we can contemplate only with the most complete disgust.

Perhaps no man has personally exercised a greater historical influence than Alexander; this cannot be questioned. But what influence he exercised, and whether it was beneficial, is a question on which opinions are divided. In regard to Greece, his conquests were altogether injurious. Through him the Greek nation was, as it were, seized with consumption, for he reduced its numbers immensely. A vast number of recruits must have gone from Greece and Macedonia to India and Upper Asia, whom he forever withdrew from their country by assigning to them settlements in those countries. It lay in the nature of things, that Greece should be lost, and should fall into a state of complete weakness, when a new wealthy and military state arose by the side of it. Even the good which arose from the establishment of this Macedonio-Asiatic empire, was injurious to Greece. Commerce was transferred to Alexandria; and Athens ceased to be spoken of as a commercial city. Alexander's influence upon the nearer and remoter parts of conquered Asia was different in different countries. Upon Egypt it was beneficial, for that country was evidently better off under the Ptolemies than it had been under the Persians. The first three Macedonian kings of Egypt were excellent princes, and raised the country to a degree of prosperity, which it never enjoyed either before or after: and that period was sufficient for such a country to heal its ancient wounds.

Alexander's contemporaries among the Greeks were not mistaken as to the influence which he exercised. He died detested and cursed by Greece and Macedonia. If he had lived longer, he would perhaps himself have seen the downfall of the structure he had reared. He could not be otherwise than active and stirring, and he could not have gone on without bringing ruin upon himself. His intention was not to hellenise Asia, but to make Greece Persian; hence if he had longer remained in Asia, we should have seen the formation of a Græco-Persico-Macedonian empire. As he wanted to arm the Greeks and Macedonians in the Persian fashion, those nations would afterwards probably have revolted and put him to death. The only means by which Greece might have been saved, and have recovered its liberty, would have been, if Alexander had passed through the natural course of his life, and had fallen with the glory of his exploits.ⁱ

HIS MOTIVES (DROYSEN)

[Bishop Thirlwall^k sees great benefits from Alexander's conquests, but doubts if they were all intentional with him, or largely the accidents of his success. Droysen feels no doubt as to the presence of sharply definite motives and large policies in Alexander's mind.]

"That the soul of this king was built on a scale that surpassed human measure," Polybius says, "is an opinion in which all agree." His strength of

will, his wide vision, his intellectual pre-eminence are proved by his deeds and the strict, the rigid, logic of their consistency. What his desire was, and what his conception of his work (a fair judge will wish no other measure), this is something one can approximately learn only from such parts of his work as he was allowed to realise. Alexander was versed in the highest culture and knowledge of his time; he would have cherished no meaner opinion of a king's calling than the "master of those who know." But for him, unlike his great teacher, the thought of what monarchy was



ARISTOTLE TEACHING THE YOUTHFUL ALEXANDER

(See p. 262)

and the "monarch's duty as watchman" did not logically lead to the necessity of treating barbarians like animals and plants. Nor would it have been his opinion that his Macedonians had been trained to arms from his father's time in order that they might be, in the philosopher's language, "masters over those who were fitly slaves"; still less that first his father, and then he himself, had forced the Greeks into the Corinthian federation, that they might plunder defenceless Asia, squeeze it dry with their exquisite selfishness and their shameless intrigues.

He had dealt Asia a terrible blow. He would remember the spear of his ancestor Achilles. He would recognise that the grace of the true spear of royalty lay in its power to heal the wounds it made. With the annihilation of the old kingdom, with the death of Darius, he became heir to the empire over unnumbered peoples who had been gov-

erned till then as slaves. A labour it was, worthy of a king indeed, to free them so far as they could understand or learn freedom, to preserve and foster whatever was sound and praiseworthy in their condition and to respect and spare them in whatever was sacred in their eyes and whatever was their very own. He must know how to propitiate, how to win them, that they too may be made to share the burden of the empire which is gradually to unite them with the Greek world. Such a monarchy could permit no mention of conquerors and conquered when once the victory was won; it must wipe out from men's memory the distinction between Greek and barbarian.

There lay on this road difficulties immeasurable — much that was arbitrary, much that was violent, unnatural — they seemed to make the undertaking impossible. But him they did not stop nor perplex; they only heightened the vehemence of his will, and stiffened the rigid and conscious assurance of his dealings. The work which he had undertaken in the exaltation of youth possessed him; gathering like an avalanche it swept him on; ruin, devastation, fields of dead, marked his progress; with the world that he conquered, there came a change over his army, over his surroundings, over the man himself. He passed on like a tempest, he saw only his aim, and in that his justification.

The majority misunderstood and disapproved of what the king did or left undone. While Alexander tried all means to win the conquered and make them forget their conquerors in the Macedonians, many of his followers in their insolence and their selfishness calmly claimed the conquerors' ruthless right of violence. While Alexander received with the same graciousness the genuflexions of Persian magnates and the congratulatory missions with which Greece honoured him, accepting alike the worship which the orientals considered they owed him, and the military acclamations of his phalanxes, they would have liked to see themselves as the equal of their king, and everything else far below them in the dust of humility. And while they themselves yielded to all the luxuriousness and licentiousness of Asiatic life, so far as the camp and the vicinity of their openly disapproving king permitted — yielded with no other object besides the gratification of appetites run mad — they took it ill of their king that he wore the Median dress and affected the Persian court functions, wherein the millions of Asia recognised and worshipped him as their god and king.¹

HIS EFFECT ON FEDERALISATION (PÖHLMANN)

[Every one admits that the lack of unity among the Greek towns was the cause of evils unnumerable, and that some form of federation was vitally needed. Many have felt that Alexander furnished the needed unifaction by his centralised empire; but Pöhlmann is of contrary mind.]

Droysen's peculiar way of seeing history has led him greatly to overrate the blessings of the new federal régime. It is true that in Hellas, under the old party names of aristocrat and democrat, the hostile interests of rich and poor were engaged in a pitiless and passionate struggle, and, if we consider the decomposition that was killing the life of communities, a monarchy would appear to be exactly what was needed to exercise a levelling and reconciliatory influence. But a kingdom of this national character, whose first aim would be to satisfy the most vital interests of the nation and create a true internal peace — such a kingdom was not at all the ideal of the Macedonian monarchy. So far from standing superior to party warfare, the monarchy supported itself by favouring the particular interests of that party which came over to the Macedonian camp. The immense emigration produced by the consequent oppression of those who belonged to the opposition, is proof enough that the new order did not produce a citizenship of inner peace, but, on the contrary, gave new food to the differences from which the communities suffered. So far as the policy of Philip was concerned, the object of the bond was attained when it brought the power of the Greek people into its own service; and even if the war against Persia had its national and Hellenic side, yet so early an authority as Polybius rightly and soberly judged that

the Macedonian king was chiefly acting in the matter to satisfy a personal end. It is an illusion of Droysen's to imagine that this subjection of Greece to a policy which was, by its nature, bound to serve dynastic and personal interests, at the same time secured to the Greeks a common national policy.

The consolidation of the new world power was a consequence of Alexander's irresistible and victorious progress through the heart of the Persian kingdom. His policy was to bring about a new "Hellenistic" régime which should lead to a peaceful blending of Greek and barbarian, and the object was to be gained by putting the oriental and the Græco-Macedonian elements on an equality in army and administration — setting Asiatics, for example, as satraps beside European military governors and treasury officers. He triumphed over opposition, which he encountered chiefly in the army.

This policy was certainly an inevitable consequence of his undertaking and of the conditions which were necessary to its success; but need he have so exaggerated it as to make a complete return to the traditions of oriental despotism? This is a question we do not find so easy to answer in the affirmative, as Droysen does, for he sees nothing but "prejudice" in the resistance which Alexander's claims to apotheosis and genuflexion encountered in the old Macedonian spirit and the Greek love of freedom.

As Ranke rightly declared, it meant a complete break with their entire national history that the Greeks as well should be subjected to the sway of an authority which was no other than that against which they had warred for centuries. Certainly the "city" had outlived its time as the final political unit. The needs of the day called for "an ascent from the city constitution to state constitutions," in which the cities themselves would enjoy only a communal independence. But then they must, to use Droysen's own words, "find in the universal bond their right and their safeguard." And this safeguard could be offered by no orientalising despotism."

HIS HERITAGE (HEGEL)

Alexander had the good fortune to die at the proper time — *i.e.*, it may be called good fortune, but it is rather a necessity. That he may stand before the eyes of posterity as a youth, an early death must hurry him away. Achilles begins the Greek world, and his antitype Alexander concludes it: and these youths not only supply a picture of the fairest kind in their own persons, but at the same time afford a complete and perfect type of Hellenic existence. Alexander finished his work and completed his ideal; and thus bequeathed to the world one of the noblest and most brilliant of visions, which our poor reflections only serve to obscure. For the great world-historical form of Alexander, the modern standard applied by recent historical "Philistines" — that of virtue or morality — will by no means suffice. And if it be alleged in depreciation of his merit, that he had no successor, and left behind no dynasty, we may remark that the Greek kingdoms that arose in Asia after him are his dynasty. The Græco-Bactrian kingdom lasted for two centuries. Thence the Greeks came into connection with India, and even with China. The Greek dominion spread itself over northern India. Other Greek kingdoms arose in Asia Minor, in Armenia, in Syria, and Babylonia. But Egypt especially, among the kingdoms of the successors of Alexander, became a great centre of science and art; for a great number of its architectural works belong to the time of the Ptolemies, as has been made out from the deciphered inscriptions. Alexandria became the chief centre of

commerce — the point of union for Eastern manners and tradition with Western civilisation. Besides these, the Macedonian kingdom, that of Thrace, stretching beyond the Danube, that of Illyria, and that of Epirus, flourished under the sway of Greek princes.^m

ALEXANDER'S TRUE GLORY (WHEELER)

If a man's life-work is to be judged only by what he erects into formal organisation, then we must pronounce the career of Alexander a failure, and more than a failure. He had dismantled what he found, and built nothing sure in its place. His dream of fusing the East and the West had been fulfilled and embodied in no visible institution, no form of government or law, of state or church. Greece, Egypt, and the Orient were still in government asunder.

No wonder that historians have written the story of Greece — among them great names like Niebuhr and Grote — and seen nothing more in the career of Alexander than a brilliant disturbance of the world's order, an enthronement of militarism, an annihilation of Greek liberty, and an undoing of Greece in all that makes her life of interest to the world. It is another thing that their blindness could see in Alexander himself only a mad opportunist and greedy conqueror, whose life, had it been spared, could have wrought no more than further conquest; for Alexander was of all things an idealist, and they who have not read that in the story of his life, may as well not have read it at all. Grote and Demosthenes are, each in his way, types of historians and statesmen who have spent their strength in deploring the waste of goodly seed-corn scattered on the fields, their eyes turned towards the former harvest, not the next. The old maxims, the old creeds, and the good old times are reasserted, defended, and bewailed long after they have passed to their larger fruitage in the unfolding of a larger life.

When Alexander's career began, the culture of the world, fixed in two main types, the feminine and the masculine, if we may broadly characterise them so, was still centralised and located, on the one hand in the wealth and settled industrial life of the Mesopotamian and the Egyptian river valleys, on the other in the free energy of the old Greek city communities. When his career ended, the barrier separating these domains had been broken down, never to be raised again.

Man as a base line for measuring the universe, man as a source of governing power, arose in Greece; it was Greece that shaped the law of beauty from which came the arts of form, the law of speculative truth from which by ordered observations came the sciences, and the law of liberty from which came the democratic state. This was what the old Greece held in keeping for the world. Alexander was the strong wind that scattered the seed; again, he was the willing hand of the sower.

The story of Alexander has become a story of death. He died, himself, before his time. With his life he brought the old Greece to its end; with his death, the state he had founded. But they all three, Alexander, Greece, the Grand Empire, each after its sort, set forth, as history judges men and things, the inner value of the saying, "Except a grain of wheat fall into the earth and die, it abideth alone."^o



CHAPTER LVIII. GREECE DURING THE LIFE OF ALEXANDER

THE great conqueror is so much more of a cosmopolitan than a Greek that it has been possible and advisable to trace his career as a unit almost without alluding to the little territory his father had been so anxious to acquire and appease. But Greece, never quiet, was not stagnant during the absence of Alexander; and before taking up the tangle of the successors of Alexander, it will be well to glance at the activities of the Grecians and their futile restiveness.^a

The springs of that policy among the Grecian republics, which produced war against Alexander in Greece itself while he was prosecuting the war of the Grecian confederacy against Persia—nowhere declared by ancient writers, but seeming rather studiously involved in mist by some of them—may nevertheless, by a careful examination of information remaining, in a great degree be traced.

Nothing in ancient history remains more fully ascertained than that, under the Macedonian supremacy, the Grecian republics enjoyed, not only more liberty and independency than under the Athenian or Lacedæmonian supremacy, but, as far as appears, all that could be consistent with the connection of all as one people. Nor did it rest there; Demosthenes, in the Athenian assembly, reviled the Macedonian monarchs, the allies of his commonwealth, the heads of the Grecian confederacy, in a manner that in modern times would be reckoned highly indecent towards an enemy; and he avowed and even boasted of treasonable practices against the general confederacy, of which his commonwealth was a member. "I," he said, "excited Lacedæmon against Alexander: I procured the revolt against him in Thessaly and Perrhæbia." In fact the government of Athens, described, as we have formerly seen, by Xenophon and Isocrates as in their time verging towards anarchy, is largely shown, in the extant works of following orators, and especially in the celebrated contest between Æschines and Demosthenes, to have been still advancing in corruption and degradation. During the whole time that Alexander was in Asia, the struggle of parties was violent—one, under Demosthenes, with the support of Persia, contended ably and indefatigably for the mastery of Athens and of Greece; the other, after Isocrates, looking to Phocion as their leader, desired peace under the established supremacy of Macedonia, and above all things dreaded the ascendancy of Demosthenes and his associates.

[333-331 B.C.]

Of the domestic politics of Lacedæmon information rarely comes to us but through transactions with other states. Agis, the reigning king of the Proclidean family, whom we have seen already active in enmity to Macedonia, appears to have been a man of character to suit the purposes of Demosthenes. Possibly he was not much grieved, nor perhaps was Demosthenes, at the death of Memnon. Had Memnon lived, either could have been but second of the Greeks of the party; which could no way maintain itself but through the patronage of Persia. By Memnon's death indeed great advantages were lost, and a contest of far less hope for the party altogether remained. But in that contest Demosthenes reckoned, by his talents and his extensive political communication, to hold the first importance among the Greeks, while Agis reckoned himself effectually first, by his regal dignity and the old eminence of the Lacedæmonian state; both trusting that they should still not fail of support from Persia. Till the battle of Issus the hopes of both might reasonably run high; and evidently they were not abandoned on the adverse event of that battle.

Looking to facts acknowledged by all, we find the half-ruined state of Lacedæmon never ceasing to avow a political opposition, at length growing into open hostility to the confederacy of republics, constitutionally established under the lead of Macedonia; as constitutionally, it appears, as ever before under the lead of Lacedæmon, Athens, or Thebes. In Athens itself an opposition to the Macedonian interest was always openly maintained. Negotiation was carried on by Lacedæmon among the other republics with avowed hostile purpose, and adverse intrigue from Athens appears to have been no secret. Against this open political hostility no interference of force has been even pretended to have been used; and, in all appearance, hardly so much opposition of influence as honest prudence might require. Negligence, inertness, short-sightedness, may seem, with more reason, to be imputed; yet they never have been imputed to Antipater, to whom the government of Macedonia and the protection of the Macedonian party in Greece were committed. While then the Macedonian supremacy, if not remissly, was liberally exercised, the party interests in every Grecian state, the inveterate hatred everywhere of fellow-citizens to fellow-citizens, and the generally active and restless temper of the Grecian people afforded ground for that league against the confederacy of the Greek nations acknowledging the lead of Macedonia, which Demosthenes and Agis succeeded in forming.

CONFEDERACY AGAINST MACEDONIA

It is beyond question that Persian gold, imputed by all writers, greatly promoted the Persian interest. It appears to have been after the disastrous battle of Arbela, when the Persian monarch's hope even of personal safety depended on opportunity to raise new enemies to Alexander, that he found means to make remittances to Greece. Æschines, uncontradicted by Demosthenes, stated before the assembled Athenian people, as a matter publicly known and not to be gainsaid, that a present to them of three hundred talents (about sixty thousand pounds) was offered in the name of the king of Persia. The prevalence of Phocion's party however at the time sufficed to procure a refusal of the disgraceful offer.

But in Peloponnesus the Persian party, under the lead of the king of Lacedæmon, for whom there was no difficulty in taking subsidies from the Persian court, obtained superiority. Argos and Messenia were inveterately

hostile to Lacedæmon, and were indeed neither by bribes nor threats to be gained. But all Elis, all Arcadia, except Megalopolis, and all Achaia, one small town only refusing, renounced the confederacy under the lead of Macedonia, and joined Lacedæmon in war, equally against Macedonia and all Grecian republics which might adhere to the confederacy. Beyond the peninsula the opposite politics generally prevailed; though in Athens Phocion's party could do no more than maintain nominal adherence to engagement, and a real neutrality; the weight of the party of Demosthenes sufficing to prevent any exertion against the Lacedæmonian league.

That league however was not of such extent that it could be hoped, with the civic troops only of the several states, to support war against the general confederacy under the lead of Macedonia; and those states were not of wealth to maintain any considerable number of those, called mercenaries, ready to engage with any party. Nevertheless mercenary troops were engaged for that league, to the number, if the contemporary orator Dinarchus should be trusted, of ten thousand — Persia supplying the means, as Æschines, still uncontradicted by Demosthenes, affirms; and another source is hardly to be imagined. With such preparation and such support Agis ventured to commence offensive war. A small force of the opposing Peloponnesian states was overborne and destroyed or dispersed; siege was laid to the only adverse Arcadian city, Megalopolis, and its fall was expected daily.

Alexander was then in pursuit of Darius. Accounts of him received in Greece of course would vary: some reported him in the extreme north of Asia; others in India. Meanwhile revolt in Thessaly and Perrhæbia, excited by the able intrigues of Demosthenes, and, according to Diodorus,^c also in Thrace, distressed Antipater; while it was a most imperious duty upon him, as vicegerent of the head of the Grecian confederacy, to protect the members of that confederacy, apparently the most numerous part of the nation, against the domestic enemy, supported by the great foreign enemy who threatened them.

WAR IN GREECE

Accounts remaining, both of the circumstances of the Macedonian kingdom at the time, and of following events, are very defective. But it appears indicated that no Macedonian force, that could be spared for war southward, would enable Antipater to meet Agis; and it was long before he could excite the republican Greeks, adverse to the Lacedæmonian and Persian interest, however dreading its prevalence, to assemble in arms in sufficient numbers. His success however in quelling the disturbances in Thessaly and Thrace, encouraging the zeal of that portion of the Greek nation which dreaded republican empire, whether democratical under Demosthenes or oligarchical under Agis, enabled him at length to raise superior numbers.

Megalopolis had resisted beyond expectation. Antipater, entering Peloponnesus to relieve that place, was met by Agis. A sanguinary battle ensued. The Lacedæmonians are said to have fought with all the obstinacy which their ancient institutions required, and which their ancient fame was adapted to inspire. But they were overborne: Agis, fighting at their head, with the spirit of a hero rather, apparently, than with the skill of a general, received a wound which disabled him, so that it was necessary to carry him out of the field. His troops, unable to resist superior numbers, directed by superior skill, took to flight. Diodorus relates that, pressed by the pursuing enemy, he peremptorily commanded his attendants to save themselves, and

[331 B.C.]

leave him with his arms; and that, disabled as he was, refusing quarter and threatening all who approached him, he fought till he was killed.

The conduct of the victor then was what became the delegate of the elected superintendent and protector of the liberties of Greece. The Lacedæmonian government, feeling its inability to maintain the war in which it was engaged, and the principal instigator being no more, sent a deputation to Antipater to treat for peace. Antipater, as deputy of the captain-general and vicegerent of the Greek nation, took nothing further upon himself than to summon a congress of the several republics to Corinth, to which he referred the Lacedæmonian ministers. There matters were much debated and various opinions declared. The decision at last, in the historian's succinct account, appears not what might best become the wisdom and dignity of a nation accustomed to appreciate its ascertained privileges, or what ought to be such. Unable to agree upon a measure to afford precedent for future times, the resource was to decree that the Lacedæmonian state, submitting itself to the mercy of their great and magnanimous captain-general, should send fifty principal Spartans into Macedonia, as hostages to insure obedience to his decision. We owe to Curtius the additional probable information that the assembly set a fine of 120 talents [about £24,000 or \$120,000] upon the Eleans and Achæans, to compensate to the Megalopolitans the damages done in the hostile operations against them.

It seems likely the Lacedæmonians rejoiced in a sentence which, in so great a degree, secured them against the usual virulence of party animosity among the Greeks, and the result of which they had reason to hope would be liberal and mild. It does not appear that anything more was required than to acknowledge error in hostile opposition to the general council of the nation, and to send, thus late, the Lacedæmonian contingent of troops for maintaining the Grecian empire, already acquired, in Asia.^b

This blow riveted the chains forged at Charonea, which however were still destined to be burst by more than one gallant struggle, though never to be finally shaken off. Alexander, when he heard of Antipater's success, is said to have spoken contemptuously of "the battle of mice," which his lieutenant had been fighting, while he had been slaughtering myriads, and over-running kingdoms; and while the event continued unknown, it did not in the slightest degree interfere with his operations. Yet Antipater's victory was perhaps not much less hardly won than either of his own over Darius. But from the distance at which he now stood, Greece and Macedonia began to appear very diminutive objects. His little kingdom was now chiefly valuable to him as a nursery of soldiers; and the most important advantage which he reaped from the establishment of his power in Greece, was that it insured a constant succession of recruits for his army.

AFFAIRS AT ATHENS

It is rather surprising that when Agis — encouraged by the great distance which separated Alexander from Europe, by perhaps exaggerated rumours of the dangers that threatened him in Asia, and by the disasters which had befallen the Macedonian arms at home — ventured on his ill-fated struggle Athens remained neutral. It was afterward made a ground of accusation against Demosthenes, that he had taken no advantage of this occasion to display the hostility which he always professed towards Alexander. The event proves that he took the most prudent course; but his motives must



URNS AND VASES

remain doubtful. He was perhaps restrained, not by his opinion of the hopelessness of the attempt, but by the disposition to peace, which he found prevailing at home, whether the effect of fear or of jealousy, or of any other cause. Had the people been ready to embark in the contest, an orator probably would not have been wanting to animate them to it. But Demosthenes may still have given secret encouragement and assistance to the Peloponnesian confederates, and may have alluded to this, when, according to his adversary's report, he boasted that the league was his work. The issue of that struggle, and the news which arrived soon after, of the great victory by which Alexander had decided the fate of the Persian monarchy at Gaugamela [Arbela], must have crushed all hope at Athens, except one, which might have been suggested by domestic experience, that the conqueror's boundless ambition might still lead him into some enterprise beyond his strength.

DEMOSTHENES AND ÆSCHINES

There was however a party there, which did not dissemble the interest it felt in the success of the Macedonian arms. Before the battle of Issus, when Alexander was commonly believed to be in great danger, and Demosthenes was assured by his correspondents that he could not escape destruction, Æschines says, that he was himself continually taunted by his rival, who exultingly displayed the letters that conveyed the joyful tidings, with the dejection he betrayed at the prospect of the disaster which threatened his friends. Æschines was the active leader of the macedonising party: all his hopes of a final triumph over his political adversaries were grounded on the Macedonian ascendancy. But Phocion, though his motives were very different, added all the weight of his influence to the same side. His sentiments were so well known, that Alexander himself treated him as a highly honoured friend; addressed letters to him from Asia, with a salutation which he used to no one else except Antipater, and repeatedly pressed him to accept magnificent presents. Phocion indeed constantly rejected them; and when Alexander wrote that their friendship must cease if he persisted to decline all his offers, was only moved to intercede in behalf of some prisoners, whose liberty he immediately obtained.

The disaster of Chæronea (337 B.C.) had held out a signal to the enemies of Demosthenes at Athens, to unite their efforts against him. He had been

[337-325 B.C.]

assailed in the period following that event until Philip's death, by every kind of legal engine that could be brought to bear upon him ; by prosecutions of the most various form and colour. All these experiments had failed ; the people had honoured him with more signal proofs of its confidence than he had ever before received : he had never taken a more active part, or exercised a more powerful sway, in public affairs. Yet it seems that after the Macedonian arms had completely triumphed, both in Asia and in Greece, Æschines thought the opportunity favourable for another attempt of the same nature. This trial, the most celebrated of ancient pleadings, the most memorable event in the history of eloquence throughout all past ages, deserves mention here, chiefly for the light it throws on the character and temper of the Athenian tribunals, at a time when the people is supposed to have been verging towards utter degeneracy, so as to be hardly any longer an object of historical interest—a time, it must be remembered, when the rest of Greece was quailing beneath the yoke of the stranger, and his will, dictated to the so-called national congress at Corinth, was sovereign and irresistible.

The occasion of this prosecution arose out of two offices with which Demosthenes had been entrusted, in the year, it seems, after that of the battle of Chæronea. He had been appointed by his tribe to superintend the repairs which, according to a decree proposed by himself, the city walls were to undergo, the work being equally distributed among the ten tribes. At the same time he filled another post—the treasurership of the theoric fund, which involved a large share in the general control and direction of the finances. In both offices he had made a liberal contribution out of his own property to the service of the state. On this ground, but more especially as a mark of approbation for his public conduct on all occasions, a decree was passed, on the motion of his friend Ctesiphon, that he should be presented with a golden crown. For this decree Æschines had indicted Ctesiphon as having broken the law in three points : first, because it was illegal to crown a magistrate before he had rendered an account of his office ; next, because it was forbidden to proclaim such an honour, when bestowed by the people, in any other place than the assembly-ground in the Pnyx, but particularly to proclaim it, as Ctesiphon had proposed ; and, lastly, because the reason assigned in the decree, so far as related to the public conduct of Demosthenes, was false, inasmuch as he had not deserved any reward. The question at issue was, in substance, whether Demosthenes had been a good or a bad citizen. Hence the prosecutor, after a short discussion of the dry legal arguments, enters, as on his main subject, into a full review of the public and private life of Demosthenes ; and Demosthenes, whose interest it was to divert attention from the points of law, which were not his strong ground, can scarcely find room for them in his defence of his own policy and proceedings, which, with bitter attacks on his adversary, occupies almost the whole of his speech.

His boast is that throughout his political career he had kept one object steadily in view : to strengthen Athens within and without, and to preserve her independence, particularly against the power and the arts of Philip. He owned that he had failed ; but it was after he had done all that one man in his situation—a citizen of a commonwealth—could do. He had failed in a cause in which defeat was more glorious than victory in any other, in a struggle not less worthy of Athens than those in which her heroic citizens in past ages had earned their fame. In a word, the whole oration breathes the spirit of that high philosophy which, whether learned in the schools or

from life, has consoled the noblest of our kind in prisons, and on scaffolds, and under every persecution of adverse fortune, but in the tone necessary to impress a mixed multitude with a like feeling, and to elevate it for a while into a sphere above its own. The effect it produced on that most susceptible audience can be but faintly conceived. The result was that Æschines not only lost his cause, but did not even obtain a fifth part of the votes, and consequently, according to law, incurred a small penalty. But he seems to have felt it insupportable to remain at the scene of his defeat, where he must have lived silent and obscure. He quitted Athens, and crossed over to Asia, with the view it is said of seeking protection from Alexander, through whose aid alone he could now hope to triumph over his adversaries.

When this prospect vanished, he retired to Rhodes, where he opened a school of oratory, which produced a long series of voluble sophists, and is considered as the origin of a new style of eloquence, technically called the Asiatic, which stood in a relation to the Attic not unlike that of the composite capital to the Ionic volute, and was destined to prevail in the East wherever the Greek language was spoken, down to the fall of the Roman Empire. He died at Samos, about nine years after Alexander, having survived both his great antagonist and his friend Phocion.

DEIFICATION OF ALEXANDER; THE GOLD OF HARPALUS

In the course of the year preceding Alexander's death, the stillness and obscurity of Athenian history were broken, partly by the new measures adopted by the conqueror on his return from India with respect to Greece, and partly by the adventures of Harpalus.

Alexander's claim of divine honours could not be viewed in Greece with the same feelings which it had excited among the victorious Macedonians. To the people bowed down by irresistible necessity under a foreign yoke, it was not a point of great moment under what form or title the conqueror, in the plenitude of his power, chose to remind them of their subjection. They might consider the demand as a wanton insult; but it was in no other sense an injury. There might not be many base enough to recommend it, but there were perhaps still fewer so unwise as to think it a fit ground for resistance. It involved no surrender of religious faith, even in those who were firmly attached to the popular creed; and the ridicule for which it afforded so fair a mark was, with most, sufficient revenge for its insolence. The Spartan answer to the king's envoys was perhaps the best: "If Alexander will be a god, let him." At Athens there was something more of debate on the question; yet it hardly seems that opinions were seriously divided on it. It was opposed by a young orator, named Pytheas. It was observed by the more practical statesmen, that he was not yet of an age to give advice on matters of such importance. He replied that he was older than Alexander, whom they proposed to make a god. Lycurgus appears to have spoken, with the severity suited to his character, of "the new god, from whose temple none could depart without need of purification." But it does not follow that he wished to see the demand rejected. At least Demades and Demosthenes were agreed on the main point, and their language, as far as it is reported, seems to have been very similar. Demades warned the people not to lose earth while they contested the possession of heaven; and Demosthenes advised them not to

[324 B.C.]

contend with Alexander about celestial honours. The assembly acquiesced in the king's demand.¹

But the order relating to the return of the exiles awakened very much stronger feelings, partly of fear, and partly of indignation. It appears that Alexander, before he set out on his expedition, when it was his object to conciliate the Greeks, had engaged by solemn compact with the national congress at Corinth — perhaps only confirming one before made by Philip — not to interfere with the existing institutions of any Greek state, but to preserve them inviolate. The tendency of Alexander's new measure was to effect a revolution, wherever Macedonian influence was not yet completely predominant, throughout Greece. Nicanor, a Stagirite, had been sent down by Alexander to publish his decree during the games at Olympia. There were some thousands of the exiles and their friends collected there, who listened to the proclamation with joy. It was in the form of a letter addressed to them in a style of imperial brevity: "King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We were not the author of your exile, but we will restore you to your homes, all but those who are under a curse [for sacrilege or murder]. And we have written to Antipater on the subject, that he may compel those cities which are unwilling to receive you."

Great alarm ensued at Athens among those who had reason to dread the execution of the decree. The people would not comply with it, but still did not venture openly to reject it. A middle course was taken, by which time at least was gained. An embassy was sent to Alexander, to deprecate his interference; and at Babylon the Athenian envoys met those of several other Greek states, who had come on the same business. In the meanwhile there prevailed at home not only great anxiety about the issue of the embassy, but fears for the immediate safety of the city.

Such was the state of affairs at Athens, when the appearance of Harpalus gave rise to fresh perplexity and uneasiness. The precise time when he arrived on the coast of Attica is difficult to ascertain. But it seems most probable that it was after the return of Demosthenes from Olympia. Harpalus, as we have seen, carried away some five thousand talents, and had collected about six thousand mercenaries. He must therefore have crossed the Ægean with a little squadron; and it is probable that the rumour of his approach reached Athens at least some days before him. He had reason to hope for a favourable reception. He came with his Athenian mistress, for whose sake he had conferred a substantial benefit on her native city; and he had already gained at least one friend there, on whose influence he may have founded great expectations: Charicles, Phocion's son-in-law, who had descended so low as to undertake the erection of the monument in honour of Pythonice, and had received thirty talents by way of reimbursement.

[¹ We insert here a defence of Alexander's act from the pen of his chief biographer, Droysen: *ad* "Neither sacred history nor dogma was grounded on the firm basis of doctrinal writings, revealed once for all as of divine origin; for religious things there was no other rule or form than the experience and opinion of men as it was and developed itself in life, also perhaps the instructions of the oracles and the many interpretations of signs. If the oracle of Zeus Ammon, although ridiculed, in the end still designated the king as Zeus' son; if Alexander, sprung of the race of Hercules and Achilles, had conquered and reorganised a world; if in reality he had accomplished greater things than Hercules and Dionysus; if the long established enlightening of minds disaccustomed to the deepest religious wants had left from the honour and feasts of the gods only the diversions, the outer ceremonies, and the calendar; — then one can realise that for Greece, the thoughts of divine honour and deification of man did not lie too far off. Alexander was only the first to claim for himself that which after him the most miserable princes and the most infamous men could justly receive from Hellenes and Greeks, above all from Athenians." The apotheosis of Alexander must then be regarded as a move not altogether due to vanity, and of political rather than religious or personal meaning.]

He might calculate still more confidently on the force of the temptation which his treasure and his troops held out to the people, if they were already disposed to risk an open quarrel with Alexander, and on the ample means of corruption he possessed. These hopes were disappointed, and at first he certainly met with a total repulse. It seems most probable—though our authors leave this doubtful—that his squadron was not permitted to enter Piræus. We know that a debate took place on his first arrival, that Demosthenes advised the people not to receive him, and that Philocles, the general in command at Munychia, was ordered to prevent his entrance. Philocles indeed appears afterwards to have disobeyed this order; but it is probable that he did not immediately allow Harpalus to land. The fullest account we have of the proceedings of Harpalus on his first appearance in the roads of Munychia, is contained in the few words of Diodorus; that, “finding no one to listen to him, he left his mercenaries at Tænarus, and with a part of his treasure came himself to implore the protection of the people.” The sum which he brought with him was a little more than 750 talents: enough certainly to buy the greater part of the venal orators; and many yielded to the temptation.

Whether Demosthenes was one of those who accepted a bribe from Harpalus, has been a disputed point from his own day to ours. It will appear from the following narrative that the evidence cannot be considered as quite conclusive on either side; all that can be proved in his favour is that, the more fully the facts of the case are stated, the more glaring are the absurdities and contradictions involved in the suppositions of his guilt, while the few facts which tend that way may be very easily reconciled with the supposition of his innocence.

The part which he took in the public debates on the affair, is known from good authority—mostly from that of his contemporaries and accusers. It is universally admitted that he was one of those who at the first opposed the reception of Harpalus. After the return of Harpalus to Athens, when he had gained over several of the orators to his side, envoys came from several quarters—from Antipater, from Olympias, and it seems also from Philoxenus, a Macedonian, who filled a high office in Asia Minor—to require that he should be given up. Demosthenes and Phocion both resisted this demand; and Demosthenes carried a decree, by which it was directed, that the treasure should be lodged in the citadel, to be restored to Alexander, and he himself was empowered to receive it. Its amount was declared by Harpalus himself; but, out of the 750 talents no more than 308 remained in his possession. It was clear that nearly 450 had found their way into other hands. Demosthenes now caused another decree to be passed, by which the Areopagus was directed to investigate the case, and he proposed that instead of the ordinary penalty—tenfold the amount of the bribe—capital punishment should be inflicted on the offenders. A very rigid inquiry was instituted; the houses of all suspected persons—with the single exception of one who had been just married—were searched: the Areopagus made its report against several, and among them was Demosthenes himself. He was the first who was brought to trial, was found guilty, and condemned to pay fifty talents. Being unable to raise this sum, he was thrown into prison, but soon after made his escape and went into exile.


One point is indisputably clear: that Demosthenes, whether bribed or not, did not change sides. Harpalus, notwithstanding the efforts of Demosthenes and Phocion in his behalf, was committed to prison, to await Alexander's pleasure. He however made his escape, returned to Tænarus, and

[324-323 B.C.]


thence crossed over with his troops, and the rest of his treasure, to Crete. Here he was assassinated by Thimbron, one of his confidential officers. His steward fled to Rhodes, where he was seized by order of Philoxenus, and forced to disclose the names of those who had accepted bribes from his master. The list was sent to Athens, and the name of Demosthenes — though Philoxenus is said to have been his personal enemy — did not appear in it.

It is a question, which the meagre accounts that have been preserved leave in great obscurity, whether any preparations for war had actually been made at Athens before Alexander's death. It can hardly be supposed that any such measures were taken until the envoys who had been sent to remonstrate with him returned from Babylon; and the interval between their return and the arrival of the news of his death, cannot have been very long. Yet that in this interval at least something was done with a view to a war which was believed to be impending, may be regarded as nearly certain. For it was at this time that a division of the mercenaries who had been disbanded by the satraps, in compliance with Alexander's orders, was brought over to Europe by the Athenian Leosthenes. Leosthenes himself had been for a time in Alexander's service, and though still young, had gained a high reputation: but it seems that he had quitted it in disgust, and had already returned to Athens, and that he went over to Asia, to collect as many as he could of the disbanded troops, whom he landed at Cape Tænarus. It can hardly be supposed that he did this without some ulterior object; and his connection with Hyperides — the chief of the anti-Macedonian party after Demosthenes had withdrawn — and his subsequent proceedings, scarcely leave room to doubt that the object was to have a force in readiness to resist Antipater, if he should attempt to enforce Alexander's edict.

When the news of Alexander's death reached Athens, Phocion and Demades professed to disbelieve the report. Demades bade the people not to listen to it: such a corpse would long before have filled the world with its odour. Phocion desired them to have patience; and when many voices asseverated the truth of the report, replied, "If he is dead to-day, he will still be dead to-morrow, and the next day, so that we may deliberate at our leisure, and the more securely." But their remonstrances were disregarded. The council of Five Hundred held a meeting with closed doors; and Leosthenes was commissioned immediately to engage the troops at Tænarus, about eight thousand men, but secretly, and in his own name, that Antipater might not suspect the purpose, and that the people might have the more time for other preparations. Confirmation of the fact was received shortly after from the mouth of eye-witnesses, who had been present at Babylon when it took place.^e



GREEK SEALS



CHAPTER LIX. THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER

SOME of the most important histories of Greece, notably those of Mitford and of Grote, have terminated with the death of Alexander; and in point of fact one feels some logic in the contention that Greece as a factor in civilisation disappeared with the close of the Alexandrian epoch. Yet as far as mere chronology goes Greece continued a nation, and in some respects a more closely unified nation than ever before, for a period after the death of Alexander as long as the period of her prominence before that event. It was in the year 500 B.C. that the Ionian cities of Asia Minor revolted against the Persian power, and precipitated that conflict which had for its chief result the bringing of the Greek nation, for the first time, into prominence as a world power. From this memorable date to the death of Alexander in 323 B.C., is a period of 177 years; and, as it happened, another period of exactly the same length intervened between the death of Alexander and the final overthrow of Greece by the Romans, culminating in the destruction of Corinth in the year 146 B.C.

But while equally extended in point of time, how utterly different are these two periods in world-historic import! Into the first of them were crowded the events which have made the name of Greece famous for all time; the second was a mere period of senility, in which a once powerful and still proud people struggled in vain to regain its former status, and finally collapsed utterly under the blows of a superior power. Yet in mere geographical extent the Greece of this later period was far larger than Greece proper of the earlier time, for now it included, in addition to the original Hellas, the territories of Macedonia and Epirus; but this was never an harmonious coalition.

The old Greeks of the classical territory were never reconciled to the domination of their northern neighbours, whom they preferred to consider as barbarians, but they were obliged for much of the time to accept that domination, however unwillingly; for the kings of Macedonia, though their power fluctuated from time to time, always had more or less influence over the entire territory of the new Greece.

The meteoric career of Alexander had been cut short at a time when that hero, though he had accomplished conquests without precedent in history, had not yet entered upon the full prime of manhood. It is known that his ever active brain was teeming with plans for fresh conquests, and it is hardly to be doubted that, had he lived, some of these would have been put into almost immediate execution. What the final result would have been, is one of those problems that must ever puzzle the mind of the thoughtful student of history. Such conjectures are utterly futile; yet one cannot escape them. Would the conqueror of the East have spread his power to the West also, subjugating Europe as he had already subjugated Asia? Would he have

[323-301 B.C.]

gone on throughout another half century, had that stretch of life been granted to him, ruling with a firm hand the wide territories that he had conquered, and holding his mighty empire under one unified government with himself at its summit — or would his mighty ambition presently have overstepped the bounds of reason, and would some reverse have presently dashed him headlong from his pinnacle of power? As to this no man can say, and all moralisings on the subject are but idle dreams.

But turning from such visions to the realities, one is presented with an extraordinary picture of a mighty empire, built up by a mere youth, held for the moment, as it were, in the grasp of his hand, and then dashed suddenly into fragments as that hand fell stricken by death. In twelve years the youth Alexander had made himself absolute master of wider territories than were probably ever ruled before by any one man in recorded history; but, almost before the breath of life had left his body, and literally before that body had been laid in the tomb, a strife had begun among the followers of the great captain, which was to lead to almost immediate dismemberment of his empire.

It is one of the surest tests of a great leader of men to be able to gather about him great men as his assistants. Judged by this test Alexander looms large indeed, for he had among his generals, as after events were to prove, a whole company of men, each of whom acknowledged himself subordinate to Alexander, but declined to bow to any lesser power; each of whom, indeed, believed himself worthy to be a king, and determined to make that belief good in practice, now that the great king was no more. Antipater and Craterus, and Antigonus, and Cassander, and Ptolemy, and Eumenes — these are but a few of the leaders among the men who at once began to quarrel about Alexander's possessions, even to the neglect of the burial of Alexander's body. It seems that Alexander had foreseen the inevitable faction, for the story was told that on his death-bed, he had been asked to whom he wished his empire to fall, and he had feebly answered, "to the best man!"

There was, indeed, a pretence of preserving the empire for Alexander's son, borne by Roxane after his death, and given the name of Alexander the Younger; but a score of years is long to wait for a ruler of a newly formed empire, which has within it so many elements of discord as were to be found in the empire of Alexander; and, however sincere a certain number of the leaders may have been, their original intentions of holding the empire for the heir of its founder had vanished from the minds of every one almost before that heir was born. There was indeed a royalist party, which for a time attempted, perhaps in good faith, to uphold the rights of the royal family of Macedonia; but, in the course of the intricate series of revolts and wars in which the entire empire was soon involved, it became difficult, if not impossible, to trace the motives that influenced the various principal actors. But, whatever these motives, the results were very tangible and unmistakable. Alexander's heir was never destined to reach manhood. Both he and his mother were ruthlessly killed by Cassander. Olympias, the mother of Alexander, who, for a time, took an active part in the contests, evincing qualities which explained many of the traits of her great son, met a like fate.

The work of destruction went on until the royal family of Macedon, which Philip and Alexander had made illustrious, was routed out to its last member, and finally, after some twenty-two years of incessant warfare, the vast empire of Alexander was divided into three chief parts: Macedonia, including Greece proper, under the Antigonidæ, the descendants of

Antigonus; the Asiatic kingdom, under the Seleucidæ; and Egypt, under the Ptolemies. The subsequent history of each of these three kingdoms must be considered by itself, but first we must make a brief survey of that great conglomerate struggle through which this dismemberment of the empire of Alexander was brought about.^a Of this Niebuhr says:

"The disputes among the generals of Alexander are to me the most confused events in history. I have very often read them attentively, in order to gain a clear insight into them; but, although I have had a tenacious memory from my early youth, I never was able to gain a distinct recollection of the detail of those quarrels and disputes: I always found myself involved in difficulties. And such is the case still; I find it impossible to group the events in such a manner as to afford an easy survey. This confusion arises from the fact that we have to deal with a crowd of men among whom there is not one that stands forth prominently on account of his personal character. The question always is, whether one robber or another is to be master, and it is impossible to take pleasure in any one of them. One is, indeed, better than another, and Ptolemy is, in my opinion, the best: he was a blessing to Egypt, which under him became happy and prosperous, for his government was rational; but still he is morally a man in whom we can take little interest. His personal character leaves us quite indifferent, when we have once formed a notion of him. Eumenes is the only one who is important on account of his personal character; all the rest are imposing through their deeds of arms alone.

"In the earlier history of Greece we like to follow the great men step by step; but all these Macedonians leave us perfectly indifferent; we feel no interest whether the one is defeated or the other; not even the tragic fall of Lysimachus can make an impression upon us; I look upon it with greater indifference than I should feel at a bull-fight, in which a noble animal defends itself against the dogs that are set at it. I could wish that the earth had opened and swallowed up all the Macedonians. Everyone intimately acquainted with ancient history will share this feeling of indifference with me. And when we are under the influence of such a feeling, it is not easy to dwell upon a history like this; it does not impress itself upon our mind.

"It would be most easy to relate the history of the successors of Alexander as minutely as it was given by Trogus Pompeius, and as we still have it in Diodorus; but there would then be before us only a vast chaos. Even where we have ample information, we must advance rapidly.

"Whoever wishes to investigate this history, must study the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth books of Diodorus; but he ought not to forget that there are many gaps in Diodorus. The eighteenth book, in particular is very much mutilated, and some of the gaps are concealed; for the manuscripts of Diodorus were made with the intention to conceal the fact that they are not complete. The student, however, must compare also the *Excerpts* in Photius from Arrian's lost work."^g

COUNCIL AT BABYLON AFTER ALEXANDER'S DEATH

The Macedonians passed the night after the king's death under arms, as if feeling themselves surrounded by enemies. The peaceable inhabitants of Babylon, perhaps with better reason, dreaded lest their wealthy city should become the scene of military tumult and licence. They hardly ventured to

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creep out of their houses to gather news; lighted no lamps in the evening, but watched for the morning in darkness and silence, eagerly listening, and trembling at every sound they caught. The great officers on whom the care of the state chiefly devolved, probably spent the same interval, together or apart, in no less anxious deliberation. By Hephestion's death the number of those who bore the title of somatophylax was reduced to seven: Leonnatus, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdiccas, Ptolemy (the reputed son of Lagus, but, according to a report rather widely spread, one of Philip's bastards, his mother having been the king's mistress), Pithon, and Peucestas. When Alexander died, they were all in Babylon.

The next day they summoned a council of the other Macedonian officers, some of whom were but little inferior to them in rank and influence, to confer on the great question of the succession. The soldiers wished to take part in it also; and, though forbidden, forced their way into the palace, and filled the avenues of the council hall, so that many witnessed the proceedings. There a mournful object met their eyes, and revived the consciousness of their loss—the vacant throne, on which had been laid the diadem, with the royal robes and armour. The sight called forth a fresh burst of lamentation, which however was hushed into deep silence, when Perdiccas came forward to address the assembly. First he placed the ring, which he had received from Alexander in his last moments, on the throne. "The ring," he said, "was the royal signet, which Alexander had used for the most important state business; it had been committed to him by the dying king, but he placed it at their disposal. It was however absolutely necessary for their own safety that they should forthwith elect a chief, capable of guarding them against the dangers to which they would be exposed without a head in a hostile land. It was to be hoped that, in a few months, Roxane would give them an heir to the throne. In the meanwhile it was for them to choose, by whom they would be governed." He had probably hoped that the wish which he so modestly dissembled would have been anticipated by general acclamation. But the meeting waited for advice.

Nearchus had a different plan to propose. He, as we have seen, had married a daughter of Mentor's widow, Barsine; and Barsine was also the mother of a son by Alexander. He therefore pointed out to the Macedonians "that there was no need to wait for the uncertain issue of Roxane's pregnancy; there was an heir to the throne already born—Hercules, the son of Barsine: to him the diadem belonged." But Nearchus was the only man present who had any interest in this choice. The soldiers clashed their spears and shields together, in token of vehement dissent; and Ptolemy gave utterance to their feelings on this point: "Neither Barsine, nor Roxane, could be mother of a prince whom the Macedonians would acknowledge as their sovereign. Was it to be borne, that the conquerors of Asia should become subject to the son of a barbarian captive? It was better that the throne should remain vacant, and that the persons who had formed Alexander's council of state should continue to have the supreme management of affairs, deciding all questions by a majority of votes." This motion however gained few partisans; its effect would have been permanently to exclude the royal family from the succession: a step for which few were prepared.

Thus most minds were turned towards the advice of Perdiccas; for there was a clear distinction between Barsine, and Roxane, Alexander's beloved wife, who was then in the palace, while Mentor's widow had been left with her son at Pergamus. It was now the right time for some friend of Per-

diccas to come forward in his behalf, and Aristonous, perhaps according to previous concert, undertook the task. He observed "that Alexander himself had already decided who was worthiest to command, when, having cast his eyes round all his friends who were at his bedside, he gave his royal signet to Perdicas. They had only to ratify Alexander's choice." Still the assembly was not inclined to invest Perdicas alone, under any title, with supreme power. The result of the whole deliberation was a sort of compromise between the proposals of Ptolemy and Aristonous. It seems to have been decided, but not without clamorous opposition, that, if Roxane should bear a son, he should succeed to the throne; and that in the meanwhile four guardians should be appointed for the future prince to exercise the royal authority in his name. Perdicas and Leonnatus were to be regents in Asia, Antipater and Craterus in Europe.


The cavalry — the aristocratical portion of the army — acquiesced in the resolution of their chiefs. But it was very ill received by the whole body of the infantry. No motive appears for their dissatisfaction, except that they had not been consulted on the question, and that they wished to dispose of the crown. Still it is not clear whether they acted quite of their own accord, or were excited to resistance by Meleager, who seems to have been impelled, partly by ambition, and partly by personal enmity to Perdicas. The accounts remaining of his conduct are contradictory as to details, but agree in representing him as the leader and soul of the opposition. According to some authors, he quitted the council of the officers after bitter invectives against Perdicas, declaring that the people was the true heir of the monarchy, and alone could rightfully dispose of it, and hastened to instigate the soldiery to insurrection and plunder. According to others, he was deputed to appease their discontent, but took the opportunity to inflame it, and placed himself at their head. We are left equally in doubt whether it was he who first proposed another competitor for the throne, whose name was soon mentioned in the popular assembly.

This was Arrhidæus, a son of Philip, by Philinna, a Thessalian woman, who is commonly described as of low condition. Arrhidæus was either naturally deficient in understanding, or had never recovered from the effects of a potion, said to have been administered to him by Olympias, whom jealousy rendered capable of every crime. It seems that Alexander, either through prudence or compassion, had removed him from Macedonia, though he had not thought him fit to be trusted with any command; and he was now in Babylon. Most probably Meleager, perceiving that whoever should raise such a prince to the throne would reign under his name, was the foremost to recommend him as the sole legitimate heir. To the army Arrhidæus must have been personally indifferent; but he was Philip's son, without any mixture of barbarian blood, and, which probably weighed more with them, he would be purely their creature. The proposal therefore was agreeable to their pride and their prejudices, which were stronger than their regard for Alexander now, as they had been in his lifetime. After a short pause — perhaps of surprise that a name so seldom heard should have been put forward on such an occasion — all, as if some happy discovery had been made, broke out into loud acclamations in favour of Arrhidæus; and Pithon, who, it seems — having apparently been sent by the council to soothe them — endeavoured to show the folly of their choice, only incurred their resentment. Meleager was deputed to bring the prince into the assembly; and, when he came, they saluted him as king, under the new name of Philip. He immediately proceeded to the palace, accompanied by Meleager, and escorted

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by the troops. The officers, it seems, were still in council there, and when Arrhidaeus appeared, some attempt was made to terminate the affair by discussion. But as the chiefs refused to sanction the choice of the infantry, they soon found themselves threatened with violence, and obliged to retire. Arrhidaeus mounted the throne, and was invested with the royal robes.

PERDICCAS, MELEAGER, EUMENES, AND THE PUPPET KING



WATER CARRIER
(After Hope)

Perdiccas had ordered the door of the room where Alexander's body lay to be locked, and prepared to guard it with six hundred chosen men; he was joined by Ptolemy at the head of the royal pages. They were

however soon overpowered by superior numbers. The soldiers of the adverse party broke into the chamber; blows were interchanged, Perdiccas himself was attacked with missiles, and blood was beginning to flow, when some of the elder among the assailants interposed, and, taking off their helmets, entreated Perdiccas and his followers to desist from their useless resistance.

Their mediation put an end to this prelude of the long contest which was to take place for Alexander's remains. But the greater part of the generals, and the whole body of the cavalry, quitted the city, and encamped outside the walls. Perdiccas did not yet accompany them; he hoped, it seems, that some change might happen in the disposition of the multitude, which he might more easily turn to his own advantage, if he stayed. But Meleager, probably apprehending the same

thing, and eager to satisfy his hatred, urged the king to give an order for the execution of Perdiccas. This he could not obtain; Arrhidaeus was perhaps too timid to strike so great a blow. Meleager therefore was forced to interpret the silence of his royal puppet as consent, and sent an armed band to the house of Perdiccas, with directions to bring him to the palace, or to kill him if he should resist. Perdiccas had only about sixteen of the royal pages with him, when his door was beset. He however appeared on the threshold with a firm countenance, and overawed those who came to arrest him by the severe dignity of his looks and his words. They probably did not think Meleager's authority a sufficient warrant for the murder of a man of such high rank. When they had withdrawn, he and his attendants mounted their horses, and hastened to the camp of their friends.

One eminent person of their party however remained in the city: Eumenes the Cardian, who had already decided on the course which his own interests required, and on this occasion gave proof of the sagacity and dexterity, which afterwards carried him through so many dangers and even brought him so near to the highest fortune. Eumenes, in his boyhood, had attracted Philip's notice by his promising talents; he was brought up at the Macedonian court, and was employed by Alexander both as his principal secretary and keeper

of the records, and in military commands. He had risen so high in favour with the king, that he could even venture on more than one occasion to quarrel with Hephæstion; but, after the favourite's death, he laboured, by ingenious contrivances and profuse expense in honour of his memory, to remove all suspicion that he viewed the event with pleasure. In this liberality, he showed the greater self-command, as he was habitually parsimonious.

Such a man was formed for the times which followed Alexander's death. Eumenes felt that he could only be safe in the strife of parties, as long as he could guard against the jealousy to which a foreigner in high station was exposed among the Macedonians. He remained, as we have observed, in Babylon after the flight of Perdiccas, under the pretext that he had no right to take a part in disputes concerning the succession; secretly however purposing to promote the interests of Perdiccas, as far as he could; for he probably foresaw that this side would finally prevail. He assumed the character of a peacemaker; and his seeming neutrality gave great weight to his mediation. It was seconded by vigorous measures on the part of the seceders. They began to stop the supply of provisions, and to threaten the Great City with famine. Meleager found his condition growing every day more embarrassing. He had been called to account by his own troops for the attempt he had made against the life of Perdiccas, and could only shelter himself under the royal authority. At length the soldiers came in a body to the palace, and demanded that an embassy should be sent to the cavalry, with overtures of peace. Three envoys were accordingly despatched: and it is remarkable, that one of them was a Thessalian, another an Arcadian of Megalopolis; so that probably the third, Perilaus, whose country is not mentioned, was not a Macedonian. The negotiations which followed are reported too obscurely to be described. It is said that the party of Perdiccas refused to treat, until the authors of the quarrel had been given up to them; and that this demand excited a violent tumult in the city, which was only calmed when Arrhidæus, displaying more vigour than he had been believed to possess, offered to resign the crown. Yet it does not appear that this condition was granted.

THE COMPACT

The terms on which the treaty was concluded were, according to the most authentic account, that Arrhidæus should share the empire with Roxane's child, if it should be a boy; that Antipater should command the forces in Europe; that Craterus should be at the head of affairs in the dominions of Arrhidæus; but that Perdiccas should be invested with the command of the horseguards, the chiliarchy, before held by Hephæstion, in which Alexander would permit no one to succeed him. This, it seems, was a post which, at the Persian court, had been equivalent to that prime minister, or grand vizier of the whole empire. It was however stipulated that Meleager should be associated with Perdiccas in the regency, though with a subordinate rank. Of Leonnatus we hear no more as a member of the government. The compact was ratified by a solemn reconciliation between the contending parties. The cavalry returned to the city; the phalanx marched out to meet them; Perdiccas and Meleager advanced between the lines to salute each other as friends. The troops on each side followed their example, and were once more united in one body.

It was however impossible, after what had happened, that Perdiccas and Meleager should ever trust each other. Meleager probably relied on the

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infantry for protection. But Perdiceas had now taken possession of the imbecile king, who was as passive in his hands as he had been in his rival's, and had resolved to strike the first blow. Before he directly attacked his enemy, he thought it necessary to deprive him of the support which he might find in the army; and he seems to have devised a very subtle plan for this end. He suborned emissaries to complain among the foot-soldiers that by the recent arrangement Meleager had been elevated to an equality with himself—not apparently for the purpose of exciting discontent, or of gaining a party among these troops, but to lead Meleager himself blindfold into a snare. Meleager was soon informed of the language that had been used against him in the camp, and indignantly complained of it to Perdiceas, whom he probably suspected to be its secret author. But Perdiceas was so great a master of dissimulation, that he completely lulled his suspicions. He affected to sympathise deeply with his resentment, and proposed to arrest the agitators. It was agreed between them, the more safely and surely to effect their object, that the whole army should be drawn out in the adjacent plain, under the pretext of a solemn lustration, to be celebrated with the old Macedonian rites, to purify it from the blood shed in the late quarrel. The usage on such occasions was to kill a dog, and to carry its entrails, divided into two parts, to opposite extremities of the field, so that the army might be drawn up between them, the phalanx on one side, the cavalry on the other. Such at least was the order now adopted by the two chiefs.

On the appointed day Perdiceas, with the king at his side, placed himself at the head of the cavalry and the elephants, facing the infantry, which was commanded by Meleager. After a short pause, he ordered them to advance. Meleager's troops were alarmed at the sight of this movement, for they now observed that the ground was favourable for the operations of the cavalry, and that, if they were attacked, they should not be able to make good their retreat without great loss. But, as they received no orders from their chief, and were quite uncertain as to the design of Perdiceas, they remained motionless, until a very narrow interval was left between the two lines. The king then rode up with a single squadron, and, having been previously instructed by the regent, demanded that the authors of the late dissensions should be given up to punishment; threatening, if they refused, to charge with the whole force of the cavalry and the elephants.

The men were dismayed by the suddenness of the proceeding; and Meleager, who now perceived his own danger, had not sufficient presence of mind to make any attempt at self-defence. Perdiceas took advantage of their consternation, to select about three hundred of those who had most distinguished themselves as his adversary's partisans, and immediately caused them to be trampled to death by the elephants in the sight of the whole army, and with the apparent consent of the king whose cause they had maintained. After this execution Meleager could have no hope of safety but in flight. He was not arrested on the field, but soon after took refuge in a temple at Babylon, where he was despatched by order of Perdiceas.

THE PARTITION

By this blow the regent's authority was firmly established, as far as related to the king and the army. A more difficult task remained. He was still surrounded by rivals as ambitious as Meleager, and more formidable from their ability and influence. His next care was to satisfy their pre-

tensions, so as least to weaken himself. A new distribution of the satrapies was settled by general consent, but probably in most points under his direction; in some at least we clearly trace his hand. It was not necessary for any purpose to make a total change; and the general principle adopted seems to have been to retain as many as possible of the satraps appointed by Alexander in their governments. The provinces which lay near the eastern and northeast frontier of the empire, were probably the least coveted, and in these scarcely any alteration was made. There were others from which, as they were more desirable, it might have been more difficult to displace their actual occupants.

The most important part of the new arrangement was that which related to the governments west of the Euphrates. Ptolemy, who was not only honoured on account of his reputed connection with the royal family, but also much beloved for his personal qualities, by the army, had fixed his eyes on Egypt, and obtained it with the adjacent regions of Arabia and Libya. Cleomenes was not removed, but placed under his orders. Laomedon remained in Syria, Philotas in Cilicia, Asander in Caria, Menander in Lydia, and Antigonos in the great province which included Phrygia proper, Lycia, and Pamphylia. But since Lycia and Pamphylia are also said to have been given to Nearchus, we may infer that he held these provinces with a subordinate rank — a suspicion which is confirmed by his subsequent relations with Antigonos. The Hellespontine Phrygia was assigned to Leonnatus — perhaps as a compensation for his share in the regency, or for the sake of removing him from court; and Eumenes, whom Perdicas regarded as his steady adherent, was rewarded with the title of satrap over Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. But these countries, which Alexander had never subdued, were still to be won by the sword from their native ruler, Ariarathes, who had held them as an hereditary vassal of Persia.

In Europe the government of Macedonia and Greece, together with that of the western countries on the coast of the Adriatic, which might afterwards be annexed to the empire, was to be divided between Antipater and Craterus — a partition in which Perdicas may have seen a prospect of collision between them likely to promote his ascendancy. Thrace, or the whole maritime region to the northeast of Macedonia, a province which had never been reduced to tranquil submission, and where the Odrysians had lately been roused to revolt by their chief Seuthes, was committed to Lysimachus, a warrior of iron frame and unflinching hardihood. There are two other names which might have been looked for in this list. Aristonous might have been expected to occupy a prominent place in it, since he had shown himself a decided partisan of Perdicas; yet we hear of no provision made for him. Hence it has been conjectured that Perdicas retained him near his person, as one of his staunchest friends. It was perhaps for a like reason that he entrusted Seleucus — who was destined to act so great a part in the history of the ensuing period — with the chiliarchy which had been assigned to himself — a highly honourable and important post indeed, but one which he might safely part with, as it could add little or nothing to the power he possessed as regent.

ALEXANDER'S POSTHUMOUS PLANS

There still remained a question on which he felt it necessary to consult the army, that he might relieve himself from a dangerous responsibility. Papers had been found in Alexander's cabinet, containing the outlines of

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some vast projects. It would seem that they might easily have been suppressed; but it was known that they corresponded in part with the instructions which had been given to Craterus, and therefore they could not safely be neglected without the general consent. Some related to the equipment of a great armament — a thousand galleys, it is said, of the largest size — destined for the conquest of Carthage, and of the whole coast of Africa on the Mediterranean as far as the Straits, and those of Spain and the adjacent maritime regions, as far as Sicily: for which end a road was to be made along the African shore. Others were plans for new colonies, to be planted in Asia with Europeans, and in Europe with Asiatics. There were also directions for six new temples to be built in Europe — at Delos, Delphi, Dodona, Diu, Amphipolis, and Cyrrhus — each at the cost of fifteen hundred talents, beside one of extraordinary magnificence to the goddess of Ilium, and for a monument to his father in Macedonia, which was to equal the largest of the Egyptian pyramids in its dimensions.

It must be owned, that there are some points in these schemes which look suspicious, and which, even if they had crossed Alexander's mind, we should not have expected he would have committed to writing. But the part relating to the temples can scarcely have been fabricated, and was probably contained in the instructions given to Craterus. The plan for an interchange of population between Europe and Asia is also quite conformable to the views which Alexander disclosed in his life-time. This however, and that of the expedition to Africa, could not any longer have entered into any one's thoughts, and might have been silently dropped. But perhaps Perdicas apprehended that the sums destined for the other objects might be demanded from him by his colleagues, and therefore deemed it advisable formally to annul the whole by the highest authority. That he forged the project of the expedition, to render the real contents of the papers the less acceptable to the Macedonians, seems a very improbable conjecture. All were laid before a military assembly, and rejected as impracticable or useless.

During the tumultuous scenes which followed Alexander's death, his body had lain in the palace unburied. There are various reports as to the place selected for its interment. According to one, it was to have been transported to the sanctuary of Ammon. But the more probable is, that it was determined it should be deposited in the sepulchre of his ancestors at Ægæ. And Aristander the soothsayer is said to have declared that it had been revealed to him, the land where it rested was destined to be ever prosperous and secure from invasion: which however was no more than an ancient Greek superstition as to the virtue of a hero's relics. Orders were now given to construct a funeral car worthy of these precious remains, and



PRIESTESS

(After Hope)

the general Arrhidæus was appointed to escort them towards the western coast.^b

The description by Diodorus (XVIII, 3) of this funeral pomp is so gorgeous that as a farewell sunset of Alexander's day it merits insertion here : *α*

ALEXANDER'S FUNERAL DESCRIBED BY DIODORUS

"First was provided a Coffin of beaten Gold, so wrought by the Hammer as to answer to the Proportion of the Body ; it was half fill'd with Aromatick Spices, which serv'd as well to delight the Sense as to preserve the Body from Putrefaction. Over the Coffin was a Cover of Gold, so exactly fitted, as to answer the higher part every way : Over this was thrown a curious Purple Coat embroider'd with Gold, near to which were plac'd the Arms of the Deceas'd, that the whole might represent the Acts of his Life. Then was provided the Chariot, in which the Body was to be convey'd, upon the top of which was rais'd a Triumphant Arch of Gold, set thick and studded over with precious Stones eight Cubits in breadth, and twelve in length : Under this Roof was plac'd a Throne of Gold, join'd to the whole Work, foursquare, on which were carv'd the Heads of Goat-Harts, and to these were fastened Golden Rings of two Hands breadth in the diameter ; at which hung, for Show and Pomp, little Coronets of various beautiful Colours, which, like so many Flowers, gave a pleasant Prospect to the Eye. Upon the top of the Arch was a Fringe of Network, where hung large Bells, that the Sound of them might be heard at a great distance.

"On both sides the Arch at the Corners stood an Image of Victory in Gold, bearing a Trophy : A Peristhylium, of Gold supported the Arch-work, the Chapiters of whose Pillars were of Ionian Workmanship : Within the Peristhylium, by a Network of Gold of a finger's thickness in the Workmanship, hung four Tablets one by another equal to the Dimensions of the Wall, whereupon were portray'd all sorts of living Creatures. At the entrance into the Arch stood Lions in Gold, with their Faces towards them that approach'd to enter. From the middle of every Pillar an Achanthus in Gold, sprouted up in Branches spiring in slender Threads to the very Chapiters : Over the Arch about the middle of the Roof on the outside was spread Purple Carpet in the open Air, on which was plac'd a vast Golden Crown, in form of an Olive Coronet, which by the reflection of the Sun-Beams darted such an amazing Splendor and Brightness, that at a distance it appear'd as a Flash of Lightning. Under the Seats or Bottom of the whole Work ran two Axle-trees, about which mov'd four Persian Wheels, whose spokes and Nathes were over-laid with Gold, but the Felloes were shod with Iron : The Ends of the Axes were of Gold, representing the Heads of Lions, every one holding a Dart in his Mouth. There were four Draught-Trees, to every one of which were fix'd four Courses of Yoaks, and to every Course were bound four Mules, so that the Mules were sixty four in number, the choicest for Strength and Largeness that could be got : Every Mule was adorn'd with a Crown of Gold, and Bells of Gold on either side their Heads ; and on their Necks were fitted Rich Collars set and beautified with precious Stones. And suitable to so stately a Show, a vast Company of Workmen and Pioneers (that plain'd the Ways for its Passage) attended it.

"And thus Arrhidæus (who had spent two Years in Preparations) brought the King's Body from Babylon to Ægypt. Ptolemy, in Honour of the King met the Corps with his Army as far as Syria, where he receiv'd it,

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and accompany'd it with great Care and Observance : For he had resolv'd not as yet to conduct it to the Temple of Hammon, but to keep the Body in the City which Alexander himself had built, the most Famous almost of any City in the World. To this end he built a Temple in Honour of Alexander in Greatness and Stateliness of Structure becoming the Glory and Majesty of that King; and in this Repository he laid the Body, and honour'd the Exequies of the Dead with Sacrifices and magnificent Shows, agreeable to the State of a Demi-God." ^c

ALEXANDER'S HEIRS

While such honours were paid to the conqueror's corpse, two of the living objects of his affection fell victims to the revenge of Roxane and the ambition of Perdicas. Roxane, with the agent's concurrence, invited Statira and her sister Drypetis to Babylon by a friendly letter, and when they came she caused them to be assassinated and secretly buried. In the course of time Roxane was delivered of a boy, who was acknowledged as partner of Philip Arrhidæus in the empire, and bore the name Alexander (*Ægus*).^b

Arrhidæus, the Imbecile

The sham government of Arrhidæus was now to commence. He must have been staying with the army. The phalanx no doubt did not believe that Arrhidæus was an idiot, but probably considered him to be a wise ruler who was only calumniated : just as even in Denmark, no one would believe that Christian VII was mad, from fear of wronging the king's majesty. The king's madness was in Holstein such a secret that persons at the utmost whispered it to one another, and to believe it appeared to the people like a culpable act; there is something mystic in the belief that such royal aberration is not madness, but profundity of thought. This may have been the feeling of the phalangites.

The cavalry were satisfied, as soon as they had him in their power. Perdicas was chiliarchus or administrator, and Craterus was to take care of the king's person, as the queen took care of the person of King George III, while the successor managed the government. Craterus was assigned to him as a kind of tutor, who took care of him, and always kept him in order; this shows how imbecile he must have been. Arrhidæus disappears altogether from history, and he was no more king than his nephew Alexander, the son of Roxane, and is mentioned only as a name. But in order to understand many coins and some inscriptions, we must bear in mind that Arrhidæus assumed the name of Philip.

The satrapies were now distributed afresh.

But before proceeding to the history of the satraps, or governors, we must relate the first of the horrible scenes of that time — viz., the insurrection of the unfortunate Greeks in the *ἀνω σατραπείαι* (323 B.C.) — a term comprising Khorasan in its widest extent, partly the province, properly so called, and partly the whole of Persia, east of the great Median desert. There Alexander had settled the captive Greeks, who had served as mercenaries under Darius, as well as other Greeks from among his own allies; he formed them into military colonies. These people were driven by despair to revolt, probably when they heard the report of the Lamian War; they assembled and determined to force their way to Greece. A Macedonian army under Pithon was sent against them. The fearful demoralisation

among the mercenaries became manifest on that occasion; he would probably have been unable to do anything against them, if he had not bribed one of their commanders, who during the engagement deserted his post. Being overpowered, they now capitulated. Pithon had received orders from Perdiccas to put them all to the sword, that they might no longer be troublesome to him. But Pithon had formed a different plan: he wanted to employ those Greeks as a force, with the aid of which he hoped to play a prominent part; he was a Macedonian, and had claims upon the empire which was already beginning to be torn in pieces. Accordingly he spared their lives; but now his Macedonians rebelled against him—here we see the effects of the national hatred existing between the Greeks and Macedonians—for they found that it would be much more advantageous to kill the Greeks and seize the booty they had collected. They therefore made a general massacre among them, and took their property. After this was done, Pithon returned as if he had executed the orders of Perdiccas. It is as if we read a history of Ali Pasha. Soon afterwards, the hostilities among the governors broke out.

The Diadochi

The generals and satraps of Alexander, called in Greek the Diadochi [*διάδοχοι*, or “successors”], were about twenty in number; none of them was inclined to play a subordinate part, but a great many could not entertain the thought of assuming supreme power. Some of them, therefore, at first kept aloof from the disputes; these were the men who had no great expectations for themselves. The great rupture at the beginning was between Perdiccas on the one hand, and Antipater and Ptolemy on the other.

Perdiccas claimed the supreme power, because Alexander, by giving him his seal-ring, had conveyed it to him; and Antipater claimed it as regent of Macedonia, because he looked upon himself in that capacity as the representative of the nation. He was joined by Ptolemy because he was far off, for if they had been near each other, Antipater and Ptolemy could never have become allies. But as it was, Ptolemy in a distant and inaccessible kingdom considered himself safe, and Antipater could have no inclination to deprive him of his kingdom.

Ptolemy showed himself as a very practical and intelligent man; for he never thought for one moment of making himself master of the whole of Alexander's empire, while the others were more or less harbouring such notions; but he was satisfied with the enormous prize he had carried off from the lottery, the possession of Egypt; and he only sought such provinces as could be maintained from his own kingdom, that is, Syria, Cyprus, and the countries on the opposite coast of Asia, which formed the monarchy under Philadelphus and Euergetes, who were masters of the opposite coast. This was very natural, as he could not but wish to secure himself on all sides.

Antipater aimed at power, but despised the diadem, still having the feelings of a soldier of Philip. He was already very far advanced in years, being the oldest of the generals; and Philip had had none who surpassed him in ability, and he had honoured him more than any other, as, for example, by the embassy to Athens. We recognise Antipater and Parmenion as the greatest among Philip's generals. Antipater was a man of the old school, and affected great simplicity. While the other generals appeared in purple chlamydes, he used the common Macedonian garment, and a stick, so that no one could distinguish him from an ordinary Macedonian. Such an

affectation, combined with internal rudeness, is very often found in men of a blood-thirsty disposition. Not even Plutarch is able to conceal his cruelty.

Perdiccas was the worst of all. He seems to have been a Macedonian noble. Although we read little of a nobility and the like among the Macedonians, and yet he appears in all circumstances as a person of great pretensions. He was guilty of every license, even the greatest cruelties, without being blood-thirsty like Antipater, who was another Duke of Alva. Perdiccas was a purely oriental and unprincipled character; a man of very moderate talents, to whom nothing was sacred.

He had no friends; Eumenes of Cardia alone was in connection with him, and drew close to him. As Craterus was the most chivalrous and gallant among the Macedonians, so Eumenes was the cleverest, and very much distinguished by his great talents: he would have been a distinguished man at any time. He is the only man of that period (if we except Craterus, who fell early) in whom we can take a personal interest; he was a true Odysseus, inexhaustible in resources. He never sacrificed a friend to his own interests. He always obeyed the dictates of humanity, and whenever in his life there occur actions which would be deplored in better times, still they are praiseworthy in comparison with what others did at the time. Being inexhaustible in counsel, he also had quite different ideas from those of the Macedonians. Had he been a Macedonian, he would unquestionably have gained the inheritance of Alexander, as far as it was possible, and as far as it could be concentrated in one man's hand. But he was a stranger, a native of Cardia in Chersonesus, and this circumstance placed him in a position among the Macedonians, which prevented his ever rising to the height which he might otherwise have attained.

Eumenes had not risen, like the rest, by his military talents alone, but more especially as a statesman. At the age of twenty he had entered the cabinet of King Philip, and was employed by him for seven years as secretary; he had then, without interruption, been with Alexander until the king's death, so that for twenty years he had been the organ of the royal government. But he was by no means unfit for the calling, by which men at that time rose to greatness, for he was also a good soldier. Alexander had a horse-guard consisting of two squadrons, and one of them was commanded by Eumenes. If he had been a native of Macedonia, he would unquestionably have eclipsed all others. He afterwards displayed the very greatest talent as a general, which is the more wonderful, as in the time of Alexander he had never commanded an army: he had only acted the part of a looker-on. He was then forty years old, but he was like the men of the revolution who displayed their military skill, although no one had suspected that they possessed any. Eumenes was appointed governor of Cappadocia and Pontus, but had first to conquer them. Perdiccas, feeling that Eumenes was very useful to him, assisted him in his conquests.

The Women Claimants

While Perdiccas was aiding Eumenes, the women of the family of Alexander began a commotion with a view of taking possession of the reins of government. Even during the life-time of Alexander, his sister, Cleopatra, the widow of the Molossian, ambitious like her mother, Olympias, and her whole race, had tried to interfere in the affairs of Macedonia. Even before Alexander's death, Olympias quarrelled with Antipater, and went to her family in Epirus. Cleopatra now endeavoured to obtain influence with

Antipater, but he would not allow her any; it would, however, seem that she acted on the authority of her brother, who wished to prevent Antipater establishing himself too firmly, and therefore allowed her some influence along with Antipater. She seems to have been the spy of her brother. After Alexander's death, Olympias remained in Epirus for several years, until



WOMAN'S COSTUME

she unfortunately returned after Antipater's death. Cleopatra, fearing Antipater, who was master in Macedonia, went to Sardis, where she kept a princely court, which became the centre of the intrigues and endless complications of the time.

As Queen Elizabeth continued to deceive many by allowing them to believe that they might hope for her hand, so Cleopatra held out hopes to several of the generals, partly because she had no confidence in her own situation, and partly because she expected brilliant results from her marrying one of the commanders. Thus she contrived to keep up a hope especially in the aged Perdiccas. This was a cause of great alarm to Antipater, who endeavoured to counteract the scheme, and to connect Perdiccas with himself by offering him his daughter, Nicæa, in marriage. This double intrigue was quite in the spirit of all the transactions of that time; it has all its meanness and untruth. The result was, that Perdiccas, through these negotiations, was placed in great difficulties. He thought it dangerous to offend Antipater; but the latter was not in earnest, wishing only to put off Perdiccas and to gain time, and thus both negotiations came to nothing.

About the same time there appeared in Asia Minor another daughter of Philip, who is called by some Cyna, and by others Cynane, a Barbaro-Macedonian name. She was a daughter of Audata, an Illyrian woman, for King Philip, according to Macedonian custom, had lived in polygamy, like other barbarian kings. The fate of this Cyna was very tragic. The fact that no one has ever made the last misfortunes of the family of Alexander the subject of a historical tragedy, shows how little the history of that time is known; we have here a most excellent subject for a tragedy, and if Shakespeare had known the fate of that princess and of Olympias, he would unquestionably have seized it as a subject for his muse.

Cyna had been married to the pretender Amyntas a cousin of Alexander, and she had remained behind in Macedonia with her only daughter, Adeia, who afterwards adopted the Greek name Eurydice, which had also been assumed by her grandmother, the mother of Cyna, whose Illyrian name was Audata; Eurydice was a common name in the family of Philip (his mother also bore it), just as Laudice or Laodice was common in the family of the Syrian dynasty. The names of the Macedonians are very often confounded; it is remarkable, that among the Macedonian princes sometimes

[323-321 B.C.]

even brothers have the same name; two brothers of Antigonus Gonatas, *e.g.*, were called Demetrius.

Cynane was an Amazon character, having accompanied her father on his last expedition, and she educated her daughter in the same way. She went to Asia Minor for the purpose of creating a revolution: she belonged to Antipater's faction, and it was, no doubt, according to a preconcerted plan with Cleopatra, that Perdicas caused her to be murdered by his brother Alcetas; she died like a heroine. This made a terrible impression upon the Macedonians, and was the main cause of the fall of Perdicas.

DEATH OF PERDICAS

Soon afterwards, hostilities broke out between Perdicas and Antigonus, the satrap of Phrygia, during which Eumenes declared in favour of Perdicas. This was followed by a general contest in which Perdicas was joined by Eumenes alone; all the rest, not only Ptolemy, Antipater, and Antigonus, but also Lysimachus and Craterus, were arrayed against Perdicas.

Perdicas, who was under the necessity of undertaking something, in order to maintain himself, now (321) undertook an expedition against Ptolemy, whom he wanted to drive out of Egypt, while Eumenes was defending himself in Asia Minor.

This undertaking, which was indeed very difficult, failed; Ptolemy had very prudently fortified himself behind the Nile, and made excellent preparations for defending himself. The army followed Perdicas very reluctantly, and after having tried in vain for weeks and months to break through the lines of Ptolemy, a rebellion broke out among his men, and he was murdered by his own troops¹ (321). His power had lasted three years, beginning with the death of Alexander; and during that period he had always carried Arrhidæus with him. Antipater, who had even before gone to Asia Minor, now came forward in the camp. The generals of Perdicas gladly concluded peace with Ptolemy.

Antipater now assumed the supreme power in the empire, which had been possessed by Perdicas, and all acquiesced in it, because he was at the greatest distance.

The show-kings were now handed over to Antipater. The unfortunate Philip Arrhidæus was married to Eurydice, the daughter of Cyna—a circumstance which is of interest only in the tragic fate of the house of Philip. Eurydice, on account of her ambition, now endeavoured to throw matters into confusion, but Antipater took her and Arrhidæus, as well as Roxane and her child, to Europe with him, and compelled them, as long as he lived, to be more humble. It may in some respects have been disagreeable to the ambitious Macedonian rulers in Asia, that the members of the royal family were in Macedonia in the hands of Antipater; but at the same time this very circumstance paved the way for their independence.

A new distribution of the satrapies also was then undertaken, which, however, was soon set at nought by Ptolemy, who by force made himself master of Phœnicia and Syria, and expelled the governors of these provinces.

[¹ Diodorus describes vividly how Perdicas tried to cross the Nile; part of his army crossing safely trod away the sand and hundreds who followed were lost. Perdicas then recalled the vanguard and they were drowned by hundreds. Enraged at this loss of two thousand lives "without a stroke stricken," a body of knights killed him in his tent.]

THE FEATS OF EUMENES

In the meantime, there had been going on in Asia Minor the war between Eumenes, the satrap of Cappadocia, and Antigonos, the satrap of Phrygia, with the party of Antipater; and in that war Craterus had fallen. He had come to the assistance of Antigonos, but Eumenes gained a brilliant victory over him, and Craterus lost his life. But now a storm was rising against Eumenes: a superior force, for which he was no match, was assembling against him. He was sometimes successful, but he succumbed in the end.

The facts are these. After the death of Perdiccas, Eumenes, together with the other partisans of Perdiccas, especially his brother Alcetas of Pisidia, was declared an outlaw in an assembly of the Macedonian army, which on such occasions represented the nation. Antigonos was commissioned to carry the sentence into effect, and he also received the means necessary for this object — but he employed them for the purpose of establishing for himself a larger dominion.

Eumenes, after having lost a battle in Cappadocia, in the face of Antigonos, shut himself up with five hundred men, in the mountain fortress of Nora in Cappadocia, and disbanded his whole army, in the hope that if circumstances should improve, his soldiers would be drawn towards him as towards a magnet. He sustained the siege for half a year. Then, after having been besieged in vain during the winter, he escaped from the besiegers, having kept them engaged, until he had collected strength in other parts. He fled into Syria, and then to the upper satrapies (which had taken no part in the earlier war) to Antigones of Susa, and Peucestas of Persia. A second war then broke out between Eumenes and Antigonos.

The death of Antipater, which had taken place in the meantime, had greatly altered all circumstances. He had appointed Polysperchon regent, and the latter called upon Olympias to come forward again. Antigonos, Cassander, and Ptolemy (though the last did not do so actively), declared against him; Polysperchon, on the other hand, put himself in connection with Eumenes, on behalf of Olympias and her grandson, and called upon him to take the family of Alexander under his protection.

Eumenes now appeared in upper Asia with full authority from Olympias. The *argyraspidæ* and most of Alexander's veterans were likewise in those parts, for what reason, we know not. They looked upon themselves as a station of invalids, were in the enjoyment of perfect leisure, and lived in the greatest abundance, like the followers of the Normans in England. They were all *seigneurs*. They had hitherto joined no party, and lived like a nation of Mamelukes, almost in the forms of a republic. Eumenes, provided with the authorisation of Olympias, now applied to them, and gained them over to his side. The satraps also declared themselves in his favour, and he obtained possession of the royal treasures. With these means at his command, Eumenes for years carried on the war on behalf of Olympias and young Alexander. For years he overcame the jealousy of the Macedonian commanders, who hated him as a foreigner, and controlled those old faithless men of the sword. He induced them to quit their merry quarters for the objects he stated to them, to follow him, and to risk their own existence for his personal objects; he guided them all by assuming the appearance that they were all equal, and by erecting a symbolical throne of Alexander.

All the Macedonian world was now divided into two masses, which fought against each other both in Europe and in Asia. Cassander was engaged in Greece against Polysperchon, and Antigonos in Asia against Eumenes, still

[321-301 B.C.]

pretending that he was obliged to carry into effect the decrees of the Macedonian army against Eumenes.

The power of Antigonus, however, increased immensely through the war with which he was commissioned: he not only made himself master of Eumenes' satrapy of Cappadocia in western Asia, and of other satrapies in Asia Minor, such as Pisidia and Lycia, but he also occupied Media and the intermediate provinces, so that his rule extended from the Hellespont to Persia. He took his headquarters at Ecbatana, whence he made war upon the southern provinces. In order to attack them he had to pass through the desert of Rhei and Kom, which separates Fars and Kerman from Media. Antigonus there undertook the celebrated expedition through the desert, in order to attack the allies in their winter quarters; but the manner in which Eumenes discovered and thwarted his march, is much more brilliant, for he deceived his enemy, and induced him to give up his plan, which could not have failed, and to make his retreat. In the eighth year after Alexander's death, Antigonus concluded the war against Eumenes, by attacking him with a far superior force. Peucestas had displayed a miserable character, but Antigonus had conducted the war in a most able manner. In the end (316 B.C.), he defeated the allies, and conquered the immense oriental train and their harems, which they carried about with them; and in order to recover these, they concluded peace with Antigonus. This was the price for which the unfortunate Eumenes was delivered up by his own troops, as Charles I was delivered up by the Scotch. Antigonus would willingly have saved him, but he was obliged to sacrifice him to the national hatred of the Macedonians against the Greeks.

THE EMPIRE OF ANTIGONUS

This war established the dominion of Antigonus, who through his victory over Eumenes and the satraps under him, obtained the supremacy over their provinces, and now was in possession of a large empire. He was the first who was courageous enough to drop all hypocrisy, and in 306 B.C. assumed the diadem and the kingly title. No one had as yet ventured to do this, just as Napoleon hesitated for a long time to assume the imperial title. Antigonus was already advanced in years, being of about the same age as Perdiccas, and somewhat younger than Antipater (who was the oldest among the generals) if we take into consideration the age at which he died in 301 B.C. He was one of the old officers of Philip, and a good one too. He was, indeed, like most of them, nothing beyond a soldier, but in ability he was superior to most of them. Among those who contended for the empire (if we except Eumenes the stranger and Craterus who fell early), he and Lysimachus were probably the best. Besides Antipater and his son Cassander, they alone were true generals. Ptolemy distinguished himself only by his skilful defence of Egypt against Perdiccas; subsequently in the war against Antigonus, not much is to be said of him.

In the meantime great changes had taken place in Macedonia. Antipater had been quiet during the latter years: he reigned in the name of Arrhidæus, and of the little son of Alexander, who at his death was not yet seven years old. Heracles was older, but illegitimate, and was regarded as incapable of succeeding his father: he too was in Macedonia with his mother Barsine. Antipater kept the royal family at Pella in a state of splendid captivity, while he himself lived in the greatest simplicity.

But when his end was approaching, he made a singular arrangement concerning the regency (319 B.C.). Two of his sons were still alive : the one, Iollas, who was said to have poisoned Alexander, was dead, but Cassander and Philip were still living. Antipater did not give the regency and his power to either of them, but to a petty Epirot prince of the name of Polysperchon or Polysperchon.

POLYSPERCHON VERSUS CASSANDER

This arrangement made Cassander and Polysperchon enemies. As soon as the father had closed his eyes, and Polysperchon had entered upon the administration, Cassander quitted Macedonia, went to Ptolemy in Egypt, assembled troops, and prepared to attack Polysperchon. He was conscious of his own superiority : he was a man who in great difficulties knew how to extricate himself ; he was a general who undertook little, but was very cautious in what he did undertake, and a remarkable instrument in taking revenge for Alexander's cruelty against the Greeks. Antigonos and Ptolemy, as we have already mentioned, joined him ; though the latter took no active part in the war, being desirous firmly to establish his own dominion in the interior.

A war now arose which was carried on with the most fearful devastation of unhappy Greece ; the ravages were constantly repeated, until the country was brought down so completely, that it was entirely annihilated.

This war between the two pretenders to the crown of Macedonia, and to the guardianship of the unfortunate royal family, however, inflicted even more suffering upon Macedonia than upon poor Greece.

Polysperchon favoured Olympias, with whom he was already connected by his nationality. She was still living among her countrymen in Epirus, whither she had gone even in the reign of Alexander. The fact that Æacides, a petty prince of the Molossians, who had been expelled by her, now supported her, and on this account brought great misery upon his family, shows that national ties were stronger than those arising from family connection. Polysperchon, as we said before, connected himself with Olympias, and called upon her to return to Macedonia, and undertake the government as the guardian of her grandson, Alexander, the son of Roxane. She readily accepted this proposal, and both now formed connections with Eumenes.

The latter obtained from Olympias full power to act as he thought fit, as if he were *Lieutenant du Roi*, and this induced the argyraspidæ and the satraps of Upper Asia to declare in his favour. Olympias, however, appears still to have remained in Epirus. Eurydice, on the other hand, joined the party of Cassander, and the feud between the two queens became the cause of the civil wars in Macedonia. Polysperchon seems to have had less ambition, and was satisfied with being the first general.

At the same time, however, Polysperchon also endeavoured to secure the assistance of the Greeks, and in the name of the king he issued a proclamation to them in which he declares, in the name of King Philip Arrhidæus, employing the language of hearty sympathy, that the Greeks ought not to impute the harsh cruelties which they had experienced from the generals (Antipater and Craterus) to the king ; that he had neither approved nor known of them ; that he disapproved of the change in their constitutions, and that they should be restored just as they had been under

[317 B.C.]


Philip and Alexander. All the exiled Greeks, moreover, with the exception of a few, were to return. For the purpose of carrying this measure into effect, Polysperchon proceeded to Greece.

Cassander appeared with a few thousand soldiers, whom he had collected in Asia. With this small force he commenced the war elsewhere described, in which he recovered the dominion of his father and a great deal more. When Cassander had established himself there, Polysperchon no longer attacked him, but turned to Peloponnesus, to carry his decrees into effect.

While Polysperchon and Cassander were thus arrayed against each other in Greece, Olympias ruled in Macedonia with a tragic fury. The Macedonians hated and despised her both personally and because she was a foreigner; and she knew this quite well. She remembered that the old national party in Macedonia had regarded Alexander as the son of a foreigner; that on the other hand, the marriage of Philip with Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, had been hailed with general rejoicings, and that she had been obliged to withdraw with Alexander. She therefore looked upon the real Macedonians as her personal enemies, and the more terrible her natural disposition was, the more she felt irritated, and the more she abandoned herself to acts of infuriated cruelty. The accounts of them are certainly not exaggerated, for we are moving during this period on perfectly historical ground, though it is indeed a barren and exhausted ground, which does not produce a single blossom of poetry. The history of that time is quite authentic, but we may rejoice that we have no very minute accounts of it.

Among the victims of Olympias, we find her step-son, the poor Arrhidæus, and his unfortunate wife Eurydice, the daughter of Cynane. This Cynane was persecuted by her in every way as a mortal enemy, and Eurydice was looked upon by her as the granddaughter of a rival. In early life, Philip had loved Olympias, but afterwards he was shocked at her, and withdrew from her; she had become detestable to him. He lived in wild polygamy, and his mistresses were to her the objects of a truly oriental hatred. Eurydice, the granddaughter of such a rival, was young, lively, and equally ambitious. Olympias cherished against her the hatred of fading age and a malign disposition against the freshness of youth. It must also be borne in mind, that Eurydice's mother had been married to Amyntas, the champion of the party which drove Olympias from Macedonia. Her mother, Cynane, was a bold woman, and Eurydice was a person of the same character; she wanted to rule in the name of her husband.

While Polysperchon was forming a connection with Olympias, Eurydice entered into a relation with Cassander. Olympias seems still to have been staying in Epirus at the time when Polysperchon went to Phocis and thence into Peloponnesus. He took Arrhidæus with him on this expedition, but he must afterwards have sent him back to Pella. Olympias now returned to Macedonia with an army of Epirots and Ætolians, which was opposed by



HYGEIA
(After Hope)

Eurydice and a Macedonian force. Olympias made use of the influence of her own name and of that of her son, for the purpose of gaining over the followers of Eurydice. The Macedonians were extremely untrustworthy, and they seem to have been induced to desert to their opponents not only by bribery, but often by mere caprice; and it is not till the time when the dominion of the Antigonidæ had become established, that this faithlessness ceases. Eurydice and Arrhidæus accordingly being deserted by the Macedonians, fell into the hands of Olympias, who now ordered them to be put to death. Wishing to enjoy their death, she first intended to kill them by hunger, and ordered them to be walled up in a dungeon — and a little food to be given to them. But as this lasted too long, Olympias becoming impatient, and fearing lest a tumult should arise, ordered the dungeon to be broken open and the harmless idiot to be murdered by Thracians. Eurydice was obliged to choose the manner in which she was to die, and died with great firmness. Olympias now put forward her little grandson Alexander with his mother Roxane. In the same manner she raged against the whole house of Antipater, one of whose sons was likewise killed.

But the cruelties of Olympias excited discontent and rebellion among the restless and mutinous Macedonians. When Polysperchon was obliged to

retreat from Megalopolis, most of the Greek cities declared for Cassander. Cassander thus gained a firm footing in Greece; and, while Polysperchon retreated, Cassander followed him into Macedonia, where the people declared for him, Pella, Pydna, and Amphipolis alone declaring against him. Olympias, with her grandson Alexander, Roxane, and others, had fled to Pydna. Polysperchon was deserted by his troops, who were bribed by Cassander, and was obliged to flee with a few faithful adherents into Ætolia.

Olympias was thus shut up in Pydna; it was situated quite close to the sea, and there was no one inclined to afford her assistance. Eumenes was then in Upper Asia, engaged in the war against Antigonus. If Antigonus, as he himself wished, had become reconciled to Eumenes, the latter would have been able to act as mediator on behalf of Olympias; but, at all events, the assistance from that quarter would have come too late. The party blockaded at Pydna were suffering from the most terrible famine, and Olympias was compelled to surrender. She stipulated for her life, and Cassander promised to spare her, but had no intention of keeping his word. The widows and orphans of those who had been murdered by Olympias brought charges



COSTUME OF A YOUTH OF THE UPPER CLASSES

against her before the Macedonians, who again formed a *champ de Mars*. Olympias did not appear, and was sentenced to death. Afterwards, she declared her willingness to appear before a court of Macedonians; but Cassander ordered her to be executed, saying, that he must obey the will of the nation. Olympias received warning that she must prepare for death.

[316 B.C.]

She put on her royal robes and came forward, leaning on two of her women, to meet the soldiers. Even they were so overpowered by the majesty of her presence, and by the numberless great recollections attached to her name, that they could not bring themselves to execute Cassander's order. He was obliged to commit the deed of blood to the persons who had accused her, and who were eager enough for revenge to undertake it themselves. She submitted to her fate with unbending firmness, neither shrinking from their swords nor uttering a word unworthy of her birth and fortunes.^b

Young Alexander, and his mother, Roxane, were sent to Amphipolis, where, for a time, they were kept in close confinement, and afterwards put to death. Hercules, the son of Barsine, was likewise murdered, and that too by Polysperchon; but when this happened cannot be accurately determined. Polysperchon now disappears from history. His son, Alexander, continued to play a part for some time, but it did not last long.

After the fall of Olympias, all the other places, which had till then held out, opened their gates to Cassander; and he now was king of Macedonia, without having the regal title.

About the same time Antigonus, by his conquest of Eumenes, became master of all Asia, while Lysimachus ruled in Thrace, and Ptolemy in Egypt. We need hardly observe, that Antigonus' dominion in the most eastern satrapies was merely nominal, or did not exist at all; but, in regard to Babylonia, Persia, and other interior provinces, the case was different, for there he really ruled as master. But none of the princes had yet assumed the kingly title. This was the state of things in 316 B.C.

In the feuds which henceforth arise among the rulers, a younger generation of men already appears on the stage, and they can in no way be compared with the older men who had gone forth from the school of Philip. Seleucus was one of these younger men; he had not yet distinguished himself, but may have become acquainted with war as early as the time of Philip. He was of about the same age as Alexander, and in every sense an *enfant de la fortune*, who rose only through his extraordinary good fortune. [His realm and his followers, known as the Seleucidæ, will be treated in a later chapter.] Antigonus had conquered for himself an empire by campaigns, labours, and hardships; he lost one eye, and, in the end, his life. Ptolemy had been a companion in arms of Philip, and had greatly distinguished himself under Alexander. Of Cassander we have already spoken; and Lysimachus had been obliged to conquer Thrace, the possession of which he was now enjoying.

It had been given to him to be conquered, for it was not a satrapy, having been under the administration of Antipater. The country had become tributary as early as the time of Philip, but had retained its ancient dynasties. The princes of the Odrysians, though dependent on, and weakened by Philip, still existed; and, in the reign of Alexander, Thrace was always united with Macedonia. But, after his death Perdiccas separated the two countries, for the purpose of weakening Antipater, and changed Thrace into a satrapy, which he gave to Lysimachus, and which Lysimachus subdued.

LYSIMACHUS

It is uncertain whether Lysimachus was a Thessalian or a Macedonian. He was captain of the king's bodyguard, and very distinguished, especially for his lion-like bravery. When Callisthenes was tortured by Alexander,

Lysimachus, on seeing his frightful condition, gave him poison out of compassion—a bold thing to do under a tyrant of Alexander's temperament. This story shows that Lysimachus was considered as a man of independence of mind, who preserved his free and proud spirit, when Alexander had already become an eastern despot.

He established his empire with small means, and for the greater part of his life he was reasonable enough to be satisfied with his dominion. It was not till his old age that ambition overcame him and carried him away, though, perhaps, not without some deeper motive and the desire to save himself. He once crossed the Danube in the vain attempt to make conquests in the country beyond the river; this may, perhaps, have been only an attempt to keep off the invading nations of the north. He had a difficult problem to solve, to conquer the wild and warlike Thracians, whose country appears to us northern people as a fair southern sort of paradise, but was terrible to the Greeks on account of the severe arctic cold; and the terror was increased by the savage manners of the inhabitants. On the coast, however, there were large and magnificent Greek cities, and the beautiful Chersonesus. We know little of the reign of Lysimachus, and we are not even informed whether he resided at Byzantium or elsewhere. In later times, during the war against Antigonus, his residence seems to have been in Asia, at Sardis or at Ephesus.

CASSANDER IN POWER

When Cassander was once in possession of Macedonia, he extirpated the family of Alexander, without a hand being raised in their defence. Aristobulus, who wished to interfere, was delivered up and sacrificed. Hence it is remarkable that he married Thessalonice, the only surviving daughter of Philip; but this may have arisen from the pride of the usurper, or from the hope of thereby establishing his dominion. His government of Macedonia was at the same time a perfect dominion over Greece, with very few exceptions, one of which was Sparta.

Thebes had been restored by Cassander immediately after the conquest of Macedonia (316 B.C.), for, in his hatred of Alexander, he undid all that Alexander had done. By their possession of the Theban territory the Bœotians were so much bound up with the interests of Macedonia, that it became a question as to whether it was prudent to restore Thebes. It is not certain whether they had incurred the suspicion of Cassander. It was a matter of great difficulty to induce the Bœotians to consent to the restoration; in all of the rest of Greece it was regarded as an act of the greatest justice, and it seems to have been a general national consolation.

About the same time Cassander founded Cassandrea, a remarkable proof that he was a man of practical sagacity. Philip had extirpated or sold the Greek population on the Macedonian coast, with the exception of that of Amphipolis and Pydna. One of these destroyed cities was Potidæa, which had at first been a Corinthian colony, but afterwards belonged to Athenian cleruchi. Now, on that site, Cassander assembled, not only many strangers, but all the Greeks, especially those Olynthians who were still surviving from the destruction of their city, and built Cassandrea. On the site of the insignificant town of Therma, he founded Thessalonica, which he called after the name of his wife. This act also shows great practical wisdom. Thessalonica, situated on a fine harbour, and in a fertile district, being now extended, became the chief commercial place in Macedonia, a

[316-307 B.C.]

rank which it has maintained down to the present day. Cassandra (now Cassandra) soon became great and powerful; it has often been destroyed, but was always restored again; and its situation was so happily chosen, that it naturally always recovered.

This was the condition of Greece at the time when the appearance of Demetrius Poliorcetes, the son of Antigonus (307 B.C.), stirred up everything without doing any good. He had even before been actively engaged in a war against Ptolemy.

The defeat and death of Eumenes put Antigonus in possession of a vast monarchy, extending from the Hellespont as far as India. According to the early invented principle of the balance of power, the others now demanded that he should give up a part of his conquests; they even thought it necessary, for the sake of justice and for the balance of power, that the countries of upper Asia should form a separate state.

Seleucus, the child of fortune, was destined to obtain that empire; a man who was the pet of fortune, but in no way distinguished as a hero or statesman. In the same year (316 B.C.) in which Cassander had conquered Macedonia, and Antigonus, after the conquest of Eumenes, returned from Upper Asia, Antigonus intended to order Seleucus to be arrested at Babylon. But he escaped, and the Chaldeans now foretold Antigonus, that the fate of his family was involved in the affair. It was easy to foretell the beginning, but not the end, for the Seleucidæ did not overthrow Antigonus. Seleucus now went to Ptolemy whom he urged on to wage war against Antigonus.

Thus arose, in 316 B.C., the second or third great internal war among the Macedonian princes—we say the second or third, because the recommencement of the war in 318 B.C. may either be regarded as a continuation of the first or as a second war. In this war, Antigonus fell out with Cassander, and Ptolemy allied himself with Cassander and Lysimachus against Antigonus. Lysimachus, however, was cunning enough to keep aloof as much as he could, and Cassander, too, at first took much less part in it than Ptolemy. In the beginning it was, properly speaking, only Antigonus and Ptolemy that were arrayed against each other.

The war was at first carried on especially in Syria and Cyprus. Ptolemy had taken possession of Coele-Syria and southern Phœnicia. Antigonus now directed his arms against him, and at first generally with success, so that he made himself master of Syria and a great part of Cyprus; until, in the fourth year of the war, Demetrius Poliorcetes lost the battle of Gaza against Ptolemy, of which we shall speak hereafter.

In the meantime, however, the generals of Antigonus were carrying on a war in Greece against Cassander, from 315 B.C. till the end of 312 B.C. It is worthy of remark that both Antigonus and Ptolemy considered the Greeks of sufficient importance, to endeavour to gain their favour by proclaiming the struggle a war of independence for the Greeks; neither of them, however, had any serious intention of this kind. In the very first year of the war, Antigonus sent Aristodemus of Miletus with a fleet and large sums of money to Greece, probably with no other intention than to make a diversion against Cassander and prevent him from crossing over into Asia.

This brought unspeakable misery upon Greece. Each city was too weak, and also but little inclined to defend itself; each threw itself into the arms of the party that happened to be at its gates. Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, had remained in Peloponnesus, establishing himself mainly at Corinth and Sicyon; he now joined Antigonus, from whom he received money and troops. He and Aristodemus also enlisted soldiers in Greece,

and the war now broke out, especially in Peloponnesus. Cassander, forcing his way into the peninsula, conquered Cenchreæ, the port of Corinth.

But all on a sudden, Alexander deserted Antigonus, and faithlessly concluded a peace with Cassander in his own name and that of his father. By this means, Aristodemus was driven out of Peloponnesus, and now went to Ætolia, whence he carried on the war against the opposite countries of Peloponnesus, Achaia, and Elis. The watchword always was, "Liberty and Autonomy for Greece;" but the towns were, notwithstanding, treated in a most terrible manner. During the first campaign, the principal scene of operations was Arcadia and Argolis, and in the second, Elis and Achaia.



A SCENE IN SYRIA

Almost the whole of Achaia was laid waste during this campaign, and Patræ and Ægium were taken. Alexander was then murdered, and Cratesipolis, his widow, keeping possession of Corinth and Sicyon, ruled there almost as an absolute queen.

But Cassander transferred the war into Ætolia; these occurrences rendered the conflict more and more important, and the Acarnanians, therefore, beginning to be apprehensive, threw themselves into the arms of Cassander and the Macedonians. Being now supported by Cassander, they endeavoured to rid themselves of their connection with the Ætolians. The year following saw the commencement of the war of Cassander against Ætolia.

In 312 B.C., Antigonus made great preparations, and under the command of Ptolemy, a son of his sister, sent an army into Greece, more especially into Bœotia, which was exasperated against Cassander, for having been obliged by him to give up the territory of Thebes. In conjunction with them, Ptolemy conquered Chalcis, and wherever they went, they were successful in expelling the garrisons of Cassander, who had no other city in Greece left that sided with him except Athens. But while Antigonus was victorious there, he was losing ground in other parts; and thus he found himself obliged, in 311 B.C., to conclude a peace with his opponents.

In Syria, Antigonus had entrusted the supreme command against Ptolemy and Seleucus to his son Demetrius, who was then still a very young man. This Demetrius plays a very prominent part in history. He has the honour of having his life described among the biographies in Plutarch—an

[312-308 B.C.]

honour which we might reasonably grudge Demetrius, for he is a despicable person. We know him, partly from Plutarch's biographies, and partly from a number of anecdotes in Athenæus, to have been the most unprincipled and most detestable man in existence: the acts of faithlessness which he committed against Alexander, the son of Cassander, are not the only things for which he deserves our detestation. He was also a voluptuary of the vulgarst and most abject description; the lowest crapule was the element in the filth of which he revelled; and he was quite a heartless man, who knew no friendship; the basest creatures, the companions of his lusts, were his only friends. Cassander was, after all, capable of distinguishing persons deserving of respect, as he showed in the selection of Demetrius Phalereus; and so also was Ptolemy; but we know that Demetrius Poliorcetes lived at Athens in intimacy with the most abject and abandoned persons of the time. He also showed towards his soldiers an ingratitude and a heartlessness, which are quite revolting; they were perfectly indifferent to him, and he regarded them only as his tools. They accomplished great things for him, but he always sacrificed them without any scruple, leaving to destruction on the morrow those who had saved his life the day before. In addition to this, he was a gambler, whose dull torpor could be excited only by great changes of fortune, and who staked everything upon a card. He is remarkable for his enormous good fortune: "fortune raised him beyond all conception, and then deserted him, but when he seemed entirely lost, she again held out her hand to him," says Plutarch, in a verse which he applies to him.

Such a man would deserve no attention at all, were it not that he acted a great part, and that nature had endowed him with great abilities, especially in mechanics, according to the leaning of that age toward the mechanical sciences. In this respect, as in many others, we may compare him with a modern person, the regent Philip of Orleans, who, however, was a far better man. Demetrius was a great inventor in mechanics, and he did much for the improvement of military engineering: this is a merit which he did not unfairly assume, but he is fully entitled to his reputation in this respect. A short time before, a great impulse had been given to mechanics in the affairs of war, and machines of every description were improved. Engines, which for centuries had remained unchanged, were now, partly through the progress of mathematics, and partly through the increased wealth that could be employed upon them, improved in one year, more than they were formerly in the course of centuries.

Demetrius was eighteen years old when Antigonus commissioned him to undertake the command of an army against Ptolemy. The first attempt failed, for at Gaza he was completely defeated, and Ptolemy again took possession of Cœle-Syria. Ptolemy carried on the war in a generous spirit, for, declaring it to be a civil war between Macedonians, he set the prisoners free without ransom, whereby he gained the good will of the Macedonians. Antigonus now undertook the command himself, and Ptolemy again evacuating the towns of Cœle-Syria, ravaged them.

Peace was then concluded, but it lasted only for a short time. Cassander succeeded in inducing Ptolemy, the nephew of Antigonus, who was stationed in Bœotia, as well as another general on the Hellespont, to revolt. Yet Antigonus soon recovered those countries. In the same year Ptolemy took Cyprus and extended his power on the coast of Asia Minor.

In the year following Ptolemy appeared with a fleet in Greece, having until then been the ally of Cassander. It was probably the Bœotians and Peloponnesians that called in his assistance against Polysperchon, and he

had a fair opportunity of being able to say that he was coming to avenge the murder of Roxane and Alexander. Cratesipolis surrendered to him her principality of Argos and Sicyon, being unable to maintain those cities any longer ; but it was not without difficulty that the mercenaries were prevailed upon to surrender : it was effected only by stratagem. The Peloponnesians afterwards were slow in doing what they had promised, and Ptolemy himself probably did not care much about the conquest. Hence he concluded a treaty with Cassander, whereby he obtained possession of Peloponnesus with the exception of Argos and Sicyon.

Antigonus now sent his son Demetrius with a fleet to Greece. No one there was willing to sacrifice himself for Cassander, who had no fleet, so that he was unable to undertake anything against Demetrius. The latter appeared unexpectedly before Piræus: the harbour not being closed, he landed and quickly took Piræus, before the posts could be occupied. He immediately proclaimed that the expedition had been undertaken for the purpose of restoring to Athens her freedom and autonomy, and he was accordingly received with enthusiasm. The Macedonian garrison under Dionysius shut itself up in Munychia, and negotiations were commenced between Demetrius Poliorcetes and the city. Demetrius Phalereus was sent as ambassador down to the camp in Piræus; Demetrius promised the Athenians an amnesty, the city was declared free, and the ancient democratic constitution was restored; but Demetrius Phalereus was sent into exile.

Demetrius Poliorcetes now besieged the Macedonians in Munychia. He would not go to Athens till he had taken that fortress; it was at first blockaded, while the preparations for a siege were going on. While the engines were building, Demetrius marched against Megara, where there was a garrison of Cassander's. The town was taken by storm and plundered, and it was only at the urgent request of the Athenian ambassadors, that its inhabitants were saved and not dragged away into slavery. He then returned to Piræus, where he attacked Munychia, until the feeble garrison, being exhausted, was obliged, after several days, to surrender, and then departed. The fortifications were razed to the ground, and the place given up to the Athenians. Athens was now free, but Demetrius, for the protection of the Athenians, gave them a garrison of his own troops. After this he stayed for a time at Athens, where he was received with enthusiasm, as elsewhere described.

If Demetrius had remained at Athens, and continued the war against Cassander, he might easily have conquered all Greece; but he was called away by his father Antigonus, because Ptolemy had made himself master of Cyprus. About the month of Hecatombæon, Demetrius sailed to Cyprus; and now, by a brilliant victory of Demetrius over Menelaus, the brother of Ptolemy, near Salamis in Cyprus, Antigonus and Demetrius gained the mastery at sea. Cyprus was reconquered. Menelaus, with all his forces in the island, was obliged to capitulate; and thus the sea far and wide was in the power of Antigonus and his son. But an expedition which the two undertook against Egypt proved a failure.

THE NAME OF KING ASSUMED

Until now, none of the princes had assumed the title of king, but after the victory of Salamis, Antigonus took the diadem for himself and his son. Immediately afterwards, Ptolemy, Cassander, Lysimachus, and Seleucus did

[307-305 B.C.]

the same; and the years were now counted from their accession (306 B.C.): these are what are called the Macedonian Eras.

Demetrius now remained absent from Athens for a period of three or nearly four years; during this time the city was left to itself, and a hard time it was. We may easily imagine that Cassander was not idle, and endeavoured to recover Athens, which was of such importance to him. He was in possession of Panactum and Phyle, and inflicted the severest sufferings upon the city. This war must unquestionably be regarded as one of the chief causes of the terrible poverty in which we afterwards find Athens, for there can be no doubt that the whole territory was laid waste during the incursions from Panactum and Phyle. In this war, Demochares was strategus of Athens, and with her resources alone he operated against Cassander for four years in a most able manner, until Demetrius returned.

According to the order observed by Trogus Pompeius — though not according to that of Justin, who has here quite without judgment omitted many things — we now come to the expedition of Demetrius against Rhodes, one year after the unsuccessful undertaking against Egypt.

THE SIEGE OF RHODES

The salted and dried fish of the Euxine were articles of great consumption in Egypt, and it was for this trade that Rhodes was the natural entrepôt. The consequence of this was that the Rhodians and the Ptolemies were natural friends and allies, and that Rhodes would on no account separate itself from Egypt; its whole existence depended upon the commercial advantages, which even the first Ptolemy conceded to them. Rhodes, therefore, was a weak place, in which Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus might attack the Egyptians; and it would have been an immense loss to Egypt, if the two princes had conquered the island, the possession of which was to them of equal importance.

Hostilities commenced by Demetrius capturing the Rhodian merchant vessels, which were sailing to Egypt; the first example in antiquity of neutral vessels being seized upon. The Rhodians paying in equal coin, captured the ships of Antigonus, who now declared this measure to be an act of open hostility; and Demetrius was commissioned to lay siege to Rhodes. While Antigonus was engaged in preparations, the Rhodians, seeing that Ptolemy's fleet had been defeated, made an attempt to obtain peace; but the terms which were offered to them were such as to prevent their accepting them. Antigonus demanded one hundred hostages, whom he himself was to select, the right freely to use the harbour of Rhodes for his ships of war, and an unconditional alliance against Ptolemy. These terms were rejected by the Rhodians.

Demetrius then landed at Rhodes. His preparations were immense: the determination of the Rhodians to defend themselves manfully could not be doubted, and hence every effort was made to compel them by force. Demetrius appeared with two hundred ships of war, one hundred and seventy transports, and many small vessels; he is said to have embarked no less than forty thousand men, partly sailors and partly soldiers. He assembled his forces at Loryma, opposite to Rhodes, and during his passage across, the sea between Caria and Rhodes was covered with his ships. He landed without opposition, made a harbour for his ships of war, and approached with besieging engines. The whole island was in the meantime overrun, the

country was laid waste, and all who had not fled into the city, were led away into slavery.

While Demetrius was thus encamped before the walls of the city, the Rhodians were making the most extraordinary preparations. Their citizens were called to arms; in their enumeration only six thousand were found capable of bearing arms, and not more than one thousand metœci and strangers, who were willing faithfully to undertake the defence. At first they do not appear to have employed mercenaries; but they allowed their slaves to take up arms, and after the close of the war they rewarded them with freedom and the franchise.

This siege is as interesting and as important as the siege of Rhodes under Soliman against the noble Grand Master de l'Isle Adam in 1522, which was



TERRA-COTTA URN
(In the British Museum)

one of the most heroic defences in modern history. In like manner, the siege of ancient Rhodes is one of the most glorious achievements in the later history of Greece.

Demetrius at last became tired, observing that the game was not worth the chase. The siege would have lasted a few months longer, and this prospect made him impatient, as he was losing immense numbers of men and ships. In addition to this, Cassander was completely gaining the upper hand in Greece, and Antigonos found that all around, everybody was rising against him. Demetrius accordingly, on the mediation of Athens and several other Greek cities, concluded a peace, by which he hoped to save his honour. It was based on the terms which the Rhodians had been willing to accept from the first: they were to assist Antigonos and Demetrius in all other wars, but not against Ptolemy, "and as the wars of the two princes were chiefly directed against Ptolemy, the Rhodians had neutrality guaranteed to them." They were further to retain their city with perfect freedom, as well as all their subjects.

Demetrius now returned to Greece. Cassander had been blockading Athens, while Demetrius was besieging Rhodes; and the latter now appeared with a very considerable fleet to relieve Athens. He landed at Aulis on the

[304-301 B.C.]

Euripus, between Oropus and Chalcis, to come upon the rear of Cassander and compel him to withdraw from Athens. Demetrius had a good harbour at Aulis. Chalcis was in the hands of Cassander, and had a Boeotian garrison; but it was a large, desolate place, and was easily taken. In order not to be cut off, Cassander was obliged to break up, and proceeded through Boeotia towards Thessaly. He succeeded in reaching Thermopylae; Demetrius pursued him, and Heraclea surrendered to him; while six thousand Macedonian troops declared in his favour.

Demetrius, then entering to Attica, conquered Panactum and Phyle, which had been occupied by Cassander, and through which he had had Attica under his control. The Athenians received Demetrius with enthusiasm, as their benefactor. All that impertinent flattery could devise had been exhausted; and what was done now had the character of caricature.

From Athens, Demetrius made several expeditions in different directions, but the city remained his headquarters. During these expeditions, the desolation of the country increased more and more, and it is surprising that Attica did not become a complete wilderness as early as that time.

In the spring of 303 Demetrius entered Peloponnesus, which was in the hands of Cassander and Ptolemy; and he again showed himself in the field as an excellent and active commander. He conquered Corinth, Sicyon, Bura, and Ægium. Then he undertook an expedition with his fleet to Leucas and Coreyra. The Coreyraeans were enemies of Cassander. While Demetrius was engaged in those parts, the Romans had advanced to the extreme point of Messapia, and accordingly were very near to Demetrius.

From thence Demetrius returned to Corinth, where he convened a congress of the Greeks, the first after the time of Alexander. He was there proclaimed hegemon of the Greeks, and in the spring, he proceeded to Athens, where he was received as a god with incense and processions by the Athenians, who, being adorned with wreaths, came out to meet him.

Afterwards Athens had to pay a war contribution of 250 talents, which Demetrius under the very eyes of the people gave to his courtesans while he ridiculed the Athenians. Things like these naturally goaded the people into madness.

Demetrius was now master of the greater part of Greece. In the following year he assembled a large army of his allies, and proceeded by way of Chalcis into Thessaly with fifty-six thousand men, to meet Cassander. He took from him a great part of Thessaly, and then after both had dragged each other about without anything being decided, they separated, Demetrius being called to Asia by his father, because a great coalition had there been formed against him. In order, therefore, to withdraw honourably, Demetrius concluded a peace with Cassander, in which Greece was declared free, and then crossed over into Asia.

THE FALL OF ANTIGONUS

Seleucus who was now master of Babylon and the upper satrapies, after having subdued all Iran as far as India without any effort, had formed, together with Ptolemy, Cassander, and Lysimachus, a coalition against Antigonus. This is the first instance known in history, of a great coalition of princes of equal rank and equal independence. Antigonus, who now possessed only Asia Minor, Cyprus, a portion of Syria and the greater part of Greece, was thus opposed by all the rest of the Macedonian world; and

it was against this coalition that Demetrius led his army into Asia Minor. We know very little about the details of the war, but it appears that the enemies pressed into Asia Minor from all sides. The decisive battle was fought near Ipsus in Phrygia; it was decided especially by the admirable infantry of Lysimachus and Cassander. Seleucus had only Asiatics; the phalanx of Ptolemy was of little importance, and only his mercenaries fought bravely; but the truth is that in reality he had no talent as a commander. Antigonus fell in the battle, and the defeat was so complete, that his whole empire was destroyed. Demetrius escaped with a small band to the maritime towns of Ionia, but behaved in a praiseworthy manner.

The empire of Antigonus was now cut up: the western provinces were divided between Cassander and Lysimachus, the upper provinces were assigned to Seleucus, and Cyprus and Syria to Ptolemy, who, however, did not maintain upper Syria but confined himself to Phœnicia and Cyprus. Plistarchus, a brother of Cassander obtained Cilicia as a special indemnification for Cassander, who himself received Caria and Pamphylia, while Lysimachus acquired Lydia, Ionia, Phrygia, and the north coast of Asia Minor.

DEMETRIUS AT LARGE

After the battle of Ipsus, Demetrius had escaped with a few thousand men to Ephesus, where he had a fleet; and he did not altogether despair of the success of his cause. Cyprus, Sidon, and Tyre, as well as several of the Ionian towns and islands, were still in his possession, and he was anything but an insignificant man. He now displayed great skill, and drew all his forces together, with a view to establish himself in Greece, and there again to try his fortune. For he saw well, that the coalition of the generals who had invaded his father's empire must soon break up, and that then his assistance would probably be sought by one or other of them, which was, in fact, afterwards done by Seleucus and Ptolemy. He sent the great Pyrrhus first as negotiator, and afterwards as hostage, to Ptolemy. Pyrrhus had been his companion in arms; he had lost his kingdom through Cassander, and was now wandering about in the world in the hope of conquering a kingdom for himself. The expedition of the adventurer Cleonymus also belongs to this time, or, rather, to a somewhat earlier one; he was a pretender to the throne of Sparta, from which he was, perhaps unjustly, excluded.

From Ephesus, Demetrius sailed through the Cyclades to Athens, where he wanted to establish himself first. But the Athenians were determined to avail themselves of the jealousy of the princes among each other, to secure their independence; and accordingly they sent an embassy to meet Demetrius, and declare to him, that they would not receive him.

Athens was now spared for a time, and Demetrius, before attacking the city, undertook several other expeditions. He first directed his course, with his squadron, towards the coast of Thrace, gained a footing in the Thracian Chersonesus, and made war upon Lysimachus, who, in the meantime, had taken possession of Lydia, Caria, and Phrygia. Lysimachus was not supported by the other princes, nor was it necessary, and Demetrius made no conquests there. Meantime, however, a new lucky star was rising for him through Seleucus, who, having fallen out with Ptolemy, and being dissatisfied with his share, was ready to form a friendship with Demetrius. He sued for the hand of Stratonice, a daughter of Demetrius, whom, however, he afterwards gave up to his son, Antiochus. Demetrius now sailed with his

[300-295 B.C.]

fleet to Cilicia and Syria, and, in passing, made himself master of Cilicia, and the treasures which Plistarchus, the son of Cassander, was guarding there, and then began to quarrel with Seleucus. For when Cilicia and the Phœnician cities were in the power of Demetrius, Seleucus in vain asked that they should be given up to him; and it was not without difficulty that Demetrius escaped from his plots: a formal rupture, however, did not take place. Demetrius then became reconciled with Ptolemy also, and that as we have already mentioned, through the mediation of Pyrrhus. He now again appeared in Greece, with increased forces. He gained a firm footing in Peloponnesus, though it is uncertain how many towns he subdued there.

In the mean time, Cassander died, and Demetrius, supported by a newly-increased fleet, began the siege of Athens. He had then again fallen out with Ptolemy, who now sent a fleet to assist the Athenians.

Demetrius blockaded the city by land and by sea, and the Athenians, being cut off from the sea, were visited by a fearful famine. They fed upon all kinds of animals, upon indigestible herbs, and the grass which grew on the Acropolis. An Egyptian fleet, attempting to introduce provisions into Piræus, was repelled by Demetrius. At length, after an obstinate defence, they were compelled by the famine to surrender. Every catastrophe brought the city nearer its downfall, though Demetrius, considering that he was the conqueror, displayed great mildness. He convened the Athenians, without their arms, in the theatre, and surrounded the building with his hoplites. But he was satisfied with having struck them with the horrors of death, and, having reproached them for their ingratitude, he declared that he pardoned them. The Athenians were obliged at once to concede to him the right to keep garrisons at Munychia and Piræus, but otherwise they fared better under him now, than at the time when as their friend he had revelled in his excesses. He even fed the Athenians, giving them grain and other necessities of life.

Demetrius now returned to Peloponnesus. During this expedition, he was on the point of making himself master of Sparta. The Spartans, ever since the battle of Megalopolis, had taken no part in the struggle of the Greeks for independence. Sparta had during that period become more and more powerless, although she was in the enjoyment of peace. That which now emboldened and induced her to declare against Macedonia, is left unnoticed by the historians of the time; and it would be inexplicable, if we did not know that Ptolemy and Lysimachus continued the war against Demetrius. We also know that down to the time of Cleomenes, there existed a constant connection between Sparta and Alexandria; whence we may suppose, that that alliance already existed, and that all the Lacedæmonians received pay from Alexandria. Acts of hostility had indeed occurred between Sparta and Demetrius, but they were not of any importance. It is unknown what forces Archidamus possessed, and what occasioned him to commence the war. All we know is that Archidamus was defeated near Mantinea, that Demetrius advanced as far as Laconia, and that Sparta was now surrounded for the second time with palisades and trenches, and in some parts also with a wall: Pausanias at least places the fortifications at this time. He also calls the defeat of Mantinea, the third great blow to Sparta after the battle of Leuctra and that of Agis. Demetrius might, no doubt, easily have crossed those fortifications, if he had not at the moment received intelligence that all his affairs were in a bad condition, and if he had not for this reason given up the war with Sparta.

For Ptolemy had taken possession of all the places in Cyprus, with the exception of Salamis, which city he was besieging, and which contained the children of Demetrius. Lysimachus was making himself master of the Ionian and other maritime Greek towns in Asia Minor, which had hitherto been under the dominion of Demetrius. The Egyptian fleet seems to have gained the ascendancy; probably because Ptolemy had become master of Tyre and Sidon, whereby Demetrius lost the means of obtaining timber and troops. The Asiatic province henceforth disappears from the history of Demetrius, and he was again in great difficulties.

DEATH OF CASSANDER; DEMETRIUS WINS AND LOSES

But the death of Cassander, and the misfortunes of his family, opened fresh prospects for Demetrius. Cassander died of dropsy in 297. His eldest son Philip appears to have been his sole heir, but he died soon afterwards at Elatea, 296; two other sons, Antipater and Alexander, then divided the empire between themselves. Both were very young, and their mother Thessalonice, a daughter of King Philip, was the only surviving member of the family; they can scarcely have been more than grown up boys, if the time of Cassander's marriage with Thessalonice is correctly stated in Diodorus. Thessalonice was appointed guardian, or she was commissioned to divide the empire between her two sons. To do this fairly, was a difficult task.

Antipater, the elder, thinking himself wronged by his mother in the division, murdered her; and applying to Lysimachus, his father-in-law, he was supported by him. But Alexander, who was confined to western Macedonia, applied to Pyrrhus, who in the meantime had returned to his paternal kingdom, to obtain his assistance, for this purpose he ceded to him the possessions which the Macedonian kings had in Epirus, together with Ambracia and Acarnania. But distrusting Pyrrhus, he applied at the same time to Demetrius. As Pyrrhus sold his assistance, we may suppose that Demetrius did not give his without some selfish motive either; he evidently caused Thessaly to be ceded to him, the whole of which had belonged to Cassander. Demetrius now entering Thessaly, met Alexander at Larissa. Both intrigued against each other, and aimed at each other's life. After many attempts, and repeated snares, Demetrius struck the blow and caused Alexander to be murdered.

The Macedonian troops of the latter now had no king; Demetrius came forward with a proclamation, in which he declared that he had acted only in self-defence; that his life had been in danger (which was really true, but all the Macedonian princes were equally bad); and called upon the Macedonians to submit to him. The troops submitted to Demetrius and he was proclaimed king. Lysimachus having put himself in possession of the dominion of Antipater, his son-in-law, gave up his new Macedonian possession and made peace with Demetrius, who thus became master of all Macedonia. He now ruled over Macedonia, Thessaly, Attica, Megara, and most of the towns of Peloponnesus. The Spartans, however, continued the war against him.

During these struggles, Demetrius wanted to take from Pyrrhus that portion of Macedonia which Alexander had ceded to him, and thus he began to quarrel with his most faithful friend. During his residence in Alexandria, Pyrrhus had married Antigone, a daughter of Ptolemy by his first wife; and

[286-285 B.C.]

as long as he lived, he was sure of the friendship of the Alexandrian court. The detail of the wars between Pyrrhus and Demetrius cannot form a part of this history, for they are petty and insignificant. Pyrrhus was allied with the Ætolians, and defended himself with great skill against an immensely superior force; and after a few years he was victorious. It was fortunate for him that Demetrius was just then planning greater things; for he was thinking of recovering the empire of his father—a senseless idea under the circumstances of the time. He built an enormous fleet, and enlisted an army which is said to have amounted to one hundred thousand men. His empire comprised not only Macedonia and Thessaly, for nominally he was also hegemon of the Greeks, as Philip and Alexander had been before, and possessed a number of coast towns in Asia; the parts of his kingdom were very much scattered about. But he collected his army with immense exertions; his subjects were fearfully oppressed, and all his dominion was in a state of ferment. His government was on the whole unbearable to the Macedonians on account of his pride and his cruelty; they were not a nation to allow themselves to be governed in the Asiatic fashion. He showed himself very rarely and accepted no petitions; but once he behaved with unusual kindness, receiving all petitions and throwing them into the folds of his garment. Everybody was highly delighted; but when he rode over the bridge of the Axius, he threw them all into the river. Such things naturally exasperated all the people against him.

In the end Pyrrhus, called upon by the more distant kings, and being no doubt invited by the Macedonians themselves, availed himself of the ferment, and invaded Macedonia with a small force. Demetrius marched against him; Pyrrhus manœuvred and negotiated with the Macedonians, until they rose in a general insurrection, refusing obedience to Demetrius and ordering him to withdraw. He was glad to get away, and went, we believe, to Demetrias in Magnesia, which he himself had built on the Gulf of Pagasæ, near the ancient town of Iolcus, and which we afterwards find in the hands of his son Antigonos. Thence he proceeded into Greece. He was a great general; his keen discernment as a military commander is attested by the foundation of Demetrias and of New-Sicyon: the fortress of Demetrias exercised an important influence upon the fate of Greece. Demetrius had reigned over Macedonia five or six years.

Demetrius soon concluded peace with Pyrrhus, and if he had waited patiently, he would have been certain of his restoration; but he could not wait, he wanted to decide everything at once, and thus in his restlessness he crossed over into Asia. He left behind him in Greece his son Antigonos, surnamed Gonatas, who remained master of a great part of Greece. His father had retained possession of Thessaly and of some Greek towns, in which he had garrisons, and the fortress of Demetrias, where he had estab-



GRECIAN OIL BOTTLE

lished arsenals and wharfs for ships of war, commanded Thessaly and Eubœa. Demetrius landed in Asia Minor, wishing to undertake an expedition into the interior of Asia, like a man who has no more to lose; heaven knows what dreams he may have indulged in of overthrowing the empire of Lysimachus and Seleucus. It was impossible for him to conceive anything else but a successful result of his scheme. He accordingly first appeared with his troops in the Asiatic provinces of Lysimachus, where he was met by Agathocles, a son of Lysimachus, who successfully manœuvred him out of those provinces, so that he was obliged to proceed to the interior. In this manner he dragged his army into Armenia, just as Charles XII dragged his into the Ukraine. His desponding troops at length delivered him up to Seleucus, who had surrounded him and cut him off from the sea. He was accordingly taken prisoner, but Seleucus treated him with great clemency. He continued to live for a time very contentedly and happily as a perfectly reckless man; Seleucus, who formed a correct estimate of him, having given him a large Persian palace with hunting grounds, etc., in Syria. Seleucus would perhaps have made use of him against Lysimachus, but Demetrius died in the meantime.

LYSIMACHUS, ARSINOE, AND AGATHOCLES

Lysimachus had, during this period, after the murder of Antipater, his son-in-law, and the last heir of the elder Antipater (perhaps as a punishment for an attempt upon his own life), been in possession of a portion of Macedonia; but he had afterwards given it up to Demetrius. The Macedonians now recognised Pyrrhus as their king; but Lysimachus invaded his kingdom, and after having reigned alone for seven months, Pyrrhus was obliged to divide his empire between himself and Lysimachus. The Macedonians deserting him as a stranger, surrendered to Lysimachus, whom they honoured as an ancient companion of Alexander, and whom they regarded as being nearly related to themselves, being either a Thessalian or a Macedonian. The division, however, between Lysimachus and Pyrrhus did not last for any length of time; for shortly after Lysimachus drove Pyrrhus out of his kingdom. He had reigned over Macedonia altogether five years and six months, partly in conjunction with Lysimachus and partly alone.

The empire of Lysimachus had been gradually extended and consolidated. Greece did not become subject to him; Antigonus Gonatas, who had received the greater part of his father's fleet, maintained himself there with the remnants of his father's forces, and from Demetrias he ruled over a part of Greece, although many Greek cities asserted their independence. Besides Macedonia proper and Thrace, Lysimachus ruled over Lydia, Mysia, Ionia, Caria, and, no doubt over Phrygia Major also—an empire as beautiful as he could have wished, “and just of that extent which Alexander ought to have given to his empire in order to insure its stability.” His real residence seems to have been Lysimachia in Chersonesus, in the neighbourhood of the ancient Cardia. With the exception of Thessalonice, all those Macedonian princes built new capitals for themselves; Alexandria was at least enlarged by Ptolemy.

Previously to the conquest of Macedonia, Lysimachus had undertaken an expedition across the Danube, against Dromichætes, a king of the Gætæ. In the plain of Bessarabia his retreat was cut off, and he, with all his army, was taken prisoner. The generous conduct of the Dacian king,

[283-282 B.C.]

Dromichaetes, is celebrated in the collection of anecdotes; Lysimachus was set free, and his power was not weakened by this defeat.

But the royal house was soon to become the scene of a terrible tragedy, the occasion of which came from the family of Ptolemy. Ptolemy had divorced his first wife Eurydice, the daughter of Antipater; and his second wife, the intriguing Berenice, employed every means to cajole Ptolemy, who was enfeebled by age, and to get the succession decided in favour of her own son. She succeeded so well that the aged Ptolemy, two years before his death, resigned his throne to his younger son Ptolemy Philadelphus, and himself took the oath of allegiance to him. The first-born Ptolemy, surnamed Ceraunus, betook himself to Lysimachus, whose eldest son, Agathocles, was married to his sister Lysandra, likewise a daughter of Ptolemy Soter, by his first wife Eurydice. Lysimachus, who received him in a friendly manner, was himself married to Arsinoe, a daughter of Ptolemy by his second wife, by whom he had two sons. This Arsinoe now had recourse to the same intrigues in the house of Lysimachus. His eldest son, Agathocles, was already a man of very mature age (Lysimachus was seventy-four years old at his death) and of great eminence. In many a campaign he had successfully commanded his father's armies; he was very popular throughout the country, and it was he that was destined to succeed his father. But Arsinoe hated him as the husband of her half-sister, against whom she entertained a deadly enmity; and also because he was an obstacle in the way of her own children. She accordingly determined to deprive him of both his throne and his life. It must be borne in mind, that in case of Lysimachus' death she had reason to fear for her own life, and that according to the practice of the age, the step-mother and her children would have been murdered by Agathocles as soon as he had ascended the throne.

Arsinoe, therefore, calumniously informed Lysimachus that his life was threatened by his son Agathocles. The latter was at first treated with insult and persecuted by his father, and soon afterwards killed by poison. As this made a great impression, Lysimachus caused several others of his sons to be put to death, and began to rage against all whom Arsinoe pointed out as partisans of Agathocles. These things produced a complete state of anarchy both in the house of Lysimachus and in his kingdom. As everyone felt that his life was in danger, his nobles began to apply for protection to Seleucus, to whom Lysandra, the wife of Agathocles, had fled with one of her husband's brothers. Seleucus had no objection to being thus called upon to interfere. He marched from Babylon across Mount Taurus down into Western Asia, and, though chiefly by treachery, gained a decisive victory over the aged king in Lower Phrygia. Lysimachus, as at all other times, showed great valour, but fell in the battle. With the exception of Cassandrea, where the widow Arsinoe resided with her children, the whole of the Macedonian state surrendered to Seleucus.

SELEUCUS; ANTIGONUS; THE PTOLEMIES

The whole of Alexander's empire with the exception of Egypt, southern Syria, a portion of Phœnicia, and Cyprus, was thus united under the sceptre of Seleucus. As he had not seen his native country since the beginning of Alexander's expedition, Seleucus now crossed the Hellespont to take possession of his native land, perhaps with the intention of there closing his days in peace. But while sacrificing in the neighbourhood of Lysimachia, he was

murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus, whom he had protected in his misfortunes with the view, according to the policy of the time, of having a dangerous pretender against Ptolemy Philadelphus. The state of dissolution was such that Ptolemy, without any difficulty, was recognised as king by the Macedonian troops of Seleucus, and by all Macedonia. He accordingly took possession of the empire. There was no hereditary family—that was the misfortune. Ptolemy Ceraunus had paved his way to the throne by murder and ingratitude; but he was in himself no insignificant man: he was very brave and resolute. What his morality was will be seen hereafter.

The Asiatic provinces of Lysimachus were quite united with the Syrian empire, of which Antiochus remained in undisturbed possession, Seleucus, even in his lifetime, having assigned to him the upper provinces. Antiochus endeavoured to avenge the death of his father; and a war broke out between Ptolemy Ceraunus and this Antiochus, who is surnamed Soter, for all the Macedonian kings bearing the same name are distinguished by surnames. He was called Soter, for having conquered the Gauls in Asia Minor. Ptolemy Ceraunus was also at war with Antigonus.

The war with Antiochus did not last long; for Antiochus was wise enough to confine himself to Asia, and not to extend his power further. He would not come to Europe, because he would have been unable to defend his possessions there. He therefore soon listened to proposals of peace.

No definite peace seems to have been concluded with Antigonus; he was too weak to effect anything against Macedonia, and seems to have been reasonable enough to avoid everything which might have called forth greater efforts against him.

Ptolemy endeavoured to establish his power firmly by treaties; and here our guide passes on to the history of Pyrrhus: Ptolemy tried to form alliances, renounced his claims to Egypt, became reconciled with his brother Ptolemy Philadelphus, and tried to win the friendship of Pyrrhus.

Throughout this period, Antigonus Gonatas was at war with Ptolemy Ceraunus, Antiochus Soter, and Ptolemy Philadelphus, and carried on a petty maritime war with them. But during the same period a general Greek war was carried on against him “with the aid of Egypt.” This war is mentioned only in a chapter of Justin, by means of which we must find our way by a careful interpretation; and for this reason the war has been overlooked by all who have written on the Amphictyons. It had its origin in the Amphictyony. Justin, who mentions its date, 281, however, does not call it an Amphictyonic war. The fact is that the Greeks sought a pretext for uniting their forces, in order to rid themselves of the dominion of Antigonus, and therefore engaged in a war against the Ætolians, who were allied with Antigonus.

It is not difficult to understand that, under the Amphictyonic pretext, the Spartans again obtained the assistance of the allies, and recovered the supremacy. Sparta had the supreme command of the army. Areus (or as the Latins call him, Areas), who was then king of Sparta, as well as his son Acrotatus, was very different from the earlier Spartan kings. In his reign Sparta again became a state of some importance, not through his power but through his name, and perhaps more particularly through his good fortune. The war was carried on with Egyptian money; with it Areus raised the armies which he commanded, and the wars continued for a long time. Egypt assisted with her fleet, but gave no land forces, which were furnished by Areus.

[281-280 B.C.]

This war forms the beginning of another interference of Egypt in the affairs of Greece, for since the time when Demetrius Poliorcetes removed the garrisons of Ptolemy Soter from Corinth and Sicily, the Egyptian kings do not seem to have interfered in the affairs of Greece. This new interference tore Greece to pieces, and owing to the subsidies which Sparta received, the power of that state rose again.

PTOLEMY CERAUNUS IN MACEDONIA

After the Amphictyonic War, Justin passes on to Ptolemy Ceraunus and the affairs of Macedonia. He reigned two years, or one year and a half, and during that period he committed crime upon crime. His sister Arsinoë, the widow of Lysimachus, was living with two sons at Cassandrea; the Macedonian princesses had such towns as places in which they resided as widows, and in which, in case of a change of dynasty, they might be safe against any hostile machinations. Cassandrea quickly rose to prosperity, and its possession had an immense charm for her brother. If Arsinoë had placed herself under the protection of Ptolemy Philadelphus, her step-brother, the latter would have had a very strong place in Macedonia, where his fleet might have been stationed, and her sons might then have placed themselves at the head of the malcontents in Macedonia, and have come forward as pretenders. The simplest way for Ptolemy Ceraunus now was to cause his sister and her sons to be murdered, and the question as to whether this should be done or not could not excite any scruples, according to the principles of that time; the only doubt was, how it should be done.

In order to carry out his plan, Ptolemy sued for the hand of his own sister, according to the notions of the family of the Lagidæ, who had adopted the Egyptian views about marriage with a sister. Arsinoë was at first very timid, and her eldest son, though still a child, foresaw what was to come, and warned his mother, saying that the whole was a treacherous scheme. But Arsinoë was a silly woman, who allowed herself to be deceived by the prospect of becoming a queen, just as afterwards Nicaea allowed herself to be gained over by Antigonus Gonatas. She confided in him, opened the gates of the fortress, and admitted him into the town. But now the clouds vanished from her eyes, and she discovered too late what his intentions were. Ptolemy treacherously took possession of the gates of the town, and the first thing he did was to murder the two boys before the eyes of their mother; Arsinoë herself was stripped of all her ornaments (for the avarice of those men was as great as their other vices), and ignominiously sent to Samothrace. She afterwards returned to Egypt, where she spent the remainder of her life. The history of that period reveals to us an interesting but horrible spectacle; it is by no means as monotonous or as unimportant as we are easily tempted to imagine.



GREEK JUG

This crime of Ptolemy Ceraunus was soon followed by its punishment — the arrival of the Gauls as previously described.

Ptolemy drew his forces together, but foolishly declined the auxiliaries offered to him by the Dardanians, and thoughtlessly ventured upon a battle, the result of which was the same as that of the battle on the Allia. No army could resist the vehemence of the Celts, without having been previously accustomed to their appearance and their horrid war cries, and without having learned to sustain the shock with which the intoxicated and infuriated Celts rushed to battle. Familiarity with these things alone rendered resistance possible. Ptolemy, with all his crimes, was an able warrior; he fought bravely, until being severely wounded, he fell into the hands of the Gauls who murdered him.

ANARCHY IN MACEDONIA

We know nothing of the consequences of this victory, except that there followed a state of anarchy in Macedonia, which lasted four years. A panic spread over the whole country, and even a number of towns no doubt succumbed to the Gauls; the open country was thoroughly inundated by the Gauls, and all the population was put to the sword or dragged into slavery, as is usually done by the Tartars and Turks, the latter of whom, in 1683, carried away from Austria no less than two hundred thousand men. There was no heir to the throne, for Ptolemy had left no issue; the families of Cassander and Lysimachus were extirpated, and Pyrrhus happened to be in Italy; civil disturbances breaking out among the Macedonians, whom the death of their king had left to themselves, completed the misfortune. One Meleager, a brother of Ptolemy Ceraunus, came forward as king, and then Antipater, a son of Philip, the brother of Cassander; but neither was able to maintain himself on account of the divisions among the Macedonians. What became of Meleager is uncertain, but Antipater afterwards appears again.

In these circumstances, a brave leader named Sosthenes gathered an army, and successfully resisted the enemy. His exploits attracted so much attention that the Macedonians proclaimed him their king. But he did not accept the royal title for himself, but only demanded that they should take the oath of allegiance to him as a strategus; he is, however, enumerated among the kings of Macedonia. His modesty does him honour. When the barbarians had murdered and plundered to their hearts' content, they gradually retreated, and Sosthenes restored a portion of Macedonia. But two years later, there followed a fresh invasion of the barbarians on their expedition to Delphi; he met them with all his forces, but the battle was lost, and the brave and worthy man died in consequence of illness, 279.

There now followed again a state of anarchy. Several pretenders arose against one another, who are mentioned in the fragments of Porphyrius on Macedonian history; Antipater came forward again, then Ptolemy a son of Lysimachus, Arrhidæus, and Antigonus. Antipater appears for a time to have had the upper hand, at least he was in possession of Macedonia at the time when Antigonus Gonatas gained the sovereignty. Among the pretenders we also find Eurydice, the daughter of Lysimachus, and widow of Antipater, the son of Cassander; she, being in possession of Cassandrea, restored its inhabitants to freedom. This must have happened after 280, when it was yet in the hands of Ptolemy Ceraunus, and before 277, in which year Antigonus Gonatas overpowered his competitors. We should scarcely know anything

[277 B.C.]

about that period, had not fortunately a kind providence preserved some isolated statements here and there, and in Eusebius the excerpts from Porphyrius on the chronology of the Macedonian kings.

Four years of perfect misery thus passed away, until Antigonus Gonatas, after having concluded peace with Antiochus Soter, proceeded from Greece and Thessaly to the coast of Macedonia, and was readily recognised by the Macedonians (277). He restored the kingdom of Macedonia. From a Greek point of view, as well as from that of common humanity, we can only detest him; but, as far as the Macedonian nation is concerned, he was a benefactor—a real Camillus, and he was even more to Macedonia than Camillus was to Rome.

The expedition of the Gauls against Delphi was contemporary with the second campaign of Pyrrhus against the Romans, and for years he did not allow himself to be induced by these dangers to return across the Adriatic, although he became more inclined to make peace. During that period Antigonus made himself master of the vacant throne of Macedonia.

The reign of Antigonus Gonatas is quite obscure; there is scarcely any other period in history which is equally so. It is a remarkable period, and the long reign of thirty-six years was not without great events.

ANTIGONUS GONATAS

He was the son of Demetrius Poliorcetes and Phila, the daughter of Antipater, so that through his mother he was a grandson of Antipater, and a step-brother of Craterus, the son of Craterus. Antigonus had not recovered Macedonia till after the lapse of ten years. In the interval he had ruled over a very scattered empire, and he seems to have resided at Demetrias in Magnesia. Whether during that period he was still in possession of Corinth and Chalcis, or whether they were already in the hands of Craterus, we cannot say with certainty. He was, however, master of a part of Thessaly. It was not till 277 that he became king of Macedonia. Chronology here is in the most terrible confusion.

Even his conquest of Macedonia has not come down to us in any connected narrative, and we can only guess the connection. Macedonia was over-come by Gauls, and had no legitimate ruler, Antipater being only a usurper. Antigonus must have come by sea, and have offered himself as king to the Macedonians. After he was landed and was encamped near Lysimachia, he came in contact with the Gauls, who were in possession of the open country. While still encamped on the coast, he tried to conclude peace with them; but they were as faithless as they were uncivilised, and at the most critical moment he learned that they were treacherously marching against him. Abandoning his camp, he withdrew to his ships, while a part of his army remained concealed in a forest; they then fell upon his camp, intoxicated themselves, and when they, engaged in plunder, had fallen into disorder, and were overladen with food and drink, Antigonus attacked and defeated them. This victory at once raised him very high in public estimation, and gained for him great repute. He then conquered Antipater, and established himself as king of Macedonia, though assuredly not of Macedonia in its whole extent. The interior at first did not belong to him, and was still occupied by the Gauls.

To Macedonia he was a very beneficent ruler, and he showed himself to be an extremely prudent, thoughtful, and resolute character.

At the very beginning of his reign there occurred a war, which Antigonus, for the recovery of Macedonia, carried on against Apollodorus, the tyrant of Cassandrea, a man whose name is interesting at a time when Greek history cannot point to any other person of importance.

This was the first success of Antigonus, and he also extended his dominion in Greece; but the Athenians maintained themselves against him.

Pyrrhus then returned from Italy after an absence of seven years; he was highly indignant at Antigonus, of whom he had demanded assistance against Italy, and who had imprudently refused it. Antigonus went to meet Pyrrhus as far as the passes of the Aous—where afterwards Antigonea was founded. Pyrrhus defeated him in a battle of some importance; during his retreat, the Gauls who were to protect Antigonus were nearly all cut to pieces, and the Macedonian phalanx, deserting Antigonus, proclaimed Pyrrhus king. Pyrrhus was thus, for a time, king of Macedonia, and Antigonus was confined to a few places on the seacoast, Thessalonica, Cassandrea, and Thessaly.

Pyrrhus now marched into Greece, and perished at Argos whither Antigonus had followed him with an army.

Antigonus was then stationed in the heart of Peloponnesus with an armed force. He availed himself of the opportunity of making himself master of the peninsula and of constituting it anew according to his own mind. Not being able to place garrisons everywhere, he gave the government in all towns which surrendered to him, to his partisans, and established tyrants who were ready to exert their power for his interests. Hence rebellions sometimes occurred when Antigonus was absent. We may mention particularly the overthrow of Aristotimus of Elis, which was brought about by a heroic conspiracy headed by a childless old man; this is one of the noble occurrences in dying Greece.

THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR

Athens, and Sparta under its king, Areus, were apparently allied with the Ætolians and with king Ptolemy against Antigonus. The friendship which the war of Pyrrhus had brought about between Antigonus and the Spartans, was of short duration; the Antigonids and Ptolemies were and remained mortal enemies, and thus the Spartans, being the allies of Ptolemy, became again involved in a war against Antigonus. We do not know how Athens was drawn into this war, whether she had imprudently formed an alliance with Ptolemy, or whether Antigonus had sought a quarrel with her. But an alliance did exist between Athens and Ptolemy, and an Egyptian fleet was stationed near Attica to support Athens by sea. Attica was cruelly ravaged by incursions from Bœotia, and Athens itself was besieged and often blockaded. This war lasted for many years, and completed the misery of Athens, as much as the siege and conquest of Totila completed the destruction of Rome.

This war in Attica is called the Chremonidean War, because Chremonides, an Athenian, was the soul of it.

We know only very little about this war. Ptolemy sent a fleet under the admiral Patroclus to the assistance of the Athenians; and while he was to land and relieve Athens from the sea side, Areus, with the Spartans and his allies, was to attack the Macedonians and oblige them to raise the siege on the land side. But Areus was too slow. The two parties thus being

[265-239 B.C.]

unable to come to an understanding, returned home without having effected anything. After a very long siege, during which Ptolemy Philadelphus, with all his good intentions, effected nothing, Athens being completely exhausted and helpless, was obliged to capitulate.

PYRRHUS' SON TAKES MACEDONIA

Among the various changes of that period, we may mention the transitory conquest of Macedonia by Alexander II, of Epirus, during the Chremonidean war. This Alexander was the only one of the three sons of Pyrrhus that survived his father, of whom he was not unworthy. After his father's death, he remained in the undisturbed possession of the country. He greatly resembled his father, and was, in fact, almost a copy of him, although with feebler features. He also possessed the intellectual culture of his father, and was, like him, an author. Alexander had the same restlessness as his father, but he was not a gambler in the same degree as his father, who staked everything on one throw. While Antigonus was deeply involved in the war with Greece, Alexander invaded Macedonia, which was then still so weak (and it was not yet so much attached to the new dynasty as it was afterwards under Philip, the grandson of Antigonus) that the Macedonian troops deserted to him, and Alexander was recognised as king without difficulty. But he did not maintain the new acquisition. Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, who was then still very young, assembled a fresh army, attacked him, and recovered Macedonia from him, just as Charles XII, in his youth, so brilliantly repelled a similar attack. Demetrius pursued Alexander himself into Epirus, so that the latter was obliged to take refuge in Acarnania, and returned to his kingdom only with the assistance of the Ætolian towns. Afterwards, Alexander of Epirus observed indeed a hostile policy towards Macedonia, but took care not to become involved in a war with it. His kingdom of Epirus was consolidated, and had the same extent in which Pyrrhus had left it to him, and he was allied with the Ætolians.

Trogus says that after the subjugation of Athens, about 264, and after the death of Arcus, Antigonus had to carry on a war with Alexander, the son of his brother. This Alexander was the son of Craterus, a half-brother of Antigonus, by Phila.


We will not decide whether the statement that Antigonus poisoned Alexander, is true or not; but there can be no doubt that he gained possession of Corinth by treachery and gained a secure footing in the Peloponnesus. But through the carelessness of the aged Antigonus, whose thoughts turned away from Greece to the restoration of Macedonia, the league of the Achæan towns was revived and gained fresh strength. Antigonus became the second founder of the Macedonian kingdom, but the more he strengthened his own country the more he neglected Greece. Aratus of Sicyon, as we have already seen, surprised Corinth and expelled the Macedonian garrison. The loss of Corinth was a death-blow to Antigonus, for through it he lost his dominion over Peloponnesus. The Ætolians, thinking themselves thus endangered, allied themselves with Antigonus. The Achæans had received considerable support from Ptolemy Euergetes. Antigonus died at the age of seventy-three and was succeeded by his son Demetrius, whose reign was inglorious and unfortunate for Macedonia. The greatest event of the reign of Demetrius is his great war for the possession of Epirus which he fought with the Ætolians.

Alexander of Epirus, the son of the great Pyrrhus, left behind him five children — two sons, Pyrrhus and Ptolemy, and three daughters. At his death his sons were yet very young, and his widow Olympias, who was at once his sister and his wife, according to the detestable custom of the Ptolemies, acted as guardian of the children. Alexander's kingdom comprised all Epirus to the extent which his father had possessed, and the part of Acarnania which had fallen to his share at the time when the country was divided between him and the Ætolians. But his relation to the Ætolians was insecure, and Olympias was not without apprehensions; it is possible that symptoms may have already been visible in Epirus of the ferment which afterwards manifested itself in so fearful a manner, and it is not unlikely that the malcontents may have applied to the Ætolians. Olympias alone being unable to offer any resistance to the Ætolians, sought the protection of the Macedonians by endeavouring to effect a marriage between one of her daughters (whose name is misspelt Ptia; we must no doubt read Phthia) with Demetrius of Macedonia. Demetrius accepted the offer, although he was already married to the Syrian princess Stratonice, a sister of Antiochus Theós, whom he now divorced in order to marry Phthia.

Stratonice, leaving Demetrius, went to Asia Minor, as Justin, our only authority, relates; the divorce, however, did not lead to a war between Macedonia and Syria, because the latter country was too weak. But in Syria itself that fury of a woman created great mischief. She proceeded to the court at Antioch, offering her hand to Seleucus Callinicus; and when he rejected the offer, she induced the restless Antiochians by her intrigues to recognise her as their queen. Seleucus happened to be engaged in an expedition against the upper satrapies, and when he returned, he conquered Stratonice. Being now deserted by the Antiochians, she was taken prisoner and put to death.

The marriage of Phthia with Demetrius then became the occasion of great confusion and misfortune, by dragging him into the war with the Ætolians. The latter availed themselves of the forlorn state of Epirus for the purpose of attacking the Epirot portion of Acarnania, and making themselves masters of the whole country. Demetrius hastened to support the Epirots, and thus arose a war between the Macedonians and Ætolians, in which the latter joined the Achæans, against whom they otherwise entertained an invincible aversion. This is the most brilliant war that was ever carried on by the Greeks against the Macedonians, but we know nothing of its separate occurrences. Whether the war was brought to a close by the conclusion of a truce or otherwise, is unknown.

There never was a moment since the Lamian war, at which the recovery of the national independence of the Greeks was so near at hand as after the death of Demetrius. He died during an expedition against the Dardanians, after a reign of ten years, leaving behind him Philip, a boy of between five and six years old, just at the time when the Romans, for the first time, appeared with their armies on the eastern coast of the Adriatic.^g



CHAPTER LX. AFFAIRS IN GREECE PROPER AFTER ALEXANDER'S DEATH

THE preceding chapter has dealt with the affairs of the post-Alexandrian epoch, with chief reference to the outlying territories of the disrupting empire. We must now take up the trend of affairs in Greece proper, and from the Grecian standpoint. Something of this has necessarily been dealt with incidentally in the preceding chapter, but a certain amount of repetition is essential to clearness. We are now back in Greece, and are to witness the effect produced at Athens by the death of Alexander.

THE LAMIAN WAR

We have seen that the report of the great conqueror's demise was at first disbelieved. The hearers hoped, but doubted. When the report was confirmed, the effect was electric.^a At once there was an end of hesitation and secrecy. The popular feeling burst forth, like a flood long pent up. Phocion, and the orators of the Macedonian party, endeavoured in vain to stem it. Their influence was gone—as Demades, before long, experienced to his cost. None were listened to but those who recommended the most decided and vigorous measures. It was resolved without delay to send a supply of arms and money to Leosthenes for his levies at Tænarus, with directions no longer to make a secret of the object for which they were destined. The remainder of the treasure of Harpalus, and the penalties which had been recovered, furnished the means.

It was very important, now that a prospect was once more opened of a general confederacy among the Greeks for a national cause, that Athens should immediately make her determination known as widely as possible. By another decree, the people declared itself ready to assert the liberty of Greece, and to deliver the cities which were held by Macedonian garrisons; for this purpose a fleet was to be equipped of forty trireme galleys, and two hundred of the larger size, with four banks of oars. All the citizens under forty years of age were to arm: those of seven tribes to prepare for foreign service, the rest to remain at home for the defence of Attica. Lastly, envoys were appointed to the principal states of Greece, to announce that Athens was again, as in the days of her ancient glory, about to place herself in the front of the battle with the common enemy, and to set her last resources, men, money, and ships, on the venture; and to exhort all who wished for independence, to follow her example.

The success of the Athenian negotiations appears not to have been so great in Peloponnesus as in the northern states, though these were exposed

to the enemy's first attacks. Sparta, Arcadia, and Achaia kept aloof from the struggle to the end — whether restrained by jealousy of Athens, or by the remembrance of the last unfortunate contest with Macedonia. Messene, Elis, Sicyon, Phlius, Epidaurus, Troezen, and Argos joined the confederacy; but even of these, several appear to have held back until they were encouraged by the first success of the other allies. In northern Greece, Leosthenes himself was one of the most active and successful envoys. As soon as he had completed the equipment of his levies at Tænarus, leaving them, it seems, under the command of an inferior officer, he went over to Ætolia. He found the Ætolians, who had been alarmed and incensed by Alexander's threats about Ceniadæ, heartily inclined to the national cause, and obtained a promise of seven thousand men. He then proceeded to solicit aid from Locris, Phocis, and others of the neighbouring states. Almost everywhere, from the borders of Macedonia to Attica, a good spirit prevailed. The Dolopians, the mountaineers of Ceta, all the towns of Doris, Carystus in Eubœa, the Locrians and Phocians, many of the tribes in the western valleys of Pindus, as the Ænianians, Alyzæans, and Athamantians, the Leucadians, and a part at least, it seems, of the Acarnanians, sent their contingents. Even from beyond the borders of Greece, the allies received some auxiliaries: from the Molossian chief, Aryptæus, who, however, afterwards deserted and betrayed them, and in very small number from Illyria and Thrace. But the policy by which Thebes had been destroyed, and its territory divided among the Bœotian towns, was now attended with an effect more disastrous to Greece than the conqueror could have foreseen. It was known that the success of the Greeks would be followed by the restoration of Thebes — the Theban exiles probably formed a strong body in the Greek army; and hence the Bœotians, though surrounded on all sides by the forces of the confederacy, zealously adhered to the Macedonian cause, which was that of their private interest, and their inveterate hatred to the fallen city.

Antipater received the tidings of Alexander's death — to him no mournful event — nearly at the same time with those of the movements in Greece. His situation was one of great difficulty and danger. The whole force immediately at his disposal was small, and, if he marched against Greece, it would be necessary to leave a part of it for the protection of Macedonia. Nevertheless Antipater determined not to wait for reinforcements nor to remain on the defensive, but to seek the enemy. The force which he was able to bring into the field amounted to no more than thirteen thousand foot, and six hundred horse. It might seem that he, rather than the Athenians, was acting rashly, when, with so small an army, he ventured to invade Greece: and perhaps he relied somewhat too confidently on the superiority of the Macedonian discipline and tactics, and on the recollection of his victory over Agis. It must however be observed, that he calculated on the support of the Thessalians, and probably of some other northern states; and he might hope by a rapid movement to crush the confederacy, before it had collected its forces, or at least to prevent it from receiving fresh accessions of strength. He had also ordered Sippas, whom he left to supply his place in Macedonia, to levy troops with the utmost diligence, and may have expected to be speedily reinforced by these recruits. His coffers were well filled, for he had received a large supply of treasure from Alexander; and the fleet which had brought it over, consisting of 110 galleys, remained with him, and was now ordered to attend the operations of the army.

Leosthenes was elected commander-in-chief, not more in honour of Athens than on account of the confidence which was reposed in his abilities.

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The Athenians could spare no more than five thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry, of Attic troops ; to these they added two thousand mercenaries. But now the Boeotians, encouraged perhaps by the tidings of Antipater's approach, collected their forces to oppose the passage of this little army, and encamped near Plataea, no doubt in very superior numbers, to watch the passes of Cithæron. Leosthenes, apprised of their movement, hastened with a division of his troops to the relief of his countrymen, effected a junction with them, and gave battle to the enemy. He gained a complete victory, raised a trophy, and returned, with this happy omen of more important success, to his camp.

Antipater was joined on his march by a strong body of Thessalian cavalry, under Menon of Pharsalus, which gave him, in this arm, a decided advantage over the allies. He drew up his forces, it seems, in the vale of the Sperchius, and offered battle. Leosthenes did not wait to be attacked. It is possible that he may have had a secret understanding with the Thessalian general. But his army was thirty thousand strong, and it may have been the sight of his superior force that fixed Menon's wavering inclination. The fortune of the day was decided by the Thessalian cavalry, which went over in the heat of the battle to the Greeks. We are not informed what loss Antipater suffered, but he did not think it safe to attempt to retreat through Thessaly. He looked about for the nearest place of refuge, and threw himself into the town of Lamia—which stood in a strong position on the south side of Mount Othrys, about three miles from the sea—began to repair the fortifications, and laid in a supply of arms and provisions furnished perhaps by the fleet. His only remaining hope was that he might be able to sustain a siege, until succours should arrive. Leosthenes immediately proceeded to fortify a camp near the town, and after having in vain challenged the enemy to a fresh engagement, made several attempts to take it by assault. But the place was too strong, the garrison too numerous: the assailants were repulsed with the loss of many lives ; and at length he found himself obliged to turn the siege into a blockade.

It was the first advantage that had been gained for many years over the Macedonian arms, which were beginning perhaps to be thought invincible ; and it had certainly reduced an enemy, late the master of Greece, to a state of extreme distress and danger. The confidence of the people was raised to its utmost height by an embassy from Antipater, by which he sued for peace. We are not informed what terms he proposed, but his overtures were probably treated as a sign of despair. The people looked upon him as already in their power, and demanded that he should surrender at discretion. Yet they did not relax their efforts, but made use of the advantage they had gained to procure additional strength for the common cause. Polyæuctus was sent with other envoys into Peloponnesus, to rouse the states which had hitherto remained neutral, to action. Here he was opposed by some of the traitors whom Athens had lately cast out from her bosom ; but he was seconded by the voluntary exertions of his old colleague Demosthenes.

As soon as Alexander's death released the Athenians from the restraint which his power had imposed on them, the orators of the Macedonian party sank under the contempt and indignation of the people, and several of them paid the penalty of their former insolence and baseness. Demades was perhaps most mildly treated in proportion to his offences. Yet he was brought to trial on several indictments—among others, as the author of the decree which conferred divine honours on Alexander, for which he was condemned to a fine of ten talents [£2000 or \$10,000]. But he was partially disfran-

chised, so as to be made incapable of taking part in public affairs. The bronze statues also, with which he had been honoured, and the city disgraced, were melted down, and applied to purposes the most expressive of contempt and loathing for the original. He however remained at Athens in the enjoyment of his ill-gotten wealth, waiting till the accomplishment of Phocion's denunciations should raise him once more out of his ignominious obscurity, and should compel the people to listen to his voice. The time-serving Pytheas, the prosecutor of Demosthenes, and the witty glutton Callimedon, who had been accused by Demosthenes of a treasonable correspondence with the exiles at Megara, were also convicted, we know not on what charges, and were obliged, either by sentence of banishment, or to escape worse evils, to quit Athens. They now threw aside the mask, openly entered into the service of Macedonia, and were employed by Antipater to counteract the influence of the Athenian envoys in Peloponnesus with all the power of their oratory.

RETURN OF DEMOSTHENES ; DEATH OF LEOSTHENES

Demosthenes had not resigned himself so contentedly as Æschines to perpetual exile. It was perhaps a weakness, but one which does not lower him in our esteem, that he met the thought of it with less courage than that of death. But when he heard of the successes of Leosthenes, when he learned that an Athenian embassy was making the circuit of Peloponnesus to advocate the cause of national independence, and that it was thwarted at every step by Antipater's hirelings, his despondency and resentment vanished ; he quitted his retreat, joined the envoys, and accompanied them to the end of their mission. To him it owed its most important results. Sicyon, Argos, and even Corinth are mentioned among the states which were brought over to the league by his eloquence. His kinsman Demon took advantage of the general feeling to propose a decree for his recall. It was passed, and not in the form of an act of grace, but of a respectful invitation. A vessel was sent by public authority, to bring him over from the place of his sojourn. When it returned with him to Piræus, a solemn procession, headed by the magistrates and the priests, came down to greet him, and to escort him back to the city. He now again raised his hands — perhaps to the goddess whom he had unjustly reproached — and congratulated himself on a return so much happier than that of Alcibiades, as it was the effect of the free good will of his fellow-citizens, not extorted from their fears. It was indeed a day of glory so pure — not to be effaced by a thousand scandalous anecdotes — that he might gladly have consented to the price which he afterwards paid for it. The penalty to which he had been condemned still remained to be discharged, and it was one of those obligations which it seems could not be legally cancelled. But Demon carried a decree by which fifty talents were assigned to Demosthenes from the treasury, nominally to defray the cost of an altar which was annually adorned at the public expense for one of the festivals.


But these bright gleams of joy and hope were soon to be overcast. Antipater's fortune had sunk to the lowest point ; it was now to be gradually gaining the ascendant. The first disaster which befell the Greek cause was the death of Leosthenes. Antipater had directed a sally against the besiegers, who were employed in the work of circumvallation. A sharp combat took place ; and Leosthenes, hastening up to the support of his men, was struck on the head by a stone from an engine, fell senseless, and was carried back to the camp, where he died, the third day after.

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It remained to be considered, who should take the place of Leosthenes. The choice, we find, was left without dispute to Athens. Antiphilus, a young man who had acquired high reputation for courage and military skill, received the command.

LEONNATUS

But in the meanwhile succours were approaching for the relief of Antipater. Leonnatus had come down to take possession of his satrapy, with instructions from Perdiccas, to aid Eumenes in the conquest of Cappadocia. But, if he was ever in earnest about this enterprise, he was soon diverted from it by other projects. He had entered into a secret correspondence



WATER CARRIER

with Olympias, who, being in open enmity with Antipater, and very much dissatisfied with the recent arrangements, desired to form an alliance, through her daughter Cleopatra, the widowed queen of Epirus, with some one powerful enough to protect her interests. The history of such negotiations is seldom accurately known; it only appears that Leonnatus received a letter from Cleopatra, in which she promised him her hand—if he came to Pella with a sufficient force, it must be supposed, to overpower Antipater, and to secure the throne of Macedonia for himself. He was a man of sanguine temper, as well as of towering ambition, and eagerly grasped at the offer. While he was occupied with this scheme, he received a message from Antipater, now blocked up in Lamia, to implore his speediest succour. Antipater's envoy was empowered to offer the hand of one of Antipater's daughters to Leonnatus. Eumenes endeavoured to dissuade Leonnatus from compliance with this request, and professed to consider his own life as in danger from the enmity of Antipater and Hecataeus. Leonnatus therefore thought he might safely trust him with the secret, let him see Cleopatra's letters, and assured him that his intentions were nothing less than friendly to

Antipater. But the project did not at all suit the views of Eumenes, who saw that he should probably forfeit his satrapy with the patronage of Perdiccas, and felt no confidence in the impetuous character of Leonnatus. He therefore made his escape by night, accompanied only by three hundred horse and two hundred armed slaves, with his treasure, which amounted to five thousand talents, and fled to Perdiccas, whose favour he secured by this proof of fidelity.

Leonnatus had now no choice left. It was in Macedonia alone that he could hope to establish himself. But it seems that he thought it necessary for his own sake, first to quell the insurrection of the Greeks, and then to rid himself of Antipater. He therefore crossed over to Europe, and marched towards the theatre of war. In Macedonia, he added a large body of troops to his army, which then numbered no less than twenty thousand foot and twenty-five hundred horse. When Antiphilus heard of the approach of this formidable force, he immediately perceived that the siege must be raised; and he seems to have taken his measures with great judgment and energy. He fired his camp, sent the baggage and all his useless

people to Melitæa, a town on the Enipeus, which lay near his road, and himself, crossing the chain of Othrys, advanced with his unencumbered troops to meet Leonnatus, before he could be joined by Antipater.

DEATH OF LEONNATUS; NAVAL WAR; WAR IN THESSALY

Leonnatus charged with his wonted valour; but after a sharp combat, his troops were broken, and put to flight, and driven into the marsh, where he himself fell, pierced with many wounds. The Greeks remained masters of the field, and erected their trophy, the third which they had won since the beginning of the war.

To Antipater however the loss which he suffered through the defeat of Leonnatus was more than compensated by the advantage he gained from the death of a formidable rival; though he may not have known the whole extent of his danger. He had followed the march of the Greeks, and it seems was at no great distance when the battle took place; for the next day he effected a junction with the army of Leonnatus, which immediately acknowledged him as its chief. He now saw himself at the head of a force, before which the allies, but for the superiority of their cavalry, would not have been able to stand. Still, such was the terror inspired by the Thessalian horse, that he did not venture to descend into the plain; and he had probably already received intelligence of the approach of Craterus. He therefore advanced along the higher ground on the skirts of the plain towards the borders of Macedonia. Antiphilus and Menon could only watch his movements, and made no attempt to obstruct them; but remained in the central vale of Thessaly.

In the meanwhile the Athenians, who had undertaken the whole burden of the war on the sea, had been defeated on what they were used to consider as their own element. The Macedonian admiral Clitus, with his 240 sail, gained two victories over the Athenians, who were commanded by Eetion, and destroyed a great number of their ships. Soon after, when the Macedonians had become masters of the sea, a squadron was sent, with a strong body of troops, Macedonians as well as mercenaries, under the command of Micion, to invade Attica. Phocion led as strong a force as could be mustered to meet the enemy, who had landed on the eastern coast, not far from Marathon, and was overrunning the country. But the enemy was defeated, and driven back to his ships with great loss, and Micion was left among the slain. So that even this naval war, though it probably inflicted a severe injury on the Athenians, terminated in a manner which reminded them of better days.

Not long after, the aspect of affairs in Thessaly was again changed by the arrival of Craterus. He had brought, beside the veterans, four thousand heavy-armed, one thousand Persian bowmen and slingers, and fifteen hundred cavalry. He probably entered Thessaly by one of the western passes, as this was the direction which Antipater had taken. When they had joined their forces, Craterus resigned the supreme command to his colleague. They then marched down into the plain, where the allies were posted, and encamped near the banks of the Peneus. The Macedonian army now amounted to between forty thousand and fifty thousand heavy infantry, three thousand light troops, and five thousand cavalry. The Greeks were little more than half as numerous; for the Ætolians had not returned to the camp. It became evident to Antiphilus and Menon that they must hazard a battle or soon be deserted by the greater part of their troops. The engagement took place on the plain of Crannon, a little to the west of

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the road between Larissa and Pharsalus, not far from the foot of a range of low hills which stretch across from the Enipeus to the Peneus. It began, as before, with the cavalry. That of the Macedonians was probably commanded by Craterus, but it was still unable to cope with the Thessalians; and the event of the day might have been similar to that in which Leonnatus fell, if the Macedonians had not now had the advantage of two able and experienced generals. Antipater, who was at the head of the phalanx, when he saw his horse giving way, fell upon the enemy's infantry. They were quite unable to sustain the shock, but still were so ably commanded that they retreated in good order to the adjacent high ground, and there took up a position from which the Macedonians vainly attempted to dislodge them. We seem to collect from this fact that Alexander was still more fortunate in his enemies than in his officers. But Menon, perceiving the retreat of his infantry, did not venture to prolong the combat, in which he was on the point of gaining a decided victory; he drew off his troops, and the Macedonians remained everywhere masters of the field.

DISSOLUTION OF THE LEAGUE

The Greeks had not lost more than five hundred men; but though the loss was trifling, it was the result of a defeat; and this, in such circumstances, was inevitably fatal to their cause. Antiphilus and Menon thought themselves forced to negotiate. Antipater at once saw that an opportunity was presented to him of dissolving the confederacy without another blow. When the Greek heralds came to him with proposals of peace, he declared that he would enter into no treaty with the confederacy, but was willing to receive envoys from the allied states separately. He knew that this would be an irresistible temptation to each to renounce the common cause, that it might make the better terms for itself. But to hasten their resolution, he and Craterus laid siege to some of the Thessalian towns, among the rest to Pharsalus, which the allies were compelled to abandon to their fate. This proof of weakness, and the danger which extorted it, overpowered all reluctance in the inferior states of the confederacy. One after another sent its envoys to the Macedonian camp, and submitted to the terms dictated by Antipater, which were unexpectedly mild. Their lenity attracted those who still hesitated, and in a short time all had laid down their arms.

The two states which had excited and guided the insurrection, now remained exposed to the conqueror's vengeance, unable to afford any help to one another—unable, had their forces been united, to offer any resistance to him. Phocion now had the melancholy pleasure of exerting the influence he had gained by his long connection with the enemies of his country, in her behalf. For the readiness he showed on this occasion, we may well forgive his gentle reproach—that if she had followed his counsels, she would not have needed his aid; as in truth if she had followed those of Lycidas in the Persian War, she would not have become an object of envy and hatred, and would perhaps never have been subject to a Macedonian master. The honour of his mediation he shared with Demades, to whom the eyes of all were first turned in this emergency. While the storm of war was rolling towards the frontiers of Attica, Demades sat aloof, like Achilles, an unconcerned spectator, brooding over his dishonour, and could only be induced to interpose by entreaties and gifts. He was a disfranchised man, who had no right to offer his advice. But he was not inexorable: and when his

franchise was restored to him, proposed a decree, which was immediately carried, to send envoys, Phocion and himself in the number, with full powers to Antipater. They found the Macedonian army encamped on the site of Thebes, and preparing to invade Attica. Antipater would be satisfied with nothing but absolute submission.

The terms finally granted were, that they should deliver up a number of their obnoxious orators, including Demosthenes and Hyperides; that they should limit their franchise by a standard of property; that they should receive a garrison in Munychia, and pay a sum of money for the cost of the war. All the articles were accepted by the plenipotentiaries, and ratified by the people; and soon after the Macedonian garrison marched into Munychia, to settle the interpretation of those which had not been precisely defined.

THE CAPITULATION

We conclude that the Athenians had been induced to expect a revival of the ancient limited democracy, perhaps as it existed in the time of Solon; by which the poorest would indeed have been excluded from several offices, but not from the privileges which they exercised in the assembly and the courts of justice. Hopeless as the condition of the people was, it seems doubtful whether they would have ratified the treaty, if they had known beforehand how Antipater understood it on this point. The new regulation which he decreed sounded very moderate, if not necessary or just; but its practical effect was that nearly two-thirds of the citizens were disfranchised, and many transported out of Greece. It provided that a qualification of two thousand drachmæ should be required from every citizen, and this has been commonly understood as the entire amount of property of every kind to be possessed by each. If this was the case, it remains an inexplicable mystery that out of twenty-one thousand persons then exercising the franchise, no more than nine thousand could be found possessing that sum [£80 or \$400].

To the disfranchised citizens Antipater offered a town and district in Thrace. A great number of a higher class were formally banished.

It seems that the contribution which had been mentioned in the treaty was not immediately exacted; perhaps was purposely reserved as an additional security for their good behaviour. The question about Samos was referred to the king's council, and, by order of Perdiccas, the Athenian colonists were soon after expelled from their possessions. The republic, it appears, was also deprived of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros.

THE END OF DEMOSTHENES

Demosthenes and his partners in misfortune had retired from the city before the Macedonian garrison arrived, yet hardly so soon as it was heard that Antipater was on his march against Athens. Demades proposed a decree condemning Antipater's victims to death. They had certainly escaped, before they could be arrested under this decree; and their first place of refuge was Ægina.

As the danger grew more pressing, the friends parted, seeking separate asylums. Aristoniceus and Himereus took shelter in the Æaceum. Hyperides, it seems, first sought refuge at the altar of Poseidon in the same island, but afterwards passed over to Peloponnesus, and fled to the temple of Demeter at Hermione, once deemed a shrine of awful sanctity. Demos-

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thenes chose the sanctuary of Poseidon in the isle of Calauræa near Trœzen. There remained no hope of safety for the fugitives, but in the protection of the gods. But Antipater had taken his measures to render even this safeguard unavailing.

It was not in Athens alone that Antipater pursued the friends of liberty to death. To carry out his purpose, he had engaged the services of a band of men, who, from their infamous occupation, acquired the title of the Exile-Hunters. The leader of this pack was an Italian Greek of Thurii, named Archias. He had been a player, and afterwards, it seems, had studied, perhaps practised, rhetoric; but we find no trace that he was connected with any political party in Greece—where indeed, as a foreigner, he could scarcely have been admitted into one. He served probably for nothing but his hire; yet he displayed as much zeal in his commission, as if he had been instigated by private enmity. He was attended on his circuit by a guard of Thracians, and with their assistance dragged most of the Athenian exiles—whom, as the prey for which his master most longed, he had undertaken to seize himself—from the altars to which he found them clinging. Aristoniceus, Himeraeus, and Hyperides were conveyed to Antipater, who was then at Corinth or Cleonæ, and the first two at least were immediately put to death. Hyperides, according to the more authentic report, was reserved to be executed in Macedonia. But all seem to have agreed that Antipater was not satisfied with his blood, but ordered his tongue to be first cut out, and his remains to be cast to the dogs. His bones however were secretly rescued by one of his kinsmen, and carried to Athens, where they were buried in the grave of his fathers.

Demosthenes calmly awaited the coming of Archias in the temple at Calauræa, well knowing that he would not be sheltered by the sanctity of the place, and prepared for his end. He had dreamed, it is said, the night before, that he was contending with Archias in a tragic part; that the judgment of the spectators was in his favour, but that he lost the prize, because he had not been furnished with the outward requisites of the exhibition—an apt illustration at least of his failure in the real contest, which was the task of his life. When Archias came to the door of the temple with his satellites, he found Demosthenes seated. He at first addressed him in the language of friendly persuasion, to inveigle him out of his retreat, and offered to intercede with Antipater in his behalf.

Demosthenes listened for a time in silence to his bland professions, but at length replied: "Archias, you never won me by your acting, nor will you now by your promises." When the player found that he was detected, he flung away the mask, and threatened in earnest. "Now," said Demosthenes, "you speak from the Macedonian tripod; before you were only acting: wait a little, till I have written a letter to my friends at home." And he took a roll, as to write, and as was his wont, when he was engaged in composition, put the end of the reed to his mouth, and bit it; he then covered his face with his robe, and bowed his head. According to another report, he was seen to take something out of a piece of linen, and put it into his mouth; the Thracians imagined that it was gold. In one way or other, he had swallowed a poison which he had kept for this use. When he had remained some time in this attitude the barbarians, thinking that he was lingering through fear, began to taunt him with cowardice; and Archias, going up to him, urged him to rise, and repeated his offers of mediation.

Demosthenes now felt the poison in his veins; he uncovered his face, rose, and fixing his eyes on the dissembler, said, "It is time for you, Archias, to

finish the part of Creon, and to cast my body to the dogs. I quit thy sanctuary, Poseidon, still breathing; though Antipater, and the Macedonians, have not spared even it from pollution." So saying, he moved with faltering step towards the door, but had scarcely passed the altar, when he fell with a groan, and breathed his last.

His end would undoubtedly have been more truly heroic, though not in the sight of his own generation, if he had braved the insults and torture which awaited him. But he must not be judged by a view of life which had never been presented to him; according to his own, it must have seemed base to submit to the enemy whom he had hitherto defied, for the sake of a few days more of ignominious wretchedness. And even on the principles of a higher philosophy he might think that the gods, who were not able to protect him, had discharged him from their service, and permitted him to withdraw from a post which he could no longer defend.

The ancients saw the finger of Heaven in the fate of the vile instruments of his destruction. That of Demades will be afterwards related; Archias ended his days in extreme indigence, under the weight of universal contempt. It was later before Athens was permitted to do justice to the services of her great citizen, who indeed had never lost her esteem. The time at length came when his nephew Demochares might safely propose a decree, by which the honours of the prytaneum and of the foremost seat at public spectacles, were granted to his descendants, and a bronze statue was erected in the agora to himself. It bore an inscription, corresponding in its import to the dream which he was said to have had at Calauria: "Had but the strength of thy arm, Demosthenes, equalled thy spirit, never would Greece have sunk under the foreigner's yoke." The statue itself was believed in Plutarch's time to have confirmed the general persuasion of his innocence as to the only charge which ever threw a shade on the purity of his political character.¹ The honours paid to his memory were not confined to Athens. A monument was erected to him in the sanctuary where he died, and both at Calauria and in other parts of Greece he continued, down to the age of Hadrian and probably as long as the memory of the past survived there, to receive marks of public reverence approaching to the worship of a hero.²

GROTE'S ESTIMATE OF DEMOSTHENES

The violent deaths of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian demos, the suppression of the public dicasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by Macedonian Exile-Hunters — are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world. Of Hyperides as a citizen we know only the general fact, that he maintained from first to last, and with oratorical ability inferior only to Demosthenes, a strenuous opposition to Macedonian dominion over Greece; though his prosecution of Demosthenes respecting the Harpalian

[¹ Plutarch tells this story: "A certain soldier being sent for to come unto his captain, did put such pieces of gold as he had into the hands of Demosthenes' statue, which had both his hands joined together: and there grew hard by it a great plane tree, divers leaves whereof either blown off by wind by chance, or else put there of purpose by the soldier, covered so this gold, that it was there a long time, and no man found it: until such time as the soldier came again, and found it as he left it. Hereupon this matter running abroad in every man's mouth, there were divers wise men that took occasion of this subject to make epigrams in the praise of Demosthenes, who in his life was never corrupted." But the same story was told of other statues.]

treasure appears (so far as it comes before us) discreditable. Of Demosthenes, we know more — enough to form a judgment of him both as citizen and statesman. At the time of his death he was about sixty-two years of age, and we have before us his first *Philippic*, delivered thirty years before (352–351 B.C.). We are thus sure that even at that early day he took a sagacious and provident measure of the danger which threatened Grecian liberty from the energy and encroachments of Philip. He impressed upon his countrymen this coming danger, at a time when the older and more influential politicians either could not or would not see it; he called aloud upon his fellow-citizens for personal service and pecuniary contributions, enforcing the call by all the artifices of consummate oratory, when such distasteful propositions only entailed unpopularity upon himself. At the period when Demosthenes first addressed these earnest appeals to his countrymen, long before the fall of Olynthus, the power of Philip, though formidable, might have been kept perfectly well within the limits of Macedonia and Thrace; and would probably have been so kept, had Demosthenes possessed in 351 B.C. as much public influence as he had acquired ten years afterwards.

Throughout the whole career of Demosthenes as a public adviser, down to the battle of Charonea, we trace the same combination of earnest patriotism with wise and long-sighted policy. During the three years' war which ended with the battle of Charonea, the Athenians in the main followed his counsel; and disastrous as were the ultimate military results of that war, for which Demosthenes could not be responsible, its earlier periods were creditable and successful, its general scheme was the best that the case admitted, and its diplomatic management universally triumphant. But what invests the purposes and policy of Demosthenes with peculiar grandeur, is, that they were not simply Athenian, but in an eminent degree Panhellenic also. It was not Athens only that he sought to defend against Philip, but the whole Hellenic world. In this he towers above



DECORATION, FROM A VASE

the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth — Pericles, Archidamus, Agesilaus, Epaminondas; whose policy was Athenian, Spartan, Theban, rather than Hellenic. He carries us back to the time of the invasion of Xerxes and the generation immediately succeeding it, when the struggles and sufferings of the Athenians against Persia were consecrated by complete identity of interest with collective Greece. The sentiments to which Demosthenes appeals throughout his numerous orations are those of the noblest and largest patriotism — trying to inflame the ancient Grecian sentiment of an autonomous Hellenic world, as the indispensable condition of a dignified and desirable existence; but inculcating at the same time that these blessings could only be preserved by toil, self-sacrifice, devotion of fortune, and willingness to brave hard and steady personal service.

From the destruction of Thebes by Alexander in 335 B.C., to the Lamian War after his death, the policy of Athens neither was nor could be conducted by Demosthenes. But condemned as he was to comparative inefficacy, he yet rendered material service to Athens, in the Harpalian affair of 324 B.C.

If, instead of opposing the alliance of the city with Harpalus, he had supported it as warmly as Hyperides, the exaggerated promises of the exile might probably have prevailed, and war would have been declared against Alexander. The Lamian War was not of his original suggestion, since he was in exile at its commencement. But he threw himself into it with unreserved ardour, and was greatly instrumental in procuring the large number of adhesions with it obtained from so many Grecian states. In spite of its disastrous result, it was, like the battle of Chæronea, a glorious effort for the recovery of Grecian liberty, undertaken under circumstances which promised a fair chance of success. There was no excessive rashness in calculating on distractions in the empire left by Alexander; on mutual hostility among the principal officers and on the probability of having only to make head against Antipater and Macedonia, with little or no reinforcement from Asia. Disastrous as the enterprise ultimately proved, yet the risk was one fairly worth incurring, with so noble an object at stake; and could the war have been protracted another year, its termination would probably have been very different. We shall see this presently when we come to follow Asiatic events. After a catastrophe so ruinous, extinguishing free speech in Greece, and dispersing the Athenian demos to distant lands, Demosthenes himself could hardly have desired, at the age of sixty-two, to prolong his existence as a fugitive beyond sea.

Of the speeches which he composed for private litigants, occasionally also for himself, before the dicastery, and of the numerous stimulating and admonitory harangues on the public affairs of the moment, which he had addressed to his assembled countrymen, a few remain for the admiration of posterity. These harangues serve to us, not only as evidence of his unrivalled excellence as an orator, but as one of the chief sources from which we are enabled to appreciate the last phase of free Grecian life, as an acting and working reality.

ANTIPATER IN GREECE

The death of Demosthenes, with its tragical circumstances, is on the whole less melancholy than the prolonged life of Phocion, as agent of Macedonian supremacy in a city half depopulated, where he had been born a free citizen, and which he had so long helped to administer as a free community. The dishonour of Phocion's position must have been aggravated by the distress in Athens, arising both out of the violent deportation of one-half of its free citizens, and out of the compulsory return of the Athenian settlers from Samos—which island was now taken from Athens, after she had occupied it forty-three years, and restored to the Samian people and to their recalled exiles, by a rescript of Perdiccas in the name of Arrhidaeus. Occupying this obnoxious elevation, Phocion exercised authority with his usual probity and mildness. Exerting himself to guard the citizens from being annoyed by disorders on the part of the garrison of Munychia, he kept up friendly intercourse with its commander Menyllus, though refusing all presents both from him and from Antipater.

Throughout Peloponnesus, Antipater purged and remodelled the cities, Argos, Megalopolis, and others, as he had done at Athens; installing in each an oligarchy of his own partisans—sometimes with a Macedonian garrison—and putting to death, deporting, or expelling hostile, or intractable, or democratical citizens. Having completed the subjugation of Peloponnesus, he passed across the Corinthian Gulf to attack the Ætolians, now the only

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Greeks remaining unsubdued. It was the purpose of Antipater, not merely to conquer this warlike and rude people, but to transport them in mass across into Asia, and march them up to the interior deserts of the empire. His army was too powerful to be resisted on even ground, so that all the more accessible towns and villages fell into his hands. But the Ætolians defended themselves bravely, withdrew their families into the high towns and mountain tops of their very rugged country, and caused serious loss to the Macedonian invaders. Nevertheless, Craterus, who had carried on war of the same kind with Alexander in Sogdiana, manifested so much skill in seizing the points of communication, that he intercepted all their supplies and reduced them to extreme distress, amidst the winter which had now supervened. The Ætolians, in spite of bravery and endurance, must soon have been compelled to surrender from cold and hunger, had not the unexpected arrival of Antigonus from Asia communicated such news to Antipater and Craterus, as induced them to prepare for marching back to Macedonia, with a view to the crossing of the Hellespont and operating in Asia. They concluded a pacification with the Ætolians — postponing till a future period their design of deporting that people — and withdrew into Macedonia; where Antipater cemented his alliance with Craterus by giving to him his daughter Phila in marriage.

Another daughter of Antipater, named Nicæa, had been sent over to Asia not long before, to become the wife of Perdiccas. That general, acting as guardian or prime minister to the kings of Alexander's family (who are now spoken of in the plural number, since Roxane had given birth to a posthumous son, called Alexander, and made king jointly with Philip Arrhidaeus), had at first sought close combination with Antipater, demanding his daughter in marriage. But new views were presently opened to him by the intrigues of the princess at Pella (Olympias, with her daughter Cleopatra, widow of the Molossian Alexander) — who had always been at variance with Antipater, even throughout the life of Alexander — and Cynane (daughter of Philip by an Illyrian mother, and widow of Amyntas, first cousin of Alexander, but slain by Alexander's order) with her daughter Eurydice. It has been already mentioned that Cleopatra had offered herself in marriage to Leonnatus, inviting him to come over and occupy the throne of Macedonia; he had obeyed the call, but had been slain in his first battle against the Greeks, thus relieving Antipater from a dangerous rival. The first project of Olympias being thus frustrated, she had sent to Perdiccas proposing to him a marriage with Cleopatra. Perdiccas had already pledged himself to the daughter of Antipater; nevertheless he now debated whether his ambition would not be better served by breaking his pledge, and accepting the new proposition. To this step he was advised by Eumenes, his ablest friend and coadjutor, steadily attached to the interest of the regal family, and withal personally hated by Antipater. But Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas, represented that it would be hazardous to provoke openly and immediately the wrath of Antipater. Accordingly Perdiccas resolved to accept Nicæa for the moment, but to send her away after no long time, and take Cleopatra; to whom secret assurances from him were conveyed by Eumenes. Cynane also (daughter of Philip and widow of his nephew Amyntas), a warlike and ambitious woman, had brought into Asia her daughter Eurydice for the purpose of espousing the king Philip Arrhidaeus. Being averse to this marriage, and probably instigated by Olympias also, Perdiccas and Alcetas put Cynane to death. But the indignation excited among the soldiers by this deed was so furious as to menace their safety, and they were forced to permit the marriage of the king with Eurydice.

All these intrigues were going on through the summer of 322 B.C., while the Lamian War was still effectively prosecuted by the Greeks. About the autumn of the year, Antigonus (called Monophthalmus), the satrap of Phrygia, detected these secret intrigues of Perdiccas; who, for that and other reasons, began to look on him as an enemy, and to plot against his life. Apprised of his danger, Antigonus made his escape from Asia into Europe to acquaint Antipater and Craterus with the hostile manœuvres of Perdiccas; upon which news, the two generals, immediately abandoning the Ætolian War, withdrew their army from Greece for the more important object of counteracting Perdiccas in Asia.

In the spring of 321 B.C., Antipater and Craterus, having concerted operations with Ptolemy governor of Egypt, crossed into Asia and began their conflict with Perdiccas; who himself, having the kings along with him, marched against Egypt to attack Ptolemy.

By the death of Perdiccas, and the defection of his soldiers, complete preponderance was thrown into the hands of Antipater, Ptolemy, and Antigonus. Antipater was invited to join the army, now consisting of the forces both of Ptolemy and Perdiccas united. He was there invested with the guardianship of the persons of the kings, and with the sort of ministerial supremacy previously held by Perdiccas. He was however exposed to much difficulty, and even to great personal danger, from the intrigues of the princess Eurydice, who displayed a masculine boldness in publicly haranguing the soldiers; and from the discontents of the army, who claimed presents, formerly promised to them by Alexander, which there were no funds to liquidate at the moment. At Triparadisus in Syria, Antipater made a second distribution of the satrapies of the empire; somewhat modified, yet coinciding in the main with that which had been drawn up shortly after the death of Alexander. To Ptolemy was assured Egypt and Libya, to Antigonus the Greater Phrygia, Lycia, and Pamphylia—as each had had before.

Antigonus was placed in command of the principal Macedonian army in Asia, to crush Eumenes and the other chief adherents of Perdiccas; most of whom had been condemned to death by a vote of the Macedonian army. After a certain interval, Antipater himself, accompanied by the kings, returned to Macedonia, having eluded by artifice a renewed demand on the part of his soldiers for the promised presents. The war of Antigonus, first against Eumenes in Cappadocia, next against Alcetas and the other partisans of Perdiccas in Pisidia, lasted for many months, but was at length successfully finished. Eumenes, beset by the constant treachery and insubordination of the Macedonians, was defeated and driven out of the field. He took refuge with a handful of men in the impregnable and well-stored fortress of Nora in Cappadocia, where he held out a long blockade, apparently more than a year, against Antigonus.

THE DEATHS OF ANTIPATER AND OF DEMADES

Before the prolonged blockade of Nora had been brought to a close, Antipater, being of very advanced age, fell into sickness, and presently died. One of his latest acts was to put to death the Athenian orator Demades, who had been sent to Macedonia as envoy to solicit the removal of the Macedonian garrison at Munychia. Antipater had promised, or given hopes, that if the oligarchy which he had constituted at Athens maintained unshaken adherence to Macedonia, he would withdraw the garrison. The Athenians

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endeavoured to prevail on Phocion to go to Macedonia as solicitor for the fulfilment of this promise; but he steadily refused. Demades, who willingly undertook the mission, reached Macedonia at a moment very untoward for himself. The papers of the deceased Perdiccas had come into possession of his opponents; and among them had been found a letter written to him by Demades, inviting him to cross over and rescue Greece from her dependence "on an old and rotten warp"—meaning Antipater. This letter gave great offence to Antipater—the rather, as Demades is said to have been his habitual pensioner—and still greater offence to his son Cassander; who caused Demades with his son to be seized, first killed the son in the immediate presence and even embrace of the father, and then slew the father himself, with bitter invective against his ingratitude. All the accounts which we read depict Demades, in general terms, as a prodigal spendthrift and a venal and corrupt politician. We have no ground for questioning this statement; at the same time, we have no specific facts to prove it.

POLYSPERCHON AND CASSANDER

Antipater by his last directions appointed Polysperchon, one of Alexander's veteran officers, to be chief administrator, with full powers on behalf of the imperial dynasty; while he assigned to his own son Cassander only



PROMONTORY OF SUNIUM

the second place, as chiliarch, or general of the bodyguard. He thought that this disposition of power would be more generally acceptable throughout the empire, as Polysperchon was older and of longer military service than any other among Alexander's generals. Moreover, Antipater was especially afraid of letting dominion fall into the hands of the princesses; all of whom—Olympias, Cleopatra, and Eurydice—were energetic characters; and the first of the three (who had retired to Epirus from enmity towards Antipater) furious and implacable.

But the views of Antipater were disappointed from the beginning, because Cassander would not submit to the second place, nor tolerate Polysperchon as his superior. Immediately after the death of Antipater, but before it became publicly known, Cassander despatched Nicanor with pretended orders from Antipater to supersede Menyllus in the government of Munychia. To this order Menyllus yielded. But when after a few days the Athenian public came to learn the real truth, they were displeased with Phocion for having

permitted the change to be made — assuming that he knew the real state of the facts, and might have kept out the new commander. Cassander, while securing this important post in the hands of a confirmed partisan, affected to acquiesce in the authority of Polysperchon, and to occupy himself with a hunting-party in the country. He at the same time sent confidential adherents to the Hellespont and other places in furtherance of his schemes; and especially to contract alliance with Antigonus in Asia and with Ptolemy in Egypt. His envoys being generally well received, he himself soon quitted Macedonia suddenly, and went to concert measures with Antigonus in Asia. It suited the policy of Ptolemy, and still more that of Antigonus, to aid him against Polysperchon and the imperial dynasty. On the death of Antipater, Antigonus had resolved to make himself the real sovereign of the Asiatic Alexandrine empire, possessing as he did the most powerful military force within it.

Even before this time the imperial dynasty had been a name rather than a reality; yet still a respected name. But now, the preference shown to Polysperchon by the deceased Antipater, and the secession of Cassander, placed all the real great powers in active hostility against the dynasty. Polysperchon and his friends were not blind to the difficulties of their position. The principal officers in Macedonia having been convened to deliberate, it was resolved to invite Olympias out of Epirus, that she might assume the tutelage of her grandson Alexander (son of Roxane); to place the Asiatic interests of the dynasty in the hands of Eumenes, appointing him to the supreme command; and to combat Cassander in Europe, by assuring of themselves the general good will and support of the Greeks. This last object was to be obtained by granting to the Greeks general enfranchisement, and by subverting the Antipatrian oligarchies and military governments now paramount throughout the cities.

OLYMPIAS AND EUMENES

The last hope of maintaining the unity of Alexander's empire in Asia, against the counter-interests of the great Macedonian officers—who were steadily tending to divide and appropriate it—now lay in the fidelity and military skill of Eumenes. At his disposal Polysperchon placed the imperial treasures and soldiers in Asia; especially the brave, but faithless and disorderly Argyraspides. Olympias also addressed to him a pathetic letter, asking his counsel as the only friend and saviour to whom the imperial family could now look. Eumenes replied by assuring them of his devoted adherence to their cause. But he at the same time advised Olympias not to come out of Epirus into Macedonia; or if she did come, at all events to abstain from vindictive and cruel proceedings. Both these recommendations, honourable as well to his prudence as to his humanity, were disregarded by the old queen. She came into Macedonia to take the management of affairs; and although her imposing title—of mother to the great conqueror—raised a strong favourable feeling, yet her multiplied executions of the Antipatrian partisans excited fatal enmity against a dynasty already tottering. Nevertheless Eumenes, though his advice had been disregarded, devoted himself in Asia with unshaken fidelity to the Alexandrine family, resisting the most tempting invitations to take part with Antigonus against them. His example contributed much to keep alive the same active sentiment in those around him; indeed, without him, the imperial family would have had no sincere or

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commanding representative in Asia. His gallant struggles for two years against the greatly preponderant forces of Ptolemy, Antigonus, and Seleucus, and against the never-ceasing treachery of his own officers and troops are among the most memorable exploits of antiquity. While even in a military point of view, they are hardly inferior to the combinations of Alexander himself, they evince, besides, a flexibility and aptitude such as Alexander neither possessed nor required, for overcoming the thousand difficulties raised by traitors and mutineers around him. To the last, Eumenes remained unsubdued; he was betrayed to Antigonus by the base and venal treachery of his own soldiers, the Macedonian Argyraspides.

IMPERIAL EDICT RECALLING EXILES

On learning the death of Antipater, most of the Greek cities had sent envoys to Pella. To all the governments of these cities, composed as they were of his creatures, it was a matter of the utmost moment to know what course the new Macedonian authority would adopt. Polysperchon, persuaded that they would all adhere to Cassander, and that his only chance of combating that rival was by enlisting popular sympathy and interests in Greece, or at least by subverting these Antipatrian oligarchies — drew up in conjunction with his counsellors a proclamation which he issued in the name of the dynasty.

This proclamation directed the removal of all the garrisons, and the subversion of all the oligarchies, established by Antipater after the Lamian War. It ordered the recall of the host of exiles then expelled. It revived the state of things prevalent before the death of Alexander — which indeed itself had been, for the most part, an aggregate of macedonising oligarchies interspersed with Macedonian garrisons. To the existing Antipatrian oligarchies, however, it was a death-blow; and so it must have been understood by the Grecian envoys — including probably deputations from the exiles, as well as envoys from the civic governments — to whom Polysperchon delivered it at Pella. Not content with the general edict, Polysperchon addressed special letters to Argos and various other cities, commanding that the Antipatrian leading men should be banished with confiscation of property, and in some cases put to death; the names being probably furnished to him by the exiles. Lastly, as it was clear that such stringent measures could not be executed without force — the rather as these oligarchies would be upheld by Cassander from without — Polysperchon resolved to conduct a large military force into Greece; sending thither first, however, a considerable detachment, for immediate operations, under his son Alexander.

To Athens, as well as to other cities, Polysperchon addressed special letters, promising restoration of the democracy and recall of the exiles. At Athens, such change was a greater revolution than elsewhere, because the multitude of exiles and persons deported had been the greatest. To the existing nine thousand Athenian citizens, it was doubtless odious and alarming; while to Phocion, with the other leading Antipatrians, it threatened not only loss of power, but probably nothing less than the alternative of flight or death. The state of interests at Athens, however, was now singularly novel and complicated. There were the Antipatrians and the nine thousand qualified citizens, there were the exiles, who, under the new edict, speedily began re-entering the city, and reclaiming their citizenship as well as their property. Polysperchon and his son were known to be

soon coming with a powerful force. Lastly, there was Nicanor, who held Munychia with a garrison, neither for Polysperchon, nor for the Athenians, but for Cassander; the latter being himself also expected with a force from Asia. Here then were several parties — each distinct in views and interests from the rest, some decidedly hostile to each other.

CONTEST AT ATHENS

The first contest arose between the Athenians and Nicanor respecting Munychia; which they required him to evacuate, pursuant to the recent proclamation. Nicanor on his side returned an evasive answer, promising compliance as soon as circumstances permitted, but in the meantime entreating the Athenians to continue in alliance with Cassander, as they had been with his father Antipater. He seems to have indulged hopes of prevailing on them to declare in his favour — and not without plausible grounds, since the Antipatrian leaders and a proportion of the nine thousand citizens could not but dread the execution of Polysperchon's edict. And he had also what was of still greater moment — the secret connivance and support of Phocion: who put himself in intimate relation with Nicanor, as he had before done with Menyllus — and who had greater reason than any one else to dread the edict of Polysperchon.

Foreseeing the gravity of the impending contest, Nicanor had been secretly introducing fresh soldiers into Munychia. Presently, making an unexpected attack from Munychia and Salamis, he took Piræus by surprise, placed both the town and harbour under military occupation, and cut off its communication with Athens by a ditch and palisade. On this palpable aggression, the Athenians rushed to arms. But Phocion as general damped their ardour, and even declined to head them in an attack for the recovery of Piræus before Nicanor should have had time to strengthen himself in it.

The occupation of Piræus in addition to Munychia was a serious calamity to the Athenians, making them worse off than they had been even under Antipater. Piræus, rich, active, and commercial, containing the Athenian arsenal, docks, and muniments of war, was in many respects more valuable than Athens itself — for all purposes of



GREEK PEASANT

(After Hope)

war, far more valuable. Cassander had now an excellent place of arms and base, which Munychia alone would not have afforded, for his operations in Greece against Polysperchon; upon whom therefore the loss fell hardly less severely than upon the Athenians. Now Phocion, in his function as general, had been forewarned of the danger, might have guarded against it, and ought to have done so. This was a grave dereliction of duty, and admits of hardly any other explanation except that of treasonable connivance. It seems that Phocion, foreseeing his own ruin and that of his friends in the

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triumph of Polysperchon and the return of the exiles, was desirous of favouring the seizure of Piræus by Nicanor, as a means of constraining Athens to adopt the alliance with Cassander; which alliance indeed would probably have been brought about, had Cassander reached Piræus by sea sooner than the first troops of Polysperchon by land. Phocion was here guilty, at the very least, of culpable neglect, and probably of still more culpable treason, on an occasion seriously injuring both Polysperchon and the Athenians; a fact which we must not forget, when we come to read presently the bitter animosity exhibited against him.

The news that Nicanor had possessed himself of Piræus, produced a strong sensation. Presently arrived a letter addressed to him by Olympias herself, commanding him to surrender the place to the Athenians, upon whom she wished to confer entire autonomy. But Nicanor declined obedience to her order, still waiting for support from Cassander. The arrival of Alexander (Polysperchon's son) with a body of troops, encouraged the Athenians to believe that he was come to assist in carrying Piræus by force, for the purpose of restoring it to them. Their hopes, however, were again disappointed. Though encamped near Piræus, Alexander made no demand for the Athenian forces to co-operate with him in attacking it; but entered into open parley with Nicanor, whom he endeavoured to persuade or corrupt into surrendering the place. When this negotiation failed, he resolved to wait for the arrival of his father, who was already on his march towards Attica with the main army.

INTRIGUES OF PHOCION

It was Phocion and his immediate colleagues who induced Alexander to adopt this insidious policy; to decline reconquering Piræus for the Athenians, and to appropriate it for himself. To Phocion, the reconstitution of autonomous Athens — with its democracy and restored exiles, and without any foreign controlling force — was an assured sentence of banishment, if not of death. Not having been able to obtain protection from the foreign force of Nicanor and Cassander, he and his friends resolved to throw themselves upon that of Alexander and Polysperchon. They went to meet Alexander as he entered Attica, represented the impolicy of his relinquishing so important a military position as Piræus, while the war was yet unfinished, and offered to co-operate with him for this purpose, by proper management of the Athenian public. Alexander was pleased with these suggestions, accepted Phocion with the others as his leading adherents at Athens, and looked upon Piræus as a capture to be secured for himself. Numerous returning Athenian exiles accompanied Alexander's army. It seems that Phocion was desirous of admitting the troops, along with the exiles, as friends and allies into the walls of Athens, so as to make Alexander master of the city; but that this project was impracticable in consequence of the mistrust created among the Athenians by the parleys of Alexander with Nicanor.

The strategic function of Phocion, however — so often conferred and re-conferred upon him — and his power of doing either good or evil, now approached its close. As soon as the returning exiles found themselves in sufficient numbers, they called for a revision of the list of state officers, and for the re-establishment of the democratical forms. They passed a vote to depose those who had held office under the Antipatrian oligarchy, and who still continued to hold it down to the actual moment. Among these Pho-

cion stood first: along with him were his son-in-law Charicles, the Phalerean Demetrius, Callimedon, Nicocles, Thudippus, Hegemon, and Philocles. These persons were not only deposed, but condemned — some to death, some to banishment and confiscation of property. Demetrius, Charicles, and Callimedon sought safety by leaving Attica; but Phocion and the rest merely went to Alexander's camp, throwing themselves upon his protection on the faith of the recent understanding. Alexander not only received them courteously, but gave them letters to his father Polysperchon, requesting safety and protection for them, as men who had embraced his cause, and who were still eager to do all in their power to support him. Armed with these letters, Phocion and his companions went through Bœotia and Phocis to meet Polysperchon on his march southward. They were accompanied by Dinarchus and by a Platæan named Solon, both of them passing for friends of Polysperchon.

The Athenian democracy, just reconstituted, which had passed the recent condemnatory votes, was disquieted at the news that Alexander had espoused the cause of Phocion and had recommended the like policy to his father. It was possible that Polysperchon might seek, with his powerful army, both to occupy Athens and to capture Piræus, and might avail himself of Phocion (like Antipater after the Lamian War) as a convenient instrument of government. It seems plain that this was the project of Alexander, and that he counted on Phocion as a ready auxiliary in both. Now the restored democrats, though owing their restoration to Polysperchon, were much less compliant towards him than Phocion had been. Not only would they not admit him into the city, but they would not even acquiesce in his separate occupation of Munychia and Piræus. On the proposition of Agnonides and Archestratus, they sent a deputation to Polysperchon accusing Phocion and his comrades of high treason; yet at the same time claiming for Athens the full and undiminished benefit of the late regal proclamation — autonomy and democracy, with restoration of Piræus and Munychia free and ungarrisoned.

As the sentiment now prevalent at Athens evinced clearly that Phocion could not be again useful to him as an instrument, Polysperchon heard his defence with impatience, interrupted him several times, and so disgusted him that he at length struck the ground with his stick, and held his peace. Hegemon, another of the accused, was yet more harshly treated. The sentence could not be doubtful. Phocion and his companions were delivered over as prisoners to the Athenian deputation, together with a letter from the king, intimating that in his conviction they were traitors, but that he left them to be judged by the Athenians — now restored to freedom and autonomy.

PHOCION'S DISGRACE

The Macedonian Clitus was instructed to convey them to Athens as prisoners under a guard. Mournful was the spectacle as they entered the city; being carried along the Ceramicus in carts, through sympathising friends and an embittered multitude, until they reached the theatre, wherein the assembly was to be convened.

The common feeling of antipathy against him burst out into furious manifestations. Agnonides the principal accuser, supported by Epicurus and Demophilus, found their denunciations welcomed and even anticipated, when they arraigned Phocion as a criminal who had lent his hand to the subver-

[318 B.C.]

sion of the constitution, to the sufferings of his deported fellow-citizens, and to the holding of Athens in subjection under a foreign potentate: in addition to which, the betrayal of Piræus to Nicanor constituted a new crime—fastening on the people the yoke of Cassander, when autonomy had been promised to them by the recent imperial edict. After the accusation was concluded, Phocion was called on for his defence; but he found it impossible to obtain a hearing. Attempting several times to speak, he was as often interrupted by angry shouts; several of his friends were cried down in like manner; until at length he gave up the case in despair, and exclaimed:

“For myself, Athenians, I plead guilty; I pronounce against myself the sentence of death for my political conduct; but why are you to sentence these men near me, who are not guilty?”



GREEK TERRA-COTTA JAR

(In the British Museum)

“Because they are your friends, Phocion,” was the exclamation of those around. Phocion then said no more; while Agnonides proposed a decree, to the effect that the assembled people should decide by show of hands, whether the persons now arraigned were guilty or not; and that if declared guilty, they should be put to death. Some persons present cried out that the penalty of torture ought to precede death: but this savage proposition, utterly at variance with Athenian law in respect to citizens, was repudiated not less by Agnonides than by the Macedonian officer Clitus. The decree was then, passed; after which the show of hands was called for. Nearly every hand in the assembly was held up in condemnation; each man even rose from his seat to make the effect more imposing; and some went so far as to put on wreaths in token of triumph.

After sentence, the five condemned persons, Phocion, Nicocles, Thudipus, Hegemon, and Pythocles, were consigned to the supreme magistrates of Police, called the Eleven, and led to prison for the purpose of having the customary dose of poison administered. Hostile bystanders ran alongside, taunting and reviling them. It is even said that one man planted himself in the front, and spat upon Phocion; who turned to the public officers and exclaimed, “Will no one check this indecent fellow?” This was the only emotion which he manifested; in other respects, his tranquillity and self-possession were resolutely maintained, during this soul-subduing march from the theatre to the prison, amidst the wailings of his friends, the broken spirit of his four comrades, and the fiercest demonstrations of antipathy from

his fellow-citizens generally. One ray of comfort presented itself as he entered the prison. It was the day on which the Knights celebrated their festal procession with wreaths on their heads in honour of Zeus. Several of these horsemen halted in passing, took off their wreaths, and wept as they looked through the gratings of the prison.

Being asked whether he had anything to tell his son Phocus, Phocion replied: "I tell him emphatically, not to hold evil memory of the Athenians." The draught of hemlock was then administered to all five—to Phocion last. Having been condemned for treason, they were not buried in Attica; nor were Phocion's friends allowed to light a funeral pile for the burning of his body; which was carried out of Attica into the Megarid, by a hired agent named Conopion, and there burned by fire obtained at Megara. The wife of Phocion, with her maids, poured libations and marked the spot by a small mound of earth; she also collected the bones and brought them back to Athens in her bosom, during the secrecy of night. She buried them near her own domestic hearth, with this address: "Beloved Hestia, I confide to thee these relics of a good man. Restore them to his own family vault, as soon as the Athenians shall come to their senses."¹

After a short time (we are told by Plutarch) the Athenians did thus come to their senses. They discovered that Phocion had been a faithful and excellent public servant, repented of their severity towards him, celebrated his funeral obsequies at the public expense, erected a statue in his honour, and put to death Agnonides by public judicial sentence; while Epicurus and Demophilus fled from the city and were slain by Phocion's son.

These facts are ostensibly correct; but Plutarch omits to notice the real explanation of them. Within two or three months after the death of Phocion, Cassander, already in possession of Piræus and Munychia, became also master of Athens; the oligarchical or Phocionic party again acquired predominance; Demetrius the Phalerean was recalled from exile, and placed to administer the city under Cassander, as Phocion had administered it under Antipater.

We cannot indeed read without painful sympathy the narrative of an old man above eighty,—personally brave, mild, and superior to all pecuniary temptation, so far as his positive administration was concerned,—perishing under an intense and crushing storm of popular execration. But when we look at the whole case—when we survey, not merely the details of Phocion's administration, but the grand public objects which those details subserved, and towards which he conducted his fellow-citizens—we shall see that this judgment is fully merited. In Phocion's patriotism—for so doubtless he himself sincerely conceived it—no account was taken of Athenian independence; of the autonomy or self-management of the Hellenic world; of the conditions, in reference to foreign kings, under which alone such autonomy could exist. He had neither the Panhellenic sentiment of Aristides, Callicratidas, and Demosthenes, nor the narrower Athenian sentiment, like the devotion of Agesilaus to Sparta, and of Epaminondas to Thebes.

¹ Plutarch, *Phocion*, 36, 37. Two other anecdotes are recounted by Plutarch, which seem to be of doubtful authenticity. Nicocles entreated that he might be allowed to swallow his potion before Phocion; upon which the latter replied: "Your request, Nicocles, is sad and mournful—but as I have never yet refused you anything throughout my life, I grant this also."

After the first four had drunk, all except Phocion, no more hemlock was left; upon which the jailer said that he would not prepare any more, unless twelve drachmæ of money were given to him to buy the material. Some hesitation took place, until Phocion asked one of his friends to supply the money, sarcastically remarking that it was hard if a man could not even die *gratis* at Athens.

[318 B.C.]

To Phocion it was indifferent whether Greece was an aggregate of autonomous cities, with Athens as first or second among them, or one of the satrapies under the Macedonian kings. Now this was among the most fatal defects of a Grecian public man.

It was precisely during the fifty years of Phocion's political and military influence, that the Greeks were degraded from a state of freedom, into absolute servitude. In so far as this great public misfortune can be imputed to any one man—to no one was it more ascribable than to Phocion. He was strategist during most of the long series of years when Philip's power was growing; it was his duty to look ahead for the safety of his countrymen, and to combat the yet immature giant. He heard the warnings of Demosthenes, and he possessed exactly those qualities which were wanting to Demosthenes—military energy and aptitude. Had he lent his influence to inform the short-sightedness, to stimulate the inertia, to direct the armed efforts, of his countrymen, the kings of Macedon might have been kept within their own limits, and the future history of Greece might have been altogether different. Unfortunately, he took the opposite side. He acted with Æschines and the Philippisers; without receiving money from Philip, he did gratuitously all that Philip desired—by nullifying and sneering down the efforts of Demosthenes and the other active politicians. After the battle of Chæronea, Phocion received from Philip first, and from Alexander afterwards, marks of esteem not shown towards any other Athenian. This was both the fruit and the proof of his past political action—anti-Hellenic as well as anti-Athenian.

Having done much, in the earlier part of his life, to promote the subjugation of Greece under the Macedonian kings, he contributed somewhat, during the latter half, to lighten the severity of their dominion; and it is the most honourable point in his character that he always refrained from abusing their marked favour towards himself, for purposes either of personal gain or of oppression over his fellow-citizens. Alexander not only wrote letters to him, even during the plenitude of imperial power, in terms of respectful friendship, but tendered to him the largest presents—at one time the sum of one hundred talents [£20,000 or \$100,000]; at another time the choice of four towns on the coast of Asia Minor, as Xerxes gave to Themistocles. He even expressed his displeasure when Phocion, refusing everything, consented only to request the liberation of three Grecian prisoners confined at Sardis. The intense and unanimous wrath of the people against him is an instructive, though a distressing spectacle. It was directed, not against the man or the administrator—for in both characters Phocion had been blameless, except as to the last collusion with Nicanor in the seizure of the Piræus—but against his public policy. It was the last protest of extinct Grecian freedom, speaking as it were from the tomb in a voice of thunder, against that fatal system of mistrust, inertia, self-seeking, and corruption, which had betrayed the once autonomous Athens to a foreign conqueror.⁶



CHAPTER LXI. THE FAILURE OF GRECIAN FREEDOM

WE have already mentioned that Polysperchon with his army was in Phocis when Phocion was brought before him, on his march towards Peloponnesus. Before he reached Attica, Cassander arrived at Piræus to join Nicanor with a fleet of thirty-five ships and four thousand soldiers obtained from Antigonus. On learning this fact, Polysperchon hastened his march also, and presented himself under the walls of Athens and Piræus with a large force of twenty thousand Macedonians, four thousand Greek allies, one thousand cavalry, and sixty-five elephants; animals which were now seen for the first time in Greece. He at first besieged Cassander in Piræus, but finding it difficult to procure subsistence in Attica for so numerous an army, he marched with the larger portion into Peloponnesus, leaving his son Alexander with a division to make head against Cassander. Either approaching in person the various Peloponnesian towns, or addressing them by means of envoys, he enjoined the subversion of the Antipatrian oligarchies, and the restoration of liberty and free speech to the mass of the citizens. In most of the towns, this revolution was accomplished; but in Megalopolis, the oligarchy held out, not only forcing Polysperchon to besiege the city, but even defending it against him successfully. His admiral Clitus was soon afterwards defeated in the Propontis, with the loss of his whole fleet, by Nicanor (whom Cassander had sent from Piræus) and Antigonus.

After these two defeats, Polysperchon seems to have evacuated Peloponnesus, and to have carried his forces across the Corinthian Gulf into Epirus, to join Olympias. His party was greatly weakened all over Greece, and that of Cassander proportionally strengthened. The first effect of this was the surrender of Athens. The Athenians in the city, including all or many of the restored exiles, could no longer endure that complete severance from the sea, to which the occupation of Piræus and Munychia by Cassander had reduced them. Athens without a port was hardly tenable; in fact, Piræus was considered by its great constructor, Themistocles, as more indispensable to the Athenians than Athens itself. It was agreed that they should become friends and allies of Cassander; that they should have full enjoyment of their city, with the port Piræus, their ships and revenues; that the exiles and deported citizens should be readmitted; that the political franchise should for the future be enjoyed by all citizens who possessed one thousand drachmæ of property and upwards; that Cassander should hold Munychia with a governor and garrison, until the war against Polysperchon was brought to a close; and that he should also name some one Athenian citizen, in whose hands the supreme government of the city should be vested. Cassander named Demetrius the Phalerean (*i.e.*, an Athenian of the deme Phalerum), one of the colleagues of Phocion.

[318-311 B.C.]

This convention restored substantially at Athens the Antipatrian government; yet without the severities which had marked its original establishment, and with some modifications in various ways. It made Cassander virtually master of the city (as Antipater had been before him), by means of his governing nominee, upheld by the garrison, and by the fortification of Munychia; which had now been greatly enlarged and strengthened, holding a practical command over Piræus, though that port was nominally relinquished to the Athenians. But there was no slaughter of orators, no expulsion of citizens; moreover, even the minimum of one thousand drachmæ, fixed for the political franchise, though excluding the multitude, must have been felt as an improvement compared with the higher limit of two thousand drachmæ prescribed by Antipater. Cassander was not, like his father, at the head of an overwhelming force, master of Greece. He had Polysperchon in the field against him with a rival army and an established ascendancy in many of the Grecian cities; it was therefore his interest to abstain from measures of obvious harshness towards the Athenian people.^b

HELLAS AT PEACE

Subsequent events, in Greece itself first of all, offer sufficient explanation of what the Peace of 311 meant, so far as the freedom of the Grecian states was concerned. And yet it appears the old magic of the word did not cease to delude the mind and inflame the heart—for did not that word comprehend everything they thought they now lacked and had once enjoyed?

Free their city republics could yet certainly be, or become—free after a certain fashion; but independent, scarce one of them. Powers far superior stood round on every side; and although full of active men ready to be hired for fighting, these little states were too poor to bring up considerable armies, too jealous and bitter about one another to make a reliable alliance, and lastly the public spirit of their citizens was too decayed to permit any possible hope of a radically better state of things. Their day was over. Only the forms of a great monarchy could have held together this restless life which was fretting itself away; but whatever attempt had been made in this direction had taken no root among a people who were entirely separatist, and whose ideas of citizenship never went beyond the limits of their various cities. The very qualities that so peculiarly fitted the Greek spirit to serve as the fermenting leaven that should work through the peoples of Asia and forward their development, incapacitated it for the work of retaining its independent politics and keeping pace with the new developments of the time.

The situation of Sparta in these times is a strange one. The laws of Lycurgus and the old forms still linger there, but the old spirit has gone out, even to the last trace. It is a reign of the basest immorality. The citizens have dwindled to a few hundreds, the constitution of Lycurgus, formally observed, is a lie. The narrower the intellectual circle in which thought may move, the cruder must be the notions that obtain. Literature and science, the comfort and hope of the rest of Greece, were still, even to this day, proscribed in Sparta. Sparta had no other interest in the situation except that in her dominion was the universal recruiting ground for all parties—the peninsula of Tænarus—and distinguished Spartans were always glad to take the field as mercenaries. Even the son of the aged king Cleomenes II, Acrotatus, led a mercenary army to Tarentum and Sicily in 315, revolting those in whose pay he fought by his bloodthirsty savagery and his

unnatural passions. He came home to Sparta dishonoured, and died before he could inherit from his father.

At the death of Cleomenes (309), Cleonymus, a worthy brother to Acrotatus in dissoluteness and arrogance, demanded the kingdom; the Gerousia decided in favour of the young son of Acrotatus, Arens, and after a few years Cleonymus entered the service of Tarentum with a force of mercenaries, to bring the name of Sparta into ignominy by behaving even worse than his brother. At home the power of the kings, since the state no longer existed for its business of war, was as good as gone. The ephorate ruled as an oligarchy, and the oligarchy wanted nothing but quiet and pleasure, wrapped up in the dead laws of Lycurgus; nothing was further from their thoughts than the idea of winning again their old hegemony, at least in the Peloponnese—an idea which might now have been justified by the distraction of Greece and the strife of parties that was bursting afresh into flames.

ATHENS UNDER DEMETRIUS; SPARTA BEHIND WALLS

Athens affords us the most vivid glimpse into this unhappy time. How often had the ruling party and the policy of the city changed since the battle of Chæronea. At last in the autumn of 318, after the victory of Cassander, the state was given a form which was anything but a democracy. The man whom the people chose, and Cassander confirmed, as state administrator, was Demetrius, the son of Phanostratus of Phalerus. He had grown up in the house of Timotheus and had been educated in science and for a political life by Theophrastus. He was a man as talented as he was vain, as versatile in the realm of letters as he was politically characterless—for the rest, a man of the world and its pleasures, who fell on his feet wherever he was.

It may be that in his early years he had lived like a philosopher, that his table was laid very frugally, "only with olives in vinegar and cheese from the islands." And then too, when he became master of the state he showed himself, according to some, a humane, clear-sighted, excellent statesman; while others declare that he spent but a small proportion of the city's income (which with subsidies from Egypt and Macedonia he had raised to twelve hundred talents) in administration and in keeping the city well prepared for war; the rest went partly in public festivities and splendour, and partly in his own riotous and dissolute living. He that would pose in his ordinances as a reformer of Athenian morals, corrupted morals by his more than doubtful example. Every day, it was said, he gave splendid dinners to which a great number of guests were always invited; in his expenditure on his table he surpassed even the Macedonians, in his elegance he outdid Cyprians and Phœnicians; spikenard and myrrh were sprinkled for perfume, the floor was strewn with fragrant, costly carpets and paintings decorated the rooms; he kept so extravagant, so luxurious, a table, that his cook, who had what was left over, was able to buy three properties in two years out of the profits he made by his sales. Demetrius spent the greatest care upon his choice of dress, he dyed his hair fair, painted his face, anointed his head with precious oils; he always showed a smiling countenance, he wanted to please every one.

The most dainty and unbridled wantonness side by side with that subtle, gracious, and witty culture, which has ever since been described by the epithet Attic—both are characteristic of the life of Athens in those days. It was the fashion to attend the schools of philosophy.

[318-317 B.C.]

Such words as home, chastity, modesty, were no longer heard in the Athens of that time, or they were only words. Life had all become phrases and epigrams, ostentation and occupied idleness. Athens distributed flattery and entertainment to the mighty ones of the earth, and permitted herself to receive in return their gifts and gratuities. She grew more servile as she grew more oligarchic. She played as a state the rôle of parasite to kings and such as held power, a sponging flatterer not at all ashamed to buy admiration and pleasures at the price of dignity. There were only two things her people were afraid of; they were afraid of being bored, and they were afraid of being ridiculous—and there were rich occasions for being both. Religion had disappeared, and with the indifference of enlightenment superstition came in—magic witchcraft, astrology. Moral conduct, out of an old habit (for morality like the laws had been reasoned away), was theoretically handled in the schools and made a theme for debate and literary duels. The two standard philosophies of the next centuries, the Stoic and the Epicurean, were evolving in Athens at this period.

It was, of course, a proud thing for Demetrius that the city was much and profitably frequented. Trade itself was probably livelier in Athens during these years than at any other time and rivalled that of Rhodes, Byzantium, and Alexandria. According to a census which was probably undertaken during the year Demetrius was archon (309), the population of Attica amounted to 21,000 citizens, 10,000 strangers, 400,000 slaves—certainly a great number of inhabitants for a territory of little more than forty square miles.^c

The acquisition of Athens by Cassander, followed up by his capture of Panactum and Salamis, and seconded by his moderation towards the Athenians, procured for him considerable support in Peloponnesus, whither he proceeded with his army. Many of the cities, intimidated or persuaded, joined him and deserted Polysperchon; while the Spartans, now feeling for the first time their defenceless condition, thought it prudent to surround their city with walls. This fact, among many others contemporaneous, testifies emphatically how the characteristic sentiments of the Hellenic autonomous world were now dying out everywhere. The maintenance of Sparta as an unwallèd city was one of the deepest and most cherished of the Lycurgean traditions; a standing proof of the fearless bearing and self-confidence of the Spartans against dangers from without. The erection of the walls showed their own conviction, but too well borne out by the real circumstances around them, that the pressure of the foreigner had become so overwhelming as hardly to leave them even safety at home.



GRECIAN HEAD-DRESSES.

THE LAST ACTS OF OLYMPIAS' POWER

The warfare between Cassander and Polysperchon became now embittered by a feud among the members of the Macedonian imperial family. King Philip Arrhidaeus and his wife Eurydice, alarmed and indignant at the restoration of Olympias, which Polysperchon was projecting, solicited aid from Cassander, and tried to place the force in Macedonia at his disposal. In this however they failed.

Olympias, assisted not only by Polysperchon, but by the Epirot prince Æacides, made her entry into Macedonia out of Epirus, apparently in the autumn of 317 B.C. She brought with her Roxane and her child—the widow and son of Alexander the Great. The Macedonian soldiers, assembled by Philip Arrhidaeus and Eurydice to resist her, were so overawed by her name and the recollection of Alexander, that they refused to fight, and thus insured to her an easy victory. Philip and Eurydice became her prisoners; the former she caused to be slain; to the latter she offered only an option between the sword, the halter, and poison. The old queen next proceeded to satiate her revenge against the family of Antipater. One hundred leading Macedonians, friends of Cassander, were put to death, together with his brother Nicanor; while the sepulchre of his deceased brother Iollas, accused of having poisoned Alexander the Great, was broken up.

During the winter, Olympias remained thus completely predominant in Macedonia; where her position seemed strong, since her allies the Ætolians were masters of the pass at Thermopylae, while Cassander was kept employed in Peloponnesus by the force under Alexander, son of Polysperchon. But Cassander, disengaging himself from these embarrassments, and eluding Thermopylae by a maritime transit to Thessaly, seized the Perrhaebian passes before they had been put under guard, and entered Macedonia without resistance. Olympias, having no army competent to meet him in the field, was forced to shut herself up in the maritime fortress of Pydna, with Roxane, the child Alexander, and Thessalonice daughter of her late husband Philip, son of Amyntas.

Here Cassander blocked her up for several months by sea as well as by land, and succeeded in defeating all the efforts of Polysperchon and Æacides to relieve her. In the spring of the ensuing year (316 B.C.), she was forced by intolerable famine to surrender. Cassander promised her nothing more than personal safety, requiring from her the surrender of the two great fortresses, Pella and Amphipolis, which made him master of Macedonia. Presently however the relatives of those numerous victims, who had perished by order of Olympias, were encouraged by Cassander to demand her life in retribution. They found little difficulty in obtaining a verdict of condemnation against her from what was called a Macedonian assembly. Nevertheless, such was the sentiment of awe and reverence connected with her name, that no one except these injured men themselves could be found to execute the sentence. She died with a courage worthy of her rank and domineering character. Cassander took Thessalonice to wife, confined Roxane with the child Alexander in the fortress of Amphipolis—where (after a certain interval) he caused both of them to be slain.

While Cassander was thus master of Macedonia, and while the imperial family were disappearing from the scene in that country, the defeat and death of Eumenes (which happened nearly at the same time as the capture of Olympias) removed the last faithful partisan of that family in Asia. But at the same time it left in the hands of Antigonos such overwhelming

[317-315 B.C.]

preponderance throughout Asia, that he aspired to become vicar and master of the entire Alexandrine empire, as well as to avenge upon Cassander the extirpation of the regal family. His power appeared indeed so formidable that Cassander of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Ptolemy of Egypt, and Seleucus of Babylonia, entered into a convention, which gradually ripened into an active alliance against him.

During the struggles between these powerful princes, Greece appears simply as a group of subject cities, held, garrisoned, grasped at, or coveted, by all of them. Polysperchon, abandoning all hopes in Macedonia after the death of Olympias, had been forced to take refuge among the Ætolians, leaving his son Alexander to make the best struggle that he could in Peloponnesus; so that Cassander was now decidedly preponderant throughout the Hellenic regions. After fixing himself on the throne of Macedonia, he perpetuated his own name by founding, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene and near the site where Potidaea had stood, the new city of Cassandrea.

Passing through Boeotia, he undertook the task of restoring the city of Thebes, which had been destroyed twenty years previously by Alexander the Great, and had ever since existed only as a military post on the ancient citadel called Cadmea. The other Boeotian towns, to whom the old Theban territory had been assigned, were persuaded or constrained to relinquish it; and Cassander invited from all parts of Greece the Theban exiles or their descendants. From sympathy with these exiles, and also with the ancient celebrity of the city, many Greeks, even from Italy and Sicily, contributed to the restoration. The Athenians, now administered by Demetrius Phalereus under Cassander's supremacy, were particularly forward in the work; the Messenians and Megalopolitans, whose ancestors had owed so much to the Theban Epaminondas, lent strenuous aid. Thebes was re-established in the original area which it had occupied before Alexander's siege; and was held by a Cassandrian garrison in the Cadmea, destined for the mastery of Boeotia and Greece.

After some stay at Thebes, Cassander advanced towards Peloponnesus. Alexander (son of Polysperchon) having fortified the isthmus, he was forced to embark his troops with his elephants at Megara, and cross over the Saronic Gulf to Epidaurus. He dispossessed Alexander of Argos, of Messenia, and even of his position on the isthmus, where he left a powerful detachment, and then returned to Macedonia. His increasing power raised both apprehension and hatred in the bosom of Antigonus, who endeavoured to come to terms with him, but in vain. Cassander preferred the alliance with Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus—against Antigonus, who was now master of nearly the whole of Asia, inspiring common dread to all of them. Accordingly, from Asia to Peloponnesus, with arms and money Antigonus despatched the Milesian Aristodemus to strengthen Alexander against Cassander; whom he further denounced as an enemy of the Macedonian name, because he had slain Olympias, imprisoned the other members of the regal family, and re-established the Olynthian exiles. He caused the absent Cassander to be condemned by what was called a Macedonian assembly, upon these and other charges.

Antigonus further proclaimed, by the voice of this assembly, that all the Greeks should be free, self-governing, and exempt from garrisons or military occupation. It was expected that these brilliant promises would enlist partisans in Greece against Cassander; accordingly Ptolemy, ruler of Egypt, one of the enemies of Antigonus, thought fit to issue similar proclamations a

few months afterwards, tendering to the Greeks the same boon from himself. These promises, neither executed nor intended to be executed, by either of the kings, appear to have produced little or no effect upon the Greeks.

The arrival of Aristodemus in Peloponnesus had re-animated the party of Alexander (son of Polysperchon), against whom Cassander was again obliged to bring his full forces from Macedonia. Though successful against Alexander at Argos, Orchomenos, and other places, Cassander was not able to crush him, and presently thought it prudent to gain him over. He offered to him the separate government of Peloponnesus, though in subordination to himself; Alexander accepted the offer—becoming Cassander's ally—and carried on war, jointly with him, against Aristodemus, with varying success, until he was presently assassinated by some private enemies. Nevertheless his widow Cratesipolis, a woman of courage and energy, still maintained herself in considerable force at Sicyon.

Cassander's most obstinate enemies were the Ætolians, of whom we now first hear formal mention as a substantive confederacy. These Ætolians became the allies of Antigonius as they had been before of Polysperchon, extending their predatory ravages even as far as Attica. Protected against foreign garrisons, partly by their rude and fierce habits, partly by their mountainous territory, they were almost the only Greeks who could still be called free. Cassander tried to keep them in check through their neighbours the Acarnanians, whom he induced to adopt a more concentrated habit of residence, consolidating their numerous petty townships into a few considerable towns,—Stratus, Sauria, and Agrinium,—convenient posts for Macedonian garrisons. He also made himself master of Leucas, Apollonia, and Epidamnus, defeating the Illyrian king Glaucias, so that his dominion now extended across from the Thermaic to the Adriatic Gulf. His general Philippus gained two important victories over the Ætolians and Epirots, forcing the former to relinquish some of their most accessible towns.

The power of Antigonius in Asia underwent a material diminution, by the successful and permanent establishment which Seleucus now acquired in Babylonia; from which event the era of the succeeding Seleucidæ takes its origin. In Greece, however, Antigonius gained ground on Cassander. He sent thither his nephew Ptolemy with a large force to liberate the Greeks, or in other words, to expel the Cassandrian garrisons; while he at the same time distracted Cassander's attention by threatening to cross the Hellespont and invade Macedonia. This Ptolemy (not the Egyptian) expelled the soldiers of Cassander from Eubœa, Bœotia, and Phocis; having taken Chalcis, Oropus, Eretria, and Carystus, he entered Attica and presented himself before Athens. So much disposition to treat with him was manifested in the city, that Demetrius the Phalerean was obliged to gain time by pretending to open negotiations with Antigonius, while Ptolemy withdrew from Attica. Nearly at the same epoch, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Leucas, found means, assisted by an armament from Corcyra, to drive out Cassander's garrisons, and to escape from his dominion. The affairs of Antigonius were now prospering in Greece, but they were much thrown back by the discontent and treachery of his admiral Telesphorus, who seized Elis and even plundered the sacred treasures of Olympia. Ptolemy presently put him down, and restored these treasures to the god.

In the ensuing year, a convention was concluded between Antigonius, on one side, and Cassander, Ptolemy (the Egyptian) and Lysimachus, on the other, whereby the supreme command in Macedonia was guaranteed to Cassander, until the maturity of Alexander son of Roxane; Thrace being at

[312-308 B.C.]

the same time assured to Lysimachus, Egypt to Ptolemy, and the whole of Asia to Antigonus. It was at the same time covenanted by all, that the Hellenic cities should be free. Towards the execution of this last clause, however, nothing was actually done. Nor does it appear that the treaty had any other effect, except to inspire Cassander with increased jealousy about Roxane and her child; both of whom (as has been already stated) he caused to be secretly assassinated soon afterwards, by the governor Glaucias, in the fortress of Amphipolis, where they had been confined. The forces of Antigonus, under his general Ptolemy, still remained in Greece. But this general presently (310 B.C.) revolted from Antigonus, and placed them in co-operation with Cassander; while Ptolemy of Egypt, accusing Antigonus of having contravened the treaty by garrisoning various Grecian cities, renewed the war and the triple alliance against him.

Polysperchon — who had hitherto maintained a local dominion over various parts of Peloponnesus, with a military force distributed in Messene and other towns — was now encouraged by Antigonus to espouse the cause of Heracles (son of Alexander by Barsine), and to place him on the throne of Macedonia in opposition to Cassander. This young prince Heracles now seventeen years of age, was sent to Greece from Pergamus in Asia, and his pretensions to the throne were assisted not only by a considerable party in Macedonia itself, but also by the Ætolians. Polysperchon invaded Macedonia, with favourable prospects of establishing the young prince; yet he thought it advantageous to accept treacherous propositions from Cassander, who offered to him partnership in the sovereignty of Macedonia, with an independent army and dominion in Peloponnesus. Polysperchon, tempted by these offers, assassinated the young prince Heracles, and withdrew his army towards Peloponnesus. But he found such unexpected opposition, in his march through Bœotia, from Bœotians and Peloponnesians, that he was forced to take up his winter quarters in Loeris (309 B.C.). From this time forward, as far as we can make out, he commanded in southern Greece as subordinate ally or partner of Cassander.

The assassination of Heracles was speedily followed by that of Cleopatra, sister of Alexander the Great, and daughter of Philip and Olympias. She had been for some time at Sardis, nominally at liberty, yet under watch by the governor, who received his orders from Antigonus; she was now preparing to quit that place, for the purpose of joining Ptolemy in Egypt, and of becoming his wife. She had been invoked as auxiliary, or courted in marriage, by several of the great Macedonian chiefs, without any result. Now, however, Antigonus, afraid of the influence which her name might throw into the scale of his rival Ptolemy, caused her to be secretly murdered as she was preparing for her departure; throwing the blame of the deed on some of her women, whom he punished with death.

All the relatives of Alexander the Great (except Thessalonice wife of Cassander, daughter of Philip by a Thessalian mistress) thus successively perished, and all by the orders of one or other among his principal officers. The imperial family, with the prestige of its name thus came to an end.

PTOLEMY IN GREECE

Ptolemy of Egypt now set sail for Greece with a powerful armament. He acquired possession of the important cities — Sicyon and Corinth — which were handed over to him by Cratesipolis, widow of Alexander son of

Polysperchon. He then made known by proclamation his purpose as a liberator, inviting aid from the Peloponnesian cities themselves against the garrisons of Cassander. From some he received encouraging answers and promises; but none of them made any movement, or seconded him by armed demonstrations. He thought it prudent therefore to conclude a truce with Cassander and retire from Greece, leaving however secure garrisons in Sicyon and Corinth. The Grecian cities had now become tame and passive. Feeling their own incapacity of self-defence, and averse to auxiliary efforts — which brought upon them enmity without any prospect of advantage — they awaited only the turns of foreign interference and the behests of the potentates around them.

The Grecian ascendancy of Cassander, however, was in the following year exposed to a graver shock than it had ever yet encountered, by the sudden invasion of Demetrius called Poliorcetes, son of Antigonus. This young prince, sailing from Ephesus with a formidable armament, contrived to conceal his purposes so closely, that he actually entered the harbour of Piræus (on the 26th of the month Thargelion — May) without expectation, or resistance from any one; his fleet being mistaken for the fleet of the Egyptian Ptolemy. The Phalerean Demetrius, taken unawares, and attempting too late to guard the harbour, found himself compelled to leave it in possession of the enemy, and to retire within the walls of Athens; while Dionysius, the Cassandrian governor, maintained himself with his garrison in Munychia, yet without any army competent to meet the invaders in the field. This accomplished Phalerean, who had administered for ten years as the viceroy and with the force of Cassander, now felt his position and influence at Athens overthrown, and even his personal safety endangered. He obtained permission to retire to Thebes, from whence he passed over soon after to Ptolemy in Egypt. The Athenians in the city declared in favour of Demetrius Poliorcetes; who however refused to enter the walls until he should have besieged and captured Munychia, as well as Megara, with their Cassandrian garrisons. In a short time he accomplished both these objects. Indeed energy, skill, and effective use of engines in besieging fortified places, were among the most conspicuous features in his character; procuring for him the surname whereby he is known to history. He proclaimed the Megarians free, levelling to the ground the fortifications of Munychia, as an earnest to the Athenians that they should be relieved for the future from all foreign garrison.

ATHENS PASSIVE AND SERVILE


After these successes, Demetrius Poliorcetes made his triumphant entry into Athens. He announced to the people, in formal assembly, that they were now again a free democracy, liberated from all dominion either of soldiers from abroad or oligarchs at home. He also promised them a further boon from his father Antigonus and himself — 150,000 medimni of corn for distribution, and ship-timber in quantity sufficient for constructing one hundred triremes. Both these announcements were received with grateful exultation. The feelings of the people were testified not merely in votes of thanks and admiration towards the young conqueror, but in effusions of unmeasured and exorbitant flattery. Stratocles (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and

[307 B.C.]

adulation. Antigonos and Demetrius were proclaimed to be not only kings, but gods and saviours; a high priest of these saviours was to be annually chosen, after whom each successive year was to be named (instead of being named after the first of the nine archons, as had hitherto been the custom), and the dates of decrees and contracts commemorated; the month Munychion was re-named as Demetrian; two new tribes, to be called Antigonias and Demetrias, were constituted in addition to the preceding ten; the annual senate was appointed to consist of six hundred members instead of five hundred; the portraits and exploits of Antigonos and Demetrius were to be woven, along with those of Zeus and Athene, into the splendid and voluminous robe periodically carried in procession, as an offering at the Panathenaic festival; the spot of ground where Demetrius had alighted from his chariot, was consecrated with an altar erected in honour of Demetrius Catábates or the Descender. Several other similar votes were passed, recognising, and worshipping as gods, the saviours Antigonos and Demetrius. Nay, we are told that temples or altars were voted to Phila-Aphrodite, in honour of Phila wife of Demetrius; and a like compliment was paid to his two mistresses, Leæna and Lamia. Altars are said to have been also dedicated to Adimantus and others, his convivial companions or flatterers. At the same time the numerous statues which had been erected in honour of the Phalerean Demetrius during his decennial government, were overthrown, and some of them even turned to ignoble purposes, in order to cast greater scorn upon the past ruler. The demonstrations of servile flattery at Athens, towards Demetrius Poliorcetes, were in fact so extravagantly overdone, that he himself is said to have been disgusted with them, and to have expressed contempt for these degenerate Athenians of his own time.

The most fulsome votes of adulation proposed in honour of Demetrius Poliorcetes by his partisans, though perhaps disapproved by many, would hardly find a single pronounced opponent. One man, however, there was, who ventured to oppose several of the votes—the nephew of Demosthenes, Demochares; who deserves to be commemorated as the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship. We know only that such were his general politics, and that his opposition to the obsequious rhetor Stratocles ended in banishment, four years afterwards. He appears to have acted as a general during this period, and to have been active in strengthening the fortifications and military equipment of the city.

The altered politics of Athens were manifested by impeachment against Demetrius Phalereus and other leading partisans of the late Cassandrian government. He and many others had already gone into voluntary exile; when their trials came on, they were not forthcoming, and all were condemned to death. But all those who remained, and presented themselves for trial, were acquitted; so little was there of reactionary violence on this occasion.



GREEK JUG

The friendship of this obnoxious Phalerean, and of Cassander also, towards the philosopher Theophrastus, seems to have been one main cause which occasioned the enactment of a restrictive law against the liberty of philosophising. It was decreed, on the proposition of a citizen named Sophocles, that no philosopher should be allowed to open a school or teach, except under special sanction obtained from a vote of the senate and people. Such was the disgust and apprehension occasioned by the new restriction, that all the philosophers with one accord left Athens. This spirited protest, against authoritative restriction on the liberty of philosophy and teaching,

found responsive sympathy among the Athenians. The celebrity of the schools and professors was in fact the only characteristic mark of dignity still remaining to them — when their power had become extinct, and when even their independence and free constitution had degenerated into a mere name.

Athenian envoys were despatched to Antigonus in Asia, to testify the gratitude of the people, and communicate the recent complimentary votes. Antigonus not only received them graciously, but sent to Athens, according to the promise made by his son, a large present of 150,000 medimni of wheat, with timber sufficient for one hundred ships. He at the same time directed Demetrius to convene at Athens a synod of deputies from the allied Grecian cities, where resolutions might be taken for the common interests of Greece. It was his interest at this moment to raise up a temporary self-sustaining authority in Greece, for the purpose of upholding the alliance with himself, during the absence of Demetrius — whom he was compelled to summon into Asia with his army, requiring his services for the war against Ptolemy in Syria and Cyprus.



CERES

(From a vase)

The following three years were spent by Demetrius: (1) In victorious operations near Cyprus, defeating Ptolemy and making himself master of that island; after which Antigonus and Demetrius assumed the title of kings, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, in Egypt, by Lysimachus, in Thrace, and by Seleucus in Babylonia, Mesopotamia, and Syria; thus abolishing even the titular remembrance of Alexander's family. (2) In an unsuccessful invasion of Egypt by land and sea, repulsed with great loss. (3) In the siege of Rhodes. The brave and intelligent citizens of this island resisted for more than a year the most strenuous attacks and the most formidable siege-equipments of Demetrius Poliorcetes. All their efforts however would have been vain had they not been assisted by large reinforcements and supplies from Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander. Such are the conditions under which alone even the most resolute and intelligent Greeks can now retain their circumscribed sphere of autonomy. The siege

[304-302 B.C.]

was at length terminated by a compromise; the Rhodians submitted to enrol themselves as allies of Demetrius, yet under proviso not to act against Ptolemy. Towards the latter they carried their grateful devotion so far as to erect a temple to him, called the Ptolemaum, and to worship him (under the sanction of the oracle of Ammon) as a god. Amidst the rocks and shoals through which Grecian cities were now condemned to steer, menaced on every side by kings more powerful than themselves, and afterwards by the giant republic of Rome—the Rhodians conducted their political affairs with greater prudence and dignity than any other Grecian city.

Shortly after the departure of Demetrius from Greece to Cyprus, Cassander and Polysperchon renewed the war in Peloponnesus and its neighbourhood. We make out no particulars respecting this war. The Ætolians were in hostility with Athens, and committed annoying depredations. The fleet of Athens, repaired or increased by the timber received from Antigonus, was made to furnish thirty quadriremes to assist Demetrius in Cyprus, and was employed in certain operations near the island of Amorgos, wherein it suffered defeat. But we can discover little respecting the course of the war, except that Cassander gained ground upon the Athenians, and that about the beginning of 303 B.C., he was blockading or threatening to blockade Athens. The Athenians invoked the aid of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who, having recently concluded an accommodation with the Rhodians, came again across from Asia, with a powerful fleet and army, to Aulis in Boeotia. He was received at Athens with demonstrations of honour equal or superior to those which had marked his previous visit. He seems to have passed a year and a half, partly at Athens, partly in military operations carried successfully over many parts of Greece. He celebrated, as president, the great festival of the *Heræa* at Argos; on which occasion he married Didamia, sister of Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus. He prevailed on the Sicyonians to transfer to a short distance the site of their city, conferring upon the new city the name of Demetrias. At a Grecian synod, convened in Corinth under his own letters of invitation, he received by acclamation the appointment of leader or emperor of the Greeks, as it had been conferred on Philip and Alexander. He even extended his attacks as far as Leucas and Coreyra. The greater part of Greece seems to have been either occupied by his garrisons, or enlisted among his subordinates.

So much was Cassander intimidated by these successes, that he sent envoys to Asia, soliciting peace from Antigonus; who, however, elate and full of arrogance, refused to listen to any terms short of surrender at discretion. Cassander, thus driven to despair, renewed his applications to Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus. All these princes felt equally menaced by the power and dispositions of Antigonus, and all resolved upon an energetic combination to put him down.

SUCCESS OF DEMETRIUS IN GREECE

After uninterrupted prosperity in Greece, throughout the summer of 302 B.C., Demetrius returned from Leucas to Athens, about the month of September, near the time of the Eleusinian mysteries. He was welcomed by festive processions, hymns, pæans, choric dances, and bacchanalian odes of joyous congratulation. One of these hymns is preserved, sung by a chorus of *ithyphalli*—masked revellers, with their heads and arms encircled by wreaths—clothed in white tunics, and in feminine garments.

Effusions such as these, while displaying unmeasured idolatry and subservience towards Demetrius, are yet more remarkable, as betraying a loss of force, a senility, and a consciousness of defenceless and degraded position, such as we are astonished to find publicly proclaimed at Athens. It is not only against the foreign potentates that the Athenians avow themselves incapable of self-defence, but even against the incursions of the Ætolians, — Greeks like themselves, though warlike, rude, and restless. When such were the feelings of a people — once the most daring, confident, and organising, and still the most intelligent, in Greece, we may see that the history of the Greeks as a separate nation or race is reaching its close; and that from henceforward they must become merged in one or other of the stronger currents that surround them.

After his past successes, Demetrius passed some months in enjoyment and luxury at Athens. He was lodged in the Parthenon, being considered as the guest of the goddess Athene. But his dissolute habits provoked the louder comments, from their being indulged in such a domicile; while the violences which he offered to beautiful youths of good family led to various scenes truly tragical. The subservient manifestations of the Athenians towards him, however, continued unabated. It is even affirmed that, in order to compensate for something which he had taken amiss, they passed a formal decree, on the proposition of Stratocles, declaring that everything which Demetrius might command was holy in regard to the gods, and just in regard to men. The banishment of Demochares is said to have been brought on by his sarcastic comments upon this decree. In the month Munychion (April) Demetrius mustered his forces and his Grecian allies for a march into Thessaly against Cassander; but before his departure, he was anxious to be initiated in the Eleusinian mysteries. It was however not the regular time for this ceremony; the Lesser Mysteries being celebrated in February, the Greater in September. The Athenians overruled the difficulty by passing a special vote, enabling him to be initiated at once, and to receive in immediate succession the preparatory and the final initiation, between which ceremonies a year of interval was habitually required. Accordingly, he placed himself disarmed in the hands of the priests, and received both first and second initiation in the month of April, immediately before his departure from Athens.

BATTLE OF IPSUS

Demetrius conducted into Thessaly an army of fifty-six thousand men: of whom twenty-five thousand were Grecian allies — so extensive was his sway at this moment over the Grecian cities. But after two or three months of hostilities, partially successful, against Cassander, he was summoned into Asia by Antigonus to assist in meeting the formidable army of the allies — Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and Cassander. Before retiring from Greece, Demetrius concluded a truce with Cassander, whereby it was stipulated that the Grecian cities, both in Europe and Asia, should be permanently autonomous and free from garrison or control. This stipulation served only as an honourable pretext for leaving Greece; Demetrius had little expectation that it would be observed. In the ensuing spring was fought the decisive battle of Ipsus in Phrygia (301 B.C.), by Antigonus and Demetrius, against Ptolemy, Seleucus, and Lysimachus; with a large army and many elephants on both sides. Antigonus, completely defeated,

[301-294 B.C.]

was slain; his age was more than eighty years. His Asiatic dominion was broken up, chiefly to the profit of Seleucus, whose dynasty became from henceforward ascendant, from the coast of Syria eastward to the Caspian Gates and Parthia; sometimes, though imperfectly, farther eastward, nearly to the Indus.

The effects of the battle of Ipsus were speedily felt in Greece. The Athenians passed a decree proclaiming themselves neutral, and excluding both the belligerent parties from Attica. Demetrius, retiring with the remnant of his defeated army, and embarking at Ephesus to sail to Athens, was met on the voyage by Athenian envoys, who respectfully acquainted him that he would not be admitted. At the same time, his wife Didamia, whom he had left at Athens, was sent away by the Athenians under an honourable escort to Megara, while some ships of war which he had left in the Piræus were also restored to him. Demetrius, indignant at this unexpected defection of a city which had recently heaped upon him such fulsome adulation, was still further mortified by the loss of most of his other possessions in Greece. His garrisons were for the most part expelled, and the cities passed into Cassandrian keeping or dominion. His fortunes were indeed partially restored by concluding a peace with Seleucus, who married his daughter. This alliance withdrew Demetrius to Syria, while Greece appears to have fallen more and more under the Cassandrian parties. It was one of these partisans, Lachares, who, seconded by Cassander's soldiers, acquired a despotism at Athens such as had been possessed by the Phalærean Demetrius, but employed in a manner far more cruel and oppressive.

Various exiles from his tyranny invited Demetrius Poliorcetes, who passed over again from Asia into Greece, recovered portions of Peloponnesus, and laid siege to Athens. He blocked up the city by sea and land, so that the pressure of famine presently became intolerable. Lachares having made his escape, the people opened their gates to Demetrius, not without great fear of the treatment awaiting them. But he behaved with forbearance, and even with generosity. He spared them all, supplied them with a large donation of corn, and contented himself with taking military occupation of the city, naming his own friends as magistrates. He put garrisons, however, not only into Piræus and Munychia, but also into the hill called Museum, a part of the walled circle of Athens itself (298 B.C.).

While Demetrius was thus strengthening himself in Greece, he lost all his footing both in Cyprus, Syria, and Cilicia, which passed into the hands of Ptolemy and Seleucus. New prospects however were opened to him in Macedonia by the death of Cassander (his brother-in-law, brother of his wife Phila) and the family feuds supervening thereupon. Philippus, eldest son of Cassander, succeeded his father, but died of sickness after something more than a year. Between the two remaining sons, Antipater and Alexander, a sanguinary hostility broke out. Antipater slew his mother Thesalonice, and threatened the life of his brother, who in his turn invited aid both from Demetrius and from the Epirotic king Pyrrhus. Pyrrhus being ready first, marched into Macedonia, and expelled Antipater; receiving as his recompense the territory called Tymphæa (between Epirus and Macedonia) together with Acarnania, Amphiloehia, and the town of Ambracia, which became henceforward his chief city and residence. Antipater sought shelter in Thrace with his father-in-law Lysimachus; by whose order, however, he was presently slain. Demetrius, occupied with other matters, was more tardy in obeying the summons; but, on entering into Macedonia, he found himself strong enough to dispossess and kill Alexander (who had

indeed invited him, but is said to have laid a train for assassinating him), and seized the Macedonian crown; not without the assent of a considerable party, to whom the name and the deeds of Cassander and his sons were alike odious.

Demetrius became thus master of Macedonia, together with the greater part of Greece, including Athens, Megara, and much of Peloponnesus. He undertook an expedition into Bœotia, for the purpose of conquering Thebes; in which attempt he succeeded, not without a double siege of that city. But Greece as a whole was managed by Antigonus (afterwards called Antigonus Gonatas) son of Demetrius, who maintained his supremacy unshaken during all his father's life-time; even though Demetrius was deprived of Macedonia by the temporary combination of Lysimachus with Pyrrhus, and afterwards remained (until his death in 283 B.C.) a captive in the hands of Seleucus. After a brief possession of the crown of Macedonia successively by Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus, Meleager, Antipater, and Sosthenes—Antigonus Gonatas regained it in 277 B.C. His descendants, the Antigonid kings, maintained it until the battle of Pydna in 168 B.C.; when Perseus, the last of them, was overthrown, and his kingdom incorporated with the Roman conquests.

Of Greece during this period we can give no account, except that the greater number of its cities were in dependence upon Demetrius and his son Antigonus—either under occupation by Macedonian garrisons, or ruled by local despots who leaned on foreign mercenaries and Macedonian support. The spirit of the Greeks was broken, and their habits of combined sentiment and action had disappeared. The invasion of the Gauls indeed awakened them into a temporary union for the defence of Thermopylæ in 279 B.C. But this burst of spirit did not interrupt the continuance of the Macedonian dominion in Greece, which Antigonus Gonatas continued to hold throughout most of a long reign. He greatly extended the system begun by his predecessors, of isolating each Grecian city from alliances with other cities in its neighbourhood—planting in most of them local despots, and compressing the most important by means of garrisons. Among all Greeks, the Spartans and the Ætolians stood most free from foreign occupation, and were the least crippled in their power of self-action. The Achæan League too developed itself afterwards as a renovated sprout from the ruined tree of Grecian liberty, though never attaining to anything better than a feeble and puny life, nor capable of sustaining itself without foreign aid.^b

At this point Grote ends his immortal work and takes farewell of Grecian history in the following words:

“With this after-growth, or half-revival, I shall not meddle. It forms the Greece of Polybius, which that author treats, in my opinion justly, as having no history of its own, but as an appendage attached to some foreign centre and principal among its neighbours—Macedonia, Egypt, Syria, Rome. Each of these neighbours acted upon the destinies of Greece more powerfully than the Greeks themselves. The Greeks to whom these volumes have been devoted—those of Homer, Archilochus, Solon, Æschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Demosthenes—present as their most marked characteristic a loose aggregation of autonomous tribes or communities, acting and reacting freely among themselves, with little or no pressure from foreigners. The main interest of the narrative has consisted in the spontaneous grouping of the different Hellenic fractions, in the self-prompted co-operations and conflicts, the abortive attempts to bring about something like an effective federal organisation, or to maintain two permanent rival confederacies, the

energetic ambition and heroic endurance of men to whom Hellas was the entire political world. The freedom of Hellas, the life and soul of this history from its commencement, disappeared completely during the first years of Alexander's reign. After following to their tombs the generation of Greeks contemporary with him — men like Demosthenes and Phocion, born in a state of freedom — I have pursued the history into that gulf of Grecian nullity which marks the succeeding century; exhibiting sad evidence of the degrading servility, and suppliant king-worship, into which the countrymen of Aristides and Pericles had been driven, by their own conscious weakness under the overwhelming pressure from without.

"I cannot better complete that picture than by showing what the leading democratical citizen became, under the altered atmosphere which now bedimmed his city. Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, has been mentioned as one of the few distinguished Athenians in this last generation. He was more than once chosen to the highest public offices; he was conspicuous for his free speech, both as an orator and as an historian, in the face of powerful enemies; he remained throughout a long life faithfully attached to the democratical constitution, and was banished for a time by its opponents. In the year 280 B.C., he prevailed on the Athenians to erect a public monument, with a commemorative inscription, to his uncle Demosthenes. Seven or eight years afterwards, Demochares himself died, aged nearly eighty. His son Laches proposed and obtained a public decree, that a statue should be erected, with an annexed inscription, to his honour. We read in the decree a recital of the distinguished public services whereby Demochares merited this compliment from his countrymen. All that the proposer of the decree, his son and fellow-citizen, can find to recite, as ennobling the last half of the father's public life (since his return from exile), is as follows: (1) He contracted the public expenses, and introduced a more frugal management. (2) He undertook an embassy to King Lysimachus, from whom he obtained two presents for the people — one of thirty talents, the other of one hundred talents. (3) He proposed the vote for sending envoys to King Ptolemy in Egypt, from whom fifty talents were obtained for the people. (4) He went as envoy to Antipater, received from him twenty talents, and delivered them to the people at the Eleusinian festival.

"When such begging missions are the deeds for which Athens both employed and recompensed her most eminent citizens, an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close."^b

A kindred feeling seems to have actuated most of the other prominent historians of Greece, with the notable exception of Thirlwall. Yet from a slightly altered point of view, there is much of interest in the story of the later struggles of this wonderful people, against a seemingly predestined fate. Even were it not so, our present purpose, which regards Greece not as an isolated entity but as a part of the scheme of world history, requires that we should follow the tragic drama to its close."^c



CHAPTER LXII. THE EXPLOITS OF PYRRHUS

WE now approach that dramatic moment when Greek first met Roman in battle array. Into the tangled web of the history of this period there flashes the scarlet thread of the life of Pyrrhus of Epirus. Though a fuller account of his war against Italy must be deferred to the Roman history, it will be briefly sketched here, together with a short account of his country and his ancestors.^a

Epirus, in spite of its distance from the chief centres of Greek thought and action, and the fact that its inhabitants were hardly regarded as other than barbarians, exerted even at an early period no small influence on Greece, by means more especially of the oracle of Dodona. One of the earliest and most flourishing settlements of the Greeks proper in Epirus was the Corinthian colony of Ambracia, which gave its name to the neighbouring gulf. The happy results of the experiment appear to have tempted other Greek states to imitate the example, and Elatria, Bucheta, and Pandosia bore witness to the enterprise of the people of Elis. Phoenice, still so called, was the wealthiest of all the native cities of Epirus, and after the fall of the Molossian kingdom the centre of an Epirotic league.

The kings or rather chieftains of the Molossians, who ultimately extended their power over all Epirus, claimed to be descended from Pyrrhus, son of Achilles, who, according to the legend, settled in the country after the sack of Troy, and transmitted his kingdom to Molossus, his son by Andromache. The early history of the dynasty is very obscure; but Admetus, who lived in the fifth century B.C., has become famous for his hospitable reception of the banished Themistocles, in spite of the grudge that he must have harboured against the great Athenian, who had persuaded his countrymen to refuse the alliance tardily offered by the Molossian chief when their victory against the Persians was already secured. He was succeeded about 429 B.C. by his son or grandson, Tharymbas or Arymbas I, who being placed by a decree of the people under the guardianship of Sabylinthus, chief of the Atintanes, was educated at Athens, and thus became at a later date the introducer of a higher kind of civilisation among his subjects. Alcetas, the next king mentioned in history, was contemporary with Dionysius of Syracuse (about 385 B.C.) and was indebted to his assistance for the recovery of his throne. His son Arymbas II (who succeeded by the death of his brother Neoptolemus) ruled with prudence and equity, and gave encouragement to literature and the arts. To him Xenocrates of Chalcædon dedicated his four books on the art of governing; and it is specially mentioned that he bestowed great care on the education of his brother's children. Troas, one of his nieces, became his own wife; and Olympias, the other, was married

[ca. 360-288 B.C.]

to Philip of Macedon, and had the honour of giving birth to Alexander the Great. On the death of Arymbas, his nephew Alexander, the brother of Olympias, was put in possession of the throne by the assistance of Philip, who was afterwards assassinated on occasion of the marriage of the youthful king with Philip's daughter Cleopatra. Alexander was the first who bore the title of king of Epirus, and he raised the reputation of his country amongst foreign nations. His assistance having been sought by the Tarentines against the Samnites and Lucanians, he made a descent, 332 B.C., at Paestum, near the mouth of the river Silarus, and reduced several cities of the Lucani and Bruttii; but in a second attack upon Italy he was surrounded by the enemy, defeated, and slain, near the city Pandosia, in the Bruttian territory.

Æacides, the son of Arymbas II, succeeded Alexander, and espoused the cause of Olympias against Cassander; but he was dethroned by his own soldiers, and had hardly regained his position when he fell, 313 B.C., in battle against Philip, brother of Cassander. He had, by his wife Pthia, the celebrated Pyrrhus, and two daughters Didamia and Troas, of whom the former married Demetrius Poliorcetes. His brother Alcetas, who succeeded him, continued the war with Cassander till he was defeated; and he was ultimately put to death by his rebellious subjects, 295 B.C. The name of Pyrrhus, who next ascended the throne, gives to the history of his country an importance which it would otherwise never have possessed.

THE ANTECEDENTS OF PYRRHUS

Born about the year 318, and claiming descent from Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, connected also with the royal family of Macedonia through Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great, he became when a mere stripling king of the wild mountain tribes of Epirus, and learned how to fight battles in the school of Demetrius Poliorcetes and of his father Antigonus. He fought by their side in his seventeenth year at the memorable battle of Ipsus in Phrygia, in which they were decisively defeated by the combined armies of Seleucus and Lysimachus. Soon afterwards he was sent to the court of Ptolemy of Egypt at Alexandria as a pledge for the faithful carrying out of a treaty of alliance between Ptolemy and Demetrius, as his sister Didamia was the wife of the latter. Through Ptolemy, whose step-daughter Antigone he married, he was enabled to establish himself firmly on the throne of Epirus, and he became a formidable opponent to Demetrius, who was now king of Macedonia and the leading man in the Greek world.^e

Demetrius had not renounced the project of resuming his father's kingdom. He made immense preparations. The other kings renewed their league in which they included Pyrrhus, who had long been the friend of Demetrius but was now to become his rival. This rivalry was the more dangerous to Demetrius since he had made himself hated by his insolence. One day when, contrary to his custom, he had received all the petitions which were presented to him, he was seen to throw them into a river as he was crossing the bridge.

All the kings of that day made an endeavour to imitate Alexander, but it was said that Demetrius represented him as an actor on the stage, bowing his head to right and left, assuming majestic airs, adorning himself with a double diadem and a purple mantle on which he had caused the sun, the moon, and the stars to be embroidered in gold.

Pyrrhus, on the contrary, recalled Alexander by his fire and his boldness. He was the type of the soldier and the adventurer. He loved war for itself and despised all else. He came to the assistance of the Ætolians when they were attacked by Demetrius, but the two kings did not meet, having both missed their way. Whilst Demetrius ravaged Epirus, Pantarchus, one of his lieutenants, gave battle to Pyrrhus, and during the fight provoked him to single combat. Both were wounded, but Pyrrhus overthrew his adversary; the Epirots, excited by the courage of their king, carried the victory, and the Macedonians, having been conquered by him, admired him more and more.

Whilst Ptolemy raised the Greek towns against Demetrius, Lysimachus entered Macedon by Thrace, and Pyrrhus by Epirus. Demetrius thought it prudent to turn first against Pyrrhus, who was a foreigner, but he was not slow to repent his action. Desertions were numerous and soon a general mutiny broke out in the army. The soldiers had not forgiven Demetrius for permitting the capture of Berœa, where most of them had left their wives and their money. They went over to Pyrrhus in crowds to ask for his commands as their general. Demetrius returned to his tent, took off his crown and his royal mantle, assumed a dark dress and a Macedonian cap and left the camp unnoticed. He had scarcely gone when his tent was pillaged.

Pyrrhus was proclaimed king of Macedon; but Lysimachus appeared on the scene and demanded his share. Pyrrhus was not sufficiently certain of the Macedonians to enter into a contest with one of Alexander's lieutenants, and he agreed to divide the towns and provinces of Macedonia with Lysimachus. As Antipater, who had murdered his own mother, protested against this arrangement and complained that he was being despoiled of his inheritance, Lysimachus had him put to death; in him the family of Alexander became extinct.

THE LAST ADVENTURES OF DEMETRIUS

Demetrius withdrew first to Cassandrea, a town which Cassander had founded on the site of Potidæa. Then he passed into Greece to endeavour to retrieve his fortunes. The Athenians, under the command of Olympiodorus, had expelled the Macedonian garrison from the Museum and resumed possession of the Piræus and of Munychia. They had summoned Pyrrhus, who, after having aided them to liberate themselves, gave them the excellent advice to receive no more kings into their city. Demetrius would have besieged Athens, but the philosopher Crates, being sent to him, dissuaded him in his own interest. Corinth and some portions of the Peloponnesus still remained to him; there he left his son, Antigonus Gonatas, and set out for Asia with such vessels as he had and about twelve thousand soldiers. Most of the towns surrendered and several he took by force, amongst others the town of Sardis. A few officers and soldiers passed into his camp. But Agathocles, son of Lysimachus, appeared with a numerous army. Demetrius, pursued across the desert, soon found himself confronted by Seleucus. The latter presented himself unarmed before his enemy's troops and exhorted them to quit a brigand leader who had not even the means of paying them. The soldiers saw the wisdom of the advice and went over to him.

Demetrius attempted to flee, but was soon dying of hunger and obliged to give himself up to Seleucus. Lysimachus offered a large sum to have him put to death; Antigonus Gonatas implored Seleucus to release his father, offering to abandon all he possessed as his ransom and to surrender himself as hostage.

[285-281 B.C.]

Seleucus repulsed both proposals. He contented himself with preventing this incorrigible adventurer from again trying his fortune. He gave him a palace, park, and all the comforts of life. The besieger developed a taste for hunting and then for games of chance. He soon accustomed himself to this easy life, became very fat, and died of over-eating (283).

THE END OF LYSIMACHUS, KING OF MACEDON

As soon as Lysimachus had nothing more to fear from Demetrius, he turned against Pyrrhus and tried to corrupt his officers. He reproached them for having selected for themselves an Epirot king whose ancestors had been the slaves of Macedon, and for having preferred him to an old comrade of Alexander. Pyrrhus could not struggle against the desertion of his troops. A caprice of the soldiers had given him Macedon; a new caprice took it away from him, and he withdrew to Epirus. We might think we were reading the history of the Lower or Byzantine Empire — the fruits of military government are everywhere the same. Macedonia was united with the kingdom of Thrace (286), but it had not yet come to the end of the revolutions which had continued to shake it ever since the death of Alexander. These revolutions, always provoked by personal ambition and never by a question of principle or national interest, refute the Utopia of monarchical stability in a striking manner.

The polygamy practised by the Macedonian kings multiplied the rivalries so common in royal families. Agathocles, the eldest of the sons of Lysimachus, who had established his father's throne on a firmer basis by his combats with the independent Thracians and with Demetrius, died of poison administered at the instigation of his step-mother Arsinoë, the daughter of Ptolemy. This murder was followed by many others, for Agathocles had numerous friends. His widow, Lysandra, who was also a daughter of Ptolemy, took refuge with Seleucus and demanded that he should avenge her. She had with her one of her brothers who, like all the members of the royal family of Egypt, bore the name of Ptolemy and was surnamed Ceraunus, the thunder, on account of his violent character. He was the eldest of the children of Ptolemy Soter, but the intrigues of Berenice, one of his step-mothers, caused him to be deprived of the throne. Ptolemy Soter abdicated in favour of the son he had had by Berenice, and who reigned under the name of Ptolemy Philadelphus (285). The eldest at first went to Lysimachus, then to Seleucus, whom he endeavoured to interest in his favour.

Seleucus, who nourished the hope of reconstituting Alexander's monarchy, had an opportunity to intervene in Macedonia to avenge Lysandra and in Egypt to support Ptolemy Ceraunus. He was undecided when Lysimachus forestalled him by declaring war against him. The two octogenarians, in whom age had not extinguished ambition, once more measured their forces in a last battle at Corupedion in Phrygia.¹ Lysimachus was slain; for some days his body was sought for in vain; it was discovered through his dog who had guarded it and kept off the birds of prey. They buried him in the town of Lysimachia which he had founded near Cardia on the European bank of the Hellespont (281). The ranks of the veterans are thinning rapidly; and little wonder, — forty troublous years had passed since Alexander died.

[¹ "This," says Justin, "was the last contest between the fellow-soldiers of Alexander; Lysimachus was seventy-four years old; Seleucus seventy-seven."]

DEATH OF SELEUCUS

Seleucus assumed the title of Nicator, the conqueror. The defeat and death of Lysimachus made him master of Asia Minor, Thrace, and Macedonia. In the east he had extended his sway over Upper Asia as far as the Indus, but he had given his son Antiochus the crown of the provinces beyond the Euphrates. Antiochus might thus think that after the death of his father he would unite under his authority all the possessions of Alexander with the exception of Egypt. It is said that at the time when Seleucus was serving as a common soldier in the army of the conqueror of Asia, the oracle of the Didymean Apollo had announced to him the greatness of his future, while advising him never to return to Europe. Nevertheless, six months after the battle of Corupedion, he wished to take possession of Macedonia and to end his days in his own country. He disembarked at Lysimachia and at once offered a sacrifice. Then Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had come to him as a suppliant and had been received by him as a friend, stabbed him before the altar (280).

The death of the last of Alexander's companions-in-arms was not avenged. The army, which had proved faithful to none of its chiefs, proclaimed the murderer king of Thrace and Macedon. He had no difficulty in getting rid of his rivals. Antiochus, to whom he abandoned Asia Minor, had to subdue the towns on the Hellespont which had revolted; Antigonus Gonatas, involved in a struggle with a league of cities in the Peloponnesus, could not assert his claims to Macedonia. Pyrrhus was more dangerous, but at this moment the Tarentines, who were at war with Rome, summoned him to their aid. Ptolemy Ceraunus furnished him with troops, elephants, and ships to pass over into Italy, gave him his daughter in marriage, and undertook to protect Epirus so long as he should be absent. Pyrrhus set out at once and the assassin might fancy that he was to enjoy his usurped throne in peace. He did not enjoy it long; the very next year a formidable invasion of barbarians swooped down on Macedonia and Greece.

INVASION OF THE GAULS

Numerous tribes of Gauls, or Galatæ, as the Greeks called them, had been established, for how long is not known, on the banks of the Danube, when a fresh migration of Belgic Tectosages, starting from Toulouse, set in motion those populations which, having little knowledge of the art of cultivating the ground, found all regions too narrow for them. Two or three hundred thousand men, divided into three bands descended like clouds of locusts on Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece. Ptolemy Ceraunus, who in his presumption had refused the assistance of the Dardani, was overwhelmed with his whole army. His head was stuck on the end of a pike and paraded about the country. The fields were laid waste, the towns closed their gates, and the inhabitants, accustomed to rely on the protection of the soldiers, could do nothing but groan and invoke the names of Philip and Alexander. A Macedonian named Sosthenes urged them to defend themselves, collected the young men and succeeded in repelling the enemy. He was offered the crown, which he refused, desiring only the title of general. But very soon his little army, weak and inexperienced as it was, succumbed with him to the invasion of a new horde of barbarians which, after completing the devastation of Macedonia turned in the direction of Greece.

[279-278 B.C.]

The Athenians, though weakened by their struggles with the Macedonian kings, resolved to arrest the barbarians at the pass of Thermopylæ. The peoples of central Greece responded to their summons, but the Peloponnesians, believing themselves to be sufficiently protected by the Isthmus of Corinth, did not stir. The Ætolians furnished the largest number of soldiers, but the command was conferred on the Athenians, who had taken the initiative in resistance. Their ships were of much service to the Greek army; they approached the shore, in spite of the difficulty of navigating amongst the morasses, and sent a shower of arrows against the enemy. It was a deadly fight for the barbarians; their superiority in numbers was of no advantage to them in this narrow passage. Then, in order to compel the Ætolians to return home, Brennus¹ detached forty thousand men who recrossed the Sperchius and deluged Ætolia with fire and blood. It was the warfare of savages; nothing was spared, neither age nor sex. As Brennus had anticipated, the Ætolians immediately quitted Thermopylæ to rescue or avenge their wives and children. But already a corps of troops from Patræ, the only town in the Peloponnesus which had thought of coming to the rescue of the Ætolians, had encountered the barbarians and inflicted such slaughter upon them that less than half returned to the camp at Thermopylæ.

DEFENCE OF THE TEMPLE AT DELPHI

The Ænians and Heracleans, ridding themselves of the neighbourhood of the barbarians by an act of treachery, showed Brennus the path by which in the old days the Persians had turned Mount Ceta. The Phocians who guarded it were thrown into confusion and the army of the Greeks would have suffered the same fate as the soldiers of Leonidas, if it had not been fortunate enough to take refuge on the Athenian vessels. The Galatæ immediately proceeded towards Delphi; they had heard of the riches of the temple and it was primarily for this that they had invaded Greece. The Delphians demanded of the oracle whether they should put the sacred treasure in a place of safety: "The god," answered the Pythia, "ordains that the votive offerings be left where they are; he will himself protect his sanctuary by means of the White Virgins." It was thus that the Pythia indicated Artemis and Athene, the moon and the light. It was indeed the terrors of the night which triumphed over the barbarians. The noise of thunder, repeated by the great echoes of Parnassus, struck them with fear. Enormous fragments of rock detached themselves from the mountain and crushed them by thousands. Amidst the awe of the sacred woods, a prey to the mysterious terror which was ascribed to Pan, they rushed against one another. Enveloped in a whirlwind of hail and snow they fled



A SOLDIER OF GAUL

[¹ This name Brennus seems to be merely a military title, having been referred to the Cymric *brenhin*—king, though others believe it a proper name like the Welsh "Bran"; some historians refer to Brennus simply as "the brenn."]

in confusion, pursued like wild beasts through the deep gorges under the irresistible arrows of the archer who strikes from afar. Brennus ordered them to burn their chariots and kill their ten thousand wounded who were hindering their flight. He himself, after taking copious draughts of wine, stabbed himself with his sword. What remained of this countless army succumbed to hunger, fatigue, and the attacks of the Ætolians and Dardani. According to Justin, Diodorus, and Pausanias, not one escaped.¹

Other bands of Galatæ were destroyed about the same time by Antigonus Gonatas who since the death of Sosthenes had returned to Macedonia. He had left them his camp after having distributed his soldiers in the woods and on ships. When the barbarians were filled with wine and meat he fell unexpectedly upon them and effected a great slaughter. As these Galatæ were strong and brave he took many of them into his pay and soon had occasion to employ them. On the coins struck in memory of this victory we see the god Pan, the originator of panic fears, bearing a trophy (278).

PYRRHUS AND THE ROMANS

The absence of any federal link between the Greek cities of Italy rendered them incapable of resisting the native peoples of the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. They were thus naturally led to demand the support of the great Roman republic, which alone could protect them. Rome never refused her protection to those who asked for it, even if they were at a distance from Italy, — like Marseilles which, thanks to her alliance with the Romans, was able to extend her commerce without any fear of her barbarian neighbours, the Ligurians and the Gauls. Rome's first relations with the Greek towns of Italy were those of friendship: Locri, Thurii, and Rhegium, asked and obtained her alliance and protection. Tarentum alone preferred to have the Romans as enemies rather than friends.

She had never had to suffer either from the tyrants of Syracuse or from the Lucanians or the Samnites, for she was separated from them by less powerful and less warlike populations. Under the influence of democratic institutions she had achieved, says Strabo, an amazing prosperity. She aspired to play a dominant part in the peninsula of Italy similar to that which Syracuse had acquired in Sicily; it was therefore with anxiety and jealousy that she watched the progress of the Roman power. By a mad act of provocation the Tarentines put themselves entirely in the wrong and rendered war with Rome inevitable. Then, according to their custom, they called in the assistance of a foreign prince, and though on this occasion they had chosen the bravest and most skilful captain of the day, the struggle on which they embarked resulted in the final establishment of the dominion of the Romans over all Italy.

PYRRHUS SUMMONED BY THE TARENTINES

They summoned Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, promising him the support of the Lucanians and Samnites. He eagerly seized the opportunity to renew the attempt of his great-uncle, Alexander the Molossian. Ptolemy Cerau-

[¹ It would hardly be necessary to add a rational explanation of this supernatural defence of Delphi, were it not desirable that the credit should not be denied the gallant 4000 Delphians and other soldiers who made so brave a stand for their gods and altars and after rolling down rocks upon the Gauls until they were in confusion, charged them and broke them into panic, pursuing them even through a night of bitter storm.]

[280-279 B.C.]

nus, in order to rid himself of a dangerous competitor, furnished him with soldiers and elephants. Pyrrhus founded great hopes on this expedition.

No sooner had he arrived than he caused the theatre, the gymnasiums, and the gardens where they met to discuss politics, to be closed, forbade festivals and all unseasonable diversions, enrolled all the citizens and had them drilled. There were many who sought to escape but he had the doors guarded. When this produced murmuring he took some of the malcontents and sent them to Epirus.

Soon he heard that the Roman army was approaching. He would have liked to await the arrival of the Lucanians and Samnites, and offered his mediation to the consul Lævinus, but was answered that the Romans did not accept him as arbitrator and did not dread him as a foe. The battle was fought near the river Siris in the neighbourhood of Heraclea. The king had his horse killed under him, and, according to Justin, was even wounded. He sent his elephants forward; the Romans, who had never seen any, called them the Lucanian oxen. It was they that gave Pyrrhus the victory. When he saw the dead bodies of the Romans, all wounded in front and with their hands on their arms: "With such men," he said, "I should have soon conquered the world." He caused them to be buried in like manner with his own soldiers (280).

Pyrrhus marched into Campania, but did not manage to surprise Capua and was not more successful in an attempt on Naples. He went as far as Præneste and came within sight of Rome; but the Romans had now raised a new army; he saw the legions being restored to life like the heads of the hydra, and fearing to be surrounded he returned to Tarentum. An embassy was sent to him; he hoped that he was about to dictate terms of peace but it merely came to discuss the ransom of the captives. Pyrrhus offered to restore the prisoners without payment. Knowing that Fabricius, the chief ambassador, was poor, he thought to win him over by proposing to repair the errors of fortune. Fabricius answered simply that his poverty did not trouble him and did not prevent his being highly considered in his own country. Pyrrhus sent Cineas to Rome with presents for the wives of the senators; it is said that these presents were refused; this is not impossible though very extraordinary. Historians are not agreed as to the conditions proposed. The senate would have accepted them, but a lofty speech of the blind old Appius Claudius so worked on the assembly as to lead to its returning Pyrrhus the answer that it would not be possible to treat with him until he had left Italy. Cineas, on his return from Rome, told Pyrrhus that the senate seemed to him an assembly of kings; politically speaking, the heads of families who composed the Roman city, may indeed be compared with the Homeric kings; but if Cineas meant to refer to the successors of Alexander, the comparison was by no means flattering to honourable men like Curius and Fabricius.

There was nothing for it but to continue the war. A fresh encounter took place near Asculum, Pyrrhus, whose Italian auxiliaries were armed in the Roman fashion, had skilfully combined the formation of the legion with that of the phalanx. But a Roman soldier cut off the trunk of an elephant: the Lucanian oxen were not, then, invulnerable. According to the *Epitome* of Titus Livius the result of the battle was doubtful. According to Plutarch the Romans had the advantage on the first day, but on the morrow Pyrrhus, having contrived to decoy them to ground on which he was able to manipulate his forces, put them to flight and obliged them to take refuge in their camp. He had lost his best soldiers, and when he was congratulated

on his success: "Another such victory," he said, "and I shall have to return to Epirus." One of his followers offered to poison him for the Romans: Fabricius denounced the treachery to him, advising him to choose his friends better. He sent back the Roman prisoners without ransom; the senate sent him an equal number of Greek and Italian prisoners. An armistice was concluded and he took advantage of it to pass into Sicily (278).

PYRRHUS IN SICILY; HIS RETURN TO ITALY

Since the death of Agathocles Sicily had been continuously troubled by the acts of brigandage perpetrated by the Mamertines established at Messana, and by the wars of Hicetas, tyrant of Syracuse, against Phintias, tyrant of Agrigentum. After having reigned nine years, Hicetas was dethroned by Thynion who took his place and occupied the island of Ortygia whilst Sosistratus was master of the rest of the town. The Carthaginians, taking advantage of the dissensions of these two leaders, besieged Syracuse. It was then that the two parties implored the aid of Pyrrhus. He had some claims to Sicily as son-in-law of Agathocles. He could not pass through Messana for the Mamertines had made a league with the Carthaginians against him. He disembarked at Tauromenium, whither he had been summoned by the tyrant Tyndarion and from there he proceeded to Catana and thence to Syracuse where he was received as a deliverer. He reconciled Thynion and Sosistratus and joining the forces of the Syracusans to those which he had brought with him, he expelled the Mamertines and forced them to retire to Messana. Agrigentum, Leontini, Selinus, Segesta, and many other towns opened their gates to him. He took Eryx, leading the assault himself, and in the same way made himself master of Panormus the principal port of the Carthaginians, to whom, of all their Sicilian possessions, only Lilybæum remained (277).

After two months' siege he judged that this place was impregnable so long as the Carthaginians were masters of the sea. He then decided to make a descent on Africa, after the example of Agathocles. But as he needed sailors he required the cities to supply them and grew angry at their tardiness and resistance; his yoke began to weigh as heavily as that of the Carthaginians and Mamertines. He had had enough of Sicily and used the reiterated appeals of the Tarentines and Samnites as an excuse for departure. With great difficulty he escaped from the Carthaginian fleet, which sank seventy of his ships, and he then fell in with a band of Mamertines who were waiting for him on the coast of Italy. He lost his rear-guard and two of his elephants; he was hurt and as he was retiring to dress his wound a tall soldier came and attacked him. But Pyrrhus had a strong arm and a well-tempered sword: he hit him a blow on the head and cut it in two. The barbarians, struck with admiration, allowed him to continue his route. He stopped at Locri to punish the inhabitants who had expelled his garrison, then, as he was in want of money to pay his troops, he pillaged the temple of Core, one of the most celebrated in Italy. But the vessels which were carrying off the sacred treasure were thrown on the shore by a tempest. Pyrrhus, struck with fear, replaced all the money in the treasury of the goddess and continued his route to Tarentum.

In his absence the Romans had retaken Crotona, admitted Heraclea to their alliance and several times defeated the Bruttians, Lucanians, and Samnites. Weakened by these defeats the allies of Pyrrhus sent him but few

[275 B.C.]

soldiers. Nevertheless he hastened to take the field to prevent the junction of two Roman armies sent against him — the one by Samnium, the other by Lucania. Near Beneventum he encountered the consul Curius, who was compelled to give battle before the arrival of his colleague. But the Romans no longer dreaded the elephants; they flung flaming tow at them. Some were killed and others reserved for the triumph. The victory of the Romans was complete (275). They took the camp of Pyrrhus who re-entered Tarentum with a small number of riders. He was compelled to renounce his projects in the west. The whole scheme had failed and he made haste to embark on another. He told the Tarentines he had written to the kings of Macedon and Asia for their help, and that he was going away to collect a fresh army. He left them a garrison. The Tarentines summoned the Car-



RUINED TEMPLE NEAR ATHENS

thaginians who sent their fleet to the harbour. But Milon, the commander of the Epirot garrison, surrendered the citadel to the Romans. They entered the town, declared it tributary to Rome and disarmed the inhabitants.

MAGNA GRÆCIA SUBDUED BY THE ROMANS

All the native peoples of southern Italy, who had welcomed Pyrrhus as a deliverer were finally subdued to the dominion of Rome. It was a deliverance for such Greek cities as still existed, but they were no more than the shadow of their former selves. Although free under the protection of Rome, they disappear obscurely from history. In the time of Strabo the name of Magna Græcia was already an ancient memory and the Greek language was no longer spoken save at Naples, Rhegium, and Tarentum. For want of a federal bond between the autonomous cities, the Hellenic race with its brilliant civilisation had gradually disappeared from the soil of Italy. The Romans were about to enter into its inheritance that they might eventually transmit it to Gaul and Spain. They re-peopled some of the ancient Greek colonies which had lapsed into barbarism, notably Posidonia and Hipponium which had long been peopled, the one by the Campanians, the other by the Bruttians and which changed their Greek names for those of Pæstum¹ and Vibo Valentia.

[¹ At Pæstum, most interesting ruins of three Greek temples are still to be seen. Two of these are in a relatively fine state of preservation; and one — the temple of Poseidon — is among the most imposing structures in existence. It is probably as old as the Parthenon, and is much better preserved.]

RETURN OF PYRRHUS TO MACEDONIA

The sole advantage which Macedonia had derived from Alexander's conquest was the barren honour of furnishing royal dynasties to Egypt and Asia. No part of the conqueror's heritage had been more disputed between ambitious rivals. Within the space of fifty years ten kings had succeeded each other on the throne in consequence of as many military revolutions. After the invasion of the Galatæ, Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius, fancied he had secured himself in the possession of devastated Macedonia by making a treaty with his competitor Antiochus Soter, whose daughter he married. But military anarchy had not yet reached its term. Pyrrhus, returning from Italy and at a loss how to pay his troops, sought an occasion for war. He entered Macedonia simply for the purpose of collecting spoil. Having won a few successes he remembered that he had been king of this country, marched against Antigonus, cut to pieces the Galatæ whom he employed as mercenaries, and took his elephants. Then he approached the phalanx, recognised some of the captains who commanded it, addressed them by their names and extended his hand to them. All the soldiers went over to him. Proud of his victory over the Galatæ, he consecrated their shields in the temple of the Itonian Athene, enlisted the barbarians, whose value he had recognised, and put them as garrisons in the Macedonian cities. At Ægæ they pillaged the royal tombs and scattered the bones. This called forth complaints from the Macedonians; but Pyrrhus, as an Epirot, took little interest in the ancient kings of Macedonia. He had no time to punish his mercenaries, and he was soon to stand in need of their services. An opportunity of conquering Greece had presented itself to him and he desired to take advantage of it.

EXPEDITION OF PYRRHUS AGAINST SPARTA

This opportunity was offered to him by Cleonymus of Sparta, the same who had been before him in making an expedition to Tarentum. He requested Pyrrhus to support the rights which he pretended to have to the throne of Sparta. The ephors had set him aside in favour of Areus, the son of his eldest brother; and to complete his chagrin his wife Chelidonis, who was much beloved by him, did not conceal her aversion, and showed her preference for the son of Areus, named Acrotatus.

This seemed to Pyrrhus a sufficient pretext for invading the Peloponnesus with twenty-five thousand footmen, two thousand horses, and twenty-four elephants. He declared, moreover, that his sole object was to restore liberty to the towns which Antigonus was keeping in subjection. As to the Spartans, far from wishing them ill, he proposed, he said, to confide his younger sons to their care, that they might be educated in the discipline of Lycurgus. When his soldiers began pillaging, the Spartans reproached him with his breach of faith. He answered, "Neither are you in the habit of saying beforehand what you will do." There had been nothing to give warning of this aggression in time of peace and the town was not in a state of defence: the whole army had followed the king Areus to Crete whither he had been summoned by the Gortynians. Cleonymus would have liked to attack immediately; but Pyrrhus preferred to wait for a capitulation which seemed inevitable. He established his camp before Sparta believing himself certain of being able to enter whenever he might wish.

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Sparta was saved by the women. It had been proposed to send them to Crete, a suggestion which roused their indignation. Archidamia, mother of Acrotatus and the richest heiress in Sparta, entered the senate, sword in hand, and protested in the name of the women against their being thought capable of surviving the ruin of their country. The walls raised in preceding wars left the town exposed at several points: the night was spent in digging a great ditch parallel with the enemy's camp, and barricades were formed on each side by means of chariots with their wheels buried in the ground. The women undertook a third of the work and obliged those who were to fight next day to rest. In the morning they armed the young men and exhorted them to die under the eyes of their mothers. During the fight, which lasted all day, they kept close to them, handing them weapons, carrying them food and drink and tending the wounded. But as Rollin has pointed out, if the women of Sparta practised masculine virtues they sometimes forgot the virtues of their sex: seeing the young Acrotatus who had fought like a lion return covered with blood and dust, they envied the lot of Chelidonis. Plutarch adds a detail which shows how far the Spartans carried the sacrifice of the family to the city: the old men, he says, cried out: "Bravo, Acrotatus. Retain Chelidonis, and may she give the country children as brave as thou." As to Chelidonis herself, not wishing to fall into the hands of her husband, she had prepared a rope to hang herself if the town were taken.

The combat began again the next day. The Macedonians endeavoured to fill up the trench with branches. Pyrrhus even succeeded in crossing it and galloped towards the town; but his horse was killed and threw him on a steep slope; his friends had great difficulty in rescuing him. Almost all the Spartans were killed or wounded, and the town was on the verge of being taken when a lieutenant of Antigonos brought help. Almost at the same time Areus arrived from Crete with two thousand Spartans. Pyrrhus decided to raise the siege. He turned in the direction of Argos, where one party had summoned him to oppose another faction supported by Antigonos. Areus pursued him as he retreated, harassing him in the defiles and destroying his rear-guard composed of Galatæ and Molossians. To avenge the death of his son Ptolemy, who had been killed in his fight, Pyrrhus destroyed almost the whole Spartan army and then continued his route towards Argos.

DEATH OF PYRRHUS

Antigonos was occupying the heights. Pyrrhus proposed to him to settle their quarrel in a single combat, but Antigonos answered that if Pyrrhus was weary of life he might find many roads to death. The Argives begged the two kings to withdraw and to permit them to remain friends of both. They consented to do so, but during the night the partisans of Pyrrhus admitted him into the town. The members of the opposite party immediately summoned Antigonos. At the same time Areus arrived with the relics of his army. Fighting went on in the streets all night in the midst of a general confusion. Pyrrhus would have retired, but his Galatæ, coming to his assistance, blocked the narrow streets. One of his elephants had fallen across the gateway, another whose driver was wounded was overturning friends and enemies indiscriminately. Pyrrhus received a blow from the javelin of an Argive soldier and turned against the man who had wounded him; the soldier's mother, who, with some other women, was watching the fight from the top of the roofs, seeing her son in danger seized

a tile and flung it at the king's head. He fell from his horse. Though he had removed the plume from his helmet he was recognised: his head was cut off and taken to Antigonos. At this example of the mutability of fortune the latter was reminded of his father Demetrius and caused a search to be made for the body of Pyrrhus, which he burned, with the head, on a funeral pyre. He sent the ashes to Pyrrhus' son Helenus who returned to Epirus (272).

ANTIGONOS GONATAS

The history of the twenty years which followed the death of Pyrrhus is little known. We have no guide but Justin^g who is not always very reliable, and some scanty indications in Polybiusⁱ and Pausanias.^h All we know is that these twenty years were not an epoch of repose for Greece, and still less of liberty. The death-blow of Greek liberty had been struck at Chæronea, and the weapon had been left in the wound. The Macedonian monarchy clung to Greece like the shirt of Nessus. Though they had been compelled to renounce Alexander's heritage the kings of Macedon were still the heirs of Philip and determined to continue his work of subjugating Greece. This policy was persistently followed by Antigonos Gonatas, who bequeathed it to his successors. After the death of Pyrrhus he had no competitors for the throne of Macedon. The greater part of the army of the king of Epirus was composed of Macedonians and Galatæ who passed without difficulty into Antigonos' service. His rule in Greece extended over Thessaly and Eubœa, over Corinth and a part of the Peloponnesus, exactly which part is not known: Justin says vaguely that the Peloponnesians were delivered into his hands by treachery. Sometimes he put garrisons into the cities, sometimes he set up tyrants: "Most of the tyrants in Greece," says Polybius, "date from this Antigonos." The isolation of the cities, their mutual jealousies and the rivalry of the political factions, everywhere raised up interested accomplices for the Macedonian usurpation.

Following the example of his predecessors, Antigonos Gonatas was especially eager for the conquest of Athens. He burned the temple of Poseidon at Colonus and the sacred wood which surrounded it. The war lasted six or seven years. A revolt of Antigonos' hired Galatæ scarcely interrupted hostilities; Areus, king of Sparta, and a lieutenant of Ptolemy Philadelphus who had been sent to the aid of Athens and might have taken advantage of this diversion, remained inactive and the Athenians, deserted by their allies, were obliged to receive a Macedonian garrison (268). Antigonos also sent garrisons to Megara, Salamis, and Cape Sunium.

But about the same time Alexander, king of Epirus, made an incursion into Macedonia to avenge the death of his father Pyrrhus, and the phalanx went over to him, thus giving a fresh example of the facility with which military monarchies change masters. Antigonos was absent; his son Demetrius, who was still very young, soon recovered possession of Macedonia. Alexander, in his turn despoiled of Epirus, took refuge amongst the Acarnanians, who subsequently reinstated him in possession of his kingdom. This did not prevent him from treating with the Ætolians for the partition of Acarnania, for gratitude is by no means a royal virtue. Antigonos kept the throne of Macedonia till his death in 243, and his dynasty maintained itself there for more than a century, prosecuting the conquest of Greece up to the last, till that country, exhausted by the ceaseless struggle, finally threw itself into the arms of the Roman people.^b

[272 B.C.]

Inglorious as was this termination of a career like that of Pyrrhus, the closing scene of his life was not without some points of resemblance to its general character. He was undoubtedly one of the nobler spirits of his age, though it would seem that it could have been only in one which was familiar with atrocious crimes, that he could have gained the reputation of unsullied virtue, more particularly of probity, which we find attached to his name. With extraordinary prowess, such as revived the image of the heroic warfare, he combined many qualities of a great captain, and was thought by some to be superior even to Alexander in military art. But his whole life was not only a series of unconnected, mostly abortive, enterprises, but might be regarded, with respect to himself, as one ill-concerted, perplexed, and bootless adventure. From beginning to end he was the sport, not so much of fortune, as of desires without measure or plan, of an impetuous, but inconstant will. His ruling passion was less ambition than the love of action; and he seems to have valued conquest chiefly because it opened new fields of battle. But viewed as subservient to higher ends, both his life and his death were memorable and important. He contributed to adjust the balance of power among Alexander's successors in the West. He exercised the Roman arms with a harder trial than they had ever before undergone; and inspired the people with a confidence in its own strength which nerved it for the struggle with Carthage, and prepared it for the mastery of the world. His death forms a momentous epoch in Grecian history, as it left the field clear for the final contest between the liberty of Greece and the power of Macedon, a contest which was only terminated by the ruin of both. *f*



GREEK BOTTLES
(From the Museum of Napoleon III)



CHAPTER LXIII. THE LEAGUES AND THEIR WARS

WHILST the cultured Greeks of the long-established cities and confederacies were being gradually absorbed into the Macedonian kingdom, and the spirit of liberty was dying out amidst luxury and the fleeting pleasures of sense, amidst theatrical shows and festivals, and amidst the philosophy and culture of the day; two races, as yet little affected by the influences of Hellenic life and culture, emerged into the foreground of effective action. These were the Ætolians and the Achæans.

THE ÆTOLIANS

For centuries the Ætolian mountaineers, a branch of the Æolian race but with a great admixture of foreign (barbarian) blood, had led in peasant simplicity a quiet and unnoted existence in the open country, dwelling in villages and scattered homesteads, remote from the culture and refinement, as from the enervation and luxury of other Hellenic peoples. Inured to a life of hardship by the character of their country, which, bounded on the west by the torrent stream of the Achelous and on the east by the Evenus, offered no fertile land for cultivation except along the southern coast—the inland tracks being fit for nothing but pasture and the chase—the Ætolians had preserved intact the warlike spirit and savage freedom of primitive times “when the law ran just as far as the sword could reach, and honourable pillage by sea and land was every brave man’s trade.” Out of sheer valour and love of fighting they undertook venturesome freebooting voyages under their native captains and chiefs, penetrating even to the distant coasts of Italy and Asia Minor, or entered the service of foreign states as mercenaries; while those who remained at home provided for the few needs of their rude and simple existence by field labour, cattle-tending, horse-breeding, and the chase.

Weapons were the pride and ornament of the free man, and he hardly ever laid them aside. When the Ætolians took the field, armed with slings and spears, and ranged, sometimes in serried phalanx, sometimes in irregular hordes, their strength, agility, and desperate courage made them formidable to all their enemies. Their national dress included the *kausia* or broad-brimmed white hat, the tunic, girded high and leaving the arms free, and the high Cretan shoe. The right foot was left bare in climbing or going uphill, “to insure a firmer foothold.” In culture and learning they were far behind other Greeks, who avoided and despised the rude, haughty, and boastful “mountain peasants” in consequence. Yet even they in time developed

some artistic feeling and talent, for as their power increased, Thermus the capital of their league, was richly adorned with public buildings and temples, pictures and statues. In this unfortified town, encircled by mountains and tracts of fertile country, the districts belonging to the league celebrated their annual festival and assembly with fairs, games, and feasts, for they were as ready to enjoy life in every sort of turbulent and unbridled pleasure as to hazard it in any bold venture.

THE ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE

From very early times the townships and districts under democratic government had been united in some sort of loose confederacy, which imposed but a very slight curb upon the independent action of each community; but it was not until the Macedonian period, when the power of other states was impaired by civil wars and their energy paralysed by the effects of a higher state of civilisation, that the several confederacies of kindred tribes united to form a general Ætolian League, its purpose being rather to safeguard their predatory excursions than to strengthen a political system based on moral or legal principles.¹ For although the germ of a vigorous federal and communal life might lie dormant in this hardy and primitive race, yet it was wanting in moral discipline, the authority of law, and the habit of obedience. The first result of the fresh unity and order brought into Ætolian enterprise by this closer union was the extension of Ætolian supremacy westward over the Ceniades and eastward over Naupactus.

From this time forth we find the Ætolians mentioned in every military achievement of importance; they manfully withstood the Macedonian greed of domination; we see them defending Hellenic liberty and independence against Antipater and Cassander; they formed the nucleus of the force which checked the wild hordes of the Celts at Thermopylæ and overthrew Brennus and his robber bands on the sacred soil of Delphi. Everywhere we find their strong hand and resolute energy at work on the destinies of the Greek nation in the mournful period of its decline and fall, staving off and delaying the complete subjugation of Greece to the best of their ability.

The supreme authority of the federated states was vested in the *Panætolium*, or Diet of the League, which assembled in council regularly every year at the autumnal equinox in the mountain city of Thermus, and at which every free-born Ætolian was entitled to appear and vote. In cases of urgency this assembly was sometimes held at other times and places. The Diet of the League declared war and peace, concluded alliances and treaties, and sent and received ambassadors. Its proceedings were directed by a president (*strategus*) who was elected annually. In administrative and judicial matters the supreme authority was the Council called the *Apocleti*, the members or "assessors" (*synedri*) of which were elected annually from amongst the members of the Diet and the noble families of the several districts. Under the presidency of the *strategus* the Council managed the ordinary course of business and judicature for the league as a whole as well as for the several districts or cantons, maintained the rights of the League and the several confederated districts against attacks from within and from

[¹Freeman² comparing the two great Leagues says: "The political conduct of the Achæan League with some mistakes and some faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the Ætolian League is, throughout the century in which we know it best, simply infamous."]

without, and in certain cases appointed commissions consisting of not more than thirty members.

At first all members of the League enjoyed full civil rights within it, and accordingly might settle anywhere within its territory, acquire landed property, contract marriages, take part in the public assemblies, vote, and hold public office. These privileges of citizenship were shared not only by all Ætolians, but by all other Greeks who joined the League, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, such as the inhabitants of certain towns and districts in Thessaly, Phocis, Locris, Messenia, and others. Since the expulsion of Aristotimus, governor of Elis, the Eleans had occupied a relation of independent defensive alliance with the Ætolians; they gave and received help at need, but retained their political autonomy. It was otherwise with the Cephallenians, who paid tribute as Ætolian subjects, and were obliged to sue for justice in the Ætolian law courts.

THE ACHÆAN LEAGUE AND ARATUS OF SICYON

In natural contrast with the Ætolian "peasant league," the league of the Achæan cities arose in the reign of Antigonos Gonatas. It was the last vigorous shoot that sprang from the decaying root of the Hellenic tree of liberty.

From primitive times the twelve towns of the coast of Achaia had been joined in a loose confederacy for which the sanctuary of Zeus Homagryrius or Homorius in the district of Helice served as a place of assembly and council. It was a religious association based upon kinship — ancient Greece has many such to show — a free union for the worship of tribal divinities under traditional forms, and involved no restraint upon the political independence of its members. Without exercising any great influence upon the political and military life of Greece, Achaia was notable for unostentatious virtues, for order, unity, and a patriarchal form of government; while Croton, Sybaris, and other flourishing colonies in lower Italy bore eloquent witness to the culture and creative energy of the Achæan race. In so great honour were the uprightness and public virtue of the simple and industrious coast dwellers held by the rest of Greece that after the battle of Leuctra the great Hellenic states besought them to arbitrate in their internal quarrels. This old-time confederacy was broken up and destroyed by the Macedonian rulers, who craftily sowed the seeds of discord, and then made use of the ensuing dissensions to subjugate and oppress the several cities by foreign garrisons and governors. But despotism could not obliterate the memory of the happy past. Favoured by the weakness and confusion which followed upon the Celtic invasion of Macedonia, four towns, Dyne, Patræ, Tritæa, and Pharæ, having expelled their garrisons and tyrants, renewed the confederacy, vowed mutual aid against external and internal enemies, and pledged themselves faithfully to observe the decrees of the League. Five years later they were joined by Ægium, thenceforth the capital. Others soon followed: Bura, where the tyrant had been slain; Cerynea, where the governor had voluntarily abdicated in fear of a like fate; Pellene, Leontium, and Ægira.

But even in its rejuvenated form the Achæan League remained for years in provincial isolation, until Aratus of Sicyon¹ induced his native city to join it, and set before it a loftier aim in the deliverance of Greece from the

[¹ Freeman⁴ praises Marcus of Cerynea as the probable founder or "Washington of the original League," though obscured later by Aratus.]

[249 B.C.]

dismemberment and chaos due to the exclusive regard of local interests, and the awakening of national spirit, unity, and vigour.

Even in the days of Macedonian rule Sicyon had not forfeited her ancient glories. Her gardens, fruitful fields, and flourishing villages, her magnificent buildings and art collections, and the merchant vessels in her sheltered harbour, bore testimony to the wealth, culture, and busy trade of her citizens. But internal discord, fostered by Macedonian guile, undermined the foundations of her prosperity. Party strife arose, bringing revolutions and tyrannies. Clinias, a citizen of noble birth, great wealth, and patriotic spirit, perished in the struggle against the tyrant Abantidas. With difficulty his son Aratus, a child of seven years old, was rescued and brought to Argos, where he grew up sound in body and mind under the fostering care of friends, while his native city fell under tyranny after tyranny, until, broken in spirit and shorn of her noblest citizens, she ultimately came under the sway of the wicked and violent Nicocles. For thirteen years Aratus dwelt in Argos, in the society of the wealthy and cultured friends of his family, and in intercourse with the numerous Sicyonians who sought refuge in this neighbouring town from the wrath and persecution of their own tyrant, and who turned eyes full of hope upon the vigorous and able youth who combined courage with discretion and burned with desire to deliver his native place and avenge his father's murder. He contrived cunningly to deceive the tyrant's spies, to whom he seemed to spend all his days in thoughtless gaiety with courtesans and boon companions.

When the auspicious moment seemed to have come, Aratus left Argos in company with some fugitives and a band of mercenaries. They climbed the walls during the night, surprised and disarmed the tyrant's bodyguard, and at daybreak summoned the citizens to rise for their liberties. Nicocles escaped in the tumult, his palace was sacked and given to the flames, his property confiscated to the commonwealth. Thus without bloodshed was the liberation of Sicyon effected. But fresh disorders and disturbances soon threatened, when some six hundred fugitives, who had once been wealthy men, returned and demanded the restoration of property which had long since passed into other hands. In order that he might not be left without support in this difficult situation Aratus induced the Dorian city, wealthy still in spite of all, to join the Achaean League on an equality of laws and privileges, and then, by the help of a large sum of money granted to him by the friendly king of Egypt, Ptolemy, upon his personal application in Alexandria, he effected a settlement and reconciliation among his contentious fellow-citizens.


The fame which he won by this prudent and patriotic act, combined with the great service he had rendered to the League by inducing such an important seaport to join it, smoothed the young commander's way to the highest office; but he modestly chose to work his way up. He first enrolled himself in the Achaean cavalry, but by the end of six years he had attained the dignity of strategus which was thenceforth seldom conferred upon another until his death. Clear-minded, far-sighted, and steeped in the philosophic and patriotic culture of his time, Aratus soon turned his energies towards the great end of uniting all Peloponnesians under the hegemony of Achaia. Without interfering with the autonomy and freedom of the several states he established the principle of equal rights for all members of the League. The road to office and honours lay open to every man within it, without distinction of wealth or social standing; and, though some towns or districts of those which were gradually won over to the League might favour

a different form of government, yet the constitution of the Achæan confederacy, as it developed by degrees under Aratus, retained the character of a moderate democracy. Moreover, careful as he was to avoid rousing local jealousies or wounding local self-esteem and prejudices by meddling with internal administration, traditional privileges and customs, or the religious peculiarities of different places or communities, he awakened the sense of a common civilisation by introducing uniformity of weights and measures, a common coinage, and equality of commercial rights, and secured it by the bond of religion.

ARATUS CONTROLS THE LEAGUE

The government of the Achæan League which was formed under Aratus was vested in the free Diet of the people, which met twice a year (in spring and autumn) at their ancient place of council, not far from Ægium, and at which every free citizen who had attained his thirtieth year was qualified to appear and give his opinion and his vote. In spring, the beginning of the civil year, the officers of the League were elected by the Diet, the president, the secretary or chancellor, and the senate, which, in concert with the demiurgi, or representatives of the ten Achæan towns which originally composed the League, formed the supreme executive authority, managing political affairs in conformity with the decrees and ordinances of the Diet and under its control, directing the discussion and voting of the great assemblies of the League, and making the necessary preparations when they were to be held. In urgent cases the strategus and senate acted on their own initiative, without the authorisation of the Diet but subject to the obligation of rendering account to it. There was a League Court, likewise appointed by the great assembly, for the settlement of internal disputes. The strategus presided at the Diet as in the greater and lesser council, and confirmed decrees and ratified documents by his signature and the seal of the League. Possessed of executive powers in external and internal affairs, he had charge of the treasury, called in the contributions of the confederates in money, ships, and men, and held supreme command of the army and fleet, subject to the obligation of rendering account of his actions. In war he was assisted by the captain of the cavalry (hipparch), and in home affairs by the chancellor or secretary (grammateus).

This admirable constitution was in the main the work of Aratus, always the "moving spirit" of the League, and though his later years are in many respects open to reproach, yet this practical application of his philosophic and patriotic ideas is worthy of the highest commendation. He is one of those characters whose portraits, distorted by the favour and enmity of partisans, are but uncertainly discerned in history. Strenuously as he strove in his *Memorabilia* (the essentials of which Plutarch has preserved in his biography) to guard his actions and motives from misconception and to truly exhibit himself to his contemporaries and to posterity, his record is



A SHIELD BEARER

[249-242 B.C.]

nevertheless darkened by many shadows and charged with many blunders. "Aratus had not a great Hellenic soul," is the verdict of Schorn, "his soul was narrow and Achaean." As a man he was distinguished by many fine and amiable qualities, as a citizen he merits respect for his great love of his country, to which he dedicated his life with an absolute devotion, and to the aggrandisement of which all his efforts were directed with rare perseverance. To the state he sacrificed himself without reserve, giving up his property, friendships, enmities, and even the implacable hatred of tyrants with which he had been imbued from his youth up; everything, indeed, except the ambition which cast a doubt even upon his patriotism. He desired to shine on the Achaean horizon alone, and he used his influence to keep down any who attempted to shine beside him.

He regarded the Ætolian peasant-league, with its raids and savage feuds, and the revolutionary attempts of the Spartan kings Agis and Cleomenes with equal abhorrence; and by turning his arms against them alternately he played into the hands of the common national foe, Macedonia. As strategus his military talents were of a very inferior order. He was admirably skilled in arranging sudden attacks and ambushes, and in the carrying out of military surprises his boldness and daring were equal to his subtlety and cunning, but as a commander his capacity was small, and in his first campaign he proved diffident, timorous, and faint-hearted. It was not his strong point to look danger boldly in the face, in battle he lost self-control and presence of mind; and he consequently preferred the privy and crooked ways of stratagem, dissimulation, and deceit to a direct and valiant attack.

In his second period of office as strategus, Aratus increased the reputation he had gained by the liberation of Sicyon, but had impaired by a profitless campaign against the Ætolians in the first year of his command, by his successful stratagem at Corinth. With mingled craft and daring he succeeded in ridding the impregnable citadel of Acrocorinthus of its Macedonian garrison, and persuaded this important city, one of the three "fetters of Greece," to join the League.^e

ARATUS TAKES CORINTH

Three brothers, Syrian Greeks, had pilfered from the royal treasure at Corinth, and one of them named Erginus, came to Sicyon from time to time to exchange their plunder at the house of a banker well known to Aratus. Through this channel Aratus learned that there was an accessible point in the wall of the citadel; and Erginus, having engaged the concurrence of a fourth brother who served in the garrison, undertook to conduct Aratus to the place, where the wall was no more than fifteen feet high. The brothers demanded a large reward. Sixty talents [£12,000 or \$60,000] were to be deposited with the banker, to be paid to them in the event of success; and even in the case of failure, if they escaped, each was to receive a house and a talent. Aratus could not immediately raise so large a sum, and was forced to pledge his plate and his wife's ornaments, purchasing, as Plutarch observes, the privilege of a perilous adventure for the good of his country, at a price which it would have been accounted magnanimous to reject, if it had been offered as a bribe. When the time came which had been fixed for the attempt, leaving the main body of his forces under arms, he proceeded with four hundred men, few of whom were in the secret, towards Corinth. As they approached the wall, the light of

the full moon, which would have rendered concealment almost impossible, was intercepted by clouds which rose from the sea. Several other propitious circumstances contributed to his success, though he fully earned it by his courage. Erginus with seven others, disguised as wayfarers, gained entrance at a gate and overpowered the guard, while Aratus, with only a hundred of his men, scaled the wall, and advanced towards the citadel with the scaling-ladders, ordering the rest to follow. But on his way through the town he fell in with a patrol, one of whom escaped, and soon raised a general alarm.

Aratus, again favoured by the moon which broke through the clouds as he was entangled in the most intricate part of the ascent, reached the wall of the citadel safely, and was soon engaged in a hard combat with the garrison. As soon as the alarm was raised, Archelaus, finding that the citadel was attacked, hastened with all his forces in that direction. But he chanced to light on three hundred Achæans, who, unable to find the track of their comrades, had cowered behind a projection of the rock. They now sprang out as from an ambuscade, and completely routed and dispersed his troops. But they were recalled from the pursuit by Erginus to the succour of Aratus, and their arrival decided the struggle. By sunrise he was in possession of the fortress, and the forces which had followed him from Sicyon, making their appearance at the same time, were joyfully admitted into the lower town by the Corinthians, who helped to capture the royal soldiers.^d

By this act, in which he generously hazarded his private fortune, Aratus gained such a degree of popular confidence that the Achæans thenceforth committed the conduct of public affairs to his hands, and followed his counsel even in the years when he was by law excluded from the office of strategus. The towns of Trœzen, Epidaurus, Cleonæ, and Megara, presently revolted from Macedonia and joined the Achæan League.

The rise of the Achæans stirred up the jealousy of other states, and incited the Macedonians to fresh exertions to recover what they had lost. The old king Antigonus concluded an alliance with the Ætolians for a joint attack on Achaia, on the basis of a partition of the territory to be acquired. But Aratus, who had chosen Ptolemy as patron of the League, and thus secured the protection of Egypt in the event of possible disaster, repulsed the Ætolian marauders before they could join hands with the Macedonians, and dissuaded King Antigonus from the proposed campaign by promising him the remaining dominions of the Peloponnesus. The aged Antigonus Gonatas died soon afterwards, and his son and heir, Demetrius II, was kept fully occupied by an invasion of his own country by the Dardans.

Aratus contrived to make use of these circumstances for fresh acquisitions. Secured from attack in the rear by an offensive and defensive alliance with the Ætolians, he induced most of the states of the Peloponnesus by force or subtlety to join the League. Thus Lydiades, the young and accomplished prince who reigned at Megalopolis, was prevailed upon to join, and the rich and extensive territory of that city was won for the League. The tyrants, abandoned by Macedonia, were no longer able to withstand the power of Achaia; they yielded voluntarily or under compulsion to the tide of democracy; so that when Demetrius II sank into his grave after ten years of feeble sovereignty, and Antigonus Doson (the Promiser) undertook the government of Macedonia during the minority of King Philip III, the Achæans ruled over Hermione, Phlius, and the greater part of Arcadia, counted the rich island of Ægina among their possessions, had induced Argos to join the League after a long struggle with three successive tyrants, and had entered into an alliance with Athens (whence, by the

[232-227 B.C.]

assistance of Aratus, the Macedonian garrisons had been forced to withdraw) on equal terms though without reciprocal civil rights. Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Elis were the only towns that remained subject to the Ætolians, who, however, had meanwhile extended their dominion over part of Thessaly; and Sparta, just awakened from her long trance and invigorated by a new birth from within, was striving to regain the ascendancy which had been hers in the glorious days of old. Out of these elements was bred the fatal conflict which broke all that was left of the strength of Greece at the very moment when the Romans began to intermeddle in the domestic concerns of warring states.^e

SPARTA UNDER CLEOMENES

Lacedæmon had, by this time, exchanged poverty and hardy discipline for opulence and voluptuous manners. The public meals, that last pledge of Spartan frugality and temperance, were discountenanced by the rulers of the state, and fell into disrepute and disuse. One or two princes, who endeavoured to stem the torrent of corruption, suffered deposition, exile, and even death. The laws of Lycurgus were totally disregarded. The lands were all in possession of a few families, who lived in the greatest splendour, whilst the rest of the Spartans, stripped of their patrimony, were doomed to the greatest indigence. The efforts of Agis IV., the king, to enforce the sumptuary laws, to cancel all debts, and to make a new division of lands, were opposed by the rich, and at last punished with death, on pretence of a design to alter the government.

In such a situation of affairs, Cleomenes ascended the Spartan throne, a prince who united integrity of heart with martial spirit and a love of glory. He found, on his accession, both the internal constitution and the public affairs of Sparta in the utmost confusion. Domestic distress, with its concomitant despondency of spirit, had caused throughout Laconia a universal depopulation. Instead of natives sufficient to occupy the thirty-nine thousand shares into which Lycurgus had originally divided the land, only seven hundred families of the Spartan race were now to be found; and, of these, about six hundred, sunk into abject penury and wretchedness, were incapable of exerting any degree of vigour in the public service. The slaves, too, had many of them perished through want of employment and subsistence, while others had been carried off, in great numbers, by the enemies of Sparta. Such was the miserable decay of both public and private virtue! Cleomenes, actuated by his natural disposition to arms, as well as by the representations already mentioned of the Ætolians, in order to revive the martial spirit of the Spartans, attacked Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos, cities of Arcadia. Having reduced these under his obedience, he marched without delay against a certain castle in the district of Megalopolis, which commanded on that side the entrance into Laconia.

Immediately upon this act of hostility, the Achæan states declared war against the Spartans. The Spartan king forthwith took the field, with what troops he could muster, and ravaged the territories of the cities in alliance with Achaia. With five thousand men he advanced against the Achæan general Aratus, who, perceiving the resolution of the Spartans, declined an engagement, though at the head of twenty thousand. The retreat of Aratus, determined the Eleans, who had never been steady in the interests of Achaia, openly to declare against her. The Achæans attempted to

chastise this defection; but they were routed by Cleomenes at Lycæum, near the Elean borders; and totally overthrown by him in the ensuing campaign, near Leuctra. Pursuing his good fortune, he reduced several of the towns of Arcadia, which he garrisoned with his Lacedæmonian troops.

He returned to Sparta with the mercenaries only, and cut off the ephori, whom he considered as troublesome to himself, and oppressive to the Spartan subjects, by assassination; a course which he endeavoured to justify, by arraigning the unconstitutional establishment of this order of magistrates, and a recital of several acts of iniquity. He now seized on the administration of justice, and re-established the agrarian and sumptuary laws of Lycurgus, which he enforced by his own example. Having thus made himself master of Sparta, he diverted that energy to foreign enterprises, which might otherwise have broken out in domestic sedition. He plundered the territories of Megalopolis, forced the Achæan lines at Hecatombæum, and obtained a complete victory. The Achæan army, composed of the flower of their nation, were almost all cut off. The Mantineans, having slaughtered the Achæan garrison stationed in their city, put themselves under the protection of the Spartans. The same spirit of defection and revolt appeared in most of the other cities of Peloponnesus. In this extremity, they sued for peace to Cleomenes; but Aratus, who had for some time declined to take the lead in the public affairs of Achaia, now resumed his authority; and, by insisting on such terms as the high-spirited Cleomenes could not accept, contrived to prevent that peace which his countrymen wished for.

Both Aratus and Cleomenes wished to unite all the nations of Peloponnesus into one commonwealth, and by that means to form such a bulwark for the liberties of Greece, as might set all foreign power at defiance. But to what people the supreme direction of the common affairs should belong, was the question. Even Aratus, so much above the love of money, showed himself, on this occasion, the slave of ambition; and, rather than see a superior in power, determined to involve everything in confusion.

The interruption of the negotiations for peace raised a general ferment throughout Peloponnesus; the conduct of Aratus fired the martial ardour of Cleomenes, and excited jealousies in different states; nor could the Achæans obtain any assistance from the Athenians, the Ætolians, or the Argives. Corinth was on the point of surrendering to the Spartan king; and even Sicyon must have been lost, had not a timely discovery prevented an intended conspiracy. Here we may remark the extreme quickness with which the Grecian states entered into any confederacy that was formed for humbling whatever power preponderated in Greece: a proof, that, however their manners were corrupted, their sentiments of liberty and the balance of power were not yet wholly subverted.


ANTIGONUS CALLED IN

Resentment against Cleomenes induced Aratus to entertain the project of calling in, for the destruction of Sparta, the aid of Antigonus of Macedon. But in Greece this attempt was generally odious, and Antigonus was averse from all interference in Grecian affairs, not being easily dazzled by the splendour of ambition. But the last and greatest of these difficulties Aratus surmounted by various artifices, and entered into a compact with Antigonus, the conditions whereof were that the citadel of Corinth should be delivered

[223-221 B.C.]

into the hands of the king; that he should be at the head of the Achæan confederacy, superintend their councils, and direct their operations; that his army should be supported at their expense. From these articles it is evident, that the liberties of Achaia were now no more, and that the sovereign of this country was Antigonus.¹

This transaction roused the indignation of the Peloponnesian states: they looked to Cleomenes as the only protector of their liberties. That hero, upon hearing that the Macedonians were in motion, took possession of a pass on the Oean Mountains, which commanded the Corinthian Isthmus; but the Achæans having surprised Argos, he was forced to



GREEK CUIRASS AND HELMETS

(In the British Museum)

abandon it, and to leave it open for the Macedonians. The Achæans now resumed their superiority in Peloponnesus, and most of the cities in that peninsula were constrained to submit to their power. The efforts of Cleomenes to restore the liberties of Peloponnesus, and to protect, of course, those of the rest of Greece, equal the most famed exploits of antiquity. But the wary Antigonus, rich in treasure, artfully protracted the war, and suffered his impetuous adversary to waste his force in vain. Cleomenes was forced to retreat to Sellasia, in order to cover Sparta.

Antigonus, therefore, encamped at a distance, on the plain below, in order to watch the motions of the enemy, and to act according to circumstances. Cleomenes, reduced to the greatest distress for want of provisions, was forced to throw open his entrenchments, and, without further delay, to come to an engagement. All his skill and valour, which were eminently displayed on this occasion, could not save him from a complete defeat (221 B.C.). He fled first to Sparta, and from thence to Egypt; where, after various adventures, the loftiness of his spirit, which could not brook the indignities offered to him by the ministers of Ptolemy Philopator, brought him to an honourable but untimely end.^f

Having eluded the vigilance of his guards he made a sally with his friends, thirteen in number, all with drawn swords, and raised the cry of liberty. The Alexandrian populace stared and applauded, as at a scene on the stage, but with as little thought of taking any part in the action. The Spartans killed the governor of the city, and another courtier, but after an ineffectual attempt

[¹ Freeman² calls Aratus "the Creator, the Preserver, and the Destroyer" of the League and bitterly compares his surrender of Corinth with Cavour's delivery of Savoy and Nice to Napoleon III.]

to break open the prison in the citadel, finding themselves universally shunned, they abandoned their forlorn hope, and turned their swords against their own hearts. Panteus, the dearest of the king's friends, consented at his request to survive until he saw that the others had breathed their last. Ptolemy, as soon as he had learned what had happened, ordered all the women and children belonging to the deceased to be put to death; and the young wife of Panteus is said to have paid the like pious offices to Cratesiclea, who was forced to witness the butchery of her two grandsons, as Cleomenes had received from her husband. The body of Cleomenes was flayed and hung on a cross, until, if we may believe Plutarch, an extraordinary occurrence awakened Ptolemy's superstitious fears, gave occasion for new expiatory rites in the palace, and induced the Alexandrians to venerate Cleomenes as a hero.

Such indeed he was, when measured with them. As we turn from them to the proper subject of this history, we feel, as it were, that we are beginning again to breathe a healthier atmosphere: and we carry away a strengthened conviction, that great as were the evils which Greece suffered from the ill-regulated passion for liberty, it was still better to live there, than under the sceptre of the Ptolemies—among a people who can hardly be said to have a history, in any higher sense than a herd of animals, always prone, unless when goaded into fury.^d

During the absence of Antigonus, a multitude of Illyrians, and other barbarians, made an irruption into Macedon, and committed great devastation. This irruption hastened his return into his own dominions. In a decisive battle, the barbarians were defeated; but the Macedonian king, by straining his voice during the engagement, burst a blood-vessel. The consequent effusion of blood threw him into a languishing state, and he died in the space of a few days, lamented by all Greece.

Antigonus II was succeeded by Philip, the son of Demetrius, the last of the Macedonian kings of that name; a prince only in the seventeenth year of his age, intelligent, affable, munificent, and attentive to all the duties of the royal station. This excellent character was formed by a good natural disposition, cultivated by the instructions and example of Antigonus, who appointed him his successor on the Macedonian throne.

THE SOCIAL WAR

The jealousy which the Ætolians had long entertained of the Achæan states, was increased by the importance which they had assumed from their alliance with Macedon. No sooner were they relieved from the dread of Antigonus, than they ravaged the Achæan coast, and committed depredations on all the neighbouring countries. Aratus having opposed to them the Achæan forces in vain, invoked and obtained the aid of the king of Macedon. Philip promised that as soon as he should have settled the affairs of his own kingdom, he would repair to Corinth, in order to meet the convention of the states in alliance with Achaia, that he might have an opportunity of settling with them a plan of future operations. In the meantime, the Ætolians, making a fresh irruption into Peloponnesus, sacked Cynætha, a city of Arcadia, put most of the inhabitants to the sword, and laid the place in ruins. The convention of the Achæan confederates, now assembled at Corinth, unanimously agreed that unless the Ætolians should make reparation, war should be declared against them, and the direction of it committed to the king of Macedon. Hence the origin of the Social War, so called

[221-216 B.C.]

from the association entered into by the several states engaged against Ætolia.

Philip commenced his operations with the siege of Ambracas, a fortress which commanded an extensive territory, belonging of right to Epirus, but now in the hands of the Ætolians. Having reduced this fortress, he restored it to the Epirots, and prepared to carry the war into Ætolia. The Ætolian spirit was not daunted either by the loss of Ambracas or the threats of Philip. They invaded Macedon, and made incursions into Achaia, which they reduced to the greatest distress. The mercenaries in the Achæan service had mutinied for want of pay; the Peloponnesian confederates became spiritless or disaffected; even the Messenians, in whose cause chiefly Achaia, had, at the beginning, taken up arms, were afraid to act against the Ætolians: whilst the Spartans, notwithstanding their engagements, at the late conventions, to Achaia, had now massacred, or sent into exile, all such of their own citizens as were in the interest of the Achæans, and openly declared against them. For the Spartans, amidst their greatest humiliation, had ever been impatient of the domination of Achaia, to which the haughtiness of that republic had, in all probability, very much contributed.

A year had elapsed since the alliance had been formed against Achaia, when Philip of Macedon, in the depth of winter, set out with the utmost secrecy to Corinth, where a part of his forces were stationed. He surprised a party of Eleans, who had gone forth to ravage the Sicyonian territories, and reduced Psophis, a stronghold within the confines of Arcadia, of which the Eleans had taken possession. He plundered Elis, one of the finest regions in Greece, in respect to cultivation, and rich in every kind of rural wealth. He next subdued under his power Triphylia, a district of Peloponnesus to the southward of Elis, and wrested the Ætolian yoke from the necks of the Messenians. Philip made a temperate use of all his victories. He granted peace to all who sued for it; and the whole of his conduct seemed to be directed by the same generous motives which had formerly directed that of Antigonus. But in the midst of these fair appearances, Philip began to manifest latent seeds of ambition. He restrained the pride and power of his ministers, who had been appointed to their offices by his predecessor Antigonus; and supported Eperatus in the election of general of Achaia, in opposition to Aratus. In order to counterbalance this unpopular measure, and to strengthen himself in the affections of the Achæan people, he besieged Teichos, and having taken that fortress, restored it to the Achæans, to whom it belonged. He also made an inroad into Elis, and presented the Dymeans and the cities in the neighbourhood with all the plunder. He now imagined that the wealth and vigour of the Achæan republic were at his disposal; but the new general had not provided any magazines, and the treasury was exhausted. Philip now affected to place great confidence in Aratus. By the advice of this statesman, he made an attempt on the island of Cephallenia, an island in the Ionian Sea, near the coast of Peloponnesus, and the great resort of the Ætolian pirates. His attempt, after it had been carried on almost to success, was baffled by the treachery of his ministers.

He now, following the advice of Aratus, invaded and ravaged Ætolia itself, returned into Peloponnesus, laid waste Laconia, and, flushed with success, meditated the subjection of all Greece, and a junction with Hannibal against the Romans. Aratus in vain attempted to dissuade him from this project. He sent ambassadors to the Carthaginian general, but they were intercepted, soon after their landing in Italy: as they gave out, however, that they were going to Rome, they, in a little time, obtained their release, and

made their way to Hannibal, with whom they concluded a treaty. On their return they were again intercepted, and sent with all their papers to Rome. But Philip despatched other ambassadors, and a ratification of the treaty was obtained. It was stipulated that Philip should furnish a fleet of two hundred ships, to be employed in harassing the Italian coasts; and that he should also assist Hannibal with a considerable body of land-forces. In return for this assistance, when Rome and Italy should be finally reduced, which were to remain in the possession of the Carthaginians, Hannibal was to pass into Epirus at the head of a Carthaginian army, to be employed as Philip should desire; and, having made a conquest of the whole country, to give up to him such parts of it as lay convenient for Macedon.

In consequence of this agreement, the Macedonian king entered the Ionian Gulf, with a large fleet, fell down to the coast of Epirus, took Oricum, on the coast of Epirus, a defenceless seaport, but from which there was a short passage to Italy, and laid siege to Apollonia; but surprised and defeated by the Romans, secretly retreated homeward across the mountains.

ALLIANCE WITH ROME

The Romans, humbled by the victorious arms of Hannibal, were not in a condition in which they might prosecute a war with Macedon; they therefore determined, if possible, to raise up enemies against Philip in Greece, that he might be employed at home in the defence of his own dominions. They accordingly made overtures for this purpose to the Ætolians, who, confiding in the flattering declarations of the Roman ambassador, hastened to conclude a treaty, of which the following were the principal conditions: That the Ætolians should immediately commence hostilities against Philip by land, which the Romans were to support by a fleet of twenty galleys; that whatever conquests might be made, from the confines of Ætolia to Corcyra, the cities, buildings, and territory, should belong to the Ætolians, but every other kind of plunder to the Romans. The Spartans and Eleans, with other states, were included in this alliance; and the war commenced with the reduction of the island of Zacynthus, which, as an earnest of Roman generosity and good faith, was immediately annexed to the dominions of Ætolia. These transactions were dated about 208 B.C.

It has already been observed, that Philip aimed at the subjection of all Greece. Aratus, who would have opposed him in this design, he took off by poison.¹ His interest in Greece was now strengthened by the introduction of the Romans: he was regarded by the Greeks as the champion of freedom, and as their defence against the Romans, whom they still considered and denominated barbarians. Not only the Greeks northward

[¹ "This infamous action," says Polybius,^b "was not for some time discovered to the world; for the poison was not of that kind which procures immediate death; but was one of those which weaken the habit of the body, and destroy life by slow degrees. Aratus himself was very sensible of the injury that he had received. 'Such, Cephalo,' he said to a favourite servant, 'is the reward of the friendship which I have had for Philip.' So great and excellent a thing is moderation, which disposed the sufferer, and not the author of the injury, to feel the greatest shame when he found that all the glorious actions which he had shared with Philip, in order to promote the service of that prince, had been at last so basely recompensed.

"Such was the end of this magistrate, who received after his death, not from his own country alone, but from the whole republic of the Achæans, all the honours that were due a man who had so often held the administration of their government, and performed such signal services for the State. For they decreed sacrifices to him, with the other honours that belong to heroes, and, in a word, omitting nothing that could serve to render his name immortal."]

[208-205 B.C.]

of the Corinthian isthmus, but even the Achæan League, prepared to take up arms in his support. Encouraged by these allies, he acted with uncommon vigour: he carried the war into Illyricum with success; marched to the relief of the Acarnanians, who were threatened by the Ætolians, and fortified himself in Thessaly. The Ætolians, notwithstanding these advantages gained over them by Philip, and that they were afterwards defeated by him in two hot engagements, remained undaunted, and prosecuted the war with an amazing obstinacy. The neighbouring states, now jealous of the successes of Philip, endeavoured to mediate a peace; nor did the Macedonian show himself unwilling to treat for that purpose.

A peace was ready to be concluded, when the Romans, deeply interested in the prolongation of war, sent their fleet to support the Ætolians; who, encouraged also by the prospect of acquiring another ally, Attalus, king of Pergamus, boldly set Philip at defiance, and talked of terms to which they knew he would not submit. The moderation of Philip strengthened the indignation of his Greek confederates against the Ætolians; a disposition which he soon found an opportunity of calling forth into action. Intelligence being brought to him, whilst he was assisting at the Nemean games, that the Romans had landed, and were laying waste the country from Corinth to Sicyon, he instantly set out, attacked and repulsed the enemy, and, before the conclusion of the games, returned again to Argos; an achievement which greatly distinguished him in the eyes of all Greece, assembled at that solemnity. After other vigorous, though unsuccessful, exertions against the Romans, he was called back, by domestic insurrections, to Macedon.

The Achæan states, though deprived of the powerful aid of the Macedonian king, still carried on their military operations under the conduct of Philopœmen of Megalopolis, in Arcadia, an enthusiast in the cause of liberty from his earliest years, and one who had been active in bringing over several of the Arcadians to join the Achæan League. Soon after the death of Aratus, to whom he was as much superior in military, as he was inferior in political abilities, he attained the chief sway in the Achæan councils. He saw with concern the humiliating condition to which a foreign yoke had reduced his countrymen, and conceived the noble resolution of relieving them from it. In the character of general of Achaia, he improved their discipline, inured them to hardship and toil, and gave them weightier armour, and more powerful weapons. The effect of this discipline soon appeared: the armies of Ætolia and Elis, which attacked them in Philip's absence, were totally defeated. In the meantime, the Romans, supported by Attalus, attacked Eubœa, of all the provinces of Greece, though an island, one of the most considerable for fertility of soil, extent of territory, and advantage of situation. Philip, on his part, kept a watchful eye on his enemies: his military preparations were vigorous, and not without success. The war was prolonged, with various success, for six years, when the Romans and Attalus retired from Greece. A peace was now concluded between the Ætolians and Romans, on the one part, and Philip on the other, whose successful ambition led him, by a natural progress, to attack the dominions of the king of Egypt.

The Romans, whose policy it was never to have more enemies on their hands than one at a time, had consented to a peace with Macedon, because they were involved in a war with Carthage; but that war being now at an end, they eagerly embraced the first pretexts they could find for a rupture with the prince, whose successes had excited a jealousy of his growing

power. Complaints being brought before that political and powerful people from Attalus, from the Rhodians, from the Athenians, and from Egypt, they readily determined to improve so favourable a juncture. And first, they declared themselves the guardians of the young king of Egypt. Marcus Æmilius was despatched from Rome, to announce to Philip the intentions of the Roman senate. The ambassador found the king before Abydos, at the head of an army flushed with victory. Philip was not insensible of the advantage of his situation; yet the Roman, undaunted by the deportment of the monarch, charged him with dignity and firmness, not to attack the possessions of the crown of Egypt; to abstain from war with any of the Grecian states; and to submit the matters in dispute between him, Attalus, and the Rhodians, to fair arbitration. "The boastful inexperience of youth," said the king, "thy gracefulness of person, and, still more, the name of Roman, inspire thee with this haughtiness. It is my wish, that Rome may observe the faith of treaties; but should she be inclined again to hazard an appeal to arms, I trust that, with the protection of the gods, I shall render the Macedonian name as formidable as that of the Roman." These things, with the cruel destruction of the city and inhabitants of Abydos, happened about 199 B.C.

Philip, like other ambitious princes, was now on terms of hostility with most of the neighbouring nations. Rome, on the contrary, was in a situation the most favourable that could be imagined to her ambition: Carthage was subdued; in Italy, all remains of insurrection had subsided; Sicily, in fertility and opulence, at that time the pride of the western world, with most of the adjacent islands, was annexed to her dominions; and even those nations which had not yet felt the force of her arms, heard, with terror, the fame of a people not to be subdued even by a Hannibal. About three years, therefore, after peace had been made with Philip, the Romans despatched a fleet, under the conduct of the consul Sulpicius, for the relief of Athens, then besieged by the Macedonians.

Philip was moved with resentment, and attempted to wreak his vengeance on Athens. Disappointed in his hope of surprising that city, he laid waste the country around it, destroying even the temples, which he had hitherto affected to venerate, and mangling and defacing every work of art in such a manner, that there scarcely remained, according to the Roman historian Livy, a vestige of symmetry or beauty. Here we have an opportunity of remarking the contrast between the genius of Athens, in the times of Philip, the father of Alexander, and that Philip who now filled the throne of Macedon. The Athenians harassed by the arms of this last mentioned prince, had recourse to the only weapons with which they were now acquainted—the invectives of their orators, and the acrimony of their popular decrees. It was resolved, that "Philip should forever be an object of execration to the Athenian people; that whatever statues had been raised to him, or to any of the Macedonian princes, should be thrown down; that whatever had been enacted in their favour should be rescinded; that every place in which any inscription, or memorial, had been set up in praise of Philip, should be thenceforth held profane and unclean; that in all their solemn feasts, when their priests implored a blessing on Athens and her allies, they should pronounce curses on the Macedonian, his kindred, his arms by sea and land, and the whole Macedonian name and nation: in a word, that whatever had been decreed in ancient times against the Pisistratidæ, should operate in full force against Philip; and that whoever should propose any mitigation of the resolutions now formed, should be adjudged a

[200-193 B.C.]

traitor to his country, and be punished with death." The flatteries of the Athenians to their allies were in proportion to their impotent execrations of the Macedonian monarch. Such is the connection between meanness of spirit and the loss of freedom!

GREEK FREEDOM PROCLAIMED

A languid and indecisive war had been carried on for the space of two years between the Macedonians and Romans, during the consulship of Sulpicius and that of his successor Villius, not much to the honour of these commanders, when the command of the Roman army devolved to the new consul, Titus Quintius Flaminius, not indeed unacquainted, being a Roman, with the science of war, but more remarkable for his skill and address in negotiation than for military genius. The Roman consul, by the vigour of his arms, but still more by the dexterity with which he carried into execution the profound policy of his nation, brought Greece to the lowest state of humiliation. By detaching the most considerable of the Grecian states, particularly the Ætolians and the Achæans, from their connection with Macedonia; by ingratiating himself with the Grecian states, whom he managed, after they had become his confederates, with infinite artifice; by making a pompous but insidious proclamation of their freedom at the Isthmian and Nemean games, he reduced the Macedonian king to the necessity of first seeking a truce, and afterwards of accepting peace on these mortifying conditions, which were entirely approved by the Roman senate:

"That all the Greek cities, both in Asia and in Europe, should be free, and restored to the enjoyment of their own laws.

"That Philip, before the next Isthmian games, should deliver up to the Romans all the Greeks he had in any part of his dominions, and evacuate all the places he possessed either in Greece or in Asia.

"That he should give up all the prisoners and deserters.

"That he should surrender all his decked ships of every kind; five small vessels, and his galley of sixteen banks of oars, excepted.

"That he should pay the Romans a thousand talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000], one half down, the rest in ten equal annual payments.

"And that, as a security for the performance of these regulations, he should give hostages, his son Demetrius being one." The date of this peace was 193 B.C.

Flaminius having made various decrees in favour of the several Grecian communities in confederacy with the Romans; having expelled Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, from Argos; and having obtained the freedom of the Roman slaves in Greece, returned to Rome, to the great satisfaction of all Greece; and withdrew, as he had promised, all the Roman garrisons.

THE ÆTOLIANS CRUSHED

Antiochus, king of Syria, was renowned for the magnificence of his court, great treasures, numerous armies, military talents, and political wisdom. He had visited the coasts of the Hellespont, formerly subject to the kings of Syria; he had even passed over into Thrace, where he had likewise claims; and he was preparing to rebuild Lysimachia, in order to make it again the seat of government in the countries anciently possessed by Lysimachus.

The pretensions of so powerful and politic a prince to countries which the Romans had already marked as their own, excited the jealousy of that ambitious people. They gave him repeated notification, that, "by the treaty with Macedon, the Grecian cities in Asia, as well as Europe, had been declared free; that Rome expected he would conform to that declaration"; and further, "that henceforth Asia was to be the boundary of his dominions; and that any attempt to make a settlement in Europe, would be considered by Rome as an act of hostility." Antiochus, at first, manifested a disposition to peace, and, in order to obtain it, would have made large concessions, could anything less than the humiliation of the crown of Syria have satisfied Roman ambition.

But Hannibal, the sworn enemy of Rome, no sooner heard of his meditating a war against the Romans, than he made his escape from Carthage to the Syrian court, and urged him to arms. The Ætoliens, too, solicited him to vindicate the cause of Greece, notwithstanding the delusive show of liberty granted by Rome, more enthralled in reality than at any former period. Hannibal recommended an invasion of Italy, where alone, in his judgment, Rome was vulnerable. With only eleven thousand land-forces, and a suitable naval armament, he offered to carry the war into the heart of that country; provided Antiochus would, at the same time, appear at the head of an army on the western coast of Greece, that, by making a show of an intended invasion from that quarter, he might divert the attention and divide the strength of the Romans. The Ætoliens, on the other hand, told him, that if Greece were made the seat of war, there would be, throughout all that country, a general insurrection against the power of the Romans. Antiochus, having adopted the plan of the Ætoliens in preference to that of Hannibal, entered Greece with a small force, and being disappointed in his expectations of succour from the Grecian states, was defeated at the straits of Thermopylæ by Manlius Acilius Glabrio, the Roman consul. He escaped with only five hundred men to Chalcis, from whence he retreated with precipitation to his Asiatic dominions, 187 years before the Christian era.

The Ætoliens having rejected the terms of peace offered to them by the Romans, the consul pressed forward the siege of Heraclea, which soon surrendered at discretion. He was preparing to besiege Naupactas, a seaport on the Corinthian Gulf, of the greatest importance to the Ætolian nation, who now decided to submit themselves to the faith of the Roman people, and sent deputies to intimate this determination to the Roman consul. Acilius, catching the words of the deputies, said, "Is it then true, that the Ætoliens submit themselves to the faith of Rome?" Phæneas, who was at the head of the Ætolian deputation, replied, that they did. "Then," continued the consul, "let no Ætolian, from henceforth, on any account, public or private, presume to pass over into Asia; and let Dicearchus, with all who have had any share in his revolt, be delivered into my hands."

"The Ætoliens," interrupted Phæneas, "in submitting to the faith of the Romans, meant to rely upon their generosity, but not to yield themselves up to servitude: neither the honour of Ætolia, nor the customs and laws of Greece, will allow us to comply with your requisition." "It is insolent prevarication," answered the consul, "to mention the honour of Ætolia and the customs and laws of Greece; you ought even to be put in chains." The Ætoliens, exasperated even to madness at this imperious treatment of their deputies and nation, were encouraged in their disposition to vindicate their liberties by arms, by the expectation of succours from Asia and from Macedon; but this expectation was disappointed, and they

[190-188 B.C.]

were reduced to the necessity of sending ambassadors to Rome, to implore the clemency of the Roman senate. The only conditions they could obtain were, either to pay a thousand talents [£200,000 or \$1,000,000], a sum which, they declared, far exceeded their abilities, and to have neither friend nor foe, but with the approbation of Rome, or to submit to the pleasure of the senate. The Ætolians desired to know, what they were to understand by "submitting to the pleasure of the senate": an explanation being refused, they were obliged to return uncertain of their fate. The war with Rome was renewed; but the Roman vigour and policy prevailed in the unequal contest, and the Ætolians were again obliged to apply to the consul, in the most submissive manner, for mercy. The conditions granted to them were extremely hard: they were heavily fined, obliged to give up several of their cities and territories to the Romans, and to deliver to the consul forty hostages, to be chosen by him, none under twelve, or above forty years of age. But one express condition comprehended everything that imperious power might think fit to impose: the Ætolians were to "pay observance to the empire and majesty of the Roman people."

The predominant power of the Achæans in the Peloponnesus, now became the object of Roman jealousy and ambition. Though confederated with Achaia, the Peloponnesian cities retained each of them peculiar privileges, and a species of independent sovereignty. No sooner was peace concluded with Ætolia, than Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, to whom the conduct of the Ætolian War had been committed on the expiration of the consulship of Acilius, took up his residence in the island of Cephallenia, that he might be ready, upon the first appearance of any dispute in Achaia, to pass over into Peloponnesus, and improve every dissension, for the aggrandisement of the Roman Republic. Such an opportunity soon presented itself: the congress of the Achæan states had always been held at Ægium; but Philopœmen, now the Achæan general, having determined to divide among all the cities of the League the advantages of a general convention, had named Argos for the next diet. This innovation the inhabitants of Ægium opposed, and appealed to the Roman consul for his decision. Another pretext for passing over into Greece was also soon offered to Fulvius. The Lacedæmonian exiles, who had been banished in the days of the tyrants, and never restored, resided in towns along the coast of Laconia, protected by Achæan garrisons, cut off the inhabitants of Lacedæmon from all intercourse with the seacoast. One of those maritime towns was attacked by the Spartans in the night-time, but defended by the exiles, with the assistance of the Achæan soldiery. Philopœmen represented this attempt of the Spartans as an insult on the whole Achæan body. He obtained a decree in favour of the exiles, commanding the Lacedæmonians, on pain of being treated as enemies, to deliver up the authors of that outrage. This decree the Lacedæmonians refused to obey. They dissolved their alliance with Achaia, and offered their city to the Romans. In revenge of this, Philopœmen, notwithstanding the advanced season, laid waste the territories of Lacedæmon.†

GREECE AT THE MERCY OF "FRIENDLY" ROME

The bond which had formerly existed between Macedonia and Greece, giving the history of both, after the time of Philip and the Great Alexander, a common road to travel, had in the course of time disappeared. The Greeks had not desired this bond with Macedonia, though nothing else

could possibly have won the townships their independence. For, while the kings of Macedonia proceeded rigorously in carrying out their desire of building for themselves a suzerainty in Greece, yet for all that the ultimate end of pursuit was not the enslaving of Greece, but her amalgamation with Macedonia. The Greeks would have been as free as the Macedonians were under the monarchy, and it was no mean degree of freedom they enjoyed.

An Asiatic despotism could take no root on this soil, it could not spring up spontaneously. Rome certainly was capable of exercising such power, since she commanded forces such as would not have been at the disposal of a king of Macedonia and Greece. But the Greeks had worked against the amalgamation with Macedonia as though it had been the worst of all fates. Now, as a reward, they accepted the rule of the cruel Romans, who revealed their character even more and more clearly through the veiling cloud of their friendship, their alliance, and their altruistic enthusiasm for freedom.

There is a silence come over the land of Greece, since the result of the Roman war against Syria, the silence of bondage. Zacynthus, Apollonia, Epidamnus, and certain other points in the Greek world, might thereafter at once be considered and treated as subject lands. Altogether the Romans during this time moved nearer. Istria was conquered and made a province. Even Ætolia was not talked of in Philip's last years; here too, stillness had come. Not one of the many little leagues, which now divided Greece dared or could dare to refuse anything the Romans demanded—if, that is to say, the Romans attached any importance to it. And of what kind these commands were one may still judge from isolated facts appearing in the detached fragments from which we have to construct the history of Greece during this period. Thebes had to receive again within her walls the murderer of the Bœotarch, Brachyllas, because he murdered for Rome's sake and was a friend of Rome.

From only one quarter of Greece did there sound any note of life and activity—from Achaia; and the Romans did, as an exception, think it worth while to concern themselves about Achaia somewhat, and to take action, when occasion offered, that her dissolution might be hastened.

But such life or activity as may still stir in the Achæan League is no longer a cheering spectacle in any way. Those of its men who are best calculated to win respect, because they are not in the pay of the Romans, and still cherish thoughts of independence, prove themselves to be, if not without real worth, yet certainly without caution or insight. Philopœmen and Lycortas stand highest among them. Philopœmen himself is said to have perceived that extinction under the Roman rule was become altogether inevitable, and that the only thing left to do was to endeavour to put it off as long as possible. That was the right view for a man to take, unless he had determined to evade bondage by a voluntary death. But Philopœmen, it would appear, did not hold the view attributed to him. He thought the bond might grow stronger again some day, and, if it were necessary, assert itself in arms against the Romans. For why else, if this were not his idea, should there have been that madness and murder in Sparta? The old Spartan life had to be stamped out, the new citizens must be strangled, because the old Sparta and the strong Sparta would not join the Achæans and so the Peloponnese remained divided. With the idea that the unity of the Peloponnese was gained at last, and that the bond was solid and complete, Philopœmen and his friends may have rested from the festival of murder in Sparta, which now found herself once more forced into the Achæan League.

[189-183 B.C.]

Obviously the heads of the League thought they might move more freely. They ventured to mention the League's independence, they continued to disobey Roman commands. In this they made one of two mistakes. Either they thought the senate really desired their independence, or else they imagined that they also were still something considerable and were capable, if necessary, of defending themselves in arms. It would not have suited the Romans just then to appear again in Greece with an army, and so, for a time, though only a very short time, they permitted the high and empty words of the Achæans. And in the end the sword was not in the least required to bring them back to heel, only a stern command from the senate, and at once the liberty craze of the Achæans tumbled pitifully into nothing.

The trifling differences which sprang from the endeavours of the Achæans and the counter endeavours of the Spartans, would be insignificant did they not conduce to our knowledge of the Roman method. The arts which were employed against Macedonia were also employed against the Achæans. The small should be stricken like the great, so that in the end both might be completely and easily taken. The Romans must have seen with pleasure the perverse measures to which Philopœmen and the Achæans resorted in order to force the Peloponnesus to the unity of the League.

The Romans, thus invited to act as umpires in Greece, found means to break the strength of the commonwealth of Achaia, by seducing its confederate states — a conduct which, in the eyes of pure morality, must appear enormously treacherous; but which if, in the ambitious designs of states and princes, the certain attainment of the end be considered as a sufficient justification of the means, must be deemed refined policy. By the intrigues of Roman emissaries, too, a party of Messenians took up arms against the Achæans; and Philopœmen, hastening to suppress the insurgents, fell into their hands, and was put to death.



BACCHUS
(After Hope)

ROME AGAINST PHILIP

During these transactions in Greece, the Romans, jealous of the increasing power of their ally, Philip of Macedon, sought an occasion of quarrelling with him, and, agreeably to their usual policy, encouraged every complaint, and supported the pretensions of his enemies; prepared to plunder them, too, in their turns, when the Macedonian power should no longer be formidable. The small cantons or communities of Thessaly, in which he had re-established his authority, were now encouraged to assert their independence; and the Macedonian king was called to account for those very outrages which he had committed on the side of the Romans. Commissioners were appointed for the settlement of differences. Philip was

required by them to evacuate Ænus and Maronea, which were claimed by Eumenes. These were cities on the Hellespont, which, from their maritime situation, afforded many advantages. The complexion and designs of the Roman commissioners were obvious; and Philip, judging it vain to keep measures with men determined at any rate to take part with his adversaries, expostulated with them with great boldness on the injustice, treachery, and ingratitude of their nation.

In this temper of mind he wreaked his revenge on the Maroneans, whose solicitations, he supposed, had been employed against him. A body of his fiercest Thracian mercenaries being introduced into Maronea, on the night before the Macedonian garrison was to march out, on pretence of a sudden tumult, put to the sword all the inhabitants suspected of favouring the Roman interest, without distinction of condition, age, or sex, and left the place drenched in the blood of its citizens. The Romans threatened to revenge this massacre, and Philip was obliged to send his second son, Demetrius, to Rome, to make an apology. The Roman senate, with a view to debauch the filial affection of Demetrius and to draw him over to the interests of Rome, told him that, on his account, whatever had been improper in his father's conduct should be passed over; and that, from the confidence they had in him, they were well assured Philip would, for the future, perform everything that justice required: that ambassadors should be sent to see all matters properly settled: and that, from the regard they bore to the son, they were willing to excuse the father. This message excited in the breast of Philip a suspicion of the connection formed between Rome and Demetrius; which suspicion was inflamed by the insinuations and dark artifices of his eldest son Perseus, a prince, according to the Roman writers, of an intriguing and turbulent disposition, sordid, ungenerous, and subtle.

Perseus and Demetrius were both in the bloom of life; the former aged about thirty years when Demetrius returned from Rome, but born of a mother of mean descent, a seamstress of Argos, and of so questionable a character, as to make it doubtful whether he was really Philip's son. Demetrius was five years younger, born of his queen, a lady of royal extraction. Hence Perseus had conceived a jealousy of his brother, and was insidiously active to undermine him in the royal favour. He accused Demetrius to the king of a design to assassinate him. Philip, familiarised as he was to acts of blood, was struck with horror at the story of Perseus. Retiring into the inner apartment of his palace, with two of his nobles, he sat in solemn judgment on his two sons, being under the agonising necessity, whether the charge could be proved or disproved, of finding one of them guilty. Distracted by his doubts, Philip sent Philocles and Apelles, two noblemen, to proceed as his ambassadors to Rome, with instructions to find out, if possible, with what persons Demetrius corresponded, and what were the ends he had in view.

Perseus, profoundly artful, and having the advantage of being the heir apparent to the Macedonian crown, secretly gained over to his interest his father's ambassadors, who returned to the king with an account that Demetrius was held in the highest estimation at Rome, and that his views appeared to have been of an unjustifiable kind; delivering, at the same time, a letter, which they pretended to have received from Quintus Flaminius. The handwriting of the Roman, and the impression of his signet, the king was well acquainted with; and the exactness of the imitation induced him to give entire credit to the contents, more especially as Flaminius had formerly

[179-168 B.C.]

written in commendation of Demetrius. The present letter was written in a different strain. The author acknowledged the criminality of Demetrius, who indeed, he confessed, aimed at the throne; but for whom, as he had not meditated the death of any of his own blood, he interceded with the monarch. The issue of this atrocious intrigue was truly tragical: Demetrius, found guilty of designs against the crown and the life of his father, was put to death. Philip, when too late, discovered that he had been imposed upon by a forger, and died of a broken heart.

PERSEUS, KING OF MACEDONIA

Perseus succeeded his father on the throne of Macedon, a hundred and seventy-nine years before the birth of Christ. The first measures of his government appeared equally gracious and political. He assumed an air of benignity and gentleness. He not only recalled all those whom fear or judicial condemnation had, in the course of the late reign, driven from their country; but he even ordered the income of their estates, during their exile, to be reimbursed. His deportment to all his subjects was happily composed of regal dignity and parental tenderness. The same temper which regulated his behaviour to his own subjects, he displayed in his conduct towards foreign states. He courted the affections of the Grecian states, and despatched ambassadors to request a confirmation of the treaties subsisting between Rome and Macedon. The senate acknowledged his title to the throne, and pronounced him the friend and ally of the Roman people. His insinuations and intrigues with his neighbours were the more effectual, that most of them began to presage what they had to expect, should the dominion of Rome be extended over all Greece; and looked upon Macedon as the bulwark of their freedom from the Roman yoke.

The only states that stood firm to the Roman cause, were Athens and Achaia. But in this all of them now agreed, that foreign aid was on all occasions necessary to prop the tottering remains of fallen liberty, which, by this time, was little else than a choice of masters. Besides all those advantages which Perseus might derive from the well-grounded jealousy of Roman ambition, he succeeded to all those mighty preparations which were made by his father. But all this strength came to nothing: it terminated in discomfiture, and the utter extinction of the royal family of Macedon. He lost all the advantages he enjoyed, through avarice, meanness of spirit, and want of real courage. The Romans, discovering or suspecting his ambitious designs, sought and found occasion of quarrelling with him. A Roman army passed into Greece. This army, for the space of three years, did nothing worthy of the Roman name; but Perseus, infatuated, or struck with a panic, neglected to improve the repeated opportunities which the incapacity or the corruption of the Roman commanders presented to him. Lucius Æmilius Paullus, elected consul, restored and improved the discipline of the Roman army, which, under the preceding commanders, had been greatly relaxed. He advanced against Perseus, drove him from his entrenchments on the banks of the river Enipeus, and engaged and defeated him under the walls of Pydna.

On the ruin of his army, Perseus fled to Pella. He gave vent to the distraction and ferocity of his mind, by murdering with his own hand two of his principal officers, who had ventured to blame some parts of his conduct. Alarmed at this act of barbarity, his other attendants refused to

approach him; so that, being at a loss where to hide himself, or whom to trust, he returned from Pella, which he had reached only about midnight, before break of day. On the third day after the battle he fled to Amphipolis. Being driven by the inhabitants from thence, he hastened to the sea-side, in order to pass over into Samothrace, hoping to find a secure asylum in the reputed holiness of that place. Having arrived thither, he took shelter in the temple of Castor and Pollux. Abandoned by all the world, his eldest son Philip only excepted, without a probability of escape, and even destitute of the means of subsistence, he surrendered to Octavius, the Roman prætor, who transported him to the Roman camp. Perseus approached the consul with the most abject servility, bowing his face to the earth, and endeavouring with his suppliant arms to grasp his knees. "Why, wretched man," said the Roman, "why dost thou acquit Fortune of what might seem her crime, by a behaviour which evinces that thou deservest not her indignation? Why dost thou disgrace my laurels, by showing thyself an abject adversary, and unworthy of having a Roman to contend with?" He tempered, however, this humiliating address, by raising him from the ground, and encouraging him to hope for everything from the clemency of the Roman people. After being led in triumph through the streets of Rome, he was thrown into a dungeon, where he starved himself to death. His eldest son, Philip, and one of his younger sons, are supposed to have died before him. Another of his sons, Alexander, was employed by the chief magistrates of Rome in the office of a clerk.

THE HUMILIATION OF GREECE

Within the space of fifteen days after Æmilius had begun to put his army in motion, all the armament was broken and dispersed; and, within two days after the defeat at Pydna, the whole country had submitted to the consul. Ten commissioners were appointed to assist that magistrate in the arrangement of Macedonian affairs. A new form of government was established in Macedon, of which the outlines had been drawn at Rome. On this occasion the Romans exhibited a striking instance of their policy in governing by the principle of division. The whole kingdom of Macedon was divided into four districts; the inhabitants of each were to have no connection, intermarriages, or exchange of possessions, with those of the other districts, but every part to remain wholly distinct from the rest. And among other regulations tending to reduce them to a state of the most abject slavery, they were inhibited from the use of arms, unless in such places as were exposed to the incursions of the barbarians. Triumphal games at Amphipolis, exceeding in magnificence all that this part of the world had ever seen, and to which all the neighbouring nations, both European and Asiatic, were invited, announced the extended dominion of Rome, and the humiliation not only of Macedon, but of Greece; for now the sovereignty of Rome found nothing in that part of the world that was able to oppose it.

The Grecian states submitted to various and multiplied acts of oppression, without a struggle. The government which retained the longest a portion of the spirit of ancient times, was the Achæan. In their treatment of Achaia, the Romans, although they had gained over to their interests several of the Achæan chiefs, were obliged to proceed with great circumspection, lest the destruction of their own creatures should defeat their designs. They endeavoured to trace some vestiges of a correspondence

[168-167 B.C.]

between the Achæan body and the late king of Macedon ; and when no such vestiges could be found, they determined that fiction should supply the place of evidence. Caius Claudius, and Cneius Domitius Ahenobarbus, were sent as commissioners from Rome, to complain that some of the first men of Achaia had acted in concert with Macedon. At the same time they required, that all who were in such a predicament should be sentenced to death : promising that, after a decree for that purpose should be enacted, they would produce the names of the guilty. "Where," exclaimed the assembly, "would be the justice of such a proceeding ? First name the persons you accuse, and make good your charge." "I name, then," said the commissioner, "all those who have borne the office of chief magistrate of Achaia, or been the leaders of your armies." "In that case," answered Xenon, an Achæan nobleman, "I too shall be accounted guilty, for I have commanded the armies of Achaia ; and yet I am ready to prove my innocence, either here, or before the senate of Rome." "You say well," replied one of the Roman commissioners, laying hold on his last words, "let the senate of Rome then be the tribunal before which you shall answer."

A decree was framed for this end, and above a thousand Achæan chiefs were transported into Italy, a hundred and sixty-seven years before Christ.^f Among these was Polybius,^g who afterwards became famous as the historian of the Roman Conquest, and whose work, though preserved only in fragments beyond the fifth book of the original forty, is the chief reliable source of information regarding some of the events of the period we have just considered. Had fortune spared us the later books of Polybius, our knowledge of the history of the Leagues would have been far different from what it is ; for this Greek of the "degenerate" Hellenistic age is universally admitted to be the most philosophical and reliable of all historical writers among his countrymen of any age, Thucydides alone excepted. We shall see more of his work when we come to the history of the Punic wars, where he is again the chief authority.^a





THE PLAIN OF ARGOS

CHAPTER LXIV. THE FINAL DISASTERS

THE condition of Achaia during this period of the Roman dominion, from B.C. 172 to 152, was peculiar and is very obscure. The government was in a very sad condition; Callicrates and Andronidas tyrannised over the Achæans, although they had no followers, and although the people were so enraged against the former that he was publicly hissed, and everybody shunned him. "He is a man who stands forth branded in every respect with everlasting infamy; he was never invited by a Greek either to dinner or to a wedding;" but still it was impossible to change the direction he gave to the state. "He was regarded as a demon, whose existence could not be controlled." No consideration was shown towards foreign powers; it was a state of utter inactivity and leisure, but at the same time of material prosperity. Commerce and agriculture were thriving, as is mentioned several times by Polybius; the taxes were not very heavy, the laws were suited to the circumstances, and hence it was a period of general material well-being. But at the same time, it is evident that the number of regular marriages decreased immensely, and consequently that of persons who were born citizens also; it was just the same as towards the end of the Roman Republic and under the Roman emperors, when people generally lived in concubinage. It was a deplorable condition.

There was not a trace of intellectual life; literature no longer existed, except that a few philosophers still lived at Athens. Poetry was confined to little poems, and was cultivated in Asia more than in Peloponnesus; the new comedy had entirely died away. In spite of the material prosperity, nothing was done for the arts and for monuments. The Achæans preserved the Greek name until the end, but the Romans need not have been jealous of them. There were still some places to be subdued to complete the supremacy of Rome, as Carthage, for example; and so long as that city existed, the Romans turned their eyes towards those who might be an obstacle to their subduing those places.

At the middle of the second century B.C., Achaia embraced the whole of Peloponnesus; it must have extended its dominion even beyond it, for not to mention Megara, which had belonged to it before, it now also comprised Pleuron and Calydon, which were originally Ætolian towns, but are called both Ætolian and Achæan. In general people had become accustomed to the Achæan League; Sparta alone bore the connection reluctantly.

The disputes which, in the end, led to the fatal war, arose out of the intrigues of Menalcidas, a Lacedæmonian, who even rose to the dignity of strategus. This Menalcidas, with a remarkable versatility in his wickedness, jumped from one party to another. The quarrels between the Achæans and Lacedæmonians are said to have arisen from his villainy and that of Diæus of Megalopolis, on the occasion of a quarrel between Athens and Oropus.



THE LAST DAYS OF CORINTH
(From the painting by Robert Fleury in the Museum of the Luxembourg, Paris)

[156-150 B.C.]

The town of Oropus, of which, ever since the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had wanted to take possession, which was often subdued by them, but each time taken from them again, had, according to Pausanias, been assigned to them by Philip after the Macedonian War, that is, he had made the town tributary to Athens. The Athenians, it is said, plundered the town, because they were suffering from severe poverty — but they had probably imposed too heavy taxes upon the Oropians, and levied them too rigorously, so that the Oropians applied to the Romans for redress. A great quantity of existing Athenian tetradrachmæ still attests the poverty prevailing at that time in Athens, for they consist of copper only covered over with a thin coat of silver. The Athenians were then compelled to pay to the Oropians one hundred talents as an indemnification ; but they contrived to become reconciled with them, and induced them not to exact the money, to return to their former relation, and admit a garrison into their town. The conduct of this garrison, however, induced the Oropians to demand its withdrawal. As the Athenians refused, the Oropians applied to the Achæans, and bribed Menalcidas, who happened to be strategus, with ten talents ; Menalcidas again prevailed upon Callicrates to persuade the popular assembly to compel Athens to pay the one hundred talents. But the Athenians were beforehand with them : they completely plundered Oropus, and Menalcidas also exacted the promised sum with the greatest insolence, while he himself refused to pay to Callicrates the sum he had promised him. The latter charged him with high treason, and Menalcidas retaliated. The former repaired to Rome, and Menalcidas is said to have saved his life only by bribing Diæus, who was strategus.

The manner in which out of this unrelated quarrel the disputes between the Achæans and Lacedæmonians arose is not clear. But they gave rise to a war, and a wretched war it was. Diæus, with an army of the Achæan confederates, entered Laconia, demanding the condemnation of the recalcitrants. A Spartan senator proposed, that the twenty-four whose condemnation was demanded by Diæus, should of their own accord go into exile. This was done, and according to a preconcerted plan, all were condemned to death. But these exiles were kindly received by the Roman senate, and Diæus and Callicrates were sent to Rome to counteract their influence. The latter died on his journey, having apparently somewhat changed his conduct during the latter part of his life. Diæus and Menalcidas vehemently disputed before the senate, which simply commanded them to return and wait, until a Roman embassy should bring over a decisive answer. The Achæans, however, did not wait, and Damocritus, who had in the meantime succeeded Diæus as strategus, invaded Laconia, before the Roman ambassadors arrived, defeated the enemy, and advanced as far as Sparta. He had no intention to pursue them farther, and the Achæans accordingly accused and condemned him, thinking that he had been bribed ; and he went into exile. This happened probably in 150 B.C. ; and Diæus now became strategus in the place of Damocritus.

In the meantime the great drama throughout the world came to a crisis. The Romans had undertaken the destruction of Carthage, but did not find it so easy as they had imagined. In the provinces, the most contemptible side of the character of the Romans was seen ; they were beheld as plunderers and oppressors ; it was known that they were hated by all the world, and it was expected that a general insurrection would break out, extending from Spain to the extreme East. And it was believed that Rome could not stand against it. It is possible that the nations may have heard of the internal decay of Rome, of the ferment of Italy, and of the discontent of the allies.

Under these circumstances, an insurrection first broke out in Macedonia. The Romans had torn that country asunder in four parts, as Napoleon wanted to divide Poland into three states—an attempt which proved fatal to him. The Romans in Macedonia had not left together those masses which, in language and origin, as well as geographically, were united; but with a diabolic and calculating policy they had torn the country to pieces, and it was divided in such a manner as to have as little connection as possible, one tribe being mixed up with others. All the respectable people of Macedonia, under the pretext of their being hostages, had been carried away with their families into Italy, where they amalgamated with the inhabitants and disappeared. In this manner all persons of mark had been removed. Moreover, the *commercium* and *connubium* among those four provinces had been abolished, so that no Macedonian was allowed to possess land in two different provinces, every one being confined to his own district. But still Macedonia was in a condition of great prosperity, especially in consequence of its mines and commerce, as we must infer from the immense quantity of Macedonian money of that period, which has come down to us. The limbs which had been torn asunder, longed to be reunited as one whole.

THE MACEDONIAN INSURRECTION

At this time there appeared among them a man of about forty years, calling himself Philip, and declaring himself to be a son of Perseus, and to have escaped from his father's misfortunes. It is possible that he was a pseudo-Philip, that his real name was Andriscus, and that he was a native of Thrace: there were several such impostors at that time. Philip defeated the Romans, and in a very short time made himself master of all Macedonia, which recognised him. He even penetrated into Thessaly, where he gained advantages, and successfully maintained himself against the untrained troops of the Romans. All sided with him; but the Achæans very inconsistently sent auxiliaries to the Romans, although at the time all nations were harbouring designs of revolt, but the Achæans thought that they were not yet ripe for it. The Achean auxiliaries came very opportunely to the Romans; it was only through these, who were commanded by a Roman legate, that they succeeded in defending Thessaly, and with their assistance they repelled the Macedonians, until Metellus came with the Roman legion. He defeated this Philip, whom the Romans call Andriscus, in several battles. Macedonia now became a Roman province, under the absolute power of an imperator; the senate coolly ordered them to dismiss from the confederacy not only Lacedæmon, but all the other places which had not belonged to Achaia at the time when the Achæans concluded the treaty with Rome in the first (or more correctly the second) Macedonian War. C. Aurelius Orestes, together with other ambassadors, brought these orders to Corinth, whither he summoned the allies of the Achæans.

THE ACHÆAN WAR

This very unjust and insolent demand threw the Achæans into a state of frenzy; even before Orestes had finished his speech, the council hastened to the market-place, calling upon the people to assemble, and it cannot excite wonder, though it is a proof of the utter want of common sense among the

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Achæans, that they fell upon the Roman ambassadors, and insultingly drove them out of the theatre. All the Lacedæmonians who happened to be in the city were arrested. After this the Achæans again marched into Læconia, where Menalcidas had, in the meantime, made away with himself, because he had broken a truce which he had been ordered to observe by the Romans.

At this time the Macedonian insurrection was not yet quelled, and fortune was still undecided. Metellus had not yet come over. Simultaneously the Third Punic War was going on; the Spaniards and Iberians were stirring; Masinissa's family was suspected, and in short the Romans were pressed on all sides. Their cunning policy therefore was mildness: they said that they were willing to pardon the Achæans, if they would but acknowledge their guilt, and apologise. But almost the whole nation was now in a state of intoxication, "according to the words of Scripture, that God makes the nations intoxicated for their own destruction." Critolaus the strategist, played the part of a hero, and inflamed the minds of the people—especially of the populace, which was already in commotion at Corinth. When the Roman ambassadors commenced speaking no one listened to them; they were obliged to stop, and as the tumult became too great, they went away. Critolaus, and still more, Diæus, now goaded the Achæans into the madness of declaring war against the Romans, and marching towards Thermopylæ. The war was decreed nominally against the Lacedæmonians, but in reality against the Romans.

We have only very scanty information about the course of this war; but the *Excerpts* of Porphyrogenitus from Polybius^c will throw light upon it. "Posterity can form no conception," says Polybius, "of the madness with which the war was carried on; it was as if men rushed into it for the purpose of perishing."

Critolaus assembled a considerable army. The Bœotians, headed by the Thebans under the wretched Pytheas, and the Chalcidians, were the only Greeks that sided with the Achæans; the Ætolians and the other nations were neutral; the Lacedæmonians, on the other hand, were hostile towards the Achæans, for which reason all of the Achæans could not leave their country. The allied army advanced as far as Heraclea near Mount Ceta, and laid siege to that town in order to protect Thermopylæ. But everything was there managed so senselessly, that when Metellus, who on being informed of this, without waiting for orders, had broken in from Macedonia with the rapidity of lightning, came to its relief, the Achæans under Diæus and Critolaus hastily fled back through the pass of Thermopylæ.

Metellus overtook them near Scarphe, attacked and defeated them so completely that within a few hours the Achæan army was utterly annihilated; many were slain, many were taken prisoners, and many dispersed in flight. Diæus fled, Critolaus was not to be found, having perhaps perished in a marsh. The whole army was scattered. An Arcadian contingent of one thousand men, which arrived too late, was carried away by the flight of the others, and a few days later, in the neighbourhood of Chæronea, it was partly taken and partly cut to pieces by the Romans. The Achæans fled in disorder into Peloponnesus. In Bœotia all the people, quitting the towns, took refuge in the mountains; Thebes was deserted; many made away with themselves from despair, and many implored the Romans to kill them, declaring themselves to be the authors of all the misfortunes.

Diæus succeeded Critolaus in the command of the army; he was a person of the utmost incapacity, and formidable only to those who obeyed him.

He had recourse to the most extreme measures; he decreed that all judicial trials for debts should be stopped, all imprisoned debtors should be set free, and that no debt should become due before the close of the war — a sad decree for the wealthy, but it made him popular among the rabble. Twelve thousand slaves were to be manumitted and armed (they are called *παράτροφοι* — i.e., milk-brothers, the children of female slaves or nurses); and heavy war contributions were levied. Four thousand men were sent to Megara to defend that place, and Diæus himself assembled the army on the isthmus. When Metellus appeared, those four thousand soon evacuated Megara, and all the forces were concentrated on the isthmus close to the walls of Corinth.



GREEK WATER VESSEL
(Berlin Museum)

Metellus now appeared before Corinth. Animated by a feeling of humanity he wished to spare the city; such a magnificent ancient city was indeed sacredly venerable to many a Roman, and the idea of destroying it was terrible to Metellus. It is also possible that he grudged the consul Mummius, who was already advancing in quick marches, the honour of

bringing the war to a close. Once more Metellus sent some Greeks to the Achæan army, granting, according to Roman notions, fair terms, if they would but lay down their arms, and requesting them to put confidence in him. What else could he have done? But Diæus, who knew that his life was forfeited, goaded the poor people to madness. The Achæans, believing that Metellus had offered peace from a feeling of weakness, nearly killed the ambassadors, and Diæus did not set them free until a ransom of ten thousand drachmæ was paid; this is a characteristic feature of the man who showed his avarice to the very last minute. The hypostrategus, who was favourable to the Romans, was tortured.

In the meantime Mummius arrived and took the place of Metellus. He had no such feelings towards the Achæans as his predecessor, who returned to Rome. Mummius now had an army of twenty-three thousand foot and three thousand horse, while the Achæans had only fourteen thousand foot and a few hundred horse. The Achæans were encamped on the isthmus in a strong position, but this was of no avail. The Romans had a fleet furnished by their allies, while the Greeks had no ships, and the Roman fleet cruised along the whole coast of Peloponnesus, landing everywhere, and ravaging the country with the most fearful cruelty. What Themistocles had said to the Peloponnesians, when they wanted to fortify themselves on the isthmus, now came to pass; the contingents, especially those of the Eleans, dispersed in all directions in order to protect their own towns, without being able to do so.

A somewhat favourable engagement, in which they defeated a detachment of the Romans, which had ventured too far and was not duly supported, made the Achæans completely mad, and being thus encouraged they

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thoughtlessly attacked the Roman army. But their small advantage was immediately neutralised by a fatal blow; for in a great and decisive battle, the Achæans were so completely routed, that they were not even able to throw themselves into Corinth. The cavalry fled immediately; the infantry maintained its ground better, but in the end all fled in different directions into the mountains, and Diæus to Megalopolis, where he first murdered his wife and then took poison. All the population of Corinth deserted the city and took refuge in the mountains, as the Romans had done on the arrival of the Gauls, and were hunted by the Romans like wild beasts.^b

THE DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH

Mummius had not expected so easy a conquest, and, though informed that the gates were open, suspecting some stratagem, suffered an entire day to pass before he marched into the city. Though no resistance was offered, all the men found within the walls were put to the sword; the women and children were reserved for sale; and when all its treasures had been carried away, on a signal given by blast of the trumpet the city was consigned to the flames. So it is said the senate had expressly decreed. But vengeance for the insults offered to the Roman envoys was probably more the pretext than the motive for this cruelty. It was at least no less a crime in the eyes of the Roman soldiers that Corinth was the richest city of Greece. Scarcely any other was adorned with so many precious works of art. Mummius himself had as little eye for them as any of his men, who made dice-boards of the finest masterpieces of painting; but he knew that such things were highly valued by others, and he therefore preserved those which were accounted the choicest to embellish his triumph.

Before the arrival of the ten commissioners, who were sent in the autumn to regulate the state of Greece, he made a circuit in Peloponnesus to inflict punishment on the cities and persons that had taken an active share in the war. The walls of all such towns were dismantled, and their whole population disarmed. The adherents of Diæus were sentenced to death or exile, and their property confiscated; and the Achæans—that is, the cities which had contributed to the war—were condemned to pay two hundred talents [£40,000 or \$200,000] to Sparta. The greater part of the Corinthian territory was annexed to Sicyon. Mummius afterwards marched northward to deal like retribution among the insurgents of Bœotia and Eubœa. He razed Thebes and Chalcis—or at least their walls—to the ground; condemned the Bœotians and Eubœans—or more probably those cities alone—to pay one hundred talents to Heraclea, which they had helped to besiege; and at Chalcis he shed so much blood of the principal citizens, that Polybius himself can only reconcile his conduct with the supposed mildness of his character by the suggestion that he was urged by his council to unwonted severity.

It remained for the ten commissioners, according to the instructions of the senate, to fix the future condition of the conquered nation. All Greece, as far as Macedonia and Epirus, was constituted a Roman province: and Achaia enjoyed the melancholy distinction of giving its name to the whole. But the senate's jealousy was not satisfied with the formal establishment of its sovereignty; it had also decreed a series of regulations tending as much as possible to restrict every kind of union and intercourse among the Greeks, and to reduce them to the lowest stage of weakness and degradation. All federal assemblies, all democratical polities, were abolished, and the govern-

ment of each city committed to a magistracy, for which a certain amount of property was required as a qualification. No one might acquire land in any part of the province but that in which his franchise lay. The details of this outline, and all temporary measures for the settlement of the country, were left to the discretion of Mummius and the Ten; and Polybius, who appears to have arrived in Greece soon after the fall of Corinth, was now able in some degree to alleviate the calamity which he had found it impossible to avert; and perhaps it would not have been equally in his power to render such services to his countrymen if he had been previously less alienated, at least in appearance, from the national cause. As the intimate friend of the conqueror of Carthage, he was treated with the highest respect and confidence; and he employed his influence so as to win the esteem and gratitude of his fellow-citizens. Mummius himself, when sated with bloodshed and rapine, showed a disposition to conciliate the vanquished. Before his departure, though he had removed the statue of the Isthmian Poseidon, to dedicate it—in gross violation of religious propriety—in the temple of Jupiter at Rome, he repaired the damage which had been done to the public buildings on the Isthmus, adorned the temples of Olympia and Delphi, and made a circuit round the principal Greek cities to receive tokens of their gratitude.

The political institutions were of course, according to the senate's decree, strictly oligarchical. And in this respect no alteration seems ever to have been granted by the Roman government. But in some other points the rigour of its original regulations was a few years afterward greatly relaxed. The fines imposed on the Achæans, and on the Bœotians and Eubœans, were remitted; the restraints on intercourse and commerce were withdrawn; and the federal unions which had been abolished were revived. The Romans in their official language seem to have described this renewal of the old forms as a restoration of liberty to Greece. But even if the monument in which this sounding phrase appears to be applied to it, did not itself illustrate the vigilance with which the exercise of political freedom was checked by the provincial government, we might be sure that these revived confederations answered no other purpose than that of affording an occasion for some periodical festivals, and some empty titles, soothing perhaps to the feelings of the people, but without the slightest effect on their welfare. The end of the Achæan War was the last stage of the lingering process by which Rome enclosed her victim in the coils of her insidious diplomacy, covered it with the slime of her sycophants and hirelings, crushed it when it began to struggle, and then calmly preyed upon its vitals.

GREECE UNDER THE ROMANS


We have brought the political history of ancient Greece down to a point which may be fitly regarded as its close; since in the changes which afterwards befell the country the people remained nearly passive. The events of the Mithridatic War—in which the Achæans and Lacedæmonians, and all Bœotia, except Thespiæ, are said to have declared themselves against Rome, and the royal army in Greece received a reinforcement of Lacedæmonian and Achæan troops—might serve to indicate that the national spirit was not wholly extinct, or that the Roman dominion was felt to be intolerably oppressive. But Athens certainly no more deserved Sulla's bloody vengeance for the resistance into which she was forced by the tyranny of Athenion, than for the credulity with which she had listened to his lying promises.

[146 B.C.-540 A.D.]

No historical fact is more clearly ascertained than that from this epoch the nation was continually wasting away. Strabo,^e who visited Greece but a little more than a century later (B.C. 29), found desolation everywhere prevailing. Beside his special enumeration of ruined towns and deserted sites, and his emphatic silence as to the present, while he explores the faint vestiges or doubtful traditions of the past, the description of almost every region furnishes occasion for some general remark illustrating the melancholy truth. Messenia was for the most part deserted, and the population of Laconia very scanty in comparison with its ancient condition: for beside Sparta it contained but thirty small towns in the room of the hundred for which it had once been celebrated. Of Arcadia it was not worth while to say much, on account of its utter decay. There was scarcely any part of the land in tillage, but vast sheep-walks, and abundant pasture for herds of cattle, especially horses; and so the solitude of Ætolia and Acarnania had become no less favourable to the rearing of horses than Thessaly. Both Acarnania and Ætolia—he repeats elsewhere—are now utterly worn out and exhausted; as are many of the other nations. Of the towns of Doris scarcely a trace was left; the case was the same with the Ænians. Thebes had sunk to an insignificant village; and the other Boeotian cities in proportion—that is, as he elsewhere explains himself, they were reduced to ruins and names, all but Tanagra and Thespie, which, compared with the others, were tolerably well preserved.

It has been usual in modern times to attribute this decline of population to the loss of independence, to the withering influence of a foreign yoke—in a word, to Roman misrule. And it would be bold and probably an error, to assert, that it was wholly unconnected with the nature of the government to which Greece was subject as a Roman province. It is too well known what that government was—how seldom it was uprightly administered, how easily, even in the purest hands, it became the instrument of oppression. The ordinary burdens were heavy. The fisherman of Gyarus, who was sent ambassador to Augustus, to complain that a tax of 150 drachmæ was laid upon his island which could hardly pay two-thirds of that sum, afforded but a specimen of a common grievance. Greece was not exempt from those abuses which provoked the massacre of the Romans in Asia at the outbreak of the Mithridatic War. And even if we had no express information on the subject, we might have concluded that it did not escape the still more oppressive arbitrary exactions of corrupt magistrates, and their greedy officers. “Who does not know,” Cicero asks, “that the Achæans pay a large sum yearly to L. Piso?” It was notorious that he had received one hundred talents from them, beside plunder and extortion of other kinds. The picture which Cicero draws of the evils inflicted by L. Piso upon Greece is no doubt rhetorically overcharged; but it is one of utter impoverishment, exhaustion, and ruin. And here we may remark that the privileges of the free cities included in the province afforded no security against the rapacity and oppression of a Piso or a Verres. The Lacedæmonians, Strabo observes, were peculiarly favoured, and remained free, paying nothing but voluntary offerings. But these were among the most burdensome imposts; and so Athens, which enjoyed the like immunity, was nevertheless, according to Cicero’s phrase, torn to pieces by Piso. To this it must be added that the oligarchical institutions everywhere established—and even Athens was forced so to qualify her democracy that little more than the name seems to have been left—tended to promote the accumulation of property in few hands; as we read that the whole island of Cephallenia was subject to C. Antonius as his private estate.

Nevertheless it seems certain, that when these are represented as the main causes of the decline of population in Greece, which followed the loss of her independence, their importance has been greatly exaggerated, while others much more efficacious have been overlooked or disparaged. For on the one hand it is clear that this decline did not begin at that epoch, but had been going on for many generations before. A comparison of the forces brought into the field to meet the Celtic invasion by the states of northern Greece with those which they furnished in the Persian War, would be sufficient to prove the fact with regard to them; the evil lay deeper than the ravages of war. And we have now the evidence of Polybius, that in the period either



RUINS OF THE ERECHTHEUM, ATHENS

immediately preceding, or immediately subsequent to the establishment of the Roman government—a period which he describes as one of concord and comparative prosperity, when the wounds which had been inflicted on the peninsula were beginning to heal—even then the population was rapidly shrinking, through causes quite independent of any external agency, and intimately connected with the moral character and habits of the society itself.

The evil was not that the stream of population was violently absorbed, but that it flowed feebly, because there was an influence at work which tended to dry up the fountain-head. Marriages were rare and unfruitful through the prevalence of indifference or aversion toward the duties and enjoyments of domestic life. The historian traces this unhealthy state of feeling to a taste for luxury and ostentation. But this explanation, which could only apply to the wealthy, seems by no means adequate to the result. The real cause struck deeper, and was much more widely spread. Described in general terms, it was a want of reverence for the order of nature, for the natural revelation of the will of God; and the sanction of infanticide was by no means the most destructive, or the most loathsome form in which it manifested itself. This was the cancer which had been for many generations eating into the life of Greece.

How little the vices of the Roman government had to do with the decrease of population in Greece, becomes still more apparent as we follow its

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course through the history of the empire. The change from republican to monarchical institutions was in general beneficial to the provinces, and especially to Greece, which was not only exempt from the danger of arbitrary oppression, but was distinguished by many marks of imperial favour. Within the space of a few years, about the beginning of this period, three new colonies animated the south coast of the Corinthian Gulf. Pompey planted a settlement of pirates in the solitude of Dyme. His great rival restored Corinth, and, if he had lived longer, would perhaps have opened a canal through the Isthmus. Though the commerce, which at the fall of Corinth had been diverted to Delos, and afterwards dispersed by the Mithridatic War, may not have wholly returned into its ancient channel, still there can be no question that the advantages of this restoration were very largely felt throughout Greece. Augustus founded another populous Roman colony at Patrae, which enjoyed the privileges of a free city. Nicopolis indeed was rather designed as a monument of his victory, than to promote the prosperity of Greece : for it was peopled from the decayed towns of the adjacent regions, and the effect was to turn Acarnania and Aetolia into a wilderness.

Athens too had soon repaired the loss it suffered through Sulla's massacre, though Piræus did not rise out of its ruins. But the Athenian population was recruited, as it had long been, by the lavish grant or cheap sale of the franchise. It was like the galley of Theseus, retaining nothing but the name and semblance of the old Athenian people, without any real natural identity of race ; so that it was no exaggeration, when Piso called it a jumble of divers nations. The poverty indeed of the city, which had been a main cause of its unfortunate accession to the side of Mithridates, still continued, and was but slightly relieved by the bounty of benefactors like Pomponius and Herodes Atticus, or even by the growing influx of wealthy strangers who came to pursue rhetorical or philosophical studies there.

While its splendour was increased by the magnificent structures added to it by Hadrian and Herodes, perhaps the larger part of the freemen was never quite secure of their daily meal. Still the good will of the early emperors was unequivocally manifested. They seem always to have lent a favourable ear to the complaints and petitions of the province, and Nero went so far as to reward the Greeks for their skilful flattery of his musical talents by an entire and general exemption from provincial government, which may have compensated for the presents he exacted from them. The Greeks, it is said, abused their new privileges by discord and tumults, and Vespasian restored the proconsular administration, and above all the tribute — which was perhaps his real motive — with the remark that they had forgotten the use of liberty. But it is evident that on the whole, from the reign of Augustus to that of Trajan, the increase of the population was not checked by oppression or by any calamity. Yet at the end of this period we find Plutarch declaring, that Greece had shared more largely than any other country in the general failure of population which had been caused by the wars and civil conflicts of former times over almost all the world, so that it could then hardly furnish three thousand heavy-armed soldiers — the number raised by Megara alone for the Persian War ; and his assertion is confirmed by the pictures drawn by another contemporary witness.

In times when the present was so void and cheerless, the future so dark and hopeless, it was natural that men should seek consolation in the past, even though it had been less full, than was the case among the Greeks, of power and beauty, prosperity and glory. Nor was it necessary then to evoke its images by learned toil out of the dust of libraries or archives. The whole

land was covered with its monuments in the most faultless productions of human genius and art. There was no region so desolate, no corner so secluded, as to be destitute of them. Even the rapacity of the Romans could not exhaust these treasures. Though Mummius was said to have filled Italy with the sculptures which he carried away, it is probable that in the immense multitude which remained, their absence, in point of number, might be scarcely perceived. If Nero robbed Delphi of five hundred statues, there might still be more than two thousand left there.

The expressive silence of these memorials was interpreted by legends which lived in the mind and the heart of the people; and so long as any inhabitants remained in a place, a guide was to be found thoroughly versed in this traditional lore. The town of Panopeus at the northern foot of Parnassus, though celebrated by Homer as a royal residence, had been reduced, when it was visited by Pausanias, to a miserable assemblage of huts, in which the traveller could find nothing to deserve the name of a city, as it contained neither an archive, nor a gymnasium, nor a theatre, nor a market-place, nor a fountain; but the people remembered that they were not of Phocian, but of Phlegyan origin: they could show the grave which covered the vast bulk of the great Tityus, and the remnants of the clay out of which Prometheus had moulded the human race. Relics of like antiquity were at the same period reverently treasured in most parts of Greece. The memory of the past was still more effectually preserved by a great variety of festivals, games, public sacrifices, and other religious solemnities. After the extinction of the national independence, the battle of Plataea did not cease to be commemorated by the Feast of Liberty; as notwithstanding the absence of all political interests, the forms of deliberation were kept up in the Amphictyonic, the Achaean, Phocian, and Bæotian councils. The heroes both of the mythical and the historical age were still honoured with anniversary rites — Aratus and Demosthenes, and the slain at Marathon, no less than Ajax and Achilles, Temenus, Phoroneus, and Melampus.


The religion of the Greeks, which was so intimately associated with almost all their social pleasures and their most important affairs, had never lost its hold on the great body of the nation. We hear much of the change wrought in the state of religious feeling by the speculations of the sophists, and the later kindred philosophical schools, by the frequent examples of sacrilegious violence, by the progress of luxury, and the growing corruption of manners. But the effect seems to have been confined to a not very large circle of the higher classes. With the common people paganism continued, probably as long as it subsisted at all, to be not a mere hereditary usage, but a personal, living, breathing, and active faith. In the age of the Antonines the Attic husbandmen still believed in the potent agency of their hero Marathon, as the Arcadian herdsmen fancied that they could hear the piping of Pan on the top of Mænalus. The national misfortunes, as they led the Greeks to cling the more fondly to their recollections of the past, tended to strengthen the influence of the old religion, and rendered them the less disposed to admit a new faith which shocked their patriotic pride and dispelled many pleasing illusions, while it ran counter to all their tastes and habits, and deprived them of their principal enjoyments. Accordingly, it seems that Christianity, notwithstanding the consolations it offered for all that it took away, made very slow progress beyond the cities in which it was first planted; and its ascendancy was not firmly established long before the beginning of a period in which a series of new calamities threatened the very existence of the nation.

[146 B.C.-540 A.D.]

The result of the Persian invasion in the mind of the victorious people had been a feeling of exulting self-confidence, which fostered the development of all its powers and resources. The terror of the Celtic inroad was followed by a sense of security earned in a great measure by an honourable struggle. Far different was the impression left by the irruption of Alaric, when Greece was at length delivered from his presence. The progress of the barbarians had been stopped by no resistance before they reached the utmost limits of the land. They retreated indeed before Stilicho, but not broken or discomfited, carrying off all their booty to take undisturbed possession of another, not a distant province. It was long indeed before the Greeks experienced a repetition of this calamity, but henceforth they lived in the consciousness that they were continually exposed to it. They neither had strength to defend themselves, nor could rely on their rulers for protection.

The safety of Greece was one of the last objects which occupied the attention of the court of Constantinople. In the utter uncertainty how soon a fresh invader might tread in the steps of Alaric, every rumour of the movements of the hordes which successively crossed the Danube, might well spread alarm, even in the remotest corners of Peloponnesus. The direction which they might take could be as little calculated as the course of lightning. Who could have foreseen that Attila and Theodoric would be diverted from their career to fall upon other prey—that Genseric after his repulse before Tænarus would not renew his invasion—that the Bulgarians would be so long detained by the plunder of the northern provinces? In the reign of Justinian the advances of the barbarians became more and more threatening, and in the year 540 northern Greece was again devastated by a mixed swarm of Huns and other equally ferocious spoilers, chiefly of the Slavonic race.

The strengthened fortifications of the Isthmus indeed withstood this flood, though they could not shelter the Peloponnesians from the earthquakes and the pestilence, which during this unhappy period were constantly wasting the scanty remains of the Hellenic population which had escaped or survived the inroads of the barbarians. Justinian's enormous line of fortresses revealed the imminence of the danger, but could not long avert it. In the course of the seventh and eighth centuries the worst forebodings were realised; after many transient incursions the country was permanently occupied by Slavonic settlers. The extent of the transformation which ensued is most clearly proved by the number of the new names which succeeded to those of the ancient geography. But it is also described by historians in terms which have suggested the belief that the native population was utterly swept away, and that the modern Greeks are the descendants of barbarous tribes which subsequently became subject to the empire, and received the language and religion which they have since retained from Byzantine missionaries and Anatolian colonists; and such is the obscurity which hangs over the final destiny of the most renowned nation of the earth, that it is much easier to show the weakness of the grounds on which this hypothesis has been reared, than to prove that it is very wide of the truth.^a



CHAPTER LXV. THE KINGDOM OF THE SELEUCIDÆ

IN the final tripartite division of Alexander's empire, the largest part, geographically speaking, fell to Seleucus, known as Nicator, or the Conqueror, who gave his name to the kingdom which was destined for many generations to play a more or less important part in Asiatic history. Seleucus had his capital first at Babylon and re-established the power of Grecian or Macedonian arms over a large part of the Asiatic territory of Alexander's empire. Subsequently the seat of the kingdom was shifted to the newly founded city of Antioch on the coast of Asia Minor, which became one of the most important capitals in the world, at times almost rivalling Alexandria. The territory and power of the Seleucidæ were early curtailed owing to the advance of outlying nations, notably the Parthians, and gradually disintegrated rather by slow stages than by the sudden shock of a single conquest. Chiefly because of the shifting of progress far to the west, it was not destined to play any really important part in the building of world history. In name, at least, the kingdom continued in independent existence long after Greece proper had been overthrown; but the Parthians and Sassanians in turn had largely shorn it of its glory, and it was these powers, rather than the Seleucidæ proper, that came into rivalry and conflict with the Roman might when that new mistress of the world extended her influence to the eastward. We must think therefore of the kingdom of the Seleucidæ rather as a link in time and place between great powers, than as a thing of really intrinsic importance. A brief summary of its history is, therefore, all that need detain us. Here again for the sake of clearness—if clearness be possible in this chaotic period—some repetition is unavoidable.^a

The kingdom of Syria was not confined to that country alone, but also comprehended those vast and fertile provinces of upper Asia, which formed the Persian empire; being, in its full extent, bounded by the Mediterranean on one side, and the river Indus on the other. These wide-spreading dominions are commonly called the kingdom of Syria, because Seleucus, the first of the Syro-Macedonian kings, having built the city of Antioch in that province, chose it, as did likewise his successors, for the usual place of his residence. Here his descendants, from him styled Seleucidæ, reigned, according to Eusebius, for the space of 251 years, that is, from the 117th Olympiad, when Seleucus recovered Babylon, to the third year of the 180th, when Antiochus Asiaticus, the last of the race of Seleucus, was driven out by Pompey, and Syria reduced to a Roman province. Before we proceed to the history of the Seleucidæ, we shall exhibit a series of the kings of that race, with the years of their respective reigns.

[323-312 B.C.]

A TABLE OF THE KINGS OF SYRIA, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THAT MONARCHY TO ITS BEING REDUCED BY THE ROMANS, WITH THE YEARS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE REIGNS.

	YEARS		YEARS
Seleucus Nicator	32	Tryphon	4
Antiochus Soter	19	Antiochus Sidetes	11
Antiochus Theos	15	Alexander Zebina	13
Seleucus Callinicus	20	Antiochus Grypus	19
Seleucus Ceraunus	3	Antiochus Cyzicenus	21
Antiochus the Great	36	Seleucus Epiphanes	7 months
Seleucus Philopator	11	Antiochus Eusebes	1
Antiochus Epiphanes	11	Demetrius Eucærus	2
Antiochus Eupator	12	Philip	3
Demetrius Soter	12	Antiochus Epiphanes	4
Alexander Balas	5	Antiochus Dionysus	7
Demetrius Nicator	6	Tigranes	14
Antiochus Theos	3	Antiochus Asiaticus	4

Seleucus, the founder of the Syro-Macedonian empire, was the son of Antiochus, one of the chief captains of Philip, the father of Alexander. He served under Alexander from his tender years, attended him in his expedition into Asia, and was by him honoured with the chief command of the elephants, a commission of great trust and reputation. After the death of that conqueror, Perdiccas, whom the officers had unanimously appointed regent of the empire, placed Seleucus at the head of the cavalry of the allies; in which command he acquitted himself with such reputation that Antipater, who succeeded Perdiccas in his regency, raised him to the government of Babylon and its territory.

SELEUCUS

In this post he was tempted, by the example of the other captains of Alexander, who aspired to the supreme power in their respective allotments, to betray his trust, and entertain thoughts of setting up for himself; whence, when Eumenes, on his march into Susiana, pressed him to join the governors of the upper provinces against Antigonus, who had openly revolted, he not only refused to lend them any assistance, but even attempted to destroy both Eumenes and his army, by cutting the sluices of the Euphrates, and laying the whole plain where they were encamped under water. Eumenes, however, though thus surprised, reached an eminence with his troops, before the waters rose to any height, and the next day, by diverting their course, found means to escape the danger, without the loss of a single man. Seleucus made a truce with Eumenes, granting him a free passage through his province. But when Antigonus demanded an account of the revenues of his government, the answer he gave him so exasperated Antigonus that he thought it advisable to abandon his province, and put himself under the protection of Ptolemy, governor of Egypt.

Seleucus meeting with a friendly reception from Ptolemy, in Egypt, represented so effectually to that prince, as also to Lysimachus and Cassander, the formidable power and ambitious views of Antigonus, that he engaged them all three in a league against him. This war put an end both to the life and reign of Antigonus. After the victory which Ptolemy gained over Demetrius at Gaza, Seleucus, having obtained of the conqueror a thousand foot and two hundred horse, took his route towards Babylon, in order to attempt the recovery of that city. This undertaking was looked upon as a desperate enterprise, even by his friends, but was attended with all the success he wished for.

Seleucus being now master of the city and castle, judged it necessary to raise what forces he could, not doubting that Antigonus would soon send an army to drive him from these acquisitions. Accordingly, while he was busy in recruiting his army and disciplining his new-raised troops, news was brought him that Nicanor, governor of Media under Antigonus, was advancing against him, at the head of ten thousand foot, and seven thousand horse. Upon this intelligence Seleucus marched out to meet him with three thousand foot and four hundred horse only, and passing the Tigris, concealed his men, as the enemy drew near, in the fens hard by the river, with a design to attack Nicanor unexpectedly; who not having had any intelligence of Seleucus' march, encamped in a disadvantageous post, where he was the following night surprised, and his army, after great slaughter, put to the rout. Such of the soldiers as survived the slaughter declared for Seleucus—a circumstance which enabled him to pursue his conquests, and reduce in a short time all Media and Susiana, with many of the adjacent provinces. Having, by this victory, established his interest and power in Babylon, he daily improved them by the clemency of his government, and by his justice, equity, and humanity, to such a degree that, from so low a beginning, he became, in a few years, the greatest and most powerful of all Alexander's successors.

And now Seleucus, seeing himself in quiet possession of Babylon and its territory, advanced at the head of a considerable army into Media, where he engaged and slew with his own hand Nicanor, or, as others call him, Nicator, whom Antigonus had sent against him. Having reduced all Media, he pursued his march into Persia, Bactria, Hyrcania, etc., subjecting to his new empire these and all the other provinces on this side the Indus, which had been formerly conquered by Alexander. In the meantime Antigonus and Demetrius having assumed the title of king, Seleucus imitated their example, styling himself king of Babylon and Media.

Having therefore no enemy to fear on this side the Indus, he resolved to cross that river, and, by a sudden irruption, make himself master of those vast provinces which were known by the name of India. These Alexander had formerly subdued; but after his death, while his successors were engaged in mutual wars with each other, one Sandrocottus, or, as others call him, Androcottus, an Indian of mean extraction, under the specious pretence of delivering his country from the tyranny of foreigners, had raised a powerful army, and having driven out the Macedonians, seized the Indian provinces for himself. To recover these provinces Seleucus crossed the Indus: but finding that Sandrocottus had made himself absolute master of all India and drawn into the field an army of six hundred thousand men, with a prodigious number of elephants, he did not judge it advisable to provoke so great a power; and therefore entering into a treaty with him, he agreed to renounce all his pretensions to that country, provided Sandrocottus furnished him with five hundred elephants—which proposal the Indian prince willingly agreeing to, a peace was concluded between them.

Seleucus marching into the upper Syria, made himself master of that rich province, and built on the river Orontes the city of Antioch, which soon became, and continued to be for many ages, the metropolis of the East; for the Syrian kings, and afterwards the Roman governors, who presided over the affairs of the eastern provinces, chose it for their place of residence; and afterward in the Christian times, it was the see of the chief patriarch of Asia. Besides Antioch, Seleucus built in the same country several other cities of less importance.

[283-273 B.C.]

A few months after the decease of Demetrius, died also Ptolemy Soter, king of Egypt, so that two only of Alexander's captains survived, — viz., Lysimachus and Seleucus. As they were each upwards of seventy, it was expected that they should have closed the scene of life in the union which had subsisted so long between them, for they had ever been closely united, and, to the utmost of their power, supported each other; but it happened quite otherwise; a war, which proved fatal to both, soon breaking out between them.

Seleucus was easily persuaded to engage in this war, being already sufficiently inclined to it on other accounts; but before he embarked in so great an undertaking, he not only resigned to his son Antiochus a considerable part of his empire, but also, by an unparalleled example, his favourite queen Stratonice. Seleucus having, without much difficulty, prevailed upon Stratonice to accept of a young prince for her husband instead of an old king, the nuptials were solemnised with the utmost pomp and magnificence; after which Antiochus and Stratonice were crowned king and queen of upper Asia, Seleucus willingly resigning to them all those provinces.

Seleucus advanced into Asia Minor, where he easily reduced all the places belonging to Lysimachus. The city of Sardis was soon obliged to capitulate. Lysimachus met the enemy at Corupedion in Phrygia. The engagement was very bloody, and the victory long doubtful; but at last Lysimachus, who had fought the whole time at the head of his troops with incredible bravery, being run through with a spear by Malacon of Heraclea, and killed on the spot, his soldiers betook themselves to flight, and left Seleucus master of the field and all their baggage. Thus died Lysimachus, after having seen the death of fifteen of his children; and as he was, to use the expression of Memnon, the last stone of his house to be pulled down, Seleucus, without opposition, made himself master of all his dominions.

What gave him most pleasure on this occasion was that he now was the only survivor of all the captains of Alexander; and that, by the event of this battle, he was become, as he styled himself, the Conqueror of Conquerors. This last victory, which he looked upon as the effect of a peculiar providence in his favour, gave him the best title to the name of Nicator, or conqueror, by which historians commonly distinguish him from other kings of the same name, who afterwards reigned in Syria.

His triumph on this occasion did not last long; for, seven months after, as he was marching into Macedon, to take possession of that kingdom, with a design to pass the remainder of his life in his native country, he was treacherously slain by Ptolemy Ceraunus, on whom he had conferred innumerable favours. Such was the end of Seleucus, the greatest general in the opinion of Arrian, and the most powerful prince, after Alexander, in the age he lived in. He died in the forty-third year after the death of Alexander, in the thirty-second of the Grecian or Seleucian era, and seventy-third or, as Justin will have it, seventy-eighth of his age.

ANTIOCHUS SOTER

On the death of Seleucus, Antiochus, surnamed Soter, his son by Apama, the daughter of Artabazus the Persian, took possession of the empire of Asia, and held it for the space of nineteen years.

Sosthenes, who had reigned some years in Macedon, being dead, Antiochus Soter, and Antigonus Gonatas, the son of Demetrius, laid claim to

that kingdom, their fathers having held it, one after the other ; but Antigonus, who had already reigned ten years in Greece, being nearest, first took possession of those dominions ; but neither daring to attack the other, the two kings came to an agreement ; and Antigonus having married Phila, the daughter of Stratonice by Seleucus, Antiochus renounced his pretensions to the crown of Macedon. In consequence of this renunciation, Antigonus not only quietly enjoyed the kingdom of Macedon, but transmitted it to his posterity, who reigned there for several generations.

Antiochus now marched against the Gauls, who having, by the favour of Nicomedes, got settlements in Asia, harassed, with frequent incursions, the neighbouring princes. Antiochus defeated them with great slaughter, and delivered those provinces from their oppressions ; and hence he acquired the title of Soter, or "saviour."

Not long after this successful expedition against the Gauls, Antiochus, hearing of the death of Philetærus, prince of Pergamus, seized that oppor-



RUINS OF ANTIOCH

tunity to invade his territories, with a view to add them to his own dominions ; but Eumenes, nephew and successor of the deceased prince, having raised a considerable army, encountered him near Sardis, overthrew him in battle, and thereby not only secured himself in the possession of what he had already enjoyed, but enlarged his dominions with several new acquisitions. After his defeat, Antiochus returning to Antioch there put to death one of his own sons for raising disturbances in his absence, and at the same time proclaimed the other, called also Antiochus, king of Syria. He died soon after, leaving his son in the sole possession of his dominions. The young prince was his son by Stratonice.

Antiochus, on his accession to the throne, assumed the surname of Theos, —that is, god ; and by this he is distinguished from the other kings of Syria who bore the name of Antiochus.

In the third year of the reign of Antiochus Soter, a bloody war had broken out between him and Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt. While Antiochus was thus engaged in a war with the king of Egypt, great commotions and revolts happened in the eastern provinces of his empire, which, as he was not at leisure to suppress them immediately, increased to such a degree that he could never afterwards re-establish quiet ; by which means Antiochus lost all the provinces of his empire lying beyond the Euphrates.

[261-223 B.C.]

These troubles and commotions in the East made Antiochus Theos weary of his war with Ptolemy, a treaty of peace was therefore concluded on the following terms: that Antiochus should divorce his former wife Laodice, who was his own sister by the father, marry Berenice, the daughter of Ptolemy, and settle the crown upon the male issue of that marriage. Two years after this marriage Ptolemy Philadelphus died—an event which Antiochus Theos, his son-in-law, no sooner understood than he removed Berenice from his bed, and recalled Laodice, with her children Seleucus Callinicus, and Antiochus Hierax; but Laodice being well acquainted with his fickle temper, and fearing lest he might again abandon her and receive Berenice, resolved to improve the present opportunity and secure the succession to her son, for by the late treaty with Ptolemy, her children were disinherited and the crown settled on the son of Berenice. To effect this design, she caused Antiochus to be poisoned; when she saw him expiring, she ordered him to be privately conveyed away, and one Artemon, who greatly resembled him, as well in features as in the tone of his voice, to be placed in his bed. Artemon acted his part with great dexterity, and personating Antiochus, tenderly recommended his dear Laodice and her children to the lords that visited him. In the name of Antiochus, whom the people believed still alive, orders were issued, enjoining all his subjects to obey his beloved son Seleucus Callinicus, and acknowledge him for their lawful sovereign. The crown being by this infamous contrivance secured to Callinicus, the death of the king was publicly declared, and Callinicus without any opposition ascended the throne. Antiochus Hierax, the other son of Laodice, had at this time the government of the provinces of Asia Minor, where he commanded a considerable body of troops.^c

Hardly had Seleucus to some extent recovered from the severe defeats inflicted upon him by Ptolemy the “benefactor” during the three years’ war of vengeance, when his younger brother Antiochus, surnamed “the hawk” (Hierax) on account of his rapacity, raised the standard of revolt in conjunction with Mithridates of Pontus, and (Seleucus having been routed by Galatian mercenaries in a terrible battle at Ancyra) made himself master of a large part of Asia Minor, but was forced to pay tribute for it to the hordes of Celtic robbers, who overran the provinces after their victory, ravaging and pillaging with impunity. Not until Seleucus had effected a reconciliation with his brother and made a peace by which he resigned to the latter his dominions in Asia Minor, was he able gradually to reunite the lost or rebellious provinces and to restore tranquillity and order in his kingdom. Both brothers were brave and energetic; but the sanguinary quarrels of their house, and the crimes which were handed down from generation to generation to beget fresh acts of revenge, had imbruted their minds. Alike in vigour, restlessness, and violence, they persecuted each other to the death. Antiochus died a fugitive in a Thracian city under the blows of Celtic assassins, and his royal brother fell in the following year in an unsuccessful fight with Attalus I, the conqueror of the Galatians and ruler of the kingdom of Pergamus.

The son and successor of Seleucus, who bore the same name as his father with the surname of “the thunderbolt” (Ceraunus), entered on the heritage of the kingdom and the war with Attalus, but after a reign of three years met his death in battle at the hands of Nicanor and the Galatian captain Apaturius. The Syrian army then bestowed the crown upon his younger brother, Antiochus III. He, being occupied with the eastern provinces, delegated the conduct of the war in Asia Minor to his maternal uncle

Achæus. They both fought with good fortune and success. While the king led an expedition into Media and Persia, defeated the rebellious satraps Molon and Alexander in the field and constrained them to commit suicide, and compelled the Bactrians, Parthians, and Indians to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Syrian king, Achæus drove his adversary Attalus back over the frontiers of his own principality, pressed hard upon him in his own capital, and, by a policy of mingled conciliation and coercion, prevailed upon the Greek cities of the western coast to submit to annexation. But, rendered presumptuous by success, he next attempted to set up an independent kingdom in Asia Minor, and thus again prevented the complete restoration of the Seleucid dominion. Antiochus, involved in a fresh war with Egypt, from which country he was scheming to wrest the intermediate Syrian territory of the Lebanon, was obliged to let his uncle have a free hand for a while. But he had hardly concluded peace with Ptolemy after the disastrous battle of Raphia in the ancient country of the Philistines, and abandoned his claim to the Syrian coast, before he took the field against the traitorous Achæus. The latter, deserted by most of his troops, took refuge in the fortified city of Sardis, where he was closely besieged by Antiochus, and, having been treacherously betrayed into his hands, was put to a painful death.

Antiochus, whom the flattery of contemporary historians styles "the great," then conceived the design of restoring the empire of the Seleucids to its pristine expansion. For this purpose he undertook an adventurous campaign of several years' duration in eastern Iran and India, constrained the revolting princes and states to do homage to him, and extorted a recognition (more apparent than real) of Syrian supremacy.

Just as Antiochus returned to Asia Minor the fourth Ptolemy, the voluptuous Philopator, died, and his son Ptolemy Epiphanes, a minor, succeeded to the kingdom. The consequent disorders, factions, and weakness of Egypt inspired the enterprising king of Syria with the hope that he might after all acquire the coast land of the Lebanon. Reinforced by a treaty of partition with Philip of Macedonia, who himself coveted the Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, and the islands, Antiochus invaded Judea with an army, overthrew the Ætolian leader, Scopas, commander of the Egyptian forces, at Paneas near the sources of the Jordan, and subjugated the coast, including the fortified town of Gaza. The inhabitants of Jerusalem and Judea gladly welcomed the rule of Syria, which was at first mild and conciliatory, though it soon became even more oppressive than that of Egypt. The guardians of the Egyptian king hastened to prevent an attack upon Egypt itself by concluding a treaty of peace in which they renounced all claim to the conquered territory and betrothed their ward to Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus. Meanwhile Philip had been waging successful war in Asia Minor, the Hellespont, and the islands, though all his conquests were rendered nugatory by the disastrous fight with the Romans at Cynoscephalæ.

Instead of manfully supporting his ally against the mighty adversary from the west, Antiochus endeavoured to turn the withdrawal of the Macedonian army to his own profit. He laid claim to all the territory west of the Taurus and on both shores of the Hellespont which his ancestor Seleucus had acquired by his victory over Lysimachus; and, not content with mastering the Greek cities on the Asiatic coast and the independent kings of Pergamus, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Pontus, and Armenia, he crossed the Hellespont, occupied the city of Lysimachia which had been rebuilt, together with other places on the Thracian peninsula, and threatened Lampsacus, Byzantium,

[196-170 B.C.]

and Heraclea. Apprehensive for their independence, the princes and cities he menaced followed the example set by the rich and powerful commercial city of Rhodes, and placed themselves under the protection of the Romans. The latter, by repeated embassies, required "the great" king to desist from hostilities against their allies, and to liberate all the Greek cities in Asia and Europe. Antiochus haughtily declined Roman intermeddling with his affairs, saying that as he did not trouble himself about the concerns of Italy and the western world, so he forbade the Romans to curtail his prerogatives in Asia and Thrace, stigmatising their demands as contrary to justice and honour. [He also gave the Carthaginian Hannibal his protection and support against Rome.] Further negotiations by embassies and epistles delayed the outbreak of war for some years, but could not divert the fatal blow from the Syrian empire. The battle of Magnesia broke the might of the Seleucid kingdom for evermore; Syria made no second appeal to arms. Antiochus "the great" was slain at Elymais, south of the Caspian Sea, by the inhabitants of the city, while he was engaged in plundering the temple of Baal to fill his empty coffers with its treasures.^b

SELEUCUS PHILOPATOR

He was succeeded by Seleucus, surnamed Philopator, or, as Josephus^d styles him, Soter, which indeed was the surname of his son Demetrius. This prince reigned eleven years and some months; but made a very poor figure, by reason of the low state to which the Syrian empire had been reduced by the Romans, and the exorbitant sum of a thousand talents he was obliged to pay annually, by virtue of the treaty of peace between the king his father and that republic. It was under this prince that the famous accident happened concerning Heliodorus, which is mentioned in the second book of Maccabees, and described in the History of Israel. Later Heliodorus poisoned Seleucus and put the crown on his own head.

Antiochus, brother of Seleucus, being arrived at Athens on his return from Rome, received there the news of his brother's death, and was at the same time told that Heliodorus had seized the crown and was supported by a strong party; but that another was forming in favour of Ptolemy, who claimed the kingdom of Syria, in right of his mother, the deceased king's sister. Hereupon Antiochus had recourse to Eumenes, king of Pergamus, and to Attalus, the king's brother, who conducted him into Syria, at the head of a powerful army, drove out the usurper, and seated him on the throne. On his being settled on the throne he assumed the name of Epiphanes, that is, "the illustrious," which title was never worse applied. His odd and extravagant conduct made his subjects look upon him as a madman; whence, instead of Epiphanes, or "the illustrious," they used to style him Epimanes, that is, "the madman."

Antiochus having, ever since the return of Apollonius from the Egyptian court, been making the necessary preparations for the war with Ptolemy, was met by the forces of Ptolemy, between Mount Casius and Pelusium. Hereupon an engagement ensued, in which the Egyptians were routed at the first onset. Antiochus, having spent the whole winter in making fresh preparations for a second expedition into Egypt, gained a second victory over the forces of Ptolemy, took Pelusium, and led his army into the very heart of the kingdom. In this last overthrow it was in his power to have cut off all the Egyptians to a man; but, instead of pursuing his advantage, he took

care to put a stop to the slaughter, riding about the field in person, forbidding his men to put any more to death. This clemency gained him the hearts of the Egyptians so completely, that when he advanced into the country all the inhabitants voluntarily submitted to him; by which means he made himself master of Memphis, and all the rest of Egypt, except Alexandria, which still held out against him. In his second invasion Ptolemy fell into the hands of the conqueror; but whether he was taken prisoner, or surrendered himself voluntarily, is uncertain. It was at this time that Antiochus took Jerusalem, and profaned the temple.

The Alexandrians, seeing Ptolemy Philometor in the hands of Antiochus, whom he suffered to govern his kingdom as he pleased, looked upon him as lost to them, and therefore placed his younger brother on the throne, giving him the name of Euergetes, which was afterwards changed into that of Physcon, or "great-bellied," his luxury and gluttony having made him remarkably corpulent, and by this name he is most commonly mentioned in history.

Antiochus, being informed of what was transacting in Egypt, took occasion from this to return a third time into that country, upon the specious pretence of restoring the deposed king; but in reality he made himself master of the kingdom. Having therefore defeated the Alexandrians in a sea-fight near Pelusium, he again entered that unhappy country at the head of a powerful army, and advanced directly to Alexandria to besiege it.

In this extremity Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleopatra his sister, who were in the city, sent ambassadors to Rome representing their situation, and imploring the assistance of that powerful republic. The Roman ambassadors obliged Antiochus to quit Egypt. On his return, being highly provoked to see himself thus obliged to quit a kingdom which he looked upon as his own, Antiochus vented his rage upon the city of Jerusalem, which had given him no offence. But the desolations he caused in Judea, and the bloody war which he carried on against the Jews, with the generous resistance made first by Mattathias, and afterwards by his son, the brave Judas Maccabæus, are recorded in the history of that people.^c

On the death of Antiochus, his favourite Philip was left as regent during the minority of Antiochus Eupator. Philip was however put to death by a rival, Lysias. Meanwhile Demetrius, the son of Seleucus Philopator, who had been at Rome as hostage for many years, escaped and seized the throne, taking the surname of Soter, "saviour." The Romans acknowledged him, but with so little enthusiasm that when an alleged impostor, Alexander Balas, claiming to be the son of Antiochus, appeared, the Romans favoured him, and he defeated Demetrius, who fell in battle 150 B.C. He left a son, also named Demetrius, who, with the aid of Ptolemy Philometor of Egypt, defeated Alexander Balas, and put him to death. Demetrius, called Nicator, was overthrown by a general named Tryphon acting for Antiochus, the son of Alexander Balas, who was crowned as Antiochus Theos, only to be put to death later by Tryphon, who claimed the crown. Tryphon was dispossessed by the brother of Demetrius Nicator, who took the name of Antiochus Sidetes, a monarch of many good qualities, and reigned nine years, winning praise even from the Jews who had suffered so much from Syrian kings. He was killed in battle with the Parthians, and Demetrius Nicator, who had remained in captivity all these nine years, recovered the throne, but was slain by a new pretender, Alexander Zebina, who was put to death by a son of Demetrius Nicator, called Antiochus Grypus, who is said to have made his mother Cleopatra—a past mistress of intrigue—drink a bowl of poison she had prepared for him.

[125-65 B.C.]

After a reign of eight years he was opposed by his half-brother, Antiochus Cyzicenus, who compelled him to share the kingdom. Grypus being assassinated, Syria was again made one under a Seleucus Epiphanes, who defeated Cyzicenus only to be expelled in seven months by Antiochus Eusebes, who in turn, after a year, fell before Grypus' fourth son, Demetrius Eucærus. He was driven out by his own brother Philip, and Philip by a younger brother, Antiochus Dionysius.

By this time the kaleidoscopic feuds of the Seleucidæ had weakened Syria till it was ripe for a foreigner, and the Armenian king, Tigranes, made prey of it. A last claimant, Antiochus Asiaticus, held out for a time; then called in the Romans, who under Pompey absorbed Syria into the empire, and put an end to the race of Seleucus, which had ruled from about 312 B.C. to 65 B.C.^a



GREEK BOTTLES
(In the Museum of Napoleon III)



CHAPTER LXVI. THE KINGDOM OF THE PTOLEMIES

WHEN the empire of Alexander was parcelled out among his generals, the most desirable lot perhaps was that which fell to the share of Ptolemy. That astute general chose Egypt for his portion, and despite the efforts of his rivals, he was able, thanks in part to the isolated geographical position, to retain it, and ultimately to become its recognised sovereign and the founder of a dynasty of kings which was to hold unbroken sway there for the long period of three hundred years.

Ptolemy, besides being an excellent general, was evidently a man of rather wide culture and varied attainments. His capacities have been sometimes accounted for by the suggestion that he was probably in fact the half-brother of Alexander the Great, as his mother had been a concubine of Philip; though his royal paternity, if indeed a fact, was never officially recognised. Be that as it may, Ptolemy was a man of great ability as a ruler, and his general culture is evidenced by the fact that he wrote a history of the life and campaigns of Alexander, which work, as we have already seen, was one of the two chief sources from which the history of Arrian was compiled.

The first Ptolemy founded, and his successors enlarged and extended, the famous Alexandrian library, which came to be by far the most important collection of books that had probably been gathered together anywhere in the world up to that time, comprising, it is said, no fewer than half a million manuscripts. In connection with the library was an institution which was virtually a college, where the most distinguished scholars of the day studied and taught. The language and the entire official life thus transplanted into Old Egypt were of course Grecian. All official connection with the mother country was soon utterly broken; the kingdom of the Ptolemies, as a political factor, was a thing quite apart; but in the broader sense the new Egyptian power was essentially Greek. Alexandria, the new Athens, became the centre of Greek life, thought, and influence; it was there, rather than to Athens itself, that the youth flocked from the provinces to drink at that fount of Grecian culture which still maintained its influence in the world for generations after the original Hellas had been shattered in power and shorn of all political significance.

But the time came when the Egyptian empire also was to come in conflict with the Romans. The tragic romance of Cleopatra, the last daughter of the Ptolemies, is known to every one, though curiously enough the patent fact is often overlooked that this "daughter of the Nile" was in no proper sense an Egyptian, but to the last drop of her blood a Macedonian Greek, bearing the name even of one of the wives of the father of Alexander the

[323-321 B.C.]

Great. It was this Egyptian empire of the Ptolemies, then, which served as the direct channel of transit of the old Grecian culture to Rome, somewhat as Persia had been the channel of transit of Egyptian and Babylonian culture to Greece. It was a curious and interesting revival through which Egypt, which for some centuries had ceased to play an important part in the great game of the nations, came to be again the centre of culture of the entire world, even though this time it bore an exotic and not an indigenous culture.

But though this empire of the Ptolemies had thus a vastly greater importance than the other portions of Alexander's dismembered empire, we shall treat its history somewhat briefly here, since we must necessarily return to some phases of it more in detail in pursuing the history of that Roman power by which the kingdom of the Ptolemies was finally overthrown.^a

THE KINGDOM OF THE PTOLEMIES: THE THIRTY-THIRD EGYPTIAN DYNASTY

	YEARS	BEGAN B.C.
Lagus or Soter reigned	38	323
Philadelphus	38	285
Euergetes	25	247
Philopator	17	222
Epiphanes	24	204
Philometor	35	181
Physcon or Euergetes II	29	146
Soter II or Lathyrus	10	117
Alexander I (Soter deposed)	18	107
Soter II restored	7	89
Berenice	6 months	81
Alexander II	6 months	80
Neus Dionysus or Auletes	14	80
Ptolemy the Elder	4	51
Ptolemy the Younger	3	48
Cleopatra	14	44
Egypt a Roman province		30 ^d

When Egypt was given to Ptolemy by the council of generals, Cleomenes was at the same time and by the same power made second in command, and he governed Egypt for one year before Ptolemy's arrival, that being in name the first year of the reign of Philip Arrhidæus, or, according to the chronologer's mode of dating, the first year after Alexander's death. The first act of Ptolemy was to put Cleomenes to death.

Perdiccas, in the death of Cleomenes and the seizure of the body of Alexander, had seen quite enough proof that Ptolemy, though too wise to take the name of king, had in reality grasped the power; and he now led the Macedonian army against Egypt, to enforce obedience and to punish the rebellious lieutenant.

Perdiccas attempted to cross the Nile at the deep fords below Memphis. Part of his army passed the first ford, though the water was up to the men's breasts. But they could not pass the second ford in the face of Ptolemy's army. After this check, whole bodies of men, headed by their generals, left their ranks; and among them Pithon, a general who had held the same rank under Alexander as Perdiccas himself, and who would no longer put up with his haughty commands. Upon this the disorder spread through the whole army, and Perdiccas soon fell by the hand of one of his own soldiers.

On the death of their leader, all cause of war ceased. Ptolemy sent corn and cattle into the camp of the invading army, which then asked for orders from him who the day before had been their enemy. The princes, Philip Arrhidæus and the young Alexander, both fell into his hands; and he might

then, as guardian in their name, have sent his orders over the whole of Alexander's conquests. But, by grasping at what was clearly out of his reach, he would have lost more friends and power than he would have gained; and when the Macedonian phalanx, whose voice was law to the rest of the army, asked his advice in the choice of a guardian for the two princes, he recommended to them Pithon and Arrhidæus; Pithon, who had just joined him, and had been the cause of the rout of the Macedonian army, and Arrhidæus, who had given up to him the body of Alexander.

The Macedonian army, accordingly, chose Pithon and Arrhidæus as guardians, and as rulers with unlimited power over the whole of Alexander's



BACCHANALIAN FIGURE

(After Hope)

conquests; but though none of the Greek generals who now held Asia Minor, Syria, Babylonia, Thrace, or Egypt, dared to acknowledge it to the soldiers, yet in reality the power of the guardians was limited to the little kingdom of Macedonia. With the death of Perdiccas, and the withdrawal of his army, Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria were left unguarded, and almost without a master; and Ptolemy, who had before been kept back by his wise forethought rather than by the moderation of his views, sent an army under the command of Nicanor to conquer those countries. Jerusalem was the only place that held out against the Egyptian army; but Nicanor, says the historian Agatharchides, seeing that on every seventh day the garrison withdrew from the walls, chose that day for the assault, and thus gained the city. What used to be Egypt was an inland kingdom, bounded by the desert; but Egypt under Ptolemy was a country on the seacoast;

and on the conquest of Phœnicia and Cœle-Syria he was master of the forests of Libanus and Antilibanus, and stretched his coast from Cyrene to Antioch a distance of twelve hundred miles.

The wise and mild plans which were laid down by Alexander for the government of Egypt, when a province, were easily followed by Ptolemy when it became his own kingdom. The Greek soldiers lived in their garrisons or in Alexandria under the Macedonian laws; while the Egyptian laws were administered by their own priests, who were upheld in all the rights of their order and in their freedom from land tax.

While Egypt under Ptolemy was thus enjoying the advantages of its insulated position, and was thereby at leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, the other provinces were being harassed by the unceasing wars of Alexander's generals, who were aiming like Ptolemy at raising their own power.

Antigonus, in his ambitious efforts to stretch his power over the whole of the provinces, had by force or treachery driven Seleucus out of Babylon and forced him to seek Egypt for safety, where Ptolemy received him with the kindness and good policy which had before gained so many friends. No arguments of Seleucus were wanting to persuade Ptolemy that Antigonus was aiming at universal conquest, and that his next attack would be upon Egypt. He therefore sent ambassadors to make treaties of alliance with

[316-311 B.C.]

Cassander and Lysimachus, who readily joined him against the common enemy.

Ptolemy crossed over to Cyprus to punish the kings of the little states on that island for having joined Antigonus; for now that the fate of empires was to be settled by naval battles the friendship of Cyprus became very important to the neighbouring states. He landed there with so large a force that he met with no resistance. He added Cyprus to the rest of his dominions. He banished the kings, and made Nicocreon governor of the whole island. From Cyprus, Ptolemy landed with his army in upper Syria, and then marching hastily into Asia Minor he took Mallus, a city of Cilicia. Having rewarded his soldiers with the booty there seized, he again embarked and returned to Alexandria. This inroad drew off the enemy from Cœle-Syria.

Ptolemy, on reaching Alexandria, set his army in motion towards Pelusium, on its way to Palestine. He was met at Gaza by the young Demetrius with an army of eleven thousand foot and twenty-three hundred horse, followed by forty-three elephants and a body of light-armed barbarians, who, like the Egyptians in the army of Ptolemy, were not counted. But the youthful courage of Demetrius was no match for the cool skill and larger army of Ptolemy; the elephants were easily stopped by iron hurdles, and the Egyptian army, after gaining a complete victory, entered Gaza, while Demetrius fled to Azotus. Ptolemy, in his victory, showed a generosity unknown in ancient warfare; he not only gave leave to the conquered army to bury their dead, but sent back the whole of the royal baggage which had fallen into his hands, and also those personal friends of Demetrius who were found among the prisoners. By this victory the whole of Phœnicia was again joined to Egypt, and Seleucus regained Babylonia.

When Antigonus, who was in Phrygia on the other side of his kingdom, heard that his son Demetrius had been beaten at Gaza, he marched with all his forces to give battle to Ptolemy. Ptolemy did not choose to risk his kingdom against the far larger forces of Antigonus. Therefore, with the advice of his council of generals, he levelled the fortifications of Acca, Joppa, Samaria, and Gaza, and withdrew his forces and treasure into Egypt, leaving the desert between himself and the army of Antigonus. Antigonus then led his army northward, leaving Egypt unattacked.

This retreat was followed by a treaty of peace between these generals, by which it was agreed that each should keep the country that he then held; that Cassander should govern Macedonia until Alexander Ægus, the son of Alexander the Great, should be of age; that Lysimachus should keep Thrace, Ptolemy Egypt, and Antigonus Asia Minor and Palestine; and each wishing to be looked upon as the friend of the soldiers by whom his power was upheld and the whole of these wide conquests kept in awe, added the very unnecessary article that the Greeks living in each of these countries should be governed according to their own laws.

All the provinces held by these generals became more or less Greek kingdoms, yet in no one did so many Greeks settle as in Lower Egypt. Though the rest of Egypt was governed by Egyptian laws and judges, the city of Alexandria was under Macedonian law. It did not form part of the nome of Hermopolites in which it was built. It scarcely formed a part of Egypt, but was a Greek state in its neighbourhood, holding the Egyptians in a state of slavery. In that city no Egyptian could live without feeling himself of a conquered race. He was not admitted to the privileges of Macedonian citizenship, while they were at once granted to every Greek, and soon to every Jew, who would settle there.

By the treaty just spoken of, Ptolemy, in the thirteenth year after the death of Alexander, was left undisputed master of Egypt. During these years he had not only gained the love of the Egyptians and Alexandrians by his wise and just government, but had won their respect as a general by the skill with which he had kept the war at a distance. He had lost and won battles in Syria, in Asia Minor, in the island of Cyprus, and at sea; but since Perdiccas marched against him, before he had a force to defend himself with, no foreign army had drunk the sacred waters of the Nile.

The next year Ptolemy, finding that his troops could hardly keep their possessions in Cilicia, carried over an army in person to attack the forces of Antigonus in Lycia. He gained the whole southern coast of Asia Minor.

While Ptolemy was busy in helping the Greek cities of Asia to gain their liberty, Menelaus, his brother and admiral, was almost driven out of Cyprus by Demetrius. On this Ptolemy got together his fleet, to the number of 140 long galleys and two hundred transports, manned with not less than ten thousand men, and sailed with them to the help of his brother. This fleet under the command of Menelaus was met by Demetrius with the fleet of Antigonus, consisting of 112 long galleys and a number of transports; and the Egyptian fleet, which had hitherto been master of the sea, was beaten near the city of Salamis in Cyprus by the smaller fleet of Demetrius. This was the heaviest loss that had ever befallen Ptolemy. Eighty long galleys were sunk, and forty long galleys with one hundred transports and eight thousand men were taken prisoners. He could no longer hope to keep Cyprus, and he sailed hastily back to Egypt, leaving to Demetrius the garrisons of the island as his prisoners, all of whom were enrolled in the army of Antigonus, to the number of sixteen thousand foot and six hundred horse.

This naval victory gave Demetrius the means of unburdening his proud mind of a debt of gratitude to his enemy; and accordingly, remembering what Ptolemy had done after the battle of Gaza, he sent back to Egypt, unasked for and unransomed, those prisoners who were of high rank, that is to say, the whole that had any choice about which side they fought for; and among them were Leontiscus the son, and Menelaus the brother of Ptolemy.

Antigonus was overjoyed with the news of his son's victory. By lessening the power of Ptolemy, it had done much to smooth his own path to the sovereignty of Alexander's empire, which was then left without an heir; and he immediately took the title of king, and gave the same title to his son Demetrius. In this he was followed by Ptolemy and the other generals, but with this difference—that while Antigonus called himself king of all the provinces, Ptolemy called himself king of Egypt; and while Antigonus gained Syria and Cyprus, Ptolemy gained the friendship of every other kingdom and of every free city in Greece; they all looked upon him as their best ally against Antigonus, the common enemy.

The next year Antigonus mustered his forces in Cœle-Syria, and got ready for a second attack upon Egypt. The pride of Antigonus would not let him follow the advice of the sailors, and wait eight days till the north winds of the spring equinox had passed; and by this haste many of his ships were wrecked on the coast, while others were driven into the Nile and fell into the hands of Ptolemy. Antigonus himself, marching with the land forces, found all the strong places well guarded by the Egyptian army; and, being driven back at every point, discouraged by the loss of his ships and by seeing whole bodies of his troops go over to Ptolemy, he at last took the advice of his officers and led back his army to Syria, while Ptolemy

[306-280 B.C.]

returned to Alexandria, to employ those powers of mind in the works of peace which he had so successfully used in war.

Antigonus then turned the weight of his mighty kingdom against the little island of Rhodes. The galleys of Ptolemy, though unable to keep at sea against the larger fleet of Demetrius, often forced their way into the harbour with the welcome supplies of corn. Month after month every stratagem and machine which the ingenuity of Demetrius could invent were tried and failed; and after the siege had lasted more than a year he was glad to find an excuse for withdrawing his troops; and the Rhodians in their joy hailed Ptolemy with the title of Soter or "saviour." This name he ever afterwards kept, though by the Greek writers he is more often called Ptolemy the son of Lagus, or Ptolemy Lagus.

The next of Ptolemy's conquests was Cœle-Syria; and soon after this the wars between these successors of Alexander were put an end to by the death of Antigonus, whose overtowering ambition was among the chief causes of quarrel. This happened at the great battle of Ipsus in Phrygia, where they all met, with above eighty thousand men in each army. Antigonus king of Asia Minor was accompanied by his son Demetrius, and by Pyrrhus king of Epirus; and he was defeated by Ptolemy king of Egypt, Seleucus king of Babylon, Lysimachus king of Thrace, and Cassander king of Macedonia; and the old man lost his life fighting bravely. After the battle, Demetrius fled to Cyprus, and yielded to the terms of peace which were imposed on him by the four allied sovereigns.

He sent his friend Pyrrhus as a hostage to Alexandria; and there this young king of Epirus soon gained the friendship of Ptolemy and afterwards his step-daughter in marriage. Ptolemy was thus left master of the whole of the southern coast of Asia Minor and Syria—indeed of the whole coast of the eastern end of the Mediterranean, from the island of Cos on the north to Cyrene on the south.

During these formidable wars with Antigonus, Ptolemy had never been troubled with any serious rising of the conquered Egyptians; and perhaps the wars may not have been without their use in strengthening his throne.

Ptolemy's first children were by Thais the noted courtesan, but they were not thought legitimate. Leontiscus, the eldest, we afterwards hear of, fighting bravely against Demetrius; of the second, named Lagus after his grandfather, we hear nothing. He then married Eurydice the daughter of Antipater, by whom he had several children. The eldest son, Ptolemy, was named Ceraunus, "the thunderbolt," and was banished by his father from Alexandria. In his distress he fled to Seleucus, by whom he was kindly received; but after the death of Ptolemy Soter he basely plotted against Seleucus and put him to death. He then defeated in battle Antigonus the son of Demetrius, and got possession of Macedonia for a short time. He



GREEK VASE
(In the British Museum)

married his half-sister Arsinoë, and put her children to death; he was soon afterwards put to death himself by the Gauls, who were either fighting against him or were mercenaries in his own army. His Macedonian coins, with the name of Ptolemy Ceraunus, prove that he took the name himself, and that it was not a nickname given to him for his ungovernable temper, as has been sometimes thought.

Another son of Ptolemy and Eurydice was put to death by Ptolemy Philadelphus, for plotting against his throne, to which, as the elder brother, he might have thought himself the best entitled. Their daughter Lysandra married Agathocles the son of Lysimachus; but when Agathocles was put to death by his father, she fled to Egypt with her children, and put herself under Ptolemy's care. Next he married Berenice, a lady who had come into Egypt with Eurydice, and had formed part of her household. She was the widow of a man named Philip; and she had by her first husband a son named Magas, whom Ptolemy made governor of Cyrene, and a daughter, Antigone, whom Ptolemy gave in marriage to Pyrrhus, when that young king was living in Alexandria as hostage for Demetrius.

With Berenice Ptolemy spent the rest of his years without anything to trouble the happiness of his family. He saw their elder son Ptolemy, whom we must call by the name which he took late in life, Philadelphus, grow up everything that he could wish him to be; and, moved alike by his love for the mother and by the good qualities of the son, he chose him as his successor on the throne, instead of his eldest son Ptolemy Ceraunus, who had shown, by every act in his life, his unfitness for the trust. His daughter Arsinoë married Lysimachus in his old age, and urged him against his son Agathocles, the husband of her own sister. She afterwards married her half-brother Ptolemy Ceraunus; and lastly we shall see her the wife of her brother Philadelphus. Argæus, the youngest son of Ptolemy, was put to death by Philadelphus, on a charge of treason. Of his youngest daughter Philotera we know nothing, except that her brother Philadelphus afterwards named a city on the coast of the Red Sea after her.

After the last battle with Demetrius, Ptolemy had regained the island of Cyprus and Cœle-Syria, including Judea; and his throne became stronger as his life drew to an end.

His last public act, in the thirty-eighth year of his reign, was ordered by the same forbearance which had governed every part of his life. Feeling the weight of years press heavily upon him, that he was less able than formerly to bear the duties of his office, and wishing to see his son firmly seated on the throne, he laid aside his diadem and his title, and without consulting either the army or the capital, proclaimed Ptolemy, his son by Berenice, king, and contented himself with the modest rank of somatophylax, or satrap, to his successor.

PTOLEMY PHILADELPHUS

One of the chief troubles in the reign of Philadelphus was the revolt of Cyrene. The government of that part of Africa had been entrusted to Magas, the half-brother of the king, a son of Berenice by her former husband. Berenice, who had been successful in setting aside Ceraunus to make room for her son Philadelphus on the throne of Egypt, has even been said to have favoured the rebellious and ungrateful efforts of her elder son Magas to make himself king of Cyrene.

[285-247 B.C.]

After the war between the brothers had lasted some years, Magas made an offer of peace, which was to be sealed by betrothing his only child Berenice to the son of Philadelphus. To this offer Philadelphus yielded; as by the death of Magas, who was already worn out by luxury and disease, Cyrene would then fall to his own son. Magas, indeed, died before the marriage took place; but, notwithstanding the efforts made by his widow to break the agreement, the treaty was kept, and on this marriage Cyrene again formed part of the kingdom of Egypt.

But the black spot upon the character of Philadelphus, which all the blaze of science and letters by which he was surrounded cannot make us overlook, is the death of two of his brothers.

Philadelphus had, when young, married Arsinoë the daughter of Lysimachus of Thrace, by whom he had three children—Ptolemy, who succeeded him, Lysimachus, and Berenice; but, having found that his wife was intriguing with Amyntas, and with his physician Chrysippus of Rhodes, he put these two to death, and banished the queen Arsinoë to Coptos in the Thebaid.

He then took Arsinoë his own sister as the partner of his throne. She had married first the old Lysimachus king of Thrace, and then Ceraunus her half-brother, when he was king of Macedonia. As they were not children of the same mother, this second marriage was neither illegal nor improper in Macedonia; but her third marriage, with Philadelphus, could only be justified by the laws of Egypt, their adopted country. They were both past the middle age, and whether Philadelphus looked upon her as his wife or not, at any rate they had no children. Her own children by Lysimachus had been put to death by Ceraunus, and she readily adopted those of her brother with all the kindness of a mother. This seeming marriage, however, between brother and sister did not escape blame with the Greeks of Alexandria. The poet Sotades, whose verses were as licentious as his life, wrote some coarse lines against the queen, for which he was forced to fly from Egypt, and being overtaken at sea he was wrapped up in lead and thrown overboard.

In the Egyptian inscriptions Ptolemy and Arsinoë are always called "the brother-gods"; on the coins they are called *Adelphi*, "the brothers"; and afterwards the king took the name of Philadelphus, or "sister-loving," by which he is now usually known.

The wars between Philadelphus and his great neighbour Antiochus Theos seem not to have been carried on very actively, though they did not wholly cease till Philadelphus offered as a bribe his daughter Berenice, with a large sum of money under the name of a dowry. Antiochus was already married to Laodice, whom he loved dearly, and by whom he had two children, Seleucus and Antiochus; but political ambition had deadened the feelings of his heart, and he agreed to declare this first marriage void and his two sons illegitimate, and that his children, if any should be born to him by Berenice, should inherit the throne of Babylon and the East. The peace between the two countries lasted as long as Philadelphus lived, and was strengthened by kindnesses which each did to the other.

Philadelphus was of a weak frame of body, and had delicate health; and though a lover of learning beyond other kings of his time, he also surpassed them in his unmeasured luxury and love of pleasure.

He reigned over Egypt, with the neighbouring parts of Arabia; also over Libya, Phœnicia, Cœle-Syria, part of Ethiopia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, Lycia, Caria, Cyprus, and the isles of the Cyclades. The island of Rhodes and many of the cities of Greece were bound to him by the ties of friendship,

for past help and for the hope of future. The wealthy cities of Tyre and Sidon did homage to him, as before to his father, by putting his crowned head upon their coins. The forces of Egypt reached the very large number of two hundred thousand foot and twenty thousand horse, two thousand chariots, four hundred Ethiopian elephants, fifteen hundred ships of war, and one thousand transports. Of this large force, it is not likely that even one-fourth should have been Greeks; the rest must have been Egyptians and Syrians, with some Gauls.

These large forces were maintained by a yearly income, equally large, of fourteen thousand eight hundred talents, or two millions and a quarter pounds sterling, besides the tax on corn, which was taken in kind, of a million and a half of artabas, or about five millions of bushels. To this we may add a mass of gold, silver, and other valuable stores in the treasury, which were boastfully reckoned at the unheard-of sum of seven hundred and forty thousand talents, or above one hundred million pounds sterling.

The trade down the Nile was larger than it had ever been before; the coasting trade on the Mediterranean was new; the people were rich and happy; justice was administered to the Egyptians according to their own laws, and to the Greeks of Alexander, according to the Macedonian laws; the navy commanded the whole of the eastern half of the Mediterranean; the schools and library had risen to a great height upon the wise plans of Ptolemy Soter; in every point of view Alexandria was the chief city in the world. Athens had no poets or other writers during this century equal in merit to those who ennobled the Museum. Philadelphus, by joining to the greatness and good government of his father the costly splendour and pomp of an eastern monarch, so drew the eyes of after ages upon his reign that his name passed into a proverb.

Needless to say, the civilisation of this time was essentially Greek. The main body of writers and scholars of the period naturally gave the stamp of this culture to the epoch. Yet the old civilisation of Egypt must have reacted upon the intruders in many ways.

Philadelphus died in the thirty-eighth year of his reign, leaving the kingdom as powerful and more wealthy than when it came to him from his father; and he had the happiness of having a son who would carry on, even for the third generation, the wise plans of the first Ptolemy.

PTOLEMY EUERGETES

Ptolemy, the eldest son of Philadelphus, succeeded his father on the throne of Egypt, and after a short time took the name of Euergetes. He began his reign with a Syrian war; for no sooner was Philadelphus dead than Antiochus, who had married Berenice only because it was one of the articles of the treaty with Egypt, sent her away together with her young son. Antiochus then recalled his first wife, Laodice, and she, distrusting her changeable husband, had him at once murdered to secure the throne to her own children. Seleucus, the eldest, seized the throne of Syria; and, urged on by his mother, sent a body of men after Berenice, with orders to put her to death, together with her son, who by the articles of marriage had been made heir to the throne.

The cities of Asia Minor hastily sent help to the queen and her son, while Ptolemy Euergetes, her brother, who had just come to the throne of Egypt, marched without loss of time into Syria. But it was too late to

[245-222 B.C.]

save them ; they were both put to death by the soldiers of Seleucus. Many of the cities, moved by hatred of their king's cruelty, opened their gates to the army of Euergetes ; and, had he not been recalled to Egypt by troubles at home, he would soon have been master of the whole of the kingdom of Seleucus. As it was, he had marched beyond the Euphrates, had left an Egyptian army in Seleucia the capital of Syria, and had gained a large part of Asia Minor. On his march homeward, he laid his gifts upon the altar in the temple of Jerusalem, and there returned thanks to heaven for his victories. He had been taught to bow the knee to the crowds of Greek and Egyptian gods ; and, as Palestine was part of his kingdom, it seemed quite natural to add the god of the Jews to the list.

No sooner had Euergetes reached home than Seleucus, in his turn, marched upon Egypt, and sent for his brother Antiochus Hierax, to bring up his forces and to join him. But before Antiochus could come up the army of Seleucus was already beaten ; and Antiochus, instead of helping his brother in his distress, strove to rob him of his crown. Instead of leading his army against Euergetes, he marched upon Seleucus, and by the help of his Gallic mercenaries beat him in battle. But the traitor was himself soon afterwards beaten by Eumenes, king of Bithynia, who had entered Syria in the hope that it would fall an easy prey into his hands after being torn to pieces by civil war. Antiochus, after the rout of his army, fled to Egypt, believing that he should meet with kinder treatment from Euergetes, his enemy, than after his late treachery he could hope for from his own brother. But he was ordered by Euergetes to be closely guarded, and when he afterwards made his escape he lost his life in his flight by the hands of Celtic assassins, as already related.

Euergetes, finding himself at peace with all his neighbours on the coasts of the Mediterranean, then turned his arms towards the south. He easily conquered the tribes of Ethiopia, whose wild courage was but a weak barrier to the arms and discipline of the Greeks ; and made himself for the moment master of part of the highlands of Abyssinia, the country of the Hexumitæ.

Euergetes did not forget his allies in Greece, but continued the yearly payment to Aratus, the general of the Achæan League, to support a power which held the Macedonians in check ; and when the Spartans under Cleomenes tried to overthrow the power of the Achæans, Euergetes would not help them. Euergetes had married his cousin Berenice, who, like the other queens of Egypt, is also called Cleopatra ; by her he left two sons, Ptolemy and Magas, to the elder of whom he left his kingdom, after a reign of twenty-five years of unclouded prosperity. Egypt was during this reign at the very height of its power and wealth. It had seen three kings, who, though not equally great men, not equally fit to found a monarchy or to raise the literature of a people, were equally successful in the parts which they had undertaken. Euergetes left to his son a kingdom perhaps as large as the world had ever seen under one sceptre, and though many of his boasted victories were like letters written in the sand, of which the traces were soon lost, yet he was by far the greatest monarch of his day.

But here the bright pages in the history of the Ptolemies end. Though trade and agriculture still enriched the country, though arts and letters did not quit Alexandria, we have from this time forward to mark the growth of only vice and luxury, and to measure the wisdom of Ptolemy Soter by the length of time that his laws and institutions were able to bear up against the misrule and folly of his descendants.

PTOLEMY PHILOPATOR

Nothing is known of the death of Ptolemy Euergetes, and there is no proof that it was by unfair means. But when his son began a cruel and wicked reign by putting to death his mother and brother, and by taking the name of Philopator, or father-loving, the world seems to have thought that he was the murderer of his father, and had taken this name to throw a cloak over the deed. Unfortunately history is not free from acts of successful wickedness. By this murder of his brother, and by the minority both of Antiochus king of Syria and of Philip king of Macedonia, Philopator found himself safe from enemies either at home or abroad, and he gave himself up to a life of thoughtlessness and pleasure. The army and fleet were left to go to ruin, and the foreign provinces, which had hitherto been looked upon as the bulwarks of Egypt, were only half guarded; but the throne rested on the virtues of his forefathers, and it was not till his death that it was found to have been undermined by his own vices.^e



A GREEK MAIDEN

At the instigation of his minister, Sosibius, he caused his brother Magas to be murdered, lest he might endeavour to secure the kingdom to himself. The death of Cleomenes, the exiled king of Sparta, who had been protected and provided for by the preceding king, soon followed. Antiochus the Great, who at this time ruled in Syria, perceiving the disorder and licentiousness which prevailed in the court of Egypt, thought it a favourable time to declare war against that country. Ptolemy, who seems not to have lacked courage, roused himself for the emergency, collected a great army, and proceeded to meet the enemy. In the beginning of the war, Antiochus obtained some advantages over the Egyptian troops: but shortly after, in a great battle fought at Raphia near Gaza, he was completely defeated, with great loss; and Ptolemy obtained a large extension of influence in Palestine and Syria. Humbled by this defeat,

and alarmed at the progress of Achaüs in Asia Minor, Antiochus was anxious to make peace with Ptolemy; and the Egyptian king, although he had every inducement to prosecute the war, being equally anxious to return to his licentious pleasures, was ready to receive his overtures. A peace was in consequence concluded, by which Cœle-Syria and Palestine were confirmed as belonging to Egypt. This being done, Ptolemy went to Jerusalem, where he was well received, and treated the inhabitants kindly, until, having made a fruitless attempt to enter the inner sanctuary, he retired from the city threatening the whole nation of the Jews with extermination. It does not appear that he dared to assail the sacred city; but, on returning to Egypt, he published a decree which he caused to be engraved on a pillar erected at the gate of his palace, excluding all those who did not sacrifice to the gods whom he worshipped. By this means the Jews were virtually outlawed,

[216-170 B.C.]

being prevented from suing to him for justice, or from claiming his protection. But this was not the extent of his infliction. By another decree he reduced them from the first rank of citizens, to which they had been raised by the favour of Alexander, to the third rank. They were in consequence degraded so far as to be enrolled among the common people of Egypt.

During this reign the Romans, being again at war with Carthage, sent ambassadors to Egypt, to renew their ancient friendship, who brought magnificent presents to Ptolemy and his queen.

EPIPHANES

At the death of Philopator, 204 B.C., Ptolemy Epiphanes, being then a child of five years old, ascended the throne. In the early part of his reign another Roman embassy visited Egypt, when the king's counsellors took the opportunity of placing the young prince under the guardianship of the powerful republic. The senate of Rome accepted the charge, and sent Marcus Lepidus to act as guardian—a trust which, after a short stay in Egypt, he conferred upon Aristomenes, an Acarnanian, who discharged the duties of this important office with integrity and ability for several years, until the king had attained the age of fourteen, when, according to the usage of the country, he was entitled to take the administration of the kingdom into his own hands. The folly of investing a person so young with absolute power, was in this instance made fully apparent. The youth, who had been universally popular whilst under the direction of Aristomenes, was no sooner enthroned than he placed himself under the influence of worthless men, by whose advice he was led to the adoption of measures through which great disorders were introduced into every branch of the government; and at length his former able and honest minister was put to death.

Epiphanes married Cleopatra, daughter of Antiochus the Great. This marriage appears to have taken place when the young king was about seventeen years old. It is generally supposed that he was taken off by poison, administered by his nobles, to prevent him from entering on a war with Syria to which he had committed himself, when the national finances were so low that they feared they should have to contribute largely towards the expenses of the contest. He left two sons, Philometor and Physcon; and a daughter, Cleopatra, who was successively married to her two brothers.

PHILOMETOR AND PHYSCON

Philometor, the elder of the two sons, then but six years old, was placed on the throne under the guardianship of his mother Cleopatra, who for eight years conducted the affairs of the kingdom with great judgment and success. After her death, Lenæus, a nobleman of distinction, and Eulæus, a eunuch, were charged with the government of the country. One of their earliest measures was to insist on the restoration of Coele-Syria and Palestine to Egypt,—these provinces having been wrested from the dominion of Egypt by the power of Antiochus the Great. This demand led to a violent contest, which tended more than any preceding event to demonstrate the rapid decline of Egyptian power, and the rising sway of Rome.

The Syrian army, under the command of Antiochus Epiphanes, prosecuted the war with such vigour and success that it penetrated to the walls of Alexandria, and actually secured the person of the Egyptian king. Whether he was taken in war, or placed himself willingly in the hands of the Syrian king, does not clearly appear. But, however this may be, the Syrian monarch gained little by his acquisition. For although he induced Philometor to enter into a treaty with him, this was instantly disallowed by the nation, who, regarding a sovereign in the power of an enemy as lost to his country, immediately raised Physcon, the king's brother, to the throne. This led to a second Syrian invasion, which resulted in the expulsion of Physcon; Antiochus restoring Philometor to the government, but retaining Pelusium, the key to the country, in the possession of Syrian troops. From this and other indications of the Syrian king's intentions, Philometor rightly judged that it was his design, by setting the two brothers in continued collision with each other, to retain Egypt virtually in his own power. Acting on this judgment, Philometor invited his brother to terms of reconciliation, which, by the aid of their sister Cleopatra, was happily effected.

The measures adopted by the two brothers to restore Egypt to an independent and prosperous condition, induced Antiochus again to march an army into that country. He was on this occasion, however, compelled, by the prompt and energetic interference of the Romans, to abandon the enterprise. By agreement between the two brothers, they were to reign jointly; but they were no sooner freed from the danger of foreign aggression, than they began to quarrel between themselves. This quickly produced an open rupture, in which Physcon succeeded in driving his brother out of the kingdom. He was, however, soon after restored by the power of Rome, which at the same time assigned Libya and Cyrene to Physcon. New disputes arose, and various contests took place between them, in all of which Rome regarded herself as entitled to act as the paramount ruler of Egypt, and to award the sovereignty according to her will.

Philometor was soon after provoked into a war with Alexander Balas, who had been raised to the throne of Syria mainly by his support. In the prosecution of this contest, the king of Egypt marched into Syria, where he completely routed the army of Alexander near Antioch, but died, a few days after, from wounds received in the battle. He left behind him a high reputation for wisdom and clemency. It was in his reign, and by his favour and that of his queen Cleopatra, that the Jews under Onias were permitted to build the famous Jewish temple at Heliopolis.

On the death of her husband, Cleopatra endeavoured to secure the crown for their son; but some of the leading men inclined towards Physcon, and invited him from Cyrene, where he then reigned, into Egypt. The queen raised an army to oppose him, and a civil war was imminent, when an accommodation was arranged, through the mediation of Rome, by which Physcon married Cleopatra, who was his sister and his brother's widow, on the understanding that they were to reign with joint authority, and that Cleopatra's son by Philometor should be declared next heir to the crown. This agreement was no sooner completed than it was violated. On the day of his marriage Physcon murdered the son of Philometor in the arms of his mother, and commenced a career of iniquity and slaughter of which this was a fitting prelude. He indeed assumed the name of Euergetes, "benefactor," which the Alexandrians changed into Kakergetes, "the evil-doer" — an epithet which he justly merited; for he was the most cruel and wicked, most despicable and vile, of all the Ptolemies. To the Jews he evinced unmitigated

[146-107 B.C.]

enmity and cruelty, because they had espoused the cause of Cleopatra. He then divorced Cleopatra, his wife, and married her daughter, of the same name, who was his own niece; but not before he had subjected the young princess to the vilest indignity.

Such conduct excited the disgust of his subjects, and, accompanied as it was with excessive cruelty, produced a revolt which drove him from the kingdom. He, however, succeeded in recovering his position, and at length died in the sixty-seventh year of his age, having reigned twenty-nine years.

It is a fact as singular as unaccountable, that this most licentious and bloody prince, whose name is infamous, as associated with almost every crime, is notwithstanding celebrated by the most respectable ancient writers as a great restorer of learning, a patron of learned men, and withal an author of some celebrity himself. Physcon left three sons — Apion, by a concubine, and Lathyrus and Alexander by his wife Cleopatra. By his will he left the kingdom of Cyrene to Apion, and the crown of Egypt to his widow in conjunction with either of her sons whom she should choose. In the exercise of this discretionary power the queen would have preferred Alexander, the younger son; but this was so distasteful to the people that she was compelled to admit Lathyrus to the joint sovereignty, and place Alexander in the kingdom of Cyprus. After reigning ten years, the former prince was obliged to leave Egypt, to which his brother immediately returned; Lathyrus repairing to Cyprus, and taking upon himself the government of that country. It was at this period that Lathyrus invaded Judea, then governed by Alexander Jannæus, and obtained such advantages over him that the Jewish state was only saved from ruin by the aid sent to it by Cleopatra from Egypt.

In the meantime the younger brother, Alexander, having for nearly eighteen years, while bearing the name of "king," submitted as a slave to the violent and capricious will of his mother, became quite weary of her intolerable tyranny, and put her to death. This fact being made public, he was driven from the throne, and Lathyrus, or Soter II, restored; he reigned seven years longer. During this period the ruin of Thebes took place. Lathyrus, freed from the power of his rival, undertook to restore the government of the kingdom to its former state. This led to an insurrection, of which Thebes was the centre. That ancient city not only refused to submit to the prescribed laws, but even struggled to regain its lost independence. The effort was vain. The king, having defeated the rebels in several battles, besieged Thebes, which, having held out for three years, was at length subdued, and so devastated that this noble capital was never afterwards repaired, and consequently sank into ruin.

ROMAN INTERFERENCE

Lathyrus was succeeded by his only legitimate child, Cleopatra, whose proper name was Berenice. This princess, however, had scarcely assumed the sovereignty, when she was called to submit to the dictation of Roman



HEAD-DRESSES

power. Sulla, then perpetual dictator of the imperial city, no sooner heard of the death of Lathyrus, than he conferred the crown of Egypt on Alexander, a son of the king of that name who had been driven out of the country for having murdered his mother. The Alexandrians succeeded in persuading Alexander to marry Berenice, and reign jointly with her. This he did, but in nineteen days afterwards caused her to be murdered. He, however, continued on the throne, and reigned fifteen years in a manner which might be expected from the atrocity of the commencement. At length the people, worn out by his exactions and goaded to desperation by his cruelties, rose with common consent, and drove him from the throne. He made some fruitless efforts to induce Pompey to aid him to recover his crown, but died a few months after his expulsion, in banishment at Tyre.

PTOLEMY AULETES ; CLEOPATRA AND THE END

The Egyptians, having driven out this tyrant, selected a natural son of Ptolemy Lathyrus to fill the vacant throne. This prince, by a gift of six thousand talents (£1,200,000 or \$6,000,000) to Julius Cæsar and Pompey, was recognised as king of Egypt in alliance with Rome. He was named Ptolemy Auletes, "the Flute-player"; but took on himself the title of Neus Dionysus, "the new Bacchus." He was a fit representative of the fallen condition of the Egyptian state. More effeminate than any of his predecessors, priding himself on dancing in a female dress in religious processions, he was at the same time equal to his grandfather Physcon in the violence and viciousness of his conduct. After some time he was, like his predecessor, expelled from the throne. He succeeded, however, by immense gifts, in inducing Gabinius, the Roman governor of Syria, to attempt his restoration, which was at length accomplished; Archelaus, who had been invested with the government, having been defeated and slain by the Romans. Auletes was thus restored to the throne, and died in peaceable possession of his dignity about four years after his restoration.

Auletes on his restoration had put to death his daughter Berenice; and at his demise left two daughters, Cleopatra and Arsinoe, and two sons. The first of these, Ptolemy the elder, otherwise called Dionysus II, was, according to his father's will, married to his eldest sister, then about seventeen years old; and the juvenile couple were invested with the sovereignty of Egypt, under the protection of the Roman republic. It appears that this most celebrated Egyptian princess evinced considerable vigour and talent, even at that early age. So clever, indeed, was she, that the ministers who had been placed in charge of the national affairs were very anxious to get rid of her, and at length deprived her of her share in the sovereignty, and expelled her from the kingdom. Cleopatra, however, had a spirit equal to the occasion. She retired into Syria, raised an army, and in a short time marched upon Pelusium, prepared to dispute with her brother the sovereignty of the nation. It was while the hostile armies of the brother and sister lay within sight of each other, that Pompey, after the loss of the battle of Pharsalia, reached Egypt, expecting protection and support, but was put to death by the ministers of Ptolemy. Soon after this event, Julius Cæsar arrived in pursuit of his rival, and was presented with Pompey's head and his ring.

Cleopatra, whose licentiousness was quite equal to her talent and energy, caused herself to be secretly conveyed to Cæsar's quarters, where she succeeded in captivating that mighty conqueror, and commenced an intimacy


[48-30 B.C.]

which resulted in the birth of a son, called, after his father, Neocæsar. The scandal of this conduct enabled Ptolemy and his ministers to rouse the public spirit of the Alexandrians, and of Lower Egypt generally, against the mighty Roman, to such an extent that he was placed in most imminent peril. Cæsar, however, disposed the handful of soldiers which he had with him in such a manner as to keep the Egyptians in check, until the arrival of Mithridates with large reinforcements, when he defeated the Egyptian forces with great slaughter. In the course of this conflict Ptolemy was drowned in the Nile.

Cæsar soon adjusted the affairs of Egypt to his own mind, placing Cleopatra on the throne. But as the Egyptians had a great antipathy to female sovereignty, he compelled Cleopatra to submit to the farce of marrying her younger brother, a lad eleven years old. She, however, held the power in her own hand until he reached the age of fourteen, when by the laws of the country he was entitled to enter upon the joint administration of affairs. She then caused him to be poisoned. Arsinoë, who had been carried to Rome by Julius Cæsar, and compelled to walk, bound in chains of gold, before his triumphal chariot, was also assassinated at the instigation of Cleopatra.

The death of Cæsar convulsed the whole empire of Rome and all its dependencies, and swept away the last feeble figment of Egyptian monarchy and independence. On this occasion Cleopatra instantly decided to support the triumvirs against the murderers of Julius. On a charge of being unfaithful to this purpose, she was summoned to appear before Antony at Tarsus. Confident in the power of her charms, she obeyed, and effectually seduced that great captain. In fact, so besotted was he by this intercourse, that he neglected his affairs, and at length was so completely ruined that, having inflicted on himself a mortal wound, he died in the arms of his wanton mistress. Cleopatra had two sons by Antony, and soon after his decease she shared the fate which she had brought on him. To avoid being made a spectacle at the triumph of Augustus, as he was proof against her seductive charms, she procured her own death in some unknown way; tradition says by the bite of an asp. Egypt then became a province of the Roman empire, and continued in this state until the birth of Christ, and long afterwards.^d





CHAPTER LXVII. SICILIAN AFFAIRS

AGATHOCLES

WHILE Greece and Macedonia were torn by the disputes of Alexander's successors, Sicily was a prey to a tyrant who for energy, audacity, and complete absence of moral sense, is worthy to be ranked amongst them. It was the age of adventurers and soldiers of fortune. Agathocles, the son of a working potter, became famous in his youth by his beauty, strength, and courage, and also by his immoral life. He enlisted as a soldier, and men were amazed by his height and the weight of his weapons. He obtained a command through the influence of a powerful citizen who liked him, and whose widow he married shortly after. This marriage brought him riches, but his ambition was not limited by wealth. He wished to gain the approval of the people by his eloquence, as he had obtained the affection of the soldiers by his daring.

Tyranny, the natural result of class antagonism in a city, had reappeared at Syracuse after the death of Timoleon. The tyrant, Sosistratus, was supported by the aristocrats; Agathocles became the advocate of the claims of the people. He had also a personal grievance against Sosistratus, who, after an expedition against the Bruttians, had refused him the prize for courage which he deserved. Being driven from Syracuse, he recruited an army among the exiles, whose number was always very great by reason of the continual revolutions of Sicily and Magna Græcia. He tried in vain to seize Croton, then served with the Tarentines, who, a short time after, drove him away because he wished to direct their government.

Some time later, a revolution broke out at Syracuse. Sosistratus was exiled with six hundred men of his faction and asked help of the Carthaginians. Agathocles returned, distinguished himself in the war by his courage and skill, and became so popular that the Corinthian Acestorides, general of the republic, suspected him of aspiring to the tyranny and wished to have him murdered. He escaped the danger by changing clothes with a

[317-310 B.C.]

slave and soon after they heard that he was raising troops. Peace was made with the Carthaginians, who brought back Sosistratus and his partisans. Agathocles obtained permission to return also, and swore in the temple of Demeter to respect the constitution.

Soon after, the people, fascinated by his speeches, named him protector of peace, and charged him with the re-establishment of harmony between the factions. According to Justin, who seldom agrees with Diodorus, Agathocles' usurpation was the result of a treaty with Hamilcar, the Carthaginian general, who supplied him with African soldiers. Whatever may be the truth in regard to this, the first use which he made of his power was to massacre the six hundred senators, their relatives, and friends. The town was given up to the soldiers, who pillaged the houses, carried off the women, and killed without discrimination. Those partisans of the oligarchy who succeeded in escaping the massacre, took refuge at Agrigentum. Then Agathocles called the people together and declared that his only wish had been to restore their freedom and that he now intended retiring to private life. His followers, especially those who had taken part in the pillage, begged him to remain in power. He consented, but on condition that he should govern alone, for the colleagues who might be given him would perhaps attempt to violate the laws, and he would not be responsible except for his own acts. Votes were taken, and as the rich were paralysed by fear, and he had promised the poor to cancel debts and divide lands, he obtained all the votes. But he took neither the crown nor any of the external signs of power: the reality sufficed; he would not even have a bodyguard. Having no further enemies to fear, he allowed himself the luxury of clemency, tactics imitated later by Augustus and recommended by Machiavelli. He then administered the finances, attended to the necessities of the army and the navy, and added to the dominion of Syracuse some of the towns and territory of the interior.

The Syracusan exiles who had taken refuge at Agrigentum stirred up the people to make war on Agathocles before his rule extended over the whole of Sicily. The Agrigentines recognised the danger, and joining with the inhabitants of Gela and Messana sent to Sparta to ask for a general, for they feared to entrust the command to one of their own citizens who might make use of it to usurp the tyranny. Acrotatus, son of King Cleomenes, was detested at Sparta; he seized the opportunity of fighting abroad. But when he came to Agrigentum, he made himself universally disliked on account of his insolence, his waste of public funds, his dissolute life, and his luxury more worthy of a Persian than a Lacedæmonian. He murdered Sosistratus, the chief of the Syracusan exiles, at a banquet. He was driven away, they even wished to stone him, but he escaped by night. The Agrigentines made peace with Agathocles who, having no further foreign hostility to fear, was able to strengthen and extend his authority. The Syracusan exiles, being forced to leave Agrigentum, took refuge at Messana, but the Messanians feared the anger of Agathocles; he offered to make alliance with them, and persuaded them to grant the freedom of the city to these exiles. Men were astonished by such noble sentiments, but some time later he found means to entice them from Messana, to the number of more than six hundred, and had them put to death. He succeeded in making his government recognised in most of the towns of Sicily, and on all sides he caused the death of all who inspired him with fear.

The ever increasing progress of Agathocles awoke the fears of the Carthaginians and they sent a large army into Sicily under the command of

Hamilcar the son of Gisco. A battle took place near the river Himera between Gela and Agrigentum. It was said to have been on this spot that a former tyrant of Agrigentum, Phalaris, put his enemies to death by shutting them up in a bronze bull under which a fire was lighted; the hill on which Phalaris' castle stood was still called Ecnomus. Agathocles seemed to have won the battle, when unexpected help came to the Carthaginians and gave them the victory. Then the towns which had accepted or suffered Syracusan suzerainty submitted successively to the Carthaginians, and Hamilcar, master of all the rest of Sicily, laid siege to Syracuse. Agathocles repaired the fortifications of the town and put it in a state of defence, but these precautions could only delay certain ruin, for no outside help could be expected. Agathocles then conceived a singularly daring plan; he resolved to carry the war into Africa. It was what Scipio did at a later date, but in less difficult circumstances, for in Agathocles' case it was first necessary to leave a town besieged by land and sea.

He had few soldiers; he set free and enlisted the slaves, and made them take an oath of fidelity. Although he had been pitiless towards his political adversaries, he knew that some were still alive, and that they were ready to capitulate with the enemy. He spoke of his plan to no one. He told the Syracusans that all he asked of them was a little patience, and that he had sure means of saving them. In the town he only left the soldiers requisite for its defence and embarked all the rest, being careful to take as hostages a member of each of the families which he mistrusted. He persuaded the rich to avoid the fatigues and privations of the siege by retiring to their estates, and when they were scattered he had them killed by his soldiers, and took their money. The port was blockaded by the Carthaginian fleet; but merchant vessels were seen bringing provisions to the besieged. The Carthaginians advanced to capture them. Agathocles seized the opportunity to leave the port, and the merchant vessels were able to enter while the Carthaginians pursued Agathocles' fleet. He escaped by dint of hard rowing and landed with his army on the coast of Africa.

Then having offered a sacrifice, he told his soldiers that he had made a vow if his vessels escaped the enemy to make torches of them for the principal goddesses of Sicily, Demeter and Core, and taking a brand from the altar he set fire to his fleet. The soldiers losing all hope of return, had no other recourse than victory. This act of temerity, which has become proverbial, was perhaps necessary. Agathocles had too few soldiers to employ some in protecting the fleet; it would have been taken by the Carthaginians, who were masters of the sea. They seized a pleasure town which Diodorus calls the Great Town and the White Tunis. Agathocles had not sufficient soldiers to leave garrisons; he razed it to the ground and encamped under the walls of Carthage.

The Carthaginians, seeing their country pillaged, thought that their army in Sicily had been destroyed. They had no time to collect mercenaries; they armed to the number of forty thousand and placed Hanno and Bomilcar at their head. These chiefs belonged to two rival families. The Carthaginians often took this precaution as a guarantee against usurpation. But this multitude of new and badly disciplined soldiers could not resist Agathocles' little army. Hanno was killed, and Bomilcar, who aspired to the tyranny, led the troops back to the town. The terrified Carthaginians attributed their misfortune to the anger of the gods. For a long time they had sacrificed to Moloch only children whom they bought; they thought that he demanded more precious victims, and offered him two hundred chil-

[310-307 B.C.]

children from the most wealthy families. Three hundred citizens offered themselves to complete the sacrifice. They were placed on the hands of the bronze statue, and a large fire was lighted; the victims fell into the burning flames. Diodorus believes that these human sacrifices, customary among Phœnician nations, possibly gave rise to the fable of Cronos devouring his children, for the Greeks identified their Cronos with the Phœnician Moloch.

The Carthaginians ordered Hamilcar to send them some of his troops; but not wishing to abandon Sicily, they announced the complete ruin of Agathocles and, as a proof, sent to Syracuse the beaks of his burnt vessels. Antander, Agathocles' brother, wished to surrender; the Ætolian Eurymedon persuaded him not to despair, and a short time later they received news of the success of the Greeks. The courage of the besieged was renewed; Hamilcar wished to attempt an assault; he was taken, his head was cut off and sent to Agathocles, who threw it into the Carthaginian camp. His success won him the alliance of the Libyan and Numidian nations. He wrote to Ophellas, governor of Cyrene, who had fought under Alexander, entreating him to invade the Carthaginian territory, which should be shared after the victory; he would leave Africa to Ophellas, and would be content to keep Sicily. This plan tempted Ophellas; he was in communication with the Athenians, because he had married a descendant of Miltiades. He raised mercenaries in Greece and set out to cross the desert with a numerous army, carrying along with it women and children, for they hoped to found colonies. The army suffered much from the heat, from thirst, and from the bites of serpents. Agathocles received his allies warmly, gave them food, then murdered Ophellas and incorporated his soldiers in his own army; the women and children were sent to Sicily and perished in a tempest. Cyrene became part of the dominions of Ptolemy.

About the same time, the Carthaginians put Bomilcar to death for attempting to seize the tyranny. Agathocles might have profited by the confusion which this event caused in Carthage, but he had received alarming news. The Agrigentines had endeavoured to profit by Hamilcar's death to free Sicily from both Carthaginian and Syracusan rule. Agathocles, leaving the command of his army to Archagathus, his eldest son, embarked on open boats which had been hastily built. On landing at Selinuntium, he was told that his officers had just defeated the Agrigentine army. He reduced to submission Heraclea, Thermæ, Centuripæ, Cephalædium, and Apollonia. It was about this time that, following the example of the successors of Alexander, he took the title of king, and had it put on his coins (307). However, he wore no crown, and instead of imitating the mistrust of Dionysius the Elder, he went to the assembly without a guard. When he gave banquets, he was often served in an earthen bowl, and willingly recalled the time when he had begun life as a working potter. He was easy tempered and gay, so as to encourage his guests to talk freely, but he took note of all that he heard, and when, by this means, he had discovered which men were not to be trusted, he invited them separately and put them to death.

In Africa, his son Archagathus was at first successful; but he found his army weakened by desertions, in need of the necessities of life, and inclined to revolt. The soldiers complained of not being paid. He risked a battle

GREEK CANDLE
STICK

and was defeated. Then he resolved to leave the army, as Bonaparte did in later times in Egypt. The soldiers, furious at finding themselves abandoned by their general, murdered his two sons and surrendered to the Carthaginians, who enrolled them in their army.

On his return to Sicily, Agathocles first of all gave vent to his anger against Segesta, which had refused him subsidies. This expedition was marked, according to Diodorus, by atrocious cruelty: men were burned alive, pregnant women made to miscarry, young girls and children sold to the Brutians, and the town of Segesta, peopled by new inhabitants, received the name of Dicaëopolis — city of vengeance. At the same time Agathocles commanded his brother Antander to slay the parents, wives, and children of the soldiers

of the African army, to revenge the murder of his sons. Diodorus adds that these savage executions produced such horror that Agathocles, despairing of keeping the power, proposed to Dinocrates, the general of the exiles, to re-establish the republic at Syracuse. But Dinocrates had no desire to do so; in the twenty years during which he had been leader of armed bands, he had acquired a taste for this kind of regal dignity. Unsuccessful in forming this alliance, Agathocles purchased Carthaginian help by yielding up certain towns to them, and beat Dinocrates whose troops surrendered. He had them massacred but spared Dinocrates, and as they were worthy of each other, he made him his lieutenant.

He undertook, following Dionysius' example, the conquest of southern Italy. He began by seizing the Æolian Isles, in order to obtain the treasure consecrated to Core and to Hephæstus in the prytaneum of Lipara; then he prepared to cross into Italy. His preparations excited the fears of the Tarentines, who were already menaced in another direction by the native populations. They applied to the Spartans, whose king, Cleonymus, enrolled mercenaries at Cape Tænarum. He formed a considerable army by uniting with them the forces of Tarentum and the Messapians, with whom he made an alliance immediately on his arrival. The Lucanians in alarm made peace with Tarentum, and Cleonymus, not wishing to have come in vain, turned

against Metapontum, which town, however, he had entered as an ally. He imposed on the town a tribute of six hundred talents, and took two hundred young girls as hostages, which caused him to be looked on with suspicion, for, although he was a Spartan, he had the reputation of a man of dissolute character; however, he was punished later on by the wicked behaviour of his wife Chelidonis. Then, instead of delivering Sicily from the tyranny of Agathocles, as he had announced the intention of doing, he attacked Coreyra, which appeared to him a convenient post for watching Greek affairs, raised a tribute, and established a garrison. Then, returning to Italy, without troubling either about the Tarentines who had summoned him, or about the Messapians whose alliance he had demanded, he began to fight and pillage indiscriminately, under pretext of punishing those whom he called rebels.



NYMPH

(From a statue)

[300-289 B.C.]

He carried on this piratical war to the remotest part of the Adriatic Sea. The Italians killed some of his troops, a tempest destroyed part of his fleet, but he escaped and wound up his series of adventures by calling Pyrrhus against his country to avenge his matrimonial troubles.

Agathocles conducted an expedition against Corcyra, in pursuit of Cleonymus, but found Cassander besieging the town by land and by sea. He burned the Macedonian fleet, and seized Corcyra, which he gave as a dowry to his daughter Lanassa, whom he married to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus. On his return he found that a number of his mercenaries were in revolt against his grandson Archagathus, who had not given them their pay; he had two thousand of them killed. According to Diodorus, they were Ligurians and Etruscans, but it seems probable that there were Bruttians among them, for this punishment led to a war between the Bruttians and Agathocles. He was defeated and revenged himself on the inhabitants of Croton, who had done him no injury. He told them not to be troubled by his advance, he was only travelling through the country to take his daughter into Epirus. They made no preparations for defence; he took the town, sacked it, and massacred the inhabitants. Then he attacked Hipponium, which was in the hands of the Bruttians, took it, and placed a garrison there which was massacred a short time later.

In his old age he suffered from a very painful illness of the joints, and his son and grandson disputed his succession during his life-time. The latter caused him to be poisoned by his favourite, Mænon, by means of a corrosive placed in a toothpick. This Mænon was a Segestan and had become the tyrant's slave; in this manner he avenged his country's ruin. It is said that Agathocles, to put an end to the torture he was suffering, had himself placed, while still alive, on the funeral pyre; this was believed to be a punishment for the sacrilege which he had committed in the Æolian Isles in stealing the sacred treasure of Hephæstus.

After the death of Agathocles, his son and grandson were killed by Mænon, who tried to seize the power with the help of the Carthaginians. The Syracusans chose Hicetas for their general, and it was agreed that they should give hostages and recall the exiles. But at the first election of the magistrates Agathocles' mercenaries claimed that they were wronged, the citizens armed, a fight was imminent; at last it was agreed that the mercenaries should leave Sicily. They were mostly Campanians, known by the name of Mamertines.

Agathocles had taken a great number into his pay. When it was agreed that they were to leave Sicily, they went to Messina to embark, and were hospitably received; but during the night they killed the inhabitants and seized their wives and possessions. This settlement of Mamertines at Messina was a fresh element of trouble for Sicily, and later on became the cause of the first war between the Romans and the Carthaginians.

PYRRHUS AND THE ROMANS

The absence of federal union between the Greek cities of Italy made them incapable of resisting the native populations, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians. They were therefore naturally induced to ask aid of the great Roman Republic, which alone was able to protect them. The earliest relations which Rome had with the Greek towns of Italy were friendly. Tarentum alone preferred having the Romans as enemies to having them as

friends. By an act of mad provocation the Tarentines put themselves entirely in the wrong and caused war with Rome to become inevitable. The as was their custom, they called to their assistance a foreign prince, and although this time they chose the bravest and most skilful captain of the period the struggle in which they engaged had as a consequence the final establishment of Roman government over all Italy.

The Lucanians and the Bruttians having attacked the town of Thurii, ally of Rome, an army, commanded by the consul Fabricius was sent to its rescue, while at the same time a squadron of ten galleys cruised in the Gulf of Tarentum. The Tarentines, assembled in the theatre which overlooked



HYGEIA

(From a statue)

the sea, perceived some of these vessels at the entrance of the port. Immediately an orator named Philocharès, who was known by the name of the famous courtesan Thais because of his shameful immorality, exclaimed that the presence of the ships was an act of hostility, and that by the terms of a treaty, the Romans were not allowed to pass Cape Lacinium. The people hurried to the port, sank or captured the vessels, the duumvir who commanded them was killed, the rowers were reduced to slavery. The Roman senate sent an embassy to demand reparation. The ambassadors had scarcely entered the theatre where the people were assembled than they were greeted by insulting laughter. They wished to speak, but their pronunciation of Greek was ridiculed and they were driven out. A drunkard soiled the toga of the principal ambassador; the laughter increased. The Roman turned round and said: "Laugh you will soon weep, for my robe shall be washed in your blood."

They summoned Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, promising him the support of the Lucanians and Samnites. An account of his exploits and death has previously been given.

All the natives of southern Italy who had greeted Pyrrhus as a saviour, were finally subdued to Roman rule. It was the rescue of the Greek towns which were still in existence, but they were only shadows of their former selves. Although

free under the protection of Rome, they vanished obscurely from history. In the time of Strabo the name of Magna Græcia was already an ancient recollection, and the Greek language was only spoken at Naples, Rhegium, and Tarentum. For want of federal union between the autonomous cities, the Hellenic race with its brilliant civilisation had disappeared gradually from Italian soil. The Romans were about to reap its inheritance and transmit it to Gaul and Spain. They re-peopled some of the former Greek colonies which had become barbarous, especially Posidonia and Hipponium, which had long been inhabited, the latter by the Campanians, the former by the Bruttians, and which had changed their Greek names for those of Paestum and Vibo-Valentia.

The Roman peace did not restore to the Greek towns of Italy the glory which had radiated from their art and literature during the stormy period

[72-216 B.C.]

their political independence. The innumerable painted vases which are treasured in our museums, and the coins of infinite variety suffice to mark their place in the history of civilisation. Not rich Tarentum only, but towns of no importance, Terina, Velia, Metapontum, Heraclea in Lucania, made coins of inimitable perfection. The production of these works of art ceased abruptly with that communal autonomy of which the coin was the visible symbol. In 268, Rome, who, till then, had only had moulded copper coinage, for the first time made silver coins, and at the same time withdrew the right of coining from all her Italian subjects. Few laws have been more disastrous to art.

The beautiful ionic coins of King Hiero and his wife, Queen Philistis, mark the last period of Sicilian autonomy. After a victory gained over the Mamertines of Messina, Hiero was proclaimed king by the Syracusans who no longer felt capable of supporting the disturbances of freedom (269). On leaving Sicily Pyrrhus had said: "What a fine battle-field we leave the Romans and Carthaginians!" The fulfilment of this prophecy was not delayed, and the First Punic War, which broke out in 263, had Sicily for a stage. At the beginning Hiero, the ally of Carthage, was defeated by the Romans, and passed over to their side. His reign, a long and peaceful one, was a transition for the Syracusans between their stormy autonomy and the inevitable dominion of Rome.^b



GREECE

Clime of the unforgotten brave !
Whose land from plain to mountain-cave
Was Freedom's home or Glory's grave !
Shrine of the mighty ! can it be
That this is all remains of thee ?
Approach, thou craven, crouching slave .
Say, is not this Thermopylæ ?
These waters blue that round you lave,
O servile offspring of the free,
Pronounce what sea, what shore is this ?
The gulf, the rock of Salamis !
These scenes, their story not unknown,
Arise and make again your own ;
Snatch from the ashes of your sires
The embers of their former fires ;
And he who in the strife expires
Will add to theirs a name of fear
That Tyranny shall quake to hear,
And leave his sons a hope, a fame,
They too will rather die than shame ;
For Freedom's battle once begun,
Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
Though baffled oft is ever won.
Bear witness, Greece, thy living page,
Attest it, many a deathless age :
While kings, in dusty darkness hid,
Have left a nameless pyramid,
Thy heroes, though the general doom
Have swept the column from their tomb,
A mightier monument command,
The mountains of their native land !
There points thy muse to stranger's eye
The graves of those that cannot die !
'Twere long to tell, and sad to trace,
Each step from splendour to disgrace :
Enough, — no foreign foe could quell
Thy soul, till from itself it fell ;
Yes ! self-abasement paved the way
To villain-bonds and despot sway.

—BYRON; *The Giaour*.



CONCLUDING SUMMARY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HELLENIC SPIRIT

WRITTEN SPECIALLY FOR THE PRESENT WORK

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HOMER stands at the beginning of Greek history; nothing before him, nothing beside him, a great gulf fixed between him and everything after; yet there is nothing Greek on which his light or shadow does not fall. Homer is a world in himself, and what a world he is! In the eyes of many, even to this day, he stands for the sum total of the Greek spirit; in the eyes of some, for the whole body of poetry. What the two epics set before us is so complete, so individual, that in spite of all concessions in detail, the oneness of the poem and of the author is constantly obtruding itself upon our notice anew. Homer is so little antiquated that he seems to be of no age; we place him in a sunnier morning-time of mankind, that is all; but to range him in the sequence of history, to conceive of him as under conditions of time and place seems like profanation; this, like so much else, he has in common with the Old Testament. And yet to classify him thus is the first necessity of real comprehension. The Greeks themselves have not done much to help us. About the time of Socrates a school of æsthetic criticism restricted the sacred name of the poet Homer, certainly not without some show of reason, to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*; and thus these poems have come down to us, but the price we pay is the loss of all others of equally Homeric origin; and hence Homer stands more than ever alone. The last word of the philology of antiquity was that Homer ought to be explained only by himself. Modern philology seemed on the way to the same conclusion.

By the discoveries of the last generation the ban of this isolation has been broken. Only by wilful blindness can the Ilium of Homer be dissociated from the Ilium restored to light on Hisarlik, though the remains of the latter go far back beyond the time of Homer and Priam. Not the age of the Homeric poets alone, but the age of the Homeric heroes rises up before us from these strongholds and tombs. The links that bind it to the older civilisation of Asia and of Egypt lie revealed, positive chronological data already enable us to determine the certainty of this or that. From these

actual remains we begin to gain some conception of the history and the peoples whose poetic reflection shines for us in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*.

On the shores of the Ægean Sea, in the second half of the second thousand years before Christ, there existed a sumptuous civilisation which had received impulses from the East and from the South, but in which we nevertheless recognise the spirit of the Greece immortalised in the Homeric poems and in the Asiatic home of Homer the connecting threads do not break off short as we trace them back. In the mother-country, on the other hand, other savage Greek tribes, whom we name after the Dorians, forced their way in; they destroyed the ancient superior civilisation, reduced some of its representatives to slavery, and drove the rest over into Asia. There was another immigration into Asia, this time of the Phrygio-Thracian tribes, the ancestors of the Armenians; such of the earlier population as were not reduced to slavery being driven south. These tribes we are wont to call after the Carians. There was a time when they reached out towards Europe, and in a few islands they continued for centuries to struggle against the Hellenising influence to which in the long run they completely succumbed. But as the study of this long and important period is still in its infancy, our main object should still be the collection of material; it will be one of the principal tasks of the next generation to sift and elaborate what has been accumulated. At the present time it is more important than any amount of detail for us to understand what is the historic background both for the subject-matter of the Homeric epics and for the practice of this form of poetry and the existence of the poets who used it.

The Homeric poems are a legacy from the first great period of Greek history. We may approximately fix the year 800 B.C. as their latest possible date. The subject-matter of the Epos, the Heroic legend, is the deposit of historical reminiscences of that earlier time. It was wholly fit that men should see in the epic heroes the founders of their own nation and of their own civilisation; but in point of fact it was through Homer that the Greek nation first acquired consciousness of itself, of its individuality and of the common blood in its veins. Not in the time of the heroes alone, but in that of the poets of the Epos, the Greeks had no national unity and less than no national feeling, and the same holds good of their civilisation. The tales which Homer tells are laid to a great extent in Argos, Thebes, and Sparta; all the heroes come from the country which we call Hellas and distinguish from Asia as their mother-country. Nearly all the Homeric gods have their homes there likewise. But now gods and heroes, like Agamemnon's Achæan host, are taken across to the northwestern angle of Asia. Achilles has conquered Lesbos; the descendants of Agamemnon rule in Mytilene and Cyne. Cyne, Smyrna, and Chios are the reputed birth-places of Homer. Here, where later the Æolian dialect comes into collision with the mightier Ionian, was perfected the artificial dialect of the epic, — a dialect spoken in this form at no time and in no place, — and the heroic verse that was at no time and in no place a really popular form, and was first imported into Lesbos itself by the Ionian Epos. Here, side by side with the ruling class which claimed descent from the Homeric gods and heroes, was evolved a class of professional bards, and amongst them arose the gifted poets whose names have been forgotten in the fame of the one and only Homer. Let us hope that the real Homer was worthy of this pre-eminence. By these Homerides the Epos, first sung to the lute, and then recited, was carried farther and farther among the islands and along the coast. The subject-matter awakened interest everywhere; being, as it were, national history, the form won for

itself an ever widening circle of appreciation. Gradually in the mother-country there were found native bards who learned from wandering rhapsodists the art of making poetry in the Homeric style, that is to say, of using a foreign language and a foreign art-form, but to express new matter, which was nevertheless invariably linked in some fashion with the world of Homeric heroes. Accordingly, the production of epic poems, ever based upon Homeric legend, was maintained in the mother-country for centuries after it had died out in Ionia, continuing into the sixth century. It is through these circles, in the main, that Homer has been preserved.

The cardinal point was that, in the Homeric Epos, the Greeks acquired an organ of speech capable of expressing all that men could say and hear. It was a well-defined and yet highly elastic style, not by any means exclusively adapted to narrative; on the contrary they never abandoned the practice of casting instruction of all kinds into this form, which was popularised and made generally intelligible by the school from the time there were schools at all. It was also used in incantations, in monumental inscriptions, and in the fleeting jest. The most abstract philosophy, the description of the starry heavens, the dogmatic side of astrology, nay even the Psalms and the Gospel of St. John, have been clothed in Homeric garb. In like manner it is characteristic of the genius of Greece that it begins its evolution by creating such a mode of expression, and for a thousand years does not grow weary of it. The instinct for form and the adherence to a form once discovered are likewise Greek; their combination begets at first an unparalleled achievement, but for centuries long it has to drudge in the service of imitative facility and orthodox formalism.

Homer, moreover, created for the Greeks their heroic legend. The whole wealth of scattered and desultory reminiscence and tradition among the various tribes and families, combined with all that occupied the memory and imagination of man, was gathered together in one by the art of the Epic poets. Thus another and more beautiful domain was built up in the imaginations of men, from which a light fell on the present so brilliant that the present paled before it, while even as children men began to make themselves at home in that domain. Here it was that the Greeks found their common fatherland, proud and united, whilst they were still at daggers drawn with one another upon earth, and once more when they were all subject to foreign lords; to this day all those of us who have drunk a draught from Homer's spring, feel at home in this region. Their gods the Greeks, likewise, received from Homer; not the faith by which the heart is made heavy and light, rendered contrite and redeemed, but the names and the histories, the relations and the amours of their celestial host—that is to say, their mythology.

The name itself implies how far it was from anything like divine revelation and holiness. The muse has much to say that is untrue but resembles truth. Homeric art, however, understood the secret of humanising the stories of the gods as effectually as the stories of tribes and kings. And this Homeric art took captive the fancy of the listeners, that is, the fancy of the whole nation as soon as it gave ear to the poetry of Homer. Homer gave to the Greek his gods, and all the Greek gods turned into men with the gift. He gives us a complete picture of nature too, he teaches us to see what surrounds us, and the sorrows and joys that condition our brief life under the sun. The roseate flush of dawn, the twinkling of the dog-star, the rush of the hurricane, the babble of the mountain stream, the tops of the fir trees in the highland forest, and the clumps of asphodel on untilled ground; the lions and wolves in the Asiatic mountain country, the horse and the hound, the

companions of man, he sees everything, shows everything, loves everything; above all, the sea, eternal, ever new, that has become a home to the Ionian in lieu of mother-earth. In the light in which he viewed Nature and set her forth the Greeks accustomed themselves to look upon her. Not only so, but whole generations took pleasure in the reproduction of what had once been done, and turned their eyes aside from the contemplation of the Real, the infinitude whereof no Homer can exhaust.

In fine, the judgment passed upon Homer by Horace, who repeats the verdict of the stoics, contains a large measure of truth:

*"Qui, quid sit pulcrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
Planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit."*

He gives us a complete picture of the doings of man, shows us princes and beggars, old men and boys, the budding maiden and the perfection of dæmonic beauty. So rich is this completeness, so profound the poet's knowledge of life, that the thing we most clearly realise is the utter preposterousness of any attempt to compare Homer with any popular poetry whatsoever. Rather does Plato rightly name him the grandsire of tragedy, and only one picture of the world can claim a birthright equal to that of Homer—the picture set forth on the stage of William Shakespeare.

In this Homeric delineation of mankind, which includes immortal men, to wit, the gods, and has the portrayal of nature for its complement, lies that specifically Homeric quality which casts a spell over every unspoilt mind, and which the finest art-critics of all times and nations never grow weary of praising. It bears witness to a high psychological culture in both poets and listeners. No state of primitive barbarism such as Tacitus depicts in the Germani, none but an old and richly developed civilisation, could lead up to this. The fresh observation of nature in the pictures of Knossos, the rigid stylistic convention of the cuttle-fish on the golden platter of Mycenæ, for example, the bold ornament on painted vessels, like the pitcher of Marseilles, the architecture of the beehive tombs, show the Homeric sense of art in other regions and at a pre-Homeric period.

This Homeric art is certainly in the main Hellenic. But for all that, it is only one side of the Hellenic spirit, which is not even remotely understood by those who identify it with Homer. A great danger is already threatening this form of art in the shape of conventionalism, of stereotyped beauty. It grows too easy to be a Homerides, and he who rests satisfied with such an achievement thereby renounces all aspiration to become a Homer. And the life depicted by Homer conceals beneath its brilliant surface much not only of hollowness but of evil. There is a total lack of national sentiment; there is no state; properly speaking there is no religion. These gods will vanish into thin air like vapours at the advent of a true god who wins men's hearts to serve him. These men and women enjoy and suffer—to what end? To blossom and wither like the leaves of the woodland. What is the end of this brilliant world? The horrors of devastation for Ilium, and for the Achæans, returning home in their fleet—shipwreck.

The Ionians had just been torn from their native mountains and springs, from their ancestors and from their gods; in dire distress they had fought for and conquered new settlements on a foreign coast and among foreign races. They had been constrained to turn away from their mother-earth: the sea cannot take its place, for the earth alone is θεσμοφόρος. So it is that the legitimate heirs of the Homeric poets are the very men who shake off Ælimeric ideals—the Milesian merchant who traverses all seas, founds

factories and cities, mingles with all nations, gathers information and wealth from all sides; the Ionian artist who abandons the excrescences of conventional style with the conventional Heroic legend, in his search for what is characteristic and individual; the subjective thinker of Ionia who seeks in his own breast the solution of the world's enigma, and whether he discovers cosmic law there or in the contemplation of the heavens, ruthlessly thrusts away from him the fair illusions of Homer.

Meanwhile, in obscurity and gloom another Greece slowly arose in the mother-country. The immigrants, before whom the peoples of Agamemnon, Achilles, and Nestor—in so far as they were not enslaved by their rough masters—fled across the sea, had to begin from the beginning. The remains of the old civilisation stood in their midst, uncomprehended and mysterious as the Roman strongholds in the countries inundated by the flood of the Germani of the great migration. Where, as in Sparta, the forms of life fitted for migratory conditions were preserved in art, that primitive rudeness survived which (to take an instance) permitted the use of the axe only and not of the plane in the fashioning of a door-post. We recognise everywhere the oldest and lowest forms of religion—fetich-worship, totemism, a gloomy form of ancestor-worship; human sacrifice is frequent. Ornament has lost the sensuous delight in form proper to the Heroic period; it begins with lines and dots. The influence of the East must for a while have been totally arrested. How ill at ease an Asiatic Greek must have felt in this world is shown by Hesiod, who inveighs against his Heliconian village-home. He was the son of an immigrant Æolian. A large part of the country, not only the whole of the west coast, but also Thessaly the home of Hellen, *i.e.*, of the whole nation, never again played an active part in civilisation. This, of course, had to come from the Greeks of Asia; and the cities of the eastern border in which the remains of the original population preponderated, Athens and Eubœa, to which the maritime city of Corinth was added from the Dorian cities, were the entrance gates to this civilisation. But the process of receiving and assimilating it was carried on in the main under the pressure of new modes of life, which we name after the Dorians. With regard to the older period we lack not direct evidence merely but credible information at almost every step: not till the beginning of the sixth century does it become possible to some extent to grasp this civilisation; but the institutions, their reflection in Heroic legend, and the character of the religion (not mere mythology) permit of a few inferences. The times were hard; for the most part a ruling class alone raised itself above the miserable, restless, joyless struggle for daily bread, and below it bondmen in many cases were out a wretched existence. Not until the end of the period do men advance beyond the stage of primitive husbandry, and then not everywhere. Agriculture and cattle rearing remain the chief means of livelihood. The ruling class is warlike; where the mountains permit it, they pursue the sport of horse-racing, but for purposes of war horsemen are of little account. Highest in public esteem stands the physical exercise which in time of peace takes the place of military service; Greek gymnastics, of which Homer knows little, become hallowed by the competitive games which by degrees not only become the culminating moments of life but also evoke the first glimmer of public spirit.

The umpires at the Olympian games are the first to apply the name of Hellenes to the nation—more exactly speaking, to the class. For here it has come to pass that, though politically divided into numberless cantons, though involved in perpetual feuds and irreconcilable local animosities, the

members of this class recognise one another, intermarry, call a truce for the festivals, and find a common interest in maintaining their class supremacy against the encroachments of the lower orders. The protection of the patriarchal organisation places Sparta at the head of a loose federation. The spirit of the age is masculine. The loin-cloth is laid aside at gymnastic exercises, the nude male form is the fairest of objects. The love of boys becomes not only a national institution but the sole province in which love claims the co-operation of the soul. Everything presents the sharpest contrast to Homer. Gymnastics require self-control and training; military service requires obedience; class supremacy is not favourable to the predominance of the individual man, but demands his subordination to the class. Thus, then, these men trained themselves strictly and austere, and gained control over themselves, body and soul. They set up an ideal of the perfect man, who by training and obedience earns the right to be free and to rule. And they held out to him the prospect of becoming equal with the gods, even as Hercules entered heaven; but on earth they kept him within bounds by raising above him the other Greek ideal, that of the free self-governing community—the aggregate of equally worthy and therefore equally privileged free men. However much the reality may have altered, these two ideals remained inviolate, and they are the specifically European element which the Greeks have to show as against the East—the Greeks of the mother-country, be it understood, for Homer knows of nothing but an unbridled individualism; he does homage to the hero who, in good and evil alike, knows no bounds. These nobles are not licensed to aspire beyond the limits of their class nor do they wish to do so. They invented an ideal of happiness that could be realised on earth; all that was required was to keep within bounds. Hercules, the ideal hero of this society, had nothing but toil upon earth, but in return he made the step from human to divine by his own strength. This grand conception betrays the lengths to which Doric self-reliance believed itself able to go.

The free man has come into being; the power above him, which we call society or the state, has also come; at that time it was called Law or Custom—*Nómos*; and this power is sanctified by the existence of an exponent of the divine revelation, the god (*i.e.* the Apollo) of Delphi. The authority of this god, and of the oracles by which he answers through his priests, is undisputed. He addresses the mortal with the warning "Know thyself," that is, as a creature that is mortal. He enjoins self-control and self-restraint; the numerous Greek adages recommending moderation, the praise of the mean and of equality, the encomiums on *sophrosyne*, belong to this period and to this world. No doubt, so much would not have been said of this virtue if it had not been so rare, but erroneous as it is to conceive of the Greeks as examples of the virtues they recommend, the establishment of this moral ideal is significant; a complement to their faith in the power of man to gain admittance into heaven by force. Under Apollo's direction music takes its place by the side of gymnastics; music also masters the wild instincts; it includes every kind of intellectual culture known to this society. The boy learns to sing, to strike the lute, to keep time in the dance; and the consecration of worship rests upon it all. Harmony must reign in the deportment and movement of the body, and of the soul likewise. The piper takes his place in the column on the march; it marks an important advance that the line of battle now marches to meet the enemy in step and in serried ranks; it is thought a fit subject for the painter's art, and not without justice. The ruling caste does not often produce a poet

who is a musician at the same time; the poets are for the most part brought from the East: but the nobles must be able to sing the songs, to dance, and even to improvise a verse to a set tune over the wine. The female sex also takes its part in music; choirs of maidens are popular, and native poetesses occur more frequently than native poets. Side by side with solemn gravity we get, at stated times of the ceremonial year, the most unbridled enjoyment, ecstatic revelry, the grossest kind of burlesque; but this is curbed; it appeals more to the lower social strata, and does not find expression in art until a late period.

Like all institutions, this worship and the whole system of the cult of Apollo was not established without fierce struggles; and it incorporated into itself, and thus rendered innocuous, many things which it was unable to cast forth. This was true more particularly of ecstasy. There had been a time when the nation was thrilled by a mighty religious movement having its source in the Phrygio-Thracian religions; the great god Dionysus came, he who walks the earth demanding faith and followers, who possesses men with his spirit and enables a man to experience what he himself experienced, and is ever experiencing afresh—divine madness, death and resurrection. The movement naturally laid hold upon the Greeks of the East also, but it did not take souls captive there; the Homeric Greeks have no appreciation of mysticism. Here, on the contrary, within the religion that was gradually being Homerised, a counter-current set in, capable, indeed, of becoming a sub-current, but only if its course were directed into the bed of the official religion, and if Apollo effected a compromise with Dionysus. In narrower circles, outside the state religion, this doctrine and practice based upon the ecstasy, the redemption of man, have always held their own; the old religion of Demeter passed through similar crises, and the incorporation into the state cult of secret rites such as were practised at Eleusis, did not suffice to stifle the longing for an individual religion. But for the time the Apolline system is triumphant.

Doric architecture is now added to the solemn rendering of Doric music. The temple, the house of the image of the god, made, not for congregational worship, but for solemn procession or devout meditation, is the consummate expression of this piety. That the gods should take the form of men is an outcome of the Homeric temper; but Zeus as a naked man hurling lightning, Apollo as a naked youth, the calm, majestic matrons and maidens—these are the Doric ideal of divinity. In addition to these we get the statues of men, the male image (*ἀνδρείας*) and the virginal image (*κόρη*). The inspiration of these arts certainly came from the East, but what interests and delights us in archaic sculpture and in those very examples which seem to us typical, as so genuinely Greek, is the Doric element; it reveals itself to us not only in the *Æginetæ* and the statues of nude youths who are just as much gods as men, but also in the *Idolino* and the Delphic charioteer, the *Hestia Giustiniani* and the female prize-runner, in the works of *Polycletus* and again in those of *Myron*; for Athens long shares in this culture, the chief prophet of which at the twelfth hour was the Theban *Pindar*, with his gift for showing us both its splendour and its remoteness from modern sentiment. To this day Homer and the Athenians produce a vivid impression on every unsophisticated mind; *Pindar* requires arduous historical study, like *Virgil*, *Dante*, and *Calderon*.

By its situation, and the close ties of consanguinity between its population and the Ionians, Athens was destined to unite the civilisations of East and West. The comparatively large peninsula of Attica, so shut off that it

is almost insular, had already developed into a political unit at an earlier stage. Aristocratic rule had, it is true, reduced the less wealthy of the peasant population to a condition of servitude, but by introducing the olive it had made agriculture profitable; and, like the Dorians in Corinth, it had recognised trade as an occupation not derogatory to men of rank. Material conditions for amelioration were far more favourable than in the neighbouring island of Ægina, where commerce concerned only the ruling class, who farmed their lands with purchased slaves. But the rapid rise of Athens from obscurity to the first rank is due to one man, in whom the union of East and West was first consummated—the wise Solon. Of noble birth and in sympathy with Dorian modes of life, he had, for all that, travelled to distant shores as a merchant, had laid aside among the Ionians all prejudice, superstition, and mysticism; above all, had acquired the power of using poetry not only for political but also for moral exhortation. He was inspired by the fullest confidence in the might, wisdom, and justice of God, and in the goodness of human nature; all it needed was liberty to exercise itself without let or hindrance,—a need which found its complement in the social order,—that other men might likewise obtain the liberty that was their right. His people had faith in him, and placed the organisation of the state in his hands. He gave the power to the whole people, *i.e.*, to the changing majority of free and upright Athenians, and he gave them all access to the national assembly, to the executive committee, the deliberative council, and the national court of justice. In principle, democracy was established. And the principle of freedom and of equality can be obscured neither by abuse nor by inadequate use; the only limitation to which it is subject is due to the higher principle which Solon himself placed above it, and which never disappears, at least, in theory, from the politics of the Greeks—the principle of justice. Whatever modification it underwent, with Solon there came into existence the municipal constitution, not of Athens alone, but of Greece, which endures as long as the Greek spirit can be traced in historical continuity—the free state of free men. At the time, as a matter of fact, freedom could not be maintained in Athens. But the struggles of the great families, which for another hundred years wrestled together for supremacy, only gave the city time to absorb the Ionian spirit more fully, to develop industry and trade side by side with agriculture, to exploit that economic freedom which was never again encroached upon, and so to accumulate strength in every direction for the decisive moment. This came with the question whether Europe was to be swallowed up in the despotic world-empire of Asia, to which Homeric Greece had already ingloriously succumbed. The issue was not a question of national differences, but simply one of freedom or servitude; a servitude, too, such as the wise man often accepts, because it does not seem to threaten individual liberty. But the free state or class, the democracy of Athens, no less than the Peloponnesian aristocracy, refused to brook it. The Athenian line of battle won the victory at Marathon—it was the triumph of the Doric element. The weapon for the maritime victory of Salamis had been rapidly forged by the genius of Themistocles, a modern Ionian in every sense of the word. In defiance of all human calculations, Xerxes was defeated and compelled to renounce his pretensions to the whole of Europe.

The spirit of Greece now became a national idea; the kinsmen of the Greeks in Asia not only came over, but they made Athens,—Sparta being so tardy,—the presiding centre of a confederation unprecedented in power and extent by anything Greek; the conception of a vast Greek empire in

the future, a national confederation, seemed capable of realisation at that moment, since it was possible for the first thought of it to take shape. Politically, too, Athens seemed destined to unite the Greeks of the East and of the West; and if she did so, the Greeks were bound to possess the world.

Under the auspices of these great times Attic tragedy arose as the most perfect expression of the union of Western with Eastern Hellenism, stamped with the features of the great period of its birth; for not until Æschylus, the warrior of Marathon, took the Homeric Heroic legend for the groundwork of the ancient ecstatic Dionysian festivals; not until he substituted the solemn Doric chorus for the satyrs, and reduplicated the Ionian reciter, was the drama discovered which, sublime beyond the scope of mere humanity, and still remaining a part of the worship of the god, yet bore within it the germ of development into a picture of human life, making an appeal more direct and more effective than the narrative of the rhapsodist or the song of the bard. An abundance of talent turned to this new form, which remained Athenian even when the poets came from abroad, and became more and more Athenian, human, and modern. Yet no one ventured to abandon the Homeric subject-matter and go direct to contemporary life for material. And so it continued to be, although with the decay of the Attic empire and its great poets, tragedy (whether as Attic drama or as a part of worship), no longer had any intrinsic claim to the subject-matter of the Heroic legend. Here again the authority of a great achievement condemned posterity to the depths of imitation. The form of drama known at Athens as comedy was regarded as quite another thing; and it had certainly gone far from its source in the same masquerade and the same Dionysian ecstasy by the time it was cast into shape by witty Athenian poets, and promoted to be species of literature. Comedy became drama, and followed the lines of tragedy by centring about a definite action; it was no less wonderful than the latter so long as it served the purpose of the moment and of the necessarily circumscribed circle of Athenian society; but for this very reason it exercised no universal influence, and was destined to fall to pieces with the collapse of the political and social fabric. The last literary achievement of Athens was to transform it, about the time of Alexander, into a refined, purely recitative play which occupied exactly the same relation to contemporary life as later tragedy occupied to the Heroic legends. This new comedy deserved and received the same classic *imprimatur* as tragedy; but the same slavish subjection to a model ensued; the figures of Menander, so infinitely commonplace and provincial, alas! were doomed to make their appearance on the comic stage, like Medea and Orestes on the tragic, whether the play were written and acted in Rome or Alexandria. In this petrified and haphazard form the theory rather than the poetry of the drama was conveyed to the West. Aristotle, in particular, failed to advance from the chance illustration of actual performances to a formulated statement of the truth, and modern writers have still an unwholesome habit of tossing about the terms "tragedy" and "comedy," at all events in theory. We have the will to admire and the capacity to understand both what has been achieved by the Athenians and the causes that led inevitably to that achievement: but the foundation of modern dramatic art is Shakespeare — or Plato, who recognised in theory that tragedians and comedians are anything but contradictory terms, and who, like Shakespeare, combined both in himself.

In the Athenian art of the fifth century, as in Æschylean tragedy, the elements of Eastern and Western Greece interpenetrate, and each heightens

the effect of the other. The Parthenon is a Doric temple with an Ionic frieze. To Ionic monumental fresco painters is given the task of painting Homeric stories on the broad surfaces of Athenian and Delphic porticoes; the capacity to immortalise the deeds of contemporary life is its own contribution. From the devout spirit that inspires the poet of the Oresteia, Phidias, with all the wealth and all the art at his command, tries to create images of the gods that will satisfy the religious feeling of his time. To the Greeks they were the greatest for all time. Precisely as in the case of tragedy, such a high strain of endeavour lasts but a short time. Then the Ionic element becomes preponderant; the human, subjective aspect thrusts itself into prominence. It is inevitable, and the thing it created is worthy of admiration. But in the *pathos* and *ethos* of the divine types created by Praxiteles and Scopas there is nothing but the mythological character of Homer's gods; they are immortal men, and no more; to Scopas and Praxiteles they were nothing higher than this. And it was right that it should be so; for in the meantime the comprehension of the truly divine had so far progressed that its circumscription in a person was merely symbolical, and implied no idea of physical incarnation.

Ionian's greatest and most important contribution was that provided by the audacity of the great thinkers and observers of the sixth century, that indeed which, by setting the whole conception of the world on a new basis, was bound to destroy the fair illusion of gods in the form of men which Æschylus and Phidias might still have regarded as a truth. It was only on Ionian soil, on the soil of Homer, that man had courage and strength to fling aside all convention, all tradition, to step into the centre of the universe himself and say "Thou art naught but what I recognise as thee, thou signifiest what I discover in thee." The idea was not at the outset formulated with this precision, but such is the spirit in which the Ionians early went to work — not the philosophers alone, but the reckless natures who in the world of action took themselves for the standard of conduct — men like Archilochus the poet, whose subjectivism combined with his brutal outspokenness and license aroused the delight and horror of his contemporaries and of posterity. A terrible moral danger lurked in this attitude, and Ionia, which changed nothing but its masters, brought an infection into the mother-country which neither the state nor society availed to overcome. But for strong natures it also provided the remedy, and the world, for its part, owes to this Ionic element the best of what the Greeks have bequeathed to her — science, philosophy, natural science, and history, though it is true that they had first to be ennobled by the Athenians. This is most easily seen in the case of history.

Historia is subjective inquiry; Herodotus, not a man of powerful intellect, gives us, as he himself says, the sum of his own investigations. This includes what he has seen, heard, read, and thought, all in close juxtaposition. The subjective mind determines how and what he can and may narrate. Thucydides, the Athenian, on the other hand, writes the war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians; here it is the object which is the determining factor. The writer renders both himself and the reader account of his subject and of his method, indicates the degree of credibility for his various statements and adds his own interpretations and conclusions for what they are worth; the scientific method has thus been reached. Man has not lost his independence, but he consciously places his whole strength at the service of an idea, in this case the idea of truth; and, clear as it is to him that he cannot reach the point of presenting it pure and complete, he has no doubt that an objective truth exists and is accessible to human knowledge.

Natural science had begun, at a stroke, to explain genesis (*das Werden*) in general and particular by a bold hypothesis. The investigator made the laws. Natural science, in its turn, came to test its laws by a thousand patient, minute, independent observations of nature, to accumulate the facts from which the rule might be deduced in its turn. Most important for this purpose is the cultivation of that domain in which pure abstraction permits of an unbroken series of proofs, the domain of numbers and geometrical concepts. Here we have a genuine process of learning from which, in time, mathematics takes its name; here the deceptive character of sensuous perceptions is as clear as the existence of knowable laws; here are revealed the necessity and possibility of many to collaborate and continue the work. It was not by means of his religious brotherhood, which, if it had lasted, would have ultimately become a sect, that Pythagoras exercised a beneficent influence, but by the methodical organisation of study, which became scientific in so far as it turned its attention to mathematics. At the same time, in spite of all premature hypotheses, medicine, the branch of observation most closely in touch with actual life, discovered by keen observation and continuous experiment the right way to gain a knowledge of the human body, its nature, its sufferings, how to keep it healthy, or if necessary how to cure it. In astronomy and medicine we have the difference between the East and Hellas most clearly manifest. Thousands of years before, the Babylonians had already observed the heavens; thousands of years before, the Egyptians had compounded prescriptions from all kinds of drugs and simples. But this was sorcery, and even the Greeks had to pay for allowing themselves to be imposed upon by it.

In the sphere of morals the breach with that *Nomos* of which we have spoken was a great danger: the whole edifice of the Apolline organisation fell to pieces. Democracy fairly challenged man to translate his theory into practice, and the mental attitude of the time was so political that people thought Anaxagoras a crank, because of his own free will he devoted himself to the *vita contemplativa* and refused to mingle in the political hurly-burly. They declined to believe in his good faith, and political suspicion allied with the principle of established authority, which always naturally opposes a tendency so novel, banished him from Athens. And from the very fact that, in all other fields, this principle was so strong among the Greeks, the age that dared express and pursue every thought that rose in the mind acquires its peculiar significance. The activity, inventiveness, and audacity of the period of the sophists, with its superabundance of talent, sowed seeds without number, many of which, unproductive at the time, have been left for the modern world rightly to appreciate. Thus a science of jurisprudence would have been developed, had not the fall of the empire destroyed the sphere in which alone a uniform system of law could prevail: the practice of the legal profession thus falling into the hands of pettifoggers, while the theory of jurisprudence was left to philosophers, who were honest in their quest of the principle of justice.

Modern speculation has gradually outgrown the tendency to regard the sophists through the eyes of Plato, and to impute to them moral and intellectual indifferentism. One thing, however, is incontestable: the whole movement, coming, as it does, from Ionia, is rationalistic through and through; the intellect will acknowledge nothing on a par with itself. A prophet like Empedocles, who was a doctor, a philosopher, and a poet to boot, besides cherishing the proud conviction of being as good a sophist as any other, could go about extolling his revelation in the Peloponnesus; in

Athens he would have found no place. The port of Athens, on the other hand, was laid out by a Milesian diagrammatically in the dreary chess-board style then in vogue for buildings on new sites, although it can only be satisfactory on paper, inasmuch as it neither takes account of the character of the landscape nor consists with the artistic feeling of the Greeks. Rationalistic in his teaching, again, was the only Athenian whose sophist doctrines gave offence to his compatriots, especially because instead of making a fortune like the teachers of wisdom from abroad, he neglected his affairs. We, ourselves, should hardly except Socrates from the category of sophists on account of his merits as a dialectician, had not the reactionary democracy of the restoration executed him as a person dangerous to the common weal. He chose to die rather than do the least thing that ran counter to his consciousness of rectitude, his Logos, the belief in the reality of the Good which he was not able to demonstrate by rationalistic methods; and the moral grandeur of his death has reared for the faith of the human race an image which bears eternal witness that man is free and happy if he can but base his actions on belief in the Good; he needs no future world of punishment and reward. This eccentric Silenus-faced Athenian did not aspire to become a god like Hercules, he would have been more at home in a pedantic than a heroic atmosphere: he merely did nothing which he did not think right. The claim that the will obeys the reason—in most cases such a pitiful brag!—was a truth with him. Socrates was Athenian to the core, and therefore a loyal citizen of the democratic state; but, like Solon, he combines the Ionian and the Doric temperament; and, in common with the law-giver, he is devoid of feeling for mysticism and the whole sphere of the Unknown. His life is only intelligible as an outgrowth of the history of Athens; his death makes him a type of man as he can and should be. So long as the human race survives on our planet it will be a master experience of our moral education to live through the dying hours of this old and ugly plebeian.

That we can so do, that we can have Socrates as our master, we owe wholly and solely to the loyalty and poetic genius of the man (Plato) who set himself in the days of that agony to show that—hard as it may be to define uprightness, courage, piety and what other virtues there may be—the upright and courageous and therefore happy man has demonstrated in his own person the reality of these abstractions. This alone would have sufficed to make Plato a benefactor to mankind; but this is only a small part of his labours. With all that Socrates and the school of sophistry taught him, he combines mathematics and the mysticism of Pythagoras. He founded the school which was destined to serve the purposes of organised scientific work for nearly a thousand years, and which is the prototype of all such organisations. He lays down the fundamental lines of every philosophical science, constructing, and, where he thinks he has found a better way, demolishing the foundations he himself has laid. Many of his intuitions have only been verified after the lapse of centuries and tens of centuries; others still await verification. The force inherent in him is best proved by the energy of those who assure us that he has had his day. He has set Eros as the mediator between heaven and earth; this Eros has no worthier abode than the writings of Plato; through them, even to-day, Psyche is learning the road heavenwards. But Plato is a Greek in every fibre, he can only be understood through his people, and his people through him.

Plato was a poet; and though he fixed his mind wholly on the eternal type, unduly despising the individual phenomenon, and thrusting his own individuality completely into the background, yet this individuality with its

poetic genius cast light and shade in bewildering alternation over every field of contemplation, like the full moon as she fleets over the mountains and plains of Attica.

Science needed the cool judgment and caution of the systematiser. She found it in the person of Aristotle, the master-builder among men (*baumeisterlicher Mann*), as Goethe calls him. At his hands science first received systematic treatment and method — the tools of her craft. The existence of the man and his work attest for all time the unnatural character of a division of the one and indivisible body of science though it be only into natural and abstract sciences. For even in the collection of material, he laboured for all branches alike. It is idle to inquire which were the greater, his personal achievements or those which owed their birth to his example. For his successors carried on the work in his spirit, even more truly when, often after vehement controversy, they advanced beyond him, than when they rested content with merely working out the plan of the master-builder. Sprung of a family of physicians, and endowed with the Ionian temperament, the natural science of Ionia is the most substantial contribution he made to the legacy bequeathed by Plato. But he had likewise made himself familiar with all the accepted tricks of oratory at Athens, he speaks with authority on logic, rhetoric, and poetry, and he is capable of treating all literary forms with the hand of a master. Yet he did not discover his own peculiar style until he combined the bald simplicity of Ionian scientific phraseology with Attic balance and Attic elegance. Thus he became the father of scientific prose, of the text-book no less than the lecture and the practical investigation. Even in halting translations he afforded nutriment to powerful intellects. His own words will have a modern ring to the end of time.

It is a characteristic distinction between the two philosophers that Plato, the incomparable artist in words, fiercely attacked rhetoric, while Aristotle made it a cardinal item in his programme of education. It was a power and he reckoned with it accordingly, not without yielding more to contemporary taste than we can approve. To the modern mind rhetoric is the least congenial element in the culture and literature of antiquity. We can understand that in the political agitation which pervaded the Attic empire, oratory, which was a daily necessity in parliamentary debate and in the law courts, was bound to develop into an art, and that a literature should have arisen corresponding to that of our daily press. So, too, we can understand that the manifold intellectual activity of the age of the sophists, and the tentative efforts of science, needed an organ which should not only convey practical information but have an eye to effect. That this prose should become Attic, in spite of the fact that the language of Athens had barely passed through its first phase of development in tragedy, was inevitable from the time when Athens took the lead in Greece. In the sphere of language, at all events, the country attained to national unity. But to us there is at first sight something monstrous in the fact that in the age of Pericles a set form of oratory should arise which not only consciously competes with poetry but seeks to supplant it — and which actually succeeded in preventing the development of any new poetic method. The whole classic world, including the Latins, devoted no trifling labour and skill to this art of eloquence, and its art-theory ended by making poetry a mere subdivision of it. We are now coming to recognise more and more how much modern poetry in particular owes to this prose-poetry and its methods: the modern connecting-link of the rhyme was discovered beyond all dispute by that Gorgias whom Plato attacked as the champion of rhetoric; the intermediate links lie before us

in an unbroken chain. Our astonishment subsides, if we so far rid ourselves of prejudice as to realise how arbitrary is every line of demarcation between poetry and prose. Not only the poems of Walt Whitman, but a great many of Goethe's finest poems would be regarded by every Greek art-critic as prose. Prose really implies that the language proceeds on foot; the reverse, — that it soars aloft by means of this device or that, — applies to every conventionalised form of speech; whether it is cast into a regular measure or not is irrelevant in comparison with the fact that it is informed by measure. The Hellenic bias towards style manifests itself here in the creation of a definite form, and we cannot question the fact that the development of the period demanded a new style and one unhampered by the laws of metre. For at such a high point of civilisation the poetic form does not suffice for what the world has to say and wishes to hear. Empty and conventional jingle, relying on tricks of style, undoubtedly attained a bad eminence in Greek and Latin oratory; but a similar spectacle has been afforded by poetry and the arts of chisel and brush. If a man had something to say, like Aristotle, Polybius, and Plutarch, it did him no harm to clothe his thoughts in a form, the effect of which we perceive agreeably even without understanding the art to which it is due. It is the same artistic conventionality which to this day lends to French prose, whether it be that of literature or of polite conversation, the charm which the Teuton does not possess in equal measure. And the French have attained to it by a rhetorical schooling traditionally derived from the method of antiquity. That elegance is not an inborn quality with them is shown by the formlessness of so great a writer as Rabelais. Were we in a position to read the laws of Solon we should perceive that Attic elegance was likewise no gift of heaven. An art which we find still dominant in the sermons and hagiography of the Byzantines is a power not to be despised, even apart from its historical value.

Again, it was not to these conventional tricks, in the first instance, that Plato was averse. He was logician enough to appreciate the high educational value of making thought move in regulated periods (a thing that many people overlook nowadays); but the heaven-born poet felt that this intellectual mechanism was antagonistic to the direct unconscious self-revelation of emotional experience. The thing that roused him to passionate protest was the claim laid by rhetoric to the formation of youth. This had to be begun on a fresh system, the old training in music and gymnastics being no longer adequate. The question was between a scientific and philosophical education (Plato was thinking particularly of mathematics, to which we also devote attention) and a conventional and mechanical training of the mind. There is no question that the rhetoricians provided the latter. It is rhetoric that our own schools desire to achieve by the practice of speaking and writing in the mother-tongue, and rhetoric that they formerly aimed at by speaking and writing in Latin. This Plato repudiated because it was no genuine knowledge, while the fact that the rhetorician took upon himself to talk of everything, irrespective of how much he knew of his subject, and never attempted to conceal that he aimed at effect and nothing else, appeared to the disciple of Socrates wantonly immoral. And when Isocrates, the most successful and systematic teacher of rhetoric, called his form of instruction philosophy, it must have sounded like mockery in the ears of the genuine philosopher. In youth, Plato had experienced in his own case that no poetic form was suited to portray what was to him the noblest of all visions — Socrates in converse with his pupils and with the sophists. He felt within himself the capacity to embody this vision directly by the reproductive power

of imagination without any other stylistic conventionality than that of his own poetic fire. Thus in the divine madness of the poet, of which he speaks later in his *Phædrus*, he found the form to suit him. This form he perfected, and created, in the height of his power, works in which we find all the merits of all kinds of poetry and rhetoric, but which are, nevertheless, something utterly apart and unique. In his old age he probably felt that the form was no longer adequate to the substance; but he did not care to abandon it; and he who has glowed with enthusiasm with the youthful Plato, in his elder years willingly gives ear to the style of his old age, because the soul within has not grown old. Great writers like Aristotle and Cicero, having safely stored this characteristic form, which was natural to one period and one person alone, in the pigeon-holes of their æsthetic system, have indeed produced admirable dialogues. They are counterfeits none the less, and it is a wholly anti-Platonic classicism which holds or would hold the dialogue to be the true, or even a particularly good, method of scientific investigation and statement. Plato's dialogue is a miracle which will edify the world to the end of time, like Athenian tragedy and the comedy of Aristophanes; but it is specifically Athenian. This is why Aristotle at his best abandoned dialogue in favour of a plain statement of ideas. Had the efforts of Aristotle been attended with success, the quarrel between rhetoric and philosophy would have been adjusted, inasmuch as rhetorical training would have received its proper and subordinate place in the philosophical education of youth. But the unforeseen expansion of Hellenic civilisation did not allow of such root-growth, and at a later period the power was wanting. In the dialogue *De Oratore*, that work which has most of the Platonic character, Marcus Cicero, though himself of the rhetorical school, renews the attempt to subordinate rhetoric to scientific training. In so doing he reproduced the ideas of his contemporaries, the successors of Plato in the Academy. The attempt succeeded neither in Rome nor in Greece. One of the strongest signs of decadence in the time of the empire is the fact that philosophy, except where it holds its own in narrow scholastic circles, has to yield precedence to rhetoric. Where the Latin language prevailed more especially, philosophy becomes no more than a part of general education; while rhetoric, thanks to an adherence to Attic models of style that grows ever closer and more difficult, becomes more and more an empty game of words that only serves to mask the internal decay which it precipitates. And yet the sight of the clinging ivy on the trunk of the dead oak is a fair one.

For centuries the great model of all rhetoricians was Demosthenes. His inimitable greatness is most plainly manifest in their imitations, even though they be those of Cicero. He, too, is intelligible only in connection with his age and his city, the only time and place which could have brought him forth as their natural fruit. The statesmen of the great epoch of Athens had wrought with the living word, prisoned in no written document — thus, Pericles. Gradually the political pamphlet began to make its way, choosing amongst other forms that of the *δημηγορία*, or parliamentary speech. The leading statesmen, indeed, wrote very seldom; but the literati, whom they made their mouthpiece, in time became a power in the formation of public opinion. Pre-eminent among these was Isocrates; he too made use of the form of the *δημηγορία* amongst others, his studied arts of speech giving it a character which must have formed a singular contrast to the words dictated by the passion of the moment in the *Pyx*. It was a result of existing conditions that the speech in the law courts was sometimes suited to produce its effect as a pamphlet pretty much in the form in which it had

been delivered. The popularity of rhetoric also preserved many speeches in the courts which had no particular tendency, and thus, curiously enough, special pleading made its way into literature. But Demosthenes was the first to rise to the position of a leading statesman by the publication of orations to the people or to the courts which he had either actually made or else had reduced to this form. Simultaneously his works took their place among the most distinguished classics of his nation. His only education had been that of an advocate, which included, it must be admitted, all the arts of speech; nothing that may even remotely be called science ever touched him. In our moral judgment of him we should apply no standard but that which he recognised; he took the license which had been taken by patriotic Athenian statesmen even in the days of Themistocles. Possibly this did not tally with the Platonic standard, but then, neither did the state of Athens. The charm of Demosthenes lies in his faith in the democratic imperialistic ideals of the Athens of Pericles. That these had long been past hope, was the key to his fate; he himself was ruined by the fact. That by the power of the spoken word and the faith that alone makes the word powerful, he almost succeeded in inspiring his worn-out and selfish nation with his own patriotism, and, that in spite of everything, Athens once again entered the arena to champion liberty against Philip with the lives of her citizens—therein lies his greatness. The tragic side of this greatness heightens its fascination for one who sees through the illusions of Demosthenes and perceives the better right, historically speaking, on the side of Philip; but the fire of the passion of Demosthenes will carry even such a one away. This is not the charm to which the rhetoricians were susceptible. What held them spell-bound is what at first alienates our sympathies. Hellenic art restrained all wildness and passion, reducing it to the smoothest, most harmonious form. Demosthenes did not speak like this, of that we are sure. As a writer he practises the art of conventionalisation with the soundest judgment and the most cautious intelligence—we discover that this speaker can do whatever he pleases, his power knows no bounds; but he himself defines the narrow limits consistent with the growth of harmonious beauty; beauty, if you will, of the style in which contemporary art adorned its mausoleums; for in the case of Scopas and Leochares, too, vast pathos slumbers beneath the sweep of the beautiful line.

Athenian independence and power and that Greek liberty in opposition to which Philip looked a barbarian and a tyrant in the eyes of Demosthenes, had in truth long been but a phantom. The attempt made by Athenian statesmen, from Aristides to Pericles, to transform into an Athenian empire the confederation of cities which the repulse of the Persians had called into existence, was the greatest act of the Hellenes in the sphere of politics. The concentration of their civilisation into a unit under the hegemony of Athens was achieved. But the issue which the young Thucydides foresaw when, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, he determined to write his history, fell out otherwise than he perhaps anticipated or than was in all human probability to be anticipated. Athens had not strength to subdue the Peloponnesus; Sparta subdued Athens and destroyed the empire—but with the help of the Persians, who were the real victors. The result was not only the desolation and brutalisation incident to a long civil war, but a despair of any kind of favourable issue—indeed of any issue at all. The restoration of the Athenian democracy, the catastrophe of Sparta, which after *Lenetra* has as much as it can do in fighting for its own existence, the ephemeral rise of Thebes, due to the pre-eminence of a single man, all this

has no further significance in the history of the nation except to emphasise the fact that none of these little cities could maintain a sovereignty either at home or over their neighbours; that they existed only in virtue of the general weakness. Even the Persian might, which imposes its will on the Greeks so frequently even without the aid of armed force, subsists only because no one attacks it. What this whole world lacks is a dominant will to coerce it to its own advantage. It lacks a master. Many are aware of this, many give voice to it; that state in particular,—founded in violence and yet powerful,—which Dionysius of Syracuse carved out for himself by overcoming the Carthaginians in the hour of their need, widely disseminated this feeling. The fall of his dynasty brought about a reaction, and the spirit of ancient municipal independence owed its power to the fact that the monarchy seemed to place even the personal freedom of the individual in jeopardy. How Philip would have solved the problem put in his hands on the day of Chæronea, it is idle to speculate. Long before that, the aged Isocrates had called upon him to take his place as general of the Hellenic confederacy against the Persians. And now it came to pass that his son was confronted with this same problem. He it was who solved it. He is and was the master of whom the Hellenic nation stood in need.

Demosthenes and all those who were pledged to the old ideals of sovereign cities, whether oligarchies or democracies, were naturally incapable of understanding the great king and his empire, but even Aristotle seems to have thought much as they did, although he had been Alexander's tutor and saw clearly the need of reform in society and the petty states, and was strongly inclined to translate his political theories into practice. His historical compilations ignore the Macedonian monarchy, and his theories reveal no suspicion of what Alexander designed and executed. This ought not to astonish us, even if we see in Alexander the crowning figure of Hellenic civilisation. For all truly great men in history seem to the reflective eye of posterity like providential agents appearing at the right moment to accomplish what has long ago been augured as a need, prophesied and prepared for. As a matter of fact they accomplish the result in quite another fashion, a fashion of their own, often contrary to all anticipation, filled as they justly are with the sense that they are contributing something new and original. But contemporaries who have no power of reading history backwards from the event (even if their interpretation were likely to be sound), experience the clash of this novel contribution with all the more violence the higher they stand over the common herd, which after all only takes up the catchword, crying, "Hosannah!" on Sunday, and on Friday, "Crucify!" Even now it counts itself singularly sage for taking its catchword from Demosthenes or Aristotle for the condemnation of Alexander.

Alexander went to Asia with the intention of seizing upon the empire of the Persian king. This he accomplished, not in a wild orgy of victory but with the tenacious perseverance which took three years for the conquest and organisation of the Eastern provinces, but did not overleap itself by extravagant ambitions. It is only legend that makes him the conqueror of the world. He was a Macedonian, the hereditary king of a feudal state which the energy of his father had transformed into a military monarchy. He was a Greek in the sense which even the journalists had long since learned to express by saying that it was not race but education that made the Greek. But he was also recognised as the legitimate successor of the Achæmenides, and was himself willing to employ the Persians, side by side with Macedonians and Hellenes, in the service of the empire. His empire was accordingly

not to be based on nationality, it was to rear itself over the heads of nations and states. He granted self-government in the widest interpretation of the term to kingdoms, half-civilised tribes, Hellenic and other towns; he not only respected all local peculiarities of manners and religion, he even went so far in this direction as to deliver peoples from a foreign yoke—as for instance in the case of the Egyptians. But his empire was to be more than a confederacy, it was to be an effective entity with the imperial rule supreme over all, with the imperial army a ready instrument of war in the hands of the sovereign, to compel the Universal Peace, as he called his empire, and with the king's officers able to exercise sufficient authority for the protection, not only of the constituent parts of the empire against one another but also of the individual against the arbitrary action of the individual community. Finally, he realised the civilising mission of the state as fully as any prince has ever realised it; he took in hand the irrigation of Mesopotamia, founded cities, built harbours, and set about the scientific exploration of his newly discovered world in a style to which even the present furnishes few parallels.

The imperial government, like the imperial army, was centred, head and heart, in the king. On his person everything depended. Absolute monarchy was the only possible form for the empire. The founder of this empire, who bore as many wounds on his body as anyone among his veterans, who commanded in all battles in person, who himself, by ceaseless toil, carried on the business of administration, might well regard himself as the true king whose right to rule, even his master, Aristotle, did not dispute, though he questioned the possibility of such a man's existence. But Alexander in no way regarded himself as a sovereign because he had the power. He regarded himself as a king by the grace of God, not in the sense of a more or less dubious legitimacy, which many great and petty sovereigns are apt to advance as sole proof of their title, but in the sense in which the genuine artist and the prophet may claim to be the depositaries of the divine spirit. It was the reverse of presumption when Alexander set the divine element in himself in the foreground. During his lifetime he exhibited the most scrupulous piety, and it is contemptible to tax him with hypocrisy; he had far more faith in miracles and oracles than we are willing to ascribe to the pupil of Aristotle, though we can readily understand it in the Macedonian and the soldier. To him it was a revelation from heaven when the Libyan god greeted him as his son. Had not his ancestor, Heracles, been the son of Zeus and of Amphitryon? For him personally it was the confirmation of his faith in his own mission, and the divinity of its ruler gave his empire a religious consecration. It was consistent with this idea that the worship of Alexander took its place above the innumerable special cults of tribes and towns, of families and communities, as the religion of the empire as a whole. There are many instances of the worship of the sovereign being assigned a place in the pantheon, side by side with that of the godhead figured under a thousand different names and shapes; for the worship of defunct monarchs, the ancient and hallowed practice of ancestor-worship offers a precedent. The adoration paid to Plato and Epicurus was of a precisely similar character. Thus, the abuses of which weaklings and miscreants on the throne, and flatterers and sycophants among subjects, have been guilty, must not be allowed to neutralise the historical and spiritual authority of the institution of the worship of the sovereign, which is inseparably bound up with the institution of the monarchy of Alexander. This monarchy is the highest phase of political and social organisation attained

by antiquity. For the much-lauded Roman Empire is nothing else than this kind of monarchy, *imperium et libertas*. Cæsar actually grasped at the crown of the Greek king. So far as Italy and the West were concerned, Augustus certainly wished to be the first citizen and no more—the confidential agent of the sovereign people. But to the Greek half of his empire he was from the first both king and god, and he owed his victory not least to his own belief and that of others in the divinity of his adoptive father. From the time of Hadrian the Augustan theory was in the main exploded even in the West.

This Hellenistic state allowed Alexander's scheme to drop; he would have granted the Persians full rights of citizenship. From henceforth these rights pertain only to the man who has been Hellenised—the legal stamp of such a condition being membership of an Hellenic community. This is clearly manifest in Egypt, where even the Roman emperor bestows Roman citizenship on no Egyptian who has not been adopted into one of the Greek cities of the country. (In this connection we may leave institutions specifically Roman out of account.) For the rest, the king strives to preserve the ideals of the elder age of Greece, the free man and the free state. Personal and economic liberty, legal redress, and liberty of emigration are for the most part secured, not only to the subjects of a single kingdom, but to all Greeks. In like manner the cities enjoy a very considerable liberty of action, in degrees ranging from nominal sovereignty down to the government by royal officials which is presently established in Alexandria. The ancient Greek municipalities of Asia, in particular, enjoyed as subjects much greater privileges than, for example, the cities of Latin countries at the present day. The country, on the contrary, was almost everywhere allotted to some municipal community; that tendency with which we are familiar in the Roman Empire, to convert nations which did not take kindly to town settlements (like the Celts, for instance) from tribes into towns, if only on paper, is equally perceptible in Syria. Egypt remained "the country," *Chora*, but likewise remained barbarous and enslaved. One of the rocks on which the civilisation of antiquity made shipwreck was the fact that the farmer was kept in tutelage or even in bondage by the city, and that he lagged behind it in education. Slavery, as an institution, has to be reckoned with only in the western half of the empire; not in Egypt, Palestine, and large districts of Asia. A community which holds property of its own, imposes its own taxes, which has its own laws and law courts, its own constitution and elective magistrates, is free to all intents and purposes; the fact that it pays a fixed tribute to the king, and leaves to his decision or award all questions of peace and war, intercourse with foreign states, or even with communities of its own political status, and is in many respects practically subject to his control, does not materially detract from its liberty. The danger of such a situation lurks in the circumstance that it minimises interest in their own city among the most capable of its citizens. It offers no career for effective political action. Worse still, the citizen ceases to bear arms. The army consists of the royal troops, official rank goes by royal appointment, and the monarchy alone has great resources at its command. To this centre, and to courts and capitals, the stir of life and every kind of talent is drawn. Very few of the free cities, mainly those which still retained their sovereign rights, like Rhodes, remained centres of civilisation. Not one of the new settlements became such, unless it was a royal capital. Doubtless there can be no genuine patriotism when the citizen takes no part in public life either by counsel or act. Doubtless a government which rests

entirely upon the capacity of the sovereign can neither be stable, nor in the long run endure. But, on the whole, we must confess that the Hellenes lived at ease under this kind of government. The ancient petty states alone chose rather to bleed to death than to forego the empty name of liberty. We may regard with sympathy the attempts at confederacies made by Crete, the Peloponnesus and Ætolia; but we cannot deny that politically they are of little importance; they are matters of no moment in the history of civilisation.

About the year 330 there were three men who stood forth as the representatives of the great ideals of life—Alexander, Aristotle, and Demosthenes. Demosthenes perishes; the time is gone by for his kind of Greek liberty and greatness; the future is for the heroes of the *vita activa* and the *vita contemplativa*, men of action who passionately assail the Doric ideal of the *sophrosyne*, as Alexander did in taking the Achilles of Homer for his model. In many cases they are inspired solely by personal ambition, and the lust of pleasure joins hands with the love of power. The end is contempt for man and the nausea of satiety. Of such are Demetrius, the conqueror of cities, and Pyrrhus. But not a few have learned from Aristotle and Alexander what the duty of a king is. The first sovereigns of the dynasties of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, Antigonus Gonatas and Hiero of Syracuse, devoted a lifetime of toil and pains to the high duty of sovereignty. Cleomenes of Sparta, the socialistic dreamer on the throne, perishes in the attempt to renew the youth of Sparta and the Peloponnesus.

The men of contemplative life vanish from public and often from social life; they make a habit of living celibate lives in small circles and communities; doctrine alone, and that often esoteric, takes its place side by side with research. Those who translate into action what they have learned from the masters generally contribute little to scientific inquiry. Philosophy is compelled to an inevitable step, the several sciences disengage themselves from her. What remains, — metaphysical and logical speculation, — nevertheless maintains its supreme ascendancy in virtue of the fact that from this time forward the active, effective potency of philosophy shines forth, the potency which she exercises as *magistra vitæ*, as the religion of the heart and the assurance of the intellect in life and conduct. This power extends its sway over ever widening circles even though it cannot reach down to the lower classes; and the gulf between the cultured and the illiterate grows broader and broader. Athens remains the capital city of this philosophy; this is its only title to distinction. Wide as are the differences between the schools, they are agreed in this, that their ideal is the sage, the man apart, who takes his stand not only above the world but outside it—the reverse of the kingly type. The historic continuity of the ancient ideals, Ionian no less than Dorian, is unmistakable.

The various sciences flourish where the necessary means are at their disposal, that is to say, at the courts. This does not make them courtly in character, although Eratosthenes and Aristarchus were tutors of princes; not mathematics alone but all serious learning knows no royal road for kings. The library, the observatory, the scientific collections, and the medical school of Alexandria, which far surpass all others, must be looked upon as directly due to the school of Aristotle; the first two Ptolemies honoured learning, and for that reason gave it nothing but means and liberty. In the second century, their unworthy successors banished the company of scholars, who then found liberty at least in Rhodes. By tracing the course of mathematics and astronomy we can see how the scholars of the few places where

they laboured with enthusiasm keep in constant touch with one another by their writings; but splendid as is the progress made by individuals, the number of those who can really follow is very small, and we feel that a general stagnation must set in if this correspondence were to die out and the few scientific institutions perish. Without the study of pure science that of the applied sciences will never make progress; it will soon lose ground. Thus it was, even in the department in which observation and practice most go hand in hand, in medicine. From his geographical, botanical, and zoölogical survey, Alexander had left behind an enormous mass of material which was at first augmented by many additions. Eratosthenes, in his map of the world, could use some of the astronomical definitions of locality which had evidently been made for the purpose. This is the origin of the network of degrees with which the globe is overlaid, and one would have thought that other scholars would have hastened to verify and complete it by further measurements of shadows. Not so. True, Eratosthenes stands at the end of the third century, when the great period of advance is over, and the evil genius of Greece gathers strength to rest satisfied with the great things achieved and, by canonising them, to put a stop to further progress. The criticism of Hipparchus, well grounded as it was in the abstract, contributed something to this end by repudiating the good attained and setting hindrances in the way of a greater attainable good, for the sake of a greatest good that was unattainable. Every department of natural science presents much the same spectacle. What has been gained by the labours of the third century, is here and there carried farther by the few (in many cases, as was inevitable, by quantitative amplification), but in the main the scientific thinking had been done; and by no means all the old ideas were transmitted, even in this petrified form. It was left for the nineteenth century, which in its own strength has advanced to an incomparable height of knowledge, to look back and appreciate at its just value the achievements and intuitions of the earlier age.

In the department of abstract science the accumulation of material, — not only of the whole heritage of literature, but also of all that was preserved in the memory of man, — was taken in hand on a scale amazingly vast. The Ionians had already taken note of the traditions of barbarous nations; the study was prosecuted in the spirit of Alexander, and presently Hellenised barbarians, such as Manetho, Berosus, and Apollonius of Caria, took part in it. Grammar, with philology, lexicography, textual criticism, and minute exegesis, likewise becomes a genuine science, the importance of which, again, the nineteenth century has been the first to realise, when, in the pride of its own strength, it soared beyond the achievements of this early period. Towards a real science of history, however, no step had been taken, even in dealing with Homer, who constituted the centre and culminating point of these studies. Nor did the Greeks attempt to gain a scientific conception of any foreign language, not even of Latin. This one-sided view hampered their historical judgment. Not one of them tried to see from the point of view of another mind, and their philology and their science of history have therefore remained rationalistic.

The students in the sphere of language and literature were principally poets, men whose interest was æsthetic; and the poetry of the time, in so far as it has come down to us, is either actually erudite or has the airs and graces of erudition, in that it employs the art-forms of an earlier period, particularly those of the Ionic school. It displays a vast amount of taste and elegance; it twines about the stately life of the courts and the seats of

learning, the quiet peristyles of the town houses and country villas by shore and stream; as rich and ornate as the grotesques of the loggias in the Vatican and the frescoes of the Farnesina, obtrusively magnificent as the allegories of the Doges' palace and of the Luxembourg. But it no longer brought forth anything that fired the spirit of the whole nation, and spoke to all mankind. Moreover, it disdained to seek new forms, and soon prohibited the search for them. No doubt in the lower and numerically larger classes of society there continued to exist a poetry which satisfied their needs, a poetry which would probably have a powerful charm for us by reason of its popular character; but the fatal evil was that the nation was now altogether incapable of renewing its youth by the upspringing of fresh elements.

Prose was more national in character and more lucid. Our terminology is incommensurable with that of the period, and the works themselves have all fallen victims to the later tendencies of style, but when we see that the historical novel, the love-story, the *roman comique*, the romance of travel, and so forth, are Hellenic products, we suspect that intellectual activity was no less marked in this sphere than in others.

In the third century the bias towards mysticism seems to have been completely repressed, we find no trace of a popular religious movement that seizes upon the hearts of men and takes their senses captive. The Ionian spirit prevails throughout. The gorgeous ritual of worship, the temple-building and festivals, all bear the stamp of superficiality. Even the disciples of Plato hark back to Socratic criticism: the result being the most important scientific work of the age, though to the uninitiated it looks like pure scepticism. It has its complement, however, in Plato's own writings and in the practical recognition of his moral idealism. The deficiency is none the less unmistakable. Even with the noblest representatives of active as of intellectual life we breathe a thin rationalistic air. In the second century mysticism begins to come slowly to the surface, frequently associated with the ancient name of Pythagoras, not seldom heralding the irruption of the barbarian element and barbarian religions. And astrology, with its vain superstitions, has already made its appearance, having tortured into its service a hideously shallow pseudo-science.

Even the man in whom the intellectual culture of the Hellenistic period as a whole is once more grandly embodied at its close does not escape the contagion of this false doctrine; I mean Posidonius, who, in the spirit of Aristotle, strove, by voyages of discovery, observations, and calculations of his own, to unite that side of philosophy which touched upon natural science with metaphysics and ethics, primarily and mainly on the basis of the old Stoic school, though strongly influenced by Plato and Aristotle. Apart from these merits, he was a brilliant portrayer of manners and chronicler of contemporary history, a loyal adherent of the Roman oligarchy, even though he preferred to live in Rhodes, the most independent of free cities. By his monotheism, which was a heart-felt religion with him, by the mixture of mysticism and reason, the abundance of his encyclopædic learning and his advocacy of encyclopædic education, he affected the succeeding age more powerfully than any other man; especially among the Romans, for Varro and Cicero, Sallust and Seneca are under his influence. For all our admiration we must confess that he himself is not free from gross superstition, and that scholarship with him is in danger of being attenuated to general culture. We can judge of the change when we remember that he was the pupil of Panætius, the shallow and shrewd-minded friend of Scipio Æmilianus, who drew up for the Romans a handbook of the Ciceronian doctrine of duty,

afterwards compiled by Cicero in his *De Officiis*, and who athetised the *Phædo*, because the doctrine of immortality appeared to him unworthy of the admired dialectician.

Posidonius came from Apamea in Syria, and countries in which the bulk of the population was Semitic furnish a large number of contemporary poets and writers of all sorts. But the best witness to the power of Hellenism is supplied by those circles which oppose it, in the front rank the Jews, concerning whom we have the fullest information. Their independence in matters of detail is of far less importance than their community of thought and feeling. In writings like Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Wisdom, the influence of Greek thought is unmistakable. Before and during the Maccabæan reaction the subject-matter of the Old Testament was worked up by Greek methods into novels, epics, and dramas. Prophecy and apocalypse linked themselves with the poetic oracles of Greece, and the nationalist movement, the leaders of which soon became Hellenistic princes themselves, goes but a little way towards severing the threads of connection. In the early days of the empire, Philo is no less subject than Cicero to the influence of Posidonius and of Plato. The Pharisees of Jerusalem, and, still more, the populations of mixed districts, could not disown the Hellenistic atmosphere they breathed. Without Alexander, without Hellenism, we cannot imagine the Gospels coming into existence.

The great task of Hellenism was the education of the nation that ruled it. This was begun in times out of mind, when the Greek character and Greek weights and measures were adopted on the Tiber, and the first temples in the Greek style arose in Roman market-places to the gods of Greece. The Latins had nevertheless preserved their national characteristics and had tolerated no Greek settlement on their shores. Now the question was no longer one of ousting the Greek language, but rather of adopting the whole of Greek civilisation. Greek scholars, hearing Marcus Cicero speak, lamented that the last advantage of their nation had been taken from them, not without justice. And yet through the winning of this soul the West was won for Greek civilisation, even though it was no less determined that the Hellenes should one day be called Romæi.

It was of cardinal importance to the history of the world that the Hellenistic kingdoms were too weak to enter into the decisive struggle carried on between Rome and Carthage, first for Sicily, (which was utterly lost to the Greeks,) and then for the mastery of the West.

Rome had already banished Greek influence from Italy. This momentous fact of the weakness of Greece was the result of Alexander's untimely death and of the impossibility of maintaining the unity of the empire, the struggle for which had lasted fifty years and allowed of the rise of three great powers which mutually held one another in check. By the time Rome had overcome Hannibal, Egypt had been so enfeebled by misgovernment that it put itself, ingloriously but prudently, under the protection of the Roman republic. Macedonia succumbed, not without honour. The king of Asia no longer had the power to extend his influence to Europe; he forfeited to Rome the countries to which he owed that title. But the fall of the empire, now called Syria, involved the strengthening of that nationality which Alexander, rightly estimating its value, had desired to gain over by a share in the government. With the Arsacid monarchy, Philhellenes though they called themselves, a foreign nationality and an intolerant religion flung Hellenism back beyond the Euphrates. The Roman senate undertook the government of the Greek provinces reluctantly, rightly thinking that the

result would be as detrimental to their own people as to the subject provinces. It is none the less true that a more ruthless set of blood-suckers has hardly ever fallen upon a defenceless prey. Despair made the Asiatics see a deliverer even in that savage Cappadocian Mithridates, thus bringing disaster upon disaster. Rome herself was utterly out of joint, and finally Greece had to furnish a stage for the decisive struggles of the Roman revolution. Rhodes, the last city that had enjoyed some degree of immunity, was pillaged by the liberators who had murdered Cæsar. How hardened men were to such catastrophes we have recently learnt when it became known that, in the time of Sulla, northern barbarians burned the temple at Delphi; a thing that had been entirely forgotten in the traditions handed down to us. It has also come to light that probably at that time the whole amount of capital accumulated and secured in countless institutions was lost, the festivals of the gods, the games, the banquets all came to an end; the guilds collapsed, even those of the musicians and actors, who had provided themselves with charters from all the powers; wide stretches of the country lay desolate. Some few individuals acquired property which in the sequel became enormously valuable, and this fact in itself was a hindrance to any healthy revival.

Augustus was the deliverer who ultimately brought peace and order: and the Greeks did extravagant homage to their saviour. He deserved it, no doubt, but fresh sap could no longer rise in the decrepit and mutilated tree. Hellenism had seen everything perish that fire and sword could destroy; the sole thing left intact was the intellectual heritage of her forefathers. With them she took refuge, they proved themselves victorious even over the Romans, her lords. Thus was consummated the process which determined the future of the world, the process by which the nation not only resigned all political aspirations, but blotted out the whole of the last three centuries, insisted on speaking as Plato or Demosthenes spoke, or even like Herodotus and Lysias, forgot even the deeds of Alexander in contemplating Salamis and Marathon, and actually went so far as to dispute the possibility of progress in poetry and philosophy (inclusive of the several sciences) beyond that of the classic age, which it chose to conclude with the Attic period. Imitation was now the only safe way, the very principle of progress was challenged. This was the case even more in theory than in practice; the plastic arts, for example, still continued to do original work, because artists are seldom burdened with literary culture. But in the whole sphere of language the results could not fail to be disastrous, for the gulf between the educated classes,—who, by virtue of schooling and study, could twist their speech into the mode of three centuries ago and more,—and the populace,—whose speech, thus deprived of all ennobling influences, rapidly degenerated,—presently became so wide that they hardly attempted to arrive at a common understanding. The difficulty of artificial modes of speech made it necessary for rhetoric and the art of style to take the first place in the schools, and words gradually stifled ideas. Nor was novelty in the latter thought desirable, they were all the more welcome if they were as classic as the words. The whole object of life was really nothing more than a repetition of forms, and of substance (so far as there was any substance), hallowed by antique usage. Even so obsolete an institution as the gymnastic games was revived, the old religious worship was laboriously restored; in the second century after Christ, Apollo began once more to dispense oracles in verse. The authority of Homer was exalted to an extravagant pitch; every one knew him who had been to school at all. In extensive circles the use of Homeric phrases passed for poetry, the Homeric Olympus for religion, and now, for the first time, he took the

place held to-day by the Old Testament among those who have no other book. This is most plainly manifest in Christian polemics.

Under the liberal and Philhellenic government of the dynasty that came to the throne with Nerva, the world prospered; in a material sense Asia has never been happier. The age could boast of orators who spoke like Demosthenes and Plato in one. A certain amount of philosophical training prevailed among educated men; lovable and able individuals are not lacking; such men as Plutarch, who paints that copy of real Hellenism which the heroes of the French revolution adopted instead of the original, and who transmits to Montaigne, for example, a large portion of the worldly wisdom of the Greeks. The work of compilation by which astronomy and geography are summed up by Ptolemy, grammar by Herodian, and medicine by Galen, is of the utmost value from the standpoint of history. A shallow Semitic pamphleteer like Lucian copies the graceful forms of antiquity with such skill, that in the Renaissance and the days of the *Éclaireissement* he passes for a leading representative of the Greek spirit. But the age is in its dotage for all that; there is natural science without experiment, abstract science without unbiassed examination, knowledge without philosophy. The deeper souls have reached a point at which their strength lies in resignation. Hope, the only treasure of all those in Pandora's box to remain with man in the youth of the nation, has now fled. None have now a living faith save those who renounce the world. The Platonic Eros is no longer a force, and the Agape is known only to those to whom Paul has revealed it. Men's souls are weary; presently their bodies too begin to sicken. *Æsculapius* is the only god of heaven whose worship flourishes side by side with that of the emperors, the gods of the empire; the feeble health of the individuals of whom we hear most becomes a disquieting factor; under Marcus Aurelius the first great wave of mortality sweeps over the empire. From this point the downward course is rapid, especially when, with Severus, the empire falls into the hands of barbarian generals. Nor must it be forgotten that Augustus greatly circumscribed the eastern half of the empire, which he permitted to remain Greek. He romanised the Danube provinces, Illyria, Africa, and even Sicily. Every year the East sent a strong contingent to the West, and though the fact contributed the largest share to the assimilation of Greek culture by the West (in Rome, for example, the language of the Christian congregations was Greek until some time after this), these emigrants were none the less permanently lost to the Greek nation. In the East the ancient nations were astir; as early as the second century an Aramaic literature begins, in Phrygia inscriptions appear in the vulgar tongue; in spite of Longinus, the Palmyra of Zenobia is not a Greek city any more; there is an alarming increase of spiritual force in barbarian religions; even in that which came across the frontier from the Parthians. In those circles into which Gnosis, so-called, leads us, which did not consist wholly of ignorant persons, the Greek element is only one of many. The imperial army becomes more and more a force that makes for barbarism. No wonder that civilisation collapses, with the empire out of joint, and the ravages of the Germans—whom the classicism of the age dubs Scythians, in the phrase of Herodotus—just beginning. By their misdeeds at this period the Goths and Vandals richly earned the secondary sense attached to their name, though it has been mistakenly associated with the devastation of Italy and Africa. They reduced Greece to a desert, they destroyed Olympia; worse still, they annihilated the prosperity of Asia. The athletic games which had taken the place of the gymnastic contests of antiquity, but had always retained


something of the spirit of the latter, practically came to an end. All that peace had allowed to come into being — temples, monuments, and theatres — was destroyed to build inadequate walls. Far and wide the thin stratum of the educated classes that overlaid a people half estranged from civilisation perished entirely. Some sort of order was restored by Diocletian and Constantine, but the place of the Greek king had now been taken by the oriental sultan; the free man had died out. Then came the church, which presently forbade freedom of thought. Origen was a thinker and philological student almost without peer among his contemporaries. Eusebius had no equal among the scholars of his day. It was therefore not the fault of Christianity if these two men had no successors, but gave place to the purblind, and barely honest superstition of Athanasius and the vulgar abuse of Epiphanius. On the contrary, Christianity showed its affinity with Hellenic civilisation by the very fact that they withered together. Its earthly victory should dazzle the eyes of those least of all who believe in the kingdom of God that Jesus preached. Of this there is hardly a trace at the council of Nicæa.


The qualities that were at work in the decay of civilisation were essentially Greek — satisfaction in present achievement, and reverence for authority. The classicist movement allowed them to gain exclusive sway. Hand in hand with them went a fine sense of form; the imitative faculty has never attained greater triumphs. Christianity also submitted to the yoke of classicist rhetoric; the impressive sermons of the great Cappadocians bear witness to this, no less than the childish *Symposium of the Virgins* of Methodius. In league with the church, this formal culture has the great merit of having preserved a large portion of the literature of antiquity as an aid to education. The Greek faculty of abstract thought showed itself mighty for good and evil. In the midst of the terrible third century, it was able to take refuge in the purer air of immaterial conceptions, though at the cost of the delight in the visible world characteristic of the Ionic school.

There was little of Plato but his name and the mysticism of his old age in this last great philosophical movement which called itself after him; and it was never more alien to the Greek spirit than when it tried by fantastic necromancy to hold fast the ancient system of religion. The same mode of thought practically prevailed to the same extent on Christian soil, not only in the many circles which the church had repudiated; orthodox dogma is itself but one of these systems, though one that was canonised and preserved for centuries together with the whole body of classical civilisation. This torpor is naturally repellent to us, especially when we contrast it with the active progress of the Roman church which takes the task of civilising the West out of the hands of imperial Rome and surpasses all she has done. Nevertheless, there is a certain grandeur in the spectacle of this ancient and mummified civilisation preserving the Greek nation from utter wreck, in the face, ultimately, of enslavement to a barbarous race and a stern and aggressive religion. But if such a great political and intellectual future as we should wish them is ever to smile upon the Greeks, or rather, the Romæi, it will not come by way of the repristination of any obsolete form whatsoever, it will not be brought about directly by the spirit of antiquity, whether Greek or Christian; but the whole nation must become new by the assimilation of the modern culture of the West. The West, it must be borne in mind, did not imitate the Hellenes, it made a right use of its heritage from them to liberate itself and renew its youth. This service they still render, and will continue to render, to the individual man. By lifting their eyes to the glory of Greece, whether it be Homeric or Doric, Athenian or Hellen-

istic, men will evermore gain strength to be free and to enter willingly into the service of the Idea, and thus, if they have strayed from the right path, will learn to find their way back to nature and to God.

Politically the Greeks did not gain the mastery of the world, they did not even attain to national unity; but a homogeneous civilisation for the whole world, nevertheless, came into being through them. In such a civilisation for the future we too believe, and we labour to realise it because we desire and advocate the fellowship and concord of many nations, countries, and languages. But the civilisation of the world knows no stronger tie than the groundwork common to all genuine civilisations; and that is our heritage from Greece.





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A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE SOURCES

IN a previous part of this work reference has been made to the large number of historians of Greece and to the fragmentary condition in which their works have come down to us. Attention has also been called to the comparatively small aid which the historian of Greece receives from epigraphical inscriptions. There are, to be sure, various inscriptions that give an incidental aid ; as, for example, the famous inscription on the leg of the statue of Ramses II at Abu-Simbel ; an Athenian inscription referring to the work on the Erechtheum ; inscriptions from the walls of the temples at Ephesus, at Priene, and the like. All of these, however, give but incidental glimpses ; taken together they would make but a most meagre and fragmentary historical record. There is, however, one inscription extant of far greater importance. This is the so-called Parian marble or Parian chronicle, which was found originally at Paros, was brought to England in 1627 at the instance of the earl of Arundel, and was subsequently presented to the University of Oxford, where it forms part of the collection of Arundel marbles.

This inscription originally comprised an epitome of the chief events in Grecian history (with various notable omissions) from the alleged reign of Cæcrops, 1318 B.C., to the archonship of Diognetus, 264 B.C. At present, however, the last part of the record is lost, so that the extant portion comes only to the time of Diotimus, 354 B.C. Various parts of the inscription are more or less illegible, and there are, as just noted, numerous very noteworthy omissions, particularly as regards political events. Moreover, the entire record, as pointed out by Clinton,¹ is everywhere one year out of the way. Nevertheless, as a guide to the sequence of events in Grecian history and as a check on the other sources, the Parian chronicle is of the very greatest importance. It is not known just when or by whom this inscription was made, but it is apparently based on earlier sources that are in the main fairly reliable.

¹ *Fasti Hellenici*.

As the entire inscription of the Parian chronicle is contained on a slab of marble only about three and a half feet in length, it is obvious that its record must be of the most epitomised character; in short, a mere sequence of names. For a fuller record of the events of Grecian history we must turn to the usual sources, the manuscripts of the historians proper. Non-historical writings are not to be altogether ignored, to be sure. In many cases they furnish us important aids in filling in gaps or in supplying details. In particular the dramatists and the orators furnish important historical data; among the former, Æschylus, Euripides, Aristophanes; among the orators, Isæus, Isocrates, Æschines, and Demosthenes. The works of Plato and Aristotle and, to a less extent, of other philosophers are also to be looked to here and there. But all of these, let it be repeated, are of meagre importance compared with the records of the historians proper.

Something has been said in another place of the large number of Greek historians. Mr. Clinton lists forty-seven by name who flourished prior to 306 B.C.; and this without including the historians of Alexander. Among these are such more or less familiar names as Cadmus of Miletus, Hecataeus, Hellanicus, Ctesias, Ephorus, Theopompus, Dinon, and Anaximenes. But of the entire list of earlier writers only three are represented by extant works in anything but the most fragmentary condition. These three bear the famous names Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon. All of these lived within the same century; and each of them left a detailed account of a relatively brief but highly significant period of Grecian history. The story of Herodotus closes with the year 478 B.C.; Thucydides deals with twenty-one years of the Peloponnesian War, though taking an incidental glance at earlier history; Xenophon, taking up the account of the Peloponnesian War where Thucydides leaves off, continues the record to the death of Epaminondas in the year 362 B.C.

Curiously enough, there is no Greek historian after Xenophon, for about two centuries, whose works have been preserved; and the records of Grecian history for all other periods than those covered by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon are mostly preserved in the writings of authors who lived long after Greece had ceased to have importance as an autonomous nation. But of course these writings drew upon contemporary records; and being made at a time when it was possible to check their accounts with numerous histories that are now lost, they have almost the same significance as if they were themselves contemporary sources. These later writings are comparatively few in number. By far the most important of them is the general history of Diodorus, to which reference has so frequently been made. Justin's abridgment of Trogus Pompeius is also of value; as are the biographies of Plutarch and of Cornelius Nepos. The chronicle of Eusebius supplies many gaps in the record, particularly as regards the earlier periods of Grecian history; and the same is true of the work of Pausanias, which, though dealing primarily with geography, makes important historical allusions here and there; as, for example, in regard to the Messenian wars. The lives of Alexander the Great by Arrian and by Quintus Curtius, based on the now lost works of Alexandrian contemporaries, furnish us full records of the age of the Macedonian hero. For the post-Alexandrian epoch the fragments of Polybius are the chief source for the periods which they cover. But these are so meagre that our main reliance must be placed upon the general historians Diodorus and Justin, here as for so many other periods.

Oddly enough, no single work except the general histories has come down to us that deals with the history of Greece as a whole; that history

can be reconstructed only by piecing together the various fragmentary records, and he who would know Grecian history at first hand has chiefly to attend to the authorities just mentioned. When one has read Diodorus and Justin, Plutarch and Nepos, and Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Arrian, and Curtius, one has appealed to the chief among first-hand sources of Grecian history. We have already had occasion to refer to some of these at considerable length, and fuller notes concerning them will be found in the present bibliography; but there is one of them whose work is so important and whose position as a factor in the history of literature is so unique that we are justified in giving more extended attention to him here. This is, of course, the oldest and in some respects the most remarkable of all, Herodotus; an author whom we encounter almost everywhere in the old Orient and who serves as almost our sole witness for the great events through which Greece attained a dominant place among the nations,—the events, namely, of the so-called Persian or Median Wars.

Herodotus, the celebrated father of history, or, as K. O. Müller styles him, the father of prose, was born at Halicarnassus, in Asia Minor, about 484 B.C., and died at Thurii, Italy, about 424 B.C. Halicarnassus was a colony of Doric Greece, and therefore Herodotus was related in his ancestry rather to the Spartans than to the Athenians. His work, however, was not written in the Doric dialect but in the Ionic, which at that time was the accepted vehicle of literary productions in Greece, being the dialect generally employed by Homer, Hesiod, and the long line of logographers. The style of Herodotus has been recognised by critics of all succeeding ages as almost perfect of its kind.

As to the life of the man himself, comparatively little is known. A wealth of fable is associated with his name, as with that of most celebrities of antiquity, but the part of this which may be accepted as historically accurate is almost infinitesimal. Certain ideas, however, have gradually clustered about the name of Herodotus that by common consent are accepted as representing his biography, in default of more accurate information, which latter, presumably, will never be forthcoming. Thus it is accepted that he was born at Halicarnassus of parents named Lyxes and Dryo, and that he was the nephew of Panyasis, a famous epic poet, from which latter circumstance it may be inferred that he came of a literary lineage. It is further alleged that he left Halicarnassus owing to the tyranny of Lygdamis, the ruler of the colony, who had put to death his uncle Panyasis. It is believed that Herodotus went to the island of Samos and lived there for several years; whether he made his extensive journeys in search of knowledge thence, or at a later period, is not ascertained. In either event it is held that he subsequently returned from Samos to Halicarnassus, and personally assisted in the overthrow of the tyrant Lygdamis. Even after this event, however, it would appear that Herodotus did not find Halicarnassus a satisfactory place of residence, as he subsequently migrated to the Greek colony of Thurii, in Italy, where his last days were spent, and where it is presumed he repolished and completed his history. The colony in Thurii was first established in the year 443, but whether or not Herodotus was a member of the first company that went out to it is in dispute; that he finally went there, however, seems to be accepted without reserve.

These meagre facts, some of them by no means too well authenticated, constitute practically all that is known from outside authority regarding the actual life of Herodotus. There are, to be sure, numerous other traditions current, some of which were doubtless founded upon fact, and a few of

which are almost inseparably associated with the name of Herodotus. Such, for example, is the story that Herodotus read the books of his great history before the people of Athens, and created such popular enthusiasm thereby that the sum of ten talents (£2,000, \$10,000) was voted him from the public treasury. If this be taken as true to fact, it would appear that the business of literature was not ill paid even in that early day. Another tale, or possibly an elaboration of the same one, alleges that Herodotus desired to make his history known to the Greek world, and decided that this could best be accomplished by reading it before the assembled multitudes at Olympia. Just when this reading was held is not clear, but, notwithstanding this lack of date, it is alleged that the reading created the greatest enthusiasm, and that Herodotus divided the honours of the occasion with the winners of the Olympic games.

Another elaboration of the tale, which one would fain believe true, asserts that the youthful Thucydides, listening to the recital of Herodotus, was moved to tears, and fired with the ambition to follow in the footsteps of the great writer. The cold hand of modern scepticism has been laid rudely on this tradition, it being asserted that the date of the birth of Thucydides is too near that of Herodotus to lend authenticity to the story. But, be that as it may, this tale is probably as near the truth as most of the others which we have associated with the name of the father of history.

The work of Herodotus is remarkable, among other things, as being the oldest complete prose composition that has come down to us from classical antiquity. It must not be inferred from this that Herodotus was the first Greek who wrote prose. The fact is far otherwise. The so-called father of prose was, as is well known, preceded by a long line of Greek writers, who composed not merely prose compositions, but compositions on history. The names of many of these men are known, but their works have come down to us only in meagre fragments. As such, however, they serve to prove the wide gap which separated the best of them from their successor Herodotus. Indeed it is doubtless because of the surpassing excellence of the history of Herodotus that his work lived on through the labours of successive copyists, while the works of his predecessors were permitted to disappear through slow decay like the works of so many other and later writers of antiquity.

If it be true that the style is the man, then we may feel that after all, despite the meagre contemporary records as to his life, the man Herodotus is well known to us; for his great work, possibly the only one that he ever composed, has come down to us intact. Not indeed that the actual manuscript of his own production has been preserved. No author of classical Greece has come down to us directly in this sense. But in that day the individual copyist did in a small way what the printing-press to-day accomplishes on a larger scale. And of the numerous copies that were made of Herodotus in succeeding ages down to the period of the Renaissance, something less than a score are still preserved. Most of these date only from the fifteenth, fourteenth, or, at the earliest, the tenth century. There are, however, two or three that are undoubtedly still more ancient, though probably none that was written within a thousand years after the death of the author himself. The fact of numerous copies made in different ages by different hands being available for comparison, however, makes it reasonably sure that we have in the carefully edited editions of modern scholarship a fairly accurate representation of what Herodotus actually wrote.

This work, then, is commonly spoken of as the *History of the Persian War*. It is really much more than that. Starting with the idea of the Persian

War as a foundation, Herodotus has built a structure which might, perhaps with more propriety, be termed a history of the world as known in his day. The work itself makes it clear that, in acquiring material for its composition, the author travelled extensively in Asia and in Egypt. He visited Babylon, and gives us the description of an eye-witness of the glories of that famous capital; and he sojourned long in Egypt, saw with his own eyes the Pyramids and other monuments of that wonderful civilisation, and heard from the priests fabulous tales of the past history of their country.

When one reflects what must have been the range of observation of the average stay-at-home Greek of that day, one readily understands how much of what Herodotus saw in these foreign lands had the charm to him of absolute novelty. He had but to recount what he had seen and heard—a fair degree of literary skill being of course presupposed—to produce a narrative which would have all the charm for his compatriots of a fascinating romance. The marvels of his actual observation in Babylon and in Egypt must have seemed to him more wonderful than anything he could conceivably invent. Therefore, even had his sole object been—as quite probably it was—merely to make an entertaining narrative, he had no inducement to depart from the recital of the truth as he saw and heard it. That, in point of fact, he did thus cling to the truth is admitted to-day on all hands. There were periods, however, within a few hundred years of his own epoch, when Herodotus was considered by even the best authorities of the time as a bald romancer. The Greeks and Romans of about the beginning of our era, with Plutarch—or a “false Plutarch”; the question of authenticity is an open one—at their head, did not hesitate to stigmatise Herodotus as a writer of fables. “Plutarch” even went further and asserted that he was a malignant perverter of the truth as well.

Such detractions, however, did not at all alter the fact that the story of Herodotus had an abiding interest for each succeeding generation of readers, and it is one of the curious results of modern exploration and investigation to prove that very often where Herodotus was supposed to have invented fables he was, in point of fact, merely narrating, in the clearest manner possible, what he had actually seen.

Mixed with these recitals of fact, to be sure, there is much that is really fabulous, but this is chiefly true of those things which Herodotus reports by hearsay, and explicitly labels as being at second hand. Whether fact or fable, however, the entire story of Herodotus has at once the fullest interest and the utmost importance for the historian of to-day. For where it tells us facts about the nations of antiquity, these are very often facts that would otherwise be shut out absolutely from our view; and where he relates fables, he at least preserves to us, in a vivid way, a picture of the mental status and the intellectual life of a cultivated Greek in the period of the greatest might of that classical nation:

Our present concern is with the part of Herodotus that deals explicitly with the affairs of Greece. This has particular reference to the Persian Wars, although giving many incidental references to other periods of history. For this period of the Persian invasions Herodotus is practically our sole source, and we have drawn on him largely at first hand. His narrative here may be paraphrased and in some slight details modified, but can never be supplanted. The account of Herodotus closes with the year 478—the definitive year in which the Persians were finally expelled from Greece. As Herodotus was six years old in 478, he must have had personal recollections of the effect produced upon his elders by the accounts of the battles of

Thermopylæ, Salamis, and Plataea; must indeed all his life have been associated with men who participated in these conflicts; his account, therefore, has all the practical force of the report of a contemporary witness.

As we have said, the period following the Persian wars—the age of Pericles—found no contemporary historian, though the writings of the poets and the orators to some extent make amends for the deficit; and the art treasures that have been preserved are more eloquent than words in their testimony to the culture of the time. The general historians and biographers supply us with the chief details of the political events of the time and bridge for us the gap between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars.

When we reach the Peloponnesian War itself we come upon the work of the master historian Thucydides. A critical estimate of his writings has already been given and need not be repeated here. Neither need we take up at length the work of Xenophon, who, as already noted, explicitly continued the history of Thucydides. We have previously had occasion to point out that Xenophon did not equal his great predecessor in true historical sense, or in breadth and impartiality of view. His partiality for Sparta and his friendship for Agesilaus led him to do scant justice to the great Theban Epaminondas, and we have previously noted how the record of Diodorus, rather than the contemporary account of Xenophon, is our best source for the history of the Theban hero. Nevertheless Xenophon remains an important source for the period of which his *Hellenica* treats. His more popular work, the *Anabasis*, describes a picturesque incident in Grecian history, which was important rather as an adumbration of possible future events than because of its intrinsic interest.

Coming to the Macedonian epoch we find, as might be expected, that the picturesque life of Alexander called forth a multitude of chroniclers; all of which, as has been said, were superseded by the later works of Arrian and Curtius.

Recapitulating in a few words what has just been said of the original sources of Grecian history, it would appear that the reader who has before him the works of Diodorus, Justin, Plutarch, Nepos, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Arrian will have access to the chief fountain-heads upon which modern historians have drawn. But it will be clear to anyone who considers these authors in their entirety that the idea of Grecian history to be gained by reading these classical writers alone would be a somewhat disjointed and unsatisfactory one. Many points of chronology would remain obscure; there would be many gaps in the story. Yet, the view thus to be gained was the only one accessible until about a century ago. The revival of interest in the classical authors that came about along with the general intellectual advance in the time of Elizabeth, had led to the translation of many classical authors by such men as Thomas North, Philemon Holland, and Arthur Golding. It had led also, as we have noted, to the production of Sir Walter Raleigh's general history, which was complete for the period during which Greece was an important nation. But there was no other attempt to unify the story of Grecian history and give it a modern garb until more than a century later.

Then the stimulus given to historical investigation by the success of Gibbon's splendid work, led to an attempt to treat the history of Greece in a manner equally comprehensive. The man who first undertook the task in England was William Mitford. The work that he produced was an epochal one, replete with scholarship, yet it had certain limitations which

led directly to the production by another hand of a yet more monumental work on the same subject. For, as is well known, the history of Grote was written with the explicit intention of combating the conception of Grecian civilisation that Mitford's book had made current.

There are two quite different points of view from which the history of a foreign nation may be regarded. One of these may be called the "sympathetic," the other the "antipathetic" view. It was the latter of these which Mitford chose, or rather to which he was impelled by temperament, in dealing with those phases of Athenian life which are the central facts in the political history of Greece. It may be laid down almost as an axiom that it is impossible to write a truly great history of a great people from the antipathetic standpoint. At best, one can obtain only a surface knowledge of a foreign people—it is hard enough to gain a correct knowledge of one's own race. Every people, like every individual, is a strangely inconsistent organism. The deeds of its diverse moods never seem to harmonise; they are as different as the two sides of a shield or medal, and in proportion as we seize on one phase or another of the inconsistencies, we change utterly the type of the picture. Of course the great historian must see all sides and properly adjust them; but the difficulty is this: it is much easier to detect the inconsistencies than the underlying consistencies, which, after all, are necessary to national life. Hence the antipathetic historian makes out a strong case against the nation with relative ease, while quite overlooking the better side; whereas the sympathetic historian, while searching for the better side, cannot by any possibility overlook the obvious inconsistencies.

To illustrate from the case in hand: Mitford was an ardent tory, and he insisted on weighing Greek conduct in his own balance. He never failed to sneer at the democratic tendency of Athens, and to point out the inconsistencies in Athenian life. And he found ample material. Nothing is more startling to the student who undertakes a careful survey of the history of Greece than the glaring defects of this people. Take two or three illustrations: The Athenians contended all along for equality of rights, yet (1) the majority of their co-residents were slaves; (2) they frequently denied to their best citizens the privilege of living in Athens, banishing them, without even the charge of crime, by ostracism; and (3) they strove all along to establish imperial power for Athens over other cities—strove so fiercely for it that the final result was the utter overthrow of Greece itself.

Again, the Athenian is said to have worshipped the æsthetic and the beautiful. His poetry and art attest the truth of the claim. Yet at table he ate with his fingers; in the streets he committed indescribable vulgarities without concealment; and in his relations with his fellows he indulged in practices of the most revolting kind so commonly that to "love after the manner of the Greeks" became an opprobrious by-word among nations. Herodotus himself records that the Greeks taught these practices to the Persians, who to this day are reproached with them.

To go no further, here is plenty of material for the antipathetic historian. Yet even a very brief analysis might serve to modify the first judgment which would tend to denounce the Greeks as the most inconsistent and disreputable of mortals.

Thus, as to the slaves, a sympathetic historian would not forget that slavery had existed almost everywhere in antiquity, among Hamitic, Semitic, and Aryan races alike; and that modern nations did not throw it off for more than two thousand years after the downfall of Greece. Nor will he forget

that the last great nation to discard it was the United States, the most advanced of democracies; and that, when the great struggle came through which it was at last rooted out there, practically all Europe sympathised in spirit with the slave-holder, and not with the party that strove to free their fellow-men. These are grotesque inconsistencies; but with the later history in mind we can scarcely hold up the matter of slavery as an essentially Greek inconsistency.

Then consider the question of ostracism. At first sight it surely seems difficult to bring within the pale of reason this fact of the banishment from Athens of one great citizen after another--of Themistocles, the hero of Salamis, of Aristides the Just, of the brilliant Alcibiades, of Xenophon, and of Thucydides. But consider the matter a little further. Here was a little people, numerically insignificant, who had got hold of a unique principle. They had experienced the pleasures of personal liberty, of free "government of, for, and by the people," and all the world about them looked jealously on their experiment. Always the gold of Persia was at hand to help on an aristocratic party at home in the effort to overthrow the democratic party by whatever means, fair or foul.

What then must necessarily be the attitude of the best citizens of Athens toward any one of their number who gained very great popularity and influence, and who seemed ambitious to use his power autocratically? Why, such a person, however respected, however loved even--indeed just in proportion to the respect and affection that he inspired--must be regarded with apprehension. And the ballot for ostracism solved the problem, after a fashion. It required no charge against the citizen. It accused him of no crime. It merely gave official expression to a popular belief that it were better for the state that this citizen should retire for a time from its precincts. It was a confession of governmental weakness, to be sure. A powerful unified democracy like the United States in modern times has no need of such a law; but a weak government like that of France still thinks itself obliged sometimes to resort to it in case of political offenders, who are feared for exactly the same reason that led to ostracism in Athens--as witness the case of Déroulède and his allies. In this view then the practice of ostracism, which very probably preserved the democratic government of Athens long after it would otherwise have been overthrown, is not the grotesque inconsistency it at first seems.

As to the factions of the cities, which led to what Ruskin calls the "suicide of Greece," they come to seem as natural as human nature itself when one stops to reflect that Hellas was never a united country under unified government. The Greek had, to be sure, a prejudice in favour of his race against outside barbarians. But his keenest prejudice was for his own city. The idea of liberty was too new for the conception of a federation of cities to be grasped all at once. Even now, after more than twenty-five hundred years of experiment and effort, that idea has only in a few instances been successfully realised and practised on a large scale for considerable periods of time--by the Greek cities themselves at a later period; by the north Italian cities late in the Middle Ages; and by the Anglo-Saxon race in our own day. It is not strange then that the Athenian regarded the Spartan as a political foreigner; and the struggles between the two were not different from the struggles that have gone on ever since between different neighbouring states all over the world. The appalling fact of universal carnage inconsistently disturbing the dreams of the brotherhood of man is one of the saddest evidences of the restricted

civilisation of our race. But with all recent history in our minds, we can hardly hold it too much against the Greek that he was not more advanced in this regard in the year 400 B.C. than is all the rest of the world in the year 1900 A.D.

Without going further it must be clear how very different the points of view are from which the "sympathetic" and the "antipathetic" historian will respectively regard a people, in particular a people of high genius like the Greeks. And, to return to Mitford, it is hardly an unjust criticism which has said of him that his ponderous work, despite its learning, "is scarcely more than a huge party pamphlet." And this is true precisely because he viewed the Greek always from the standpoint of his own narrow prejudice. Yet this must not be taken to imply that Mitford's history is valueless. The fact is far otherwise. With due allowance for its bias, it may be read with full profit by everyone, and there are many passages of it that are unprejudiced and authoritative, while the merits of its style commend it so highly that we have had occasion to return to it again and again.

But the greatest distinction of Mitford was to call forth the work of Grote; for it was through indignation aroused by Mitford's attitude toward Grecian affairs that the London banker, whose recreation was the study of the classics, was led to present a different view of Grecian history. The intentions to combat Mitford developed finally the conception of a comprehensive history, and when this history was completed, a definitive presentation of Grecian affairs had been put forward. Next to Gibbon's *Rome*, perhaps the greatest historical work ever produced in England is Grote's *History of Greece*. Unfortunately, Grote did not continue his history beyond the time of Alexander, so we must seek other guides for the period of the decline and fall of Grecian power. The earliest epochs of Grecian history also have been opened up by the work of Schliemann and his successors since the day of Grote. Nor need it be denied that in various details Grote's theories have been modified by later investigations. But, in the main, his work was based upon such secure foundations, and was conceived and carried out in such a broad and philosophical spirit, that it must stand indefinitely, like the work of Gibbon, as a finished historical structure.

If one were to single out for particular reference the part of Grote's work which was most revolutionary and at the same time most satisfactory, one would cite perhaps the earliest portion, that which deals with the myths and traditions of Greece. It is almost a matter of course that the chief authoritative investigators of such a subject as this are usually scholars by profession; closet students of that type of mind which can give years of enthusiastic devotion to the investigation of a few pages of an obscure manuscript, and which can devote pages of polemics to the establishment of the correct reading of a disputed text the subject-matter of which is perhaps altogether trivial. This type of mind is in many ways admirable, and the work which it accomplishes is entitled to full respect, but it is not the kind of intellect one would willingly follow as a rule in the decision of questions of more practical import. And it is because this is the sort of intelligence which has chiefly attacked this problem, that the discussion of it has usually evinced so little of practicality. Moreover, another set of persons of even more visionary cast, the poets, namely, have added their modicum of argument along equally visionary lines, prejudiced in their view by love of the great literature in which the mythical tales are embalmed. But Grote combined in his own mind the qualities of secure and profound scholarship with a full appreciation of the beauties of literature and a rare practical

knowledge of the world of everyday affairs, which gave him perhaps a keener critical view and a clearer historical perspective than had been vouchsafed anyone who had before attempted to deal with the subject.

Grote was a practical banker and successful financier, turned historian through sheer love of his subject. He applied to the subject of Greek mythology the rules of what may be best described as sound common-sense. He recognised that a myth is not the growth of a day, but the accretion of perhaps many generations, or even centuries of legendary history. He fully recognised two very essential basal principles of practical psychology, namely, first, that quite the rarest feat of the human mind is anything approaching pure invention; but that, secondly, scarcely less rare is a recital, however securely founded in history, which does not contain some elements of invention. He recognised, in other words, the full truth of the homely saying that "where there is much smoke there must be some fire"; but he recognised also the truth that no two persons could ever be found who, after viewing the smoke, would agree as to the exact proportion which it bore to the fire.

Making the application to the case in hand, Grote was convinced that every important myth and legend must have had the prototype of at least its outline in the actual history of some human beings in some period. He combined with this conviction the no less certain one that in our day it is utterly impossible to say what people or what time furnished this historical basis of the tradition, or just what proportion of fact is mingled with the enshrouding cloud of fable. When, therefore, Grote came to write his history of Greece, he adopted a compromise regarding the mythical period, which is one of the most striking illustrations of his practical sagacity. He recited the fables as fables, labelling the legendary period as such, and making no attempt whatever to determine what relation any specific incident among these legends might bear to the actual experiences of the people of prehistoric Greece. Grote's decision in this matter was at once received with acclaim by a large number of readers; and though of course it by no means silenced the champions of other views, it may fairly be said that after more than half a century there is no other manner of treating this period which can justly supplant that which the great historian established.

Our estimate of Grote in other fields is well illustrated by the liberal use we have made of his work. Notes on other historians of Greece — many of them by no means unimportant in themselves, but no one of them quite to be compared with this master historian — will appear in the following bibliography. It will be sufficient here to recall the names of Thirlwall and Curtius among the general historians of Greece of the earlier generation, and the names of Holm, Beloch, Busolt, and Bury among the more recent writers; while for special periods the names of Droysen, Müller, Schliemann, and Finlay have particular prominence.

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L. Flavius Arrianus, born at Nicomedia about 100 A.D., died at an advanced age during the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

In considering a career so romantic as that of Alexander, it is quite impossible that the historian should remain a calm, unmoved spectator of the incidents which he describes. We find, therefore, that the numerous biographers of Alexander have for the most part placed themselves explicitly on one or another of opposite sides. Either, on the one hand, they have considered Alexander as the greatest of heroes and most wonderful of men, or, on the other hand, have regarded him as merely the greatest of adventurers. It is tolerably easy, accordingly as one emphasises one side or another of the facts of Alexander's history, to make out a seemingly good case from either of these points of view. But what we have elsewhere said about the sympathetic historian applies with full force here, and it is not to be expected that anyone can have written a really satisfactory biography of Alexander who has not been appreciative of those points of his genius which lie quite without the range of the ordinary adventurer. Thus it is not surprising to find that the really great biographies of Alexander, both those of antiquity and those of modern times, have been written from the sympathetic point of view.

The biography of Arrian, which, by common consent, far exceeds in importance all other writings on Alexander that have come down to us, is certainly most judicious in spirit, and probably as impartial as such a production could possibly be. Arrian does not spare the faults of Alexander nor hesitate to give them full expression, but he fully appreciates the greatness of his hero, and he undertook to write his life, as he himself explicitly states, because he felt that no one before him had done full justice to his subject. Arrian frankly states his opinion that his own production will be found not unworthy, and that, in virtue of it, he, himself, must be entitled to be regarded as one of the great writers of Greece. All things considered, it is, perhaps, strange that posterity should have declined to accede to this claim. The work of Arrian is indeed admitted on all hands to be a production of sterling merit — certainly one of the most impartial and judicial historical productions of antiquity. Yet, notwithstanding the extreme importance of his subject, the name of Arrian is comparatively little known to the general public, whereas the name of Xenophon, whom Arrian to some extent took for his master, is familiar to everyone, though the subject of his chief work was of such relative insignificance.

This anomaly is, perhaps, partly explained in the fact that Arrian did explicitly follow Xenophon as a master, since one never expects to rank the follower on a par with the originator. But the truer explanation is probably that Arrian lived at a late period, after the glory of Greece, as the literary centre of the world, had quite departed; and it has been customary to regard all works of this later period, with their necessary alterations of style, representing the time of degeneracy of the Greek language, as things to be looked at askance by lovers of that language in its purity. Then, too, perhaps, the very importance of Arrian's subject may have been detrimental to the permanent popularity of his work. There was no possible reason why any other writer should take up in great detail the story of the *Anabasis* of the Ten Thousand after Xenophon, since that story, much as if it had been a mere romance, owed its importance almost entirely to the qualities of style of the original narrator. But the case of Alexander was quite different. Numberless writers, as was most natural, had told his story in the times immediately after his death. It was inevitable that so amazing a history should continue to excite the interest of mankind throughout all time and should be retold again and again by countless generations of historians. Even had the biography of Arrian proved in all respects comprehensive and satisfactory, later generations must have demanded that the story should be retold after the manner of their own times, but in point of fact, the biography of Arrian, important as it is, is by no means altogether comprehensive. It contains, to be sure, all incidents which its author was satisfied were authentic, but it explicitly omitted various other incidents, which, whether true or false, must have an abiding interest from the very fact of having been associated with the name of Alexander.

Each succeeding generation of historians must then judge for itself, as is the prerogative of the critic, among the various contradictory stories that have come down to us, and must weigh anew the evidence of this side or that, and make for itself a new story of Alexander.

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August Boeckh, born at Carlsruhe, November 24, 1785; died in Berlin, August 3, 1867. He published an edition of Pindar with a continuous commentary, a Latin translation, and a treatise on Greek Versification, (1811); also *Metrological Investigations concerning the Weights, Coins, and Measures of Antiquity* (1838); *A Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurium in Attica*, and other treatises. He began the *Corpus Inscriptionum Græcarum*, continued by his pupil Franz and still unfinished. His most important work on the *Public Economy of the Athenians*, while necessarily somewhat antiquated, retains its original importance in many features, and as a repository of knowledge drawn from the classical writers has not been superseded.

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John B. Bury, born 1861; was educated at Trinity College, Dublin, became professor of modern history in Dublin University in 1893; regius professor of Greek in 1898; and regius professor of modern history in the University of Cambridge, 1903. Professor Bury is well known for his *History of the Later Roman Empire* and for his edition of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*. In preparing the history of Greece he wavered, as his preface tells us, between an elaborate work and the more difficult task of presenting a well-balanced epitome of Greek history in a single volume. He was probably wise in choosing the latter; and in so doing he has produced a work which, while brief, may properly be styled comprehensive and authoritative and which is also entertaining. It does not attempt to supplant the more elaborate works of the older writers, nor does it enter quite the same field with the recent German productions; but it is almost the only work which, in a single volume, gives the reader any clear idea of the latest developments of Mycæan history, while carrying the story of Grecian history in general through the age of Alexander.

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George W. Cox, born at Benares, January 10, 1827: vicar of Bekesbourne, 1881, rector of Serayingham, 1881-1897. His various historical works have had great popularity, to which the excellence of their style eminently entitles them. They are scholarly as regards their treatment of facts, but are essentially artistic in their presentation of these facts. No one has treated the mythological period in a more satisfactory way. Obviously, considering the date of their publication, they are not to be looked to for the latest phases of Mycenaean investigation.

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Ernst Curtius was born at Lübeck, Germany, September 2, 1814: died July 12, 1896. When K. O. Müller undertook that tour of Greece which began so auspiciously and ended so disastrously, he had as an assistant a young German of kindred genius to his own, afterwards to be known perhaps even more widely than himself as an historian of Greece, in the person of Ernst Curtius. The work which Müller was not permitted to complete was carried on by Curtius, who devoted his entire life to the study of classical antiquities as his master had done before him. It was Curtius who, many years later, conceived the idea of making excavations at the famed site of Olympia. Curtius himself, acting as envoy for the German government, secured to that country the monopoly of excavating there. The results of these excavations which Curtius for a time personally conducted are full of importance and interest, and were given to the world in a series of ponderous volumes.

Much of the work of Curtius had this technical character, but the one book through which he became best known, and by which he will probably be longest remembered, was an essentially popular history of Greece—by far the most popular exposition of the subject that has ever been written in Germany. It is a work essentially un-German, so to say, in its plan of execution. It is a condensed running narrative of the events of Grecian history, and, what is strange indeed in a German work, it is quite unmarred by footnotes: notes there are, to be sure, but these are relatively few in number and are placed by themselves at the end of each volume, where they may be easily found by the few who care to seek them out, without marring the interest and distracting the attention of the mass of readers of the text. It is interesting to note that this most delightful and popular history was written at the instance of a publisher as a companion work to Professor Mommsen's equally famous history of Rome. The similarity of treatment and general identity of plan of these two famous works suggest that the publisher perhaps had no small share in predetermining their character and scope; if so, the world owes him two of the most important histories that have come out of the land of historians.

Professor Curtius' personal point of view may be described at once as sympathetic and critical; he had the ripest scholarship, and he early imbibed much of Müller's enthusiasm, but he perhaps brought to his subject a shade more of practicality than his great master. The combination of traits made him almost a perfect historian. As a teacher he was long regarded as one of the most successful in the land of great teachers. Professor Boyesen, in a popular article on the Berlin University, written for an American magazine some years ago, described at some length a seminar of Professor Curtius, and expressed his surprise and admiration at the ease and fluency with which Professor Curtius carried on what might be styled a familiar conversation in classical Latin. Such an incident is far less novel in Germany than it would be in France, or England, or America; for in Germany the student is still taught to speak Latin—after a fashion—in the Gymnasium, and the scholars are not few who learn to handle it with relative ease as a spoken language. In the case of Professor Curtius, then, this mastery of classical languages is perhaps less remarkable than his practical mastery of his mother-tongue; for there are many German professors who can speak Latin fluently where there is one who can write German that anyone who is not a German can read with pleasure.

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enberg, C. V.*, and *Saglio, E.*, *Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines*, Paris, 1873; *La Médecine dans Homère*, Paris, 1865. — *Dares*, the Phrygian, *Daretis Phrygii de Excidio Troje Historia*, L'hist. véritable de la guerre des Grecs et des Troyens, faite française par Ch. de Bourgueville, 1893. — *Dauban, C. A.*, *Extraits des auteurs anciens sur l'hist. grecque*, Paris, 1888. — *Deltour, N. F.*, *Histoire de la littérature grecque*, Paris, 1885. — *Diodorus*, Siculus, *Βιβλιοθήκη ἱστορική*, edited by L. Dindorf, Leipsic, 1828, 6 vols. The Historical Library, London, 1700. — *Diogenes*, Laertius, *φίλοσοφοι βίου*, edited by H. G. Hübner, Leipsic, 1828, 6 vols. — *Lives and Opinions of the Most Eminent Philosophers*

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Johann Gustav Droysen was born at Treptow, Pomerania, Prussia, July 6, 1808; died at Berlin, June 19, 1884. His history of Alexander was written before any of the really great modern histories of Greece were undertaken, and it far surpassed any preceding effort in the fullness with which it drew upon all sources of antiquity and in the critical acumen with which it analysed the material thus gathered. It had, moreover, the merit of a style of more than average lucidity, and this, added to its other qualities, gave it at once a wide popularity and an authoritative position which it has continued to hold to this day. Indeed, it is only very recently that anyone has attempted to write a history of Alexander which could be regarded as competing in the same field with that of Droysen, except such extended sketches as form part of such comprehensive Grecian histories as those of Grote, Thirlwall, and Curtius.

Droysen treats his subject from a truly sympathetic point of view. For him Alexander is a very great hero; he is thoroughly in sympathy with the monarchical idea, and he regards Alexander as a great benefactor of his kind, who, had he lived, would have put the stamp of his genius still more firmly upon the most important epoch in the history of human evolution. Even such debatable points as Alexander's demand that divine honours should be paid him by the Greeks, after the oriental manner, are made by Droysen, as we have seen, to appear altogether favourable to his hero. It must not be supposed from this, however, that the history of Droysen is a fulsome eulogy. It is, on the other hand, the work of a candid critic of broad views and clear insight, who is by no means blind to the defects of his hero, but who believes that, in spite of these defects, the hero was not merely one of the greatest military geniuses, but one of the greatest men of any age.

Having treated the age of Alexander, it was not unnatural that Droysen should go on to the study of later Greek life. His treatment of the Hellenic age remains perhaps the most comprehensive and scholarly contribution to this difficult subject.

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Falke, J. von, *Greece and Rome, their Life and Art* (trans. by W. H. Browne), New York, 1882.—**Farfar**, J. A., *Paganism and Christianity*, London, 1891.—**Fellows**, C., *An Account of Discoveries in Lycia*, London, 1841.—**Finlay**, G., *History of Byzantine and Greek Empires from 716 to 1453*, Edinburgh, 1853; *History of Greece from Conquest by Crusaders, 1204–1461*, Edinburgh and London, 1851; *History of Greek Revolution*, Edinburgh and London, 1861; *History of Greece under Ottoman and Venetian Domination*, Edinburgh and London, 1856; *Greece under the Romans*, Edinburgh, 1844. Most of Finlay's works, dealing with the later period of Grecian history, are properly without the scope of the present bibliography. They treat the Byzantine epoch from a Greek point of view and are thus complementary to Gibbon's work. We shall have occasion to return to them when dealing with the later Roman Empire.—**Flathe**, J. L. F. F., *Geschichte Macedoniens*, Leipsic, 1832–1834.—**Floigl**, V., *Cyrus und Herodot*, Leipsic, 1881.—**Fraenkel**, A., *Die Quellen der Alexander Historiker*, 1834, 8 vols.—**Françillon**, R. E., *Gods and Heroes*, Edinburgh, 1892.—**Freeman**, E. A., *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, London, 1893; *History of Sicily*, Oxford, 1891; article on "Sicily" in the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. The first edition of Professor Freeman's work on federal government, cited above, bore the following title: *The History of Federal Government from the Foundation of the Achaean League to the Dissolution of the United States*; a title which suggests the difficulties an historian may encounter when his enthusiasm leads him to enter the fields of prophecy. For obvious reasons the author was not able to complete his work in accordance with the original title. Unfortunately, he did not move as far towards its completion as he might have done, as a second volume was never published. The fragment

that he has given us, however, retains great importance in its application to that late and futile effort of the Greeks to harmonise the relations of their antagonistic cities. — **Furtwängler** (in collaboration with **Löschke**), *Mykenische Vasen*, Berlin, 1886.

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Oliver Goldsmith was born at Pallas, County Longford, Ireland, November 10, 1728; died in London, April 4, 1774. The name of Goldsmith has been everywhere a household word for more than a century, but probably comparatively few of the multitude of readers of *The Deserted Village* and *The Vicar of Wakefield* are aware that the famous poet and novelist was also a writer of histories. And, in point of fact, it would be going much too far to claim for Goldsmith any such rank in the field of history as, by common consent, he is accorded in these other walks of literature. Indeed it might almost be said that Goldsmith was not a historian at all in the modern sense of the word; he did not prepare himself by any extended series of intimate personal researches; he did not attempt to ferret out any new facts, or bring any novel lights to bear upon the subject. To put the matter briefly, he took up the writing of history as pure hack-work for whatever monetary recompense it would bring at the moment, with probably little thought beyond that. Nevertheless Goldsmith had some of the inherent instincts of the scholar, and, moreover, he was too great an artist not to know that truth lies at the foundation of all art; hence, even though he wrote in one sense carelessly, he could not do less than ground himself in at least the main outlines of the story that he had to tell, and it would be quite a mistake to suppose that his history of Greece is utterly despicable as a mere narrative of facts. Generally speaking, on the contrary, it may be depended on as to mere statement of fact, while its manner of presentation is, it goes almost without the saying, such as to give it a place quite aside from the ordinary.

There are indeed times when the spirit of the writer seems somewhat to flag, and one misses here and there that felicity of expression and charm of narrative which one is wont to associate with the name of Goldsmith; but, in the main, the story, as a story of Grecian life, is told in a manner not unworthy of the author of *The Vicar*, which is equivalent to saying that the mere story of Greek history has rarely elsewhere been told so well. The skill of the trained writer is shown, however, perhaps even more in the selection and massing of materials than in the mere matter of verbal style in the narrower sense. In particular Goldsmith has followed out the tangled web of post-Alexandrian history and woven it into something like a continuous and uniform texture with a facility of literary resource that is rare indeed among writers of history. Of course matter, rather than manner, is the *sine qua non* with the historian, and it was not to be expected that the history of Goldsmith could retain the prestige which it once enjoyed, after such writers as Mitford, Thirlwall, Grote, and Curtius had devoted years of effort to a more extended treatment of the same subject. Nevertheless the history of Goldsmith still has its utility for a certain class of readers. Judicious selections from it are fully entitled to stand beside the best that has been written on the subject. If, on the whole, one regrets that Goldsmith did not take the time to give his work greater authority, one cannot but regret also that some of the later writers, and notably Grote, were not able to add to their more ponderous productions something of the charm of style which is the chief merit of Goldsmith's history.

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George Grote was born near Beckenham in Kent, November 17, 1794; died at London, June 18, 1871. He was educated for a commercial life, and as a banker became a partner in the firm of Prescott, Grote & Co. He continued in active business until 1843, and he three times represented the city of London in parliament, retiring from public life in 1841. The first two volumes of his *History of Greece* were published in 1846, the remaining volumes appearing successively between 1847 and 1856. His *Plato and the other Companions of*

Socrates, in three volumes, appeared in 1865. In politics Grote was greatly influenced by his friend James Mill, accepting his theories upon church establishment and government. Years before the passage of the reform bill, Grote was one of the earnest reformers who strove to further the views of Mill and Bentham. His work as a politician, however, was quite subordinate to his importance as a historian, for the latter work was taken up at first as a mere labour of love, and only carried to completion, it is said, at the instigation of his wife. We have already commented at length upon Grote's work in the introduction to this bibliography.

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Adolf Holm was born in 1830 at Lübeck; he is at present professor of history at Palermo, Sicily. Professor Holm's work, combining original investigation with a fair grade of popularity of treatment, is one of the most important of recent contributions to the subject.

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Edward George Earle Lytton Bulwer-Lytton was born at London, May 25, 1803; died at Torquay, January 18, 1873. It has happened more than once that the achievements of a man's later life have quite eclipsed the renown of his earlier years. It was so in the case of Bulwer-Lytton. In mature life he came to be so universally known as a politician and novelist that perhaps comparatively few of his readers are aware that he ever wrote a history. Part of this neglect is perhaps due to the fact that he never finished the important work on Athens which at one time was very widely and favourably known. Possibly his success as a novelist led him to abandon his early project, or, more likely, the distractions of other activities prevented him from returning to a work which he must have abandoned with reluctance. In any event the two volumes which he published on Athenian history remain a valuable fragment. They are written from the standpoint of an ardent admirer of all phases of Grecian life, and his judgment must, therefore, sometimes be accepted with a certain reserve. Yet, as a whole, his work so far as it was carried has hardly been supplanted as an estimate of the Athenian people and their life. It is the work of a man who, though pre-eminent as a writer, had also large attainments as a scholar and investigator. Whoever turns to the volumes before us must leave them with regret that the fascinating story which they tell was never completed. Such as they are, however, they constitute a most valuable estimate of an artistic people by a man who was himself an artist.

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John Pentland Mahaffy was born at Chaponnaire, near Vevey, Switzerland, February 26, 1839.

The student of history has occasion to deplore, over and over, the fact that the greatest scholars so generally fail utterly to master a lucid style of writing. It is a real pleasure therefore, as well as a surprise, when, now and again, one comes across a man of recognised scholarship who has also real distinction as a writer. Such a man is Professor Mahaffy. As a scholar, and particularly as an investigator of Grecian life in all its phases, including prominently the age of the Ptolemies, Professor Mahaffy has long had an established reputation. And it requires but the most casual inspection of any of his books to show that his capacity as a writer is of a high order.

The explanation of what might almost be said to be an anomaly such as this is found, seemingly, in the wide sweep of Professor Mahaffy's interests and in the sound fund of common sense which he brings to bear on any problem of scholarship. Too many students of antiquity have been carried away with the beauties of the Greek language, and brought utterly under the spell of the classical literature, until all critical acumen that they might once have possessed focalises and wastes itself solely on verbal questions, leaving none for application to practicalities. Thus it has happened that all manner of myths have grown up in the minds of men about the word "Greek."

Some of these myths Professor Mahaffy has made it his business to attempt to dispel. We have already had occasion to refer to his criticism on the eulogists of Thucydides. Again, in a matter of much broader scope, Professor Mahaffy long ago pointed out that the popular notion which regarded the Greek as the type of brave man was a most palpable illusion. He called attention to the fact that in some of the most important of Grecian battles—as, for example, that in which the Spartans won against the Corinthians, in the time of Agesilaus—the total death roll was sometimes only half a dozen men. He noted the childish way in which the Greek leaders were wont to keep up the courage of their men by harangues and bombast, and the way in which each side strove to frighten the other by loud shoutings and clashing of arms as it advanced. "These," he said, "are not the characteristics of men who are brave in the modern sense of the word." Again, he asked if it is conceivable that a modern body of warriors would have been repelled year after year by the walls of Athens, when only a handful of men, so to say, were within to defend them.

Advancing still further in the same iconoclastic spirit, Professor Mahaffy pointed out that some of the dearest traditions of Grecian history had been interpreted and foisted on the world through the minds of prejudiced participants, rather than in a spirit of fairness and equity. Thus the battle of Marathon, which we are accustomed even now to hear spoken of as the great decisive contest between the East and the West, will with difficulty bear this interpretation if one will consider it without prejudice. At the best, it was certainly a far less important and decisive battle than that of Platea, but it chanced that the Athenians were the victorious combatants at Marathon, whereas at Platea the Spartans bore the honours of the day; and since the Athenians, through their literature, served as the mouthpiece of Greece, it is not strange that the event in which they chiefly figured should have been unduly magnified, and the memory of it transmitted in distorted proportions to posterity. It is vastly to the credit of modern scholarship that it should be able to revise certain judgments on such matters as these, that have come down to us with all the accumulated inertia of generations of repetition.

It must not be supposed, however, from what has just been said, that Professor Mahaffy's task in dealing with the history of Greece is altogether, or even chiefly, iconoclastic. The fact is quite otherwise. Critical as he can be on occasion, Professor Mahaffy nevertheless is, on the whole, an ardent and sympathetic admirer of the people who have furnished the theme of his life studies; but his laudatory judgments may be accepted with the more confidence because of the evidence he has given us that in considering the Greeks he does not allow himself to be carried utterly away by his enthusiasm, nor to forget that the Greeks, despite their national genius, were after all very human, and only properly to be understood when judged by some such practical standard as we apply to peoples of our own generation.

Professor Mahaffy knows his Greece of to-day at first hand quite as well as he knows ancient Greece through studies of the classics. He has described most charmingly his rambles in Greece proper; and latterly he has made the Ptolemaic epoch peculiarly his own, and his writings on this period take rank as among the most important contributions to a subject which most students of Grecian history have distinctly neglected.

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Karl Otfried Müller was born at Brieg, Prussia, August 28, 1797; died at Athens, August 1, 1840. If to be sympathetic with the genius of a people is a prerequisite for the great historian, Müller was eminently qualified to write a history of the Greek people. He was a man of essentially poetical and artistical temperament, and combined with these qualities a profound scholarship. An incident of his early manhood will illustrate perfectly his temperament. The incident occurred during his visit to the famous art gallery in Dresden. In itself it was nothing more than the fact of his becoming entranced by the celebrated Raphael there. Before this picture, as he himself writes, he stood quite enchanted, and he could scarcely bring himself to leave it long enough to visit other portions of the gallery. Now, of course, to any person of less impressionable temperament who has seen the picture, it will be quite clear that Müller, standing thus entranced before the Madonna, saw with the inner eye of his own enthusiasm, rather than with the more tangible organ of sense. Doubtless, in his half-hypnotic trance, he would have been equally delighted had the veriest chromo been substituted in the canvas for the original picture. He had gone to see the Raphael full of enthusiastic expectancy, and he was sure not to be disappointed. He did not see the awkward, mechanical, old-fashioned grouping; he was quite unmindful of the defect of drawing which had given unequal legs to the kneeling figure at the right. He did not know that, if he had come across this same painting unlabelled and before unheard of, he would scarcely have given it a second thought; he only knew that it represented an ideal—an

ideal that had lingered fondly in his mind since his earliest youth. To stand before that picture and see it with his own eyes was to realise that ideal. Many another person has had that same sensation before that same canvas, and for the same reason; and with them, as with him, it was a test of personal temperament, and not a test of the excellence of the picture itself.

Gifted with this impressionable artistic temperament, it was not strange that Müller's ambitions early looked in the direction of Greece. From his earliest youth the study of classical times became his one absorbing passion, and long before he had reached middle age he had come to be known to scholars everywhere as a member of that inner circle who have made classical lore their own. Naturally he wrote as well as studied, and his works on Greece became classical from the moment of their issue. His especial interest during those early years, which were to represent the largest portion of his working life, was directed towards the early history of the Greeks as a nation and towards the effort to solve the riddles of that period. In particular, his studies of the Doric race became famous, and remain to this day practically the last word that has been said on the subject. One must, perhaps, sometimes make allowance for Müller's enthusiasm and favourable prejudice, just as for Mitford's opposite point of view; but generally speaking, Müller's work is distinguished above all things, next to its scholarship, for its fairness and the breadth of view from which the subject is contemplated.

Oddly enough, all Müller's important works were written before he himself had ever visited the land of which he treated. Needless to say, a desire to visit Greece was ever with him, but it was long before the desire was realised. At last, however, the opportunity came to visit Greece in a semi-official capacity; the government granted him leave of absence from his university work, and provided him with a draftsman to make sketches in Greece under his direction. In the autumn of 1839 he started on this memorable and, as it proved, fatal tour. A story is told of his entry into Greece which will illustrate the power and charm of his personality. A friend of Finlay, the English historian of the later period of Greece, chanced to be on the same boat with Müller, and, after landing, he at once reported to Finlay that a most extraordinary man had come to Greece—a man whose name and nationality were unknown to him, but who had surprised everyone on the boat by seeming to speak all languages with equal facility and to discuss all topics with a like affluence of erudition. "I don't know who he is," said the narrator, "but he is somebody quite out of the common." Needless to say, Finlay was not left long in doubt as to who this "somebody quite out of the common" really was.

With what enthusiasm and energy Müller began his investigations in the land, every part of which was so dear to him and at once so familiar and so novel, may be easily imagined, but his labours were not destined to reach the results that had been hoped; for, partly perhaps through over-exertion and fatigue, he was stricken with a fever, was brought back to Athens unconscious and delirious, and died there on the 1st of August, 1840. His work was thus cut short while he was yet in his prime, but even so he will always be remembered as one of the most prominent contributors to Grecian history of any age.

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Heinrich Schliemann was born at Neu-Buckow, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, January 6, 1822; died at Naples, December 27, 1890. He was in many ways a most extraordinary man. He was largely denied the advantages of an early liberal education, as it became necessary for him to earn his way in the world while yet a boy, but he made amends for this by putting into practice a most amazing system of self-education, through which he had been able to acquire an entire mastery of a list of languages only limited by his own desires. French, Italian, Spanish, English, Russian, — he learned one after another in periods of only a few months for each; but not till relatively late in life, at thirty-five namely, did he take up the study of Greek. The reason for this delay, as he himself explained it, was that his interest in Grecian history had always been so intense that he dared not take up the study of the language lest it should prove a distraction detrimental to his business. But now he had followed out that business so persistently that he had become a wealthy man and could afford to do as he wished. He acquired Greek as quickly and as completely as he had acquired other languages, beginning with the modern Greek and passing back in inverse chronological order to the various classical authors. He learned not merely to read the language, but to write it with facility and speak it fluently, so that he could express himself in either modern or ancient Greek almost as readily as in his native tongue.

This accomplished, he had prepared the way for an attempt which, as he believed in later years, had been an ambition with him all his life, — the search, namely, for the site of

Ancient Troy. Having amassed a fortune, the income from which was more than sufficient for all his needs, he retired from active participation in business and devoted the remainder of his life to a self-imposed task. How well he succeeded, all the world knows. In opposition to the opinions of many scholars he picked on the hill of Hisarlik as the site of ancient Ilium, and his excavations there soon demonstrated that at least it had been the site, not of one alone, but of at least seven different cities in antiquity — one being built above the ruins of another at long intervals of time. One of these cities, the sixth from the top, — or, to put it otherwise, the most ancient but one, — was, he became firmly convinced, Ilium itself.

The story of his achievements has already been told. But it is necessary here to point the warning that Dr. Schliemann's excavations — wonderful as are their results — do not, perhaps, when critically viewed, demonstrate quite so much as might at first sight appear. There is, indeed, a high degree of probability that the city which he excavated was really the one intended in the Homeric descriptions, but it must be clear, to anyone who scrutinises the matter somewhat closely, that this fact goes but a little way towards substantiating the Homeric narrative as a whole. The city of Ilium may have existed without giving rise to any such series of events as that narrated in the *Iliad*. Dr. Schliemann himself was led to realise this fact, and to modify somewhat, in later years, the exact tenor of some of his more enthusiastic earlier views, yet the fact remains that the excavations at Hisarlik must be reckoned with by whoever in future discusses the status of the Homeric story.

If they did not prove as much as some could wish, they at least were enormously suggestive. Had they done nothing else, they at least furnished a mass of authentic documents bearing upon the life of the prehistoric period of Grecian antiquity. Even more important in this regard were the excavations of Dr. Schliemann subsequently made at the sites of the old Greek cities of Mycenæ and Tiryns. Ilium was not located on Grecian soil, and its relation with Grecian history was only conjectural, but these other cities were in Greece itself, and inspection of their ruins has brought within the historic period some centuries of Grecian life that hitherto were utterly obscure, or only known through incidental references of the Homeric poems.

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Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, born at Jever, Germany, November 17, 1776; died at Heidelberg, September 23, 1861, the Nestor of German historians has been spoken of — not unjustly — as the German Tacitus. More than almost any other man, perhaps, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, he was influential in establishing the school of what may be called scientific history, not merely through his writings but through his personal influence on a coterie of pupils who included many of the distinguished historians of the middle of the nineteenth century.

Professor Schlosser was a beautiful character as well as a scholarly mind. The historical sweep of his mind was of the widest, as evidenced in the subjects which he selected, while the force of his personality is equally demonstrated by the results that he achieved. His *Universal History* and his *History of the Eighteenth Century* immediately took place as the greatest authorities in the field at the time of their publication, and the latter work was early translated into English.

The work on *Universal History* was the first attempt of its kind, of anything like a corresponding comprehensiveness, in modern times. As originally written by Schlosser himself it had a largely technical character, yet it so clearly contained the elements of a great popular work that it was soon elaborated under Schlosser's own direction by his pupil, Dr. G. L. Kriegck, and in this popularised form, though a bulky work of nineteen volumes, it soon achieved a wide circulation throughout Germany. This was about the middle of the century. Since then there have been numerous new editions of Schlosser's popular history, and, even to-day, its sale probably exceeds in Germany that of any other similar work. It occupies, indeed, a place of its own which no other universal history exactly rivals. It has fullest authority, yet it is essentially popular in character. It is the narrative of the sweep of world-historic events. Its style, though less eloquent than that of Weber, is reasonably lucid, and the sentiments which actuate it throughout are those of which every reader in the main approves. We shall have occasion to recur again and again to its pages, and each such recurrence will tend to increase one's surprise that a work of such comprehensive merit should never, hitherto, have been made accessible to the reader of English.

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Connop Thirlwall was born at Stepney, London, January 11, 1797; died at Bath, July 27, 1875. Bishop Thirlwall was one of those extraordinary men who are, perhaps, much more numerous than the world generally imagines, of whom it may be justly said that he never accomplished half that he might have done had he focalised his energies, and more persistently applied his capabilities. He was almost a prodigy of learning as a child, and in adult life he showed how the capacity to acquire knowledge was still retained by making himself master of the Welsh tongue, and preaching in that language when called to a Welsh pulpit. But his efforts were never focalised for a long period on any particular field, and it was almost by accident, and certainly by outside influence, that he was led to produce the one work which will transmit his name to posterity. This work of course is his history of Greece.

Such criticism as this is not intended in any sense to be a disparagement of that history, nor indeed of Thirlwall's accomplishments as a whole. Applied in that sense criticism would be absurd, for it may be doubted, even to this day, whether Thirlwall's is not the best general history of Greece that has ever been written. Certainly, for the general reader, it combines in a larger measure authority with a popular interest of presentation than any other in the English language. But the work was written to meet a popular demand, and while it was in no sense a hurried or careless production, the friends of Thirlwall always thought that it might have been given a somewhat more authoritative cast, had it been undertaken through different motives.

After all, however, perhaps the world is better for the work as it stands. Ponderous histories of Greece are no novelty, whereas readable histories of any country are never a drug on the market. The frequency with which we have had occasion to recur to the pages of Thirlwall in treating the history of Greece has been an earnest of our estimate of the position which his history holds after two or three generations of workers have searched for fresh material in the same field.

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Benjamin Ide Wheeler was born at Randolph, Mass., July 15, 1854. President of the University of California since 1899. President Wheeler's earlier publications were chiefly concerned with Greek philology, but his interest in other phases of Greek life is evidenced by the work above cited. As a matter of course this work is scholarly; but it is also popular in the best sense of the word: indeed, no more readable and satisfactory account of the life of Alexander exists in any language.

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Showing his route ———→
And that of his generals ———
And the cities founded by him.







